CENTRO ESCOLAR UNIVERSITY

Mendiola, Manila

The Challenges of the ASEAN in the last 25 years: Thailand in Focus

WENDELL GLENN P. CAGAPE1

PhD in Southeast Asian Studies
Centro Escolar University
wendellglenncagape@gmail.com

I. Role of Thailand in the ASEAN

Being an active partner for regionalism in Southeast Asia, Thailand endeared itself as the
birthplace of regionalism where in 1967, together with Malaysia, The Philippines, Indonesia and
Singapore, the foreign ministers signed the Bangkok Declaration which became the cornerstone
of modern ASEAN today.
Over the years, Thailand, together with other States in Southeast Asia has espoused the
“ASEAN Way” which is the preference for consensus decision-making and building of “comfort
levels” over direct and open divisions – in its institutions and state practice” (Natalegawa, 2017).
Further, Thailand portrayed a pivotal role in the crafting, in 1976, of the Bali Concord I otherwise
known as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. This pave the way for a more
coordinated regionalism that promotes common security and trade among members of the
association.
Thailand sustained its role in the ASEAN by also by enhancing its economy. Its economy
has propelled the Kingdom to partake on an active role in cementing intra-ASEAN and regional
trade by the early 2000.
At the Bali Summit in October 2003, ASEAN Leaders declared that the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) shall be the goal of regional economic integration (Bali Concord II) by 2020. In
addition to the AEC, the ASEAN Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community

1
Wendell Glenn P. Cagape is a PhD Scholar of the CHED currently pursuing his PhD in Southeast Asian Studies at the
Centro Escolar University. He obtained his PhD in Education from La Salle University and his Master of Arts in Foreign
Service from the Lyceum of the Philippines University. He obtained his Postgraduate Diploma in Chinese Studies
from the China Youth University for Political Sciences in Beijing, China. He presented academic papers in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia (2008) hosted by the International Islamic University Malaysia; in Brunei Darussalam (2008) hosted
by the Universiti Brunei Darussalam; and in Osaka, Japan hosted by the International Academic Forum. He also sits
in the Board and was adjudged as one of the 2017 Best Reviewer of the International Journal of Doctoral Studies. He
is currently the Board Secretary V of JH Cerilles State College.
are the other two integral pillars of the envisaged ASEAN Community. All the three pillars are
expected to work in tandem in establishing the ASEAN Community in 20202.
In 2004, the role of Thailand has been enhanced over the decades of being the founding
member of the ASEAN. The regional bloc as well as international players recognized Thailand’s
initiative at the Asia Cooperation Dialogue or ACD, as a step forward towards regional
cooperation3. This was undertaken at the backdrop of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Thailand is actively participating as an economic driving force in the regional association
owing to the robust opportunities brought about by the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
Thailand’s share of trade with mainland Southeast Asia has always been larger compared
to the rest of ASEAN, which comprises around 10.6%. This reflects the appetite of Thai traders,
particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with regard to new markets opening
closer to home as a result of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and new open border access to
all kinds of goods and services for trading among themselves (Cheewatrakoolpong & Chirathivat,
2015).
Aside from economics, ASEAN members have engaged the major powers in Southeast
Asian affairs in inclusive, balanced, even-handed, and non- confrontational ways, through various
ASEAN-centered forums at several levels, through joint exercises and other cooperative
activities, and through schemes like free trade area and economic partnership agreements
between ASEAN and external partners. In this way, they have contributed directly to the region’s
stability (Menon & Severino, 2013 ).
Further, Thailand belongs to the zone growth within the ASEAN Economic Community.
The Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) was formed to also promote the
economic integration of the region; assist in the construction of physical linkages among
countries; and promote the fairer utilization of limited resources in the subregion (Basu Das &
Pomfrat, 2013).
The principle of the ASEAN Economic Community rests on the backbone of the
Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II or the Bali Concord II which was signed in Bali, Indonesia in

2
This was included in introduction of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint published in 2008 by the ASEAN
Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia. This was following the adoption of the Declaration of the ASEAN Economic
Community Blueprint in Singapore on the 13th ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN declaration was signed by Sultan Hassanal
Bolkiah of the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam; Samdech Hun Sen of the Kingdom of Cambodia; Dr. Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono of the Republic of Indonesia; Bouasone Bouphavanh of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Dato Seri
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi of Malaysia; General Thein Sein of Myanmar; Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of the Philippines;
Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore; General Surayod Chulanont of the Kingdom of Thailand and Nguyen Tan Dung of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
3
Speech delivered by H.E. Dr. Surikiart Sathirathai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand at the
hosting of the LSE Asia Forum 2004 held in Bangkok, Thailand on 18 March 2004. He considered that the ACD is the
cobweb of functional cooperation to be regarded as an embryo of a Asian economic community and opined that it
will take the second route which is the move towards an ASEAN community and its eventual economic integration
with China, Japan and Korea.
2003 during the 9th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The AEC forms part of
the three pillars which the ASEAN Community shall rests. The others being the ASEAN Security
Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community.
This paper attempts to look at the ASEAN Economic Community as a purveyor of regional
cohesiveness via the role of Thailand as it relates to economic superpowers such as the United
States, China and Japan.

II. Geopolitical realities of Southeast Asia: Focus on Thailand

Thailand, is a Kingdom-nation of 68 Million people with an HDI of 0.740 and ranked 87 in
the Human Development Index. According to the World Bank, Thailand’s economy is
expected to expand in 2018 to around 3.6 % (Kongrukgreatiyos, 2017).
Politically, Thailand is a volatile democracy. The last coup against an elected Thai
government happened in May 2014 which saw the appointment of General Prayut Chan-O-
Cha, the former Thai Army Chief to become its Prime Minister. The junta and its leaders were
endorsed by His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the opening of its parliament was
opened by then Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. The coup was triggered by accusations
of corruption and dishonesty by the government of former Thai Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra. Promising swift political reforms and a return to democratic processes,
Thailand’s military rulers ruled the country after Prime Minister Shinawatra’s disposal. Just
three years after her departure from Thai politics, the Supreme Court of Thailand handed
down 5 years of prison term (Beech, 2017) to former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra who
escaped to exile in Dubai.
Analysts foresee at least three major questions for Thai politics in 2017. The first is
whether there will be a delay in the promised elections until at least 2018 given the current
year-long period of national mourning. These elections, under the new electoral system
established by the new Constitution voted for in August 2016, were previously scheduled to
be held before the end of the 2017. The second is how the balance of power and relations
between the royal household and the Thai army will change. Finally, King Bhumibol was the
only king that the vast majority of the Thai population has ever known and he was widely
revered. This is a hard act to follow (Cook, 2017).
Aside from politics, Thailand enjoys a favorable investment climate and tourism still picks
up as one of the highest in Southeast Asia although slightly affected by the death of His
Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej.
The Asian Development Bank in 2017, identified policy challenges for Thailand to sustain
its economic growth. With Thailand suffering subpar growth in recent years when compared
with growth in its Southeast Asian peers or with its own past performance, concern is growing
that the country may have slipped onto a low-growth path that leads to the middle-income
 trap. The economy grew at an average annual rate of 9.5% in the decade to 1996, before the
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, then slowed to an average of 5.2% from 1999 to 2005.
Since then, growth has plummeted further to an average of 3.3%. At this juncture, reigniting
growth is the government’s most pressing policy challenge4.
Recognizing the problem, the government embarked last year on an ambitious program
of strategic reform dubbed Thailand 4.0, which aims to lift the country’s long-term growth
path. In a nutshell, Thailand 4.0 is built on three strategic components: an agricultural
transformation away from traditional farming to what it calls “smart farming,” industrial
restructuring into “smart enterprises,” and service sector upgrading to wean tourism related
services in particular away from short-stay, low-spending tourists toward high-value guests.5
Another cause for concern in the contemporary geopolitical issues of Thailand that has
implications to ASEAN is the on-going border disputes that involved member-states.
Between February and April 2011, Thai and Cambodian military forces exchanged rounds
of artillery, mortars, and rifle fire in the proximity of two Hindu temples, which sit in a hilly
jungle area that both sides say belongs to them. Clashes subsequently extended to the hill-
top temple of Preah Vihear, a flashpoint for the dispute. Thailand also admitted the use of
cluster bombs during four days of border fighting. The violence killed 17 people and displaced
36,000 villagers (Mancini, 2013). To further stressed the opinion of Professor Mancini, he
argued that, “The tremendous importance of this region to the peace, stability, and prosperity
of the Asia-Pacific cannot be overstated. It remains to be seen whether a negotiated solution
will be possible and if the involvement of regional organizations, such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other global powers, such as the US, will facilitate or
complicate a diplomatic solutions”.
The Preah Vihear issue between Thailand and Cambodia also played into the political
turmoil in Bangkok. Following the joint communique in which Thailand expressed support for
Cambodia to list Preah Vihear as a UNESCO World Heritage site, The People’s Alliance for
Democracy (PAD), or the so-called Yellow Shirt movement, accused the People Power Party’s
Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama of ceding the 4.6 square kilometer area surrounding the
Temple to Cambodia and abandoning Thailand’s right to reclaim the Preah Vihear in exchange
for business concessions in Cambodia (Chingchit, 2014).
Another issue in the geopolitical make up of Thailand vis-à-vis the ASEAN is the Rohingya
crisis. Thailand figured out into the issue with Malaysia and Indonesia when it refused to
receive the hundreds of Rohingya onboard ships. According to Phil Robertson of Human

4
See Asian Development Outlook 2017, Transcending the Middle-Income Challenge, page 257 and published in
Manila, (2017). The ADO 2017 is published yearly by the Asian Development Bank. For this chapter, it was written
by Pilipinas Quising of the Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila; and Anthony
Patrick, consultant, Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department, ADB, Manila.
5
Ibid, page 258
 Rights Watch Asia, “The Thai, Malaysian and Indonesian
navies should stop playing a three-way game of human ping
pong, and instead should work together to rescue all those
on these ill-fated boats” (Tisdall, 2015).
It is noteworthy to point out that Thailand claims the
distinction as the only Kingdom in Southeast Asia that has never
been conquered by major superpowers such as France, Great
Britain and Portugal. It was through the astute Royal diplomacy
that buoyed the Royal Thai nation above the waves of conquest
and subjugation by major players of the world.
Such was the role of Thailand that it partakes itself of the
task of unifying ASEAN to the ‘asianness’ to the core while
maintain good relations, from bilateral to multilateral relations
with foreign super powers, for its economy and culture.
Thailand sits at the crux of the Indochina and Malay
peninsulas, forming the core of the greater Southeast Asian peninsula and overlooking the Gulf
of Thailand. The Dawna mountain range bounds the northern and western extent of the Thai
territory, while the Khorat Plateau, a grassy highlands at the base of the Indochina Peninsula,
forms the more permeable eastern boundary. North of the Kharat Plateau, the Mekong River
marks the boundary line. In the South, Thailand extends down the narrow bottleneck of the
Malay Peninsula until the point where it widens (The Geopolotics of Thailand: A Kingdom in Flux,
2018).
The Texas-based thinktank Stratfor highlighted the geopolitical imperatives which has
remained unchanged since the 14th and 15th centuries, respectively. These geopolitical
imperatives6 are:

• Maintain stability in Bangkok – the home of 10 per cent of the population – and
preserve central Thailand’s political dominance;
• Rein in and consolidate power over three outlying regions to gain strategic depth: the
northern mountains, the northeastern Khorat Plateau and the southern Malay
Peninsula;
• Prevent incursions from Myanmar to the west and Laos and Cambodia to the east by
helping to keep them destabilized, fragmented and incapable of posing a threat;
• Reach out to foreign powers to benefit from them economically and technologically
while not allowing them to undermine central Thai political power or social stability.

6
The Stratfor Worldview comes out with its analyses on countries in the Asia-Pacific region and more on this,
check: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitics-thailand-kingdom-flux
 As we proceed to the study of its bilateral relations, this paper pursues Thailand’s bilateral
relations with the United States of America, China and Japan.

III. Thai-US Relations

The U.S.-Thailand relationship boasts a long history, with the first diplomatic ties
established through the Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833 during the administration of
Andrew Jackson. Since then, Thailand has been a staunch U.S. ally. Thai King Mongkut offered
U.S. President Abraham Lincoln elephants to use in battle during the U.S. Civil War, and Thai
troops fought alongside American soldiers in World War I, Korea, and Vietnam. Commercial
relations also grew in the early 19th century, as ships crossed the ocean for trade. Later efforts
included humanitarian, cultural, and philanthropic causes. After World War II, government-to-
government and people-to-people ties grew more extensive as each nation recognized the
increasing importance and benefits of maintaining positive relations (Brandon & Cohen, 2013).
As a backgrounder on a thesis written by Kenneth Stanley Harbin for his Master of Arts in
National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in December 1990, he cited that “In
1950, relations between the United States and Thailand were substantially improved after the
U.S. persuaded the Thai government to recognize the Bao Dai government in Southern Vietnam.
In return, the U.S. provided Thailand with grants for military, education, health, and agricultural
development assistance. The majority of these grants were provided under U.S.-Thai agreements
for economic and technical cooperation and for military assistance” (Harbin, 1990).
Thailand has been an American Treaty ally since 1954. Rightly so, that America has
watched a careful eye on the domestic political upheavals in Bangkok more interestingly. The
country’s political stability and democratic development have been shaken, however, by
extensive political turmoil in the wake of the September 2006 by the Thai military that deposed
Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a populist tycoon whose political party had won two
parliamentary elections. Thaksin’s rise – and then its fall and its aftermath – exposed deep and
lasting divisions within Thai society, largely between urban elites and politically isolated rural
Thais, who Thaksin courted with populist economic programs. The coup also set off power
struggle among established power centers, which spilled over into unprecedented street violence
in 2010 and large demonstration in late 2013 by protestors calling for the government to stop
down and, in some form, an alteration of the country’s political system (Chanlett-Avery & Dolven,
2013).
As in 2006 coup, the US suspended the US$ 24 Million Foreign Military Financing and the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) however the 40-50 Joint US-Thai exercises
including the Cobra Gold proceeded without disturbances.
The 2014 coup against Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra by the Thai military has soured
US-Thai relations. US President Barack Obama took a hardline approach against Thailand. At this
time, the US suspended the more than US$ 4.7 million in unspent FMF and IMET assistance for
Thailand but it also cancelled high-level engagements, exercises and a number of training
programs with the military and police. With regard to the later, probably most significantly, it
curtained US participation in the region’s premier multilateral military exercise, Cobra Gold, in
2015, and plans to do so again in 2016. It has also been much more publicly vocal about the state
of democracy and human rights in Thailand (Lohman, 2015).
The United States has a chance every year to improve its security relationship with
Thailand through Cobra Gold. This exercise, hosted by Thailand, brings together participants from
29 countries who work together in coordinating military, logistical, and humanitarian operations.
More importantly, this drill demonstrates the readiness and resolve of the United States to work
with its partners in the Asia-Pacific to respond to any disaster, be they natural or manmade.
However, U.S. troop participation levels have fallen for three years in a row, numbering 3,500,
one-third of its peak of 9,500 (Woon Cho, 2017).
On the Thai-US trade relations, in 2017, the US has a bilateral trade deficit in US$ 16,687.3
Billion.

Month Exports Imports Balance

January 2017 834.9 2,381.4 -1,546.4

February 2017 830.8 2,212.0 -1,381.2

March 2017 819.4 2,603.7 -1,784.3

April 2017 863.5 2,327.6 -1,464.1

May 2017 861.1 2,563.9 -1,702.8

June 2017 1,078.7 2,724.1 -1,645.4

July 2017 807.0 2,733.4 -1,926.4

August 2017 859.1 2,785.2 -1,926.1

September 2017 1,034.5 2,539.4 -1,505.0

October 2017 1,062.6 2,868.3 -1,805.6

TOTAL 2017 9,051.7 25,739.1 -16,687.3

Source: https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5490.html
This was lower than 2016 data of US-Thailand trade balance with a trade deficit
amounting to US$ 19,032.1 Billion and in 2015 which totaled to US$ 17,390.0 Billion.
This bilateral trade relations stemmed from existing bilateral agreements entered into by
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Thailand. The cornerstone of this bilateral
relations is the 1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce which was sustained and enhanced by the
modern 2002 Bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).
 IV. Thai-Sino Relations
As state leaders arrived in Bangkok for the October 2003 Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation meeting, an important dynamic of Thailand’s policy debate regarding the PRC was
evident: managing good relations with both the PRC and the United States without losing the
favor of either. Of the two powers, Chinese President Hu Jintao arrived first on October 17, 2003
with warm praise for the flourishing relations between the PRC and Thailand. While still enjoying
the success of China’s first space launch, Hu used the occasion to convey to Thai leaders the
symbolism of making Thailand the first country of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) he visited since becoming president. China sees its relationship with Thailand as a model
for the region, with strong personal ties, military and civilian exchanges, and booming trade
relations (Matthews, 2003).
Due to centuries-old historical linkages between China and Southeast Asia, as well as
geographic proximity, China enjoys more influence in the ASEAN region than elsewhere.
According to the 2016 Asian Barometer Survey, “despite sovereignty disputes in the South China
Sea, a majority of citizens in most Southeast Asian countries (with the exception of Myanmar)
view the influence of China favorably” (Mabdubani & Nair, 2017) Thailand included.
Thai-Chinese relations have warmed to levels unseen since the anti-Vietnam years when
Thailand was ASEAN’s frontline state in a standoff against the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin regime
in Phnom Penh, a united front that included the Beijing-supported Khmer Rouge. While Thai-
Chinese ties have never been estranged since their normalisation and Bangkok’s adoption of a
one-China policy in the mid-1970s, this subtle but deepening bilateral partnership is reinforced
by the role of the overseas Chinese, who have become economically integrated and ethnically
seamless entrepreneurs in Thailand’s economic development. As China’s economic rise becomes
the defining feature of regional politics in the 21st century, Thailand’s natural omnidirectional
hedging between the major powers has augured well for the Bangkok-Beijing axis. China was the
only major power to recognise Thailand’s putsch in 2006 and allowed high-level contacts with
coup-appointed government officials. Military ties have deepened in recent years, as the Chinese
have sponsored more Thai middle-ranking military officers for training in China than ever, and
the two countries have undertaken joint military exercises every year since 2003. Indeed, in 2007
Thailand was the first Southeast Asian country to host the People’s Liberation Army on its
territory (Pongsudhirak, 2012).
At the recent Official Visit to China 28-29 May 2007, Thai Prime Minister Surayuth
Chulanond witnessed the signing of a Joint Action Plan on Thailand-China Strategic Cooperation,
which provided the blueprint for strategic partnerships in 15 areas, including military and security
cooperation. Over the next five years, from 2007-2011, Thailand and China will deepen and widen
their cooperation so as to strengthen their bilateral relationships as well as to foster their
strategic partnership (Chinwanno, 2008).
 Thai-China bilateral relations has been the focal point for debates on conflagrating
interests of China in Southeast Asia because of Bangkok’s central and unique geopolitical location
in the region. In its relations with the West in general and with the United States, Thailand wields
its “bamboo foreign policy tradition” which meant it likens external relations to a bamboo which
bends with the wind but never breaks.
As Dr. Karl D. Jackson of the famed Johns Hopkins University testified before the US China
Commission Hearing on Mainland Southeast Asia on June 8, 2017 puts it: “Thailand has been
adjusting its policies toward China ever since 1975 when it began to see China, in all its enormity,
begin to develop, first economically and then militarily. In Thailand regimes and constitutions
come and go. But Thailand persistently hedges its bets, by tilting toward whatever power is
emerging in Asia (once Great Britain, subsequently the U.S., and now China) but without
abandoning relationships with other powers who might be needed to preserve Thai sovereignty
in some future scenario (Jackson, 2017)”.
Further, Dr. Jackson opined in his testimony that “Thailand’s economic interactions
currently favor leaning toward China because two-way trade with China is nearly twice as much
as its two-way trade with the United States. One Belt One Road offers infrastructure projects
from China that it cannot attain from the United States.”
Thailand and the People’s Republic of China entered into a free trade agreement in June
2003.
Because of the ambitious China’s One Belt One Road, Thailand anticipates infrastructure
projects that will most certainly benefit the Thai society. Thailand has recently sought closer
relations with China, such as in defense procurement and infrastructure development. Just last
week, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-O-Cha used his absolute power to hasten a delayed $5.2
Billion high-speed rail joint venture with China. He later rejected criticism that he overrode due
process and said the order was in the nation’s best interests. Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC)
plan covers Rayong, Chachoengsao and Chonburi provinces. Under the project, Thailand will aim
to take on Singapore’s dominance in aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul as part of a $5.7
Billion upgrade of U-Tapao International Airport. The increased terminal capacity would also ease
the strain of coping with an annual influx of more than 30 Million tourists (Amin & Nguyen, 2017).
This optimism is also being shared by Thai businessmen. Chairman of the Thailand-China Business
Council Wikrom Kromdit said China’s One Belt One Road, which starts from the souther part of
China to Vietnam, Lao and Thailand, will be an important route used by China to the Indian Ocean.
Thailand will be directly benefited from the route by connecting with China whose 4-trillion-USD
trade value is currently the highest in the world (Private sector believes China’s One Belt One
Road will benefit Thailand, 2017).
 The One Belt One Road Initiatives of China effectively links Thailand within the heart of
ASEAN and the rest of Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
China is attempting to export its approach to development, which has lifted hundreds
of millions of its people out of poverty. The “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative,
described by leaders as a vehicle for soft power, calls for spurring regional connectivity. It
seeks to bring together the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road through a
vast network of railways, roads, pipelines, ports, and telecommunications infrastructure that
will promote economic integration from China, through Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, to
Europe. To finance a share of these international projects, China contributed $50 billion to
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank upon its founding, half of the bank’s initial capital.
Beijing also pledged $40 billion for its Silk Road Fund, $25 billion for the Maritime Silk Road,
and another $41 billion to the New Development Bank (established by BRICS states: Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Albert, 2017).
The Chinese Government’s campaign to market its high-speed railway technology is
perhaps the best example of how it intends to use OBOR to upgrade China’s industry. Many have
dubbed Premier Li’s marketing effort in this area as ‘high-speed railway diplomacy’. Beijing
considers its high-speed railway technology to be one of the crown jewels of its advanced
manufacturing industry. The Chinese Government has mobilised more than 10, 000 scientists and
engineers to incorporate imported foreign technology as well as to develop the country’s own
high-speed rail technology. The result of this effort is evident in the breathtaking development
of China’s high-speed rail sector. Today the country is home to more than 50 per cent of the
world’s total constructed high-speed railway. Premier Li Keqiang has personally marketed
Chinese-made high-speed to Thailand, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia. All of these countries are
considered to be key strategic partners in OBOR (Cai, 2017).
Thailand is willing to maintain high-level exchanges with China, deepen bilateral and
multilateral cooperation, consolidate political mutual trust, expand economic and trade
exchanges, promote mutual investment, enhance personnel exchanges and strengthen
cooperation in such fields as education, scientific research and infrastructure. Thailand supports
and will actively participate in the "Belt and Road" initiative proposed by China, the Lancang-
Mekong cooperation and other important propositions that may promote the common
development in the region (Chan-O-Cha, 2017).

V. Thai-Japan Relations
The Royal Thai Government established its bilateral relations with the empire of Japan
since 1887.
A cursory review of the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, it describes
the Thai-Japan relations to be long and cordial. Historical records attest to the existence of
relations between Ryukyu (Okinawa) and Ayudhaya as far back as the 15th century. Trade
between the two countries became active during the 17th century, at which time the Japanese
community in Ayudhaya flourished. But after Japan adopted the policy of Sakoku, a policy of
closing the country to the outside world, in 1639, the community began to decline. Centuries
later, a new chapter of the relations in modern history began with the Declaration of Amity and
Commerce between Japan and Siam in 1887. At that time, Japanese experts on law, education,
sericulture and so forth were dispatched to Thailand to contribute to the modernization of the
country. At the time of World War II, Thailand, allied with Japan, declared war against the United
States of America and the United Kingdom, but made the said declaration null after the War
(Japan-Thailand Relations , 2016).
Its historic economic ties was on the backbone of the signing of the Japan-Thailand
Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA). As well-known Thai economist Pasuk Phongpaichit
claimed in his speech in Tokyo: “Over the intervening six centuries, trade and economic relations
between Thailand and Japan have waxed and waned in different periods, but there is a strong
overall continuity. In the negotiations of 1419, the issue was Ryukyu’s access to rare goods for
import back to Japan. The negotiations that resulted in the JTEPA were much more wide ranging.
They include trade in commodities in both directions; trade in services in both directions; and
investment in both directions.”7
Japan is our single largest trading partner. Japan’s shares of our imports (around 20
percent) and exports (around 15 percent) are declining slightly as we diversify our trade, but are

7
Speech delivered at Symposium on Future of Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership on the occasion of 120th
anniversary of Japan-Thailand Diplomatic Relations. 1 November 2007, Hotel New Otani, Tokyo
still of major significance (Fig. 2). The US takes a slightly higher share of our exports, but Japan’s
share of our imports is two to three times that of the US. Japan is also an important friend-in-
need, as was shown during the Asian crisis of 1997. Japan contributed generously to the IMF
rescue program, and then went further by providing the Miyazawa Fund to help stimulate a
recovery. This is well remembered and appreciated (Phongpaichit, 2007).
Back in 2012, Japan and Thailand expect their bilateral trade to boost in 2017, as a result
of the trade pact. According to the Trade Negotiations Department, bilateral trade between
Thailand and Japan was worth $66.2Billion last year, an increase of 13.7 per cent from 2010.
Exports from Thailand to Japan were valued at $24.1 Billion, a 17.9 per cent increase, while
imports were $42.3 Billion, up by 11.4 per cent on a year (Pratruangkrai, 2012). In November
2017, Thailand’s trade balance with Japan was a record of 113.36 Billion Yen.

VI. Thailand and the ASEAN: Contemporary Issues and Challenges

Thailand shares the historic limelight as one of the pioneers who created the ASEAN.
Under its chairmanship of the ASEAN in 2008-2009, Thailand steered ASEAN to commit itself to
ASEAN Charter and ensure the ASEAN Community-building processes. During this stint, Thailand
ensured the adoption of the Roadmap to the ASEAN Community 2025 which included the three
pillars namely: ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN
Socio-cultural Community.
Thailand, being the only nation in Southeast Asia that was not subjugated to colonial rule
by the world’s superpowers have a unique contribution to the independence of the ASEAN as
well as it principle of non-confrontational and non-interference in the domestic affairs of
member states and contributing very much to the de-escalation of tensions by open dialogue and
cooperation. This is the centerpiece of the ASEAN as a regional association since its inception
until the present.
Although in the Second World War, Thailand sided with the Japanese, after the end of the
war, America and its allies left Thailand untouched. It must be the golden years of Thai diplomacy
that insulated itself from external power’s annexation or colonization. After the war towards the
Cold War, Thailand has become an active and dynamic treaty partner of the United States
although China placed a special bond in Thailand’s foreign policy sphere.
The Royal Thai society maintained to this day, warm and deep bilateral relations with
major royal houses in Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia. Due that this confluence of royal
relationships, Thailand places a special role in the affairs of the ASEAN as a key player for its
regionalism and enhanced international reputation as a regional bloc.
Politics and economic issues in Thailand has deep repercussions in the affairs of the
ASEAN. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis hits Thailand badly, ASEAN was also shaken. The
symbiotic relationship of Thailand and the ASEAN is buoyed by its interdependence on
cooperation by instituting institutional reforms that benefits both Thailand and other member-
states of the ASEAN.
Following the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together, signed
during the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur; Thailand recognizes the “rapidly changing
geostrategic landscape which continues to present both opportunities and challenges which
requires that ASEAN respond proactively in order to remain relevant as well as to maintain ASEAN
centrality and role as the primary driving force in the evolving regional architecture”.
Foremost also is the landmark Kuala Lumpur Declaration on a People-oriented people-
centered ASEAN which was signed during the 26th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur; Thailand as
well as all other member-states commits to “enhance ASEAN cooperation with its dialogue
partners and relevant external parties within the framework of ASEAN-led mechanisms in all
three pillars of the ASEAN Community that would complement regional efforts to strengthen
people-oriented people-centered and rules-based ASEAN.
These two declarations sealed the bond of unity within ASEAN which Thailand also
adheres to stay relevant in the ASEAN community. It is however, in this backdrop that the issue
of the Rohingya in Myanmar was deliberated in the UN Third Committee which Thailand
abstained from voting. It will continue to be a challenge to the people-oriented people-centered
ASEAN in the next decade.
Amitav Acharya of the American University posed the question of “can ASEAN cope with
the changing world order? The question was thrown at the ASEAN with the rising China in the
background and the American pivot to Asia long dead after the election of American President
Donald Trump. Prof. Acharya opined that “China and India are likely to push for globalisation
without automatically accepting the liberal values associated with it. The new globalization will
be politically illiberal and more respectful of state sovereignty.” This poses a challenge for other
members of the ASEAN whose liberal democracy associate foreign direct investments with strings
attached to key issues of liberalism and democratic ideals. For most of the ASEAN, these
approaches by China engages them economically through the OBOR initiatives but also ensuring
that their domestic politics and affairs are not intervened as a result of engagements.

Under such circumstances, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative of China, together
with financial institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road
Fund, breathes a new life into ASEAN’s connectivity hopes. During the 17th ASEAN-China Summit
in 2014, ASEAN officials said they “appreciated China’s continued support” in realizing MPAC,
while at the same time “expecting AIIB to provide financial support to regional infrastructure
projects, with an emphasis on supporting the implementation of the MPAC” (Minh Vu, 2017).

Another external challenge to the ASEAN-led architecture is the attitude and policies of
the United States under the Trump administration. The Trump administration is unlikely to
display the same interest in and support for ASEAN as the Obama administration. If — and it’s a
big if — the United States’ approach weakens US alliances in the region, especially the US–Japan
alliance, ASEAN may lose a major geopolitical cushion for its multilateral diplomacy (Acharya,
2017).

Finally, the question is posed: What is the role of the United States in Southeast Asia?

There is much uncertainty about US policy in the Asia Pacific. I believe this is not only in
the medium term or because of the absence of a clearly articulated vision and goals under
President Donald Trump, but potentially over a longer period. For a long time, US foreign policy
has been underpinned, among other things (like promotion of national interest and the desire to
sustain global leadership), by belief in the superiority of liberal democracy as a legacy of Western
civilization. Today, internal political divisions in the United States have damaged consensus over
what American values are, and the Trump election into the presidency is not the cause but
possibly a symptom, if not an effect. Without American certitude that they represent a superior
vision and ways that should be admired and emulated by others, the alliances and other
relationships across the globe that helped secure the dominant role of the US on the basis of
agreement on values have begun to unravel and will continue to unravel. The US could well
remain a leader on the basis of tactical convergence of material interests with other states, but
the ideational foundations of its leadership will badly need to be restored if it seeks to sustain its
legitimacy as a global leader (Baviera, 2017).

Prospectively, as the Philippines successfully hosted the 50th Anniversary of the ASEAN in
Manila in 2017, the next logical question will be: What should ASEAN do in the next 50 years?

For the answers, I rest in the thoughts of the culled works of Ahmad Rizky Umar and Karina
Larasati Riyanto who are both from the ASEAN Studies Center at the esteemed Universitas
Gadjah Mada of Indonesia. They cited several responses to the question I raised.

Ahmad Rizky M. Umar kicked-off by arguing that the future ASEAN integration needs to
move beyond political and economic integration. He suggests that ASEAN needs to take into
account broader issues other than traditional free trade, security, or political integration issues.
ASEAN needs to deal with oft-neglected issues such as Middle Income Trap, Sustainability,
Human Rights, or Gender.

Suraj Shah, for example, argues that ASEAN needs to rethink its approach to development
and industrial strategy in order to escape the Middle Income Trap. Economic integration attempt
to pave the way for such initiative, but the perceived ASEAN way among the member states
constrained the implementation.
 Taking a more critical stance, Jakkrit Chuamuangphan calls ASEAN to pay more attention
to Human Rights defender. The case of forced disappearances in many Southeast Asian states
(most notably, the Sombhat case in Laos) should be tackled by ASEAN by functioning its Human
Rights Commission, which has been established since 2009. Farieda Ilhami Zulaikha highlights the
many languages of gender discrimination in the region, which ASEAN is still unable to respond
with proper policy frameworks.

From a sustainability perspective, Ibnu Budiman reflects the need for ASEAN to rethink
its approach to agricultural sector due to the danger of climate change. Moreover, he suggests
that ASEAN should start to protect the rights of smallholder farmers through investing in climate
action. A more participatory approach with farmers in each ASEAN member states is therefore
necessary.

Dendy Raditya Atmosuwito raises more questions as to how we should reconsider ASEAN
studies in the future, given the existing social and political challenges in the last 50 years. For
example, as Dio H. Tobing has critically asked, is such notion like ASEAN Way –a perceived
diplomatic culture among ASEAN member states based on non-intervention principle—still
relevant in the future? The answer yes, given the historical importance of such norm in the past.

Nevertheless, according to Rifky Maulana Iqbal Taufik, ASEAN should also consider
establishing a more complex form of collective identity to bring the idea of ASEAN Community
‘down to ordinary people’. This is where paradiplomacy is increasingly important for ASEAN. Ario
Bimo Utomo explains that which the practice of diplomacy is not only dominated by the central
government, but also the local government. This new framework should also be considered by
ASEAN in the future. This necessitates further capacity development and inclusion of ‘good
governance’ in ASEAN’s institutional design, according to Pinto Buana Putra (Riyanto & Umar,
2017).

VII. Insights and reflection

This paper allowed me to dissect issues and challenges that surrounds Thailand in its link
with the ASEAN. It allowed me to understand how history of a nation can help steer the wheel of
diplomacy to favor its people and nation, internationally and regionally. It is without a doubt that
Thailand enjoys its reputation today due wholly to its unique place in the history of colonization
of Southeast Asia.
Unlike Burma which was colonized by Great Britain and Cambodia having been colonized
by France and similarly with Vietnam, Thailand remains to this day, untouched by colonizers
which allowed its national identity to flourished without restraint. It allowed its democracy to
shine under the umbrella of the Thai military which remains very loyal to the Royal Thai family
for centuries.
 Most of the political turmoil that happened in Thailand stemmed from corruption and the
allegations of corruption among the ranks of the elected parties and personalities which
necessitates for a military crackdown and turn-over. The militarization of the Thai politics can
also be traced to the unquestionable allegiance of the military establishment to the Thai Royal
family especially during the reign of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Other than politics, as
most certainly argued by economists and scholars, Thailand’s economy is steadily growing from
where it slumps during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. It’s tourism continues to attract millions
of tourist arrivals which help buoyed its resilience against harmful threats to its national
economy.
As I see this as an opportunity for Thailand to lead mainland Southeast Asian member-
states of the ASEAN towards a united front but it has to carefully tread the issue of Preah Vihear
temples with the Kingdom of Cambodia as well as threats to its internal security from the influx
of forced migration of Rohingya from Myanmar which could trigger backlash from the more than
95% Buddhist Thai majority. The scheduled 2018 national elections too is a challenge Thailand
has to faced plus its relatively young King’s influence on Thai’s military and civic society.

-o0o-

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