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Labor Law

MUST READ CASES (LABOR LAW)

LABOR STANDARDS

Estrellita G. Salazar vs Philippine Duplicators, Inc, G.R. No. 154628 December 6,


2006

The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to
oppress employers. The commitment under the fundamental law is that the cause of
labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when the law is clearly on its
side.

People of the Philippines vs. Teresita “Tessie” Laogo. G.R. No. 176264 January 10,
2011

Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, specifies that recruitment activities
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority are deemed illegal and
punishable by law. When the illegal recruitment is committed against three or more
persons, individually or as a group, then it is deemed committed in large scale and
carries with it stiffer penalties as the same is deemed a form of economic sabotage. But
to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused, without being duly
authorized by law, gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or
ability to send them abroad for work, such that the latter were convinced to part with
their money in order to be employed. It is important that there must at least be a
promise or offer of an employment from the person posing as a recruiter, whether
locally or abroad.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY INC. v. CABILES, G.R. No. 170139,


August 5, 2014

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court
ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no


rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative
as if it has not been passed at all."

When a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar
law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse
conclusion.
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Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Company vs. Carol De Raedt. G.R. No. 161366; June 16,
2009

To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law has


consistently applied the four-fold test, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s
power to control the employee on the means and methods by which the work is
accomplished. The so-called "control test" is the most important indicator of the
presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship.

Manila Water Company, Inc. vs. Jose J. Dalumpines. G.R. No. 175501; October 4,
2010

It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence of the right
to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer
actually supervises the performance of duties of the employee. It is enough that the
former has a right to wield the power.

Macarthur Malicdem and Hermenigildo Flores vs. Marulas Industrial Corporation.


G.R. No. 204406; February 26, 2014

The test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable


connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual business or trade of the employer.

KASAMMA-CCO v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 159828; April 19, 2006

A casual employee is only casual for one year, and it is the passage of time that gives
him a regular status.

Jose Y. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, G.R. No. 138051, June 10,
2004

Television-radio talent is not an employee. Relationship of a big name talent and a


television-radio broadcasting company is one of an independent contracting
arrangement. ABS-CBN engaged Sonza’s services specifically to co-host the "Mel &
Jay" programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to Sonza. To perform his work,
Sonza only needed his skills and talent. How Sonza delivered his lines, appeared on
television, and sounded on radio were outside ABS-CBN’s control. Sonza did not have
to render eight hours of work per day. The Agreement required Sonza to attend only
rehearsals and tapings of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings.
ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of Sonza’s script.

Gapayao v Fulo, et al., G.R. No. 193493 (2013)


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Farm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. The Court has
consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular
employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from time to time.
The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season,
they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when their
services may be needed. They are in regular employment because of the nature of
their job, and not because of the length of time they have worked.

This rule, however, is not absolute. Seasonal workers who have worked for one season
only may not be considered regular employees. Also when seasonal employees are
free to contract their services with other farm owners, then the former are not regular
employees. For regular employees to be considered as such, the primary standard used
is the reasonable connection between the particular activity they perform and the usual
trade or business of the employer.

FVR Skills and Services Exponents, Inc. (SKILLEX), et al. v. Jovert Seva, et al.,
G.R. No. 200857, October 22, 2014

For an employee to be validly categorized as a project employee, it is necessary that


the specific project or undertaking had been identified and its period and completion
date determined and made known to the employee at the time of his engagement. This
provision ensures that the employee is completely apprised of the terms of his hiring
and the corresponding rights and obligations arising from his undertaking. Notably, the
petitioner's service contract with Robinsons was from January 1 to December 31, 2008.
The respondents were only asked to sign their employment contracts for their
deployment with Robinsons halfway through 2008, when the petitioner's service
contract was about to expire.

Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where the consent of a party was vitiated
by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud, are voidable or annullable.
The petitioner's threat of nonpayment of the respondents' salaries clearly amounted to
intimidation. Under this situation, and the suspect timing when these contracts were
executed, we rule that these employment contracts were voidable and were effectively
questioned when the respondents filed their illegal dismissal complaint. Respondents
are thus regular employees.

Pasos v Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 192394 (2013)

Project employee is deemed regularized if services are extended without specifying


duration. While for first three months, petitioner can be considered a project employee
of PNCC, his employment thereafter, when his services were extended without any
specification of as to the duration, made him a regular employee of PNCC. And his
status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was assigned to
several other projects and there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys
security of tenure.
Labor Law

Alcatel Phils. vs Relos, G.R. No. 164315. July 3, 2009

However, a project or work pool employee who has been continuously rehired by the
same employer for the same tasks that are necessary to the usual business of the
employer must be deemed a regular employee.

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v Arlene S. Espiritu, G.R. No. 204944-45, 03


December 2014

An employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term contract. The law does not
preclude the possibility that a regular employee may opt to have a fixed-term contract
for valid reasons. This was recognized in Brent: For as long as it was the employee who
requested, or bargained, that the contract have a “definite date of termination,” or that
the fixed-term contract be freely entered into by the employer and the employee, then
the validity of the fixed-term contract will be upheld.

GMA Network, Inc. v Pabriga, et al., G.R. No. 176419 (2013)

Petitioner’s allegation that respondents were merely substitutes or what they call pinch-
hitters (which means that they were employed to take the place of regular employees of
petitioner who were absent or on leave) does not change the fact that their jobs cannot
be considered projects within the purview of the law. Every industry, even public offices,
has to deal with securing substitutes for employees who are absent or on leave. Such
tasks, whether performed by the usual employee or by a substitute, cannot be
considered separate and distinct from the other undertakings of the company. While it is
management’s prerogative to device a method to deal with this issue, such prerogative
is not absolute and is limited to systems wherein employees are not ingeniously and
methodically deprived of their constitutionally protected right to security of tenure.

Avelino Lambo vs NLRC. G.R. No. 111042 October 26, 1999

There is no dispute that petitioners were employees of private respondents although


they were paid not on the basis of time spent on the job but according to the quantity
and the quality of work produced by them. There are two categories of employees paid
by results: (1) those whose time and performance are supervised by the employer.
(Here, there is an element of control and supervision over the manner as to how the
work is to be performed. A piece-rate worker belongs to this category especially if he
performs his work in the company premises.); and (2) those whose time and
performance are unsupervised. (Here, the employer’s control is over the result of the
work. Workers on pakyao and takay basis belong to this group.) Both classes of
workers are paid per unit accomplished. Piece-rate payment is generally practiced in
garment factories where work is done in the company premises, while payment on
pakyao and takay basis is commonly observed in the agricultural industry, such as in
sugar plantations where the work is performed in bulk or in volumes difficult to quantify.
Petitioners belong to the first category, i.e., supervised employees.
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PCL Shipping Philippine, Inc. and U-Ming Marine Transport Corporation, vs


NLRC. G.R. No. 153031,December 14, 2006

With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining
whether or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board
and cannot leave ship beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they
actually rendered service in excess of said number of hours. In the present case, the
Court finds that private respondent is not entitled to overtime pay because he failed to
present any evidence to prove that he rendered service in excess of the regular eight
working hours a day.

Bisig Manggawa sa Tryco, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 151309 October 15,
2008

D.O. No. 21 sanctions the waiver of overtime pay in consideration of the benefits that
the employees will derive from the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme,
thus:
 The compressed workweek scheme was originally conceived for establishments
wishing to save on energy costs, promote greater work efficiency and lower the rate of
employee absenteeism, among others. Workers favor the scheme considering that it
would mean savings on the increasing cost of transportation fares for at least one (1)
day a week; savings on meal and snack expenses; longer weekends, or an additional
52 off-days a year, that can be devoted to rest, leisure, family responsibilities, studies
and other personal matters, and that it will spare them for at least another day in a week
from certain inconveniences that are the normal incidents of employment, such as
commuting to and from the workplace, travel time spent, exposure to dust and motor
vehicle fumes, dressing up for work, etc. Thus, under this scheme, the generally
observed workweek of six (6) days is shortened to five (5) days but prolonging the
working hours from Monday to Friday without the employer being obliged for pay
overtime premium compensation for work performed in excess of eight (8) hours on
weekdays, in exchange for the benefits abovecited that will accrue to the employees.
Moreover, the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company will help
temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to a
farther workplace.

Rosario A. Gaa vs CA G.R. No. L-44169 Dec. 3, 1985

The term "wages" differs from the term "salary." Wages apply to compensation for
manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times and measured by the day, week,
month or season; while salary denotes a higher grade of employment or a superior
grade of services and implies a position or office. By contrast, the term "wages"
indicates a considerable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment,
while "salary" is suggestive of a larger and more important service

The distinction between salary and wage in Gaa vs CA was only for the purpose of Art.
1708 of the Civil Code which provides that "the laborers' wage shall not be subject to
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execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and
medical attendance.

Our Haus Realty Development Corporation v. Alexander Parian, et al., G.R. No.
204651, 06 August 2014

The benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration
above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said
benefit or privilege is part of the laborers' basic wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies
not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but
in the purpose for which it is given. In the case at bench, the items provided were given
freely by SLL for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers
while they were working at their respective projects.

Ultimately, the real difference lies not on the kind of the benefit but on the purpose why
it was given by the employer. If it is primarily for the employee’s gain, then the benefit is
a facility; if its provision is mainly for the employer’s advantage, then it is a supplement.
Again, this is to ensure that employees are protected in circumstances where the
employer designates a benefit as deductible from the wages even though it clearly
works to the employer’s greater convenience or advantage.

Under the purpose test, substantial consideration must be given to the nature of the
employer’s business in relation to the character or type of work performed by the
employees involved.

Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company v Glyza Esteban, G.R. No. 192582, 7
April 2014

The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides:

SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. - Where the employer is


engaged in a trade, occupation or business where the practice of making
deductions or requiring deposits is recognized to answer for the
reimbursement of loss or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied
by the employer to the employee, the employer may make wage deductions
or require the employees to make deposits from which deductions shall be
made, subject to the following conditions:
(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for the
loss or damage;
(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause why
deduction should not be made;
(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall not
exceed the actual loss or damage; and
(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not exceed 20
percent of the employee's wages in a week.
Labor Law

Petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was responsible for the negative
variance it had in its sales for the year 2005 to 2006 and that Esteban was given the
opportunity to show cause why the deduction from her last salary should not be made.
The Court cannot accept the petitioner’s statement that it is the practice in the retail
industry to deduct variances from an employee’s salary, without more.

Lilia P. Labadan vs. Forest Hills Academy. G.R. No. 172295 December 23, 2008

Respecting petitioner’s claim for holiday pay, Forest Hills contends that petitioner failed
to prove that she actually worked during specific holidays. Article 94 of the Labor Code
provides, however, that
 (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less
than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee to work on any
holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular
rate.
 The provision that a worker is entitled to twice his regular rate if he is required to
work on a holiday implies that the provision entitling a worker to his regular rate on
holidays applies even if he does not work.

BPI Employees union-Davao City-FUBU v Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al.,


G.R. No. 174912 (2013)

Contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business judgment or
management prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an
employer. BPI’s policy of contracting out cashiering and bookkeeping services was
considered as a valid exercise of management prerogative which is further authorized
by the Central Bank in CBP Circular No. 1388, Series of 199.

Central Azucarera De Tarlac vs. Central Azucarera De Tarlac Labor Union-NLU.


G.R. No. 188949, July 26, 2010

Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-Diminution Rule, mandates
that benefits given to employees cannot be taken back or reduced unilaterally by the
employer because the benefit has become part of the employment contract, written or
unwritten. The rule against diminution of benefits applies if it is shown that the grant of
the benefit is based on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long
period of time and that the practice is consistent and deliberate. Nevertheless, the rule
will not apply if the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful
or difficult question of law. But even in cases of error, it should be shown that the
correction is done soon after discovery of the error.

Netlink Computer Incorporated v Eric Delmo, G.R. No. 160827, 18 June 2014

With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been observed to
constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot be unilaterally reduced, diminished,
discontinued or eliminated by the employer, we find that jurisprudence has not laid
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down any rule requiring a specific minimum number of years. In Davao Fruits
Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, the company practice lasted for six years. In
Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, the employer, for three years
and nine months, approved the commutation to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the
sick leave with pay benefits of its intermittent workers. In Tiangco v. Leogardo, Jr., the
employer carried on the practice of giving a fixed monthly emergency allowance from
November 1976 to February 1980, or three years and four months. In Sevilla Trading
Company v. Semana, the employer kept the practice of including non-basic benefits
such as paid leaves for unused sick leave and vacation in the computation of their 13th-
month pay for at least two years.

With the payment of US dollar commissions having ripened into a company practice,
there is no way that the commissions due to Delmo were to be paid in US dollars or
their equivalent in Philippine currency determined at the time of the sales. To rule
otherwise would be to cause an unjust diminution of the commissions due and owing to
Delmo.

Bankard Employees Union-Workers Alliance Trade Unions vs NLRC. G.R. No.


140689 February 17, 2004

Even assuming that there is a decrease in the wage gap between the pay of the old
employees and the newly hired employees, to Our mind said gap is not significant as to
obliterate or result in severe contraction of the intentional quantitative differences in the
salary rates between the employee group. As already stated, the classification under
the wage structure is based on the rank of an employee, not on seniority. For this
reason, ,wage distortion does not appear to exist.

Rogelio Reyes vs NLRC. G.R. No. 160233, August 8, 2007

Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following
compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary:

a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of


Instruction No. 174;
 b) Profit sharing payments;
 c) All allowances and monetary
benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the
employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.

Producers Bank v. NLRC. G.R. No. 100701. March 28, 2001

Bonus is not demandable as a matter of right. It is a management prerogative, given in


addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient.

Philipiine Telegraph vs. Laplana. G.R. No. 76645; July 23, 1991

It is the employers’ prerogative, based on its assessment and perception of its


employees’ qualifications, aptitudes, and competence, to move them around in the
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various areas of its business operations in order to ascertain where they will function
with maximum benefit to the company. When an employee’s transfer is not
unreasonable, nor inconvenient or prejudicial to him, and it does not involve a demotion
in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges, the employee may not
complain that it amounts to a constructive dismissal.

UE v. PEPANIO, G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not


unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The
government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient
academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions.
Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only
the students, but the public as well from ill-prepared teachers, who are lacking in the
required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination
or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 125792; November 9, 1998

In legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the


principal and the job contractor's employees. The principal is responsible to the job
contractor's employees only for the proper payment of wages. But in labor-only
contracting, an employer-employee relation is created by law between the principal and
the labor-only contractor's employees, such that the former is responsible to such
employees, as if he or she had directly employed them

Vigilla, et al. v Philippine College of Criminology, Inc., G.R. No. 200094 (2013)

In legitimate job contracting, the principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable
with the job contractor only for the payment of the employees' wages whenever the
contractor fails to pay the same. On the other hand, in labor-only contracting, the
principal employer becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the
rightful claims of the employees. In this case, the releases, waivers and quitclaims
executed by employees in favor of the labor-only contractor redounded to the benefit of
the principal.

San Miguel Corp. vs. MAERC Integrated Systems. G.R. No. 144672; July 10, 2003

The employer is deemed the direct employer and is made liable to the employees of the
contractor for a more comprehensive purpose (wages, monetary claims, and all other
benefits in the Labor Code such as SSS/Medicare/Pag-Ibig). The labor-only contractor
is deemed merely an agent. A finding that a contractor is a “labor-only” contractor is
equivalent to declaring that there is an ER-EE relationship between the principal and the
employees of the “labor-only” contractor.
Labor Law

Cheryll Santos Leus v St. Scholastica’s College Westgrove, et al., G.R. No.
187226, 28 January 2015

That an employee was employed by a Catholic educational institution per se does not
absolutely determine whether her pregnancy out of wedlock is disgraceful or immoral.
There is still a necessity to determine whether the petitioner’s pregnancy out of wedlock
is considered disgraceful or immoral in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct. To stress, pre-marital sexual relations between two consenting adults who
have no impediment to marry each other, and, consequently, conceiving a child out of
wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of morality, does not amount to
a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS.

Duncan vs. Glaxo Wellcome. G.R. No. 162994; September 17, 2004

Prohibition of marriage or existing or future relationships between employees of


competing companies is not violative of the equal protection clause.

Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,


G.R. No. 200575 (2014)

Cabiles’ contention that his employment with Intel HK is a continuation of his service
with Intel Phil alleging that it was but an assignment by his principal employer, similar to
his assignments to Intel Arizona and Intel Chengdu is untenable.

Eugene Arabit, et al. v Jardine Pacific Finance, Inc., G.R. No. 181719, 21 April 2014

It is illogical for Jardine to terminate the petitioners’ employment and replace them with
contractual employees. The replacement effectively belies Jardine’s claim that the
petitioners’ positions were abolished due to superfluity. Redundancy could have been
justified if the functions of the petitioners were transferred to other existing employees of
the company.

To dismiss the petitioners and hire new contractual employees as replacements


necessarily give rise to the sound conclusion that the petitioners’ services have not
really become in excess of what Jardine’s business requires. To replace the petitioners
who were all regular employees with contractual ones would amount to a violation of
their right to security of tenure.

Supreme Steel Pipe Corp. vs. Bardaje, G.R. No. 170811; April 24, 2007

Although fighting within company premises may constitute serious misconduct (possible
ground for disciplinary actions), not every fight with in company premises in which an
employee is involved automatically warrant dismissal from service.

Punzal vs. ETSI Technologies. G.R. No. 170384-85. March 9, 2007


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Halloween invitation sent out by employee for office trick-or-treating without clearance
from higher management is considered misbehavior. The circumstances in the case
were differentiated from Samson vs. NLRC where the offensive remarks were verbally
made during informal Christmas gathering.

Lores Realty Enterprises, Inc. v. Virginia E. Pacia, March 2011

Petitioner employer ordered the respondent employee to prepare checks for payment of
petitioner’s obligations. Respondent did not immediately comply with the instruction
since petitioner employer had no sufficient funds to cover the checks. Petitioner
employer dismissed respondent employee for willful disobedience. The Court held that
respondent employee was illegally dismissed. Though there is nothing unlawful in the
directive of petitioner employer to prepare checks in payment of petitioner’s obligations,
respondent employee’s initial reluctance to prepare the checks, although seemingly
disrespectful and defiant, was for honest and well intentioned reasons. Protecting the
petitioner employer from liability under the Bouncing Checks Law was foremost in her
mind. It was not wrongful or willful. Neither can it be considered an obstinate defiance of
company authority. The Court took into consideration that respondent employee,
despite her initial reluctance, eventually did prepare the checks on the same day she
was tasked to do it.

Gonzales vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 131653; March 26, 2001

The act constituting the breach must be “work-related” such as would show the
employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.

Jardine Davies vs. NLRC. G.R. No. 106915; August 31, 1993

For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment there must
be a deliberate unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This
refusal must be clearly shown. Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied
by overt acts pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work
anymore.

SME Bank, Inc., et al. v De Guzman, et al., G.R. No. 184517 (2013)

While resignation letters containing words of gratitude may indicate that the employees
were not coerced into resignation, this fact alone is not conclusive proof that they
intelligently, freely and voluntarily resigned. To rule that resignation letters couched in
terms of gratitude are, by themselves, conclusive proof that the employees intended to
relinquish their posts would open the floodgates to possible abuse. In order to withstand
the test of validity, resignations must be made voluntarily and with the intention of
relinquishing the office, coupled with an act of relinquishment. Therefore, in order to
determine whether the employees truly intended to resign from their respective posts,
we cannot merely rely on the tenor of the resignation letters, but must take into
consideration the totality of circumstances in each particular case.
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Sanoh Fulton Phils., Inc., et al. v Bernardo, et al., G.R. No. 187214 (2013)

A lull caused by lack of orders or shortage of materials must be of such nature as would
severely affect the continued business operations of the employer to the detriment of all
and sundry if not properly addressed. Sanoh asserts that cancelled orders of wire
condensers led to the phasing out of the Wire Condenser Department, which triggered
retrenchment. Sanoh presented the letters of cancellation given by Matsushita and
Sanyo as evidence of cancelled orders. The evidence presented by Sanoh barely
established the connection between the cancelled orders and the projected business
losses that may be incurred by Sanoh.

Hocheng Philippines Corporation v Antonio M. Farrales, G.R. No. 211497, 18


March 2015

Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct. The misconduct to
be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must, nevertheless, be in connection
with the employee’s work to constitute just cause for his separation.

Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. v Janrie C. Dailig, G.R. No.
204761, 2 April 2014

A floating status of a security guard for more than six months constitutes constructive
dismissal. The temporary inactivity or "floating status" of security guards should
continue only for six months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable
for constructive dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work
assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for constructive
dismissal.

Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation and/or Ma. Teresa Marcelo v
Armando D. Serrano, G.R. No. 198538, 29 September 2014

It is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of the
six-month period of floating status as a case of constructive dismissal, without looking
into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the security guard’s failure to assume
another post. This is especially true in the present case where the security guard’s own
refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was the reason that he was not given an assignment
within the six-month period. The security agency, Exocet, should not then be held liable
for constructive dismissal.

Philippine Sheet Metal Workers’ Union vs. CIR. G.R. No. L-2028; April 28, 1949

Reduction of the number of workers in a company’s factory made necessary by the


introduction of machinery in the manufacture of its products is justified. There can be no
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question as to the right of the manufacturer to use new labor-saving devices with a view
to effecting more economy and efficiency in its method of production.

Oriental Petroleum & Minerals Corp. vs. Fuentes. G.R. No. 151818. October 14,
2005

Standards to Justify Retrenchment:


1. The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent;

2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent. It be

 reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; 

3. The employer should have taken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment

 to forestall losses; 

4. The alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent losses must be

 proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. 


BPI v. BPI EMPLOYEES UNION DAVAO, G.R. No. 164301, October 19, 2011

By upholding the automatic assumption of the non-surviving corporation’s existing


employment contracts by the surviving corporation in a merger, the Court strengthens
judicial protection of the right to security of tenure of employees affected by a merger
and avoids confusion regarding the status of their various benefits which were among
the chief objections of our dissenting colleagues. However, nothing in this Resolution
shall impair the right of an employer to terminate the employment of the absorbed
employees for a lawful or authorized cause or the right of such an employee to resign,
retire or otherwise sever his employment, whether before or after the merger, subject to
existing contractual obligations. In this manner, Justice Brion’s theory of automatic
assumption may be reconciled with the majority’s concerns with the successor
employer’s prerogative to choose its employees and the prohibition against involuntary
servitude.

King of Kings Transport vs. Mamac. G.R. No. 166208. June 29, 2007

In order to intelligently prepare the employees for their explanation and defenses, the
notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve
as the basis for the charge against the employee – a general description of the change
will not suffice.

Esguerra vs. Valle Verde Country Club. G.R. No. 173012. June 13, 2012

The law does not require that an intention to terminate one’s employment should be
included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are properly apprised of the
charges brought against them so they can properly prepare their defenses; it is only
during the second notice that the intention to terminate one’s employment should be
explicitly stated
Labor Law

Lavador vs. “J” Marketing Corporation and Soyao. G.R. No. 157757; June 28, 2005

A hearing or conference should be held during which the employee concerned, with the
assistance of counsel, if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to respond to
the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.

AGABON v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such
damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the
relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we
deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of damages would serve to
deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees.
At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right
granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot. G.R. No. 151378.March 28, 2005

If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be
tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to
the employee. On the other hand, if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause
under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s
exercise of his management prerogative.

Tangga-an v Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 180636 (2013)

Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages shall be
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent. It is the
obligation of the employer to pay an illegally dismissed employee or worker the whole
amount of the salaries or wages, plus all other benefits and bonuses and general
increases, to which he would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed
and had not stopped working.

Reyes, et al. v RP Guardian’s Security Agency, Inc., G.R. No 193756 (2013)

Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally
dismissed employee in order to alleviate the economic damage brought about by the
employee’s dismissal. “Reinstatement is a restoration to a state from which one has
been removed or separated” while “the payment of backwages is a form of relief that
restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful dismissal.” Therefore, the
award of one does not bar the other.
Labor Law

Crisanto F. Castro, Jr. vs Ateneo De Naga University, et al., G.R. No. 175293, 23
July 2014

The Court holds that the order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered moot
and academic. He remained entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA's order of
reinstatement until reversal thereof. In Islriz Trading v. Capada, we even clarified that
the employee could be barred from claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to
reinstate him was without the fault of the employer.

Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November 2002, and
that their inability to reinstate him was without valid ground, they were liable to pay his
salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the LA (i.e., September 3, 2001) until
his reinstatement in November 2002. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to
exercise their option to choose between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point
because the order of reinstatement was immediately executory.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Reynaldo V. Paz, G.R. No. 192924, 26 November 2014

The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the
reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. The test is two-fold: (1) there must
be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not
executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s
unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the
employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the
Labor Arbiter’s decision.

A scrutiny of the circumstances, however, will show that the delay in reinstating the
respondent was not due to the unjustified refusal of PAL to abide by the order but
because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. The inopportune event of PAL’s
entering rehabilitation receivership justifies the delay or failure to comply with the
reinstatement order of the LA. In light of the fact that PAL’s failure to comply with the
reinstatement order was justified by the exigencies of corporation rehabilitation, the
respondent may no longer claim salaries which he should have received during the
period that the LA decision ordering his reinstatement is still pending appeal until it was
overturned by the NLRC.

Globe Mackay v. NLRC. G.R. No. 82511; March 3, 1992

When the employer can no longer trust the employee and vice-versa, or there were
imputations of bad faith to each other, reinstatement could not effectively serve as a
remedy. This doctrine applies only to positions which require trust and confidence.

Wenphil Corporation vs. Abing, G.R. No. 207983, 7 April 2014

Even outside the theoretical trappings of the discussion and into the mundane realities
of human experience, the "refund doctrine" easily demonstrates how a favorable
Labor Law

decision by the Labor Arbiter could harm, more than help, a dismissed employee. The
employee, to make both ends meet, would necessarily have to use up the salaries
received during the pendency of the appeal, only to end up having to refund the sum in
case of a final unfavorable decision. It is mirage of a stop-gap leading the employee to a
risky cliff of insolvency.

Unilever Philippines v Rivera, G.R. No. 201701 (2013)

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In
exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a legally
dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on “equitable grounds.” In both
instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2)
did not reflect on the moral character of the employee. In this case, the transgressions
were serious offenses that warranted employees’ dismissal from employment. Hence,
employee is not entitled to separation pay.

Agricultural and Industrial Supplies Corp. et al vs. Jueber P. Siazar, G.R. No.
177970 August 25, 2010

In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu of reinstatement,


the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service reckoned from the first day of employment until the finality of the decision.
Payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. And if separation
pay is awarded instead of reinstatement, backwages shall be computed from the time of
illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.

Zenaida Paz v Northern Tobacco Redrying Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 199554, 18
February 2015

The award of financial assistance to an employee who rendered almost three decades
of dedicated service to an employer without a single transgression or malfeasance of
any company rule or regulation, coupled with her old age and infirmity which now
weaken her chances of employment is justified and allowed under special
circumstances. These circumstances indubitably merit equitable concessions, via the
principle of “compassionate justice” for the working class.

Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative Inc. vs NLRC. G.R. No. 163561, July 24,
2007

Although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of
separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of
termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity under the Labor
Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner
for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of
this case, does not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a
Labor Law

regrettable lack of loyalty and worse, betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length
of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal,
such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social
justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.

Conrado A. Lim v. HMR Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 201483, 04 August 2014

No essential change is being made (in a final judgment) by a recomputation because


such is a necessary consequence which flows from the nature of the illegality of the
dismissal. To reiterate, a recomputation, or an original computation, if no previous
computation was made, as in the present case, is a part of the law that is read into the
decision, namely, Article 279 of the Labor Code and established jurisprudence. Article
279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal, one of which is the payment of
full backwages until actual reinstatement, qualified only by jurisprudence when
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is allowed, where the finality of the illegal
dismissal decision instead becomes the reckoning point.

The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that backwages continue to add on until
full satisfaction. The computation required to reflect full satisfaction does not constitute
an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented as the illegal
dismissal ruling stands. Thus, in the present case, a computation of backwages until
actual reinstatement is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments.

Zuellig Pharma Corporation v Sibal, et al., G.R. NO. 173587 (2013)

In the present case, the CBA contains specific provisions which effectively bar the
availment of retirement benefits once the employees have chosen separation pay or
vice versa. Section 2 of Article XIV explicitly states that any payment of retirement
gratuity shall be chargeable against separation pay. Clearly, respondents cannot have
both retirement gratuity and separation pay, as selecting one will preclude recovery of
the other. To illustrate the mechanics of how Section 2 of Article XIV bars double
recovery, if the employees choose to retire, whatever amount they will receive as
retirement gratuity will be charged against the separation pay they would have received
had their separation from employment been for a cause which would entitle them to
severance pay. These causes are enumerated in Section 3, Article XIV of the CBA (i.e.,
retrenchment, closure of business, merger, redundancy, or installation of labor-saving
device). However, if the cause of the termination of their employment was any of the
causes enumerated in said Section 3, they could no longer claim retirement gratuity as
the fund from which the same would be taken had already been used in paying their
separation pay. Put differently, employees who were separated from the company
cannot have both retirement gratuity and separation pay as there is only one fund from
which said benefits would be taken. Inarguably, Section 2 of Article XIV effectively
disallows recovery of both separation pay and retirement gratuity. Consequently,
respondents are entitled only to one. Since they have already chosen and accepted
Labor Law

redundancy pay and have executed the corresponding Release and Quitclaim, they are
now barred from claiming retirement gratuity.

Grace Christian High School, represented by its Principal, Dr. James Tan v
Filipinas A. Lavandera, G.R. No. 177845, 20 August 2014

RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor
Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in
the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that “an
employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and
other agreements shall not be less than those provided” under the same – that is, at
least one-half (½) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year – and that “[u]nless the parties provide for
broader inclusions, the term one-half (½) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus
one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five
(5) days of service incentive leaves.”

The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable
agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other
applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement
set by law. Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply
is still superiority in terms of benefits provided.

The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., has recently affirmed that
“one-half (½) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-
twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for [SIL].” The Court sees
no reason to depart from this interpretation. GCHS’ argument therefore that the 5 days
SIL should be likewise pro-rated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail.

Noriel R. Montierro v Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 210634,
January 14, 2015

When a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his
fitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The
physician has 120 days, or 240 days, if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the
physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-
designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and binding on them.

Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., et al. v Arnel G. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 214132, 18
February 2015

For the purpose of determining “temporary total disability”, the seafarer shall submit
himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to
do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed
Labor Law

as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting


requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. If a
doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall
be final and binding on both parties.

LABOR RELATIONS

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, et al., G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009

Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as “any union or
association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment.” Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional
Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate
indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant
labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and
privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration.

T&H Shopfitters Corporation/Gin Queen Corporation, et al. v T&H Shopfitters


Corporation Corporation/Gin Queen Workers Union, et al., G.R. No. 191714 (2014)

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization, is, whether the employer has engaged in
conduct which, it may reasonably be said, tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees’ rights; and that it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if
there is a reasonable inference that the anti-union conduct of the employer does have
an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, et al., G.R. No. 162355, August 14, 2009

A bargaining unit is a “group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less


than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.” The fundamental factors in
determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
 (2) affinity and unity of the employees’
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule);
 (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and
 (4) similarity of employment status.
Labor Law

Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc., vs DOLE. G.R. No. 157117,November 20, 2006

Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, supervisory employees are not eligible for
membership in a labor union of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees
are allowed to form their own union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file
union because of potential conflicts of interest. Further, to avoid a situation where
supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors’ labor union
would represent conflicting interests, a local supervisors’ union should not be allowed to
affiliate with the national federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that
federation actively participates in the union activity within the company. Thus, the
limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file union.
The prohibition extends to a supervisors’ local union applying for membership in a
national federation the members of which include local unions of rank-and-file
employees.

San Miguel Foods, Inc. vs. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union. G.R.
No. 146206. August 1, 2011

The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of
certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers. Law and policy
demand that employers take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The
bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free from any extraneous
influence of management. The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Article 258 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain
collectively.

Holy Child Catholic School v Hon. Sto Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 179146 (2013)

A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer
itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but
even after such filing its role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a
bystander. The employer clearly lacks the personality to dispute the election and has no
right to interfere at all therein.

Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the


bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate
labor organization.

NUWHRAIN ‐ MPHC v. SLE. G.R. No. 181531, July 31, 2009

It is well‐ settled that under the “double majority rule” for there to be a valid certification
election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted and the winning union must
have garnered majority of the valid votes cast. Following the ruling that all the
probationary employees’ votes should be deemed valid votes while that of the
supervisory Ees should be excluded, it follows that the number of valid votes cast would
increase. Under Art. 256 of the LC, the union obtaining the majority of the valid votes
Labor Law

cast by the eligible voters shall be certified as the sole exclusive bargaining agent of all
the workers in the appropriate bargaining unit. This majority is 50% + 1.

Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Ees and Worker’s Union‐ PAFLU. G.R. No. L‐
24711, April 1968

The Er cannot revoke the validly executed CB contract with their Er by the simple
expedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract.
It cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified CB agent
automatically assumes all the personal undertakings of the former agent‐ like the “no
strike clause” in the CBA executed by the latter.

Takata Philippines Corporation vs Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 196276, 4


June 2014

For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be shown that
there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification; or, in connection with the election of officers, the minutes of the election of
officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of
the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.

The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in
the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel
respondent’s certificate of registration. The cancellation of a union’s registration
doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud
and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the
Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and
compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.

Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free workers vs. Cirtek Electronics,


Inc., G.R. No. 190515. June 6, 2011

A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing
that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rules. Such disaffiliation, however,
does not result in it losing its legal personality. A local union does not owe its existence
to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary
association owing its creation to the will of its members. The mere act of affiliation does
not divest the local union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a
contract of agency where the former acts in representation of the latter. In the present
case, whether the FFW went against the will of its principal (the member-employees) by
pursuing the case despite the signing of the MOA, is not for the Court, nor for
respondent employer to determine, but for the Union and FFW to resolve on their own
pursuant to their principal-agent relationship. Moreover, the issue of disaffiliation is an
intra-union dispute which must be resolved in a different forum in an action at the
Labor Law

instance of either or both the FFW and the union or a rival labor organization, but not
the employer as in this case.

Legend International Resorts Limited v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda. G.R.


No. 169754, February 23, 2011

The pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration does not preclude
collective bargaining, and that an order to hold a certification election is proper despite
the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the union’s registration because at the
time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform
such act absent an order cancelling its registration. The legitimacy of the legal
personality of respondent cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification
election proceeding but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the
purpose of assailing it.

The Implementing Rules stipulate that a labor organization shall be deemed registered
and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration.
Once a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be
subject to a collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for
cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of
Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.

Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v Pilipinas Shell Petroleum


Corporation, G.R. No. 170007, 7 April 2014

The duty to bargain does not compel any party to accept a proposal or to make any
concession. While the purpose of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement
between the employer and the employee’s union resulting in a binding contract between
the parties, the failure to reach an agreement after negotiations continued for a
reasonable period does not mean lack of good faith. The laws invite and contemplate a
collective bargaining contract but do not compel one. For after all, a CBA, like any
contract is a product of mutual consent and not of compulsion. As such, the duty to
bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.

Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing‐ United Workers of the Phils


v. NLRC. G.R. No. 113856, Sept. 7, 1998

There is no perfect test of good faith (GF) in bargaining. The GF or BF is an inference to


be drawn from the facts and is largely a matter for the NLRC’s expertise. The charge of
BF should be raised while the bargaining is in progress. With the execution of the CBA,
BF can no longer be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA
are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily incorporated therein by the parties.
This is not a case where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards CB
because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union. The CBA is
good enough that private respondent exerted “reasonable effort of GF bargaining.
Labor Law

FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization


(FVCLU-PTGWO) Vs. Sama-samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-
Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organization (SANAMA-FVC-SIGLO.
G.R. No. 176249, November 27, 2009

While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s original five-year term together with all
other CBA provisions, any such amendment or term in excess of five years will not carry
with it a change in the union’s exclusive collective bargaining status. By express
provision of the above-quoted Article 253-A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go
beyond five years and the representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace
parties to agree upon. In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of
more than five y ears, either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining
union’s exclusive bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged
within sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.

Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Services Inc., v. Confessor. G.R. No. 111809,
May 5, 1997

The signing of the CBA does not determine whether the agreement was entered into
within the 6 month period from the date of expiration of the old CBA. In the present
case, there was already a meeting of the minds between the company and the union
prior to the end of the 6 month period after the expiration of the old CBA. Hence, such
meeting of the mind is sufficient to conclude that an agreement has been reached within
the 6 month period as provided under Art. 253‐ A of the LC.

Teodoro S. Miranda, Jr. vs. Asian Terminals, Inc. and Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
174316, June 23, 2009

A shop steward leads to the conclusion that it is a position within the union, and not
within the company. A shop steward is appointed by the union in a shop, department, or
plant and serves as representative of the union, charged with negotiating and
adjustment of grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer. He is the
representative of the union members in a building or other workplace. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines a shop steward as a union official elected to represent members in a
plant or particular department. His duties include collection of dues, recruitment of new
members and initial negotiations for the settlement of grievances. A judgment of
reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of union Shop Steward would have no
practical legal effect since it cannot be enforced. Based on the requirements imposed
by law and the APCWU-ATI CBA, and in the nature of things, the subsequent
separation of the petitioner from employment with respondent ATI has made his
reinstatement to union Shop Steward incapable of being enforced.

Herminigildo Inguillom, et al. vs. First Philippine Scales, Inc., et al. G.R. No.
165407, June 5, 2009
Labor Law

“Union security” is a generic term, which is applied to and comprehends “closed shop,”
“union shop,” “maintenance of membership” or any other form of agreement which
imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a
condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees
are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued
employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are
union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become
members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment
until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is
terminated. A closed-shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in
which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives,
no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise
unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a
member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in
interest are a part.

In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the Union Security Clause,


the employer needs only to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable;
(2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the
CBA; and
(3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union’s decision to expel the employee
from the union or company.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Confessor. G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004

Whether or not the union is engaged in blue‐ sky bargaining is determined by the
evidence presented by the union as to its economic demands. Thus, if the union
requires exaggerated or unreasonable economic demands, then it is guilty of ULP. In
order to be considered as unfair labor practice, there must be proof that the demands
made by the union were exaggerated or unreasonable. In the minutes of the meeting
show that the union based its economic proposals on data of rank-and-file employees
and the prevailing economic benefits received by bank employees from other foreign
banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches of the bank in the Asian
region. Hence, it cannot be said that the union was guilty of ULP for blue-sky
bargaining.

General Santos Coca Cola Plant Free Workers Union-Tupas vs. COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 178647. Feb. 13, 2007

Unfair labor practice refers to “acts that violate the workers’ right to organize.” The
prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the
observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, are not unfair labor
practices.
Labor Law

Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
139940, September 19, 2006

To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross violation of the
CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions thereof. Evidently, the University can not be
faulted for ULP as it in good faith merely heeded the above-said request of Union
members.

Salunga v. CIR. G.R. No. L‐ 22456, Sep. 27, 1967

Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership
and a closed‐ shop applicants provision will not justify the employer in discharging, or a
union in insisting upon the discharge of an employee whom the union thus refuses to
admit to membership without any reasonable ground thereof.

Phil. Can Co. v. CIR. G.R. No. L‐ 3021, July 13, 1950

A coercive measure resorted to by laborers to enforce their demands. The idea behind
a strike is that a company engaged in a profitable business cannot afford to have its
production or activities interrupted, much less, paralyzed.

Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, Inc., etc. vs. Samahan ng mga Manggagawa
sa Hyatt-National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant, etc., G.R. No. 165756,
June 5, 2009

The requisites for a valid strike are:

(a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15
days in case of ULP;
 (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and

(c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike. The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply
therewith renders the strike illegal.

Club Filipino, Inc., et al. v Benjamin Bautista, et al., G.R. No. 168406, January 2015

The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states the company’s counter-proposal shall
be attached to the notice of strike "as far as practicable." In this case, attaching the
counter-proposal of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable.
It was absurd to expect the union to produce the company's counter-proposal which it
did not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was impossible because no
counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a notice of strike.
Labor Law

NSFW vs. Ovejera. G.R. No. 59743, May 31, 1982

The cooling‐ off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7‐ day strike ban after the strike‐ vote
report prescribed in Art. 264 (f) were meant to be mandatory. The law provides that “the
labor union may strike” should the dispute “remain unsettled until the lapse of the
requisite number of days from the filing of the notice”, this clearly implies that the union
may not strike before the lapse of the cooling‐ off period. The cooling‐ off period is for
the Ministry of Labor and Employment to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to
effect a voluntary settlement. The mandatory character of the 7‐ day strike ban is
manifest in the provision that “in every case” the union shall furnish the MOLE with the
results of the voting “at least 7 days before the intended strike.” This period is to give
time to verify that a strike vote was actually held.

In the event the result of the strike/lockout ballot is filed within the cooling‐ off period,
the 7‐ day requirement shall be counted from the day following the expiration of the
cooling‐ off period.

Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos. G.R. No.


113907, Feb. 28, 2000

A no strike/lockout clause is legal, but it is applicable only to economic strikes, not ULP
strikes. As a provision in the CBA, it is a valid stipulation although the clause may be
invoked by an employer (Er) only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is
conducted to force wage or other concessions from the Er that are not mandated to be
granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded
on ULP.

Interphil Laboratories Ees Union‐ FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. G.R. No.
142824, Dec. 19, 2001

The concept of a slowdown is a "strike on the installment plan." It is a willful reduction in


the rate of work by concerted action of workers for the purpose of restricting the output
of the employer (Er), in relation to a labor dispute; as an activity by which workers,
without a complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties
and functions to compel management to grant their demands. Such a slowdown is
generally condemned as inherently illicit and unjustifiable, because while the employees
(Ees) "continue to work and remain at their positions and accept the wages paid to
them," they at the same time "select what part of their allotted tasks they care to
perform of their own volition or refuse openly or secretly, to the Er's damage, to do other
work;" in other words, they "work on their own terms.

Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al. vs. Secretary


of Department of Labor and Employment, et al./Triumph International (phils.), Inc.
vs. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Triumph International, et al., G.R. No.
167401, July 5, 2010
Labor Law

The assumption of jurisdiction powers granted to the Labor Secretary under Article
263(g) is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that may have
preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of the strike or lockout
that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction”
connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor
Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which
arose out of the strike or lockout, including cases over which the labor arbiter has
exclusive jurisdiction.

Sarmiento v. Tuico. G.R. Nos. 75271‐ 73, June 27, 1988

Where the return to work order is issued pending the determination of the legality of the
strike, it is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be
disregarded if illegal. Precisely, the purpose of the return to work order is to maintain the
status quo while the determination is being made.

Manila Diamond Hotel Ees Union v. SLE, G.R. No. 140518, Dec. 16, 2004

Payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement but there must be showing of


special circumstances rendering actual reinstatement impracticable, or otherwise not
conducive to attaining the purpose of the law in providing for assumption of jurisdiction
by the SLE in a labor dispute that affects the national interest.

Solid Bank Corp. Ernesto U. Gamier, et al. and Solid Bank Corp., et al. vs. Solid
Bank Union and its Dismissed Officers and Members, et al. G.R. No. 159460 and
G.R. No. 159461, November 15, 2010

Under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, a strike that is undertaken
despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption order and/or
certification is illegal. So is a declaration of a strike during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike. In the present case, there is no dispute that
when respondents conducted their mass actions on April 3 to 6, 2000, the proceedings
before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties filed motions for
reconsideration of the March 24, 2000 Order. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated
the aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration.

Jackbilt Industries, Inc. Vs. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-Naflu-KMU, G.R.


No. 171618-19, March 13, 2009

Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from
obstructing the free ingress to and egress from the employer’s premises. Since
respondent was found in the July 17, 1998 decision of the NLRC to have prevented the
free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioner’s compound, respondent’s officers and
employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike. The
use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore,
pursuant to the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was
Labor Law

ipso facto illegal. The filing of a petition to declare the strike illegal was thus
unnecessary.

Yolito Fadriquelan, et al. vs. Monterey Foods Corporation/Monterey Foods


Corporation v. Bukluran ng mga Manggagawa sa Monterey-ILAW, et al., G.R. No.
178409/G.R. No. 178434, June 8, 2011

A distinction exists between the ordinary workers’ liability for illegal strike and that of the
union officers who participated in it. The ordinary worker cannot be terminated for
merely participating in the strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts
during its conduct. On the other hand, a union officer can be terminated upon mere
proof that he knowingly participated in the illegal strike. Moreover, the participating
union officers have to be properly identified. In the present case, with respect to those
union officers whose identity and participation in the strike having been properly
established, the termination was legal.

Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC. G.R. No. 86000, Sep. 21, 1990

No backwages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their participation in


the illegal strike. As for the union officers, for knowingly participating in an illegal strike,
the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment and they are
not entitled to any relief.

MSF Tire & Rubber v. CA, G.R. 128632, Aug. 5, 1999

The innocent by stander must show: Compliance with the grounds specified in Rule 58
of the Rules of Court, and That it is entirely different from, without any connection
whatsoever to, 
 either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign
to the 
 context thereof. 


Victor Meteoro, et al. v. Creative Creatures, Inc. G.R No. 171275, July 13, 2009

In sum, respondent contested the findings of the labor inspector during and after the
inspection and raised issues the resolution of which necessitated the examination of
evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. Hence, the
Regional Director was divested of jurisdiction and should have endorsed the case to the
appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Considering, however, that an illegal
dismissal case had been filed by petitioners wherein the existence or absence of an
employer-employee relationship was also raised, the CA correctly ruled that such
endorsement was no longer necessary.

Honda Cars Philippines, Inc. v. Honda Cars Technical Specialist and Supervisors
Union, G.R. No. 204142, 19 November 2014

The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters. The Voluntary
Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the
propriety of the withholding of tax. These issues are clearly tax matters, and do not
Labor Law

involve labor disputes. To be exact, they involve tax issues within a labor relations
setting as they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the
NIRC. They do not require the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the
MOA and/or company personnel policies.

The University of the Immaculate Conception, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
181146, January 26, 2011

Article 217 of the Labor Code states that unfair labor practices and termination disputes
fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. As an exception,
under Article 262 the Voluntary Arbitrator, upon agreement of the parties, shall also
hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining
deadlocks. For the exception to apply, there must be agreement between the parties
clearly conferring jurisdiction to the voluntary arbitrator. Such agreement may be
stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement. However, in the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement, it is enough that there is evidence on record showing the parties
have agreed to resort to voluntary arbitration.

Samar-Med Distribution v National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162385


(2013)

The non-inclusion in the complaint of the issue of dismissal did not necessarily mean
that the validity of the dismissal could not be an issue. The rules of the NLRC require
the submission of verified position papers by the parties should they fail to agree upon
an amicable settlement, and bar the inclusion of any cause of action not mentioned in
the complaint or position paper from the time of their submission by the parties. In view
of this, respondent’s cause of action should be ascertained not from a reading of his
complaint alone but also from a consideration and evaluation of both his complaint and
position paper.

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al. vs. Estanislao Surio, et al. G.R. No.
154213, August 23, 2012

Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino
workers from the POEA to the Labor Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all disciplinary action cases
and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers. The obvious
intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving all
administrative matters affecting and involving such workers. The NLRC had no
appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA in disciplinary cases involving
overseas contract workers.

People’s Broadcasting Service vs. The Secretary of Labor and Employment. G.R.
No. 179652, March 6, 2012
Labor Law

If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is


properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by
a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art.
217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and
other terms and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and there is still an existing employer-employee
relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE,
however, may still be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.

Rolando L. Cervantes vs. PAL Maritime Corporation and/or Western Shipping


Agencies. G.R. No. 175209. January 16, 2013

There was substantial compliance with the NLRC Rules of Procedure when the
respondents PAL Maritime Corporation and Western Shipping Agencies, Pte., Ltd. filed,
albeit belatedly, the Joint Declaration Under Oath, which is required when an employer
appeals from the Labor Arbiter’s decision granting a monetary award and posts a surety
bond. Under the NLRC rules, the following requisites are required to perfect the
employer’s appeal: (1) it must be filed within the reglementary period; (2) it must be
under oath, with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash
or surety bond; and (3) it must be accompanied by typewritten or printed copies of the
memorandum of appeal, stating the grounds relied upon, the supporting arguments, the
reliefs prayed for, and a statement of the date of receipt of the appealed decision, with
proof of service on the other party of said appeal. If the employer posts a surety bond,
the NLRC rules further require the submission by the employer, his or her counsel, and
the bonding company of a joint declaration under oath attesting that the surety bond
posted is genuine and that it shall be in effect until the final disposition of the case.

In the case at bar, the respondents posted a surety bond equivalent to the monetary
award and filed the notice of appeal and the appeal memorandum within the
reglementary period. When the NLRC subsequently directed the filing of a Joint
Declaration Under Oath, the respondents immediately complied with the said order.
There was only a late submission of the Joint Declaration. Considering that there was
substantial compliance with the rules, the same may be liberally construed. The
application of technical rules may be relaxed in labor cases to serve the demands of
substantial justice.

Mcburnie v Ganzon, et al., G.R. No. 178034 (2013)

While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the
conditions that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious
grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by
the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the
running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that
unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond within the 10-day reglementary
Labor Law

period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety bond securing the full
amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant the motion for
reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be to
reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day
period.

AGG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid vs. Melanio B. Yuag. G.R. No. 195033,
October 12, 2011

On the issue of the propriety of entertaining the Petition for Certiorari despite the
prescribed Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC, the SC found that the CA
committed error when it entertained the petition for certiorari and explained that when
respondent failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC’s 30 November 2006
Resolution within the reglementary period, the Resolution attained finality and could no
longer be modified by the Court of Appeals. Untimeliness in filing motions or petitions is
not a mere technical or procedural defect, as leniency regarding this requirement will
impinge on the right of the winning litigant to peace of mind resulting from the laying to
rest of the controversy.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions
should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Manila Pavilion Hotel, etc. vs. Henry Delada. G.R. No. 189947, January 25, 2011

In Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v. Deputy Administrator Magsalin, the Supreme Court ruled
that the voluntary arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authority to interpret the
agreement to arbitrate and to determine the scope of his own authority – subject only, in
a proper case, to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. It was also held in that case that
the failure of the parties to specifically limit the issues to that which was stated allowed
the arbitrator to assume jurisdiction over the related issue. In Ludo & Luym Corporation
v. Saornido, the Supreme Court recognized that voluntary arbitrators are generally
expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission
agreement; that, nevertheless, they can assume that they have the necessary power to
make a final settlement on the related issues, since arbitration is the final resort for the
adjudication of disputes. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that even if the specific issue
brought before the arbitrators merely mentioned the question of “whether an employee
was discharged for just cause,” they could reasonably assume that their powers
extended beyond the determination thereof to include the power to reinstate the
employee or to grant back wages. In the same vein, if the specific issue brought before
the arbitrators referred to the date of regularization of the employee, law and
jurisprudence gave them enough leeway as well as adequate prerogative to determine
Labor Law

the entitlement of the employees to higher benefits in accordance with the finding of
regularization. Indeed, to require the parties to file another action for payment of those
benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional
mandate providing full protection to labor and speedy labor justice.

Philippine Electric Corporation v Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168612, 10


December 2014

The rule is that a Voluntary Arbitrator’s award or decision shall be appealed before the
Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt of the award or decision. Should the
aggrieved party choose to file a motion for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator,
the motion must be filed within the same 10-day period since a motion for
reconsideration is filed “within the period for taking an appeal.

People’s Broadcasting (Bombo Radyo Phils) v. Secretary of Labor, et al.


GR No. 179652, May 8, 2009

It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power
somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however, cannot be coextensive with the
visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely
preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor
standards provisions. The determination of the existence of employer-employee
relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause “in
cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists” in Art. 128(b).

Thus, if a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the
DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-
employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the NLRC. If a complaint is filed
with the DOLE , and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is
properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that
the Labor Arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, if
accompanied by a claim for reinstatement. If a complaint is filed with the NLRC, and
there is still an existing employer- employee relationship, the jurisdiction is purely with
the DOLE. The findings of the DOLE, however may still be questioned through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Manolito Barles, et al. v. Hon. Benedicto Bitonio, et al. GR No. 120270, June 16,
1999

The BLR shall have original and exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon
request of either or both parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts. As already
Labor Law

held by the Court in La Tondena Workers Union v. Secretary of Labor, intra-union


conflicts such as examinations of accoutns are under the jurisdiction of the BLR.
However, the Rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration purpose and expressly
separated or distinguished examinations of union accounts from the genus of intra-
union conflict and provided a different procedure for the resolution of the same. Original
jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is vested on the
Regional Director and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the former is lodged with
the BLR. This is apparent from Sections 3 and 4 of the Med-Arbitration Rules as already
mentioned. Contrast these two sections from Section 2 and Section 56 of the same
rules. Section 2 expressly vests upon Med-Arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide inter alia “all other inter-union or internal union disputes.” Section 5
states that the decisions of the Med-Arbiter shall be appealable to the DOLE Secretary.
Without a doubt, the rules of Procedure on Mediation-Arbitration did not amend or
supplant substantive law but implemented and filled in details of procedure left vacuous
or ambiguous by the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.

Araullo v Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 194169 (2013)

The Writ of Execution in the instant case was procedurally irregular, as it pre-empted
the NLRC Rules which require that where further computation of the award in the
decision is necessary during the course of the execution proceedings, no Writ of
Execution shall be issued until after the computation has been approved by the Labor
Arbiter in an order issued after the parties have been duly notified and heard on the
matter. When the writ was issued, there was as yet no order approving the computation
made by the NLRC Computation and Examination Unit, and there was a pending and
unresolved Motion to Recompute filed by Club Filipino. A cursory examination of the
motion reveals that it raised valid issues that required determination in order to arrive at
a just resolution, so that none of the parties would be unjustly enriched.

Virgilio Anabe v. Asian Construction. GR No. 183233, December 23, 2009

To properly construe Article 291 of the Labor Code, it is essential to ascertain the time
when the third element of a cause of action transpired. Stated differently, in the
computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a determination must be made as to
the period when the act constituting a violation of the workers’ right to the benefits being
claimed was committed. For if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years
before the filing of the money claim, said cause of action has already prescribed in
accordance with Article 291.

George A. Arriola v Pilipino Star .Ngayon, Inc. and/or Miguel G. Belmont, G.R. No.
175689, 13 August 2014

This court ruled that Callanta’s complaint for illegal dismissal had not yet prescribed.
Although illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code, it is not the "offense"
contemplated in Article 290. Article 290 refers to illegal acts penalized under the Labor
Code, including committing any of the prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts,
Labor Law

unfair labor practices, and illegal recruitment activities. The three-year prescriptive
period under Article 290, therefore, does not apply to complaints for illegal dismissal.

Instead, "by way of supplement," Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
governs complaints for illegal dismissal. Under Article 1146, an action based upon an
injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within four years. This court explained:

. . . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood,
the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment
constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the
plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be
brought within four [4] years.
This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages, not the three-
year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. A claim for
backwages, according to this court, may be a money claim "by reason of its
practical effect." Legally, however, an award of backwages "is merely one of the
reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the
NLRC to render inhis favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by
the employer." Though it results "in the enrichment of the individual [illegally
dismissed], the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right, but,
rather, is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public
reparation for his violation of the Labor Code."

Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, therefore,
governs these actions.

SOCIAL LEGISLATION

SSS v. Aguas. G.R. No. 165546; February 27, 2006

A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be
"dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary.
Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time
of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for
support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.

Bernardina P. Bartolome v Social Security System, et al., G.R. No. 192531, 12


November 2014

Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given
Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already
died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue
solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary. The rule limiting death
benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.
Labor Law

The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption.

Hacienda Cataywa, et al. v Rosario Lorezo, G.R. No. 179640, 18 March 2015)

To be exempted from the coverage of SSS Law on the basis of casual employment, the
services must not merely be irregular, temporary or intermittent, but the same must not
also be in connection with the business or occupation of the employer. The primary
standard, therefore, of determining a regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the
scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.

GSIS vs. De Leon. G.R. No. 186560; November 17, 2010

Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a
vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a
protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under
pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become
due as provided under the terms of the public employees’ pension statute. No law can
deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without
notice and opportunity to be heard.

GSIS vs. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 128524; April 20, 1999

The 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and
circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not
on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically police service in character.

Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. ECC. G.R. No. L-26341. Nov. 27, 1968

When the injury is sustained when the employee is proceeding to or from his work on
the premises of the employer, the injury is compensable.

Enao v. ECC G.R. No. L-46046; April 5, 1985

The company which provides the means of transportation in going to, or coming from
the place of work, is liable to the injury sustained by the employees while on board said
means of transportation.