Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: Whether or not constitutional provisions are self-executing.
Citation: G.R. No. 122156 - MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, etc.

FACTS:
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, is invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant
to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner,"
is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and
financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close
bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a
subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust
Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the
Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . .which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It
is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6
Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of
the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51%
of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec.
10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate,
there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which business may be done."
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term
national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as
cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that
have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall
under the patrimony of the nation.
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing.

RULING:
YES. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is self-executing.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing.
That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust
legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
— qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where
there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.
Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Whether or not constitutional provisions are self-executing.
Citation: 224 SCRA 792 - G.R. No. 101083 - Oposa vs Factoran

FACTS:
This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said
petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents.
The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests."The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert
witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
Plaintiffs specifically allege their cause of action.
Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion
in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.
They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in
its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause
of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted
in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutional provision on the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
self-executing.

RULING:
Yes. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic
rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific
averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly
or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for
they are indispensable parties.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.
Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Whether or not constitutional provisions are self-executing.
Citation: G.R. No. 118910 - KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, etc vs. MANUEL L.
MORATO, etc.

FACTS:
Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case. They insist that the decision in the
first case has already settled (1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and (2)
whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office can enter into any form of association or collaboration with any party in operating an on-
line lottery. Consequently, petitioners contend, these questions can no longer be reopened.
It is argued that, in any case, a reexamination of the two questions is barred because the PCSO
and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation made a " formal commitment not to ask for
a reconsideration of the Decision in the first lotto case and instead submit a new agreement that
would be in conformity with the PCSO Charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) and with the
Decision of the Supreme Court in the first Kilosbayan case against on-line, hi-tech lotto."
There was thus no "formal commitment" — but only a manifestation — that the parties were not
filing a motion for reconsideration.
Indeed, a change in the composition of the Court could prove the means of undoing an erroneous
decision.
We now consider the specific grounds for petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
I. We have held that because there are no genuine issues of constitutionality in this case, the rule
concerning real party in interest, applicable to private litigation rather than the more liberal rule
on standing, applies to petitioners. Two objections are made against that ruling: (1) that the
constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying the basis for
affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or
official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to
independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on
constitutional grounds.
The policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner read:
Art. II, §5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property,
and thepromotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people
of the blessings of democracy.
Id., §12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
 Id., §13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being.
It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
Id., §17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote
total human liberation and development.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the policies and principles of the Constitution invoked by petitioner are self-
executing.

RULING:
No. As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing. They do not confer rights
which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive
action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that
consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this
authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCOR of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per
se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit."
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners
assert an interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing
taxpayer's suits
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can
they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners,
who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they
do not complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.
The "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable, because this case is not a continuation of the first
one. Indeed, the questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims involved are
substantially different from those involved in the prior case between the parties. As already
stated, the ELA is substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void in the first
case.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED
with finality.
Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Justiciable Controversy vs Political Question Doctrine
Citation: G.R. No. 134577 - SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO
S. TATAD vs. SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN.

FACTS:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of
government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own
constitutionally allocated sphere.
The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmeña as presiding officer, convened
on July 27, 1998 for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress.
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the
position of Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also
nominated to the same position by Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8

Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin
M. Drilon as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier
manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven
(7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No
consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question
continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session
day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed
by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, 9 stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as
the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for
quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding
and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them,
rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUE:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?

RULING:
After a close perusal of the pleadings and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con,
the Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the
recognition of and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority
leader.

First Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
In the instant controversy, the petitioners — one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist — try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that
Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate
minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on
the part of respondents.
Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or
petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. 35 In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it
is clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives.

Second Issue:
Violation of the Constitution
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a
number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the
members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who could thereby
elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers
of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine the rules
of its proceedings." \
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any rate, such offices, by tradition
and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines
or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of
powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.

Third Issue:
Usurpation of Office
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one
without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the
proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public
prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. The action shall be brought against the person who
allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding of exercising such office.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or
she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office
allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. 58 In this case, petitioners present no
sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may
lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or
the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way
can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption and
exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of
discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

Fourth Issue:
Fernan's Recognition of Guingona
We hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to
one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of
the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate
President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules
of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave
abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence
and authority.

WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Justiciable Controversy vs Political Question Doctrine
Citation: G.R. No. L-36142 - JOSUE JAVELLANA vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE.

FACTS:
For the plebiscite case, on March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2,
which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution No. 2,
as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970,
pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on
November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on
June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On November 29,
1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The
next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73,
"submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on January 15, 1973. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin
said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner,
until further orders of the Court". On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open
debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the
postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No
formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was
issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until
further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of
December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes
of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." "In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the
petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be
decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." On January 15, 1973
the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file
"file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting
the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on
the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion
and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to
him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in
G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the
public there present that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary
of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.
For the ratification case, on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142
against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to
restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the
provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of
1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and
registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly
situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set
forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced
"the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents
including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the
said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the
same "are without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that
the election held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."

ISSUE:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore
non-justiciable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly
(with substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and
statutory provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid
ratification) by the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness.
Acceptance or agreement by keeping quiet or by not making objections.)
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

RULING:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of
the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their
discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it
is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of
whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should
keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from
both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied
with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue
is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with
Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e.,
"in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and
duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has
been validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional
concepts regarding the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens'
Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls
short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing
to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for
considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of
plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not
in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the
belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that
in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has been substantially
complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their
view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for
valid ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that
"the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American
decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution
once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not
at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of
time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the
absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on
the question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement
that "Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media
vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether
the people have accepted the Constitution."
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal,
Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice
Makalintal and Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said
Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to
resolve which considerations other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this
Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself
voted to deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold
that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee
cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not
state with judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution;
and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not
enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice
and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby
dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect.
The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which was left to the
people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.
Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Expanded Judicial Power, Doctrine of Supremacy of the Constitution, basic rules in
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
Citation: 201 SCRA 792 - G.R. No. 97710 - DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, etc.

FACTS:
This case involves a question of power.
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP)
were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal which is composed of nine (9)
members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members
of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a
reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four
(4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over
Pineda to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and
Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed
Congressman Camasura by letter that the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur,
had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having
allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for
allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as
those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a complete
betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP".
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because
Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of
powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET
without violating the doctrine of separation of powers.

RULING:
Yes. That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power
as both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate
cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean
that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of
legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by
someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case.
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET. —
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party
discipline," are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion,
an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure. —
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that
it violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole
judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the
judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just
cause, such as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the
House of Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has
become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the
HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
It should be stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had
no political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to
punish him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how
he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to
nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so
that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura
in the Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to
substitute Congressman Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in
the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights
against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be
deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its
judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of
the House. The Court must perform its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be
the highest official of the land or the Government itself"
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to
unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the
fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly
violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the
House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Pineda and
Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal.
The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted.
Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Expanded Judicial Power, Doctrine of Supremacy of the Constitution, basic rules in
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
Citation: G.R. No. 160261 - ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., etc. vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,etc.

FACTS:
Following Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
(House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On July 22, 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President
Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed
in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on
Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
but voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report
to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. A day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Thus arose the instant petitions against respondents, most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings;
(2) Whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been fulfilled;
(3) Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.

RULING:
Judicial Review
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in
Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can
be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government.
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily
turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. T
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like
almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is
a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture." The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the
validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term
"political question,"viz: [T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of
Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not
intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that
there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
governmental act should be avoided whenever possible.
Judicial Restraint
Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over
justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the
filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a
meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on
June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Name: SAGURAN, JUNE PAOLO C.
Subject: Constitutional Law 1
Topic: Expanded Judicial Power, Doctrine of Supremacy of the Constitution, basic rules in
interpreting the provisions of the Constitution
Citation: G.R. No. 159139 - INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, etc. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.

FACTS:
There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill
will or personal bias.
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046,5 which authorized Comelec to conduct a
nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-
test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM).
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 84366 authorizing Comelec to use an
automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll
body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and
materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
Initially intending to implement the automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections,
Comelec -- in its Resolution No. 2985 dated February 9, 19987 -- eventually decided against full
national implementation and limited the automation to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some
automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire
Province of Sulu.8
In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local
positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral
exercise allegedly because of time constraints.
On October 29, 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for
the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated
Election System; namely, Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II -
Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission.
On January 24, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172,
which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the May 10, 2004 elections. Upon
the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.
On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid.
Out of the 57 bidders, the BAC found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation
(TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BAC’s Technical Working
Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information
Technology Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and
Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter14 to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested
the award of the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in
which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with
eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of which have been discussed
at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on Elections, the agency vested with the exclusive constitutional
mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion when, in the exercise of its
administrative functions, it awarded to MPC the contract for the second phase of the
comprehensive Automated Election System.

RULING:
The Petition is meritorious.

Main Substantive Issue:

Validity of the Award to MPC
We come now to the meat of the controversy. Petitioners contend that the award is invalid, since
Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it did the following:
1. Awarded the Contract to MPC though it did not even participate in the bidding
2. Allowed MPEI to participate in the bidding despite its failure to meet the mandatory
eligibility requirements
3. Issued its Resolution of April 15, 2003 awarding the Contract to MPC despite the issuance
by the BAC of its Report, which formed the basis of the assailed Resolution, only on April
21, 200331
4. Awarded the Contract, notwithstanding the fact that during the bidding process, there were
violations of the mandatory requirements of RA 8436 as well as those set forth in Comelec’s
own Request for Proposal on the automated election system
5. Refused to declare a failed bidding and to conduct a re-bidding despite the failure of the
bidders to pass the technical tests conducted by the Department of Science and Technology
6. Failed to follow strictly the provisions of RA 8436 in the conduct of the bidding for the
automated counting machines
After reviewing the slew of pleadings as well as the matters raised during the Oral Argument, the
Court deems it sufficient to focus discussion on the following major areas of concern that
impinge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion:
A. Matters pertaining to the identity, existence and eligibility of MPC as a bidder
B. Failure of the automated counting machines (ACMs) to pass the DOST technical tests
C. Remedial measures and re-testings undertaken by Comelec and DOST after the award,
and their effect on the present controversy
Clearly, such jumbled ratiocinations completely negate the rationale underlying the bidding
process mandated by law.
At the very outset, the Court has explained that Comelec flagrantly violated the public policy on
public biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not
qualified to do so; and (2) by eventually awarding the Contract to MPC/MPEI. Now, with the
latest explanation given by Comelec, it is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law
on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to change and alter the subject of the
Contract (the software), in effect allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding.
This stance is contrary to settled jurisprudence requiring the strict application of pertinent rules,
regulations and guidelines for public bidding for the purpose of placing each bidder, actual or
potential, on the same footing. The essence of public bidding is, after all, an opportunity for fair
competition, and a fair basis for the precise comparison of bids. In common parlance, public
bidding aims to "level the playing field." That means each bidder must bid under the same
conditions; and be subject to the same guidelines, requirements and limitations, so that the best
offer or lowest bid may be determined, all other things being equal.
Thus, it is contrary to the very concept of public bidding to permit a variance between the
conditions under which bids are invited and those under which proposals are submitted and
approved; or, as in this case, the conditions under which the bid is won and those under which
the awarded Contract will be complied with. The substantive amendment of the contract bidded
out, without any public bidding -- after the bidding process had been concluded -- is violative of
the public policy on public biddings, as well as the spirit and intent of RA 8436. The whole point
in going through the public bidding exercise was completely lost. The very rationale of public
bidding was totally subverted by the Commission.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL and VOID
Comelec Resolution No. 6074 awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific
Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the subject Contract executed between
Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). Comelec is further ORDERED to refrain from
implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.