LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.]
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE
M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA,
PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President,
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO
MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS,
RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National
Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE'S COUNTRY, NOT AMONG THE
RIGHTS GUARANTEED. — The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
— It is the court's well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and under our Constitution,is part of the law of the land [Art. II Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.]
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO RETURN, DISTINCT AND SEPARATE FROM THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL. — It is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
4. ID.; ALLOCATION OF POWER IN THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT A GRANT OF ALL THE POWERS
INHERENT THERETO. — As the Supreme Court in Ocampov. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a
grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means
a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.] If this can be
said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more
than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally
be said of the executive power which is vested in one official — the President.
5. ID.; PRESIDENT'S POWER UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; EXTENT AND LIMITATION. — Consideration
of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a
complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the
President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power."
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated
in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated.
6. ID.; PRESIDENT'S RESIDUAL POWER TO PROTECT THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE; THE POWERS
INVOLVED. — The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems
of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on
the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is
not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision.
7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE
PHILIPPINES; TO BE TREATED AS ADDRESSED TO THE RESIDUAL UNSTATED POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. —
The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in
the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject
to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to
the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or
denied.
8. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; POWER TO DETERMINE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION ON ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. — The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination
to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the official whose action is being questioned.
9. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL OF REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THE
PHILIPPINES, NOT A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties,
from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents
were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision. The documented history of the
efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate
and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. With these before her, the
President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; ITS PROVISIONS PROTECT ALL MEN, AT ALL TIMES AND UNDER
ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. — "The Constitution . . . is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace,
and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its
provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall.
2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866]).
2. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTIONS; OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION. — It is a well-settled
doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions.
3. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED. — It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to
determine what matters fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside
the scope of the judicial power. More properly, however, it means those questions which, under the
constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
4. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL POWER VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE PRESIDENT OR CONGRESS, BEYOND
PROHIBITION OR EXAMINATION BY THE COURT REQUIRED FOR ITS EXISTENCE. — For a political question to
exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or Congress, the exercise
of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power against a civil right
which claim is not found in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission
allowing public officials to strike where they please and to override everything which to them represents
evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law. The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights itself does not exist because no law has been enacted specifying the circumstances when the right
may be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The power is in Congress, not the
Executive.
5. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; RIGHT TO TRAVEL INCLUDES RIGHT TO TRAVEL OUT OF
OR BACK TO THE PHILIPPINES. — Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of
a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6 further provides that the right to
travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back into the Philippines, cannot be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
6. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE NO LONGER UTILIZED BY THE COURT; COURT COMPELLED TO
DECIDE THE CASE UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. — The framers of the Constitution believed that the
free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years to fall back on
prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of consequences or a fear that it
was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine and strike down an
exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel were
among the most vigorous critics of Mr.Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the political question
doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing
to invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the political question doctrine. We are
compelled to decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier
fundamental charters.
7. ID.; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL; DENIAL A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — We do not
have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the
respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the
implications of aMarcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion. In the first place, there has never been
a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national security and public safety
will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only after the present
petition was filed that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently surfaced in the
respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos policy to
(1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of
recovery and stability. Neither ground satisfies the criteria of national security and public safety. The
"confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone
sustains the claim of danger to national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem
or any troublesome person can be substituted for theMarcos threat as the catalysing factor. It was precisely
the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores
of other "undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate period which led the
framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political,
economic and other aspects of national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
"people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of
the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of
television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and
the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawaii with mercenaries aboard
an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to
the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their
followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power"
and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however,
stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major
players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and
civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they
conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment that threatened civilian
supremacy over the military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the
mercy of a fractious military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements in the military
establishment and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There were also the communist insurgency and
the secessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent
that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own in the areas they effectively control
while the separatists are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up in these
groups' determination to wrest power from the government. Not only through resort to arms but also
through the use of propaganda have they been successful in creating chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the
nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic
recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the
poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into
exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the
short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
The issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following
issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and
his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security,
public safety or public health" —
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of
former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding, —
(1) Have the requirements of due
process been complied with in making such
finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to
petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing
may be dispensed with, has the President's
decision, including the grounds upon which it was
based, been made known to petitioners so that
they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a
political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the
return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to
bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and would be
acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former
President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners,
pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.]
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to
travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that
effect. llcd
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public
order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others,
and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political
question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode.
Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to
attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the
Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the
President that such return and residence will endanger national security and
public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a
political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law provides
on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners
 Ferdinand E.Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the
question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it. cdrep
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the
Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable
question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the
Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence
here will endanger national security and public safety? This is still a justiciable
question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand
E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their residence
here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not decide
for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the
Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In
support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of
the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza, Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio Batista
of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez
of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their
governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for
Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its
limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the
controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel
and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S.
116, 78 SCt. 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt. 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which
affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(1)] separately from the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(1)] and the right to "be
free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights and
freedoms of others." [Art. 12(3)] as distinguished from the "right to enter his own country" of which one
cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and
the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the
right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
Constitution,is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil
and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases of Kent and Haig, which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of
effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material
insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue
before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence. Cdpr
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations
on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate
case for its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its
resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or
not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in
Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)],
"the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.] Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines" [Art.
VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual
division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial
powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised
under the government." [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power
which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one
official — the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executive power" although
in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power,
the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee
foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget
to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23]. LLphil
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these
enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the
President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert:
"The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius." [Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4; Rollo p. 233.] This argument brings to mind
the institution of the U. S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned. **
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem.
He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think
that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare;
by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave
considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision
realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article II in its opening words: "The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." . . . [The
President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office
from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's
dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important
measure on who is President." [At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger, who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. It remained, of
course, an agency of government subject to unvarying demands and duties no
matter who was President. But, more than most agencies of government, it
changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each
President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his
habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the White House
and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford,
was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the
President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore
altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood
it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold
the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and
posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional
order. [At 212-213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the
consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under
the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers
than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the
parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the
President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987
Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.LexLib
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions
pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides
that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of
specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision ofSpringer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277
U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature
may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and
the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to
do so, said:
. . . Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board"
and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the performance of any
legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of performance
of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question
whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act
in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and
still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the
authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they
do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of government
are divided . . . [At 202-203; emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find
reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government
to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black
and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by
veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative
and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into
watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.[At 210-211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve
and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the
blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of
life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of
presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has
to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them. prcd
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President
has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the
national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is
also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the
common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people
forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are
the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions
of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they
invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and
of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707,
October 7, 1988].
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the
exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the
general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To
paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything
not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be
viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
[see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of
discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.
[Rossiter, The American Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external
and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order
and ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion,
within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by
the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain
public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning has been
recognized by members of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of
Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to
the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of
our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under theConstitution and our laws."
[House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to
allow a man to come home to die in his country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of
abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied. llcd
The Extent of Review
Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor
General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through
a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a
presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor
can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power
is reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question
doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination
to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law
is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v.
Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that:
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to
the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the
Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether
or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect,
is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
 In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
not to supplant — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act .. [At 479-480.]. prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the SO ORDERED.
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines.
If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely ||| (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, [September 15, 1989], 258 PHIL 479-541)
abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during
the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the
President's decision.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within
by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials,
to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and
instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment
has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic
effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the
camel's back.

With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and
whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of
violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-
in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting
through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence
if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is
the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State — the fruition of the people's
sovereignty — is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend
the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility. LLjur

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships
brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and
relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth
stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing
burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which
stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant
ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit
of judicial notice.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within
our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that
determination.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-62100. May 30, 1986.]
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN
E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of theCourt of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES
& EXCHANGE COMMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as
Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; PROHIBITION AGAINST LEAVING THE PHILIPPINES, A
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. — A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935). ". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable
at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the
jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch
as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they
would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction." Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFINED. — Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in the custodyof the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECT. — Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the
power of the court as if he were in custody of proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused
so as to answer the call ofthe court and do what the law may require of him.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. — The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record,
and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who
have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a
continuationof the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the
person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. If the sureties
have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from which the
sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains
unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by
petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would
not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHEPHERD CASE (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) DIFFERENTIATED FROM CASE AT
BAR. — To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in
People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage: ".
. . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the pleasure of the Court. . . .
The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in
the territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants are out of the country.
Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty
operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for
the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country." The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the
appellate court is misplaced. The rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for
while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not
transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to
show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to
the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above.
6. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; LACK OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE
DENIAL OF MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY WAS PREMISED ON THE
FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO SATISFY THE TRIAL COURT OF THE URGENCY OF HIS TRAVEL. — As petitioner
has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof,
as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their
having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with
contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in
allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the
conditions of her bail bond.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL; IMPAIRED BY ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT RELEASING PETITIONER ON BAIL. — The constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states: "The liberty of abode
and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health." To our mind, the orderof the
trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision.
DECISION
FERNAN, J p:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a criminal
indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management,
Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the management of the
latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as
president of the former corporation. LexLib
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this jurisdiction,
petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a
petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a management committee,
not only for ManotocSecurities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative
to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the
Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr.,
Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management committee was organized and
appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested the then
Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum
to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration
Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a fake,
six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as
president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding
criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon,
and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases, petitioner has been
admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU Insurance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission
to leave the country", stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing,
both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:
"Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all
embracing ground that his trip is '. . . relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.'
"The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is
discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
"In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr.
now or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated." 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
"6. — Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if
the Court would allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety companies
that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held
liable in their undertakings because it was the Court which allowed the accused to
go outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused
fail or decide not to return.
"WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED." 3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall or
withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied in a letter
dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4 seeking to
annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He
likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and
the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.
On October 5,1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14, 1983 6 petitioner filed on
August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion, petitioner stated that his
presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of foreign investment
in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief executive
officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting his presence in
the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be involved in its investments." Petitioner,
likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the
prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission
. . . (he) was not in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of the
commission of the offenses imputed to him." 10Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the dismissal of the
other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered merely the informations
amended so as to delete the allegation that petitioner was president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder," 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. prLL
On September 20, 1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted
him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
"Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending
the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the
call of the court and do what the law may require of him." 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People v. Uy Tuising, 61
Phil. 404 (1935).
". . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to
prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond
that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said
jurisdiction."
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts.
"The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released
thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge
to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original
imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have
the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state." 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal remains
unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by
petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply
not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were otherwise. with the conditions of her bail bond.

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People vs.
Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
". . . The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
pleasure of the Court. . . . The law does not limit such undertaking of the
bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial "The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful
confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants are out of the order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public
country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail, albeit provisional is safety or public health."
indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully within as without the
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
boundaries of the granting state. This principle perhaps accounts for the
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail
does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country." Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court finds
that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The rather
broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed, neither law nor WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the
country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court. SO ORDERED.

Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was able to ||| (Manotoc, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-62100, [May 30, 1986], 226 PHIL 75-85)
show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to
the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
In contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the
Solicitor General in his comment:

"A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show
that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where
he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or
compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur
thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for
him to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged
business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
Neither is there any hint that petitioner's absence from the United States would
absolutely preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein,
nor is there any showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would
cause him irreparable damage or prejudice." 15

Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it.
Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in
accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any
proceedings with the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against
him. Under this rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has been reached as
to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to
permit the principal to leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued
by Judge Pronove has been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal
cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the
duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial
discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in much the same
way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 94284. April 8, 1991.]
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G.
GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL, DEFINED. — "Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before
any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule
114, Secs. 1 and 2).
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO TRAVEL RESTRICTED BY CONDITIONS OF BAIL. — The
condition imposed upon an accused on bail to make himself available at all times whenever
the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law,
Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138).
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; A PERSON RELEASED ON BAIL MAY BE RE-ARRESTED;
GROUND. — An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION ON THE RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT. — Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the libertyof travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in
the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A LIMITATION ON THE INHERENT POWER OF THE COURT TO USE ALL MEANS TO CARRY
THEIR ORDERS INTO EFFECT. — Article III, Section 6 of the1987 Constitution should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders
into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel
so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People ofthe Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times
to Court Orders and processes.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio v. Hon.
Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court ofCebu. In due time, he posted bail for his
provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the
Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the
Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily
on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not
yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and
there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad
without the knowledge and permission ofthis Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence,
this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to
decide the case. Cdpr
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July
1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could
not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to
travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national
security, public safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that
it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already
been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set
for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by
respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:
"1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until
this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled
arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the
failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to
appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;
 "2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never
appeared in person before the Court;
"3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and
warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason — failure
to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given
accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been
reached" (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p.
73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on
erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a
Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled
by reason ofPetitioner's non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the
right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of theCourt, even on grounds other than the
"interest of national security, public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to
appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the
conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before
any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule
114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever
the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc,
Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges
may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional
Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par.]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts
to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the
right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared
to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision. Article
III, Section 1 (4) thereof reads: prcd
"The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired."
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:
"The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health" (Article IV, Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently,
to wit:
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall
the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law."
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the
grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel
may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities
are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the
basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987,
p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international
travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel
Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent
power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending
before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, process
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that
the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever
the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under
the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged
whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was
but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing
to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and
processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his
pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the
reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in
any criminal proceeding is the People ofthe Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Silverio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94284, [April 8, 1991], 273 PHIL 128-135)
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 72119. May 29, 1987.]
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this
special civil action for Mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.Legaspi against
the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on
the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire
the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Mandamus to compel the
respondentCommission to disclose said information.
This is not the first time that the writ of Mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to
information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et al. vs. Tuvera et al., (G.R. No. L-
63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973
Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of
various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition
of the right in said Constitution,the statutory right to information provided for in the Land Registration
Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in another Mandamus
proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering
data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).
The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of
Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law.
The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec.
7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development." The new provision reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. cdphil
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to
information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for
by the Legislature are reason able conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest (Constitution,Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation
may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative
and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked
in a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He
challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal
right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls
attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular
information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of theCommission to furnish the
petitioner with the information he seeks.
1. To be given due course, a Petition for Mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. (Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The
petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal
right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.
In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is
asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi's actual interest in
the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas. At most there is a vague reference to
an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition,
Rollo, p. 3).
But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right.
It has been held that: LLphil
. . . when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution
of the laws . . . (Tanada et al. vs. Tuvera, et al., G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985,
136 SCRA 27, 36).
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner
is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, supra, when it held that even
those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom
"(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open . . ." (Sec. 56, Act
No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:
. . . "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces
every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a
pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of
inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. . . . (Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra at
p. 387).
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged
obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring
the present suit.
2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of
those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a
constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their
power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional
(Cooley, supra. at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the
Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties
exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the
ultimate illusion.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly
mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in
addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption
of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article
II, Section 28 thereof, to wit:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. (Art. II, Sec. 28).
In the Tanada case, supra, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an
imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We
granted Mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of
said duty: LexLib
. . . That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The
law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such
listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication. (Tanada v. Tuvera, supra, at
39), (Emphasis supplied).
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in allowing the examination of public
records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized in Subido vs.
Ozaeta, supra:
Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful,
or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the
person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the
information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that
scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is
the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy. . . . (Subido v. Ozaeta, supra at 388). (Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion
in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the
reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner
in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In the Subido case, We recognized the
authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect,
examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds
may promulgate are confined to:
. . . prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to
or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of
the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be
prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be
insured . . . (Subidovs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387).
Applying the Subido ruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate
the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case of Baldoza vs. Dimaano (Adm.
Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent
judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding
by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject
records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed
by him upon themanner of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both the Subido and the Baldoza cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to
regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction
has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular
information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose
(Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody
of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss
of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented,
and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured
(Subido vs. Ozaeta, supra). Cdpr
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford
access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance
cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The
constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in
a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and
the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on
the propriety of the issuance of the writ of Mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by
the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.
3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano,
Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members
of society to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 [1939]), access
to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review
1505 [1974] by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a
open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security
(Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations
Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
under the law upon access to the register of civil serviceeligibles for said position, the duty of the
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or
respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern. WHEREFORE:, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of
sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas for
a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information.
said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly
observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against Feliciano, J., is on leave.
release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of
access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case,
access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
||| (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, [May 29, 1987], 234 PHIL 521-537)
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace
a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their
lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis,
it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public. LibLex

The public concern invoked in the case of Tañada v. Tuvera, supra, was the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. In Subido vs. Ozaeta,
supra, the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate
transactions which some believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.

The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government
employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The
Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:

Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness
to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy
determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive
examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2. [2]).

Public office being a public trust, [Const.,Art. XI, Sec: 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their
respective positions.
b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For Mandamus to lie in a given
case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.

In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to
cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass
the civil serviceexaminations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are
released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civilservice eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.]
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO
BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY"
ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE RESORT TO COURTS OF
LAW MAY BE ALLOWED; EXCEPTIONS. — A settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can
be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress
available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case
unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when
only a question of law is involved.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; EFFECT OF DENIAL THEREOF. — The
cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In
this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by
the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public
office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from
abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the
Constitution.
3.ID.; ID.; NOT RESTRICTED BY THE EXERCISE OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS. — The right
to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say
that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise
of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with
the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance
the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.
4.ID.; ID.; NOT ABSOLUTE. — Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
5.ID.; RIGHT OF PRIVACY; CANNOT BE INVOKED BY A JURIDICAL ENTITY; RIGHT IS PURELY PERSONAL IN
NATURE. — When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a
potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. The right to privacy belongs
to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. A
corporation has no right to privacy since the entire basis of the right to privacy is injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS
through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely
personal in nature.
6.ID.; RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION; GOVERNMENT AGENCY PERFORMING PROPRIETARY
FUNCTIONS, NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE. — The government, whether carrying out its sovereign
attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. Consequently,
that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of
the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
7.ID.; ID.; LIMITATION. — The consideration in guaranting access to information on matters of public
concern does not however, accord to citizen the right to compel custodian of public records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire such information.
8.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT. — It must be
stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a)to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members
belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note
of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b)to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or
(c)to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
[Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the
following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila.
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am
requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members
of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million
each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez
 of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the
Freedom Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by
law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your
favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO
C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Companero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications,
President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and
reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of "the opposition
members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2
million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos."
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty
to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper
for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable
financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond
positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service
and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitionerValmonte wrote respondent another
letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former
members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition
members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.].
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After
petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required
to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board
of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is
therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no
cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether
or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.
Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to
resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available
under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless
the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466
(1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v.
Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which
requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can
be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees,
involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of
the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this
procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel
respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to
information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of
which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving
the constitutional right to information. In Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA
27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987, 150
SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public
interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
 The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV
Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic
thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon,
is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system,
governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the
people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of
public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the
people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the
obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press
and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to
information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's
monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in
the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be
effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore
restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The
right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure ** and
honesty in the public service. *** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi, The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure
is limited to "transactions involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of
"public interest" or "public concern", and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.].
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern". As observed in Legaspi: prcd
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there
is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541.]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to
information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate
the actions and conduct of citizens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are
eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.].
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain
Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans
from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the
former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume
a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to
pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the
reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A No. 186, as amended) was the necessity
"to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second
Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not
supposed to grant `clean loans'." [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public
to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of
the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore
expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of
fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by
the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through
mandamus proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality
as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what
the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power.
 Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally
protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of
the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information. llcd
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case
of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice
Fernando, stated:
. . . The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the
basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector —protection,
in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual —has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
technological age —industrialization, urbanization, and organization —operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a
citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-
quoted statement of the Court inMorfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right
cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills
Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis
of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would
have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to
privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf.Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121
Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.R.A. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A.
286 (1895)], and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers
themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied
that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared
to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty.
Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321
(1949).].
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters
of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to officialacts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary
functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records. llcd
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its
insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public
disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent —ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function
has long been repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and
Offices [G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 644], the Court said that the
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the
same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function
would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include
government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the
coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?
MR. OPLE.Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you.
When we declare "a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" —
referring to the transactions of the State —and when we say the
"State" which I suppose would include all of the various agencies,
departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the government. . . .
MR. OPLE.Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.Including government-owned and controlled corporations.
MR. OPLE.That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.And when we say "transactions which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman
refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does
he refer to the contract itself?
MR. OPLE.The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ.This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE.Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ.Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon
the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and
 controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable EN BANC
to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. [G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008.]

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by
the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS
hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious. SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 Process, respondents.
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled
[G.R. No. 183752. October 14, 2008.]
to "access to official records," the constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
or matters of public concern.cdrep CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT,
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and
duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2,
the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, City of Zamboanga,petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE P
126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of HILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C.
the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and
the list requested. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace
Process, respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of
the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may
specify, inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. [G.R. No. 183893. October 14, 2008.]

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH

SO ORDERED.
CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES
||| (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., G.R. No. 74930, [February 13, 1989], 252 PHIL 264-279) PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO
GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN
SULLIVAN, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly
appointed Presidential Adviser onthe Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

[G.R. No. 183951. October 14, 2008.]

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by

HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H.
OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st
Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rd Congressional
District, and Members of theSangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH
FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M.
MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC
 L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO,
HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J.
CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E.
TORRINO, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE
S PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA
and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential
Adviser of Peace Process,respondents.
[G.R. No. 183962. October 14, 2008.]
ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL
III, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA,
and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATINGPANEL,
represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.
SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioner-in-intervention.
MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N.
DEANO, petitioner-in-intervention.
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P.
SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioner-in-intervention.
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU,
in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of theProvince of Sultan
Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in
Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention.
CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and
RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan,petitioners-in-
intervention.
MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.
MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC. (MUSLAF), respondent-in-
intervention.
MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT
(MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J p:
Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace
process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center onthe armed conflict in Mindanao
between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a
bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet
again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly
delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in
strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom ofaction vested by that
same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.
I.FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late
Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur
Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF
away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. 1
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon
motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. IECcaA
The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations
began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General
Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same
contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and
respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and
refrain from the use ofthreat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace
negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going. 2
Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace
process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central
Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. 3 In
response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. cHDaEI
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was
suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading
MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo
asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help
convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously
discuss thematter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. 4
The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian
government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreementon the General Framework
for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its
military actions. 5
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22,
2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001)
containing the basic principles and agenda on the following
aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and AncestralDomain Aspect. With
regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same
be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting".
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended
with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspectof the Tripoli Agreement 2001
leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing
Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001,
which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many
incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al
Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of theMILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator
was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. 6 ISCHET
In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading
to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August
5, 2008.
II.STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument
— the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591,
183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.
Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain. 7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes
Esperon, Jr.
On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato 8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 9 Invoking the right to
information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD, pending thedisclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public
consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. 10
This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and
Prohibition. 11 filed by the City of Zamboanga, 12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and
Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray
that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical
Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.
By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and
directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-
AD. 13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official
copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD, 14 to which she complied. 15
Meanwhile, the City of Iligan 16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R.
No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already
been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners
herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. HSDCTA
The Province of Zamboanga del Norte, 17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep.
Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members 18 of theSangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition, 19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia,that the MOA-AD be declared null and
void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for
Prohibition, 20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining
respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived
therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifyingthe MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners
herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman
Mohagher Iqbal.
Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-
intervention. Petitioners-in-intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin
Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela 21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-
Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat 22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in
Lanao del Norte, 23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang
Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo
Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal
Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development
(MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention. aIHSEc
By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed
Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.
Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall
thoroughly review the MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and
thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met
with vigorous opposition from petitioners.
The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal
issues:
1.Whether the petitions have become moot and academic
(i)insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in
view of the disclosure of official copies of the final
draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and
(ii)insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government
Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has
become fait accompli with thefinalization of the draft;
2.Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
 3.Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis-Ã -
vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;
4.Whether there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article
III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including
public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]
If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;
5.Whether by
signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be BINDING itself ACcISa
a)to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b)to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA;
c)to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No.
8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]
If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so
bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;
6.Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato,
Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela,
and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/fromthe areas
covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable
question; and
7.Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid
commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 2
4
The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties
submitted their memoranda on time.
III.OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD
As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six
petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as thetwo comments-in-intervention in
favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.
The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.
Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements
between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements betweenthe GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement,
signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos. TICAcD
The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes — the organic act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), 26 and several international
law instruments — the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter,
among others.
The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating
from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace
agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device".
During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple
dichotomy: there was the dar-ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) anddar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first
referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the second denoted those lands where Muslims
were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective. 27 This way of viewing the world,
however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became
part ofthe international community of nations.
As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-
governmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually
lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories.
For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to
countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with
Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-
aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with
Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims. 28
It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-
mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements betweenthe MILF and the Philippine
government — the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement — that
partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing
that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that
elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]". 29
The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS", and starts with
its main body.
The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory,
Resources, and Governance.
A.CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES
This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous
peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as 'Bangsamoros'". It defines "Bangsamoro
people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelagoat the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed
or of full blood, including their spouses. 30
Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro", as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as
traditionally understood even by Muslims, 31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. ICTaEH
The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland", the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rightsof occupation. 32 Both parties
to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain. 33
The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be
rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally underthe suzerain authority of their sultanates
and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states
or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state
in the modern sense. 34
The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain
authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined asthe Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by
several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a
confederation ofindependent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom
was supreme over the others. 35
The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the 'First Nation' with defined territory and
with a system of government having entered into treaties ofamity and commerce with foreign nations".
The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory,
particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be
called "First Nation", hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations". 36 To
that extent, theMOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" — suggesting its
exclusive entitlement to that designation — departs from the Canadian usage of theterm.
The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it
grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain andAncestral Lands of the Bangsamoro. 37 ADaECI
B.TERRITORY
The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime,
terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domainand the atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. 38
More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM — thus
constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City.
Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion
in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. 39
Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are
grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each ofthese areas is to be subjected to a
plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be
subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-
AD. 40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas", on the other hand, are to be subjected to
a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement — the Comprehensive
Compact. 41
The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its
"internal waters", defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE
area; 42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters", which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters
up to the baselines of the Republic of thePhilippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao;
and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably
with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural
resources. 43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint".
The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central
Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation
agreement. 44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are
enumerated, among which arethe exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping
and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures. 45 There is no similar
provisionon the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.
C.RESOURCES
The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with
foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships
and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into
environmental cooperation agreements. 46 ACcaET
The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central
Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's
participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized
agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations
for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing ofincomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain. 47
With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy,
petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested
in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction". This right carries the proviso that,
"in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires", the Central Government may, for a fixed
period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or
direct the operation of such resources. 48
The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural
resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. 49
The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust
dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization
shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as
mutually determined bythe Parties. 50 STDEcA
The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining
concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management
Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including
those issued by thepresent ARMM. 51
D.GOVERNANCE
The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and
monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details
for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party
shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. 52
The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE
The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative",
characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states thatthe structure of governance is to be
based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions
in the Comprehensive Compact.
The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take
effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with
due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained
in theComprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy xxx xxx xxx
hangs on the legality of this provision.
In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no
The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional
electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary
judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate
in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact. AIaDcH petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere
contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly,
As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and
Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures.
respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as (Underscoring supplied)
"the representatives of the Parties", meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not
merely of the negotiating panels. 53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is The Solicitor General cites 63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:
"WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
"ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) TERRITORY
Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED
xxx xxx xxx
"IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr.
Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last 2.Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:
August 5, 2008.
xxx xxx xxx
Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces,
municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned d.Without derogating from the requirements of prior
in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY. agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and
deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12)
IV.PROCEDURAL ISSUES months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite
A.RIPENESS covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted
in the map as Category A attached herein
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. 54 Courts decline to issue advisory (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic part of this framework agreement. Toward this
questions. 55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies end, the Parties shall endeavor to
defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding
intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government. 56 issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15)
months from the signing of the MOA-AD.caTESD
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. xxx xxx xxx
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. 57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case GOVERNANCE
between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination. 58 CEHcSI
xxx xxx xxx
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is
ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual 7.The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual
challenging it. 59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable
into the picture, 60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to it to occur effectively. CASTDI
itself as a result of thechallenged action. 61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 62
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
in the present petitions, reasoning that: framework with due regard to non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained
The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further in the Comprehensive Compact. 64 (Underscoring supplied)
negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed
at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.
a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel,
obligationsuntil the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. . Jr. v. Aguirre, 65 this Court held:
..
 . . . [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law
or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular
violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty. DEaCSA
xxx xxx xxx
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution andthe laws . . . settling the dispute becomes the duty
and the responsibility of the courts. 66
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge
to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was
ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was
being challenged as unconstitutionalon its face. 68
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v.
United States, 69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action
by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe
for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996,
because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's
consequences. 70
The present petitions pray for Certiorari, 71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are
remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, inthe case of certiorari, or is
proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 72Mandamus is a remedy granted by law
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. 73 Certiorari,
Mandamusand Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or
prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. 74
The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3),
issued on February 28, 2001. 75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy
framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying
out the comprehensive peace process . . . be governed by this Executive Order". 76
The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-
AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing
them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.
Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-
AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework
shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework", implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-
AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of theConstitution. Such act
constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.
As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating
their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of theConstitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima
facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for
adjudicationexists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of thejudiciary to
settle the dispute. 77 HSIDTE
B.LOCUS STANDI
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens thepresentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions". 78
Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised. 79
When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. 80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is
sufficient that thepetitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. 81 EaHcDS
For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or
deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage ofpublic funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. 82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit. 83
In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that
injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be
questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested bythe Constitution in his office. 84
An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members, 85 but the mere invocation
by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to
preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing. 86
As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its
own, and of the other LGUs. 87
Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that
satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention, . 88 such as a legal interest inthe matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.
In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal
attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 89 where
technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents. 90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving
constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.
In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine
whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within thelimits of the Constitution
and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical
rules of procedure. 91 ScHADI
In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del
Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and
petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat,
City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon havelocus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that
they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included
in theintended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion
in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond
doubt.
In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no
standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or
privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent
mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering
their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them
standing.
Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government
funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE
territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in
these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their
personality to intervene in these petitions.
With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a
citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of thepublic's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-
AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or
failure of either of theparties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor.
With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a
taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter,
citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of CotabatoCity; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest
in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax theprocedural
technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand. ECaAHS
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group
for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance
Foundation, Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited
or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays
for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with
standing.
B.MOOTNESS
Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot
with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent
pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately
decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA". 92
In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already
disbanded the GRP Peace Panel. 93
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a
magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 95 (b) the situation
is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; 96 (c) the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; 97 and
(d) the case is capable ofrepetition yet evading review. 98
Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary
cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer
voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear
and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or
prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation. 93 SICDAa
The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial
review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only
in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo 100 and Manalo v. Calderon 101 where the Court
similarly decided them on themerits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same
moot notwithstanding.
Petitions not mooted
Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis
that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order.
Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points",
especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties
concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus
points", foremost of which isthe creation of the BJE.
In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend
and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take
effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD,
but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary for its realization. The petitions
have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-
AD, 101 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well
as the disbanding of the GRP Panel notwithstanding.
Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest
There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant
part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected
LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional
amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.
Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al. 103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no
longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good
to the nation as a whole".
The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and
eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband
network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties — the government and a private
foreign corporation. As theissues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard
principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual
circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy. ATcaID
The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements
In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry
out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwellson the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli
Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security
Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002.
Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor
General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not
sign the MOA[-AD]", mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.
Need to formulate principles-guidelines
Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry
out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could
contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary
that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano, 110 the Court ruled that access to public records is
because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured", it is minded to render a predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters ofpublic concern since,
decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to undoubtedly, in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, thegovernment in negotiating with the MILF significance.
regarding Ancestral Domain.
. . . The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a
Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
in Sanlakas v. Reyes 104 in which he stated that the doctrine of"capable of repetition yet evading review" democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's
can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance". They contend that the Court must have to information of general interest. Information is needed to
jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked. DHSEcI enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has
been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information
The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." . . . 111
treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be
resolved. 105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time,
access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a
Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation 112 so that they may be able to criticize and
referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases. 106 There is a reasonable expectation that participate in the affairsof the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by
petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government
Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 113
subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another
or any form. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having,
by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final
draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for
themselves, copies of theMOA-AD.
V.SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be
resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating
to its provisions, viz.:
1.Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and
later initialed the MOA-AD?
2.Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?
ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in
Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 7.The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. 107
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, 108 Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect
public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. SaHTCE
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. 109
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern 114 faces no
serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. 115 In previous
cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered
in the Register of Deeds, 116 the need for adequate notice to thepublic of the various laws, 117 the civil
service eligibility of a public employee, 118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant
loans to public officials, 119 therecovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten
wealth, 120 and the identity of party-list nominees, 121 among others, are matters of public concern.
Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject ofthe present cases is of public concern, involving as it
does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at
large. ACcHIa
Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading
to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as tothe executory nature or commercial
character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:
. . . [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction". Certainly, a consummated contract is
not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated,
and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark
until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or
even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a
requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public
discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined
in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional
right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest." 122 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Intended as a "splendid symmetry" 123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this
is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading: policy. 129 (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 28.Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable
interest. 124 safeguards". The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader 130 right to information on matters of public concern
to information on matters of public concern found in the Billof Rights. The right to information is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public
guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point
recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. 125 to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. SDHAEC
The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know asthe centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State between the government and the people. It is in theinterest of the State that the channels for free political
to be accountable by following such policy. 126 These provisions are vital discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's
to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable will. 131Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for
to the people. 127 DcaCSE feedback mechanisms.
Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so MS. ROSARIO BRAID.
disclose:
Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate?
MR. SUAREZ. Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people
can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not
And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not
able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose
be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it.
this will be part of the government implementing operational
MR. OPLE. mechanisms.

I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately MR. OPLE.

but, of course, the implementing law will have to be enacted by
Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer. 128
The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is
enlightening.
MR. DAVIDE.
I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I
get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-
executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to
implement?
MR. OPLE.
Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment
from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national
interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law".
MR. DAVIDE.
But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress
may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national
interest?
Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses
take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. ROSARIO BRAID.
Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?
I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public
officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based
organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more
credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and
voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are
afraid that there will be another OMA in the making. 132 (Emphasis
supplied) ScCEIA
The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching
orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public
consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No.
3. 133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further
enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by
institutionalizing the people's participation.

MR. OPLE.
Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately
influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course,
Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is
One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be
community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be
defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as
one community". 134Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building
and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to
build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's
participation in the peace process". 135
Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations,
contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation". 136
Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to
"[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek
relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely
reports on the progress of thecomprehensive peace process". 137 E.O. No. 3 in the locality where these will be implemented. 145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek
advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and
local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil
society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives". 138 aTADcH
In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary
to the constitutional right to information and disclosure.
PAPP Esperon committed grave
abuse of discretion
The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in
excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof.
The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner.
It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority
granted by the President. 139
Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in
justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by
which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express
mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that
border on classic lip service. 140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined.
As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable
under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit
provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order
even recognizes the exercise of thepublic's right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or
before the government proffers its definite propositions. 141 It bears emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to
elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.
AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their
unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of theMOA-AD. By unconditionally complying
with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or
without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. ESTDcC
Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require
all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions" 142 is well-taken. The LGC
chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:
Prior Consultations Required. — No project or program shall be implemented by
government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and
26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is
obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be
implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 143 (Italics and
underscoring supplied)
In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Paño, 144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted
provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular
local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment
and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, 146 which could
pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their
total environment.
With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are
represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have,
under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect
their rights, lives and destinies. 147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to
justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act, 148 which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.
Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all
other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping
declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as
one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it
seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While
paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal
framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section. TcSHaD
Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available
always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. 149
ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot
all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much
in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to
amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents,
nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein
which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary
changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For
now, the Court shall pass upon how
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws as
presently worded.
In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein
to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing
some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn
first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD,
namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this
concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind.
Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph
4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to
describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. aTCAcI
4.The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical
entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and
responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive,
legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers
and functions in thecomprehensive compact. A period of transition
shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact
specifying the relationship between the Central Government
and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely
in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association"
in international law, and the MOA-AD — by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR — placed
itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. cdrep
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish
durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain
responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status
as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence. . . . 150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
(FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory ofthe Pacific Islands, 151 are associated
states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S.
dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a
mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council
and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally
have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters
such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural
relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult
with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as
relating to or affecting either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government
has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part ofU.S. territory. The U.S. government,
moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated
states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these
territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an
international association between sovereigns. The Compact ofFree Association is a treaty which is
subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association
consistent with the rightof independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated
states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually
based on an underlying status of independence. 152 ACTISE
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed
through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,
Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states. 153
Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade
relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's
participation in meetings and events inthe ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participatein
Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and
sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming
part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to
be consulted bythe U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not
recognized under the present
Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having
an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, theconcept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. caTIDE
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specificallythe following provisions of Article X:
SEC. 1.The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall beautonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SEC. 15.There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as
it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, 154 namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other
states. AEITDH
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it — which has betrayed itself by its useof the concept of association — runs
counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself
contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-
AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by theconstituent units in a plebiscite called as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole
for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign
shall be included in the autonomous region". (Emphasis supplied) policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2 (c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2 (d) and 2 (e), the present transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-
geographic area of theARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite — Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) CIHAED
Tangkal — are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in theoverview. That the present components of the ARMM Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to
and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and
another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. ScCIaA development." (Underscoring supplied)An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While
there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national
The MOA-AD, moreover, would government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice,
not comply with Article X, Section has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
20 of the Constitution
Besides being irreconcilable with the
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
Constitution, the MOA-AD is also
SEC. 20.Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this inconsistent with prevailing
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions statutory law, among which are
shall provide for legislative powers over: R.A. No. 9054 156 or the Organic
|Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA. 157
(1)Administrative organization;
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro
(2)Creation of sources of revenues; people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 onCONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES states:

(3)Ancestral domain and natural resources; 1.It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to
(4)Personal, family, and property relations; those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or
(5)Regional urban and rural planning development;
colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their
(6)Economic, social, and tourism development; descendants are classified as
Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.
(7)Educational policies; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cHAaCE

(8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic
Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of theBangsamoro and other indigenous peoples
(9)Such other matters as may be authorized by law living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:
for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring "As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers
supplied) to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require (a)Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic
an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and
pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that
might vest inthe BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other (b)Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have
provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vestingthe BJE with retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political
treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: institutions."
"The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided,
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and
however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's
against theGovernment of the Republic of the Philippines . . . ." Under our constitutional system, it is manner of delineating the ancestraldomain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that
only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary 155instructs: procedure. By paragraph 1 of TERRITORY, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations
inthe agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well
as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and theaerial domain, the atmospheric space 10)Write-ups of names and places derived from the native
above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region". dialect of the community.

Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following e)Preparation of Maps. — On the basis of such investigation
provisions thereof: and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains
Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with
SEC. 52.Delineation Process. — The identification and technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and
delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following landmarks embraced therein;
procedures:
f)Report of Investigation and Other Documents. — A complete
xxx xxx xxx copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be
prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;
b)Petition for Delineation. — The process of delineating a specific perimeter may
be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or
through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a
majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs; CSaIAc g)Notice and Publication. — A copy of each document, including a translation
in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a
c)Delineation Proper. — The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A
including census of all community members therein, shall be copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and
immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a
filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive
done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen
times include genuine involvement and participation (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where
by the members of the communities concerned; no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid
substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed
d)Proof Required. — Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall
sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available; aCTADI
include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other
documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or h)Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication,
occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim
authentic documents: that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is
deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
1)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;
require the submission of additional evidence: Provided,
2)Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed
institution; ISaCTE patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided,
further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
3)Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable
villages; to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are
conflicting claims among
4)Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral
boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist
other ICCs/IPs; them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict,
without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section
5)Survey plans and sketch maps; below.
6)Anthropological data; xxx xxx xxx
7)Genealogical surveys; To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal
8)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law
and hunting grounds; is in order, for
Article II, Section 2 of the
9)Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as Constitution states that the
mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; Philippines "adopts the generally
and accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land".
 Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 158 held
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the landon account of which it
ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not
been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu 159 applied the aforesaid
constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals.
International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples", understood not merely
as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In
considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from
Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSIONOF QUEBEC 160 had occasion to
acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international
conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond 'convention' and is considered a general
principle of international law".
Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 162which state, in
Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-determination, "freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development". DICSaH
The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral
right of secession. A distinction should be made between theright of internal and external self-
determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
"(ii)Scope of the Right to Self-determination
126.The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-
determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination
— a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development
within the framework of an existing state. A right to externalself-determination
(which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances. . . .
External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement
from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis
added) HDAaIS
127.The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a
framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various
international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-
determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion
that theexercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to
an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between
sovereign states.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-
determination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or
exploitation outside a colonial context, and — less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators —
is blocked from themeaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held
that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign
domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social
and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial
institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified
in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THEAALAND
ISLANDS QUESTION. 163 There, Sweden presented
to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands
should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty
or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving thequestion, appointed an
International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary
issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic
jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows:
. . . [I]n the absence of express provisions in international
treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an
attribute of the sovereignty ofevery State. Positive International Law does not
recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves
from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any
more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a
separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusalof the right to a portion of its
population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other
method, is, exclusively, an attribute of thesovereignty of every State which is
definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question,
under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International
Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned.
Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State
and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which
would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State", but would
also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not
possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held
by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other
State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) DHTCaI
The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which
is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction ofFinland, thereby applying the exception
rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a
very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was
undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according
to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required
for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst ofrevolution, anarchy, and civil
war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people,
and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its
duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these
circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign
state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a
portion of its population the option to separate itself — a right which sovereign nations generally have
with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship
as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and
connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing
society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion
inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or
communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies
born of the forces of empire and conquest. 164Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous
peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of "peoples", indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general
right to independence or secession from those states under international law, 165 but they do have rights
amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination.
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution
61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting
against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly
recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or
self-government, to wit:
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development. TAHCEc
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right
to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right
to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural
life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been
understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination". 166 Theextent of self-determination provided
for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted
hereunder:
Article 8
1.Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced
assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2.States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:
(a)Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their
integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or
ethnic identities;
(b)Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their
lands, territories or resources;
(c)Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or
effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d)Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e)Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or
ethnic discrimination directed against them.
Article 21
1.Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination,
to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including,
inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training
and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. SHCaDA
2.States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures
to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social
conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special
needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with
disabilities.
Article 26
1.Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2.Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands,
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional
ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those
which they have otherwise acquired.
3.States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect
to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous
peoples concerned. ScCIaA
Article 30
1.Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous
peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise
freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2.States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples
concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through
their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories
for military activities.
Article 32
1.Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and
other resources.
2.States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to
obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands or territories and other resources,
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or
exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. CEHcSI
3.States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such
activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse
environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 37
 1.Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and
enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have
States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements.
2.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or
eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall
take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to
achieve the ends of this Declaration. EScIAa
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as
embodying customary international law — a question which theCourt need not definitively resolve here
— the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people,
through theinstrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD.
Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its
application by the different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their
own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide
protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands — a function that
is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's
identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less
significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an
acknowledgement of the right ofindigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it
upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. IDTSEH
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate
States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights
recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1.Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, theterritorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section
2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of theMOA-AD so as to render its
compliance with other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled
with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded.Respondents proffer, however,
that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave
abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent
with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD
strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience: AcSIDE
7.The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact
to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.
Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and
upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to
non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained inthe Comprehensive Compact.
Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into
force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not
mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal
framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating
in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE
and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with . .
. the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines". (Emphasis
supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit
acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing. HDAaIS
Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective
because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below.
The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3,
Section 5 (c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for
negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to
conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups". These negotiating panels
are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress ofthe negotiations.
It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its
negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws
as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3
collectively refers to asthe "Paths to Peace", is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which
may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4 (a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates
Section 3 (a), of E.O. No. 125, 167 states: HSEcTC
SEC. 4.The Six Paths to Peace. — The components of the comprehensive peace
process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component
processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be
pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall
include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a.PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This
component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and
projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal
armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require
administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional
amendments.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr.
to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:
to "think outside the box", so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that
included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated . . . [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must
within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional form the core of any post-conflict peace-building mission. As we have observed in
amendments. Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without
modification of the political environment, even where state-building is
The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause", however, cannot stop here, because it must be undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-
asked AIcaDC building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states
emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial
whether the President herself may proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.
exercise the power delegated to the
GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an
Sec. 4 (a). important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution-making
after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state
The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President,
and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace
in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and
agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new
constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present
democracy will operate. 170
laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of HIEAcC
In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements,
the extent of the President's power
observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization
to conduct peace negotiations.
and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and
That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly legal and human rights institutions. 171
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary, 168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion — an authority In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been
which is not expressly provided for in theConstitution. The Court held thus: recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution.
Behindthe provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions 172 is the framers' intention to
"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP
jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF
power to forbidthe return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale Chairman Nur Misuari. aTIEcA
for the majority's ruling rested on the President's
MR. ROMULO.
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied
from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve
comply with her duties my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I
underthe Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to have only two questions.
what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished
notwithstanding the avowed
a great deal ofthe problems. So, my question is: since that already
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to
exists, why do we have to go into something new?
limit thepowers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a MR. OPLE.
limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those
relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar
diminution of the general grant of executive power. cEITCA is right that certain definite steps have been taken to
implement the provisionsof the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli
Commander-in-Chief powers. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy
contemplated in that agreement, and now by state
Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief
policy. 173 (Emphasis supplied)
Executive and Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, thePresident has the general responsibility to
promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have,
rebellion and lawless violence. 169 to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, theFilipino people are still faced
with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be
As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however,
expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then
peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a
she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require
changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct
peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise
nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. DAaIEc
The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she
may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is
minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In
particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution,
to propose the recommended amendments or revision to thepeople, call a constitutional convention, or
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.
While the President does not possess constituent powers — as those powers may be exercised only by
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum — she may submit
proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not
involve the arrogation of constituent powers.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, 174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting
proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing theinterim National Assembly which
was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President
Marcos, it will be recalled, never convenedthe interim National Assembly. The majority
upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President
as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose
constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muñoz Palma vigorously
dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then
divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.
Justice Teehankee's dissent, 175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may
directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition
that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President
convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee
opined:
"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential
departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and
prescribes the mannerof the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power
has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime
Minister, it follows that thePresident's questioned decrees proposing and
submitting constitutional amendments directly
to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in
whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal
basis." 176 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President — agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact".
in the course of conducting peace negotiations — may validly consider implementing even those policies
that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement
them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a
certainty. TEAaDC
Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments
through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not
as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for
their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed
through initiative.
These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions
to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its
character as a genuine "people's initiative". The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which
truly proceeds from thepeople. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC: 177
"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the 'people's voice'.
However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02, in theverification of their petition with the COMELEC, that 'ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo for constitutional reforms'. The Lambino Group thus admits that their
'people's' initiative is an 'unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent
President to changethe Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be
wary of incantations of 'people's voice' or 'sovereign will' in the present
initiative." SEcITC
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, 178 only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits
herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional
amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since
her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for
Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice
is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress.
Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared
by the President, which — for all intents and purposes — is a proposal for new legislation coming
from the President. 179
The "suspensive clause" in the
MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards
Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or thepeople, in whom constituent powers are vested.
Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be
reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework". This stipulation does not
bear the marks of a suspensive condition — defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event — but of a
term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected,
but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph
goes on to state that thecontemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior
Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal
framework contemplated in the MOA-AD — which changes would include constitutional amendments, as
discussed earlier. It bears noting that, TSHcIa
By the time these changes are put in
place, the MOA-AD itself would be
counted among the "prior
agreements" from which there
could be no derogation.
What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for
these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal
framework.
Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority
to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution
and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus
points" found in theMOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional.
A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing
in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.
As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two
phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving theputting up of new administrative
structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD)
and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase
II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or
repeal ofR.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM.
The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded
autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-
AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually
guarantees that the"necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final
peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall
be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law". cHECAS
Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law
obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground
that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant
to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in
international law, however.
The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as
signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur.
These circumstances readily lead one to surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding
international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law,
however, leads to the contrary conclusion.
The Decision on CHALLENGE TO JURISDICTION: LOMÉ ACCORD AMNESTY 180 (the Lomé Accord
case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lomé Accord was a peace agreement
signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF),
a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years
at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which
were the Governmentof the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States,
and the UN.
On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra
Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by theUN and that Government
whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an
international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since November 30, 1996. AETcSa
Among the stipulations of the Lomé Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF
with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization
since the conflict began.
In the Lomé Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation
not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other
things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that
agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a
treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in
international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like
it of jurisdiction.
"37.In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed
conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some
degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to
have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties
to the conflict, the document formalizing thesettlement is signed by
foreign heads of state or their representatives and
representatives of international organizations,
means the agreement ofthe parties is internationalized so as to create
obligations in international law. cHITCS
xxx xxx xxx
40.Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict
and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies
under whose auspicesthe settlement took place but who are not at all
parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim
any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation
from the settlement.
41.In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State
and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and
purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting
signatories of the Lomé Agreement were moral
guarantors of the principle that, in the termsof Article
XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with
integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors
assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its
representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an
understanding of the extent ofthe agreement to be implemented as
not including certain international crimes.
42.An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and
obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms
will be a breach determined under international law which will also
provide principle means of enforcement. The Lomé Agreement
created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by
international law. An agreement such as the Lomé Agreement which
brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual
situation of restoration of peace that the international community
acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however,
will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an
obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal,
law.A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in
resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace
in the determination of theSecurity Council may indicate a
reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible
legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created.
Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to
 Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor
from theobligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a
remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles
an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one
which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be
between two or more warring States. TheLomé Agreement cannot be
characterised as an international instrument. . . ." (Emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied) AHSaTI
Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international
organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under
international law.
In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral
declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with
all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly
regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France, 181 also
known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). EcIaTA
In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests
in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and
similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974
series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case. 182 Those
statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which
required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective.
Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound
to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz.:
43.It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts,
concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating
legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very
specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration
that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention
confers on the declaration the character of a legal
undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be
bound, even though not made within the context of international
negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing
in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent
acceptanceof the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral
nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State
was made.
44.Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take
up a certain position in relation to a particular matter
with theintention of being bound — the intention is to be ascertained
by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which
their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is
called for. cCSTHA
xxx xxx xxx
51.In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would
be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large,
including theApplicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests.
It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these
statements and rely ontheir being effective. The validity of these
statements and their legal consequences must be considered
within the general framework of the securityof international
intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential
in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these
statements, and from the circumstances attending their making,
that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be
deduced. The objects ofthese statements are clear and they were
addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court
holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal
effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in
deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an
undertaking to the international community to which his words were
addressed. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be
construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were
clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its
statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental
to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar
circumstances.
The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ
entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali, 183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public
declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign
press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a
commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and
Burkina Faso. CaASIc
Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act
with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in theNuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar
circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit:
40.In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must
be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For
example, inthe Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that
since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned
at the possible continuance ofatmospheric testing by the French
Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had 'conveyed
to the world at large, including theApplicant, its intention effectively to
terminate these tests' (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474,
para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French
Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than
by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have
accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants
without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was
lawful.The circumstances of the present case are radically
different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from
manifesting an intention to acceptthe binding
character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity
Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal
agreement onthe basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind
 was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
no grounds to interpret thedeclaration made by Mali's importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening
head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-
implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring Arroyo.
supplied)
Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual
Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, theCourt finds that the present petitions
declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave
draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole violation of the Constitution involved; (b) theexceptional character of the situation and paramount public
or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as (d)the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. EDcICT
witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact that in
addition to the parties to the conflict,the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-
obligations in international law. HaAIES AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar
provisions compared to the original.
Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such
commitments would not be detrimental to the security ofinternational intercourse — to the trust and The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in
confidence essential in the relations among States. view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners withthe official copy of the final
draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.
In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina
Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is
declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information
formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28
legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective
that the signatures of the participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure
commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that provided by law. HcaATE
prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest
That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be
in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading
bound to the international community. Onthat ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral
to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
declaration under international law.
commercial character of the agreement.
The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding,
An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication
respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself,
between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback
sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered,
mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights.
as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness
to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to thepeace agenda.
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
undue influence or interference with that process. aTIAES and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice,
The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. AIHECa
to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change theConstitution in any it wants, so long as the change
is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens. 184 Respondents, however, may Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
not preempt it in that decision. consultations before any project or program critical to theenvironment and human ecology including those
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
SUMMARY therein. TheMOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure
to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper
for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
matter for judicial review.
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, thestatute does not grant the Executive Department or any EN BANC
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998.]
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information
or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly
in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of thefinal draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE
public scrutiny. ISCDEA REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104,respondents.
IN SUM, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed
to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and
Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary
SYLLABUS
to and in excess ofthe legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and
despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PROSCRIPTION AGAINST CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT; DEATH PER SE, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN. — The death penalty per se is not a
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons, this Court
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution .It implies there something
is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal
2. ID; ID; ID; DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION, CONSTITUTIONAL; INFLICTION OF PAIN, MERELY INCIDENTAL. —
framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its
Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely in carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does
defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE
not fall within the constitutional prescription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. "In a limited
and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President
sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain of
dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, asthe clause is worded, it
suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishment are cruel. But of course the Constitution does
virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the
in place. Neither the GRP PeacePanel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee.
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary
Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative,
for the only way that the Executive can ensure theoutcome of the amendment process is through an undue 3. ID.; ID.; REIMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS.
influence or interference with that process. ScaEIT — Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our international
obligations, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted by the
While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration
binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act ofguaranteeing amendments is, by General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, signed and ratified by the Philippines on
December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986, respectively. Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines
itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.
the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital
WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the
COURSE and hereby GRANTED. "most serious crimes." On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. Evidently, petitioner's
Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared CONTRARY TO LAW AND THECONSTITUTION. DTcASE assertion of our obligation under Second Optional Protocol is misplaced.

SO ORDERED. 4. POLITICAL LAW; SEPARATION OF POWERS; CONSTRUED. — The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the
||| (Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral framing of our Constitution. each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
Domain, G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, 183962, [October 14, 2008], 589 PHIL 387-732) placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. ACETSa

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS; EXCEPTIONS. — Corollary to the doctrine of

separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated or as expressed in Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest." The recognized
exceptions to the rule are as follows: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2)
of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2)
of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments;
and (5) Delegation of administrative bodies.
6. ID.; DELEGATION OF POWERS; REQUISITES. — Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate —
and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. aEHASI
7. ID.; ID.; R.A. 8177, VALID DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. — Empowering the
Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of
legislative authority to administrative bodies. Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177,
which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently
describes what job must be done, who is to do it and what is the scope of his authority. R.A No. 8177 likewise
provides the standards which define the legislative policy, marks its limits, map out its boundaries and
specify the public agencies which will apply it. Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise
of discretion by the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated
legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited
discretion, which though general, are capable of reasonable application. A careful reading of R.A. No.
8177would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of
Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of correctional system." Hence, the
import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of
Health. CaAIES
8. ID.; ID.; RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. No. 8177, AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF POWER.
— The Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could not be
overlooked. the Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable
vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review
and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections
could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the
Secretary of Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of
departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid. As to the second paragraph of Section 19,
the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the
convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain, a
copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of public concern, "which the public may want
to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen."
9. ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF PUBLIC CONCERN; A RECOGNITION OF
ESSENTIALITY OF THE FREE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION. — The incorporation in the Constitution of
a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of
ideas and information in a democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in
democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the
nation. caIDSH
10. ID.; DELEGATION OF POWER; RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177; SECTION 17
THEREOF ADDING A GROUND FOR SUSPENSION OF DEATH SENTENCE, DISCRIMINATORY. — While Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the
implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery,
Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when
the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is
sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's review, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans
statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
11. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS; CANNOT SUPPLANT OR MODIFY
LAW; CASE AT BAR. — Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but
instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule
or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in
Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within the three years (3) next following the date of
sentence finds no support in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be
declared invalid. ETAICc
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed 1 the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of
rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death
penalty for the said crime. LexLib
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues, and on its heels, a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the issue of the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7659 2 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
rape.
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied 3 petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration with a finding that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the reimposition
of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death penalty from
electrocution to lethal injection, 4 and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY
LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659. 5 Pursuant to the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules") 6 and directed the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. 7
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition 8 for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out
the execution by lethal injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these are
unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per se as well as by
reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the
Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful
delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of Court 9 to Amend and
Supplement Petition with the Amended and Supplemental Petition 10attached thereto, invoking the
additional ground of violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin said
public respondents from acting under the questioned rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents
to COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties
"to MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend and Supplement Petition,
and required respondents to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice.
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To Clarify Status Quo Order, and (2) For the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order expressly enjoining public respondents from taking any action
to carry out petitioner's execution until the petition is resolved.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General 11 filed a Comment (On the Petition and the
Amended Supplemental Petition) 12 stating that (1) this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of
the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the
questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more
economical, safer and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); (3) the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death
penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that (5) R.A. No.
8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice, Secretary of
Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto within a non-extendible period
of ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights 13 filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae 14 with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae 15 alleging that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by R.A.
No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards, and further invoking (a) Article
II, Section 11 of the Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b) Article III of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which
states that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," and Article V thereof, which states
that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."; (c)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in particular, Article 6 thereof, and the Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming At The Abolition of The
Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of October 1996, 58 countries have
abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15 countries have abolished the death penalty for ordinary
crimes, and 26 countries are abolitionists de facto, which means that they have retained the death penalty
for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists in practice in that they have not executed anyone during
the past ten (10) years or more, or in that they have made an international commitment not to carry out
executions, for a total of 99 countries which are total abolitionists in law or practice, and 95 countries as
retentionists; 16 and (e) Pope John Paul II's encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3,
1998, the Court duly noted the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply 17 stating that (1) this Court is not barred from exercising judicial
review over the death penalty per se, the death penalty for rape and lethal injection as a mode of carrying
out the death penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment; (3) lethal
injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, and that being the "most modern" does not make it
less cruel or more humane, and that the Solicitor General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and that
lethal injection is not risk free nor is it easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty violates
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considering that the Philippines participated in the
deliberations of and voted for the Second Optional Protocol.
After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition, which it now resolves on the
merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the constitutionality of the mode of carrying
out his death sentence by lethal injection on the following grounds: 18
I.
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A CRUEL,
DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
II.
THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND.
III.
LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE
QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS AN UNNECESSARY
AND WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL,
DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
IV.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER TO
RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
V.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS
DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 T O RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM
UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND UNLAWFULLY USURPED THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED RULES.
VII.
SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING
DISCRIMINATORY AS WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT
SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO LEGISLATE.
VIII.
INJUNCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AND INJURY TO
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY REASON OF THE EXISTENCE, OPERATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID
IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,
(b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and
(d) being discriminatory.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues in seriatim.
 I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19,
ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
The main challenge to R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section 19 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The
prohibition in the Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon safeguard against
governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first appearance in the reign of William and Mary
of England in 'An Act declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the
crown,' passed in the year 1689. It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the United States (of
America) and into most constitutions of the various States in substantially the same language as that used
in the original statute. The exact language of the Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine
Bill." 19 "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be
imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' . . . In the 1973 Constitution the phrase became
'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission read the
1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to
experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text which prohibits
'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the meaning desired and with
jurisprudence on the subject." 20
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment
considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection,
the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the
accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of execution, time of
notification, the court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and
suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in administering the
drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of administering lethal injection
is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and wheeled into the execution
room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a vein in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow
of saline solution. At the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the intravenous line.
The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep
inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal doses of pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3)
potassium chloride, which stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs are commonly used during
surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax muscles; the third is used in heart bypass surgery. 21
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. 22 In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, 23 this Court held that "[p]unishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which
are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials. 24
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 25 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the time and
date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner
already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which convicted the
accused, that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records of the case 26 and has affirmed the
judgment of the lower court. Thereupon, the procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days
after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution." 27 Neither is there any uncertainty as to the date of execution
nor the time of notification. As to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read
in conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence
shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later than eighteen (18) months after the judgment
has become final and executory, without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
clemency powers at all times." Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from
the time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory 28 wherein he can seek
executive clemency 29 and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs. 30
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible complications in the
intravenous injection, considering and as petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned, renders lethal
injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Such supposition is highly speculative and
unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection requires the expertise only
of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or
ineffective. 31 Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal injection
allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the convict, 32 without any other evidence
whatsoever. cdrep
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires that all personnel
involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must
presume that the public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty (by lethal
injection) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment. 33
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death
penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of
course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." 34 The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely. 35 Numerous
federal and state courts of the United States have been asked to review whether lethal injections constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal injections to implicate prisoners' Eighth
Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed the issue state in one or two sentences that
lethal injection clearly is a constitutional form of execution. 36 A few jurisdictions, however, have addressed
the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception, these courts have found that lethal
injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. After reviewing medical evidence that indicates
that improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain and that prison officials
tend to have little training in the administration of the drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes
of pain does not rise to a constitutional violation. 37
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 38 Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have focused on
'standards of decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal injections indicates that it comports with
contemporary norms." 39 The primary indicator of society's standard of decency with regard to capital
punishment is the response of the country's legislatures to the sanction. 40 Hence, for as long as the death
penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent requirements provided by the
Constitution, we must confine our inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly
sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that the legislature's substitution of the mode of
carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection infringes no constitutional rights of
petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law violates our international
obligations, in particular, the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, signed and ratified by the Philippines on
December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986, 41 respectively.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force
at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of
the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgment rendered by a competent court." (emphasis supplied)
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that
nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation
of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may
be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant."
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of
the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life,
subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Pursuant to Article 28 of
the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and under Article 40 of the Covenant, States
Parties to the Covenant are required to submit an initial report to the Committee on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized within the Covenant and on the progress made on
the enjoyment of those rights within one year of its entry into force for the State Party concerned and
thereafter, after five years. On July 27, 1982, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment
No. 6interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that "(while) it follows from Article 6 (2) to (6) that State
parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular,
to abolish it for other than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing their
criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the application of the death penalty to
the most serious crimes.' The article strongly suggests (pars. 2 (2) and (6)) that abolition is desirable. . . . The
Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be read restrictively to mean
that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional measure." Further, The Safeguards Guaranteeing
Protection of Those Facing the Death Penalty 42 adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious crimes' should not go beyond intentional crimes,
with lethal or other extremely grave consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the Philippines on
December 19, 1966 and August 22 1989, 43 respectively. The Optional Protocol provides that the Human
Rights Committee shall receive and consider communications from individuals claiming to be victims of
violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on December 15,
1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document. 44 Evidently, petitioner's assertion of our
obligation under theSecond Optional Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in the framing of ourConstitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. 45 Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers.
"The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest." 46 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 47
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of
delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. 48
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 49 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 50
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the
death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and
what is the scope of his authority. 51
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its
boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which
the legislative purpose may be carried out. 52 R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he death sentence
shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as
possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution." 53 Further, "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Corrections shall
take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death
of the convict." 54 The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the administration of lethal
injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." 55 The Court cannot see that any useful
purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. 56 The question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense, 57 but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts.
In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative
officials concerned is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that keep it
from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of Justice and
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where standards are
formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are capable of
reasonable application. 58
It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally provided for the death
penalty by electrocution was not subjected to attack on the ground that it failed to provide for details such
as the kind of chair to be used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of attachment of
electrodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with respect to lethal injection
must fail.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from
the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice. 59Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration
of the correctional system." 60 Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of
Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection
Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health. 61
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. No. 8177 suffer serious flaws that could
not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules
which provides:
"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. — Details of the procedure prior to, during and
after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual to be
prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others, the
sequence of events before and after execution; procedures in setting up the
intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of
death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to authorized
prison personnel."
Thus, the Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The
Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the execution
procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review and approval
thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not
promulgate a manual that would not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of
Justice as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental
responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of confidentiality of the contents
of the manual even with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the
convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters of
public concern "which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."62 Section 7 of Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a
recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. 63 In the same way
that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, 64 access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making 65 by giving them a better
perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. 66
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. No. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING
DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section 17 of the implementing rules which provides:
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. — Execution
by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next
following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person
over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be
commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid
exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the
instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 now reads as follows:
"ART. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. — The death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within one
(1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In this last
case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40. . .".
On this point, the Court finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death
penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing
rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended,
and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's
view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an
impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain consistent
and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are
intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." 67 An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. 68 In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule or regulation
issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which
suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date of sentence finds no
support in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.
One member of the Court voted to declare Republic Act No. 8177 as unconstitutional insofar as it delegates
the power to make rules over the same subject matter to two persons (the Secretary of Justice and the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections) and constitutes a violation of the international norm towards the
abolition of the death penalty. One member of the Court, consistent with his view in People v. Echegaray,
267 SCRA 682, 734-758 (1997) that the death penalty law (Republic Act No. 7659) is itself unconstitutional,
believes that Republic Act No. 8177 which provides for the means of carrying out the death sentence, is
likewise unconstitutional. Two other members of the court concurred in the aforesaid Separate Opinions in
that the death penalty law (Republic Act No. 7659) together with the assailed statute (Republic Act No.
8177) are unconstitutional. In sum, four members of the Court voted to declare Republic Act No. 8177 as
unconstitutional. These Separate Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act
No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section
17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act. No. 7659;
and (b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary
of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including
the accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and
implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with
this Decision.
NO COSTS. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
||| (Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, [October 12, 1998], 358 PHIL 410-476)
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998.]
FRANCISCO
I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (P
CGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of the
PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON,
and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
AND ACCESS TO OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS; SUFFICIENT BASIS TO UPHOLD
PETITIONER'S LOCUS STANDI IN CASE AT BAR. — The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people
to information and access to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition
at bar should be allowed. In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot
by the intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The
standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitioners-
intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or disposition
of the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties may adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO FULL PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF ALL TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING PUBLIC INTEREST;
LIMITATIONS IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF, ENUMERATED. — The "information" and the "transactions"
referred to in Sec. 7 (Article III) and Sec. 28 (Article II) of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and
extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised
or the correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3)
criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
3.ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;SCOPE THEREOF; TERM "PUBLIC INTEREST" AND "PUBLIC CONCERN," CONSTRUED. —
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,the Court emphasized that the information sought must be "matters of public
concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public disclosure extends
only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law." As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, elucidated: "In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern
there is no rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like 'public interest' is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the
matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public " In Aquino-
Sarmiento v. Morato,the Court also held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit of their official
functions are public in character; hence, the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within
the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records. DACcIH
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID ; RATIONALE. — Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated
to "provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and]
ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate . . .," except when
"otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest." In particular, the law mandates free
public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies
of government and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets, liabilities
and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. In general, writings coming into the hands of
public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with
the policy of transparency of governmental affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are
honestly, faithfully and competently performing their functions as public servants. Undeniably, the essence
of democracy lies in the free flow of thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the
public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well
as participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly,
it is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well informed public that
a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.
5.ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, CONSTRUED; RECOVERY OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH, CONSIDERED A
MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN AND IMBUED WITH PUBLIC INTEREST. — With such pronouncements of
our government, whose authority emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the
Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest We may
also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the
aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten wealth" refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired,
directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates
through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having
taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting
in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from
the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims
of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for
the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. We
believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to respondents'
disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth.
6.ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;INCLUDES DISCLOSURE ON ANY PROPOSED SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PCGG AND
OSTENSIBLE OWNERS AND HOLDERS OF ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS. — Considering
the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers,
as well as othergovernment representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier — such
as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information. HCISED
7.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PCCG; E.O. NO. 14, SECTION 5 THEREOF, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 14-A;
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE PCGG MAY EXERCISE THE POWER TO GRANT CRIMINAL IMMUNITY,
ENUMERATED. — In the present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by
Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A. The said provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise
such authority under these conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides
information or testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony
pertains to the unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or accumulated
ill-gotten property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil
liability of such individual. From the wording of the law, it can be easily deduced that the person referred to
is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or accused.
8.ID.;ID.,ID.;COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PCGG AND MARCOS IN CASE AT BAR, NOT IN
CONFORMITY THERETO; GRANT OF CRIMINAL IMMUNITY TO PRINCIPAL DEFENDANTS IN THE ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH CASE, UNWARRANTED. — Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements
between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. First, the
Agreements do not conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal
immunity under Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate
of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan. As stated earlier, the provision is
applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or
accused in an ill-gotten wealth case. While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses "shall provide
the [government] assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that
could shed light on the cases being pursued by the [government] against other parties," the clause does not
fully comply with the law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an afterthought, conceived
in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no indication whatsoever that
any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against any respondent or defendant as to
the manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired public property. HSaIDc
9.ID.; ID.; NO POWER TO GRANT TAX EXEMPTION EVEN UNDER THE COVER OF ITS AUTHORITY TO
COMPROMISE ILL-GOTTEN WEALTH CASES; PCGG'S COMMITMENT TO EXEMPT FROM TAX THE PROPERTIES
TO BE RETAINED BY MARCOS HEIRS, CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION. — Under Item
No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be
retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax
exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28 (4),
Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no
power to grant tax exemption, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth
cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying taxes on their
properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights.
Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will
also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable."
10.ID.;ID.;GRANT OF TAX EXEMPTION TO MARCOSES DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE POWER OF
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO COMPROMISE TAXES OR ABATE TAX LIABILITY; REQUISITES FOR
A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER TO COMPROMISE TAXES OR TO ABATE TAX LIABILITY, ENUMERATED. —
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue
to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there isreasonable doubt as to the
validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position demonstrates a
clear inability to pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the
Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part of which
they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the
commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears
to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify
the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the
determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions
have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.
11.ID.;ID.;CANNOT GUARANTEE THE DISMISSAL OF ALL PENDING CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST THE
MARCOSES. — The government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs,
pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial powers,
particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the doctrine that once a case has been filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full
discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the manner in which the prosecution is handled,
including the matter of whom to present as witnesses, may lie within the sound discretion of
the government prosecutor; but the court decides, based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will
dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by
the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to dismiss the complaint. The prosecution's motion to
withdraw or to dismiss is not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the
trial court to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent
to effecting a disposition of the case itself. Thus, the PCGG, as the governmentprosecutor of ill-gotten wealth
cases, cannot guarantee the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts,
for said dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion. IEHScT
12.ID.; ID.; STIPULATION IN COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PCGG AND MARCOSES WAIVING
ALL GOVERNMENT CLAIMS AGAINST THE LATTER, CONSIDERED CONTRARY TO LAW AND A VIOLATION OF
THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. — The government also waives all claims and
counterclaims, "whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. Again, this
all-encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be
waived. The stipulation in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the
Marcoses that the government thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may well be
interpreted to include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to
perpetrate fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond
the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a virtual warrant for
public officials to amass public funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in
exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
13.ID.;ID.;COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PCGG AND MARCOSES IN CASE AT BAR DO NOT
PROVIDE FOR DEFINITE PERIOD FOR FULFILLMENT OF THE PRESTATION. — The Agreements do not provide
for a definite or determinable period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may
take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit an inventory of their total assets.
14.ID.; ID.; ID.; DO NOT STATE WITH SPECIFICITY THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHICH ASSETS TO BE
FORFEITED AND WHICH SHALL BE RETAINED BY THE MARCOSES. — The Agreements do not state with
specificity the standards for determining which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall
be retained by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be
entitled to 25 percent of the $356 million Swiss deposits (lessgovernment recovery expenses), such sharing
arrangement pertains only to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the
other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75
percent sharing ratio. Public officers entering into an arrangement appearing to be manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, invite their
indictment for corruption under the said law.
15.ID.;ID.;ID.;CONSIDERED INVALID; CASE AT BAR. — The absence of then President Ramos' approval of the
principal Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unforceable.
Nevertheless, as detailed above, even if such approval were obtained the Agreements would still not be
valid. From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and Supplemental
Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs, are
violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned.
16.REMEDIAL LAW; COMPROMISE; PROHIBITED COMPROMISE, ENUMERATED. — In general, the law
encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following matters: the civil status of
persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3) any ground for legal separation, (4) future
support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future legitime. And like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to laws, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order. A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the consent of a party
is vitiated — such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery,
or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may
be invalidated by the courts.
17.ID.;ID.;EFFECT THEREOF IN CIVIL ACTION. — One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its
primary object, is to avoid or to end a litigation. In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a
civil case to agree to a fair settlement. As an incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing
party who shows a sincere desire to compromise.
18.ID.;ID.;RELATING TO CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM AN OFFENSE DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY
EXTINGUISH CRIMINAL LIABILITY; POWER TO GRANT CRIMINAL IMMUNITY MUST BE SPECIFICALLY
CONFERRED. — Any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not automatically
terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor. While a
compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar general sanction as regards
criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. CSDcTA
19.ID.;COURTS; SUPREME COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER ISSUE INVOLVING THE PRECISE
INTERPRETATION IN TERMS OF SCOPE OF THE TWIN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON PUBLIC
TRANSACTIONS — In Tañada and Legaspi,we upheld therein petitioners' resort to a mandamus proceeding,
seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a public duty mandated by no less
than the fundamental law. Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus.Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before
the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the compromise
Agreements is pending resolution. There may seem to be some merit in such argument; if petitioner is
merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the
public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public disclosure of
"all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related to or relating to
such negotiations and Agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs." In other words, this petition is
not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any ongoing or future
undertaking towards settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the
precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on "public transactions." This
broad and prospective relief sought by the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people's constitutional
right to information on matters of public concern. Does this right include access to the terms
of government negotiations, prior to their consummation or conclusion? May the government,
through the Presidential Commission onGood Government (PCGG),be required to reveal the
proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten
wealth? More specifically, are the "General Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated
December 28, 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and binding?
The Case
These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and
"[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and
concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad —
including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s] to make public all
negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating
to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs." 1
The Facts
 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who
initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of
the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of
dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how
to split or share these assets. Cdpr
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information 3 and the correlative duty of the
state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, 4 demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of
ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating
effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the
Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing
that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has,
PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of
the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements
to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitledRepublic v. Heirs of Ferdinand
E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said
Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to
Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their
undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The
Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan
dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.
Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum 5 to then
PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated:
"This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press
Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you to approve the Compromise
Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses,
and would have disapproved them had they been submitted to me.
"The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not
authorize you to approve said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President
of the Republic of the Philippines."
The assailed principal Agreement 6 reads:
"GENERAL AGREEMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and
between —
The Republic of the Philippines, through
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a
governmental agency vested with authority defined underExecutive
Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building, Pasig,
Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman referred to as the FIRST
PARTY,
— and —
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez
Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.,all of legal age, and with address
at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St.,Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Jr.,and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
PRIVATE PARTY.
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of
nationalism and love of country and of the entire Filipino people, and their desire
to set up a foundation and finance impact projects like installation of power plants
in selected rural areas and initiation of other community projects for the
empowerment of the people;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss
Federal Tribunal of December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle
to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but
even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment
of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY;
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out
litigation which, as proven by the past 7 years, is consuming money, time and
effort, and is counter-productive and ties up assets which the FIRST PARTY could
otherwise utilize for its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other
urgent needs;
WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a
policy of unity and reconciliation in order to bind the nation's wounds and start
the process of rebuilding this nation as it goes on to the twenty-first century;
WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which
the parties may have against one another, whether past, present, or future,
matured or inchoate.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants
set forth herein, the parties agree as follows:
1.The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held by other
parties for the benefit of, the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of
determining the totality of the assets covered by the settlement. The
subject assets shall be classified by the nature thereof, namely: (a) real
estate; (b) jewelry; (c) paintings and other works of art; (d) securities;
(e) funds on deposit; (f) precious metals, if any, and (g) miscellaneous
assets or assets which could not appropriately fall under any of the
preceding classification. The list shall be based on the full disclosure of
the PRIVATE PARTY to insure its accuracy.
2.Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded
to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the
PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of and
exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines.
 However, considering the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant 9.In case of violation by the PRIVATE PARTY of any of the conditions herein
documents and information as to balances and ownership, the actual contained, the PARTIES shall be restored automatically to the status
specification of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be quo ante the signing of this Agreement.
covered by supplemental agreements which shall form part of this
Agreement. For purposes of this Agreement, the PRIVATE PARTY shall be
represented by Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr.,as their only Attorney-in-Fact.
3.Foreign assets which the PRIVATE PARTY shall fully disclose but which are held
by trustees, nominees, agents or foundations are hereby waived over IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this
by the PRIVATE-PARTY in favor of the FIRST PARTY. For this purpose, 28th day of December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila.
the parties shall cooperate in taking the appropriate action judicial
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
and/or extrajudicial, to recover the same for the FIRST PARTY.
GOOD GOVERNMENT
4.All disclosures of assets made by the PRIVATE PARTY shall not be used as
evidence by the FIRST PARTY in any criminal, civil, tax or administrative By:
case, but shall be valid and binding against said PARTY for use by the
FIRST PARTY in withdrawing any account and/or recovering any asset. [Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO
The PRIVATE PARTY withdraws any objection to the withdrawal by
and/or release to the FIRST PARTY by the Swiss banks and/or Swiss Chairman
authorities of the $356 million, its accrued interests, and/or any other
account; over which the PRIVATE PARTY waives any right, interest or ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R.
participation in favor of the FIRST PARTY. However, any withdrawal or MARCOS, MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC,
release of any account aforementioned by the FIRST PARTY shall be FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,& IRENE MARCOS
ARANETA
made in the presence of any authorized representative of the PRIVATE
PARTY. By:
5.The trustees, custodians, safekeepers, depositaries, agents, nominees, [Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
administrators, lawyers, or any other party acting in similar capacity in
behalf of the PRIVATE PARTY are hereby informed through this General [Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC
Agreement to insure that it is fully implemented and this shall serve as
absolute authority from both parties for full disclosure to the FIRST FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 7
PARTY of said assets and for the FIRST PARTY to withdraw said account
and/or assets and any other assets which the FIRST PARTY onits own [Sgd.] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
or through the help of the PRIVATE PARTY/their trustees, etc.,may
Assisted by:
discover.
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR.
6.Any asset which may be discovered in the future as belonging to the PRIVATE
PARTY or is being held by another for the benefit of the PRIVATE PARTY Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact"
and which is not included in the list per No. 1 for whatever reason shall
automatically belong to the FIRST PARTY, and the PRIVATE PARTY in Petitioner also denounces this supplement to the above Agreement: 8
accordance with No. 4 above, waives any right thereto.
"SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT

This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and
7.This Agreement shall be binding on, and inure to the benefit of, the parties and between —
their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns and shall
The Republic of the Philippines, through
supersede any other prior agreement.
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a
8.The PARTIES shall submit this and any other implementing Agreements to the governmental agency vested with authority defined underExecutive
President of the Philippines for approval. In the same manner, the Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the Philcomcen Building, Pasig,
PRIVATE PARTY shall provide the FIRST PARTY assistance by way of Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo,
testimony or deposition on any information it may have that could hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY,
shed light on the cases being pursued by the FIRST PARTY against other
— and —
parties. The FIRST PARTY shall desist from instituting new suits already
subject of this Agreement against the PRIVATE PARTY and cause the Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez
dismissal of all other cases pending in the Sandiganbayan and in other Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.,all of legal age, and with address
courts. at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St.,Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda
 Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Jr.,and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth."
PRIVATE PARTY.
Issues
WITNESSETH: The Oral Argument, held on March 16, 1998, focused on the following issues: Cdpr
The parties in this case entered into a General Agreement dated Dec. "(a)Procedural:
28, 1993;
(1)Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing
The PRIVATE PARTY expressly reserve their right to pursue their to file the instant petition; and
interest and/or sue over local assets located in the Philippines against
parties other than the FIRST PARTY. (2)Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this
action may be filed.
The parties hereby agree that all expenses related to the recovery
and/or withdrawal of all assets including lawyers' fees, agents' fees, (b)Substantive:
nominees' service fees, bank charges, traveling expenses and all other
(1)Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the
expenses related thereto shall be for the account of the PRIVATE
public the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
PARTY.
(2)Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the
compromise agreement between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the
PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth." 11
be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits.
After their oral presentations, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed this instrument this
28th day of December, 1993, in Makati, Metro Manila. On August 19, 1998, Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before
the Court a Motion for Intervention, attaching thereto their Petition in Intervention. They aver that
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON they are "among the 10,000 claimants whose right to claim from the Marcos Family and/or the Marcos
Estate is recognized by the decision in In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation,
GOOD GOVERNMENT
Maximo Hilao, et al.,Class Plaintiffs No. 92-15526, U .S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit US
By: App. Lexis 14796, June 16, 1994 and the Decision of the Swiss Supreme Court of December 10, 1997."
As such, they claim to have personal and direct interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since
[Sgd.] MAGTANGGOL G. GUNIGUNDO a distribution or disposition of the Marcos properties may adversely affect their legitimate claims. In
a minute Resolution issued on August 24, 1998, the Court granted their motion to intervene and
Chairman required the respondents to comment thereon. The September 25, 1998 Comment 12 of the solicitor
general on said motion merely reiterated his aforecited arguments against the main petition. 13
ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R.
MARCOS, MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC, The Court's Ruling
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.,& IRENE MARCOS-
The petition is imbued with merit.
ARANETA
First Procedural Issue:
By:
Petitioner's Standing
[Sgd.] IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS
Petitioner, on the one hand, explains that as a taxpayer and citizen, he has the legal
[Sgd.] MA. IMELDA MARCOS-MANOTOC personality to file the instant petition. He submits that since ill-gotten wealth "belongs to the Filipino
people and [is],in truth and in fact, part of the public treasury," any compromise in relation to it would
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. 9 constitute a diminution of the public funds, which can be enjoined by a taxpayer whose interest is for
a full, if not substantial, recovery of such assets.
[Sgd] IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Assisted by: Marcoses is an issue "of transcendental importance to the public." He asserts that ordinary taxpayers
have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders
[Sgd.] ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are "of paramount public interest;"
Counsel & Attorney-in-Fact" and if they "immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people."
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
Acting on a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 10 dated when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, 14such as in this case. He invokes several
March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their agents and/or representatives from "entering into, or
decisions in 15 of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,when the
subject of the case involved public interest.
On the other hand, the solicitor general, on behalf of respondents, contends that
petitioner has no standing to institute the present action, because no expenditure of public funds is
involved and said petitioner has no actual interest in the alleged agreement. Respondents further
insist that the instant petition is premature, since there is no showing that petitioner has requested
PCGG to disclose any such negotiations and agreements; or that, if he has, the Commission has
refused to do so.
Indeed, the arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as
regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public documents and records is
a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves. 16
In Tañada v. Tuvera, 17 the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and
the object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested
in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of
the action. 18 In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be
informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 19 in connection with the rule that laws in order to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners'
legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced "is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land."
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 20 while reiterating Tañada,further declared that
"when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general
'public' which possesses the right." 21
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, 22 we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have
been involved under the questioned contract for the development, the management and the
operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, "public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of the
country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved." We concluded that, as a
consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient authority for
upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and
access to official records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the
satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal
standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the
petition at bar should be allowed.
In any event, the question on the standing of Petitioner Chavez is rendered moot by the
intervention of the Jopsons, who are among the legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth. The
standing of the Jopsons is not seriously contested by the solicitor general. Indeed, said petitioners-
intervenors have a legal interest in the subject matter of the instant case, since a distribution or
disposition of the Marcoses' ill-gotten properties may adversely affect the satisfaction of their claims.
Second Procedural Issue:
The Court's Jurisdiction
Petitioner asserts that because this petition is an original action for mandamus and one
that is not intended to delay any proceeding in the Sandiganbayan, its having been filed before this
Court was proper. He invokes Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition and mandamus.
The solicitor general, on the other hand, argues that the petition has been erroneously
brought before this Court, since there is neither a justiciable controversy nor a violation of petitioner's
rights by the PCGG. He alleges that the assailed agreements are already the very lis mota in
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0141, which has yet to dispose of the issue; thus, this petition is
premature. Furthermore, respondents themselves have opposed the Marcos heirs' motion, filed in
the graft court, for the approval of the subject Agreements. Such opposition belies petitioner's claim
that the government, through respondents, has concluded a settlement with the Marcoses as regards
their alleged ill-gotten assets.
In Tañada and Legaspi, we upheld therein petitioners' resort to a mandamus proceeding,
seeking to enforce a public right as well as to compel performance of a public duty mandated by no
less than the fundamental law. 23 Further, Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly confers
upon the Supreme Court originaljurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,quo
warranto and habeas corpus.
Respondents argue that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Civil Case No. 0141, in which the enforcement of the compromise
Agreements is pending resolution. There may seem to be some merit in such argument; if petitioner
is merely seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose
to the public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here seeking the public
disclosure of "all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and documents related
to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
In other words, this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been
drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged
Marcos loot. Ineluctably, the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of
the twin constitutional provisionson "public transactions." This broad and prospective relief sought by
the instant petition brings it out of the realm of Civil Case No. 0141.
First Substantive Issue:
Public Disclosure of Terms of Any Agreement, Perfected or Not
In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements pertaining to a
compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner
invokes the following provisions of the Constitution:
"Sec. 7[Article III].— The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
"Sec. 28[Article II].— Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."
Respondents' opposite view is that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed
and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. As regards the assailed Agreements
entered into by the PCGG with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accrued, because
said Agreements have not been approved by the President, and the Marcos heirs have failed to fulfill
their express undertaking therein. Thus, the Agreements have not become effective. Respondents add
that they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another compromise with the Marcoses
regarding their alleged ill-gotten assets.
 The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of
the Constitution have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the
exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information, (7) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other
confidential information.
Limitations to the Right:
(1)National Security Matters
At the very least, this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect such state
secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other information, 25 provided
that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."
Likewise, information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties
and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest. 26
(2)Trade Secrets and Banking Transactions
The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national
security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual
Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Act 28 ) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure. 29
(3)Criminal Matters
Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, 30 which courts may not inquire
into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement would be
seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information regarding rescue
operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities. cdrep
(4)Other Confidential Information
The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or
divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public." 32
Other acknowledged limitations to information access include diplomatic correspondence,
closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. 33
Scope: Matters of Public Concern and
Transactions Involving Public Interest
In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., 34 the Court emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full
public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law." As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and
"public concern," the Court, in Legaspiv. Civil Service Commission, 35 elucidated:
"In determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. 'Public concern' like 'public
interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public."
Considered a public concern in the above-mentioned case was the "legitimate concern of
citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles." So was the need to give the general public adequate notification of various
laws that regulate and affect the actions and conduct of citizens, as held in Tañada.Likewise did the
"public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
(members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa)" qualify the information sought in Valmonte as matters
of public interest and concern. In Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato, 36 the Court also held that official acts
of public officers done in pursuit of their official functions are public in character; hence, the records
pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access
to public records.
Under Republic Act No. 6713, public officials and employees are mandated to "provide
information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, [and] ensure
openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate . . .," except when
"otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest." In particular, the law mandates
free public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies
of government and government-owned or controlled corporations; and the statements of assets,
liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and employees. 37
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official
functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental
affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity to determine whether those to
whom they have entrusted the affairs of the government are honestly, faithfully and competently
performing their functions as public servants. 38 Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free
flow of thought; 39 but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the public would gain a
better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate
in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. Certainly, it is by
ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that
a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people. 40
The Nature of the Marcoses'
Alleged Ill-Gotten Wealth
We now come to the immediate matter under consideration.
Upon the departure from the country of the Marcos family and their cronies in February
1986, the new government headed by President Corazon C. Aquino was specifically mandated to
"[r]ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and [to]
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or
accounts." 41 Thus, President Aquino's very first executive orders (which partook of the nature of
legislative enactments) dealt with the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten properties.
Executive Order No. 1, promulgated on February 28, 1986, only two (2) days after the
Marcoses fled the country, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to assist the President in the
recovery of vast government resources allegedly amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates both here and abroad.
Under Executive Order No. 2, issued twelve (12) days later, all persons and entities who
had knowledge or possession of ill-gotten assets and properties were warned and, under pain of
penalties prescribed by law, prohibited from concealing, transferring or dissipating them or from
otherwise frustrating or obstructing the recovery efforts of the government.
 On May 7, 1986, another directive (EO No. 14) was issued giving additional powers to the
PCGG which, taking into account the overriding considerations of national interest and national
survival,required it to achieve expeditiously and effectively its vital task of recovering ill-gotten wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority emanates from the
people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of
public concern and imbued with public interest. 42 We may also add that "ill-gotten wealth," by its
very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, "ill-gotten
wealth" refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their
improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of
their public office; or their use of powers, influences or relationships, "resulting in their unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from
thegovernment itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon
reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive
claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national
economic recovery.
We believe the foregoing disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right
to respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses'
purported ill-gotten wealth.
Access to Information on Negotiating Terms
But does the constitutional provision likewise guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement? This same clarification was
sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations, which
we quote hereunder: 43
"MR. SUAREZ.
And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from
contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman
refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does
he refer to the contract itself?
"MR. OPLE.
The 'transactions' used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can
cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated
contract, Mr. Presiding. Officer.
"MR. SUAREZ.
This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction?
"MR. OPLE.
Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest."
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other governmentrepresentatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of
the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications 44 during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier — such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.
Second Substantive Issue:
Legal Restraints on a Marcos-PCGG Compromise
Petitioner lastly contends that any compromise agreement between the government and
the Marcoses will be a virtual condonation of all the alleged wrongs done by them, as well as an
unwarranted permission to commit graft and corruption.
Respondents, for their part, assert that there is no legal restraint on entering into a
compromise with the Marcos heirs, provided the agreement does not violate any law. cda
Prohibited Compromises
In general, the law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the
following matters: (1) the civil status of persons, (2) the validity of a marriage or a legal separation, (3)
any ground for legal separation, (4) future support, (5) the jurisdiction of courts, and (6) future
legitime. 45 And like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order. 46 A compromise is binding and
has the force of law between the parties, 47 unless the consent of a party is vitiated — such as by
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence — or when there is forgery, or if the terms
of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable. In the latter instances, the agreement may be
invalidated by the courts. 48
Effect of Compromise
on Civil Actions
One of the consequences of a compromise, and usually its primary object, is to avoid or to
end a litigation. 49 In fact, the law urges courts to persuade the parties in a civil case to agree to a fair
settlement. 50 As an incentive, a court may mitigate damages to be paid by a losing party who shows
a sincere desire to compromise. 51
In Republic & Campos Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 52 which affirmed the grant by the PCGG of
civil and criminal immunity to Jose Y. Campos and family, the Court held that in the absence of an
express prohibition, the rule on compromises in civil actions under the Civil Code is applicable to PCGG
cases. Such principle is pursuant to the objectives of EO No. 14, particularly the just and expeditious
recovery of ill-gotten wealth, so that it may be used to hasten economic recovery. The same principle
was upheld in Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and
IBC 53 and Republic v. Benedicto, 54 which ruled in favor of the validity of the PCGG compromise
agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto.
Immunity from
Criminal Prosecution
However, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an offense does not
automatically terminate the criminal proceeding against or extinguish the criminal liability of the
malefactor. 55 While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no similar
general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be specifically conferred. In the
present case, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on PCGG by Section 5 of EO No.
14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides:
"SEC. 5.The Presidential Commission on Good Government is
authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who
provides information or testifies in any investigation conducted by
such Commission to establish the unlawful manner in which any respondent,
defendant or accused has acquired or accumulated the property or properties in
question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to
 ascertain or prove the latter's guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby
granted shall be continued to protect the witness who repeats such testimony
before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by
the Commission."
The above provision specifies that the PCGG may exercise such authority under these
conditions: (1) the person to whom criminal immunity is granted provides information or testifies in
an investigation conducted by the Commission; (2) the information or testimony pertains to the
unlawful manner in which the respondent, defendant or accused acquired or accumulated ill-gotten
property; and (3) such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability
of such individual. From the wording of the law, it can be easily deduced that the person referred to
is a witness in the proceeding, not the principal respondent, defendant or accused.
Thus, in the case of Jose Y. Campos, the grant of both civil and criminal immunity to him
and his family was "[i]n consideration of the full cooperation of Mr. Jose Y. Campos [with]
this Commission, his voluntary surrender of the properties and assets [—] disclosed and declared by
him to belong to deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos [—] to the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines[;] his full, complete and truthful disclosures[;] and his commitment to pay a sum of
money as determined by the Philippine Government." 56 Moreover, the grant of criminal immunity
to the Camposes and the Benedictos was limited to acts and omissions prior to February 25, 1996. At
the time such immunity was granted, no criminal eases have yet been filed against them before the
competent courts.
Validity of the PCGG-Marcos
Compromise Agreements
Going now to the subject General and Supplemental Agreements between the PCGG and
the Marcos heirs, a cursory perusal thereof reveals serious legal flaws. First, the Agreements do not
conform to the above requirements of EO Nos. 14 and 14-A. We believe that criminal immunity under
Section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcoses, who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten
wealth cases now pending before the Sandiganbayan.As stated earlier, the provision is applicable
mainly to witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant or accused in
an ill-gotten wealth case.
While the General Agreement states that the Marcoses "shall provide the [government]
assistance by way of testimony or deposition on any information [they] may have that could shed
light on the cases being pursued by the [government] against other parties," 57 the clause does not
fully comply with the law. Its inclusion in the Agreement may have been only an afterthought,
conceived in pro forma compliance with Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended. There is no indication
whatsoever that any of the Marcos heirs has indeed provided vital information against any respondent
or defendant as to the manner in which the latter may have unlawfully acquired public property.
Second, under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from
all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of
the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a
certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. 58 Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution,
specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses from paying
taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under
the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute
class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and
equitable." 59
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of
internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there
is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial
position demonstrates a clear inalibity to pay. 60 Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of
the Marcoses, because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims
against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax
exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can
be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the
administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. 61 In this
instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In
any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in
which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.62
Third,the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the Marcos
heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts. 63 This is a direct
encroachment on judicial powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well-settled is the
doctrine that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the matter of its
dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of the judge. In a criminal case, the
manner in which the prosecution is handled, including the matter of whom to present as witnesses,
may lie within the sound discretion of the government prosecutor; 64 but the court decides,
based on the evidence proffered, in what manner it will dispose of the case. Jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw
the information or to dismiss the complaint. 65 The prosecution's motion to withdraw or to dismiss is
not the least binding upon the court. On the contrary, decisional rules require the trial court to make
its own evaluation of the merits of the case, because granting such motion is equivalent to effecting
a disposition of the case itself. 66
Thus, the PCGG, as the government prosecutor of ill-gotten wealth cases, cannot guarantee
the dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said dismissal
is not within its sole power and discretion.
Fourth,the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, "whether past, present,
or future, matured or inchoate," against the Marcoses. 67 Again, this all-encompassing stipulation is
contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for future fraud may not be waived. 68 The stipulation
in the Agreement does not specify the exact scope of future claims against the Marcoses that
the government thereby relinquishes. Such vague and broad statement may well be interpreted to
include all future illegal acts of any of the Marcos heirs, practically giving them a license to perpetrate
fraud against the government without any liability at all. This is a palpable violation of the due process
and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces the Marcoses beyond
the reach of the law. It also sets a dangerous precedent for public accountability. It is a virtual warrant
for public officials to amass public funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their
liability in exchange for only a portion of their ill-gotten wealth.
Fifth,the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within which
the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime before the Marcoses submit
an inventory of their total assets.
Sixth, the Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining which
assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained by the Marcoses. While the
Supplemental Agreement provides that the Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356
million Swiss deposits (less governmentrecovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only
to the said deposits. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the other properties.
Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing
ratio. Public officers entering into an arrangement appearing to be manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, 69 invite
their indictment of corruption under the said law.
 Finally,the absence of then President Ramos' approval of the principal Agreement, and EN BANC
express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete and unenforceable. Nevertheless, as
detailed above, even if such approval were obtained, the Agreements would still not be valid. cdasia
[February 14, 2012.]
From the foregoing disquisition, it is crystal clear to the Court that the General and
Supplemental Agreements, both dated December 28, 1993, which the PCGG entered into with the
Marcos heirs, are violative of the Constitution and the laws aforementioned. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreements dated ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER THE
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE
VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012.
all government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly or indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose
to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement,
relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this NOTICE
Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, [December 9, 1998], 360 Sirs/Mesdames:
PHIL 133-177)
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated FEBRUARY 14,
2012, which reads as follows:
"In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials
and employees as witnesses under the subpoenas ofFebruary 10, 2012 and the various letters for the
Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM p:

Before us are the letters of Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Congressman and Impeachment
Prosecution Panel Manager, in behalf of the House Impeachment Panel, requesting for the actions
described below. These letters are:
(1) LETTER dated January 19, 2012 of Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Congressman,
1st District, Cavite; Chairman, Committee on Appropriations; and
Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, writing in behalf of the
House Impeachment Panel, requesting that the Public Prosecutors, as
well as the Private Prosecutors, be permitted to examine, among
others, the rollo of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the
Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), et al., G.R. No.
178083;

LETTER dated January 25, 2012 of Hon. Irvin M. Alcala for Hon. Joseph Emilio A.
Abaya, in behalf of the House Impeachment Panel, requesting
for certified true copies of the Agenda and Minutes of the
Deliberations of, among others, the case of FASAP v. PAL, et al., G.R. No.
178083.

(2) LETTER dated January 19, 2012 of Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Congressman,
1st District, Cavite; Chairman, Committee on Appropriations; and
 Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, writing in behalf of the
House Impeachment Panel, requesting that the Public Prosecutors, as
well as the Private Prosecutors, be permitted to examine, among
others, the rollo of Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011.
(3) LETTER dated January 25, 2012 of Hon. Irvin M. Alcala for Hon. Joseph Emilio
A. Abaya, Congressman, 1st District, Cavite; Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations; and Impeachment Prosecution Panel
Manager, in behalf of the House Impeachment Panel, requesting that
the Public Prosecutors, as well as the Private Prosecutors, be
permitted to examine the rollo of the case of Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et
al., G.R. No. 193459. EICSTa
(4) LETTER dated January 19, 2012 of Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, Congressman,
1st District, Cavite; Chairman, Committee on Appropriations; and
Impeachment Prosecution Panel Manager, writing in behalf of the
House Impeachment Panel, requesting that the Public Prosecutors, as
well as the Private Prosecutors, be permitted to examine, among
others, the rollo of League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951,
177499 and 178056.
In an intervening development, the Hon. Impeachment Court directed the
attendance of witnesses Clerk of Court Enriqueta E. Vidal and Deputy Clerk of CourtFelipa Anama, and
the production of documents per the subpoena ad testificandum et duces tecum dated February 9,
2012 in the case of FASAP v. PAL:
1. Records/Logbook of the Raffle Committee showing the assignment of the
FASAP case;
2. Letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza addressed to the Clerk of Court dated
September 13, 2011 (copy furnished: The Hon. Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona), in connection with the FASAP case;
3. Letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza addressed to the Clerk of Court dated
September 20, 2011 (copy furnished: The Hon. Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona), in connection with the FASAP case;
4. Letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza addressed to the Clerk of Court dated
September 22, 2011 (copy furnished: The Hon. Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona), in connection with the FASAP case;
5. Letter of Atty. Estelito Mendoza addressed to the Clerk of Court dated
September 16, 2011 (copy furnished: The Hon. Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona; Hon. Arturo D. Brion, Hon. Jose P. Perez, Hon. Lucas P.
Bersamin and Hon. Jose C. Mendoza), in connection with the FASAP
case.
Another subpoena ad testificandum dated February 10, 2012 directs
Clerk of Court Vidal, in the case of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 199034) and
former First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo (G.R. No. 199046) to bring with her, for submission to the
Impeachment Court, the following:
1. Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp) Petition for Special Civil
Actions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (G.R. No. 199034) (GMA
TRO Petition), including the Annexes thereto;
2. Supreme Court received (with time and date stamp) Petition for Special Civil
Actions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No.
199046 (Mike Arroyo TRO Petition), including the Annexes thereto;
3. Respondent Corona's travel order or leave applied for within the
month of November 2011;
4. Minutes of the Supreme Court Raffle Committee which handled the GMA and
Mike Arroyo TRO Petitions;
5. Appointment or Assignment of the Member-in-Charge of the GMA and Mike
Arroyo TRO Petitions;
6. Resolution dated November 15, 2011 in the GMA and Mike Arroyo TRO
Petitions;
7. TRO dated November 15, 2011 issued in the GMA and Mike Arroyo TRO
Petitions;
8. Logbook or receiving copy showing the time the TRO was issued to the
counsel of GMA and Mike Arroyo, as well as the date and time the TRO
was received by the Sheriff for service to the parties;
9. Special Power of Attorney dated November 15, 2011 submitted by GMA and
Mike Arroyo in favor of Atty. Ferdinand Topacio and Anacleto M.
Diaz, incompliance with the TRO dated November 15, 2011;
10. Official Receipt No. 00300227-SC-EP dated November 15, 2011 issued by the
Supreme Court for the Two Million Pesos Cash Bond of GMA and Mike
Arroyo, with the official date and time stamp; TcHDIA
11. November 15 and 16, 2011 Sheriff's Return for service of the GMA and Mike
Arroyo TRO dated November 15, 2011, upon the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Solicitor General;
12. Certification from the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the
Supreme Court dated November 15, 2011, with the date and time it
was received by the Supreme Court Clerk of Court showing it to be
November 16, 2011 at 8:55 a.m.;
13. Resolution dated November 18, 2011 issued in the GMA and Mike Arroyo TRO
Petitions;
14. Resolution dated November 22, 2011 on the GMA and Mike Arroyo TRO
Petitions;
15. Logbook showing the date and time Justice Sereno's dissent to the November
22, 2011 Resolution was received by the Clerk of Court En Banc;
16. Dissenting Opinions dated November 13 and 18, 2011, and December 13,
2011 of Justice Sereno on the GMA and Mike Arroyo TRO Petitions;
17. Dissenting Opinions dated November 15, 2011 and December 13,
2011 of Justice Carpio on the GMA and Mike Arroyo TRO Petitions;
 18. Separate Opinion dated December 13, 2011 of Justice Velasco on the GMA
and Mike Arroyo TRO Petitions;
19. Concurring Opinion dated December 13, 2011 of Justice Abad on the GMA
and Mike Arroyo TRO Petitions;
20. Official Appointment of Respondent Corona as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court; and
21. Official Appointment of Respondent Corona as Chief Justice.
A Brief Statement of Relevant Background Facts and Developments
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel
manifested in a COMPLIANCE dated January 27, 2012 that it would present about 100 witnesses and
almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public offices. The list of proposed
witnesses included Justicesof the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify
on matters, many of which are, internal to the Court.
It was at about this time that the letters, now before us, were sent. The letters asked for
the examination of records, and the issuance of certified true copies ofthe rollos and the Agenda and
Minutes of the Deliberations, as above described, for purposes of Articles 3 and 7 of the Impeachment
Complaint. These letters specifically focused on the following:
a.with respect to the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. case 1 (presently pending on the merits), the examination of the rollo of the
case and the issuance of certified true copies of the Agenda and the Minutes of the case;
b.with respect to Navarro v. Ermita 2 or the Dinagat case (still pending on the merits), the
examination of the rollo of the case;
c.with respect to Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee
on Justice, et al. 3 (a closed and terminated case), the examination of the rollo of the case; and
d.with respect to League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC, 4 (a closed and
terminated case) the examination of the rollo of the case.
Per its MANIFESTATION in open court in the impeachment trial of February 7 and 8, 2012,
the House Impeachment Panel requested the Impeachment Courtfor the issuance of subpoena duces
tecum and ad testificandum for the production of records of cases, and the attendance of Justices,
officials and employees of the Supreme Court, to testify on these records and on the various cases
mentioned above. aATHIE
Instead of issuing subpoenas as requested, the Hon. Presiding Senator-Judge Juan Ponce
Enrile, on February 8, 2012, issued an Order denying the Prosecution Panel's request for subpoena ad
testificandum to JJ. Villarama, Sereno, Reyes and Velasco (In re: Impeachment Trial of Hon. Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, Case No. 002-2011). Thus, the attendance of Supreme Court Justices under
compulsory process now appears to be moot and academic. If they are included at all in the discussions
below, reference to them is for purposes only of a holistic presentation and as basic premises that
serve as the bases for the disqualification of Courtofficials and employees, and the
exclusion of privileged and confidential documents and information.
On February 10, 2012, Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to our attention
the Subpoena Ad Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received,
commanding her to appear at 10:00 in the morning of the 13th of February 2012 with the original and
certified true copies of the documents listed above, and to likewise appear in the afternoon at
2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to produce the above listed documents and to testify.
In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court ruling and based on
the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court's rules and policies, we shall now determine how
the Court will comply with the subpoenas and the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
Prefatory Statement
The Court states at the outset that this Resolution is issued not to favor or prejudice the
Chief Justice whose impeachment gave rise to the letters and the subpoenas under consideration, but
to simply consider the requests and the subpoenas in light of what the Constitution, the laws, and our
rules and policies mandate and allow.
From the constitutional perspective, a necessary starting vantage point in this
consideration is the principle of separation of powers through the
recognitionof the independence of each branch of government and through the
protection of privileged and confidential documents and processes, as recognized by law, by the rules
and by Court policies.
The Independence of the Judiciary
The doctrine of separation of powers is an essential component of our democratic and
republican system of government. The doctrine inures not by express provision of the Constitution,
but as an underlying principle that constitutes the bedrock of our system of checks and
balances in government. 5 It divides the government into three branches, each with well-defined
powers. In its most basic concept, the doctrine declares that the legislature enacts the law, the
executive implements it, and the judiciary interprets it.
Each branch is considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within its own
sphere, under the legal and political reality of one overarchingConstitution that governs one
government and one nation for whose benefit all the three separate branches must act with
unity. Necessarily under this legal and political reality, the mandate for each branch is to ensure that
its assigned constitutional duties are duly performed, all for the one nation that the three branches
are sworn to serve, obey and protect, among others, by keeping the government stable and running.
The Court's mandate, in so far as these constitutional principles are concerned, is to keep the different
branches within the exercise of their respective assigned powers and prerogatives through
the Ruleof Law. 6
A lesser known but no less important aspect of the principle of separation of powers —
deemed written into the rules by established practice and rendered imperative by the departments'
inter-dependence and need for cooperation among themselves — is the principle of comity or the
practice of voluntarily observing inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned
constitutional duties for the harmonious working of government.
The Judiciary applies the principle of comity at the first instance in its interpretation and
application of laws. In appreciating the areas wholly assigned to a particular branch for its sole and
supreme exercise of discretion (i.e., on political questions where the courts can intervene only when
the assigned branch acts with grave abuse of discretion), the courts tread carefully; they exercise
restraint and intervene only when the grave abuse of discretion is clear and even then must actwith
carefully calibrated steps, safely and surely made within constitutional bounds. The two other branches,
for their part, may also observe the principle ofcomity by voluntarily and temporarily refraining from
continuing with the acts questioned before the courts. Where doubt exists, no hard and fast rule
obtains on how due respect should be shown to each other; largely, it is a weighing of the public
interests involved, as against guaranteed individual rights and the attendant larger public interests,
and it is the latter consideration that ultimately prevails. DSEIcT
A case in point is on the matter of impeachment whose trial has been specifically assigned
by the Constitution to the Senate. Where doubt exists in an impeachment case, a standard that should
not be forgotten is the need to preserve the structure of a democratic and republican
government, particularly the check and balance that should prevail.
Access to court records: general rule — envelope containing its final copy, addressed to the parties, has been transmitted to the process
a policy of transparency
Underlying every request for information is the constitutional right to information (a right
granted to the people) that Article III, Section 7 of the Constitutionprovides:
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to officials acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. [emphases ours]
The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution's own terms, is not
absolute. On the part of private individuals, the right to privacy, similarly inviolable, exists. Institutions
also enjoy their own right to confidentiality, that, for governmental departments and agencies, is
expressed in terms of their need to protect the integrity of their mandated tasks under
the Constitution and the laws; these tasks, to state the obvious, are their reasons for their being.
In line with the public's constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a
policy of transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody, necessary to maintain
the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable disputes. 7 This policy, in terms of Court Rules,
is embodied in Section 11, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, 8 which states:
Section 11. Certified copies. — The clerk shall prepare, for any person demanding
the same, a copy certified under the seal of the court of any paper, record, order,
judgment, or entry in his office, proper to be certified, for the fees prescribed by
these rules. [emphases ours]
Notably, the rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of fees
and compliance with rules; it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This
grant, however, is not as open nor as broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is subject to the
limitations the laws and the Court's own rules provide. As heretofore stated, for the Court and the
Judiciary, a basic underlying limitation is the need to preserve and protect the integrity of their main
adjudicative function.
When Court Records are considered
Confidential
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records "create a hierarchy of rights
that protect certain confidential relationships over and above the public's evidentiary need" or "right
to every man's evidence." 9 Accordingly, certain informations contained in the records of cases
before the Supreme Court are considered confidential and are exempt from disclosure. To reiterate,
the need arises from the dictates of the integrity of the Court's decision-making function which may
be affected by the disclosure of information.
Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
disclosure of (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Courton each case
included in the agenda of the Court's session, and (3) the deliberations of the
Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before it.
Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC 10 declares that the results of the raffle of cases shall only be
available to the parties and their counsels, unless the cases involve bar matters, administrative cases
and criminal cases involving the penalty of life imprisonment, which are treated with strict
confidentiality and where the raffle results are not disclosed even to the parties themselves. 11
Rule 10, Section 2 of the IRSC provides that the actions taken in each case in the Court's
agenda, which are noted by the Chief Justice or the Division Chairman, are also to be treated with
strict confidentiality. Only after the official release of the resolution embodying the Court action may
that action be made available to the public. 12 A resolution is considered officially released once the
server for personal service or to the mailing section of the Judicial Records Office.
Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication. Section 2,
Rule 10 of the IRSC provides:
Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. — Court sessions are
executive in character, with only the
Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not
be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized
by the Court. [emphasis ours] ACaDTH
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his concurring opinion to
the Court Resolution in Arroyo v. De Lima 13 (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on
confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to "freely discuss the issues without
fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions" or fear ofhumiliation for one's comments. 14 The
privilege against disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is known as deliberative
process privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. "Written advice
from a variety of individuals is an important element of the government's decision-making process
and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations;"15 the privilege is intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of deliberative
communications." 16
The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in passing recognized the
claim of this privilege by the two other branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority 17 (speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court declared that—
[t]he information . . . like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized
as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal
branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. 18 (emphases ours)
Justice Brion noted this fact in his Separate Concurring Opinion in Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations: 19
Significantly, this type of privilege is not for the Executive to enjoy alone. All the
great branches of government are entitled to this treatment for their own decision
and policy making conversations and correspondence. It is unthinkable that the
disclosure of internal debates and deliberations of the Supreme Court or the
executive sessions of either Houses of Congress can be compelled at will by
outside parties. [emphasis ours]
Thus, a Senator may invoke legislative privilege when he or she is questioned outside the Senate about
information gathered during an executive session of the Senate's legislative
inquiry in aid of legislation. In the same manner, a justice of the court or a judge may invoke judicial
privilege in the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, for proceedings in the performance of his or
her own judicial functions. What applies to magistrates applies with equal force to courtofficials and
employees who are privy to these deliberations. They may likewise claim exemption when asked about
this privileged information.
While Section 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC cited above speaks only of the
confidentiality of court deliberations, it is understood that the rule extends to documents and other
communications which are part of or are related to the deliberative process. 20 The deliberative
process privilege protects from disclosure documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations that are component parts of the process for formulating governmental decisions
and policies. Obviously, the privilege may also be claimed by other court officials and employees when
asked to act on these documents and other communications.
The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel in fact provides that access shall be denied with
respect to information or records relating to drafts of decisions, rulings, orders, or internal
memoranda or internal reports. In the 2007 Resolution on Access to Justice for the Poor
Project, 21 the Court excluded the same information and records from the public by classifying them
as confidential:
Article 1. Definition of Terms. —
2. Confidential information generally refers to information not yet made a
matter of public record relating to pending cases, such as notes, drafts, research
papers, internal discussion, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers. Even after the decision, resolution, or order is
made public, such information that a justice or judge uses in preparing a
decision, resolution, or order shall remain confidential. [emphases ours]
To qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege, the agency must show
that the document is both (1) predecisional and (2) deliberative. 22
A document is "predecisional" under the deliberative process privilege if it
precedes, in temporal sequence, the decision to which it relates. 23 In other words,communications
are considered predecisional if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion. 24 HTCaAD
A material is "deliberative," on the other hand, if it reflects the give-and-take of the
consultative process. 25 The key question in determining whether the material is
deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the information would discourage candid discussion
within the agency. 26 If the disclosure of the information would expose the government's decision-
making process in a way that discourages candid discussion among the decision-makers (thereby
undermining the courts' ability to perform their functions), the information is deemed privileged.
Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature are thus protected and
cannot be the subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved. The privilege in general
insulates the Judiciary from an improper intrusion into the functions of the judicial branch and shields
justices, judges, and court officials and employees from public scrutiny or the pressure of public
opinion that would impair a judge's ability to render impartial decisions. 27 The deliberative process
can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making process to public scrutiny before or even
after the decision is made, as discussed below.
Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well
as preventing members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process: (1) the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and (2) the pendency of an action or matter.
The prohibition against disclosure of confidential information is required to be observed
by members of the Court under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. Section
9, Canon 4 (Propriety) states:
Section 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity
shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.
[emphasis ours]
This rule of judicial ethics complements the rule of evidence that disqualifies public
officials from testifying on information they acquire in confidence in the course of their duties:
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned inconfidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence,
when the courtfinds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. [emphasis ours]
To ensure the observance of these rules, the improper disclosure of confidential
information learned in official capacity is made criminally punishable underArticle 229 of the Revised
Penal Code, 28 Section 3 (k) of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, 29 and Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. 30 Under existing laws, neither the Impeachment Court nor the Senate has
the power to grant immunity from criminal prosecution for revealing confidential information.
Under the law, therefore, the Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information
they acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication, such as information on
how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the justices used in decision-making,
because the end-result would be the disclosure of confidential information that could subject them
to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as
it pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to any compulsory
process in relation to the performance of their adjudicatory functions. InSenate of the Philippines v.
Exec. Sec. Ermita, 31 the Court declared that members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from
[the Congress'] power of inquiry [in aidof legislation]. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is
vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary.
This ruling was dictated in no small measure by the principle of comity mentioned above. Inter-
departmental courtesy demands that the highest levels of each department be exempt from the
compulsory processes of the other departments on matters related to the functions and duties of their
office.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on confidentiality that apply
to justices and judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the
raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's
session, and (3) the deliberationsof the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending
before it. They are subject as well to the disqualification by reason of privileged communication and
the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend to documents and other communications
which cannot be disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are for the Supreme Court (as the
representative and entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual justice, judge,
or court official or employees to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must be referred to the
Supreme Court for its consideration and approval. SEAHcT
In fine, there are Philippine laws, rules and jurisprudence prohibiting the
revelation of confidential or "secret" information that causes damage to public interest
even in judicial and other proceedings such as the sui generis impeachment trial. As far as the Court is
concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-bound to observe the
privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the administration of justice
were to be preserved —i.e., not even Members of the Court, on their own and without the
consent of the Supreme Court, can testify on matters covered by the prohibitions and exclusions,
particularly with respect to matters pending resolution before the Supreme Court.
 To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, inthe exercise of their
adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where the testimony is
on a matter which is externalto their adjudicatory functions and duties.
For example, where the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice
may be called as a witness in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to
or is not connected with the adjudicatory functions and duties of a magistrate. A Justice, however,
may not be called to testify on the arguments the accused Justice presented in the internal debates
as these constitute details of the deliberative process.
Public interest, among others, demands that justices, judges and judicial proceedings must
not only be, but must appear to be impartial since an impartial tribunal is a component of the right to
due process that the Constitution guarantees to every individual. Section 4, Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires that —
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair
trial ofany person or issue.
As a penultimate point, witnesses need not be summoned to testify on matters of public
record. These are the records that a government unit is required by law to keep or which it is
compelled to keep in the discharge of duties imposed by law. A record is a public record within the
purview of a statute providing that books and records required by law to be kept by a clerk may be
received in evidence in any court if it is a record which a public officer is required to keep and if it is
filled in such a manner that it is subject to public inspection. 32 Under the Rules of Court, the rule on
public records is embodied in Section 44, Rule 130 which provides:
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
To restate the rule, entries in official records may be presented without the
necessity of presenting in court the officer or person who made the entries. 33Entries in public or
official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or records themselves or by a
copy certified by the legal keeper thereof. 34These records, however, may be presented and
marked in evidence only where they are not excluded by reasons of privilege and the other reasons
discussed above.
The reasons for this rule are necessity and trustworthiness.
Necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official's attendance
as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the courseof his duty. A public officer is
excused from appearing in court in order that public business may not be interrupted, hampered or
delayed. Where there is no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found
devoting the greater part of their time attending as witnesses in court, delivering their deposition
before an officer. 35
Trustworthiness is a reason because of the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. The law reposes a particular
confidence in public officers that it presumes that they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy
and fidelity; and therefore, whatever acts they do in the discharge oftheir public duty may be
given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and
circumstances of each case may appear to require. 36 Thus, "[t]he trustworthiness of public
documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on: 1) the
sense of official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed
to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
occurred." 37 CIaDTE
As a last point and mainly for purposes of stress, the privileges discussed above that apply
to justices and judges apply mutatis mutandis to court officials and employees with respect to their
official functions. If the intent only is for them to identify and certify to the existence and
genuineness of documents within their custody or control that are not otherwise confidential or
privileged under the above discussed rules, their presence before the Impeachment Court can be and
should be excused where certified copies of these non-privileged and non-confidential documents can
be provided.
In sum, Philippine law, rules and jurisprudence prohibit the disclosure of confidential or
privileged information under well-defined rules. At the most basic level and subject to the
principle of comity, Members of the Court, and Court officials and employees may not be compelled
to testify on matters that are part of theinternal deliberations and actions of the Court in the
exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties, while testimony on matters external to their
adjudicatory functions and duties may be compelled by compulsory processes.
To summarize these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and
are not subject to disclosure:
(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by
the Court on each case included in the agenda of the Court's session on acts done material to pending
cases, except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case,
pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and
matters pending before the Court;
(3) Court records which are "predecisional" and "deliberative" in nature, in particular,
documents and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e.,
notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal
deliberations, and similar papers.
(4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and
employees in the course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even
after their term of office.
(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot
be disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by
the court to the general public.
(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest
officials of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.
(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or
judge in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual justices or judges,
no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the
consent of the Court.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the above-cited laws, rules, jurisprudence and principles,
the Court resolves the matter of the House Impeachment Panel's letters through as follows:
A. 1. On the letters dated January 19 and 25, 2012 sent in behalf of the House
Impeachment Panel, the Court cannot grant the requested
examination of the FASAP v. PAL 38 rollo as this is still a pending case
and the rollo contains privileged and confidential materials. The Court,
 however, can issue certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders and 2. to SERVE a copy of this Resolution immediately to the House Impeachment
Resolutions it issued in the case and which have been released to the Panel and to the Impeachment Court;
parties, and certified copies of the parties' pleadings and the
letters of Atty. Estelito Mendoza. 3. to REPORT to the Court the results of its actions, under (1) and (2) above, as
soon as they are completed and no later than the deadline imposed by
2. On the letter of January 25, 2012, regarding the the Impeachment Court.
examination of the rollo of Navarro v. Ermita 39 (Dinagat case),
the Court — although the Dinagatcase is closed and terminated — D.The Court's Internal Rules and Revision of Rules Committees shall forthwith meet for the
cannot grant the requested examination as the rollo contains alignment of the above discussed laws, rules and policies with the Internal Rules of the
privileged and confidential information. The Court, however, can issue Supreme Court and the Rules of Court, and to further discuss these rules and policies to the end that
certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders and Resolutions it the needs of transparency can fully meet, and be harmonized with, the
issued in the case and which have been released to the parties, and requirements of confidentiality."
certified copies of the parties' pleadings. Given by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 14th day of February 2012. JJ.
3. On the letter of January 25, 2012, regarding the examination of the rollo of the Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
case of Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Mendoza and Reyes, concurring; Presiding Officer Carpio and J. Sereno, concurring under Separate
Committee on Justice, 40 this is a closed and terminated case. Opinions; Chief Justice Corona, inhibiting; JJ. Velasco, Jr.and Perlas-Bernabe, on official
However, the court cannot still allow examination of the rollo as it leave of absence." TIaCcD
contains materials that are still covered by privilege or are still
considered confidential. The Court, however, if requested by the
Prosecution Panel, can issue certified true copies of the Decisions, Very truly yours,
Orders and Resolutions that are now matters of public record, as well
as certified copies of the parties' pleadings. SCHTac
(SGD.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
4. On the letter of January 19, 2012 in behalf of the Prosecution Panel in the
Clerk of Court
case of League of Cities v. COMELEC, 41 this is still a pending case and
theCourt cannot allow the examination of the rollo. The Court, if
requested by the Prosecution Panel, can provide certified true
copies of its Decisions, Orders and Resolutions that have been ANNEX A
furnished the parties, and certified copies of the parties' pleadings.
1. Supreme Court-received (with time andMatter of Public Record — Certified
B. On the subpoena duces tecum et ad testificandum in the FASAP v. PAL case that is the date stamp) Petition for Specialcopy can be provided by the witness to
subject of the subpoena, the case is still pending. Therefore, all the requested documents cannot be Civil Actions for Certiorari andthe Impeachment Court, as directed.
produced as discussed above. Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
The witness can consequently provide certified true copies to the Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Impeachment Court of the Decisions, Orders and Resolutions furnished to the parties, as well as Preliminary Injunction filed by
certified copies of the parties' pleadings and the letters of Atty. Estelito Mendoza. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (G.R. No.
199034) [GMA TRO Petition],
The Court cannot as well waive the privileges attendant to the proposed
including the Annexes thereto
testimony of Clerk of Court Enriqueta E. Vidal and of the other Court officials and employees on
matters covered by privilege and confidentiality.
The documents directed to be produced by the subpoena duces tecum in the GMA and
Arroyo cases (G.R. Nos. 199034 and 199046) are listed in the attached Annex "A" hereof, and are
resolved in accordance with this listing. The witness can only testify on the documents
or records allowed under this listing.
C. The Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED:
1. to PHOTOCOPY the non-confidential documents and records requested in the
letters of the House Impeachment Panel, if requested by the
Prosecution Panel. She shall as well provide these certified copies to
the Impeachment Court pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum, but
shall exclude therefrom the documents and records considered as
confidential or privileged;
2. Supreme Court received (with timeMatter of Public Record — Certified 7. Logbook or receiving copy showingPrivileged and Confidential because
and date stamp) Petition for Specialcopy can be provided by the witness to the time the TRO was issued to thethis is a pending case; expressly
Civil Actions for Certiorari andthe Impeachment Court, as directed. counsel for GMA and Mike Arroyoprohibited under the IRSC. The
Prohibition with Prayer for the as well as the date and time the TRO parties, however, may request for a
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining was received by the sheriff forcopy of this record, with portions
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary service to the parties relating to other cases deleted.
Injunction docketed as (G.R. No.
199046) [Mike Arroyo TRO
Petition], including the Annexes
thereto
8. Temporary Restraining Order datedMatter of Public Record. Certified
15 November 2011 issued in thecopy can be provided by the witness to
GMA and Mike Arroyo TROthe Impeachment Court as directed.
Petition

3. Official Leave of RespondentNot Confidential — matter of Public

Corona's travel order or leaverecord. The witness can provide
applied for days within the monthcertified copy to the Impeachment 9. Special Power of Attorney dated 15Privileged and Confidential because
of November 2011 Court, as directed. November 2011 submitted by GMAthis is a pending case; expressly
and Mike Arroyo in favor of Atty.prohibited under the IRSC. Parties can
Ferdinand Topacio appointing himrequest for a copy.
"to produce summons or receive
documentary evidence" with the
4. Minutes of the Supreme CourtPrivileged and Confidential because official date and time stamp of the
Raffle Committee which handledthis is a pending case expressly Supreme Court
the GMA and Mike Arroyoprohibited under the IRSC. The
TRO Petition parties, however, may request for a
copy of the Minutes, with portions
relating to other cases deleted.

10. Official Receipt No. 00300227-SC-Part of public record and certified

EP dated 15 November 2011 issued copy can be provided to the
by the Supreme Court for the TwoImpeachment Court.
5. Appointment or Assignment of thePrivileged and Confidential because Million Pesos Cash Bond of GMA
Member-in-Charge of the GMAthis is a pending case; expressly and Mike Arroyo with the official
and Mike Arroyo TRO Petition prohibited under the IRSC. The date and time stamp
parties, however, may request for a
copy of this record, with portions
relating to other cases deleted.

11. November 15 and 16, 2011 Sheriff'sPrivileged and Confidential because

Return of service of the GMA andthis is a pending case; expressly
Mike Arroyo TRO dated 15prohibited under the IRSC. Parties can
6. Resolution dated 15 November 2011 Matter of Public Record. Certified November 2011 upon therequest for a copy of this record.
on the GMA and Mike Arroyo TROcopy can be provided by the witness to Department of Justice and the
Petition, as published the Impeachment Court, as directed. Office of the Solicitor General
12. Certification from the FiscalPrivileged and Confidential because 16. Dissenting Opinion of JusticeThe Dissenting Opinion refers to the
Management and Budget Officethis is a pending case; expressly Sereno in G.R. No. 199034 andpersonal opinion of the writer who has
of the Supreme Court datedprohibited under the IRSC and 199046 as published on 15the constitutional duty to explain her
November 15, 2011 with thedeliberative process. The requested November 2011, 18 NovemberDissent, and is a matter of public
date and time it was received bycertification refers to the time the bond 2011 and 13 December 2011 record after this was published. The
the Supreme Court Clerk of Courtwas received by the Court. Court, however, as the institution
showing it to be November 16, 2011 entitled to the deliberative process
at 8:55am privilege, cannot waive the
confidentiality of certain portions of
this Dissent for being part of the
privilege.
The Court shall allow the witness to
issue a certified true copy of this
13. Resolution dated 18 November 2011 Matter of Public Record. Certified Dissent, subject to its reservation.
issued on the GMA and Mike copy can be provided by the witness to
Arroyo TRO Petition, as published the Impeachment Court, as directed.

14. Resolution dated 22 November 2011 Matter of Public Record. Certified

on the GMA and Mike Arroyo TROcopy can be provided by the witness to
Petition the Impeachment Court, as directed.
17. Dissenting Opinion of Justice CarpioThe Dissenting Opinion refers to the
dated 15 November 2011 and 13personal opinion of the writer who has
December 2011 in G.R. No. 199034the constitutional duty to explain his
15. Logbook showing the date and timePrivileged and Confidential because and 199046 as published Dissent, and is a matter of public
Justice Sereno's dissent to the 22this is a pending case; expressly record after this was published. The
November 2011 Resolution wasprohibited under the IRSC. Court, however, as the institution
received by the Clerk of Court En entitled to the deliberative process
Banc privilege, cannot waive the
confidentiality of certain portions of
this Dissent for being part of the
privilege.
The Court shall allow the witness to
issue a certified true copy of the
Dissent, subject to its reservation.
18. Separate Opinion of Justice VelascoThe Separate Opinion refers to the ||| (In re Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials & Employees,
dated 13 November 2011 in G.R.personal opinion of the writer and is a Notice, [February 14, 2012])
Nos. 199034 and 199046 matter of public record after this was
published. The Court, however, as the
institution entitled to the deliberative
process privilege, cannot waive the
confidentiality of certain portions of
this Separate Opinion for being partof
the privilege.
The Court shall allow the witness to
issue a certified true copy of this
Separate Opinion, subject to its
reservation.

19. Concurring Opinion of Justice AbadThe Concurring Opinion refers to the

dated 13 December 2011 in G.R.personal opinion of the writer and is a
Nos. 199034 and 199046 matter of public record after this was
published. The Court, however, as the
institution entitled to the deliberative
process privilege, cannot waive the
confidentiality of certain portions of
this Concurring Opinion for being part
of the privilege.
The Court shall allows the witness to
issue a certified true copy of this
Concurring Opinion, subject to its
reservation.

20. Official Appointment of RespondentMatter of Public Record. The witness

Corona as Associate Justice of thecan provide certified copy to the
Supreme Court Impeachment Court, as directed.

21. Official Appointment of RespondentMatter of Public Record. The witness

Corona as Chief Justice can provide certified copy to the
Impeachment Court, as directed.
To complete the records of the Impeachment Court, a certified copy of the Separate
Opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion dated December 13, 2011 on the same issue in the case can also be
provided, subject to the same conditions made in item nos. 16, 17, 18 and 19.

RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85279. July 28, 1989.]
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISIO T. BAYLON,
RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM(SSS
), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; PROHIBITION TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FROM STRIKING. —
While the Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employees may
strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No.
6 series of 1987 of the Civil Service Commission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO STRIKE. — Government employees may, therefore, through
their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law.
3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ARE PART THEREOF AND COVERED BY
MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES. — SSS employees are part of the civil service and are covered by
the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
4. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180; ALLOWS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO
NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OFEMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG THOSE FIXED BY LAW.
— E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees, allows negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment
involved are not among those fixed by law.
5. ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT ARE GOVERNED BY
LAW; EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT STRIKE TO SECURE CHANGES. — Section 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took
effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes thereof."
6. ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; STRIKES; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE STAGED BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES;
REASONS. — An injunction may be issued to restrain it. It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the
subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuanceof the strike. The Labor
Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed
by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving
government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN SAID
STRIKE; REASON. — The Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law authority to
issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the
NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT PROPER WHERE COURT CANNOT BE
ACCUSED OF IMPRUDENCE OR OVERZEALOUSNESS AS IT PROCEEDED WITH CAUTION. — The
lower Court cannot be accused of imprudence or zealousness, for after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining
the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in
the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their
employer-employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.
9. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION; WHEN REMEDY OF PETITIONER. — Petitioners' remedy is not to
petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the order of the Merit Systems
Promotion Board if it has already become final.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional Trial Court can enjoin
the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) from striking and order the striking employees to
return to work. Collaterally, it is whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right
to strike.
The antecedents are as follows:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers
and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing
non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS;
that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike
and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to
pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-
off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and
permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other
regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after
the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salariesof the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-24].
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo, pp. 72-82.] To this motion,
the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222].
On July 22, 1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo,
pp. 83-86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August
14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolution dated October 21, 1987,
the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals on March 9, 1988
promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp. 130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall
the Court of Appeals' decision. In the meantime, the Court on June 29, 1988 denied the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic. Petitioners' motion to recall the
decision of the Court of Appeals was also denied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for
reconsideration [Rollo, pp. 141-143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals[Rollo, pp. 12-37].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6, 1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-
152].
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners,
considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated
by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ ofpreliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with
the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations Commission, since the case
involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are
covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the
right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional
Trial Court may enjoin theemployees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners,
the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not
allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS'
complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whether or not
the Court of Appeals erred is finding that the Regional Trial Court did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case and enjoined the strike are as follows:
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the
strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?
These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim.
I
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including those in
the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the
Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as "all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied
to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides
that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while
there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted
the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike.
Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that "[t]he right to self-
organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the
apprehensions expressed by Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission,
explained:
MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When we proposed
this amendment providing for self-organization of government employees, it does
not mean that because they have the right to organize, they also have the right to
strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as
a union. With regard to the right to strike, everyone will remember that in the
Bill of Rights, there is a provision that the right to form associations or societies
whose purpose is not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the
purpose of the state is to prohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising
government functions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited,
then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And that provision is
carried inRepublic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers, including those from the
government-owned and controlled, are allowed to organize but they are
prohibited from striking. So, the fear of our honorable Vice-President is
unfounded. It does not mean that because we approve this resolution, it carries
with it the right to strike. That is a different matter. As a matter of fact, that subject
is now being discussed in the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying
to find a solution to this problem. We know that this problem exists; that the
moment we allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will happen if
the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What will happen to those
people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the Committee
on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry
with it the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (C.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code (PAD.
442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including instrumentalities
exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary functions:
Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the
 policy of this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the
purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and
conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization
which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided,
however, That this section shall apply only to employees employed in
governmental functions and not those employed in proprietary functionsof the
Government including but not limited to governmental corporations.
No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time it recognized the
right of employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code to organize and
bargain collectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations for purposes not contrary to law"
[Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P. Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms
and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employeesof government owned
and controlled corporations, shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art.
276]. Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or not government employees may strike, for
such are excluded from its coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], is equally silent
on the matter.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to
organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to
organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and
rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any
legislation that may be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum
Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees . . . enjoins under
pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the
absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or
regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the
validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil
service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1); see also Sec.
1 of E.O. No. 180where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"]
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870
& 70295, November 24, 1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R.
No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between
workers in the private sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike:
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and
conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision
or instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace
Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended).Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind
labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured
through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and
their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative
heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this
is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].
Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, in his position paper submitted to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and quoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not
applying to public employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that
the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all
people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are
present in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between
government and those whom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National
Housing Corporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172, 178-
179].
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees,
while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms
and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof,
except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between
duly recognized employees' organizations and appropriate government
authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes
in the public sector, to wit:
SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever
applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases
involving government employees. In case any dispute remains unresolved after
exhausting all the available remedies under existing laws and procedures, the
parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management]
Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress
for the betterment of the terms and conditions ofemployment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by
law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-
Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes,
walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Government to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations
to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after
the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled corporations with
original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing
changes thereof."
 II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law, an
injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction
enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of governmentemployees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the
NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and
issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor-Management Council
has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction.
Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to
the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate. LibLex
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it had proceeded
with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any
further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to
refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationship to the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
III
In their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," and reiterated in their reply and
supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSS unlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the
individual petitioners and they pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatory
injunction to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof and to compel the SSS to
pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated
May 5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who are
reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to their
salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems
Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners' remedy is
not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has
already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for
review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellatecourt dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No.
13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated
December 13, 1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Social Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85279, [July 28, 1989], 256
PHIL 1079-1091)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.]
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY,
INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPEWORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J p:
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the
"Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde RopeFactory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of
the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to asUnion) which had with the Company a
collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement."
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March
4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350,
the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment
to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: . . . "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization,
Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the
Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning
from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel
that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and
theUnion from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the
collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality ofRepublic Act No. 3350; and contended that
the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and
(e). 2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered
its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the
defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his
present employment and sentencing the
defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's
fees and the costs of this action." 3
From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law, assigning the
following errors:
"I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional.
"II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff
the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof."
In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union contented, firstly, that the
Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of
said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such
religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given
religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ;
and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of
the 1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation
of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement containing
a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs
the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the
obligation to continue as such members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which
ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution;
and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor
organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision that "no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join
associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a
religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits
membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate
religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws" clause
of the Constitution, it being a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operation of
closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue
advantages over their fellowworkers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it
nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other
emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the
promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining agreement
cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic
Act No. 3350; 12 and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this
country would be wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo
in order to do away with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right
to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from
a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein, and the Act has given
substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said
Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the
terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that the Act does not violate the establishment of religion clause
or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious
needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and balanced the
collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen
religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference
over union security measures which are merely contractual 16 ; that said Act does not violate the
constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending on
their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law, and applies
to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the
Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the
midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs. 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to premise that there are
some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable
basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all
possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such
religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears
nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary
implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed
the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III
of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article n ofthe Constitution of 1973, provide that the
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3
of Republic Act No. 875provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join
or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the
Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations.
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the
nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right
comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of legal restraint,
whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power, whereby
an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee
who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join,
he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still
retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any
time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a unionincludes the right to abstain from joining
any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that
the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does
not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is,
however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which
the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus
Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that
although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment
of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep
his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said
employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an
exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any
such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from
infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not
prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members
the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in
deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce
them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract,
specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company,
by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent
employees workers". This agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was
enacted of June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the
agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no longer
be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the
Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from theUnion. The Act,
therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly
absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in
permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of
saidunion security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the contract, or its legal
construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract. The
extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching
in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the
contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated
on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not
absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction
to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for
it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24 In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues
to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding
said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with
reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made
in reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be
precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise
may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of
a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile — a government which retains
adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the
Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate
instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows that not
all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition
as to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally
destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to contracts
regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts,
for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts
has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers
of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an
infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his
employees, the law having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and
being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging
yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be
measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own
circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are
reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the
reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure
freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against
those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming
thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the
only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid
that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of
group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his
working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective
capital, directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective
force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both
the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when
the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the
individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill
No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:
"It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of
his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor
organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is
tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right
under the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to
the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labor
organization, Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their right
to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any manner violating
their religious faith and/or belief." 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose — exempting
the members of said religious sects from coverage of unionsecurity agreements — is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to
contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the
United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include
freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although
not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in the hierarchy
of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably
necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the
danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional,
appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation
of Section 1(7) of Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article 8 of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without. discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights."
The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within
limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs,
to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or
all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a
general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without
imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be precluded from
pursuing valid objectives secular ID character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion
or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional
prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional
inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and
eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free
exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason
of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a
living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined,
in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital
and industry. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and
employers." 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects
that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees
against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden
on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment,
which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also
promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop
agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment
clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has
been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the
constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden
that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it
enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could
take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of
the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted
unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see no such compelling state
interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects, it leaves no
right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was
not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No.
875and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of
labor unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by its
silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain members
of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor
unions. Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers,
for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a fortiori to a
labor union - assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is
constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted by
prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional prohibition against
requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does
not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular
religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits Its
members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union.
Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts
members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a
religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign from
the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious
objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he is
exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How
then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its
purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional
provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following
a legal way to do it.49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as
it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating
Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal
protection of the laws.50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52 The
very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality
in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 54 This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 57 Neither is it
necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may
in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude
the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may
appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies
employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of unionshop security agreements, into those who
by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose
religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and
sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ
in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all
places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many
views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners
in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country
is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are
important and should not be ignored.
Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important differences.
Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical
consequences and are the motives of certain rules of human conduct and the justification of certain
acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to
human life its distinctive-character, its tone, its happiness, or unhappiness, its enjoyment or irksomeness.
Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor
of their experience is more important to them than their religion, or their not having any religion. Because
of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better than the
rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all
possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable
and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious
beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to
a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs. The classification,
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely
to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their
right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended
to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed
shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by
their religion from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements
continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision.
The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act
unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association
which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who
are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees,
because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law
unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to
equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in
some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not
offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has
been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the
public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld
even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62

6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social
justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act
No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious
belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of
livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that
the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350 insures
economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component
elements of society, for it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a
labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic
and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts
the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements, and
equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor
unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply social
equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or
subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative
term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65 Social justice
guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to
accomplish — it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not
called for - in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held
that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the
constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the
enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover,
legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs
of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that unless
the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of religious sects that
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree.
The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the religious sects
that control the demands of the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and
anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute
is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result
arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71
"No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a
labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on
behalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a
party, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a
contract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the
trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right of some
other person to dispose of his capital or labor." (Emphasis supplied)
That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be 'disputed for appellant sought the discharge of
respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a
question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74 The discharge or the
act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in
asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done . . . in furtherance of an industrial
dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in
furtherance of an industrial dispute.75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24
of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time
when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article provides
that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff . . . to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court
deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the
instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused
Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule
142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union.
It is so ordered.
||| (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-25246, [September 12, 1974], 158 PHIL 60-99)

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued that the decision
of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24
of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party,
and saidUnion merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing
collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil
Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did not
therefore suffer any damage at all. 72

In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there was really no
industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in
the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that
since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally be
ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code.73

The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by appellant provides that:
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).
SYNOPSIS
For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since the latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the
removal of respondent's name from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws
of the IBP.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope ofmembership therein and the obligation to
pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A)
constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition
to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization
to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of
the IBP is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to
pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an
inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A
ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar,
to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State,
an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.
2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A
VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren inthe profession, to the courts, and to
the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of
justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this
privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has
created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the
police power"
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The
Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing
the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973,
were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the general welfare,
may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S.
vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public
welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING
ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that
this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the
admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which
he is not already a member. He becomes a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All
that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not
compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There
is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers
are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyer s public responsibilities.
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME
COURT. — The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.
10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional
nor illegal, and a lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment
and striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J p:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues"
to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of
the IBP, which reads:
". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay
the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted
for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are inessence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found inpar. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-
Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the
Court Rule, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12
of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys."
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule: LLphil
"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body
to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons
whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. . . . ."
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably
and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define
the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that
case in its Resolutionordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable' . . ."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,membership in which is voluntary. Integration of
the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his
share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest
and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the
administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"
(Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectivity." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court inordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing
the constitution of the IBPinto a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973,
were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin
maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental
principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is
a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from
all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article
X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively."
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of theConstitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law, " it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration
vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision
of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise
of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for
it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became
a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide
an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further
the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of
a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void
as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public
responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration
Act of Kentucky, said: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend
upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court —
appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice . . . the argument that this is an
arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives
the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to
sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is
a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an
honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty
is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. . ."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdll

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
||| (In re: Edillon, A.C. No. 1928 (Resolution), [August 3, 1978], 174 PHIL 55-68)