De La Huerta Michael Rubin

1 CHANEL KATIRAIE, Esq.
SBN 315825
.ffe*".ffi,
AARON G. FILLER, Esq. SBN 302956
2 Tensor Law, P.C.
2716 Ocean Park Blvd, #3082
J
Santa Monica, California 90405
4 Tel: (310) 450-9689
Fax: (310) 496-3176
5
Attorneys for P laintiff
6 Tensor Law P.C.
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES _ CENTRAL DISTRICT
9
TENSOR LAW P.C., a California caseNo.
10 Corporation, SCilooutl
l1 Plaintiff,
vs.
12
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR:
MICHAEL F. RUBIN, an individual;
13
HARVEY WEINSTEIN, an individual; 1. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WTTH A
14 THE WEINSTEIN COMPANY; and DOES CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
1 -50
15
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITII A
16
PROSPECTTVE ECONOMIC
Defendants.
ADVAI\TAGE
t7
3. PRACTICING LAW WITIIOUT
18 LICENSE _ \TIOLATION OF
CALIFORNIA BUSINESS &
19
PROFESSTONAL CODE $6126
20
2t
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
VERIFIED COMPLAINT of Tensor Law P.C. vs. Michael Rubin, Harvey Weinstein, et al
1 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 7
2 II. PARTIES ............................................................................................................................................. 13
III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ......................................................................................................... 15
3
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS .............................................................................................................. 17
4 A. Events Leading To Client De La Huerta’s Causes of Action Against Weinstein and THE
Weinstein COMPANY ..................................................................................................................................... 17
5 1) Initial Assault on December 7, 2010 ................................................................................................................ 17
2) Corroboration of First Assault ............................................................................................................................ 19
6 3) Second assault on December 23, 2010 ........................................................................................................... 20
7 4) Event in Los Angeles ............................................................................................................................................... 21
5) Post Assault Retaliation by Weinstein Against De La Huerta to Punish Her for Her
8 Condemnation of His Rapes ...................................................................................................................................... 22
6) Legal Jeopardy Is Attached to The Weinstein Company as well as to Weinstein so that Both
9 Were Motivated to Try to Undermine Efforts by Victims to Achieve Justice ....................................... 23
B. Events Leading to Defendants’ Liability In the Current Action .................................................. 23
10 C. Actions Of RUBIN to Attempt to Force a Waiver of De La Huerta’s Patient-Psychotherapist
Privilege as to Communications with SueAnne Piliero, PhD ........................................................... 26
11
V. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACTUAL
12 RELATIONSHIP ..................................................................................................................................... 32
A. An Actual Valid Contract Existed .......................................................................................................... 33
13 B. DEFENDANTS Had Knowledge of the Contract ................................................................................ 34
C. Defendants Engaged In Specific Intentional Acts Intended To Disrupt And Interfere With
14 The Performance Of The Contract By FILLER And By Tensor Law P.C. ........................................ 36
D. The Intentional Acts of DEFENDANTS were Wrongful And Unjustified .................................. 36
15 1) Wrongful and Unjustified Advice as to an Urgent Need to Terminate All Representation ...... 37
2) RUBIN’S Plan to Create a Devastating and Irremediable Waiver of De La Huerta’s Patient-
16
Psychotherapist privilege. ......................................................................................................................................... 38
17 3) The Wrongful Nature of RUBIN’s Actions ...................................................................................................... 41
E) RUBIN’S Actions Have Resulted In Severe or Negatively Dispositive Interference with
18 Progress Towards Indictment of Weinstein ......................................................................................... 43
F) RUBIN’s Actions Resulted in a Break in Contract ........................................................................... 47
19 1) Causation is Readily established for Making the Objective of Obtaining an Indictment of
Weinstein More Difficult as Well as Less Likely ............................................................................................... 47
20 2) The Amount of Pecuniary Damages is Susceptible to Being Accurately Established ................. 49
G. Direction by an Undisclosed Principal to Interfere with Contractual Relations ................. 50
21
VI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A PROSPECTIVE
22 ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE .................................................................................................................... 52
23 VII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE – VIOLATION

OF CAL. BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL CODE §6126 ................................................................... 53
24 VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................................. 53
25
26
27
28
-2-
1
CASES
2
Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc.,
3 424 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2005)............................................................................................ 33
4 American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Patners LTD,

225 Cal.App.4th 1451 (2014).............................................................................................. 48
5
6 Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra,

7 Cal.4th 503 (1994) .......................................................................................................... 48
7
Bank of New York v. Fremont General
8 523 F.3d 902 (9th Circuit 2008). ......................................................................................... 46
9 Brady v. Maryland,
10 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ............................................................................................................. 26
11 Buckaloo, v. Johnson supra,

14 Cal.3d 815 (1975) ......................................................................................................... 45
12
Builders Corporation of America v. United States
13
148 F.Supp. 482 (N.D.Cal.1957) ....................................................................................... 45
14
Contra Costa County Title Co. v. Waloff,
15 184 Cal.App.2d 59 (1960).................................................................................................. 48
16 Di Loreto v. Shumake
38 Cal.App.4th 35 (1995) .................................................................................................. 47
17
18 Estate of Williamson
150 Cal.App.2d 334 (1957)................................................................................................ 48
19
Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc.,
20 116 Cal.App.4th 375, (2004) ............................................................................................ 46
21
In re Sealed Case,
22 116 F.3d 550 (1997). .......................................................................................................... 38
23 Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co.

107 Cal.App 97 (1930)....................................................................................................... 12
24
25 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist.,

55 Cal.2d 224 (1961) ......................................................................................................... 41
26
Luce v. Sutton
27 115 Cal.App.2d 428 (1953)................................................................................................ 12
28
-3-
1 Manor Investment Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co.
59 Cal. App. 3d 586 (1984)................................................................................................ 42
2
Mitchell v. Gonzales,
3
54 Cal.3d 1041 (1991) ....................................................................................................... 46
4
Nelson v. Kellogg,
5 162 Cal. 621 (1912) ........................................................................................................... 48
6 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co.
7 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126, (1990) ............................................................................... 30, 42, 45
8 Patterson v. Dominos Pizza LLC

60 Cal.4th 474 (2014). ........................................................................................................ 12
9
People v. Caldwell,
10 36 Cal.3d 210 (1984) ......................................................................................................... 46
11
Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp,
12 59 Cal. 2d 618 (1963) ........................................................................................................ 48
13 Quelimane Co. v Stewart Title Guaranty Co.,

19 Cal. 4th 26 (1998) .................................................................................................... 30, 34
14
15 Ramona Manor Convalescent v. Care Enterprises,

177 Cal.App.3d 1120 (1986).............................................................................................. 33
16
Reeves v. Hanlon
17 33 Cal.4th 1140 (2004) ................................................................................................ 34, 45
18
Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,
19 16 Cal.4th 953, (1997) ....................................................................................................... 46
20 Savage v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,

21 Cal App 4th 434 (1993).................................................................................................. 35
21
Schnier v. Percival
22
83 Cal.App 470 (1927)....................................................................................................... 12
23
Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.
24 36 Cal. 3d 752 (1984) ........................................................................................................ 42
25 Sebastian International v Russolillo
162 F.Supp.2d 1198 (C.D. Cal 2001) .................................................................... 32, 33, 42
26
27 Shamblin v. Berge,
166 Cal. App. 3d 118 (1985)) ............................................................................................ 42
28
-4-
1 Sole Energy Company et al v Petrominerals Corporation et al,
128 Cal.App.4th 212 .......................................................................................................... 47
2
Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters
3
29 Cal.2d 34 (1946) ........................................................................................................... 45
4
Stevens v. Chisholm,
5 179 Cal. 557 (1919) ........................................................................................................... 48
6 Tate v. Canonica,
7 180 Cal.App.2d 898 (1960)................................................................................................ 46
8 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Employer's Ins. Co.,

159 Cal.App.3d 277 (1984)................................................................................................ 46
9
Youst v. Longo
10 43 Cal.3d 64 (1987) ........................................................................................................... 47
11
12
STATUTES
13 Cal Civil Code §1708.5 .................................................................................................................. 13
14
California Business and Professional Code §6126 ........................................................................ 51
15
California Evidence Code §1014 ................................................................................................... 37
16
California Evidence Code §912 ..................................................................................................... 37
17
18 New York Consolidated Laws, Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR) §4507 ................................ 37
19 NY Uniform Rules of Courts 22 NYCRR Part 200 §200.16 to §200.27 ....................................... 26
20
21
22 OTHER AUTHORITIES
23 Book of Approved Jury Instructions –
BAJI - No. 7.89 .................................................................................................................. 47
24
Civil Conspiracy and Interference with Contractual Relations
25
(1975) 8 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 302 ..................................................................................... 42
26
Evidentiary Privileges: Grand Jury, Criminal, and Civil Trials” by Lawrence N. Gray, Esq.;
27 New York State Bar Association ....................................................................................... 38
28
-5-
1 Interference with Contractual Relations: A Property Limitation
(1966) 18 Stan.L. Rev. 1406 ............................................................................................. 42
2
Prosser & Keeton on Torts
3
(5th ed.1988) ................................................................................................................ 42, 46
4
Restatement 2nd of Torts ........................................................................................................... 33, 42
5
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-6-
1
2 COMES NOW Plaintiff, TENSOR LAW P.C. and complains of Defendants MICHAEL
3 F. RUBIN, an individual; HARVEY WEINSTEIN, an individual; and THE WEINSTEIN
4 COMPANY a New York Corporation with offices in Los Angeles, California, as well as DOES
5 1-50, inclusive as follows:
6
7 I. INTRODUCTION
8
9 1. This is a matter wherein MICHAEL F. RUBIN (hereinafter “RUBIN”), a New

10 York attorney, acted to interfere with Plaintiff TENSOR LAW P.C.’s (hereinafter “TLPC”)
11 contractual business interests in the representation of its client Paz De La Huerta, and to hinder
12 TLPC’s efforts to advance criminal and civil prosecution of Weinstein for sexual assault against
13 De La Huerta. The only beneficiaries of these alleged acts by RUBIN are HARVEY Weinstein
14 (hereinafter “Weinstein”), who has been a leading figure in the Film Industry, and his
15 Corporation, THE Weinstein COMPANY (hereinafter “TWC”).
16 2. While every Defendant is entitled to the best defense through the legal system,
17 Weinstein and TWC instead benefitted from actions of a criminal defense attorney – Michael F.
18 Rubin – who falsely and under secrecy, represented himself to TLPC’s client De La Huerta as a
19 victims rights advocate. On information and belief, RUBIN actually acted for the benefit of
20 Weinstein and TWC – to interfere by a series of harmful subterfuges, threats, and extortion
21 demands, entirely outside the legitimate strictures of the legal system. In this plan, RUBIN acted
22 secretly to a) mislead De La Huerta into believing RUBIN was supporting her case, while in fact
23 he was working to b) ruinously expose her medical records to the public, c) convince her to
24 proceed without any representation, and to d) withdraw her complaint against Weinstein. As a
25 result of these acts – and despite TLPC’s success at protecting De La Huerta herself - Tensor Law
26 P.C., whose representation De La Huerta terminated, suffered harms for which it now seeks
27 redress.
28
-7-
1 3. Because of the very large number of litigations commencing and pending against
2 Weinstein and TWC, these entities commenced a series of pre-emptive and disruptive tactics
3 including: a) the use of Mossad agents (former Israeli Intelligence) to investigate and intimidate
4 victims, and b) use of tactics of persons they hired working under false pretenses to befriend and
5 co-opt expected plaintiffs (such as Rose McGowan) who had been assaulted by Weinstein, in
6 order to c) block, interfere with and gain an undeserved and unfair advantage over as part of d) a
7 vast multi-million dollar effort to prevent or minimize the success of those who had been
8 assaulted in their efforts to seek redress. This effort to interfere with and disrupt the normal
9 operations of the legal system included retaining some of the most prominent and respected
10 attorneys in the country including David Boies (who represented the New York Times even as
11 Boies hired sub-rosa agents to undermine and intimidate New York Times reporters) and Lisa
12 Bloom daughter of Gloria Allred – even as Allred moved to represent many of the victims of her
13 daughter’s client. Thus at the current moment, after the expenditure of several million dollars to
14 undermine and preempt legal efforts against him, more than 80 women have complained of
15 sexual assaults by Weinstein – including numerous rapes -, but no criminal prosecutions have
16 commenced and very little has moved forward on a civil basis.
17 4. Michael Rubin is a specialist in the criminal defense of rapists. The website for his
18 law firm Kelly & Rubin LLP has a section for personal injury that lists nine categories of personal
19 injury but for which seven have categories have no link or actual webpage (see Exhibit A). In
20 addition he has a page for criminal defense wherein all six categories have active links and
21 associated webpages including a page for sexual assault. Uniquely, he additionally has a separate
22 web page offering to defend those who rape children with Visa, Mastercard and American
23 Express logos at the top, see figure 1 below, or if not taken down:
24 http://www.kellyrubin.com/Criminal-Law/Sexual-Assault/Child-Sex-Crimes.shtml
25 In particular RUBIN features a general remedy of filing false arrest actions against the New York
26 Police Department and malicious prosecution against the New York District Attorney.
27
28
-8-
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
5. RUBIN is a well known public figure because he is formerly an assistant district
28
-9-
1 attorney in the Bronx and he is a famous public figure because of his work in the defense of a
2 heinous serial rapist, Fletcher A. Worrell, wherein Rubin and his efforts to derail the prosecution
3 were extensively covered in a series of New York Times articles. He battled against the extension
4 of the statute of limitations for rape. The exact extension that forms the basis for De La Huerta’s
5 case against Weinstein:
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-10-
1 6. As detailed below, RUBIN pursues an aggressive policy to obtain clients which
2 will include secret and surreptitious aggressive contacts with already-represented clients and cold
3 calls to arrange referrals to potential clients identified through the news feed that comes through
4 his web site and other sources. RUBIN holds himself out to be the most experienced,
5 knowledgeable and successful defender of rapists in New York, with numerous personal contacts
6 inside the New York County District Attorney’s office.
7 7. When RUBIN learned that Weinstein was under criminal investigation for rape in
8 New York, he can be reasonably expected to have contacted individuals who were in a position to
9 communicate with Weinstein’s defense team and the TWC defense team to offer his superior
10 expert defense attorney services. These services for which he professes to be among the leading
11 experts are for a) the derailment of any grand jury indictment for rape and – if unsuccessful in
12 preventing indictment – b) for the best possible defense representation in New York.
13 8. Certainly, for a defense attorney who represents himself as a leading specialist in
14 defending New York rapists, an opportunity to associate himself publicly with Weinstein – aside
15 from the remunerative possibilities - would greatly enhance his standing in the segment of the
16 public most important to his business and to whom his marketing is directed. However, shortly
17 thereafter, he contacted Paz De La Huerta to falsely and fraudulently offer his expertise to “help
18 assure success” in her criminal charges against Weinstein.
19 9. RUBIN first instructed De La Huerta to keep all communications between himself
20 and her absolutely secret from everyone and most importantly not to inform her attorney –
21 FILLER– of any of his contacts with her, nor of the actions he would instruct her to carry out.
22 During this time he provided false information – such as informing De La Huerta that she must
23 urgently and immediately terminate representation by TLPC because TLPC could not act on her
24 behalf in New York – e.g. tainting her case by practicing law without a license in New York. This
25 was obviously untrue because TLPC partner Alex R. Straus, Esq. is an experienced New York
26 licensed attorney (NY Bar #5175419). This was defamatory and false although he informed De
27 La Huerta that he had carefully researched this fact and that it mandated her to terminate counsel
28 immediately and become unrepresented rather than risk false representation by TLPC.
-11-
1 10. If RUBIN’s research extended as far as looking at the TLPC website, then this was
2 a provably knowing falsehood. If he made this assertion without even looking at the website, then
3 it was reckless and wanton and so goes beyond being negligent and unknowing. This was a false
4 and defamatory allegation of gross misconduct against TLPC, made to undermine the confidence
5 of De La Huerta and to cause her to panic into terminating TLPC. RUBIN knew he was lying at
6 the time he put this in writing in a communication to De La Huerta. His purpose was to
7 undermine TLPC’s attorney-client relationship and to stampede De La Huerta into a frantic act
8 that would harm her and harm her efforts to seek justice from Weinstein. It would disrupt a
9 proceeding – the motion before Judge Charles Solomon - which was part of the Grand Jury
10 proceeding. In this fashion, RUBIN used a falsehood to attempt to disrupt the Grand Jury process.
11 11. After this series of efforts to damage and humiliate De La Huerta, RUBIN
12 informed her, on November 12, she had no case and should withdraw her allegations against
13 Weinstein. On information and belief he then went on to advise the New York District Attorney
14 not to indict Weinstein. During the course of these actions, De La Huerta’s attorney Filler, at
15 TENSOR LAW PC did discover RUBIN’S activities and commenced an investigation of RUBIN.
16 De La Huerta also did not follow RUBIN’s advice to withdraw her complaint, but did terminate
17 TLPC’s representation in this matter – although continuing to retain TLPC as to other prior
18 matters. Without first seeking to review any case files of De La Huerta’s attorney FILLER,
19 RUBIN made calls to the Manhattan District Attorney assigned to the De La Huerta matter,
20 Maxine Rosenthal, with false and discouraging advice, leading to the abrupt halt of progress
21 toward indictment of Weinstein. De La Huerta then retained Carrie Goldberg, Esq. – a specialist
22 in the protection of the privacy of sexual assault victims. Although RUBIN knew Goldberg had
23 been retained on November 8, he continued his secret efforts including travelling to Spain to meet
24 with De La Huerta and interview her extensively on November 12. This allowed him to obtain
25 extensive confidential information from De La Huerta, and during this period, convincing De La
26 Huerta to keep his actions secret from her new specialist attorney Goldberg, as well, at least
27 through November 14, 2017 when Filler learned of RUBIN’s actions and subsequently informed
28 Goldberg.
-12-
1 12. Because more than 80 individuals around the country have reported being victims
2 of Weinstein and because thousands have experienced work related, or power imbalance sexual
3 assault that have been brought to light because of the events related to Weinstein, there has been
4 intense media interest. Media in the Weinstein matter has a capability to disarm or at least provide
5 some balance to pressure from the multi-million dollar high power Weinstein defense machine.
6 Further media coverage is a means by which witnesses may become aware of assaults and thereby
7 come forward to help corroborate what has taken place. It is additionally a means by which
8 victims can be made aware of the subterfuges and counter-efforts arrayed against their efforts to
9 seek justice. RUBIN additionally convinced De La Huerta that she must have no media coverage
10 and must not put any pressure on the NY DA’s office to proceed with her case.
11 13. Importantly, this case also turns on the nearly successful efforts of RUBIN to
12 cause a waiver of De La Huerta’s patient-psychotherapist privilege and to gain personal
13 possession of these records, thus releasing hundreds of pages of intensely personal details to the
14 public. This sort of action – as RUBIN and Weinstein both are likely aware – is exactly the reason
15 why many woman will not seek criminal prosecution of a rapist. This included an effort by
16 RUBIN, to the benefit of Weinstein, to falsely represent himself as her attorney to attempt to gain
17 control of the records, to attempt to cause De La Huerta to be unrepresented at a critical juncture,
18 and to attempt to interfere with a proceeding in relation to a New York Grand Jury.
19 II. PARTIES
20 14. Plaintiff Tensor Law P. C. (hereinafter “TLPC”) is a California licensed Law
21 Corporation with whose Managing Partner is Aaron G. Filler, Esq. and who is also a licensed
22 physician in both California and New York who maintains a neurosurgical practice and a law
23 practice. FILLER’s law firm – Tensor Law P.C. - includes partner Alex Strauss, Esq. who is a
24 New York Licensed attorney and Chanel Katiraie, Esq, a California attorney. FILLER was
25 retained by a California resident and prominent actress – Paz De La Huerta – to represent her in a
26 matter in which Lionsgate is the defendant. This matter is currently pending as a petition for
27 review before the Supreme Court of California (S245626). Under the agreement between FILLER
28 and De La Huerta, he represents her on various other matters under the condition that he agrees to
-13-
1 the representation. On this basis, De La Huerta contacted TLPC on October 14, 2017 asking for
2 representation in regard to allegations including two rapes by Harvey Weinstein occurring in New
3 York and a sexual exposure episode occurring in Los Angeles and TLPC agreed to provide
4 representation. As is thoroughly demonstrated by public actins, under the intense pressure that
5 ensued – De La Huerta and TLPC acted in the context that any interruption of representation by
6 TLPC in regard to Weinstein would be abandonment and TLPC agreed to continue to provide full
7 representation for her including the services of the firm through its New York licensed partner
8 Alex Straus. Filler also maintains a background physician –patient relationship with De La Huerta
9 in California, and New York and through his UK GMC licensure – throughout European Union
10 and Commonwealth countries.
11 15. Defendant, Michael F. Rubin, Esq. is a New York & New Jersey Licensed attorney
12 whose practice Kelly & Rubin LLP is located at 40 Wall Street, 25th Floor, New, NY 10005.
13 RUBIN is a former criminal prosecutor who worked as an assistant District Attorney in the office
14 of the Bronx County District Attorney. He is the subject of a number of news reports because of
15 his representation of a serial rapist, Fletcher Worrell, who was among a number of rapists and
16 child rapists he has represented. He does not represent De La Huerta but attempted to obtain a
17 physical copy of two years of De La Huerta’s detailed psychotherapist records from therapist
18 SueAnne Piliero, PhD, which action - if he had succeeded - would have waived De La Huerta’s
19 patient psychotherapist privilege to prevent public access to these very private records. RUBIN is
20 sued herein as an individual or as an agent of an Undisclosed Principal if proof of agency can be
21 established, see Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co. 107 Cal.App 97, 100 (1930); Luce v. Sutton 115
22 Cal.App.2d 428, fn 4 (1953), Schnier v. Percival 83 Cal.App 470, 479 (1927) and Patterson v.
23 Dominos Pizza LLC 60 Cal.4th 474, 492 (2014).
24 16. Defendant Harvey Weinstein is an accused serial rapist who alleges that all of the
25 reported sexual assaults were in fact consensual and he is named as a potential undisclosed
26 principal of Defendant RUBIN in this action at this time. FILLER’s client Paz De La Huerta has
27 alleged rape and sexual exposure by Weinstein. Weinstein has been the CEO of MiraMax films
28 and The Weinstein Company which entities engage in production of major motion pictures. In
-14-
1 that role, he has produced a remarkably large number of very successful films which have
2 garnered numerous Oscars and Golden Globe awards.
3 17. Defendant The Harvey Weinstein Company, LLC (hereinafter “TWC”) is named
4 as a potential undisclosed principal of Defendant RUBIN in this action at this time. It has offices
5 at 9100 Wilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills, California and also at 375 Greenwich Avenue, New York,
6 NY. It is registered with the Secretary of State, in the State of California under registration
7 number: #200513810010, having extensive regular business and extensive contacts in the State of
8 California and is therefore subject to general jurisdiction in the State of California. Actions of
9 TWC and/or its officers constitute a substantial part of the subject matter of this dispute.
10 18. Plaintiff is unaware of the true names or capacities, whether they are individuals or
11 business entities, of Defendant DOES 1 through 50, and therefore sues them by such fictitious
12 names and will seek leave of this Court to insert true names and capacities once they have been
13 ascertained.
14 19. Plaintiff will ask leave of court to amend this Complaint to show such true names
15 and capacities of such Defendants when the names of such Defendants have been ascertained.
16 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that each of the Defendants designated
17 herein, including DOES, were authorized and empowered by each other to act, and did so act, as
18 agents of each other, and all of the things herein alleged to have been done by them were done in
19 the capacity of such agency and whether or not agency is established, they are responsible in
20 some manner and liable herein by actionable conduct, and that such conduct, was a substantial
21 factor in causing the injuries to Plaintiff complained of and as hereinafter alleged.
22
23 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
24
25 20. One of the events giving rise to this complaint took place in Los Angeles,
26 California in this Central District at the Four Seasons Hotel at 300 South Doheny Drive, Beverly
27 Hills, California where Weinstein exposed himself sexually to FILLER’s client De La Huerta. In
28 relation to this event, Chanel Katiraie, Esq, an attorney at Tensor Law PC, had prepared a civil
-15-
1 litigation for filing, alleging Assault, Sexual Battery in Violation of Cal Civil Code §1708.5, as to
2 Weinstein, as well as Negligent Supervision as to The Weinstein Company. Additionally,
3 working at its California office in Santa Monica, California, Tensor Law PC had prepared civil
4 litigation for filing in New York alleging similar causes of action. Because the assaults took place
5 in 2010, the California complaint alleged equitable estoppel as to the statute of limitations, while
6 the New York litigation depended upon success of a criminal action in order to proceed.
7 21. On November 7, Michael F. Rubin purposely availed himself of the venue of
8 California, by calling into California to speak to FILLER in his Santa Monica, California office
9 while a motion was pending. He advised FILLER that he was terminated as counsel, that RUBIN
10 was taking over immediately and he directed FILLER to halt filing of the California litigation and
11 to withdraw any motions filed in New York. Through this purposeful availment and ordering the
12 actions of a California attorney with regard to a California cause of action, the Superior Court of
13 California has personal special jurisdiction over Rubin (see Exhibit C – Declaration of Filler).
14 22. The Harvey Weinstein Company, LLC (hereinafter “TWC”) has offices at 9100
15 Wilshire Blvd, Beverly Hills, California and also at 375 Greenwich Avenue, New York, NY. It is
16 registered with the Secretary of State, in the State of California under registration number:
17 #200513810010, having extensive regular business and extensive contacts in the State of
18 California and is therefore subject to general jurisdiction in the State of California.
19 23. Weinstein, upon information and belief, is now, and at all times mentioned herein
20 was, an individual, over the age of majority, residing in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los
21 Angeles, State of California and in the City of New York, County of New York, State of New
22 York who has engaged in the buying and selling of property at least at 518 North Kilkea Avenue
23 in Beverly Hills, California and who has extensive regular business activities and extensive
24 contacts in the State of California, thereby subjecting him to general jurisdiction in the State of
25 California.
26 24. Venue is appropriate in California because key elements of RUBIN’s efforts
27 involved calls by RUBIN into California to affect De La Huerta’s counsel in California. Further,
28 RUBIN interfered with a not-yet-filed lawsuit drawn up by TLPC attorneys Chanel Katiraie and
-16-
1 Aaron Filler which addressed Weinstein’s harassment of De La Huerta in California and
2 negligent supervision by TWC. Weinstein’s is currently believed to be in Scottsdale, Arizona, bu
3 the likelihood of Defendant WEINSTEIN’s arrest if he appears in New York to respond to this
4 suit also makes venue in California more likely to assure progress of this action.
6
IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
7
8 A. Events Leading To Client De La Huerta’s Causes of Action Against Weinstein and THE
9 Weinstein COMPANY
10
25. Plaintiff’s client, Paz De La Huerta has publicly alleged that her strictly
11
professional relationship began with Weinstein when she was 14 years old in 1999. Weinstein
12
was working for the Company Miramax. Miramax produced the film “Cider House Rules” in
13
which De La Huerta was employed as an actress. Subsequently, the client’s residence was in the
14
same Tribeca neighborhood of Manhattan, New York, in which both TWC’s offices were located
15
and where Weinstein was residing. TLPC’s position continues to be that De La Huerta has made
16
public statements, which together with evidence located by her and by TLPC make a compelling
17
case for indictment of Weinstein on criminal charges. A determination on this issue is still
18
pending before the New York County District Attorney.
19
20
1) Initial Assault on December 7, 2010
21
22
26. On December 7, 2010 Plaintiff’s client De La Huerta encountered Weinstein at a
23
lounge called “Top of the Standard” (aka Boom Boom Room) on the High Line located in
24
Manhattan, New York, because both were attending a party at that location celebrating the
25
opening of a movie called Blue Valentine. De La Huerta and Weinstein were neighbors who did
26
recognize each other occasionally – as at grocery stores or cafes as well as having a prior
27
employee/employer relationship from 1999.
28
-17-
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
27. According to De La Huerta’s public statements, Weinstein offered De La Huerta a
17
ride home to Tribeca which De La Huerta agreed to. On the way to De La Huerta’s home,
18
Weinstein continuously pressured De La Huerta to have a drink with him. Upon reaching De La
19
Huerta’s home, Weinstein insisted on coming up to De La Huerta’s apartment to avoid discussing
20
business and personal matters in the public lobby of De La Huerta’s apartment building. Once
21
inside of De La Huerta’s apartment, Weinstein made warnings to De La Huerta about harm to her
22
career if she did not submit to sex, then forced himself on De La Huerta and raped De La Huerta.
23
28. In her public statements, Plaintiff’s client Paz De La Huerta alleges that Weinstein
24
or an employee of TWC then called De La Huerta’s cellphone at least several times over the
25
following two weeks. Weinstein would tell De La Huerta that he was waiting outside of her
26
apartment building in his vehicle or in the lobby of the building waiting for her. De La Huerta
27
would avoid his calls, and avoid returning to her home until she could confirm with the doormen
28
-18-
1 that he had left the premises. Weinstein continued this behavior through the two weeks after
2 raping De La Huerta.
3 2) Corroboration of First Assault
4 29. According to news reports, Weinstein had a protective program for his assaults
5 which included seeking to have a photograph taken with his prior victim, following any assault.
6 When the October 5, 2017 report in the New York Times by Jodi Kantor caused a furore about
7 the assaults, Weinstein produced a number of such photographs to the board of directors of The
8 Weinstein Company for the purpose of showing that these photographs would derail any criminal
9 or civil action against him. Weinstein procured such a photograph with De La Huerta, one week
10 after the first rape:
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
30. TLPC located and presented the December 7th, 2010 photographs to the NYPD to
27
show the date of the first assault and to prove the veracity of De La Huerta’s statements to the
28
-19-
1 NYPD. TLPC located and presented the December 13th, 2010 photo to the NYPD to prove that
2 Weinstein had developed a direct interaction with Weinstein. Further TLPC asserted that in the
3 light of the revelation of Weinstein’s defensive modus operandi (obtaining public, post-assault
4 photographs for defensive purposes), this provided prima facie evidence of an active cover-up by
5 Weinstein tending to prove an assault from which he believed he would need a defense. The
6 December 13th photos are the only time these two persons have been photographed together.
7 3) Second assault on December 23, 2010
8
31. Additionally, in her public statements, Plaintiff’s client De La Huerta states that
9
shortly thereafter, on December 23, 2010, De La Huerta received a phone call from Weinstein
10
while she was at work doing a professional photoshoot wherein he again stated that he was
11
waiting outside her building and insisted he would remain there until he she got home. The
12
photographer is able to corroborate at least the date. De La Huerta has reported in her public
13
statements that she decided to confront Weinstein to point out that she viewed this as stalking and
14
that he was to leave her alone, but out of stress and alarm, commenced drinking heavily on the
15
way home to her apartment.
16
32. She has stated that she did confront Weinstein, again waiting at the lobby of her
17
home when she returned home. De La Huerta told Weinstein to leave, to which Weinstein
18
“hushed” her and insisted that they speak in a private place, promising that they would be able to
19
resolve this discussion in her apartment. Upon reaching De La Huerta’s apartment, Weinstein
20
again raped her using overpowering physical force. Weinstein left immediately after he raped De
21
La Huerta, leaving her in a state of absolute shock, humiliation, embarrassment, and pain.
22
33. Following this confrontation and attack, however, Weinstein did cease his series
23
of direct contacts, personal calls, and calls by his office staff directed at arranging to meet De La
24
Huerta at her New York apartment as well as ceasing all uninvited visits to her building.
25
Following media reports in November of 2017, additional witnesses came forward to corroborate
26
Weinstein’s presence in De La Huerta’s apartment building and at the door of her room with De
27
La Huerta.
28
-20-
1 4) Event in Los Angeles
3 34. Subsequently, about four weeks later, when De La Huerta was in Los Angeles in
4 relation to the Golden Globe awards, Weinstein was visiting, on information and belief, the Four
5 Seasons Hotel on South Doheny Drive in Beverly Hills, California having drinks with several
6 associates. De La Huerta has reported in her public statements that she received a call from
7 Weinstein to request that she join him and some of his associates for drinks with him at the
8 hotel’s lounge.
9 35. De La Huerta and her friend Goli Samii who were nearby at the time of receiving
10 the call, did travel to the Four Seasons hotel and De La Huerta has stated that she did this with the
11 intent of confronting Weinstein again to accuse him as a stalker and rapist. Samii can corroborate
12 the occurrence of at least the meeting. Almost immediately – according to De La Huerta’s
13 statements - Weinstein excused himself from the group and did not return. Shortly thereafter, a
14 concierge of the hotel gave De La Huerta a note indicating that it was from Weinstein, requesting
15 her presence in his hotel room for any substantive discussion. De La Huerta has reported that
16 Weinstein opened the door, wearing an opened bathrobe thereby prominently exposing himself.
17 De La Huerta told Weinstein that was inappropriate behavior and complained to him of his prior
18 bad behavior and quickly left the vicinity of Weinstein’s room feeling embarrassed, shocked and
19 humiliated, rejoining her associate Samii in the lobby and thereupon departing.
20 36. De La Huerta was extremely upset by the events and has been publicly
21 documented as drinking very heavily on or around the date of the Los Angeles encounter in
22 consequence of this further upsetting event. She has stated that over the following months she
23 engaged in a stream of self-destructive behavior – much of which is well documented by media
24 reports.
25
26
27
28
-21-
1 5) Post Assault Retaliation by Weinstein Against De La Huerta to Punish Her for Her
2 Condemnation of His Rapes
4 37. At the time of the attacks, De La Huerta was in the second season of filming for
5 Boardwalk Empire. Following these events, her contract for additional episodes and seasons of
6 Boardwalk Empire was not renewed, although no reason was ever given by HBO for this
7 discontinuation. On information and belief, TLPC here alleges that it believes that retaliatory
8 action by Weinstein played a critical role in the termination. Additionally and in consequence, De
9 La continued to be fearful of further career harm throughout the film industry, if she proceeded
10 with a lawsuit against Weinstein. She subsequently – in 2014 – provided a detailed account which
11 was reviewed by attorneys representing her at that time but she was too fearful to allow action to
12 be taken.
13 38. De La Huerta has publicly alleged that she had feared to press any charges or file
14 any lawsuits against Weinstein and TWC, because of statements and warnings made by
15 Weinstein during the course of the events in late 2010 and early 2011 that lack of cooperation on
16 her part with his advances would harm her career..
17 39. For the reasons set forth in the two prior paragraphs, Weinstein and TWC would
18 be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations in the event that De La Huerta
19 proceeds to file a California action against them. Unlike an employer where a person can evade
20 future harms by changing employment, Weinstein’s pervasive role and impact in the film industry
21 and awards events left no means to escape or terminate the reach of Weinstein’s ability to
22 negatively influence her career.
23
24
25
26
27
28
-22-
1 6) Legal Jeopardy Is Attached to The Weinstein Company as well as to Weinstein so that Both
2 Were Motivated to Try to Undermine Efforts by Victims to Achieve Justice
4 40. TLPC believes, and upon such information and belief states that the criminal and
5 intentional acts performed by Harvey Weinstein have been alleged to have been endorsed by The
6 Weinstein Company or to have been known to TWC in that, for instance, The Weinstein
7 Company has been alleged to have funded hotel rooms wherein Weinstein would commit his
8 lewd, forceful and unconsented acts. The Weinstein Company additionally has been alleged to
9 have participated in setting up meetings between Weinstein and De La Huerta with no asserted
10 business purpose, including attempting to direct her to meet Weinstein at De La Huerta’s home.
11 TWC has also been alleged to have been the sole possessor of knowledge of a pattern of sexual
12 assaults by Weinstein because of confidentiality agreements formed to address other past
13 allegations of sexual assaults, whose contents TWC would have been aware of. For these reasons
14 The Weinstein Company faces liability and would share with Weinstein an interest in preventing
15 legal actions seeking retribution, compensation, and criminal conviction as to Weinstein’s sexual
16 assaults. This would lead a New York defense attorney specializing in the defense of rapists – e.g.
17 RUBIN – to engage in actions intended to make TWC aware of his services.
18
19 B. Events Leading to Defendants’ Liability In the Current Action
20
21 41. On October 14, 2017, following the numerous public reports of sexual assaults by
22 Harvey Weinstein, Plaintiff TLPC was contacted by then current client Paz De La Huerta for
23 legal advice and representation in regard to the above mentioned assaults by Weinstein. At that
24 time, Plaintiff TLPC was engaged in several active legal projects on behalf of De La Huerta
25 which had extended over a period of years.
26 42. Plaintiff then agreed to proceed to represent De La Huerta in regard to all matters
27 in relation to Weinstein under the terms of their existing contingency agreement which allowed
28 for addition of any project wherein both parties agreed to the representation. These
-23-
1 representations include contract and physical assault litigation against Lionsgate Films and certain
2 of its personnel, various personal legal matters on behalf of De La Huerta, contract negotiation for
3 film projects, assistance in the resolution of on-set creative disputes during active filming, and
4 assistance in developing funding for future projects to be produced & directed by De La Huerta.
5 43. The work in relation to the Weinstein action included the aspects of dealing with
6 incoming requests from media – such as New York Times reporter Jodi Kantor - who had learned
7 independently about the Weinstein assaults due to statements made about the assaults by De La
8 Huerta in 2014, and facilitating the work of Vanity Fair on its report about the Weinstein assaults.
9 This was in addition to intensive work to develop and investigate the substantive legal case. The
10 substantive work involved identifying and interviewing various witnesses, searching for
11 documents and images, examining various databases and researching locations, times and dates to
12 establish irrefutable corroboration for key elements of the assaults.
13 44. In addition, civil filings for New York and for California were drawn up. In light
14 of the proposed litigation, an additional retainer agreement was drafted to explicitly include the
15 services and the hourly rates for more recently employed additional attorneys with Tensor Law
16 PC to be involved in the litigation who were not listed in the original retainer agreement although
17 this updated was not executed by De La Huerta – on information and belief – because RUBIN
18 warned her not to sign.
19 45. As the evidence collection process continued – ultimately involving more than a
20 hundred hours of intensive legal work – it became apparent to Plaintiff TLPC that the elements
21 and evidence should be sufficient to support a criminal prosecution. Therefore, Plaintiff on behalf
22 of De La Huerta on October 24th, Plaintiff initiated contacts with the New York Police
23 Department on October 24 and 25, and then subsequently with the office the District Attorney in
24 New York County in relation to the assaults by Weinstein upon De La Huerta. Because the
25 NYPD and he NYDA expressed a high level of interest after their initial interviews with De La
26 Huerta and preliminary discussion of the evidence, the very active work on evidence development
27 and identification of witnesses accelerated.
28 46. It should be noted that De La Huerta as an artist generally sustained a relationship

-24-
1 with the law firm in which she was not intimately involved in legal details, contents of legal
2 filings, details of interviews, the identity of various witnesses who contacted the law firm,
3 evidence development, affidavits, examination of financial and business records, negotiations
4 with other involved counsel, etc but only maintained a generalized high level knowledge of the
5 details of the case. This was in part to shield her from excessive distraction and anxiety and allow
6 her to continue to focus on her artistic projects.
7 47. The work progressed with a very high level of success. De La Huerta received a
8 very effective initial report of her story in Vanity Fair on November 2, 2017 which was followed
9 by highly effective detailed prominent reports in the New York Times, CBS News and CNN,
10 based on interviews arranged substantially through Tensor Law PC. Further, the NYPD and
11 NYDA were convinced by the evidence and New York District Attorney Cyrus Vance issued a
12 press release statement indicating the case was under active investigation. New York Mayor Bill
13 de Blasio, together with New York Chief of Detectives Robert K. Boyce held a press conference
14 on November 3rd, expressing a high level of confidence in De La Huerta’s case against Weinstein.
15 All indications were that a Grand Jury would be convened, and an indictment of Weinstein was
16 imminent. The NYPD Detectives involved with the case stated a present readiness to seek an
17 arrest of Weinstein for criminal rape charges.
18 48. At this point, RUBIN commenced his successful effort to derail and destroy the
19 case, relying on subterfuge, misdirection, and misinformation. In addition he worked to attempt to
20 cause grievous personal harm to Plaintiff’s client De La Huerta. He was able to simultaneously
21 mislead and misinform the District Attorney’s office and prevent further communication with the
22 NYDA by Tensor Law by supplying De La Huerta with a series of false and defamatory
23 statements causing her to panic and believe she must immediately discharge Tensor Law PC as
24 counsel and proceed without representation. In addition, without making any effort to obtain the
25 extensive files and evidentiary materials developed and held by Tensor Law PC in this matter, he
26 proceeded to advise the NYDA that there was not sufficient evidence for an indictment. His
27 communications with the NYDA office were also a subterfuge in that he represented himself to
28 them as counsel for De La Huerta, while at the same time being careful to attempt to avoid
-25-
1 liability by acting to assure that he was not in fact representing her. He later met with De La
2 Huerta on November 12, in Seville, Spain and advised her she had no case and should withdraw
3 her police complaint in order to avoid personal ruin.
4 49. Because RUBIN issued his advice to the NYDA without first discussing the matter
5 with Tensor Law PC or obtaining the case file, it is provable that any advice to the NYDA and to
6 De La Huerta was not based on and did not consider the full set of evidence held by De La
7 Huerta’s attorneys at TLPC. He acted as if he was serving in his usual capacity as an experienced
8 criminal defense attorney serving to the benefit of Weinstein while superficially maintaining a
9 pretense of representing himself to De La Huerta as a victims support attorney. Even if RUBIN
10 had occasionally done victims advocate work in the past, his website leaves no doubt about his
11 primary business in the criminal arena and it makes no mention of the type of services he feigned
12 to offer to De La Huerta.
13 50. An attorney representing Weinstein would be expected to contact the NY DA and
14 advise them there was no case – without first acquainting himself with the evidence in hand. An
15 attorney representing Weinstein would be expected to act to hide his undermining
16 communications with the client. In fact, based on statements by RUBIN to FILLER, RUBIN had
17 repeatedly advised De La Huerta that he would use his superior knowledge and experience to
18 assure that she accomplished her goals. However RUBIN had advised De La Huerta that she must
19 keep his involvement completely secret from her attorney, FILLER until the moment arrived
20 when he would give her the go ahead to terminate the TLPC representation, which would come
21 AFTER he had the psychotherapists records in his physical possession.
22
23 C. Actions Of RUBIN to Attempt to Force a Waiver of De La Huerta’s Patient-
24 Psychotherapist Privilege as to Communications with SueAnne Piliero, PhD
25
26 51. The timing for the attempted termination of all counsel for De La Huerta was set to
27 attempt to disrupt, terminate and interfere with Tensor Law P.C.’s Emergency Motion to Quash
28 the Subpoena of the New York District Attorney for two years of psychotherapy records
-26-
1 comprising a thousand pages of dense material covering a wide variety of intensely personal
2 material. The timing was also set to allow RUBIN to attempt to cause a devastating and
3 irremediable WAIVER of De La Huerta’s Patient-Psychotherapist privilege. The information in
4 the records at issue not only affected De La Huerta, but included extraordinarily confidential
5 information on various friends and associates of De La Huerta which she never imagined would
6 go beyond her highly confidential and highly protected communications with her therapist. These
7 efforts also included a brazen and astonishing effort by RUBIN to gain personal possession of the
8 physical records which would allow him to surreptitiously copy and sell or distribute said records
9 to Weinstein.
10 52. The issue of information held by the psychotherapist SueAnne Piliero, PhD only
11 arose because of efforts to establish the exact date of the two New York assaults. Ultimately, it
12 proved possible to identify these dates based on other evidence uncovered by De La Huerta and
13 by Filler. De La Huerta contacted Piliero on October 17th, 2017 to request a statement as to the
14 exact date and a contemporary corroboration that a sexual encounter had in fact occurred that
15 caused severe acute distress to De La Huerta in the fall of 2010.
16 53. Piliero responded on October 24th with an email stating that all records from 2010
17 and 2011 had been on her computer and they were all lost in a hard disk crash, with no backup
18 and no recovery possible. Therefore, when De La Huerta met with the NYPD on October 25th and
19 gave consent to access any existing medical records, the consent did not extend to the
20 psychotherapy records which she believed were destroyed.
21 54. Filler scheduled an interview with Piliero on November 6, 2017 at 4pm Eastern
22 time and informed NY Assistant District Attorney Maxine Rosenthal of the interview. Rosenthal
23 requested, and Filler agreed that Rosenthal could have the 4 pm appointment, but that he would
24 interview Piliero at 5pm. Arrangements were made through Piliero’s attorney Bruce Hillowe,
25 Esq.
26 55. However, around 10 pm on November 5th, Piliero discovered that she had been
27 incorrect about the destruction of the records and that she had now found all of them. Hillowe
28 then cancelled the Piliero interviews with Rosenthal and with Filler on the grounds they were
-27-
1 unnecessary. Rosenthal then issued a subpoena for all of the found records and Hillowe replied by
2 stating he had advised Piliero not to comply with the subpoena. Under New York law, the
3 Patient-Psychotherapist privilege is at an even higher level than the general patient-physician
4 privilege and is more comparable to the attorney-client privilege. Rosenthal then responded with
5 a Judicial “so-ordered” subpoena which would be sufficient to pierce the patient-psychotherapist
6 privilege. Hillowe indicated he would instruct Piliero to comply, but that it would take 24 hours
7 to prepare the records. Note that at this point, neither De La Huerta nor her counsel had seen the
8 records.
9 56. After further discussion between Filler and De La Huerta, and between Filler and
10 Hillowe, Tensor Law planned to file an Emergency Motion to Quash the Subpoena as overbroad.
11 De La Huerta sought to review the records and withhold any obviously irrelevant information that
12 might be particularly humiliating, compromising or which might significantly invade the privacy
13 of another person. Discussions between Filler and Rosenthal on November 6 did not resolve the
14 issue so Filler informed Rosenthal that the motion would be filed on November 7th by 4:30pm.
15 57. In particular, TLPC was concerned by the November 6, 2017 issuance by New
16 York Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, Hon. Janet DiFiore of new rules 200.16 and
17 200.27 of the Uniform Rules of Courts Exercising Criminal Jurisdiction 22 NYCRR Part 200.
18 This was an order “requiring judges to order prosecutors to search their files and disclosed all
19 evidence favorable to the defense at least 30 days before major trials” according to a subsequent
20 report in the New York Times:
21 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/nyregion/rule-would-push-prosecutors-to-release-
22 evidence-favorable-to-defense.html
23 and see formal details at:
24 https://www.nycourts.gov/PRESS/PDFs/PR17_17.pdf
25 The Chief Judge’s intent was to assure that New York Courts were fully in compliance with
26 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and other U.S. Supreme Court decisions intended to
27 protect rights of defendants and reduce the risk of wrong convictions (see Exhibit B).
28 58. After discussing the new rule with Rosenthal on the evening of November 6, 2017
-28-
1 TLPC felt that the subpoena was issued without due concern by Rosenthal for the impact of the
2 new rule. Because defense attorneys in rape cases will tend to seek any evidence for attacking an
3 accusers reliability, they would likely succeed in getting access to De La Huerta’s entire detailed
4 psychotherapy record set if the subpoena was applied as then written. At least in part, the new
5 rule was intended directly to interfere with e.g. Rosenthal’s past efforts to keep material from
6 criminal defense attorneys. TLPC believed that his posed a direct unnecessary risk to De La
7 Huerta’s reasonable privacy concerns.
8 59. RUBIN changed his plan on November 7th when Hillowe resisted turning over the
9 records to RUBIN personally. Prior to this point, RUBIN had directed Paz to keep his
10 involvement secret until he was able to divert the records so that RUBIN would provably have no
11 privilege and so that De La Huerta’s attorney – TLPC - would be interfered with. Then Rubin
12 purposely availed himself of the venue of California, by calling into California to speak to
13 FILLER in his Santa Monica, California TLPC office at approximately 1:10 pm Pacific Time,
14 November 7, 2017. RUBIN, incorrectly, informed FILLER that FILLER was terminated as
15 counsel to De La Huerta, effective immediately and that he, RUBIN was now counsel. FILLER
16 informed RUBIN that an EMERGENCY MOTION TO QUASH A JUDICIAL GRAND JURY
17 SUPBPOENA was due to be filed in New York Supreme Court by 4:30 Eastern Time – within 20
18 minutes. RUBIN stated that he was aware of this – because of prior discussions he had with
19 Rosenthal - and instructed that FILLER must stand down from the California filing, and from the
20 New York Motion. If the Motion had been filed it was to be withdrawn immediately. He stated no
21 time available to discuss these orders because he had a further phone conference with the District
22 Attorney at 4:15 Eastern on this matter.
23 60. Filler then contacted De La Huerta and consulted on the counsel issue. Based on
24 those discussion, Filler determined that the RUBIN was engaged in a fraud. He called RUBIN to
25 confront him with the fact that he was not actually representing De La Huerta, which he then
26 admitted. However, he further admitted that he had convinced De La Huerta to terminate
27 representation by Tensor Law. Filler explained to RUBIN that Tensor Law represented her on
28 several active matters and had enjoyed excellent appraisal and approval from De La Huerta on all
-29-
1 of these matters up to that hour, that there was no indication of a termination other than his false
2 statement.
3 61. Filler also stated that even if RUBIN had convinced De La Huerta to go
4 unrepresented, he would advise De La Huerta that because the motion was now filed and pending
5 before the court – at least under California law – FILLER could not withdraw as counsel unless
6 the judge either agreed to an emergency withdrawal or if a substitution could be arranged.
7 FILLER informed RUBIN that he would advise De La Huerta that if she did wish to respect
8 RUBIN’S advice to terminate Tensor Law as counsel, that she should immediately retain Carrie
9 Goldberg who would have the greatest knowledge and experience about protecting the privacy of
10 her records under New York law. Tensor Law would continue to represent until a signed notice
11 from De La Huerta and a signed substitution from some other counsel such as Goldberg was
12 received. This was because FILLER had a duty to protect De La Huerta from the severe personal
13 harm that would befall her if her unfiltered, unredacted therapy records were made public.
14 62. RUBIN expressed anger and stated he was on his way to Hillowe’s office to take
15 personal possession of the psychotherapy records and with that, RUBIN discontinued the
16 conversation.
17 63. Filler then immediately contacted Hillowe to learn of the status of the records.
18 Hillowe stated that he had been contacted by RUBIN and that RUBIN had informed him that
19 there was a change in plans. RUBIN had stated he had authority to take personal physical
20 possession of the records. Hillowe requested proof and RUBIN provided a one line email from
21 De La Huerta saying it was OK for Piliero to turn the records over to Hillowe. Filler then
22 informed Hillowe that RUBIN was not actually retained as counsel by De La Huerta. Thereupon
23 Hillowe and Filler agreed that if RUBIN took possession of the records with De La Huerta’s
24 approval while RUBIN was not counsel – this would result in a waiver of the patient-therapist
25 privilege because he would be classified as an unnecessary third party with no confidential
26 relationship with De La Huerta. The only exception would be if RUBIN had provided
27 documentation to establish himself as a messenger service, but that Hillowe had no such
28 documentation. Therefore, Hillowe agreed to refuse to release the records to RUBIN when he
-30-
1 arrived at Hillowe’s office. Hillowe did have a copy of the records delivered only to Judge
2 Charles H. Solomon, Part 82 of New York Supreme Court at 100 Centre Street, Room 1313, to
3 where Tensor Law electronically delivered the Emergency Motion to Quash the Subpoena.
4 64. Subsequently, on November 8, Goldberg and De La Huerta arranged for
5 representation and a substitution of Goldberg’s firm for Tensor Law as to the Weinstein matter
6 was effected. Later that day Weinstein announced that he had retained Blair Berk and Benjamin
7 Brafman as defense counsel for the New York De La Huerta investigation. Brafman has publicly
8 stated that he commences such a representation by providing information to the District Attorney
9 to undermine the credibility of the accuser. Brafman immediately made a statement on November
10 9 that he was certain there would be no indictment.
11 65. Goldberg subsequently negotiated with Rosenthal and they reached an agreement
12 on November 15th allowing Goldberg and De La Huerta to review the records and to withhold
13 any papers that were of a high level of personal compromise but a low level of relevance to the
14 Weinstein matter. After this review, significant amounts of records were provided to the NY DA.
15 66. Nonetheless, although RUBIN was fully informed that Carrie Goldberg was
16 serving as highly expert counsel to De La Huerta in the Weinstein assault matter as of November
17 8, RUBIN again convinced De La Huerta to keep his further activities secret from Goldberg as he
18 sought an electronic copy of the records. RUBIN then travelled to Seville, Spain where De La
19 Huerta was staying at that time and on November 12, 2017 conducted an extensive interview with
20 De La Huerta as to the facts and recollections as she understood them in relation to the assaults.
21 At the end of the discussions that day, RUBIN informed De La Huerta that he could not in fact
22 offer to represent her, that she had no case, and that she should withdraw her complaint against
23 Weinstein. RUBIN did not obtain a copy of the records.
24 67. Following this, the District Attorney’s office held private meetings with
25 Weinstein’s official defense counsel – Benjamin Brafman, upon which Brafman issued a
26 statement indicating that no indictment would be sought against Weinstein by the District
27 Attorney. Goldberg publicly protested the meeting with Brafman because she was not informed
28 of the meeting and there was no indictment.

-31-
1
2 V. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A
3 CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
4 (as against RUBIN, alternatively upon election against any Undisclosed Principal
5 & against DOES 1 to 50)
6 68. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference as though fully set forth herein,
7 each and every allegation set forth above in this Complaint.
8 69. The standard for an action in tort for interference with contractual relations was
9 reviewed by the California Supreme Court in Quelimane Co. v Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 19
10 Cal. 4th 26 (1998):
11 "The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional
12 interference with contractual relations are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third
party; (2) defendant's knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to
13 induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of
the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear
14 Stearns & Co. 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1126, (1990).
15
70. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that a critical difference between the
16
California elements for intentional interference with contract (IIC) as opposed to the elements for
17
the intentional interference with prospective economic advantage (IIPEA), is that no wrongful
18
conduct needs to be shown for IIC. The higher standard for IIPEA is intended to assure that there
19
is no cause of action amongst parties simply competing for business. In the current matter,
20
however, RUBIN was not seeking to represent De La Huerta, and he was not seeking to promote
21
her interest in seeing that an indictment of Weinstein resulted. Rather, his purpose was to disrupt
22
the case against WEINSTEN by fraudulently representing himself to De La Huerta as a
23
prospective attorney. In essence his purpose was not to compete with FILLER for the business of
24
representing De La Huerta, rather his purpose was to deprive De La Huerta of counsel at the time
25
her critical Motion to Quash was filed and to disrupt the efforts of Filler to perform effectively as
26
De La Huerta’s attorney generally in the effort to seek justice as to Weinstein’s assaults against
27
her.
28
-32-
1
2 A. An Actual Valid Contract Existed
4 71. Firstly (1), the Plaintiff’s case must be based on actual valid contracts between
5 Plaintiff and a third party. This element is met because Plaintiff Tensor Law P.C. entered into an
6 open ended contingency representation contract with De La Huerta on May 29, 2015 which
7 included the statement “Our agreeing to provide any additional representation will be in our sole
8 and absolute discretion.” In the current matter De La Huerta requested representation and Plaintiff
9 agreed, then proceeded to provide more than a hundred hours of intensive legal effort with
10 outstanding success in advancing De La Huerta’s goals.
11 72. She obtained impeccable positive and very highly positioned media coverage for
12 her statement in Vanity Fair, the New York Times, CBS and CNN from leading journalists. The
13 follow on included tens of thousands of reports because of all of the hundreds of accusers of
14 Weinstein and others similarly situated, only hers resulted in a powerful endorsement of the
15 likelihood of prosecution. Rather than relying only on her own statements or comments of an
16 attorney such as Gloria Allred, instead De La Huerta’s accusations, together with evidence
17 developed by Tensor Law PC, were endorsed by the District Attorney of New York County,
18 Cyrus Vance, as well as by Bill de Blasio, Mayor of New York City and by Robert K. Boyce,
19 Chief of Detectives of New York. Weinstein was put in fear of his liberty by affirmative
20 statements from the NYPD that he faced imminent arrest if he attempted to return to his home in
21 New York. Scores of other media sought further interviews with De La Huerta. Note that
22 circumstances have changed, but when she relied on other New York counsel to try to get
23 coverage and action for the exact same accusations in 2014, no press coverage and no legal action
24 resulted. It is evident that a contract existed for legal services and that it was being performed
25 with a very high level of competence and success by Tensor Law P.C. Even if there had been no
26 actual written contract, it is still the case that documented offer acceptance consideration and
27 performance demonstrably existed.
28
-33-
1
3 B. DEFENDANTS Had Knowledge of the Contract
4 73. Knowledge of the contracts (2) is required, but California law does not require
5 that the tortfeasor have knowledge of the parties of the contract or the terms of the contract. All
6 that is required is that the defendant have knowledge that contracts exist that are substantially
7 certain to be interfered with in consequence of defendant’s intentional action. Here, RUBIN
8 reveals awareness of the contract because he sent email writings to De La Huerta specifically
9 instructing her not to inform Filler of RUBIN’s activities. Further, extensive media coverage of
10 De La Huerta’s case included citation to Filler as her attorney in this matter. The fact that he
11 reached out to contact her in Spain shows that he became aware of the Weinstein accusation
12 involving De La Huerta and is unlikely to have avoided entirely seeing any of the coverage in the
13 New York Times, CNN, CBS, NBC Today/Megyn Kelly as well as thousands of follow on media
14 reports. Further, De La Huerta will have certainly informed him immediately that she had
15 representation and Hillowe was certain to have informed him that De La Huerta had
16 representation. Although it is true that an additional revised retainer agreement specifying hourly
17 rates for additional attorneys at Tensor Law had been provided, the existence of a contract was
18 already obvious to RUBIN.
19 74. In Sebastian International v Russolillo 162 F.Supp.2d 1198 (C.D. Cal 2001) the
20 Court held that it is not necessary to allege the individual contracts in detail, rather it is sufficient
21 to reasonably show that Defendant was “on notice” as to the class of contracts with which their
22 actions were substantially certain to interfere:
23
“The Court finds that this evidence supports the Plaintiff's assertion that the Defendants were
24 “on notice'' as to the class of contracting salons and distributors with whom Sebastian has
25 contractual relations, and that it can be reasonably inferred from such notice that Defendants
had knowledge of the class of contractual relations potentially disrupted by their actions.
26 Therefore, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the second element of
Plaintiff's claim for interference with contractual relations.”
27
Sebastian, at 1204.
28
-34-
1 75. In Sebastian, the Court states that this view follows California law through it’s
2 citation of Ramona Manor Convalescent v. Care Enterprises, 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1131 (1986).
3 The Court in Ramona ruled that a holdover lessee could interfere even though it did not know the
4 identity of the new lessee whose possession was affected:
5 “We are not persuaded knowledge of the injured party's specific identity or name is a
6 prerequisite to recovery for either IIK or IIPEA. Care failed to quote another passage found in
the same section and the same comment which qualifies the portion it did quote and which
7 seems to us dispositive of the point: “The rule does not require, however, that the person who
loses the performance of the contract as a result of the conduct of the actor should be
8 specifically mentioned by name. It is sufficient that he is identified in some manner....”
Restatement 2nd of Torts, § 766, com. p, pp. 15–16.
9
10 Care's decision to hold over beyond the termination of the lease under which it had possession
was made with the knowledge that such action would frustrate the legitimate contractual
11 expectations of a specific, albeit unnamed, new lessee. That is all it was required to know to
incur liability.”
12
Ramona at 1133. In the current matter, it is clear that RUBIN knew the general type of contract
13
that would underlie a high profile high stakes litigation such as the claims of De La Huerta
14
against Weinstein, but that RUBIN knew of Filler. Further RUBIN states in an email to De La
15
Huerta that he has investigated FILLER, then going on to provide incorrect information about
16
Tensor Law PC to De La Huerta, such as a false assertion that Tensor Law PC could not represent
17
her in New York.
18
76. This position of the court in Ramon is also relied on in Altera Corp. v. Clear
19
Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1092 (9th Cir. 2005) where the 9th District cites Sebastian and also
20
cites Ramona stating:
21
“When the defendant performs the act that causes the interference, the defendant need not
22 know exactly who is a party to the contract, so long as he knows he is interfering with a
23 contractual relationship.”
Altera at 1092. Thus, even if RUBIN was not aware of New York Attorney Alex Strauss who is a
24
partner in Tensor Law PC it was sufficient that RUBIN knew this was a law firm representing De
25
La Huerta and that Tensor Law PC had filed an Emergency Motion to Quash the Grand Jury
26
Subpoena in the Supreme Court of New York, Department 82.
27
28
-35-
1 C. Defendants Engaged In Specific Intentional Acts Intended To Disrupt And Interfere
2 With The Performance Of The Contract By FILLER And By Tensor Law P.C.
4 77. The plaintiff must plead (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a
5 breach or disruption of the contractual relation. The intent & design at issue, under California
6 Law, is an intent to perform some act which results in the interference, but there is no requirement
7 that it is defendant’s intention to interfere with the contract - it is only necessary that the
8 intentional act does result in the interference and that a reasonable party in the defendant’s
9 position would be substantially certain that such interference would result. Further, Intentional
10 Causation of Breach is a separate tort, so that Intentional Interference only requires that
11 performance be made more difficult rather than requiring that an actual specific breach of
12 contract be induced.
13 “To establish the claim, the plaintiff need not prove that a defendant acted with the primary
14 purpose of disrupting the contract, but must show the defendant's knowledge that the
interference was certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his or her action.”
15 (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 56, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 709,
960 P.2d 513.)
16
17 Reeves v. Hanlon 33 Cal.4th 1140, 1148 (2004). Thus, even if RUBIN somehow believed that his
18 direct instructions to De La Huerta to terminate Filler and Tensor Law was not done for the
19 purpose of disrupting Plaintiff’s contract with De La Huerta, he will have known that disruption
20 would be substantially certain to occur if she accepted his advice and followed his instructions.
21
22 D. The Intentional Acts of DEFENDANTS were Wrongful And Unjustified
23
24 78. Plaintiff also must reasonably assert that the (3b) Defendant’s intentional act was
25 either unlawful (e.g. constituted defamation) or if lawful, that it was unjustified :
26
“Thus, the jury may infer culpable intent from conduct substantially certain to interfere with
27 the contract or prospective economic relationship…[A] cause of action under either tort theory
28 will lie for the intentional interference by a third person with a contractual relationship either
-36-
1 by unlawful means or by means otherwise lawful when there is a lack of sufficient
justification.”
2
Savage v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 21 Cal App 4th 434, 449 (1993).
3
4 1) Wrongful and Unjustified Advice as to an Urgent Need to Terminate All Representation

5 79. Here, it is reasonably asserted that DEFENDANTS could not interfere by giving
6 truthful information to De La Huerta. However, it is abundantly clear that it was not
7 DEFENDANT’S intent to provide truthful information. Firstly, we have the prima facie fact of
8 the spectacular success of the three weeks of representation – which a) allowed De La Huerta to
9 tell her story through the most prominent and well positioned media in the world, wherein she had
10 received little or no media coverage for several years (other than coverage of her Lionsgate
11 litigation); b) exceeded the success of all other famous powerful and well represented accusers
12 (including Ashley Judd, Rose McGowan, Gwyneth Paltrow, Angelina Jolie, Rosanna Arquette,
13 Lupito Nyong’o and Kate Beckinsale) and even the most famous attorney in this field – Gloria
14 Allred - by putting Weinstein on direct notice of possible imminent arrest if he returned to his
15 home, and c) obtaining public statements of endorsement of her case by the New York County
16 District Attorney, The Mayor of New York City and the Chief of Detectives of New York City
17 with d) all leading to imminent empaneling of a Grand Jury and likely indictment – an
18 immanency revealed by District Attorney Rosenthal’s urgent rush to seize all of De La Huerta’s
19 records before De La Huerta even had a chance to review them. To the extent that all of this
20 success flowed directly from De La Huerta, rather that from joint work with her counsel, the
21 actions of counsel clearly did not impede or limit her success in any demonstrable fashion.
22 80. In the light of the facts set forth in the previous paragraph we can consider the
23 veracity of RUBIN’s advice that representation by Filler and Tensor Law must be immediately
24 terminated if she was to have any chance of success. Thus RUBIN must have known his advice
25 was untruthful and clearly rose to the level of a set of defamatory statements, particularly in the
26 light of the previous five years of professional cooperation and trust between Filler and De La
27 Huerta. Even if no defamatory statements were made, the comments and advice to De La Huerta
28
-37-
1 that she must protect her claim by immediately becoming unrepresented were clearly unjustified
2 in light of the facts.
3 81. Further, advising De La Huerta to become unrepresented just after filing of her
4 crucial Emergency Motion to Quash the Grand Jury Subpoena was unjustified as well as reckless
5 and unconscionable. For many affected women, the very reason that they do not report rapes and
6 that they do not seek criminal prosecution of rapists is that there is little personal benefit from a
7 criminal conviction – other than a sense of justice achieved – while they risk having every
8 potentially embarrassing detail of their personal and private lives put on public display and
9 attacked by defense counsel. This is particularly the case for a celebrity such as Paz De La Huerta
10 who will likely find any negative or embarrassing life detail in her psychotherapy records
11 plastered across tabloids and thousands of web pages around the world – an experience she has
12 encountered previously. Therefore, for good reason, total public release of portion of these
13 records - totally unrelated to the Weinstein prosecution - is among her greatest fears. As her
14 attorney, (and as her physician) Filler has a primary responsibility to protect this information from
15 unnecessary public release. Operationally for the success of the case, there was a valid concern
16 that potential embarrassment would lead De La Huerta to withdraw from the prosecution – an
17 unconscionable success for Weinstein at further intimidating and humiliating his victims - which
18 De La Huerta would reasonably have relied upon her attorney to prevent. It is not even the case
19 that there necessarily was any information in the records that was so harmful, but that there is
20 extensive and unfiltered intimacy of conversation over hundreds and hundreds of pages of the
21 records.
22
23 2) RUBIN’S Plan to Create a Devastating and Irremediable Waiver of De La Huerta’s Patient-
24 Psychotherapist privilege.
25
26 82. Also directly on point as to false and wrongful behavior was RUBIN’s plan to
27 cause a devastating and irremediable waiver of De La Huerta’s Patient-Psychotherapist privilege
28 while Filler was still counsel responsible for helping to protect that privilege. It should be clear
-38-
1 that breach of that privilege would not only render the identified Piliero records as open to public
2 access, but would affect all psychotherapy records from any period in her life, in New York, in
3 California and elsewhere. An example of a deeply personal set of information would be her
4 discussions with her therapist around the time of the death of her ex-boyfriend, Stone Temple
5 Pilots lead singer Scott Weiland. There is nothing wrongful or inappropriate, but this is the type
6 of intensely personal information that would be laid bare despite a high level of public interest.
7 83. In California, the Patient-Psychotherapist privilege is set forth in California
8 Evidence Code §1014. It is held by the patient applies to both psychologists and psychiatrists
9 differs from the general Patient-Physician privilege in that it applies to criminal actions as well as
10 to civil actions. In New York, the Patient-Psychotherapist privilege – which is set forth in New
11 York Consolidated Laws, Civil Practice Law & Rules (CPLR) §4507 is even more substantive in
12 that is comparable to the attorney client privilege, so that it can only be crossed by a “so ordered”
13 subpoena from a judge. The reason for the high level of deference is that courts have understood
14 that discussions with a therapist reach into the mind of the patient in a way that exposes far more
15 in the realm of legal relevance than might be revealed by routine medical information.
16 84. Waiver of the Patient-Psychotherapist Privilege in California is covered under
17 California Evidence Code §912:
18
The right of any person to claim a privilege provided by Section…1014…is waived with
19 respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without
20 coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure
made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the
21 holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the
privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to
22 claim the privilege
23
Importantly to understanding RUBIN’s shocking conduct is that the privilege is not waived if the
24
records are released to a third party unintentionally or by any deceit. The release must be
25
documented as having been done by a direct intentional writing by the holder of the privilege –
26
e.g. De La Huerta in this situation. Therefore, when RUBIN obtained a one line email from De La
27
Huerta authorizing release to him, the intentional release requirement was met.
28
-39-
1 85. Further, in California, the release does not damage the privilege if is released to a
2 person with whom the patient holds a different privilege where reasonable necessary. This would
3 mean that it could be released to a persons attorney without effecting waiver if there was a
4 necessary purpose for allowing the attorney to see the records – such as Carrie Goldberg’s review
5 of the records to help cooperate with District Attorney Rosenthal by identifying and removing
6 irrelevant material. However, RUBIN made sure that De La Huerta would keep RUBIN’s
7 involvement secret from FILLER and to keep any discontinuation of FILLER’s representation
8 secret until the records were in RUBIN’s hands. This would make it possible to prove that that at
9 the time that they were obtained by RUBIN he could he was not De La Huerta’s attorney. Further,
10 to meet the letter of the law to show that his receive the physical records was not “necessary” he
11 arranged to receive them in paper form on November 7, 2017 so that he could personally deliver
12 them by hand to De La Huerta in Seville, Spain on November 12, 2017. Prior to this, De La
13 Huerta expected to receive them as a securely transmitted PDF to reach her on the 7th. Therefore,
14 RUBIN’s physical receipt of the records coupled with a statement that he would not review them
15 until he met in person with De La Huerta in Spain were calculated to assure that Waiver was
16 caused.
17 86. In New York, we can look to the 2015, 6th edition of the New York State Bar
18 Association text “Evidentiary Privileges: Grand Jury, Criminal, and Civil Trials” by Lawrence
19 N. Gray, Esq. which covers this issue at page 41, §3.9:

20
As to waiver by document transfer generally, it has been held that “voluntary disclosure of
21 privileged material subject to the attorney-client privilege to unnecessary third parties . . .
22 ‘waives the privilege, not only as to the specific communication disclosed but often as to all
other communications relating to the same subject matter.’ ”111
23
[111]In re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d 550, 562 (1997). Thus it is apparent that had RUBIN convinced
24
Hillowe to transfer to him the documents with an approval from De La Huerta, for the
25
unnecessary purpose of taking five days to deliver them to her personally in Spain, then De La
26
Huerta would have waived privilege – possibly on all patient psychotherapist records where
27
anything that might be relevant might appears. Worse, since it would have been a blanket release
28
-40-
1 of records on all subjects discussed with her therapist over the two year period, the waiver as to
2 other years might well be completely unrestricted.
4 3) The Wrongful Nature of RUBIN’s Actions
5 87. This attempted act was wrongful because RUBIN directly encouraged De La
6 Huerta to do this completely unnecessary and very harmful thing. He did not advise her of the
7 consequences. This wrongfully violates a duty to inform a person of the consequences of such a
8 release. There was no benefit to De La Huerta. Without RUBIN’s attempted intervention, the
9 records would have reached De La Huerta and De La Huerta’s attorney in electronic format
10 within a few hours. Therefore the actions were completely unnecessary.
11 88. The duty clearly pertains to an attorney who is representing the person when he
12 encourages his own client to commit an act resulting in a waiver of attorney-client privilege. As
13 with any evidentiary privilege, a lay person is not expected to fully understand the significance of
14 evidentiary privileges and nor is such a person expected to understand waiver. Therefore, in
15 directing De La Huerta to cooperate in a series of act that would result in waiver of her patient-
16 therapist privilege, RUBIN committed a wrongful act.
17 89. RUBIN might argue that he had no fiduciary duty nor any duty at all because he
18 was not representing De La Huerta, never offered to represent her and in fact refused to represent
19 her. This only proves that his wrongful conduct can be treated as fraud instead of breach of duty
20 since he made a false statement – that De La Huerta should or must commit actions resulting in
21 harmful waiver – that De La Huerta relied on these knowingly false statements and that she
22 would have suffered harm due to her reliance. The fact that FILLER and Hillowe intervened and
23 prevented RUBIN from obtaining the records does not relieve these actions from being
24 considered as wrongdoing from the point of view of meeting the elements of the cause of action
25 for intentional interference with contractual relations.
26 90. Having the records in his possession with an undertaking to show them to De La
27 Huerta in Spain five days later would provide ample time for RUBIN to copy, market and sell
28 these records. RUBIN knew through widespread media accounts that Weinstein expended two
-41-
1 million dollars to attempt to discourage other actions by his accusers – included in the actions of
2 David Boies, Esq. in retaining “Black Cube” to intimidate the New York Times reporters and
3 various accusers. Therefore, a reasonable person in RUBIN’s position would have calculated that
4 Weinstein would have been prepared to pay considerable sums of money for a full set of De La
5 Huerta’s psychotherapy records on November 7, 2017 as a Grand Jury indictment appeared to be
6 imminent. Even if no physical copy was made and no copy was sold, RUBIN would have
7 physical proof that De La Huerta’s privilege had been waived by express consent. This would
8 allow Weinstein to subpoena these records, and in fact might allow any person to seek to obtain
9 them – such as news media. Alternately, RUBIN could reasonably be believed to have made a
10 deal in advance with Weinstein or through an intermediary wherein RUBIN would be paid if he
11 could succeed in obtaining a usable waiver for De La Huerta’s psychotherapy records and
12 perhaps an additional sum of money for a copy of the actual records that could not be traced to
13 the PDF version prepared by Piliero.
14 91. If we try to imagine an innocent and positive explanation of RUBIN’s actions, that
15 effort is unavailing. Firstly, could RUBIN have believed that some harm would come to De La
16 Huerta or to her case if the records had been delivered to her longtime attorney and physician
17 FILLER as planned? Could RUBIN have believed it would be beneficial to De La Huerta to
18 unnecessarily and permanently waive her patient-psychotherapist privilege? Could RUBIN have
19 believed it was beneficial to De La Huerta to have no attorney at all as Judge Solomon considered
20 release of her psychotherapist records at a hearing on her motion? Could RUBIN have believed
21 he should be communicating about the case with Assistant District Attorney Maxine Rosenthal –
22 at a time that announcement of empanelling of a Grand Jury seemed imminent - when at the time
23 of the communication RUBIN was not representing De La Huerta? Would it be unreasonable to
24 ask WHO’s interest RUBIN was acting on behalf of in his astonishing and truly shocking actions.
25 Any reasonable attorney or lay person would reasonably believe that the only benefit would
26 accrue to Weinstein.
27 92. More importantly, we can consider whether RUBIN was in fact naïve and
28 uneducated with regard to the handling of a rape victims psychotherapy record. Sadly, it cannot
-42-
1 be held to be convincing that RUBIN did not understand exactly what he was doing. Firstly, he
2 had served for several years as a prosecutor in the Bronx County office of the District Attorney.
3 Then for nearly 20 years, he worked as Defense counsel defending rapists to try to prevent their
4 indictment or conviction. On his own website he states that in his efforts to protect someone of
5 accused of raping a child he states:
6 We understand what prosecutors are looking for and what mistakes they are capable of as
7 they pursue a conviction. We work with private investigators and interview witnesses to
determine the credibility of the charges against you. We look into social media, text messages,
8 credit card statements, prior relationships and any other indicators that may affect the
outcome of your case
9
10 Helping Minimize the Consequences of Child Sex Crimes, by Michael F. Rubin, Esq. at
11 http://www.kellyrubin.com/Criminal-Law/Sexual-Assault/Child-Sex-Crimes.shtml
12 (see also the figure between paragraph 4 & 5 above in case RUBIN has taken down this web
13 page). From the words on his website, it is clear that RUBIN understands well the task of defense
14 counsel hired by an accused rapist for obtaining the mental health records of his client’s accuser.
15
16 E) RUBIN’S Actions Have Resulted In Severe or Negatively Dispositive Interference with

17 Progress Towards Indictment of Weinstein
18
19 93. Plaintiff must allege (4) an actual breach or disruption of the contractual
20 relationship. It is not necessary that the contracts be fully breached, but only that their
21 performance is made more difficult or expensive:
22
[“T]he California courts have made clear that “interference'' does not necessarily require
23 evidence of any “breach.'' In Ramona, the court noted that the California Supreme Court had
24 previously expanded the tort of inducing breach of contract “to permit liability where the
defendant does not literally induce a breach of contract, but makes plaintiff's performance of
25 the contract ‘more expensive or burdensome.’ Ramona, 177 Cal.App.3d at 1131, 225 Cal.Rptr.
120 (quoting Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 232, 11 Cal.Rptr. 97,
26 359 P.2d 465 (1961)). Therefore, in order to satisfy this element, Plaintiffs have to offer
credible evidence that Defendants intentional actions resulted in greater expense or burden on
27
the performance of its contractual obligations with third parties.”
28
-43-
1 Sebastian, 162 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1204-5 (C.D. Cal 2001).
2 “Plaintiff need not allege an actual or inevitable breach of contract in order to state a claim for
disruption of contractual relations. We have recognized that interference with the plaintiff’s
3
performance may give rise to a claim for interference with contractual relations if plaintiff’s
4 performance is made more costly or more burdensome. (See Seaman’s Direct Buying Service,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., supra, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 766 (1984) ; Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary
5 Sch. Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, 232 [11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 359 P.2d 465] ; see also Ramona
Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises, supra, 177 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1130-1131
6 [holdover tenant liable for interference with landlord’s contractual relations with new tenant].)
7 Other cases have pointed out that while the tort of inducing breach of contract requires proof
of a breach, the cause of action for interference with contractual relations is distinct and
8 requires only proof of interference. (Shamblin v. Berge (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 118 [212 Cal.
Rptr. 313] [defendant warned off potential buyers of real estate, causing rescission of sales
9 contract]; Manor Investment Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co. 159 Cal. App. 3d 58 (1984), 593, fn.
3 [206 Cal. Rptr. 37] [termination of at will license could be basis for action for intentional
10 interference with contractual relations, but judgment reversed because inconsistent verdicts];
11 see also Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 766A , at p. 17 & coms. c and g, at pp. 18-19; Prosser &
Keeton, Torts, supra , § 129, at pp. 991-992; Note, Civil Conspiracy and Interference with
12 Contractual Relations (1975) 8 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 302, 314, fn. 45; Comment, Interference
with Contractual Relations: A Property Limitation (1966) 18 Stan.L. Rev. 1406.)
13
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal. 3d 1118, 1129 (1990)
14
94. Here, on November 7th at 1:10 pm Pacific Time, RUBIN called into FILLER’s
15
office and falsely ordered him to halt work, cancel legal filings and or act to withdraw whatever
16
had been filed. He then proceeded to interfere by contacting the New York District Attorney –
17
Maxine Rosenthal – to provide false information including the mis-statement that FILLER was no
18
longer representing De La Huerta, that he RUBIN was now counsel, that the Motion to Quash
19
was withdrawn, and further incorrect characterizations of the status, fundamentals and facts of the
20
De La Huerta complaint against Weinstein. FILLER then contacted Rosenthal who indicated
21
confusion about who was counsel, and raised concern about the implications of this confusion for
22
the prospects of going forward to seek indictment of Weinstein. This created an abrupt loss of
23
momentum and loss of confidence as to De La Huerta’s consistency as a witness should the case
24
go forward because of the appearance of confusion or conflicting instructions to two attorneys
25
alleged to arise with De La Huerta.
26
95. In fact none of these communications should have been made by RUBIN – to the
27
extent that the information was substantially incorrect – and to the extent that it was highly
28
-44-
1 improper and inexplicable that he should be speaking to the District Attorney for the purpose of
2 sewing confusion. This made the objective of proceeding towards an indictment far more
3 difficult. Indeed, several days later – on information and belief – he advised the district attorney
4 not proceed with the indictment. This advisement occurred after FILLER agreed to substitute
5 Goldberg in as counsel. All of the active investigation and witness development that FILLER had
6 in progress were interrupted and brought to a halt – most of which were never resumed. That is –
7 RUBIN was not interested at all in learning about the ongoing investigation, identity of witnesses
8 or other facts of the case. He was only interested in disruption. The complete failure to request
9 any transfer of case files or to inquire about the investigations underway by FILLER showed a
10 complete lack of interest in progressing this case of extremely high national significance. Even
11 later, over the next four days – as RUBIN continued to purport to De La Huerta that he was
12 seeking the indictment – he made no effort to obtain case information from FILLER.
13 96. By the time that RUBIN was speaking with De La Huerta and making the
14 determination that he should inform De La Huerta and the District Attorney that there was no
15 case and that De La Huerta should withdraw her complaint – FILLER had already spent hours
16 providing details to Goldberg and her legal team and had transferred more than a thousand
17 documents relevant to the case. Separately, Goldberg’s review of the psychotherapist records
18 provided to her by Piliero’s counsel revealed a vast amount of intensely personal information as
19 to many other issues of personal interest to De La Huerta, with only a tiny fraction of those
20 documents having any relevance or potential interest value for the District Attorney. RUBIN had
21 access to none of this information when he made his “determination” and “recommendation.”
22 97. These facts would lead any reasonable attorney to believe that RUBIN had no
23 actual purpose of advancing the case for indictment of Weinstein. Rather his sole intentions in
24 these actions – on their apparent face - were to a) interfere with work on this matter at Tensor
25 Law PC and so to b) interfere with prevent and obstruct the likelihood of indictment of Weinstein
26 and to c) harm and interfere with FILLER’s standing with De La Huerta, convincing her she
27 should d) attempt to urgently and immediately become unrepresented while her critical Motion to
28 Quash was considered by the Court. During this period, as his subsequent actions reveal, he did
-45-
1 not actually intend to take over as counsel.
2 98. RUBIN’s actions were designed to cause De La Huerta to believe that it was his
3 practice to meet with a client in person and to interview the client before agreeing to consider
4 commencing a representation – this was to explain why he advised her to terminate representation
5 by TLPC immediately at a time when he was not willing to offer representation. In fact, on
6 information and belief, he did not ever provide an offer to De La Huerta that would giver her the
7 power to accept him as counsel.
8 99. No privilege was established by RUBIN with De La Huerta because he was an
9 unsolicited advisor, who had first informed her he was unwilling to take over as counsel until he
10 visited her in person and upon meeting with her – simply informed her that he refused to consider
11 being retained. Therefore, his communications were entirely for the purpose of damaging her case
12 and damaging her relationship with her longstanding attorney, FILLER, and then to proceed
13 immediately to commence undermining De La Huerta’s confidence in her new attorney Goldberg.
14 100. In this, RUBIN took care to avoid incurring any responsibility for protecting
15 information provided to him by De La Huerta. By making clear to her from the time of his initial
16 contact, that he was not prepared to consider becoming her attorney, and then – after interviewing
17 her for several hours under false pretenses – informed her that he was refusing to represent her
18 because “she had no case” and must withdraw her complaint. Because this was and is presently
19 the only active criminal investigation of Weinstein close to resulting in an indictment, RUBIN’s
20 effort, and because of the national prominence and societal importance of this potential criminal
21 prosecution, this tampering and interference was and is a matter of very significant public
22 concern, far beyond and in addition to any limitation to personal concerns of De La Huerta.
23 101. Under California law – causing the termination of even an at will contract is a
24 “break in contract,” caused by interference that meets the standard of interference under this
25 cause of action and that the cause of action is also subject to being pursued as an interference with
26 prospective economic advantage as an aspect of interference with a business relationship:
27
The great weight of authority is that the tort of interference with contract is merely a species
28
-46-
1 of the broader tort of interference with prospective economic advantage. [Citations.] Thus
while the elements of the two actions are similar, the existence of a legally binding agreement
2 is not a sine qua non to the maintenance of a suit based on the more inclusive wrong.”
(Buckaloo, [v. Johnson] supra, 14 Cal.3d 823 (1975), 122 Cal.Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865, fn.
3
omitted.) The Buckaloo court also cited with approval the following language from Builders
4 Corporation of America v. United States 148 F.Supp. 482 (N.D.Cal.1957) : “Both the tort of
interference with contract relations and the tort of interference with prospective contract or
5 business relations involve basically the same conduct on the part of the tortfeasor. In one case
the interference takes place when a contract is already in existence, in the other, when a
6 contract would, with certainty, have been consummated but for the conduct of the tortfeasor
7 ....” (Id., at p. 484, fn. 1.)
Manor Investment Co v. FW Woolworth 159 Cal.App.3d 586, 593 (1984). This is viewed in the
8
light of Reeves v. Hanlon, supra, in the sense that an “at will” contract can be viewed as a
9
situation where any renewal, from time to time, can be viewed as a business expectation subject
10
to interference:
11
12 [W]e hold that inducing the termination of an at-will employment relation may be actionable
under the standard applicable to claims for intentional interference with prospective economic
13 advantage.
14 Reeves at 1144.
15 May the tort of interference with contractual relations be predicated upon interference with an
16 at-will contract? Historically, the answer is yes. A third party's “interference with an at-will
contract is actionable interference with the contractual relationship” because the contractual
17 relationship is at the will of the parties, not at the will of outsiders. (Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1127, 270 Cal.Rptr. 1, 791 P.2d 587;
18 Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters 29 Cal.2d 34 (1946), 39, 172 P.2d 867.)
19 Reeves at 1148.
20
21 F) RUBIN’s Actions Resulted in a Break in Contract

22
23 1) Causation is Readily established for Making the Objective of Obtaining an Indictment of

24 Weinstein More Difficult as Well as Less Likely
25
26 102. The fifth element of the cause of action (5) is the demonstration of resulting
27 damage. This element raises two issues, firstly there is the appropriate means of identifying
28
-47-
1 causation and secondly there is the question of what sort of damages are actionable once the first
2 four elements and causation are established.
3 103. The standard for causation under California law in cases of intentional interference
4 with contractual relations is articulated in Bank of New York v Fremont:
5 California employs the “substantial factor” test for determining causation in intentional torts
6 cases. See Franklin v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 116 Cal.App.4th 375, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 429, 441
(2004) (applying the substantial factor test in an intentional interference with contractual
7 relations action and noting that “a cause of ... damage ... is something that is a substantial
factor in bringing about ... damage”). “The substantial factor standard generally produces the
8 same results as does the ‘but for’ rule of causation which states that a defendant's conduct is a
cause of the injury if the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ that conduct.” Rutherford v.
9 Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (1997) (citing
10 Mitchell v. Gonzales, 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 913, 819 P.2d 872, 879 (1991) ).
California law defines “substantial” expansively, and at least one court has cautioned against
11 placing “undue emphasis” on the ordinary meaning of that word. Rutherford, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d
16, 941 P.2d at 1214. Although “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ or ‘theoretical’
12 part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a substantial factor,” the substantial factor
test is a “broader rule of causality than the ‘but for’ test.” Id. (citing People v. Caldwell, 36
13
Cal.3d 210, 203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274, 280 (1984) ; Prosser & Keeton on Torts (5th
14 ed.1988 supp.) § 41, pp. 43-44); see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Employer's Ins. Co.,
159 Cal.App.3d 277, 205 Cal.Rptr. 460, 465 (1984) (“The critical question as to causation in
15 intentional torts is whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the type
of harm which he intended from his original act. [N]o consideration is given to the fact that
16 after the event it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought about such harm or
that the actor's conduct has created a situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for
17
which the actor is not responsible”) (quoting Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal.App.2d 898, 5
18 Cal.Rptr. 28, 35 (1960)) (internal citations and some punctuation omitted).
19 Bank of New York v. Fremont General 523 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Circuit 2008).
20 104. Here, causation and harm are readily shown. After five years of cooperative effort
21 between FILLER and De La Huerta – RUBIN brought about a termination of representation
22 directly through and as the purpose of his interference. Indeed, RUBIN’s sole purpose was deny
23 De La Huerta access to her extremely effective counsel for the purpose of aiding Weinstein.
24 Whether the relationship between RUBIN and Weinstein is a co-conspirators or if RUBIN in
25 breaking the representation or whether RUBIN simply hoped to collect a fee from Weinstein if he
26 could damage the case, and or to obtain the psychotherapy records to sell to Weinstein’s defense
27 counsel is immaterial to RUBIN’s liability.
28
-48-
1 2) The Amount of Pecuniary Damages is Susceptible to Being Accurately Established
2 105. The damages that are actionable arise from both the contractual and the tortious
3 aspects of this cause of action:
4 “The measure of damages for intentional interference with contractual relations or prospective
5 economic advantage is “an amount that will reasonably compensate plaintiff for all loss or
harm, providing that you find it was [or will be] suffered by plaintiff and caused by the
6 defendant's conduct.” (BAJI No. 7.89 ; see also Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn. 6,
233 Cal.Rptr. 294, 729 P.2d 728 [damages for interference with prospective economic
7 advantage are “economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the
defendant”].) The amount of such harm or loss includes “[t]he financial loss of the benefits of
8 the [contract] [or] [the prospective economic relationship].” FN7 (BAJI No. 7.89.) FN7. BAJI
9 No. 7.89 is derived from the Restatement Second of Torts, section 774A, which states, in
relevant part: “(1) One who is liable to another for interference with a contract or prospective
10 contractual relation is liable for damages for [¶] (a) the pecuniary loss of the benefits of the
contract or the prospective relation; [¶] (b) consequential losses for which the interference is a
11 legal cause; and [¶] (c) emotional distress or actual harm to reputation, if they are reasonably
to be expected to result from the interference.” (See Di Loreto v. Shumake (1995) 38
12
Cal.App.4th 35, 38–39, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 22.) The Restatement Second of Torts recognizes a
13 proper plaintiff may recover lost profits when a third person is prevented from performing a
contract with that plaintiff and, on a claim for interference with prospective economic
14 advantage, may recover the lost profits to have been made out of the expected contracts.
(Rest.2d Torts, § 774A , com. b, p. 55.) cited in Sole Energy Company et al v Petrominerals
15 Corporation et al, 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 798).
16
106. In regard to Weinstein, success in the criminal case was required in order to
17
proceed with the civil case. Thus disruption of the criminal case interfered with the ability of
18
TENSOR LAW P.C. to obtain a contingency fee. TENSOR LAW P.C. has been prepared to
19
allege that De La Huerta suffered pecuniary harm because Weinstein played a roll in causing De
20
La Huerta to be terminated off of her then active HBO series Boardwalk Empire which
21
termination at the end of the second of the five seasons of the series, followed closely upon her
22
accusation to Weinstein in January of 2011 that he was a rapist.
23
107. On information and belief, the financial harm of being terminated off of
24
Boardwalk Empire constituted a loss of income and loss of future work valued at $5 million. In
25
addition, although De La Huerta was injured on the set of “Nurse” – a Lionsgate production – in
26
2011, California courts may find that the subsequent substantial collapse of her film career was
27
not due to the Lionsgate injury. If that fact is established, then De La Huerta would have looked
28
-49-
1 to Weinstein for the substantial cause of these career harms which she has valued at $55 million
2 in her action against Lionsgate. To the extent that RUBIN’s interference caused TENSOR LAW
3 PC to lose its contingency fee on $60 million of liabilities, a typical or conservative 33%
4 contingency rate results in damage of $20 million to Tensor Law PC directly attributable to
5 RUBIN’s actions.
6 108. In addition Plaintiff suffered consequential damages in being forced to expend in
7 funds to bring this current suit:
8
“A person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his
9 interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover
10 compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures
thereby suffered or incurred. (Stevens v. Chisholm, 179 Cal. 557 (1919), 564 [178 P. 128]
11 (1919); Nelson v. Kellogg, 162 Cal. 621 (1912) , 623 [123 P. 1115 , Ann.Cas. 1913D 759];
Contra Costa County Title Co. v. Waloff, 184 Cal.App.2d 59 (1960), 67 [9a] [7 Cal.Rptr. 358]
12 ; Rest., Torts (1939) § 914; 15 Am.Jur. (1938) Damages, § 144, p. 552; 25 C.J.S. (1941)
Damages, § 50c, p. 534; cf. Estate of Williamson, supra, 150 Cal.App.2d 334 (1957), 341.)
13
Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp, 59 Cal. 2d 618, 620 (1963). Thus any attorneys
14
fees incurred will be sought as well.
15
16
G. Direction by an Undisclosed Principal to Interfere with Contractual Relations
17
109. Plaintiff further alleges a possible status of undisclosed principal as to Weinstein’s
18
relationship with or TWC’s relationship with RUBIN as distinct from consipracy
19
20 Civil conspiracy is “a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not
actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or
21 design in its perpetration. [Citation.] By participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator
effectively adopts as his or her own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the
22 conspiracy. [Citation.] In this way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the
immediate tortfeasors.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7
23 Cal.4th 503, 510 (1994)–511, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454 .)

24
American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners LTD, 225 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1473 (2014).
25 110. Here there is no discernible personal motive for RUBIN to interfere with and
26 disrupt the contractual relations which were intended to accomplish a criminal indictment of
27 Harvey Weinstein. Often, interference with contract is done for competitive reasons, but in this
28
-50-
1 case, RUBIN took care to assure that he never developed an attorney-client relationship with De
2 La Huerta and ultimately advised her she had no case and should withdraw her claim against
3 Weinstein. These actions place RUBIN’s law license in jeopardy because he appears to have
4 obtained confidences from De La Huerta under her mistaken belief that RUBIN was trying to aid
5 her objectives when in fact he was trying to prevent her from achieving her objectives. These
6 confidences were then shared with a third party. He acted to create a waiver that would place all
7 of her personal therapy records in a position of exposure and availability to Weinstein and
8 potentially to the entire public, while attempting to convince her to drop the case. Immediately
9 after interfering and undermining FILLER, RUBIN proceeded to interfere with and undermine
10 Goldberg who was then trying to advance the case.
11 111. Weinstein has been shown to have expended millions of dollars to prevent any
12 case such as De La Huerta’s from emerging and proceeding. He managed to retain David Boies to
13 undermine and intimidate New York Times reporters, even while Boies was retained by the New
14 York Times. This modus operandi is consistent with what Weinstein sought to achieve with
15 RUBIN as to De La Huerta. Because a criminal conviction would have devastating impact on
16 Weinstein and greatly disadvantage him in a hundred other civil actions against him, he will have
17 placed a very high financial value on disrupting and defending against the criminal conviction
18 against him sought by De La Huerta.
19 112. The Weinstein Company devised arrangements to intimidate victims of sexual
20 harassment and to discourage them from proceeding against Weinstein. Common purpose with
21 Weinstein and RUBIN is established by these actions. Therefore both conspiracy and, where
22 applicable, aiding and abetting of interference, bring DOES 1 to 10 – through whom RUBIN
23 conveyed to Weinstein and The Weinstein Company and DOEs 11 to 20 – through whom RUBIN
24 received commitments of benefits from Weinstein and The Weinstein Company into this cause of
25 action. These DOES are thus defendants alongside their contact, retained attorney, or potential
26 vendor of stolen information – RUBIN.
27 113. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants unlawful conduct, Plaintiff has
28 suffered economic harm and other consequential damages all in an amount according to proof at
-51-
1 trial.
2 114. The acts of Defendant, as alleged herein were willful, wanton, and malicious and
3 were intended to oppress and cause injury to Plaintiff. In light of the willful, wanton, malicious
4 and intentional conduct engaged in by Defendant, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of punitive
5 damages.
6 115. Alternatively to conspiracy, however, Plaintiff alleges that – subject to proof –
7 Harvey Weinstein or The Weinstein Company were the Undisclosed Principal, and will elect
8 among RUBIN as principal or WEINSTEIN as principal or TWC as principal upon such proof or
9 at the necessary time of election, see Klinger, supra; Luce, supra; Schnier, supra; and Patterson,
10 supra.
11
12 VI. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A
13 PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
14 (as against RUBIN, alternatively upon election against any Undisclosed Principal
15 & against DOES 1 to 50)
16
19 117. To the extent that a court may find that the business relations between Tensor Law
20 PC and Paz De La Huerta do not constitute contractual relations, the same assertions made in
21 cause of action for Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations are realleged, restated, and
22 reasserted here.
23
24
25
26
27
28
-52-
1 VII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE –
2 VIOLATION OF CAL. BUSINESS & PROFESSIONAL CODE §6126
3 (As Against Defendant RUBIN)
7 119. Routine contacts between attorneys in different states is necessary in many
8 situations to reasonably conduct routine activities. However, in the current matter, RUBIN called
9 into the law offices of Tensor Law PC and gave a series of orders and directions to FILLER
10 affecting both New York and California matters. These actions constituted the practice of law
11 without a license in violation of California Business and Professional Code §6126.
12 120. RUBIN informed Filler – falsely – that FILLER has been terminated as counsel,
13 he informed falsely that he was an attorney representing De La Huerta, he sought information
14 from FILLER in relation to a pending court filing, he ordered Filler to halt or withdraw the legal
15 filing. The fact that the filing was for a New York Court does not change the fact he was
16 materially attempting to direct and control actions of attorneys in California. The order for
17 termination of legal action from RUBIN to FILLER also included a Complaint for Sexual
18 Harassment by De La Huerta against Harvey Weinstein for events in California, which had been
19 drafted but not yet filed.
20
21 VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
22
23
24 1. General damages in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial.
25 2. Special damages in an amount to be shown according to proof at the time of trial.
26 3. Punitive and exemplary damages in an amount appropriate to punish or se an
27 example of Defendant.
28 4. Cost of Suit.
-53-
1 5. Such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper.
3 Date: January 5, 2018 Chanel Katiraie, Esq.
4 Aaron G. Filler, Esq.
7 Chanel Katiraie, Esq.

8
Aaron G. Filler, Esq.
TENSOR LAW PC
10
Attorneys for Plaintiff, TENSOR LAW, PC
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-54-
1
2 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
4 Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial in this action.
7 Date: January 5, 2018 Chanel Katiraie, Esq.
8 Aaron G. Filler, Esq.
10

12
Aaron G. Filler, Esq.
TENSOR LAW PC
14 Attorneys for Plaintiff, TENSOR LAW, PC
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-55-
1 VEzuFICATION
I declare that:
2
I have read the COMPLAINT filed by Tensor Law PC in Case titled:
J
TENSOR LAW PC v. MICHAEL F. RUBIN, an individual; HARVEY WEINSTEIN. an
4
individual; THE WEINSTEIN COMPANY and DOES l-50, having the follou.ing causes
of action: (1) Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations; (2) Intentional
5 Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage; (3) Practicing Law Without A License -
Violation Of Cal. Business & Professional Code S6126 and understand its contents.
6
7
trI am the Person Most Knou,ledgeable for a parI1,' to this action. The matters stated in
the foregoing document are true of my o\\,n knorvledge except as to those matters
8 which are stated on information and beliet. and to those matters I believe them to
be true. I am informed and believe and on that ground allege that the matters stated
9
in the foregoing document are true.
10
x I am apafiy to the above entitled action. The matters stated in the document described
11
above are true of my own knowledge except as to those matters which are stated
t2 on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.
13
n I am one of the attorneys for "a pafiy to this action. Such
14
party is absent from the county of aforesaid where such attorney's have their
15 offices, and I make this verification for and on behalf of that party for that reason.
am informed and believe and on that ground allege that the matters stated in the
16
foregoing document are true.
t7
Executed on January 5, 2018 at Santa Monica, California.
18
I declare under penalty of perjury under the of the State of California
t9 foregoing is true and correct.
20
Aaron G. Filler
2t
22 Type or Print Name
^!. )
24
25
26
27
28
-56-
VERIFIED COMPLAINT of Tensor Law P.C. vs. Michael Rubin, Harvey Weinstein. et al

EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT B

PRESS RELEASE
New York State Contact:

Unified Court System Lucian Chalfen, Public Information Director
Arlene Hackel, Deputy Director
(212) 428-2500
Hon. Lawrence K. Marks
Chief Administrative Judge www.nycourts.gov/press
Date: November 8, 2017
Chief Judge DiFiore Announces Implementation of New Measure

Aimed at Enhancing the Delivery of Justice in Criminal Cases
New York – To help prevent wrongful convictions and enhance the delivery of justice in
criminal matters, Chief Judge Janet DiFiore today announced the adoption of new rules that will
require judges presiding over criminal trials to issue an order notifying and reminding
prosecutors and defense attorneys appearing before them of their professional responsibilities.
While numerous state and federal judges have individually issued such orders, the New York
State court system is the nation’s first jurisdiction to implement such a measure on a statewide
level.
Trial court judges in applicable cases will issue an order to the prosecutor responsible for
the case to timely disclose exculpatory evidence favorable to the accused − called Brady material
(referring to the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision Brady v. Maryland, that in criminal
cases prosecutors must disclose all evidence that could be materially favorable to the defense) −
as required by the federal and state constitutions, statutory and ethical rules.
This order makes specific reference to the types of material that could be required to be
disclosed, including information that impeaches the credibility of witnesses, exculpates or
reduces the degree of the defense, or mitigates the degree of the defendant’s culpability or
punishment.
Additionally, trial judges in criminal cases will be required to issue a directive focusing
on the defense counsel’s obligations to provide constitutionally effective representation in the
case, such as keeping the client informed about the case, providing reasonable advice regarding
any plea offers, and performing a reasonable investigation of both the facts and law pertinent to
the case. A copy of such order will be given to the defendant in the case.
While the professional responsibilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys are regulated
by law, the new order, which does not in any way change existing law, provides a mechanism by
which to educate inexperienced prosecutors and defense attorneys − and remind experienced
ones − about their constitutional and ethical duties.
Both directives are modeled on the recommendations of the New York State Justice Task
Force, among the first permanent task forces to address wrongful convictions and whose work
has generated significant reforms.
Recently, the Justice Task Force concluded an extensive study, producing a report
centered on serious concerns that undermine the fairness and reliability of the criminal justice
process, namely Brady violations by prosecutors and ineffective representation by defense
attorneys. In its report, the task force offered a series of recommendations to address these issues.
Foremost was a call for judges in criminal cases to have a greater oversight role, including that
judges in applicable criminal cases issue standing orders informing the prosecution and defense
of their respective obligations.
As noted by the Justice Task Force in its report, an order directed to the prosecution
“would create a culture of disclosure, educate inexperienced prosecutors, serve as a reminder for
more experienced prosecutors regarding their disclosure obligations, and ensure that judges have
an ability to enforce compliance with disclosure requirements.” While permitting a court to
impose sanctions or take other appropriate action for deliberate violations, the order’s primary
goal is preventative. In proposing a directive aimed at defense counsel, the task force’s objective
was to devise a useful, detailed reminder to defense attorneys regarding their most fundamental
duties to provide constitutionally effective legal representation in the case.
The Justice Task Force drafted model directives for the courts to use, with these
proposals submitted for public comment this past spring. Following the comment period, Chief
Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks, with the approval and consent of Chief Judge DiFiore
and the Administrative Board of the Courts, issued an Administrative Order, amending the
uniform rules for courts exercising criminal jurisdiction to require judges in applicable criminal
actions to issue an order notifying both the prosecution and defense of their legal and ethical
obligations. The order is to be issued at the early stages of the case. While the Chief Judge’s
Administrative Order does not mandate the issuance of any specific directive, a model order has
been approved for use.
“This newly adopted measure will go a long way to help prevent and remedy systemic
errors that contribute to wrongful convictions, acting as a consistent reminder to prosecutors and
defense attorneys of their respective – and critically important − roles in the fair administration
of justice. I commend the Justice Task Force for its thoughtful recommendations pertaining to
attorney responsibility in criminal cases, including the proposed directives, and for its steadfast
commitment to due process and the eradication of wrongful convictions of the innocent in New
York State,” said Chief Judge DiFiore, who in her former role as Westchester County District
Attorney served as a Justice Task Force co-chair.
“The statewide application of these directives will serve to promote the quality of justice
in New York, increasing judges’ ability to ensure that prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys
appearing before them have a clear, thorough understanding of their legal and ethical obligations.
Along with the Justice Task Force, whose outstanding efforts have led us to this historic point, I
am appreciative to all those who provided valuable input on the proposed orders during the
public comment period,” said Chief Administrative Judge Marks.
Copies of the Administrative Order and approved model order, along with the New York
Justice Task Force’s Report on Attorney Responsibility in Criminal Cases, are attached.
# # #
New York State Justice Task Force
Report on Attorney Responsibility

in Criminal Cases
February 2017
A component of attorney respons ibility is attorney discipline, which has been addressed
in New York State in various capacities by a number of different entities in recent years. ln 2009.
for example, the New York State Bar Association's Task Force on Wrongful Convictions
published a report that addressed one component of attorney discipline in the criminal context:
1
prosecutorial misconduct. Most recently. fon:ner Chief Judge Lippman created the Commission
on Statewide Attorney Discipline. which conducted a comprehensive review of New York's
attorney disciplinary system. The Commission issued a report in September 2015 offering
recommendations to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the attorney discipline process. 2
Though the topic of anorncy discipline has been studied. the Task Force recognized that
there continues to be a dearth of statistics and raw data on the prevalence of attorney misconduct
in the criminal context and on the potential contribution of such misconduct to wrongful
convicrions. 3 Nonetheless. the Task Force discussed the fact that there may be a public
perception that attorney misconduct- particularly prosecutorial misconduct- is. in fact, a
significant contributor to wrongful convictions.
Beginning in October 2015, the Task Force hosted presentations from academics.
representatives of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. and representatives of the
Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline on the subject of attorney responsibility and
discipline in the criminal context. In December 2015, the Task Force crcaLed a subcommittee to
examine the issue in greater depth. The subcommittee discussed a number of possible refonns.
taking into account existing reports on attorney misconduct. including the Commission· s
September 2015 report. proposed legislation, and proposals from the Legal Aid Society. the
lnnocence Project. the District Attorneys· Association of the State of New York ("DAASNY'J.
individual New York State judges, and various other entities and individuals. The subcommittee
also reviewed case law, news articles. and commentary for additional context on the issue.
4
After four full Task Force meetings, six subcommittee meetings, 5 and a number of
additional meetings of a smaller subgroup. the 2 l voting members of the Task Force achieved
consensus on the majority of the recommendations considered. in many cases reaching
1
Ne,.\ York State Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline. "Enhancing Fairness rind Cons1s1cncy[.) Fostenng EfficienC)
and Transparenc) :· September 20 I 5. available at https:/1www.nycouns.gowanorneys/disc1pline/ (herei.nafter. "Commission on
Statewide Attorney Discipline Repon'").
: As a result of those recommendauons. the four Depanmems of the New York State Supreme Coun. Appellate Division. adopted
nC\\. unitonn. statewide rules 10 govern Ne,1 York's attomey disciplinary process. which f)rov1de for a harmonized approach 10
the 111vest1gauon. adjudication. and post-proceedmg administration of attorney disctplmary matters. See Pan 1240 of the Rules of
the Appellate D1v1sion (22 NYCRR Pan 1240) (e!Tec11vc July 20 16).
' While the Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline did not focus specifically on criminal mal1crs, it did briefly address the
issue of"prosecutorial misconduct."" including the possibility of having a separa1e disciplinary mechanism specifically dedicated
10 such mauers. See Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline Report, at 75. Uhimot,e ly. the Commission recommended
that ;udic1al determina11ons of prosecutorial misconduct be promptly referred 10 disciplinary conunittees and that each
Dcpanment should track and record such matters .. with a view t0ward generating annua l s1::111stical reports."' Id. The
Comm1ss1on also noted that a distmct1on should be made between good-faith error and an~· "'unctl11cal or mahc1ous·· behavior. Id.
"The Task Force meetings occurred on October 19. 2015, November 13. 20 t 5. October 21. 2016. and November 4. 2016.
s 111e subcornmmee meetings occurred on December 14. 2015. January 28. 2016. April 7. 20 I 6. June 13. 201 o. June 21.2016.
and July 16. 2016.
2
unanimous or near-unanimous agreement. The diverse perspectives and relevant backgrounds of
the subgroup, subcommittee, and T ask Force members proved critical to these recommendations.
As discussed in greater detai l below, and as enumerated at Appendix A, the Task Force
agreed on a series of recommendations concerning: (I) use of the Lenn "misconduct." (2)
reporting of attorney "misconduct," (3) the grievance process, (4) data collection and statistics.
(5) the role of the judiciary in making referrals for disciplinary review, and (6) training. In
addition, the Task Force recognized that prosecutorial error in the Brady context. as well as
failure of defense counsel to adhere to their professional obligations. has the potential to
contribute to incidents of wrongful convictions. After a great deal of discussion. the Task Force
agreed to the groundbreaking recommendation that all New York State trial court judges should
issue an order at the outset of criminal cases regarding the obligation of prosecutors to make
timely disclosures of infonnarion favorable to the defense as required by Brady r Maryland, 373
U S 83 (! 963). Giglio \' Unized States. 405 US 150 (1972), Peopl~ ,, Geasle11. 54 NY2d 5 I 0
(1 981 ). and their progeny under the United States and cw York State constitutions. and under
Rule 3.8(b) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. The Task Force similarly
recommended that all New York State trial counjudges issue an order directing criminal defense
counsel to comply with the defendant's statutory notice obligations and help ensure
constitutionally effective representation.
Recommendations Relating to Attornev Responsibilitv in C riminal Cases
I. Use of the Term Misconduct
At the outset. the Task Force spent significant time discussing its view that the tenns
"misconduct'' and. in particular...prosecutorial misconduct.'' arc 100 often used without sufficient
regard to their meaning and connolations. The overbroad use of the term '·misconduct'· can
create the perception that any time an error is made. regardless of whether that error was
intentional or a mistake made in good faith. there has been malfeasance. Accordingly. the Task
Force recommended that when discussing attorney misconduct. courts. the press. and academics
be conscious of the distinction between good-faith error and intentional wrongdoing. In
particular. the Task Force recommended that the tenns "prosecutorial misconduct'' and "defense
counsel misconduct'· be reserved for instances where a prosecutor or defense attorney engages in
conduct- including a pattern or practice of behavior-that violates a law. ethical rule. or
standard. either with the intent to do so or with a conscious disregard of doing so. and where
there is no good-faith reason for having done so. ln a simi lar vein. trial and appellate courts,
wherever possible. should distinguish between good-faith error and prosecutorial or defense
counsel misconduct in written opinions and provide clear guidance regarding the specific
attorney conduct that has been deemed improper, in order to enable practitioners to avoid such
conduct in the furure.
.,
.)
II. Encouraging Reporting of Attorney Misconduct
The Task Force identified an apparent perception in the literature and in the media that
misconduct- particularly by prosecutors- is underreported. ln order to address this perception.
the Task Force discussed ways to encourage both practitioners and judges to report potential
misconduct ·with greater frequency, and ultimately, made recommendations to achieve that end.
Currently. New York State Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3(a) only requires a lawyer to
report misconduct where that lawyer "knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty.
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer .. .... (emphasis added). The Task Force discussed that
many attorneys use this standard as a th reshold, only reporting potential misconduct if they
firmly "know'· that there has been a violation. This has the potential to result in underreponing.
as it is difficult to "know" for certain that a v iolation has occurred. Instead of basing the
decision regarding whether 10 repon solely on R ule 8.3(a). the Task Force recommended that
lawyers (including District Attorneys· offices and institutional defense providers) and judges be
encouraged 10 report misconduct. regardless of whether it is required. in situations where a
lawyer or judge knows or is aware of a hie:h orobabil itv based on credible evidence that another
lawyer has engaged in misconduct.
Further. tO the extent that they have not already done so. it is recommended that District
Attorneys· offices and institutional defense providers develop clear. written internal procedures
regarding how allegations of error and misconduct against lawyers on their respective staffs will
be processed and reviewed. Moreover. these institutions should develop such procedures
explaining how corrective actions (whether individual or office-wide ). if appropriate. will be
implemented. The Task Force also recommended that Disrrict Attorneys' offices and
instirurional defense providers maintain imernal procedures regarding when to refer or repon
misconduct (whether that of their own lawyers or other lawyers) to l11e appropriate disciplinary
authorities. District Attorneys · offices and institutional defense providers also are encouraged to
make these written procedures publicly available.
Finally. the Task Force beheves that it is important that members of the public
understand the role of Grievance Comm ittees and how 10 repon misconduct. The Task Force
therefore recommended that Grievance Committees disseminate i11 formation to tbe public
explaining their function and practice. and the procedures for filing a complaint.
HI. Grievance Process
A question that has been the subject of much discussion and study. including by the
Commission on Statewide Attorney Discipline. is whether there should be a separate body (either
within or apart from the established Grievance Committees) speciJically designated to consider
allegations of prosecutorial or defense counsel misconduct. Proponents of a separate body argue
that investigating potential misconduct in the criminal context requires specialized knowledge
4
tha1 the current Grievance Committees lack. However, others believe that a separate body is
unnecessary and that it would be more efficient and achievable to make improvements within the
already-established grievance process. The Task Force ultimatel y agreed with the latter view,
determining that the existing Grievance Committees should take certain steps Lo ensure that they
are equipped to handle criminal justice matters. 6
In particular. the Task Force recommended that Grievance Committees include active
practitioners from both the prosecution and defense bars who have substantial experience and
expenise in the criminal justice system. Moreover. all Grievance Committee members should be
provided with specialized rraining on the standards relating to criminal matters. lt is also
important that investigations be undertaken where a finding of attorney misconduct has been
made in a court decision. Such findings may include prosccurorial misconduct or ineffective
assistance of counsel. Accordingly. to the extent that they arc nor curren11y doing so, the
Grievance Committees should proactively review available court decisions where such a finding
has been made. Additional dedicated funding and staff should be aluocatcd to undenake this
effon as needed.
IV. Data Collection and Statistics
As indicated. there currently is a public perception that misconduct (particularly

prosecutorial misconduct) is prevalent in the criminal justice system and that responsible
attorneys are not being appropriately disciplined. However, there is a dearth of statistics in
support of such propositions. Recognizing the work already being done by the Office of Court
Administration and the Grievance Committees ro collect data and statistics about attorney
discipline generally. the Task Force made recommendations regarding data collection in the
criminal context that would fit within and improve upon the existing framework.
First. it is important that the data collected by the Office of Coun Administration and
Grievance Comrninees include details that allow prosecurors. defense lawyers. and the public to
better understand the nature of the matters being reported and whether there arc discemable
trends that should be addressed through rraining or otherwise. This data should include the rype
(e.g., prosecutorial or defense counsel misconduct), nature (e.g .. discovery-related). and number
of complaints received and reviewed. and resulting determination. if any. Data should be
aggregated and analyzed, and statistics should be published.
Further. the Grievance Committees should publish annual reports that aggregate data
about the number of grievances filed against prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys and the
outcomes of those allegations. These reports should provide information about the types of
allegations that have been substantiated and should include recommendations. where appropriate.
for new or additional training, supervision. or practices based on the Grievance Committees·
review of these matters.
• See supra note:!.
5
The Task Force also discussed how to ensure that DistTict Attorneys' offices and
institutional defense providers are made aware when someone on their staff has been referred to
the Grievance Committee for potential misconduct. ln considering this issue. Task Force
members determined that it was important to distinguish between requiring notification of an
allegation (which may be frivolous or unsubstantiated) and requiring notification of actual
Grievance Committee investigations. To this end, the Task Force recommended that, to the
extent that they do not already do so, District Attorneys' offices and institutional defense
providers require staff to notify their supervisors when they become aware that a Grievance
Committee has commenced an investigation into their conduct. Staff should also notify their
supervisors when they become aware that a Grievance Commjttee has made a determination
following an investigation.
V. Role of Judiciary in Making Referrals
As discussed. the Task Force focused on the perception that attorney misconduct is
underreponed. Recognizing that the judiciary can play an important role in the referral of
prosecutors or criminal defense lawyers for disciplinary review. the Task Force recommended
that judges receive training on the standards and processes for referring attorneys for disciplinary
review. Further, judges should be encouraged to promptly refer 10 the appropriate Grievance
Committee all matters in which a judicial find ing of prosecutorial or criminal defense counsel
misconduct has been made.
VI. Training
The Task Force concluded that education and training are fundamental to achieving
compliance with applicable rules and standards. To the extent that they do not already do so.
prosecutors and institutional defense provider attorneys should receive training. both at the outset
of employment and periodically thereafter, with respect to their ethical and other obligations.
The content of these training programs shouJd be updated as needed to reflect recent case law,
ethical opinions. new technology and research, as well as to address any areas of needed
improvement identified by internal supervision, courts, or the Grievance Committees. The New
York Prosecutors Training Institute ("NYPTI") should receive and review any report issued by
the Grievance Committees and incorporate the recommendations into NYPTI's various
educational programs and statewide bulletins. Furthermore, solo practitioners should be given
the opportunity to receive similar training through free Continuing Legal Education ("CLE")
courses.
District Attorneys' offices and instinnional defense providers should also work together
to foster a culture of openness, transparency, and shared learning. They should meet on a regular
basis to discuss issues and concerns regarding the Rules of Professional Conduct, best practices
on difficult practice points, lessons learned from internal and external allegations/investigations.
6
and when referrals should be made. In add ition. offices should be encouraged to share their
internal protocols with each other.
Finally. the Grievance Committees should meet periodically with representatives of the
local prosecution and the criminal defense bar to provide an overview of the types of allegations
they arc receiving and alert these representatives to areas of law or practice where additional
training or supervision is needed.
V B. Order R egarding Disclosure Obligations for Prosecutors
Building from its recommen dations regarding education an d training. the Task Force also
considered whether it would be helpful for trial courts to issue a stan ding order in criminal cases
regarding the prosecution's obligation to make timely disclosures of favorable information to the
defense pursuant to federa l and state constitutional and ethical mies. As noted. Brady violations
can lead 10 wrongful convictions. T he Task Force has discussed this link between Brady
violauons and wrongful convictions in the past. including in its July 2014 Report on
Recommendations Regarding Criminal Discovery Reform. That report noted that additional
recommendations relating to Brady, including ,vitb respect to the training of prosecutors. should
be considered.
To this end. Task Force members generally agreed that a fom1 document issued by trial
courts regarding prosecutors' disclosure obligations would serve as a useful educational tool;
however. there was significant debate regarding whether such document should be framed as an
order or instead as a notice or reminder. Proponents of an order contended that an order would
create a culture of disclosure. educate inexperienced prosecutors. serve as a reminder for more
experienced prosecurors regarding their disclosure obligations. and ensure that judges have an
ability to enforce compl iance with disclosure requirements. Proponents of a nobce or reminder
(rather than an order) expressed concern that adopting an order had the potential 10 criminalize
disclosure mistakes by prosecutors and undermine the existing anomey disciplinary strucrure.
Ultimately. the Task Force recommended that couns issue an order directing the
prosecuting authority to disclose all covered materials and that such order should be directed 10
the District Anorney and the Assistant responsible for the case. The order should be issued by
tdal courts upon defendant's demand at arraignment on an indictment. prosecutor's information.
information. or simplified information (or. where either the People or counsel for the defendant
is not present at the arraignment. at the next scheduled court date with counsel present).
The Task Force drafted a model order for use by trial courts, attached hereto as Appendix
B. This model contains certain key features that the Task Force agreed are necessary to ensure
both that the order serves an educational p urpose and that it encourages a culture of compliance.
as rntcndcd. Its key provisions include the following:
7
The order references three broad categories of information favorable to the defense
( exculpatory, impeaching, and affecting suppression) . It cites to the prosecutor's
constitutional obligations under Brady v Maryland. 373 US 83 (1963), Giglio v
United Scates, 405 US 150 (1972). People v. Geaslen. 541\TY2d 510 (1981), and their
progeny under the United States and New York State constitutions, and to the
prosecutor's ethical obligations under Rule 3.8(b) of the New York State Rules of
Professional Conduct.
There is a specific reference to certain types of materials or information that could be

required to be disclosed, including: (1) relevant benefits. promises, or inducements to
a witness in connection with the w itness's tesrimony or other cooperation in the case
(which may come from law enforcement officials. law enforcement victims services
agencies, or the prosecutor): (2) prior inconsistent statements and uncharged criminal
conduct and convictions; and (3) a witness's mental or physical illness or substance
abuse.
With respect to the timing of disclosure, the order states that the prosecutor is
obligated to timely disclose information in accordance w ith the United States and
New York State constitutions, as well as CPL article 240 . However, in order to
encourage early disclosure and provide some guidance as to reasonableness in this
area, the order contains a statement that disclosure is presumptively timely if the
prosecutor shall have completed it no later than 30 days before commencement of a
trial in a felony case and 15 days before commencement of a trial in a misdemeanor
case.
Finally. in furtherance of the intent that this order serve an educational purpose and
not be construed as a means of sanctioning prosecutors for good-faith error. the order
contains a statement that only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a
violation of the order or permit personal sanctions against a prosecut0r.;
VIII. Order Regarding Obligations for Defense Attorneys
The Task Force also recognized that the failure of defense counsel to adhere to their
professional obligations (such as the duty to provide effective assistance of counsel) can
contribute to wrongful convictions. As a result, the Task Force recommended that courrs adopt
an order to be issued by the trial court on every criminal case. directing defense counsel to
comply with the defendant's statutory notice obligations and seeking to ensure constitutionally
7
There was leng1hy discussion regarding whether the order should incorporate a m:iterialiry threshold, whereby either the
prosecutmg authority would be required to disclose only material information favorable to the defendant or only failures 10
disclose matenal information would permit sanctions. Ultimately. the Task Force determined ihat materiality should not be
referenced m the order. but provided that only willful and deliberate conducr will constitute a violation offhe order or pennit
personal sancuons against a prosecutor.
8
effective representation. This order should be directed to the firm or institutional defender (and
also to the individual attorney responsible for the case at a firm or institutional defender). For
non-institutional providers, it should be directed to the individual defense counsel. The
defendant should be provided with a copy of the order. A model order recommended by the
Task Force is attached hereto as Appendix C.
9
Appendix A
Summarv of Recommendations Regarding Attomev Responsibiliiv in Criminal Cases
l Use of the Term Miscon d uct
I. Courts. the press. and academics should be encouraged to be conscious of the distinction
between good-faith error and intentional wrongdoing when discussing misconduct.
The tenns '·prosecutorial mjsconducr·· or "defense counsel misconduct.. should be

reserved for instances where a prosecutor or defense attorney engages in conducL.
including a pattern or practice of behavior. that violates a law. ethical rule. or standard.
either with the intent to do so or with a conscious disregard of the same, and there is no
good-faith reason for having done so.
3. Trial and appellaLe courts should be encouraged to. wherever possible. distinguish
berween good-faith error and prosecutorial or defense counsel misconduct in wrinen
opinions and to provide clear guidance regarding the specific attorney conduct that has
been deemed improper to enable practitioners to avoid such conduct in the future.
II. Encourage Report ing of Attorney Misconduct
1. Lawyers (including District Attorneys' offices and institutional defense providers) and
judges should be encouraged to report misconduct. regardless of whether it is required. in
situations where a lawyer or judge knows or is aware of a high probability based on
credible evidence that another lawyer has engaged in misconduct.
2. Grievance Comminees should disseminate infonnation to the public about what they do
and ho\.v to file a complaint.
3. To the extent that they do no1 already do so. District Attorneys' offices and insLitutional
defense providers should (i) develop clear written internal procedures regarding ho"'
allegations of error and misconduct against internal lawyers will be processed and
reviewed. and (i i) based on their review finding, take corrective actions. if appropria1c,
both on an individual and office-wide level.
a. District Attorneys· offices and insrinnional defense providers should develop

internal procedures regarding how allegations of error and misconduct against
external lawyers wi II be processed and reviewed.
b. District Attorneys· offices and institutional defense providers should develop

internal procedures regarding when to refer/report misconduct of internal or
exrernal lawyers to the appropriate ilisciplinary authorities.
c. District Attorneys· offices and institutional defense providers should be

encouraged to make public finalized internal written procedures.
IO
Ill. Grievance Process
l. The Grievance Committees should include active practitioners from both the prosecution
and defense bars who have substantial experience and expertise in the criminal justice
system to address allegations of attorney misconduct filed against prosecutors and
defense attorneys.
2. Although no change should be made to the existing Grievance Committee structure,

specialized training should be provided to existing Grievance Committee members on the
standards relating to criminal matters.
3. To the extent that it does not already do so, the entity tasked with addressing grievances
in criminal matters should proactively review available courr decisions where a finding of
attorney misconduct is made. As necessary, additional, dedicated funding and staff
should be allocated to undertake this effort.
JV. Data Collection and Statistics
1. The Office of Court Administration and the Grievance Committees should collect,
aggregate, analyze, and publish statistics regarding attorney misconduct regarding the
type (e.g., prosecutorial or defense counsel misconduct), nature (e.g .. discovery-related),
and number of complaints received and reviewed and the resulting determination, if any.
a. The Grievance Committees should publish annual reports that aggregate data
about the number of grievances filed against prosecutors and defense attorneys
and the outcomes of those allegations. These reports should provide information
about the types of allegations that have been substantiated, and these reports
should include recommendations, where appropriate, for new or additional
training, supervision. or practices based on the Grievance Committees' review of
these matters.
b. To the extent that they do not already do so. District Attorneys· offices and
institutional defense providers should require staff to notify their supervisors
whenever they become aware that a Grievance Committee has commenced an
investigation about them.
c. To the extent that they do not already do so. District Attorneys ' offices and
institutional defense providers should require staff to notify their supervisors
whenever they become aware that a Grjevance Committee bas made a
determination following an investigation about them.
V. Role of Judiciary in Making Referrals
1. Judges should receive training on the standards and processes for referring attorneys for
disciplinary review.
11
2. Trial and appellate court judges should promptly refer to the appropriate Grievance
Committee all matters in which a judicial finding of prosccutorial or defense counsel
misconduct has been made.
VI. Training
1. Prosecutors should receive training. both at the outset of employment and periodically
throughout their tenure. in criminal law and procedure. ethical obligations. and all areas
of professional practice. The content of these training programs should be updated as
needed to reflect recent case law. ethical opinions. new technology and research, as well
as to address any areas of needed improvement identified by internal supervision. courts.
or the Grievance Committees. The NYPTI should receive and review any report issued
by the Grievance Committees and incorporate the rccommcnda1ions into NYPTT's
various educational programs and statewide bulletins.
2. Institutional defense provider attorneys should receive training. both a1 the outset of
employment and periodically throughout their tenure. in criminal law and procedure.
ethical obligations. and all areas of professional practice. The content of these rraining
programs should be updated as needed to reflect rece111 case law. ethical opinions. new
technology and research. as well as to address any areas of needed improvement
idemified by internal supervision, courts, or the Grievance Commillecs. Solo
practitioners should be given the opponuniry to receive similar tra.ining through free CLE
courses.
3. Prosecutors· offices and instinHional defense pro\'iders should meet with one another on
a regular basis to discuss issues and concerns regarding the Rules of Professional
Conduct. best prac1ices on difficult prac1icc points. lessons learned from internal and
external allegations/investigations. and when referrals should be made. Offices should be
encouraged to share their internal protocols with one another to fos1er openness and
transparency.
4. Grievance Committees should meet periodically with representatives of the local

prosecution and the defense bar to provide an overview of the types of allegations they
are receivjng and alert these attorneys to areas of law or praclice where additional trnining
or supervision is needed.
Vll. Order Regarding Disclosure Obligations for Prosecutors
1. Couns should adopt a form document to be issued by trial couns in criminal cases
regarding certain disclosure obligations of the prosecuting authority and to provide
recommended language for that document.
2. The scope of the document should be explained through reference to three categories of
information favorable to the defense (exculpa10ry. impeaching and affecting suppression)
and by citing obligations under Brady v Maryland. 373 US 83 ( 1963 ), Giglio 1· U11i1ed
Stares, 405 US 150 (I 972). People 1• Geasien, 54 NY2d 510 ( 1981 ), and their progeny
under United States and New York State constitutions. and obligations under Rule 3.8(b)
of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct.
12
3. The document should be phrased as an order, which should direct the prosecuting
authority to d isclose all covered materials.
4. The order should be directed at the District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the
case.
5. The order should not contain any reference to materiality.
6. The order should explain that disclosure of benefits. promises, or inducements to a

wimess in connection with the w itness's testimony or other cooperation in the case couJd
be required.
7. The order should include speci fie references to certain types of materials or infom1ation
that could be required to be disclosed, including:
a. that relevant benefits, promises, or inducements may come from law enforcement
officials, law enforcement victims services agencies. or the prosecuror;
b. prior inconsistent statements and uncharged criminal conduct and convictions;

and
c. a witness 's mental or physical illness or substance abuse.
8. The order should include that the prosecutor's duty to disclose information that is
favorable solely because it tends to impeach a witness's credibihty appl ies only with
respect to a testifying witness.
9. The order should provide tbat the prosecutor is obligated to timelv disclose information
in accordance with the U nited States and New York State constitutional srandards. as
well as CPL article 240. and the order should provide that disclosure is presumptively
rimely if the prosecmor shall have completed it no later than 30 days before
commcncemcnl of a trial in a felony case and 15 days before commencement of a trial in
a misdemeanor case.
10. The order should provide th.at only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a
violation of the order or be eligible for personal sanctions against a prosecutor.
VIII. O rder Regarding Obligations for Defense Attorneys
1. Couns should adopt a form document, issued by trial courts in criminal cases. regarding
the defense counsel's obligation to comply with defendanf s statutory norice obligations
and to help ensure constiturjonally effective representation and to provide language for
such a document.
.., The document should be phrased as an order. which should direct the defense counsel to
comply with defendant's statutory notice obligations and to help ensure constitutionally
effective representation.
13
3. The order should be directed to the firm or institutional defender and the individual
defense counsel. as well as the individual attorney responsible for the case at a finn or
instinnional defender.
4. The defendant should be provided with a copy of such order.
]4
Appendix B
Model Order Direczed zo the Prosecution
At arraignment on an indictment, prosecutor's infonnation, informat ion. or simplified

information, the court shall issue a written order as described below. "Where either the People or
counsel for the defendant is not present at the arraignment. the court shall issue the order at the
next scheduled court date with counsel present. As a condition for issuance of 1.he order. counsel
for the defendant shall provide the prosecutor with a written demand as specified under CPL
240.10(1 ) and 240.20. unless the prosecution waives the need for a demand.
The order shall include the following inforrnaLion:
The court hereby orders the District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case. or, if the
matter is not being prosecuted by the District Attorney. the prosecuting agency and its assigned
representative. ro make timely disclosures of information favorable to the defense as required by
Brady,. Maryland. 373 US 83 (J 963), Giglio ,. U11i1ed Stai es. 405 US 150 ( 1972). People,.
Geaslen. 54 l\TY2d 510 (1981 ). and their progeny under the United Stares and New York State
constitutions. and by Ruic 3.8(b) of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct. as
described hereafter.
The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case have a duty to learn
of such favorable information that is known lO others acting on the government's
behalf in the case. including the police. and should therefore confer with investigative
and prosccutorial personnel who acted in this case and review their and their agencies·
files directly related to the prosecution or investigation of th.is case.
Favorable information could include. but is nor limfred to:
a) lnfonnarion that impeaches the credibi lity of a testifying prosecution wimess.

including (i) benefits, promises. or inducements. express or tacit. made to a
witness by a law enforcement official or law enforcement victim services
agency in connection with giving testimony or cooperating in the case: (ii) a
witness ·s prior inconsis1ent statements. written or oral: (iii) a wimess ·s prior
convictions and uncharged criminal conduct: (iv) information that rends to
show tha1 a wimess has a morive ro lie to inculpate the defendant. or a bias
against the defendant or in favor of the complainant or the prosecution; and (v)
information that tends to show impairment of a wimess·s ability to perceive,
recall. or recount relevant events, including impairment resulting from mental
or physical illness or substance abuse.
b) lnfom,ation that tends 10 exculpate. reduce the degree of an offense. or

support a potentjaJ defense to a charged offense.
c) Information that tends to mitigate the degree of the defendant's culpability as

to a charged offense. or to mitigate punishment.
15
d ) Information that tends to undcnninc evidence of the defendant's identity as a
perpetrator of a charged crime, such as a non-identification of the defendant
by a wimess to a charged crime or an identification or other evidence
implicating another person in a manner that tends to cast doubt on the
defendant's gui It.
e) Information that could affect in the defendant's favor the ultimate decision on
a suppression motion.
Favorable information shall be disclosed whether or not it is recorded in tangible

form, and irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.
Favorable information must be timely disclosed in accordance with the United States
and New York State constiturional standards. as well as CPL article 240. Disclosures
are presumptively "timely'· if they are completed no later than 30 days before
commencement of trial in a felony case and 15 days before commencement of trial in
a misdemeanor case. Records of a judgment of conviction or a pending criminal
acrion ordinarily are discoverable within the time frame provided in CPL 240.44 or
240.45( I). Disclosures that pertain to a suppression hearing are presumpri vely
"timely"' if they are made no later than 15 days before the scheduled hearing date.
The prosecutor is reminded that the obligation to disclose is a continuing one.
A protective order may be issued for good cause. and CPL 240.50 shall be deemed to
apply. with respect to disclosures required under this order. The prosecutor may
request a ruling from the court on the need for disclosure.
Only willful and deliberate conduct will constitute a violation of this order or be
eligible to result in personal sanctions against a prosecutor.
16
Appendix C
Model Order Directed to Defense Counsel (with a copy to criminal defendants)
At arraignment on an indictment. prosecutor's infonnation, information. or simplified

infonnarion. the coun shall issue a written order calling attention to certain professional
obligations of counsel for the defendant during the representation . \\'here the People or counsel
for the defendant is not present at the arraignment. the coUJ1 shall issue the order at tbe next
scheduled coun date with counsel present. The order should include the following information:
Defense counsel has the obligation to:
a) Confer with the cliem about the case and keep the client informed about all
significant developments in the case:
b) Timely communicate to the client any and all guilty plea offers, and provide
reasonable advice about the advantages and disadvantages of such guilty plea
offers and about the potential sentencing ranges that would apply in the case:
c) When applicable based upon the client's immigration status. ensure that the
client receives competent advice regarding the immigration consequences in
the case as required under Padilla v Kentucf..,"}). 559 US 356 (2010):
d) Perform a reasonable investigation of both the facts and the law pertinent to
the case (includi11g as applicable, e.g .. visiting the scene. interviewing
witnesses. subpoenaing pertinent materials. consulting experts. inspecting
exhibits. reviewing all discovery materials obtained from the prosecution.
researching legal issues, etc.). or, if appropriate. make a reasonable
professional judgment not to investigate a particular matter:
e) Comply wi th the requirements of the New York State Rules of Professional

Conduct regarding conflicts of interest. and when appropriate. timely noti(v
the court of a possible conflict so that an inquiry may be undenaken or a
ruling made:
t) Possess or acqui:re a reasonable knowledge and familiarity with criminal

procedural and evidcmiary law to ensure constirutionally effective
representation in the case: and
g) When the starutory requirements necessary to trigger notice from the defense
a re met (e.g .. a demand. intent to introduce the evidence. ere.). comply with
the statutory notice obligations for the defense as specified in CPL 250.10.
250.20. and 250.30.
17
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF THE
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OF THE COURTS
Pursuant to rhe authority ,·estcd in me. and upon consultation with and agreement of the
Administrati ve Board or the Courts. I hcreby amcnd the uniform rules fo r courts exercising
criminal jurisdiction (22 NYCRR Part 200) by adding sections 200.16 and 200.27 as follows.
effective January I. 2018:
***
200.16/200.27: Issuance of Order Confirming Disclosure and Notice Obligations
In all criminal actions on an indictment. prosecutor's in formation. information. or

simplified infonnation. when: counsel for the defendant has provided the prosecutor with a
,uitten demand as specilicd under CPL 2-W. 10( 1) and 240.20. or where the prosecution has
waived such demand. the court shall issue an order 10 prosecution and defense counsel that. inter
alia, (I) confi rm::; the prosecutor"s disclosure obligations pursuant to Brady v. Ma,y/and. 373
U.S. 83 ( 1963). CiiKlio ,.. United S!lt!l!s. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). ?<!ople ,, Cieaslen, 54 N. Y.2d 510
( 1981 ), and their progeny: and {1) confi rms defense counsel"s professional obligation to provide
effective assistance of counsel and meet defendanrs statutory notice obligations. The order shal l
be issued on the first scheduled court date. following demand, where both the prosecutor and
defense counsel arc present. The Ch ief Administrator of the Courts sha ll promulgate a model
order for this purpose that the coun ma) use as it deems appropriate.
Dated: November 6.201 7

AO291/17
ST t\ TE OF >!EW YORK. COURT
COU1'TY OF : CR.I1V1INAL TERM. PART
--------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
Case No.
-against-
------
Order to Counsel in
- - - - - -- - - - -- - - ' Defendant. Criminal Cases
-----------------------------------------------------------------------x
- - -- - - - - - -- . J.
The court, pursuant Lo an Administrative.; Order of the Chief Administrative Judge and at the
recommendation of the New York State Justice Task force and in furtherance of the fair
administration of justic.:c. issues this order as both a reminder and a directive that counsel uphold
their constitutional. staruro0 and ethjcal responsibilities in the above-captioned proceedings.
To the Prosecutor:
The District Attorney and the Assistant responsible for the case. or. if the maner is not being
prosecuted by the District Attorney. the prosecuting agency and its assigned representative. is
directed to make timely disclosures of information favorable to the defense as required by Brady,·
Mm:1·/and. 373 US 83 ( I 963). Giglio,. United States. 405 US 150 ( 1972). PeoplC' ,. Geaslen. 54
NY2d SI O( I 98 I). and their progeny under the United States and New York State constitutions. and
b~ Rule.: 3.8(b) of the e\, York State Rules of Prnfossional Conduct. as dcscribc.:d hereafter.
· The Disrrict Attorney and the Assistant rc.:sponsible for the case: have a duty ro learn of such
favorable infonnation that is knovvn 10 others acting on the govemment" s behal r in the case.
including the polic<.:. and should therefore confer with investigative and prnsccutorial personnel
who acted in this case and review their and their agencies· files directly related to the
prosecution or investigation of this case.
• Favorable infomianon could include. bm is not limited t0 :
a) ln fonnation that impeaches the credibilit~· of a tcsrifying prosecurion witness. including (i)
benefits. promises. or inducements. express or tacit. made to a ,,·itness by a la\\'
enforcement official or law enforcement victim services agcnc~ in connccuon with giving
testimony or cooperatmg in the case: (ii) a wi tness·s prior inconsistent statements. written
or oral: (i ii ) a witness's pnor convictions and uncharged criminal conduct: (iv) information
that tends to show that a witness has a motive to lie to inculpme the defendant. or a bias
against the defendant or in favor of the complainant or the prosecution: and (v) infom1ation
that tends to show impainnent of a witness's ability to perceive. recall. or recount relevant
events. including impairment resulting from mental or physical illness or substance abuse.
h) lnfonnation that tends to exculpate. reduce the degree of an offense. or support a potential
defense to a charged offense.
c) lnfonnation that tends to mitigate the degree of the dcfcndanr's culpability as to a charged
offense. or to mitigate punishment.
d) Information that tends to underm i,ne evidence of the defendant's identity as a pcrpeu·ator of
a charged crime. such as a non-idenrification of the defendant by a witness t0 a charged
crime or an identification or other evidence implicating another person in a manner that
tench: to cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.
e) Information that could affect in the defendant's favor the ultimate decision on a suppression
motion,
• r: avorable information shall be d isclosed whether or not it is recorded in tangible:: form. and
irrespective of whether the prosecutor credits the information.
• Favorable information must be timely disclosed in accordance with the United States and
New York State constitutional standards. as well as CPL article 240. Disclosures arc
presumptively ··rimelr.. if they are completed no later than 30 days before commencement of
trial tn a felon> case and 15 days before commencement of trial in a misdemeanor case. Records
of a judgment of conviction or a pending criminal action ordinaril y are discoverable within the
tim<: fram<.: provided in CPL 240.44 or 240.45( I). Disclosures that pertain to a suppression
bearing are presumptivel>' ··timely·· if the>' are made no later than 15 days before the scheduled
hearing date. The prosecuror is reminded that the obli gation to disclose is a continuing one.
Prosecutors should strive to determine if favorable infom1ation exists. Nothing herein shall be
understood ro diminish a prosecutor·s obligation to disclose excul patory infonnation as soon as
n.:asonahly possible.
•A protective order may be issued for good cause, and CP[~ 240.50 shall be deemed rn apply.
with respect to disclosures required under this order. The prosecutor may request a ruling fTom
the court on the need for disclosure,
• Oni~' willful and deliberate conduct will consti tu1 e a violation of this order or be eligible to
result in personal sanctions against a prosecutor.
To Defense Counsel:
Dcfcns<.: counsel. having filed a notice of appearance in the above captioned case. is
obligated under both the 't\ew York State and the United States Constitution to provide effective
n.:prcscntation of defendant. Although the following list is nm meant to be exhaustive. counsel shall
remain cognizant of the obligation to:
a) Confer with the client about the case and keep the cl ient inforn,cd about all significant
developments in the case:
b) Timely communicate to the client any and all gui lry plea offers. and provide reasonable
advice about the advantages and disadvantages or such guilty pica offers and about the potential
scnrcncing ranges that would apply in the case:
c) When applicable based upon the client's immigration status. ensure that the cl ie111 receives
competent advice regarding the immigrntion consequences in the case as required under Padilla
,, Kentucky. 55() US 356 (20 I 0):
d) Perform a reasonable investigarion of both the fac1s and the la\\' pcninent to the case
(including as applicable. e .g .. visiting the scene. imcrviewing witnesses. subpoenaing pertinent
materials. consulting experts. insrecting exhibits. reviewing all discovery materials obtained
from the prosecution. researching legal issues. etc.), or. if appropriate. make a reasonable
professional judgment not to investigate a particular matter:
e) Comp!:, with the requirements of the . ew York State Rules of Professional Conduct
regarding conn1c1s of interest. and when appropriate. timely noti(\' the court of a possible
conflict so that an inquiry ma:, be undertaken or a ruling made:
f) Possess or acquire a reasonable knowledge and familiarity with criminal procedural and
cvidemiary bw Lo ensure constituti onally effecti ve representation in the case: and
g) When the s1atutory requirements necessary to trigger notice from lilt' defense are met (e.g.. a
demand. intent to introduce the evidence. ere.). comply with the staru1or~· notice obligations for
the defcnst: ns specified in CPL 250.10. 250.20. and 250JO.
So ordered.
Judge or .Justice
Dated:

EXHIBIT C

1 CHANEL KATIRAIE, Esq. SBN 315825
2 Tensor Law, P.C.
3 Santa Monica, California 90405
4 Tel: (310) 450-9689
Fax: (310) 496-3176
5
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6 Tensor Law P.C.
7
8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT
9 TENSOR LAW P.C., a California Case No.
Corporation,
10
11 Plaintiff,
vs.
12 DECLARATION OF AARON G. FILLER AS
MICHAEL F. RUBIN, an individual; TO ACTIONS OF MICHAEL F. RUBIN TO
13 Harvey Weinstein, an individual; The PRACTICE LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE
Weinstein Company; and DOES 1-50
14
15
Defendants.
16
17
18
DECLARATION OF AARON G. FILLER
19
20 I, the undersigned Aaron G. Filler do hereby swear, certify, affirm and declare that:
21 1. I am over the age of 18, am a resident of the County of Los Angeles and of the State of
California. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law before all State Courts within
22 the State of California and I am duly admitted to the United States District Court,
Central District of California and to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I have
23 personal knowledge of the facts herein, and, if called as a witness in a court of law,
could testify competently thereto. I am the attorney employed by Tensor Law P.C. in
24
this matter.
25
2. On November 7, 2017, at 1:10 pm while at my office in Santa Monica I received a phone
26 call from Michael F. Rubin. He stated his name and that he was taking over as attorney
in the representation of Paz De La Huerta in relation to criminal and civil proceedings.
27 Without stopping for any questions he went on to state that I was terminated as counsel
effective immediately and then went on to repeat this – for effect and impact – four
28
1
Declaration of Aaron G. Filler Concerning Rubin

I more times using various alternative expressions "Your done, your terminated, its over,
stand down." I pointed out that I had no such instruction from the client and that a
2 motion was being filed by my colleague that had to be filed within the next 20 minutes.
I additionally pointed out that if he was a New York attorney * did he have a plan for
J filing the California litigation we had drawn up. He replied that if we filed anything, I
was to see that the motion was withdrawn or cancelled. He stated that I should not file
4
anything in California. When I attempted to discuss the status of the case, he told me he
5 could not speak because he had a scheduled call at that moment with New York District
Attorney Rosenthal, she was on the other line, and that he would have to hang up at that
6 time.
8
Executed on January 5, 2018 at Santa Monica, California.
9
I the declarant affirm and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
10
California and New York and the United States that the foregoing
11 correct.
t2
13 Aaron G. Filler, Esq. .
t4
15
16
t7
18
t9
20
21
22
Z)
24
25
26
27
28
a
Declaration of Aaron G. Filler Concernine SAG & AMPTP Contracts

EXHIBIT D

1 CHANEL KATIRAIE, Esq. SBN 315825
2 Tensor Law, P.C.
3 Santa Monica, California 90405
4 Tel: (310) 450-9689
Fax: (310) 496-3176
5
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6 Tensor Law P.C.
7
8 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT
9 TENSOR LAW P.C., a California Case No.
Corporation,
10
11 Plaintiff,
vs.
12 DECLARATION OF AARON G. FILLER AS
MICHAEL F. RUBIN, an individual; TO AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS AND
13 Harvey Weinstein, an individual; The FIGURES
Weinstein Company; and DOES 1-50
14
15
Defendants.
16
17
18 DECLARATION OF AARON G. FILLER

19
I, the undersigned Aaron G. Filler do hereby swear, certify, affirm and declare that:
20
1. I am over the age of 18, am a resident of the County of Los Angeles and of the State of
21 California. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law before all State Courts within
the State of California and I am duly admitted to the United States District Court,
22 Central District of California and to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. I have
personal knowledge of the facts herein, and, if called as a witness in a court of law,
23 could testify competently thereto. I am the attorney employed by Tensor Law P.C. in
this matter.
24
25 2. The photographs appearing in the complaint at page 18 are true and correct copies of
archival Getty images which I downloaded from the internet at the Getty website on
26 January 2, 2018 from:
27
28
1
Declaration of Aaron G. Filler Concerning Rubin

1 http ://www. getfyimages. com/photos/blue-valentine-
weinstein?mediatype:photography&phrase:blue%o20valentineo/o2}weinstein&sort:mo
2 stpopular&family:editorial
J 3. The photographs appearing in the complaint at page 19 is a true and correct copies of
archival Getfy images which I downloaded from the internet at the Getfy website on
4
January 2,2018 from:
5
http ://www. geffy image s. comlphoto s/blue-valentine-
6 weinstein?mediatype:photography &page:2&phrase:blueYo2}valentineYo2}weinstein
& sort:mo stpopular&family:editorial
7
8
4. The web pages appearing atpage 9 and in Exhibit A are true and correct copies of web
9 pages which I downloaded from the Kelly & Rubin LLP website which I downloaded
from the internet on January 2,2018 from:
10
hup://www.kellyrubin.com/Criminal-LadSexual-Assault/Child-Sex-Crimes.shtml
11
t2
5. The web page appearing at page 10 of the complaint is a true and correct copy of a webpage
13 which I downloaded from the New York Times website on the internet on lanuary 2,
2018 from:
T4
http://www.nytimes.con,/2006lAll02lnyregionlin-new-york-power-of-dna-spurs-call-
15
to-aboli sh- statute-of. html
16
t7 6. The Order of the Chief Judge of New York appearing at Exhibit B is a true and correct copy
of the order which I dornnloaded from the internet on January 2,2018 from:
18
https ://www.nycourts. gov/PRES S/PDFs/PR 1 7_ 17 .pdf
19
20
Executed on January 5,2018 at Santa Monica , Califomia.
21
22
I the declarant affirm and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
^!.3
California and New York and the United States that the foregoing is true and
correct.
24
25
Aaron G. Filler. Esq. ,
26
27
28
Declaration of Aaron G. Filler Concernine SAG & AMPTP Contracts

De La Huerta Michael Rubin

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

De La Huerta Michael Rubin

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 CHANEL KATIRAIE, Esq.

23 VII. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE – VIOLATION

4 American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Patners LTD,

6 Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra,

11 Buckaloo, v. Johnson supra,

23 Klinger v. Modesto Fruit Co.

25 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist.,

8 Patterson v. Dominos Pizza LLC

13 Quelimane Co. v Stewart Title Guaranty Co.,

15 Ramona Manor Convalescent v. Care Enterprises,

20 Savage v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,

8 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Am. Employer's Ins. Co.,

19 NY Uniform Rules of Courts 22 NYCRR Part 200 §200.16 to §200.27 ....................................... 26

9 1. This is a matter wherein MICHAEL F. RUBIN (hereinafter “RUBIN”), a New

16 commenced and very little has moved forward on a civil basis.

5 case against Weinstein:

6 inside the New York County District Attorney’s office.

13 8. Certainly, for a defense attorney who represents himself as a leading specialist in

18 assure success” in her criminal charges against Weinstein.

19 9. RUBIN first instructed De La Huerta to keep all communications between himself

12 cause a waiver of De La Huerta’s patient-psychotherapist privilege and to gain personal

17 control of the records, to attempt to cause De La Huerta to be unrepresented at a critical juncture,

20 14. Plaintiff Tensor Law P. C. (hereinafter “TLPC”) is a California licensed Law

10 and Commonwealth countries.

20 sued herein as an individual or as an agent of an Undisclosed Principal if proof of agency can be

23 Dominos Pizza LLC 60 Cal.4th 474, 492 (2014).

2 garnered numerous Oscars and Golden Globe awards.

21 factor in causing the injuries to Plaintiff complained of and as hereinafter alleged.

23 III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2 Weinstein, as well as Negligent Supervision as to The Weinstein Company. Additionally,

7 21. On November 7, Michael F. Rubin purposely availed himself of the venue of

18 California and is therefore subject to general jurisdiction in the State of California.

26 24. Venue is appropriate in California because key elements of RUBIN’s efforts

2 negligent supervision by TWC. Weinstein’s is currently believed to be in Scottsdale, Arizona, bu

3 2) Corroboration of First Assault

10 after the first rape:

7 3) Second assault on December 23, 2010

12 the occurrence of at least the meeting. Almost immediately – according to De La Huerta’s

23 engaged in a stream of self-destructive behavior – much of which is well documented by media

2 Condemnation of His Rapes

16 her part with his advances would harm her career..

22 negatively influence her career.

2 Were Motivated to Try to Undermine Efforts by Victims to Achieve Justice

12 assaults by Weinstein because of confidentiality agreements formed to address other past

17 RUBIN – to engage in actions intended to make TWC aware of his services.

19 B. Events Leading to Defendants’ Liability In the Current Action

25 which had extended over a period of years.

12 establish irrefutable corroboration for key elements of the assaults.

18 warned her not to sign.

27 and identification of witnesses accelerated.

28 46. It should be noted that De La Huerta as an artist generally sustained a relationship

3 evidence development, affidavits, examination of financial and business records, negotiations

6 her to continue to focus on her artistic projects.

17 arrest of Weinstein for criminal rape charges.

19 case, relying on subterfuge, misdirection, and misinformation. In addition he worked to attempt to

3 her police complaint in order to avoid personal ruin.

9 pretense of representing himself to De La Huerta as a victims support attorney. Even if RUBIN

13 50. An attorney representing Weinstein would be expected to contact the NY DA and

15 attorney representing Weinstein would be expected to act to hide his undermining

21 AFTER he had the psychotherapists records in his physical possession.

23 C. Actions Of RUBIN to Attempt to Force a Waiver of De La Huerta’s Patient-

24 Psychotherapist Privilege as to Communications with SueAnne Piliero, PhD

3 irremediable WAIVER of De La Huerta’s Patient-Psychotherapist privilege. The information in

15 caused severe acute distress to De La Huerta in the fall of 2010.