Caravan Travels and Tours International Inc.
vs Abejar In her Complaint, respondent made allegations that
FACTS: On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was
walking along the west-bound lane of Sampaguita Street,
Parañaque City.
A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east-
bound lane, opposite Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle,
the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes. Alex Espinosa
(Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and
loaded her in the back of the van.
Espinosa told the driver of the van, Bautista, to bring
Reyes to the hospital. Instead of doing so, Bautista appeared
to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with
Reyes still in the van. Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified
civilian came to help and drove Reyes to the hospital.
Upon investigation, it was found that the registered
owner of the van was Caravan. Caravan is a corporation
engaged in the business of organizing travels and tours.
Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the van as
its service driver.
Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of
Reyes but despite medical attendance, Reyes died.
Respondent Abejar, Reyes' paternal aunt and the person who
raised her filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Bautista and Caravan. In her Complaint, Abejar
alleged that Bautista was an employee of Caravan and that
Caravan is the registered owner of the van that hit Reyes.
After trial the RTC found that Bautista was grossly
negligent in driving the vehicle. It awarded damages in favor
of Abejar. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision hence the
case at bar.
Petitioner’s Argument: Caravan argues that Abejar has no
personality to bring this suit because she is not a real party in
interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not exercise legal
or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially
appointed guardian of the deceased. She is also not "the
executor or administrator of the estate of the
deceased." According to Caravan, only the victim herself or
her heirs can enforce an action based on culpa aquiliana.
ISSUE: WON Abejar is a real party in interest who may bring
an action for damages against petitioner Caravan
RULING: YES. Having exercised substitute parental authority,
respondent suffered actual loss and is, thus, a real party in
interest in this case.
would sustain her action for damages: that she exercised
substitute parental authority over Reyes; that Reyes' death
was caused by the negligence of petitioner and its driver; and
that Reyes' death caused her damage.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
defines a real party in interest:
Parties in Interest. — A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law
or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
“To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in
whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear
to be the present real owner of the right sought to be
enforced.” Respondent's capacity to file a complaint against
petitioner stems from her having exercised substitute
parental authority over Reyes.
Article 233 of the Family Code provides for the
extent of authority of persons exercising substitute parental
authority, that is, the same as those of actual parents:
Art. 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents.
As Reyes' custodian, respondent exercised the full
extent of the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a
parent. Consistent with Article 220 of the Family Code,
respondent supported Reyes' education and provided for her
personal needs.
First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With
her affinity for Reyes, it stands to reason that when Reyes
died, respondent suffered the same anguish that a natural
parent would have felt upon the loss of one's child. It is for
this injury that respondent seeks to be indemnified.
Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes'
actual parents would have been capacitated to do. Inasmuch
as persons exercising substitute parental authority have the
full range of competencies of a child's actual parents, nothing
prevents persons exercising substitute parental authority
from similarly possessing the right to be indemnified for
their ward's death. (Wa na nako giapil ang issue sa quasi-
delict basta liable ang petitioner)

Resident Marine Mammals vs DOE Secretary Reyes
Facts: 2 ni ka case pero ang petition ra sa Resident
Mammals akong i-focus
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred
to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the petition, are the
toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon
Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo Ramos (Ramos) and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians
and as friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards")
who seek the protection of the aforementioned marine
species.
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a
Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with JAPEX. This
contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the
Tañon Strait. Later, DOE and JAPEX executd another contract
named SC-46 for the exploration, development, and
production of petroleum resources in a block covering
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon
Strait.
JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the
Tañon Strait. JAPEX also committed to drill one exploration
well during the second sub-phase of the project. Since the
well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, where the Tañon Strait was declared a
protected seascape in 1988, JAPEX agreed to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements
On March 6, 2007, the DENR granted an ECC to the
Dept of Energy (DOE) and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas
exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on
November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well.
It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that
petitioners applied to this Court for redress, via two separate
petitions wherein they commonly seek that respondents be
enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners' Allegations: Petitioners Resident Marine
Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after the
seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced
drastically. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the
destruction of the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."
Respondent’s Allegations: It contended, among others, that
petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards have no
legal standing to file the present petition.
Petitioner’s counter-argument: The Resident Marine
Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the
legal standing to file this action since they stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa
v. Factoran, Jr. they also assert their right to sue for the
faithful performance of international and municipal
environmental laws created in their favor and for their
benefit.
In opposition, public respondents argue that the
Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section
1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to
be either natural or juridical persons.
Issue: WON petitioners have standing to file the action.
Ruling: YES. They have legal standing to file the action.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases, which allow for a "citizen suit," and
permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts
for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in
representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce
rights or obligations under environmental laws. Xxx
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in
the Annotations to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, commented: Citizen suit. Xxx This provision liberalizes
standing for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature.
Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before
the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure
"may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure."
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the
Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not
just in representation of the named cetacean species.
The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having
shown in their petition that there may be possible violations
of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal
standing to file this petition.
And the rest was history. Basta VOID ang SC 46 kay
it violates the Constitution, and several statutes.
Board of Optometry v Colet
FACTS:
Respondents were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.;
Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines
(OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA);
Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO);
and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the
Philippines (SMOAP) — each allegedly represented by
its president. (In summary: Acebedo Optical, OPAP,
COA, ACMO, SMOAP)
Respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief and
for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order of RA 8050 - Revised
Optometry Law of 1995 (providing a revised concept of
the practice of optometry which mandates as standard,
the use of DPA's in optometric examination) docketed as
Civil Case No. 95-74770. They pray an order be issued
granting a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining,
restraining, restricting, and forbidding the petitioners,
their agents, officers, and employees from performing or
undertaking any act in implementation or enforcement
of R.A. No. 8050, or any of its provisions, or its Code of
Ethics, during the pendency of the case, until further
orders of the court
Argument of respondent: (Not important in the topic but
may be asked)
 the Revised Optometry Law which is intended to
provide our people with better opportunities and
better facilities for better vision, institutes a
practice which in its actual operation, exposes
persons availing of optometric services to
serious risk of impairment of vision, possible
loss of sight and even possible loss of life,
through administration by optometrists of DPA's.
 Hardest hit in this regard are the
optometrists, whose vested right to continue
in the practice is virtually bludgeoned by the
Revised Optometrist Law, as virtually
admitted by respondents in their Opposition
On the one hand, the revised concept of the
practice of optometry [Sec. 4] mandates as
standard, the use of DPA's in optometric
examination. For this reason, said Law
authorizes virtual suspension of the licenses of
the present crop of optometrists, until after they
shall have re-trained and qualified to use DPA's
[Sec. 31]. In case such optometrists insist on
practicing without the mandatory training, their
practice could be viewed as substandard if they
would avoid use of DPA's [Sec. 4]. Alternatively,
if they use DPA's before they are qualified
through mandatory training, they could incur
criminal liability [Secs. 32 and 33]. In either
case, their use of DPA's without or after
qualifying training, would expose them to
malpractice suits from persons who might have
sustained injury through the use of DPA's.
Again, they might not have the option of
refraining from the use of DPA's, since they
could face an ethics charge for substandard
practice in not using DPA's in their practice.
Trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet, issued
a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
respondents from enforcing or implementing R.A. No.
8050 or its Code of Ethics and eventually on 1
September 1995, respondent Judge Colet issued a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction
Petitioner argued that respondent does not have locus
standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.
per the certifications of the SEC, private respondents
COA and ACMO are not registered associations; and
two of the alleged presidents of the respondent
associations are not duly registered optometrists as
certified to by the PRC. Finally, the petitioners aver, the
private respondents did not allege in their petition in Civil
Case No. 95-74770, and in their Rejoinder to the
Opposition therein, their capacity to bring suit as
required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent, a group of associations, has locus standi to
question the constitutionality of RA 8050.
RULING:
No. For having failed to show that they are juridical
entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and
SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal
personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-
74770.
[RE: Who may be parties] – MAIN TOPIC
Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized
by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an
association is considered a juridical person if the law
grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of
its members. prcd
There is serious doubt as to the existence of private
respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. FOR
ONE, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-
74770 makes no mention of these associations nor
states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed
therein that they are juridical entities. These run
counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that facts
showing the capacity of a
party to sue or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is
made a party must be averred. SECOND,
not even in the sworn statements of the alleged
presidents representing the "associations," which were
offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction, were such "associations"
mentioned or named. FINALLY, in their Comment on
the instant petition, the private respondents chose to
remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of
their "associations."
[Re: Real Parties in interest]
A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court is a party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
In the case at bench, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and
SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they
cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties
in interest. Moreover, since the names of private
respondents Miguel Acebedo, Miriam F. Llave,
and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the registration
books of the Board of Optometry as authorized
optometry practitioners in the Philippines, they do not
have the requisite personal and substantial interest in
the case. Even further, although private respondents
Roberto Rodis, Jr., Cyril Corales, and Elmer Villarosa
claim to be practicing optometrists, the petition in Civil
Case No. 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation to make
them real parties in interest to challenge the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.
[Re: class suit]
As a class suit, Civil Case No. 95-74770 must fail. Not
only did the private respondents fail to allege this in their
petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and
prove the requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject
matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons, and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court.
Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a
class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of
joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty
may arise if the decision secured is favorable to the
plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were
otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by
their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim
denial of due process.
Neither may the private respondents be allowed at this
late stage to seek refuge under the doctrine allowing
taxpayers' suits. While they claimed their petition in Civil
Case No. 95- 74770 was a taxpayers' suit, and although
this Court, in a catena of cases, has shown liberality in
granting locus standi to taxpayers in taxpayers' suits, the
private respondents have not adequately shown that this
liberality must be extended to them. Their plea of injury
or damage is nothing but a sweeping generalization.
Borlasas v Polistico
FACTS:
In the month of April, 1911, the plaintiffs and defendants,
together with several hundred other persons, formed
an association under the name of Turnuhan Polistico &
Co.
Vicente Polistico, the principal defendant herein, was
elected president and treasurer of the association, and
his house in Lilio, Laguna, was made its principal place
of business. The life of the association was fixed at
fifteen years, and under the by-laws each member
obligated himself to pay contribution (50c or P1) to the
effect that a lottery should be conducted weekly among
the members of the association
It is further alleged that by virtue of these weekly lotteries
Vicente Polistico, as president-treasurer of the
association, received sums of money amounting to
P74,000, more or less, in the period stated, which he
still retains in his power or has applied to the purchase of
real property largely in his own name and partly in the
names of others.
This action was then instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna on July 25, 1917, by Victoriano
Borlasa and others against Vicente Polistico and
others, chiefly for the purpose of securing the
dissolution of a voluntary association
named Turnuhan Polistico & Co., and to compel the
defendants to account for and surrender the money
and property of the association in order that is affairs
may be liquidated and its assets applied according to
law.
Defendants argued: lack of parties and set out a list of
some hundreds of persons whom they alleged
should be brought in as parties
CFI: requiring the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
within a stated period so as to include all of the members
of the association either as plaintiff or defendant.
Plaintiff: complied but was not able to include all
members.
CFI: Sustained the demurrer that the amended
complaint on the ground that it showed on its face a lack
of necessary parties
ISSUE:
WON each of the members of the association (hundred plus
of them) should be brought in either plaintiffs or defendants.
RULING:
NO. The situation involved is precisely the one
contemplated in section 118 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, where one or more may sue for the
benefit of all. The addition of some hundreds of persons
to the number of the plaintiffs was unnecessary and as
the presence of so many parties is bound to prove
embarrassing to the litigation from death or removal.
It is evident from the showing made in the complaint,
and from the proceedings in the court below, that it
would be impossible to make all of the persons in
interest parties to the case and to require all of the
members of the association to be joined as parties would
be tantamount to a denial of justice.
The General Rule with reference to the
making of parties in a civil action requires, of
course, the joinder of all necessary parties
wherever possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, the presence of those latter being
a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power.
An EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION is a class suit
where there are numerous persons all in the
same plight and all together constituting a
constituency whose presence in the litigation is
absolutely indispensable to the administration of
justice. Here the strict application of the rule as to
indispensable parties would require that each and
every individual in the class is sufficiently
represented to enable the court to deal properly and
justly with that interest and with all other interests
involved in the suit. IN THE CLASS SUIT, then,
representation of a class interest which will be
affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is
not indispensable to make each member of the class
an actual party.
It is suggested that upon the return of this
record to the lower court for further proceedings, the
plaintiff shall again amended their complaint by
dismissing as to unnecessary parties plaintiffs, but
retaining a sufficient number of responsible persons
to secure liability for costs and fairly to represent all
the members of the association.
There is another feature of the complaint
which makes a slight amendment desirable, which
is, that the complaint should be made to show on its
face that the action is intended to be litigated as a
class suit. We accordingly recommend that the
plaintiffs further amend by adding after the names of
the parties plaintiffs the words, "in their own behalf
and in behalf of other members of Turnuhan
Polistico & Co."
Juana Complex vs. Fil-Estate
Facts: Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc.
(JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions
(collectively as JCHA, et al.), instituted a class suit
representing the regular commuters and motorists of
Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were
deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate, et
al.
JCHA, et al., were regular commuters and motorists
who used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) by passing through La Paz Road; that
they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10)
years; that sometime later, Fil-estate excavated, broke
and deliberately ruined La Paz Road so JCHA, et al.,
would not be able to pass through the said road.
Fil-Estate, et al., filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that
it was improperly filed as a class suit.
Ruling of the RTC and CA
The complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was
shown that the case was of common interest and that
the individuals sought to be represented were so
numerous that it was impractical to include all of them
as parties. Case remanded to RTC.
Issues: WON the complaint has been properly filed as a
class suit
Ruling: Yes.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class
suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of
the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of
them which the court finds to be sufficiently
numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the
benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class
suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons; 2) the
parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing
the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all
commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As
succinctly stated by the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the
closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially
shown to be of common or general interest to many
persons. The records reveal that numerous
individuals have filed manifestations with the lower
court, conveying their intention to join private
respondents in the suit and claiming that they are
similarly situated with private respondents for they
were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in
closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover,
the individuals sought to be represented by private
respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be
named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint.
These individuals claim to be residents of various
barangays in Biñan, Laguna and other barangays in
San Pedro, Laguna.
Cabutihan vs Landcenter
Facts: Respondent corporation decided to engage the
assistance of petitioner Cabutihan, herein called the
FACILITATOR, alongside Forro, Radan and Anave for the
purpose of facilitating and arranging the recovery of the
property (from the squatters), as well as the financing
of such undertakings necessary in connection thereto.
As compensation for the undertaking of the
FACILITATOR, they shall be entitled to
Petitioner Cabutihan: 20% of the total area of the
property recovered.
Forro: 10%
Radan: 4%
Anave: 2.5%
TOTAL: 36.5%
Petitioner accomplished her undertakings under the
subject Agreement. Thus, petitioner demanded
payment from Respondent Corporation but it remained
unheeded. Consequently, an action for specific
performance was filed by petitioner praying that
respondent corporation be ordered to execute the
appropriate document assigning, conveying,
transferring and delivering the particular lots in her
favor.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the Complaint by
reason of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
since Forro, Radan and Anave were not named as
plaintiffs in the complaint. Petitioner was also not
named as representative of Forro, Radan and Anave by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney or other formal
written authority. According to the Rules, where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest
Ruling of the RTC – against petitioner; dismissed the
complaint
The RTC ruled that there was no allegation anywhere in
the records that petitioner had been authorized to
represent Forro, Radan and Anave, who were real
parties-in-interest with respect to their respective
shares of the 36.5 percent claim. Such being the case,
the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of their claims.
Petitioner’s contention – all correct
Petitioner claims that she was duly authorized and
empowered to represent the members of her group
and to prosecute their claims on their behalf via a
Special Power of Attorney executed by Forro, Radan
and Anave. Besides, she argues that the omission of her
companions as plaintiffs did not prevent the RTC from
proceeding with the action, because whatever
judgment would be rendered would be without
prejudice to their rights. In the alternative, she avers
that the trial court may add or drop a party or parties at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.
Issues: WON the omission to include Forro, Radan and
Anave as plaintiffs would divest the RTC of acquiring
jurisdiction over the subject matter and hence warrants
the dismissal of the complaint
Ruling: No.
Again, we side with petitioner. Neither a misjoinder nor
a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of
an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of
the court, on motion of any party or on the court's own
initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC should
have ordered the joinder of such party, and
noncompliance with the said order would have been
ground for dismissal of the action.
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of
the whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading the
companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC
could have separately proceeded with the case as far as
petitioner’s 20 percent share in the claim was
concerned, independent of the other 16.5 percent. This
fact means that her companions are not indispensable
parties without whom no final determination can be
had. At best, they are mere necessary parties who
ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action. The non-
inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the
court from proceeding with the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice
to the rights of such party.
Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete
FACTS: Then incumbent mayor Felipe Antonio Remollo and Agustin
Perdices were among the candidates for mayor in Dumaguete City
during the May 14, 2001 elections. Perdices won over Remollo and
the former was to assume office on June 30, 2001.
After the elections but before Perdices’ assumption, Remollo made
15 promotional appointments and 74 original appointments for
various positions in the city government. Said appointments were
reflected in the June 2001 Report of Personnel Actions of the city,
that was submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office-
Dumaguete.
Soon after Perdices assumed office, during the flag ceremony for city
hall employees, Perdices announced that he was not honoring or
recognizing the appointments made by Remollo. Scared of
termination, Leah Nazareno. Et. Al. filed with RTC of Duma a petition
for mandamus, injunction and damages, with TRO and Preliminary
Injunction, against the City of Duma.
Petitioners averred that the appointments made by Remollo were
valid, as they were issued pursuant to CSC resolution 992411, which
granted Duma City the authority to take final action on its
appointments subject to the terms and conditions enumerated
therein. In view of the government’s act of withholding salary,
petitioners prayed for injunction.
Director Fabio Abucejo of the CSCFO invalidated and revoked the
questioned appointments as they were issued in violation of the
CSCFO guidelines. Respondents then moved for the dismissal of the
injunction on the ground that the ruling of Director attained finality
when the appointing authority failed to move for recon.
RTC denied motion to dismiss. The court agreed that the action of
Director was already final and executory for failure to appeal. As
such, it has become moot and academic but the action for
mandamus and damages filed by petitioners for payment of salaries
should proceed. Petitioners motion for recon was denied.
Petitioners appealed to the CA via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. CA denied the petition and dismissed the same. The court
held that it was Mayor Perdices who had the locus standi to elevate
the matter to the CSC.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have the legal personality to appeal the
invalidation of their appointment (naa lain issue pero not related)
RULING: No. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of
due process, but a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by law. It is necessary that the same
be instituted by the party who is given such authority. At this point,
the concepts of "legal standing" and "real party-in-interest" become
relevant.
The difference between "real party-in-interest" and "legal standing"
has been thoroughly explained by this Court in the cases of Abella,
Jr. v. Civil Service Commission and Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives, in this wise:
Standing is a special concern in constitutional
law because in some cases, suits are brought
 not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official
action taken, but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence, the question in
standing is whether such parties have "alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."
On the other hand, the question as to "real
party-in-interest" is whether he is "the party
who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment," or the "party entitled to the avails
of the suit."
Real party-in-interest, on the other hand, is a concept in civil
procedure and is expressly defined in the Rules of Court as the one
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or one entitled
to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule
means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the rule
refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from
a mere expectancy.
The question on who the real party-in-interest is to challenge the
invalidation of one's appointment has been settled in the case
of Abella, where the Court held that both the "appointing authority"
and the appointee may question the disapproval of an appointment.
The appointing authority stands to be adversely affected when the
CSC disapproves an appointment. The CSC's disapproval of an
appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing
authority's discretion. He must, therefore, have the right to contest
the disapproval.
Petitioners in the instant case, would like this Court to settle who
the "appointing authority" is — is it the former mayor, who made
the questioned appointments, or the incumbent mayor, who at the
time of the invalidation of the appointment was the one holding the
position? The appointing power of the mayor or the local chief
executive is set forth in Republic Act (RA) 7160 or the Local
Government Code. The power to appoint is vested in the office of
the chief executive and not in the person occupying the position.
The local chief executive exercises such power in his official capacity.
Applying it in the present case, the appointing authority who had
the right to assail the invalidation of the appointment is the mayor
occupying the position at the time of the institution of the appeal
and not the former mayor who made the assailed appointment.
Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing
authority is the real party-in-interest to institute an appeal or
motion to reconsider the invalidation of an appointment, there is
nothing to preclude the appointee from taking the same course of
action. Aggrieved parties, including the Civil Service Commission,
should be given the right to file motions for reconsideration or to
appeal. The appointee is also injured by the CSC disapproval,
because he is prevented from assuming the office in a permanent
capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable
judgment is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on
him all the rights and privileges of a permanent appointee.
Clearly, petitioners timely appealed the action of Director Abucejo
to the CSC Regional Office, to the CSC Proper and ultimately to the
CA. In fact, the CSC, in Resolution 040932 (on the appeal made by
petitioners herein) recognized the right of the appointees to assail
the nullification of their appointment. The CSC pronounced that the
appointees themselves may appeal the disapproval of their
appointments as when, at the time of the disapproval of their
appointments, there is already a new appointing
authority. Therefore, at the time of the issuance of the RTC Order
dismissing the petition for injunction, Director Abucejo's action had
not yet become final and executory in view of the timely appeal
made by petitioners. It is thus error for the CA to affirm the finding
of the trial court that petitioners' appeal did not prevent the earlier
decision from attaining finality because of lack of legal personality
on the part of the petitioners to institute the same.
(naa ni discussion about writ of preliminary injunction wa nako apila,
pero overview lang regarding ato, naa pay administrative remedies
ang petitioners so the instant case prior to the invalidation of their
appointment was premature. Also, in another case that they filed
with the CSC and appealed to the CA, they sought for the same relief
ani nga case which is injunction, so 2 na ka case seeking for the same
remedy, proscribed by the rules of court)
Sulpicio Lines v. Napoleon Sesante
Moral damages are meant to enable the injured party to obtain the
means, diversions or amusements in order to alleviate the moral
suffering. Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to
reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by
creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior.
FACTS: September 18 1998, the M/V Princess of the Orient, a
passenger vessel owned by petitioner, sank near Fortune Island in
Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150 were lost. Napoleon
Sesante, then a member of PNP and a lawyer, was one of the
passengers who survived the sinking. He sued petitioner for breach
of contract and damages.
Sesante alleged in his complaint that the boat left the port of Manila
while Manila was experiencing stormy weather causing strong winds
and big waves to rock the boat back and forth, and that eventually it
sunk, but he managed to stay afloat and was washed ashore to
Cavite and Batangas, and that he had been traumatized, and he lost
a lot of his important documents and precious belongings, and that
petitioners had committed bad faith in allowing the vessel to still sail
despite the storm.
In its defense, the petitioner insisted the seaworthiness of the M/V
Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the
Port of Manila by the proper authorities, and that the sinking had
been caused by force majeure and that they had not been negligent
since the crew made preparations to abandon vessel.
RTC favored the respondent, awarding him damages. Dissatisfied,
petitioner appealed to the CA. Pending appeal, Sesante passed
away, and was substituted by his heirs. The CA affirmed the RTC
ruling but lowered the amount of damages and held that despite the
seaworthiness of the boat, they still remained civilly liable for being
negligent.
ISSUE: WON a complaint for breach of contract and damages
survives the death of the plaintiff
(naa 2 other issues, but irrelevant, oblicon shit)
RULING: An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the
death of the plaintiff.
 The petitioner urges that Sesante's complaint for
damages was purely personal and cannot be transferred to his
heirs upon his death. Hence, the complaint should be dismissed
because the death of the plaintiff abates a personal action.
The petitioner's urging is unwarranted.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the
proper procedure in the event of the death of a litigant, viz.:
Section 16. Death of party; duty of
counsel. — Whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address
of his legal representative or
representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
Substitution by the heirs is not a matter of
jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It protects the
right of due process belonging to any party, that in the event of
death the deceased litigant continues to be protected and
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed
legal representative of his estate.
The application of the rule on substitution depends
on whether or not the action survives the death of the litigant.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
following actions that survive the death of a party, namely: (1)
recovery of real or personal property, or an interest from the
estate; (2) enforcement of liens on the estate; and (3) recovery
of damages for an injury to person or property. On the one
hand, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court lists the actions
abated by death as including: (1) claims for funeral expenses
and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments
for money; and (3) all claims for money against the deceased,
arising from contract, express or implied.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended
with public duty, neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees and gives ground for an action for
damages. Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his
personal injury caused by the breach of the contract of
carriage. Pursuant to the aforecited rules, the complaint
survived his death, and could be continued by his heirs
following the rule on substitution
MACASAET, vs. CO (wa gyud issue about action diri)
FACTS: On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer
assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, sued
AbanteTonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its
Publisher Allen A. Macasaet, et al(petitioners), claiming
damages because of an allegedly libelous article that
petitioners published in the June 6, 2000 issue of
AbanteTonite. The suit which in due course issued summons
to be served on each defendant, including AbanteTonite.
RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to
effect the personal service of the summons on the
defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each
defendant in the address were futile because the defendants
were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in
the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at
serving the summons, but he was informed that petitioners
were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his
sheriff's return.
On October 3, 2000, petitioners moved for the dismissal of
the complaint through counsel's special appearance in their
behalf, alleging lack of jurisdiction over their persons because
of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons.
They contended that the sheriff had made no prior attempt
to serve the summons personally on each of them in
accordance with Section 6 and Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court. They further moved to drop AbanteTonite as a
defendant by virtue of its being neither a natural nor a
juridical person that could be impleaded as a party in a civil
action.
RTC in favor of respondent. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether jurisdiction over the persons of the
petitioners were acquired.
RULING: YES, JURISDICTION WAS ACQUIRED.
The significance of the proper service of the summons on the
defendant in an action in personam cannot be
overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and (b) to
afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the
claim brought against him. As to the former, when
jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil action
through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid
waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment
are void. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense.
With the proper service of the summons being intended to
afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim
against him, he may also waive the process. In other words,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of the
summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of
jurisdiction.
Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should
firstly be effected on the defendant himself whenever
practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a
copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the
defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to
him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in
order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental
objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable
time, the service of the summons may then be effected
either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof. The latter mode of service is known as substituted
service because the service of the summons on the
defendant is made through his substitute. Only when the
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable
time may substituted service be resorted to.
There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to
serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at
their office address, the first in the morning of September 18,
2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each
attempt failed because Macasaet and Quijano were "always
out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always
roving outside and gathering news." After Medina learned
from those present in the office address on his second
attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners
going to the office during the business hours of that or any
other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them
in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not
expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal
service by all means and at all times, considering that he was
expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should
he be unable to effect the personal service within a
reasonable time. In that regard, what was a reasonable time
was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are
strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do
not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already
justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the
procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.
In reality, petitioners' insistence on personal service by the
serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had
actually received the summonses served through their
substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several pleadings in
the RTC, including an answer with compulsory
counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad cautelam.
They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery
available under the Rules of Court. Such acts evinced their
voluntary appearance in the action.
SALVADOR vs. LOCSIN (medyo libog mga pre, old
case)
FACTS: This is an action to foreclose a mortgage on a
certain parcel of land in Buenavista, Iloilo. Plaintiffs sold
this land on June 5, 1937, to Enrique Palenzuela and Lina
Camon de Palenzuela for P50,000, of which P18,000 was
paid at the time of the execution of the contract. The
balance of P32,000 was agreed to be paid within 10 years
from the sale, with interest at 8 per cent per annum,
payable yearly in the month of June. A mortgage over the
land and its improvements was constituted to guarantee
the payment of the balance of the purchase price
remaining unpaid. It was further agreed that if the
purchasers should fail to pay the mortgage, they would be
liable to pay P3,000 as judicial expenses. On June 24, 1938,
Enrique Palenzuela and Lina Camon de Palenzuela sold the
land to Guillermo Locsin. Locsin assumed the mortgage to
the plaintiffs, paying the balance to the spouses Palenzuela.
As Guillermo Locsin failed to pay the mortgage, plaintiffs
brought this to collect the total amount of the mortgage,
plus P3,000 attorney's fees.
The original answer of the defendant was a general
denial. On February 15, 1949, he filed an amended answer
alleging that the mortgage is not due and demandable
because of the provisions of section 2 of Republic Act No.
342, the defendant having filed a claim of P69,000 with the
U. S. War Damage Commission. The trial took place on
January 18, 1950, and thereupon the parties filed a
stipulation of facts in which defendant admits (1) the
indebtedness arising out of the contract of mortgage, and
(2) nonpayment of interest from 1941. The plaintiffs, in
turn, admit the filing of a claim by the defendant with the
U. S. War Damage Commission. Upon this stipulation the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered judgment ordering
the defendant to deposit the sums of P32,000 and P3,000,
with interest due, within 90 days from the date on which
the moratorium is lifted, pursuant to Republic Act No. 342.
Against this judgment an appeal was prosecuted to this
Court by the plaintiffs-appellants.
ISSUE: The application of the moratorium law to the
present action.
RULING: It is claimed that an action for the foreclosure of a
mortgage is a real action, which seeks to reach the
property and subject it to the payment of an obligation;
that the recovery of money indebtedness is not involved
therein, and if it is, it is so only coincidentally, and,
therefore, the moratorium law does not apply. We can not
agree with this contention. The situation is not as
appellants contend; it is the opposite. The principal
obligation is the money indebtedness, and the subjection
of the property only resorted to upon failure to pay the
debt. Hence, the money debt is the principal thing; the
foreclosure of the property only the result, or an incident
of the failure to pay the indebtedness.
It is also contended that the defense of moratorium was
waived by the defendant because after presenting it as a
defense, it was subsequently made the basis of a motion
for dismissal. The argument is without merit. A defense
may be pleaded either in an answer or in a motion to
dismiss. (Sec. 5, Rule 8, Rules of Court.)
The most serious contention of appellants is the
unconstitutionality of the moratorium law. We have just
held in Rutter vs. Esteban, that the said law is unreasonable
and oppressive and, therefore, null and void. Following the
ruling and the procedure adopted in said case, we hereby
render judgment ordering the defendant-appellee to pay to
plaintiffs, or deposit with the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, the sum of P32,000, with 8 per cent
interest per annum from the year 1941 to the time of
payment, plus the amount of P3,000 as attorney's fees, and
costs. The deposit shall be made within ninety (90) days
from the date of the service of this judgment, otherwise
the property shall be sold to realize the mortgage debt and
costs.
GOCHAN VS GOCHAN
FACTS: Respondents were owners of shares of stock of the
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan
Realty Development Corporation. They offered to sell their
shares to the petitioners for P200M, which the petitioners
promptly paid.
Respondents then issued a “receipt” acknowledging such
payment, and executed a quitclaim. In turn, respondents,
through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to
execute a "promissory note," undertaking not to divulge the
actual consideration they paid for the shares of stock.
Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the
"promissory note" a phrase that says, "Said amount is in
partial consideration of the sale."
Since partial ra ang consideration nga nabayran, respondents
filed a case in RTC Cebu City for specific performance
contending that in addition to the P200M peso price paid, the
petitioners also allegedly obliged themselves to deliver
certain properties (daghang real properties bai, such as
various lots from Cebu, a fishpond and a building). Moreover,
they paid docket fees worth only P165000 since they
contended that it was an action only for specific
performance.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the complaint is
in the nature of a real action which affects title to real
properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein
the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for
the assessment of the correct docket fees.
The Court of Appeals found that the complaint was one for
specific performance and incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE: Whether the action was for specific performance, or a
real action? And if it was real action, can the respondents still
pay the remaining docket fees?
RULING: It was a real action (not a personal action), and the
respondents cannot anymore pay the remaining docket fees.
(Kumbaga, it’s nothing personal lol. Ka-get mo sa pun?)
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint
in order to resolve the issue of whether or not respondents
paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor.
In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of
an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the
pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or
heading.13 The caption of the complaint below was
denominated as one for "specific performance and damages."
The relief sought, however, is the conveyance or transfer of
real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated
in the provisional memorandum of agreement. Under these
circumstances, the case below was actually a real action,
affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as
one for specific performance but nonetheless prays for the
issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary
objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land
itself and, thus, is deemed a real action.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial
court was in the nature of a real action, although ostensibly
denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently,
the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall be the
assessed value of the property, or the estimated value
thereof as alleged by the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, provides:
“Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. — x x x
(b) xxx xxx xxx
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there
is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.”
AS TO ALLOWING TO PAY THE REMAINING DOCKET FEES
The liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment
of docket fees as applied in the case of Sun Insurance cannot
apply to the instant case as respondents have never
demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to
pay the correct docket fees.
Remember nga the court may allow payment of docket fees
basta di lang beyond prescriptive period and basta naa’y
willingness on the part of the complainant to pay. Instead,
respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed
was one for specific performance and damages and that they
actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of
the filing of the complaint. Therefore, they had no willingness
kuno to pay the right amount of fees.
Hence, the case was remanded to the RTC Cebu City for
preliminary hearing.
FAR EAST BANK VS SPOUSES PLAZA
FACTS: One Charlie Ang obtained from petitioners a loan of
₱2,158,000.00 using as collateral a piece of land owned by
respondent-spouses; hence the mortgage to petitioners. Ang
later obtained more loans from petitioners covered by
promissory notes amounting to ₱4,800,000.00. When Ang
failed to pay the loans upon maturity, petitioners started
proceedings to foreclose the mortgage. Respondent-spouses
offered to pay the mortgage indebtedness of ₱2,158,000.00
but petitioners refused to accept payment unless
respondents assumed the other obligations of Ang with
petitioners.
Respondents filed a civil action against petitioner banks and
Charlie Ang for release of the real estate mortgage and
damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and
issuance of writ of injunction. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for
non-payment of docket fees. Petitioners alleged that the
action to enjoin foreclosure of mortgage was a real action
and there was no showing that the docket fees were paid
based on the assessed or estimated value of the real property
involved.
In the pre-trial stage, respondents sent a formal letter to
petitioners offering to pay the amount of ₱2,158,000.00 and
asking the release of the real estate mortgage. They enclosed
a cashier’s check in the amount of ₱2,158,000.00. Petitioners
accepted the check only as partial payment without prejudice
to the remaining balance of the loans. Respondents now
insist that they have already paid the loans in full and that
petitioners should release the mortgage in view of the
payment. But petitioners still won’t release the mortgage
invokved.
RTC: Ruled in favour of the spouses.
CA: Affirmed and ruled that it is a personal action. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE: Whether the action is real or personal?
RULING: It’s personal.
The action filed by respondent-spouses before the RTC is a
personal action. An action to compel the mortgagee to accept
payment and for the consequent cancellation of a real estate
mortgage is a personal action if the mortgagee has not
foreclosed the mortgage and the mortgagor is in possession
of the premises since neither the mortgagor’s title to nor
possession of the property is in question.2
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, respondents do not
question the validity of the real estate mortgage they entered
into. In fact they uphold its validity since they are willing to
pay their obligation under the contract after which the
contract should then be declared without legal effect. Also,
there is as yet no transfer of title from respondents to
petitioners. Respondents maintain that the title remains in
their name and they are still in actual physical possession of
the property. There is no foreclosure yet of the mortgage.
Hence, there is no title to the land to be affected by the
action.
As to the issue whether the mortgage covers only the 2, 158,
000 or it also covers other loans, the Supreme Court said that
it is still premature to decide on it since it will require
presentation of evidence.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by
the Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED.
LIGAYA S. ORBETA, represented by her Atty.-In-Fact,
RUBEN S. ORBETA, JR., petitioner, vs. RUBEN P.
ORBETA and ANITA B. WOLCOTT, respondents
FACTS:
Ligaya (petitioner) and Ruben (respondent – dili
kanang Jr), are married and are co-owners of a parcel of land
in Pililla, Rizal. Later, the couple became estranged and Ligaya
then left for US. She subsequently learned upon returning that
her husband obtained a loan (P200k) from Anita Wolcott and
used the land as collateral.
Ligaya then filed a complaint for annulment of Deed of
Mortgage with damages saying that she did not consented and
that her signature in the deed was forged coz she was abroad.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming that
Ligaya’s complaint is a real action, hence should have been
filed where the property is located. Likewise, since her
complaint was filed in violation of Art. 222 of CC, earnest
efforts to compromise should have been made before filing
said complaint.
Ligaya opposed claiming that her action is a personal
one, and that Art. 222 does not apply coz Wolcott is not a
family member.
Trial court dismissed the complaint coz venue
was improperly laid.
(Walay discussion about sa decision sa CA; mao rani
facts) Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
WON the action of Ligaya is personal or real. -
PERSONAL
RULING: PERSONAL – SO PROPER VENUE RA
CONTENTION OF LIGAYA:
She maintained that her complaint does not affect title
to or possession of the property but is hinged on respondents’
liability for damages for having made it appear that she
consented and signed the deed.
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS:
Ligayas complaint is a real action, citing Carandang v
CA, coz it affects title to the subject property. Likewise, Ruben
pointed out that as co-owner, he can dispose the part of the
property owned by him.
REPLY OF LIGAYA TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
CARANDANG CASE:
It does not apply because there is yet no foreclosure
of the mortgage in this case. Instead, what applies is
Hernandez v Rural Bank of Lucena, wherein no foreclosure
was made and the property remained in the possession of the
mortgagor. Moreover, Wolcott’s interest is inchoate because
the property has not yet been foreclosed.
REAL ACTION DEFINED:
Under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that
affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest
therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
PERSONAL ACTION WHERE COMMENCED:
May be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff
IN THIS CASE:
SC agrees with Ligaya that the Hernandez case
applies. In that case, no foreclosure was made and the
plaintiffs remained in possession of the lot. It was likewise
ruled that an action for cancellation of a real estate
mortgage is a personal action since it is not expressly
included in the enumeration found in Sec 2 (a), Rule 4 of
the RRC.
In this case, title to the property still remained with
Ligaya and Ruben and they are likewise in possession
because there is no showing of default in the part of Ruben,
hence no foreclosure.
Also, the SC cited Chua v Total Office Products
and Services Inc, wherein a complaint for declaration of nullity
of a loan contract for lack of consideration was also filed by
respondent. It was alleged that the loan and real estate
mortgage were fictitious since it never authorized anybody to
enter into said transactions, and that the complaint remained
a personal action even if it will necessarily affect the
accessory real estate mortgage.
Taking into account that Ligaya’s complaint is similar
with the Chua case, then it should be decided in the same
manner. PERSONAL ACTION.
So, since personal, the proper venue is where Wolcott
resides, Las Pinas City. – in effect PROPER VENUE KAY
RTC LAS PINAS MAN GI FILE NI ANG COMPLAINT.
Bale diba gi dismiss man kay venue improperly laid,
PROPER VENUE ingon ang SC kay Personal action mani, nya
taga Las Pinas man si Wolcott.
PETITION GRANTED.
ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and ANTONIO HERAS, respondents
FACTS:
Asiavest filed a complaint against Heras for the latter
to pay it the amount awarded by the Hong Kong Court
Judgment. Heras filed a motion to dismiss. Before it was
resolved, a fire hit Quezon city, which destroyed the court
trying said motion. Then later, upon Asiavest;s motion, case
was reconstituted. The pending motion to dismiss was later
denied.
Asiavest presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to show the existence and authenticity of the Hong
Kong judgment.
On the other hand, Heras presented two witnesses.
The first witness claimed that no writ of summons or copy of a
statement of claim of Asiabest was shipped in the office of
Heras, nor at his new residence in Quezon City. Her personal
knowledge is based from the fact that she was the personal
secretary of Heras during his shipping business in Hong Kong.
The second witness, Mr. Louisch, an expert of the laws of
Hong Kong, claimed likewise that no writ of summons was
served. No copy of judgment was also served, but
nevertheless is not a legal requirement under Hong Kong
laws. Moreover, he stated that under Hong Kong laws, the
mere fact that an HK court rendered judgment, it can be
presumed that there was service of summons; and that in this
case, there was in fact service by an employee of the Sycip
firm.
Trial court decided in favor of Asiavest since the Hong
Kong judgment was duly proved, and that Heras failed to
discharge his burden of proof that the Hong Kong court did not
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
On appeal by Heras, the CA set aside the trial court’s
decision because the Hong Kong court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the Heras. It opined that since the action of
Asiavest in Hong Kong was an action in personam, the
summons should have been served personally to Heras.
Hence, the petition.
ISSUES:
4 issues ang na mention diri but in essence the issue is, WON
the HK COURT acquired jurisdiction over Heras, and thus
can be enforced in the Philippines.
RULING:
ACTION IN PERSONAM, IN REM, QUASI IN REM DEFINED:
An action in personam is an action against a person
on the basis of his personal liability.
 Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case.
 Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who
does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
o If he cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance
with Section 8 of said Rule.
o If he is temporarily out of the country, any of
the following modes of service may be resorted
to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section
8; (2) personal service outside the country,
with leave of court; (3) service by publication
also with leave of court; or (4) any other
manner the court may deem sufficient
 However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant
is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service
of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person.
o This method of service is possible if such
defendant is physically present in the
country. If he is not found therein, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and
therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
against him.
o An exception was laid down in Gemperle v.
Schenker wherein a non-resident was served
with summons through his wife, who was a
resident of the Philippines and who was his
representative and attorney-in fact in a prior civil
case filed by him; moreover, the second case
was a mere offshoot of the first case.
An action in rem is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the person.
An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual
is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening
the property.
 In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.
o Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the
court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying
the due process requirements.
 Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident who is not
found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action relates to, or
the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines
in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest; (3)
the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from
any interest in the property located in the Philippines; or
(4) the property of the defendant has been attached in
the Philippines
o Service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with
leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave
of court; or (c) any other manner the court
may deem sufficient.
IN THIS CASE:
The SC concluded that Heras was not a resident of
Hong Kong at the time the Hong Kong suit was tried because
his residence was already in New Manila, Quezon City, when
the Hong Kong Court sought to obtain jurisdiction over his
person through the extraterritorial service of summons. Since
he was not a resident of Hong Kong, and that the action was
an in personam action, summons should have been
personally served on him in Hong Kong.
The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was
therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong
court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong
Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect
here in the Philippines for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
Assuming that Heras was indeed a resident of Hong
Kong, at the time the extraterritorial service of summons on
Nov. 1984 was made, he was no longer a resident of Hong
Kong because as declared by her secretary, he left Hong
Kong in Oct. 1984 for good. Again, it is necessary that the
summons should be served personally being an action in
personam.
TAKE NOTE: extraterritorial service of summons vis-à-vis
action in personam is NOT allowed. IT SHOULD BE
PERSONAL. Moreover, since NON-RESIDENT (New Manila,
Quezon City, na iyang new residency) man si Heras at the time
the HK Court was seeking jurisdiction over him, HK court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over him BECAUSE THE
SUMMON MUST BE SERVED WITHIN THE STATE (HONG
KONG).
Paderanga vs Buissan, GR No. 49475
Facts: Petitioner was the lessor in a lease contract entered into with
respondent Elumba who was a managing partner of a business. The
lease involved a building owned by petitioner which was located in
Ozamiz City and the lease was for an indefinite period of time.
Issue came when petitioner subdivided the area leased by respondent
Elumba and constructed a party wall because after such subdivision,
he took possession of one portion of it. Aggrieved, respondent
Elumba filed a case for damages at the same time praying that the
lease be set to a period of 5 years at the RTC of Dipolog City.
Petitioner moved to dismiss contending that the case should have
been filed in Ozamiz city since the property was located there but
respondent judge Buissan denied such motion saying that the suit
merely involved the enforcement of a contract and as such it is an
action in personam and not in rem, hence venue was proper.
Issue: WON or not respondent judge was correct in saying that venue
was proper.
Held: No, respondent judge was wrong, hence the case should have
been filed in Ozamiz City where the property was located.
Private respondent appears to be confused over the difference
between personal and real actions vis-a-vis actions in personam and
in rem. The former determines venue; the latter, the binding
effect of a decision the court may render over a party, whether
impleaded or not.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the action instituted by
private respondent against petitioner affects the parties alone, not the
whole world. Hence, it is an action in personam, i.e., any
judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded. However, this does not automatically mean that the
action for damages and to fix the period of the lease contract is also a
personal action. For, a personal action may not necessarily be an
action in personam and a real action may not at the same time be an
action in rem.
In Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., we held thus —
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of
personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the
recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in section
2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to
real property or for the recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on, real property.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the
basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an
action against the thing itself, instead of against the person.
Hence, a real action may at the same time be an action in
personam and not necessarily an action in rem.
Consequently, the distinction between an action in personam and
an action in rem for purposes of determining venue is irrelevant.
Instead, it is imperative to find out if the action filed is a personal
action or a real action. After all, personal actions may be instituted
in the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where
the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. On the other hand, real actions should be brought before
the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the territory in
which the subject property or part thereof lies.
The Dial Corporation vs Soriano, GR No. 82330
Facts: Petitioners are foreign corporations organized and existing
under the laws of United States, United Kingdom, and Malaysia and
who are not domiciled in the Philippines while respondent was a
domestic corporation who entered into contracts for the delivery of
coconut oil to the petitioners. A stipulation in the contract contained
that any dispute will be settled through arbitration under the rules of
either the Federation of Oils Seeds and Fats Association (FOSFA) or
the National Institute of Oil Seed Products (NIOP).
Issue came when the board of directors of respondent repudiated the
contracts entered into with petitioners saying that they were mere
“paper trading in futures” upon which no actual delivery has been
made. Further, they contend that the contracts entered into were
illegal, having been entered into without authority from its former
president. With this, petitioners initiated arbitration proceedings
abroad while respondent sued for injunction and damages in RTC
Manila.
The RTC Manila judge then issued extra-territorial summons to
petitioners and upon receipt of summons, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss contending that the court has no jurisdiction over them
because the extra-territorial summons were improper. The judge
denied such motion to dismiss saying that the present action relates to
property rights which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which
defendants claim liens or interests, actual or inchoate, legal or
equitable and that since they were doing business in the Philippines
they opened themselves to foreign courts.
Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction.
Held: No, the court did not acquire jurisdiction as the extra-territorial
service was improper.
Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court only in four (4) instances is
extraterritorial service of summons proper, namely: "(1) when the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action
relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines,
in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non
resident's property has been attached within the Philippines" (De
Midgely vs. Ferandos, 64 SCRA 23).
The complaint in this case does not involve the personal status of
the plaintiff, nor any property in the Philippines in which the
defendants have or claim an interest, or which the plaintiff has
attached. The action is purely an action for injunction to restrain the
defendants from enforcing against IVO ("abusing and harassing") its
contracts for the delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to
recover from the defendants P21 million in damages for such
"harassment." It is clearly a personal action as well as an action in
personam, not an action in rem or quasi in rem. "An action in
personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself,
instead of against the person." (Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena,
Inc., 76 SCRA 85). A personal action is one brought for the recovery
of personal property, for the enforcement of some contract or
recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages
for the commission of an injury to the person or property (Hernandez
vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 71 SCRA 292).
As Civil Case No. 87-40166 is a personal action, personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendants, not extraterritorial
service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. The rule is
explained in Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court thus:
"As a general rule, when the defendant is not residing and
is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot
try any case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court. But, when the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines, or is
intended to seize or dispose of any property, real or
personal, of the defendant located in the Philippines, it may
be validly tried by the Philippines courts, for then, they
have jurisdiction over the res, i.e., the personal status of the
plaintiff or the property of the defendant and their
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is
not essential. Venue in such cases may be laid in the
province where the property of the defendant or a part
thereof involved in the litigation is located." (5 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd Ed., p. 105.)
In an action for injunction, extraterritorial service of summons and
complaint upon the non-resident defendants cannot subject them to
the processes of the regional trial courts which are powerless to reach
them outside the region over which they exercise their authority (Sec.
3-a, Interim Rules of Court; Sec. 21,subpar. 1, B.P. Blg. 129).
Extraterritorial service of summons will not confer on the court
jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders.
Neither may the court by extraterritorial service of summons
acquire jurisdiction to render and enforce a money judgment
against a nonresident defendant who has no property in the
Philippines for "the fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in
personam over non-residents, so as to sustain a money judgment,
must be based upon personal service within the state which
renders the judgment" (Boudard vs. Tait, 67 Phil. 170, 174).
The respondent court's finding that, by filing motions to dismiss, the
petitioners hypothetically admitted the allegations of the complaint
that they are doing business in the Philippines without any license,
and that they may be served with summons and other court processes
through their agents or representatives enumerated in paragraph 2 of
the complaint, is contradicted by its order authorizing IVO to
summon them by extraterritorial service, a mode of service which is
resorted to when the defendant is not found in the Philippines, does
not transact business here, and has no resident agent on whom the
summons may be served.
*(There must be personal service here and not extraterritorial
service of summons because the action is a personal action and at
the same time an action in personam. Had the action been a real
action and an action in rem, then extraterritorial service would
have been correct to confer jurisdiction upon petiioners.)
Alba v. Court of Appeals
Facts: Respondent filed a petition for cancellation of entry in the
birth certificate of the petitioner and the ff: 1. Petitioner’s surname,
2. Reference to respondent as petitioner’s father, and 3. Alleged
marriage contracted by the respondent with the petitioner’s
mother. Subsequently respondent amended his petition to include
petitioner’s mother and any other persons who have claim or any
interest with the petition.
Trial court then set the schedule of hearing and directed publication
of such order and service to the address of petitioner’s mother
reflected in the petitioner’s birth certificate. Then trial then after
issued another order rescheduling the hearing with the same order
of service to the petitioner’s mother and publication. The said order
was published in Today, a newspaper of general circulation. On the
date of the hearing, petitioner’s mother did not appear.
Subsequently, the petition was granted and became final and
executory.
Subsequently, petitioner’s mother learned of the judgment thus she
filed for a petition for annulment of judgment contending that the
court that promulgated the decision did not acquire jurisdiction
when the said order was not received by her.
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling: In determining whether or not the court acquired
jurisdiction, the nature of the action must be determined first. An
action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of
the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation. Hence, petitions
directed against the thing itself or the res, which concerns the status
of a persons, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or
correction of entries in the birth certificates, as in the instant case,
are actions in rem.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res.
Jurisdiction over the resis acquired either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and
made effective.
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for
cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial
corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry
records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be
effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court.
Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, which binds the whole world to the judgment
that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication
the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which
is property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a
lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded
in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when the defendant non-residents property has been attached
within the Philippines
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a)
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b)
publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient. Such only applies in actions in rem.
However, where the action is in personam, one brought against a
person on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. When the defendant is a non-resident, personal
service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person.
This cannot be done, however, if the defendant is not physically
present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and
decide the case against him.
At first it may be deemed to be an action in rem since it appeared
that respondent sought to exclude petitioner’s claim over the
property however, it was shown by evidence that the relief that
respondent wanted was for payment of damages against petitioner
for being a nuisance defendant (bogo sya kay sya ray gaimplead nila
nya sya rapuy niingon nga nuisance sila) and thus the relief sought
went beyond the res of the action. Therefore the action is in
personam thus publication of the court did not give it jurisdiction.

Brasil V. Court of Appeals

Facts: A vessel owned by a Panamanian Corporation had an engine
problem and requested that its ship’s cargo be unload and stored in
Phil. Ports Authority in San Fernando, La Union. The ship was
subjected to seizure proceedings and while it was going on, the
place where the ship was located was hit by three typhoons thereby
causing damage and subsequent abandonment. Respondent agreed
to repair the vessel at the agreed amount 1 million dollars with the
ship’s representative. However, the ship was subsequently declared
to sold and forfeited in favor of the government. This prompted
respondent to file a case to enforce its preferred salvor’s lien.
Respondent impleaded different parties including petitioner herein
and upon its motion, summons by publication against defendants
including petitioner who was not a resident and had no direct
representative in the Philippines. The defendants including the
petitioner was declared in default and an order to pay damages
against petitioner was made. This prompted petitioner to file a case
to annul the judgment on the ground that the decision was void for
being rendered without having acquired jurisdiction over the
petitioner. Petitioner avers that the action filed against it is an
action for damages, as such it is an action in personam which
requires personal service of summons be made upon it for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over it. However, inasmuch as petitioner
Banco do Brasil is a non-resident foreign corporation, not engaged in
business in the Philippines, unless it has property located in the
Philippines which may be attached to convert the action into an
action in rem, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over it in respect
of an action in personam.
Issue: WON the court acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling: When the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in
the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, Section 17. Under this provision, there are
only four (4) instances when extraterritorial service of summons is
proper, namely: "(1) when the action affects the personal status of