SAN LUIS VS ROJAS

DOCTRINE: Depositions; The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories,
at the instance of any party.—The rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that private respondent is a non-
resident foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case. The evident purpose is to
enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent the
said trials from being carried out in the dark. San Luis vs. Rojas, 547 SCRA 345, G.R. No. 159127 March 3, 2008

- Berdex Intl. (PR)- filed with RTC a complaint for a sum of money against Pet
- Alleging that a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of US with principal office in San Francisco Cali
- Is maintaining an action only to enforce its right by virtue of an isolated transaction with the pet
- That pet received from it certain amounts of money which were meant
o partly as advances or loan and
o partly for the purchase of 40% shares in both Seanet and Seabest Corporations,
o however, not a single share in those corporations was transferred to private respondent by petitioner and the shares were retained by the latter;
o the parties then agreed to treat all the payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner as the latter's loan;
- petitioner proposed the payment of the loan within a period of 3 years, which proposal was accepted by private respondent with the agreement that in
case of non-payment of any installment on their due dates, the entire amount shall become due and demandable;
- petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of loan; petitioner confirmed such loan to private respondent's auditors on August 8, 2000; and he had
only paid US$20,000.00 and no further payment was made despite repeated demands. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the
amount of US$150,335.75 plus interest until fully paid and attorney's fees.

Pretrial conference terminated and the case was subsequently set for trial.

- PR filed a motion to authorize deposition-taking thru written interrogatories

- alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3, 2002; that
o however, all of its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA;
o that one of the witnesses is already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous;
o and there is a perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2002; 6
o that written interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such mode of deposition-taking will save
precious judicial and government time and will prevent needless delays in the case.
- This was opposed by PR on the ground that:
o Taking the deposition through written interrogatories would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor
of witnesses.
o The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who are all Americans is frivolous, since respondent has not
presented evidence that the US government has prohibited its citizens from traveling to the Philippines; and if ever there was such prohibition,
it was not binding on our own legal system. Old age was not a valid reason.
o
- RTC granted PR’s Motion to take deposition thru writted interrogatories
- Pet’s MR was denied
- Pet filed certiorari with the CA, denied. Ruled in favour of PR

ISSUE1: whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of having all its witnesses, all of whom are
foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract

Held: yes

Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, which substantially reproduced Section 1, Rule 24 of the old Rules, provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property
which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be
taken, at the instance of any party, by depositions upon oral examination or written interrogatories.

Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition. The fact that private respondent is a non-resident foreign
corporation is immaterial.

- The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of
any party.
- Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case.
- The evident purpose is to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
civil trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark. 22
- In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes23, where we upheld the right of plaintiff during the trial stage of the case to present its evidence by deposition of its
witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction in lieu of their oral examination in court, we said:
- Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person
which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by
adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the
material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses. In fine, the
object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof,
to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely
laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
- Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore
generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for oral
examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules of evidence. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
- "SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under
oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally."
- Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court,
may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay: the p+arty against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at
the time that his testimony is offered. It matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of the deposition; for normally,
the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial
or hearing.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes. These exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 2424 of the Rules of Court.

SEC 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the
rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with
any of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness;

(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation,
partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the
witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty 25 (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears
that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice,
that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of
witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;

(d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the party introduced, and
any party may introduce any other parts.

The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent
with another rule of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to
cross-examine him."

- It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the
Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the
deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
- Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer, whether the
deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the
process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . (stating) the time and place for taking
the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to
identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs . . . "(Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to
"enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose
conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action
and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith
or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24). 26 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's MOTION (To Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written
Interrogatories) considering private respondent's allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the
exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.

- While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even when permitted to be undertaken without leave and without judicial intervention, 27 such
limitations inevitably arise when it can be shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith; 28 or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the person subject to the inquiry; 29 or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. 30

It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment 31 and should not be unduly restricted if the matters
inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal
discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated. 32 In fact, we find nothing in the rules on deposition that
limits their use in case of oral contract as alleged by petitioner.

In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time. The admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.33

- We also find no merit in petitioner's claim that his right to cross-examine private respondent's witnesses will be curtailed since petitioner is fully accorded
the opportunity for cross-examination under Section 25, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 25. Depositions upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. - A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon
written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and the
name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so served may serve
cross interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) days thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a
party who has served cross interrogatories. Within three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve re-cross
interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition.

Thus, petitioner may submit cross-interrogatories upon private respondent with sufficient fullness and freedom.

PEOPLE VS GO
DOCTRINE: SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in
open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
opportunity o f cross-examination.

FACTS: Accused-appellants Donel Go and Val de los Reyes were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco, Albay with two
and three counts of rape, respectively, all committed against Imelda Brutas. Of the two, only accused-appellant Go was initially apprehended; de
los Reyes remained at large.

Arraigned on May 3, 1995, accused-appellant Go pleaded not guilty to the charges. Before the prosecution could finish presenting
evidence, he jumped bail and was tried in absentia.

The evidence for the prosecution consists of the testimonies of its five witnesses, namely: private complainant Imelda Brutas, her mother
Adela, sister Clara, Dr. Marissa Saguinsin of the Rural Helath Unit in Tabaco, Albay, and SPO4 Rosalino Bonavente; Imeldas panty [1] and
watch[2] which she was wearing when the rape allegedly occurred; the certification [3] about the entry in the police blotter of Imeldas complaint;
the medical certificates issued by Dr. Estela Zenit of the Ziga Memorial District Hospital [4] and Dr. Marissa Saguinsin of the Rural Health Unit
in Tabaco, Albay;[5] the affidavit executed by Marivic after the alleged incident; [6] the photographs of accused-appellants Go and de los Reyes;
[7]
and the Referral Form of the ABS-CBN program Hoy Gising. [8]

For the defense, the testimonies of five witnesses were offered.

In its Decision of June 25, 1997, Branch 16 of the RTC of Tabaco, Albay found accused-appellant Go guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty for each count. An alias warrant of arrest against accused-appellant de los
Reyes was issued and the cases against him were archived.

Hence, the automatic review of the cases against accused-appellant Go, docketed herein as G.R. Nos. 130714 and 139634.

Accused-appellant de los Reyes was later apprehended, hence, Branch 16 of the Tabaco, Albay RTC ordered the revival of the cases
against him. On December 3, 1997, the cases were transferred to Branch 15 of the same court, it having been designated by this Court as a
heinous crimes court. At his arraignment on January 8, 1998, he pleaded not guilty to all three charges of rape. Trial ensued thereafter.

Except for SPO4 Bonavente, the same prosecution witnesses who testified at the trial of accused-appellant Go were availed of at the trial
of accused-appellant de los Reyes.

When Adela Brutas, Imeldas mother, was called to the witness stand, the private prosecutor started rereading the questions and answers
as recorded in the transcript of her testimony at the trial of accused-appellant Go. Before he could go over the entire transcript, however,
the defense counsel objected. The private prosecutor thereupon asked Adela, as the following transcript of the proceedings,
quoted verbatim, shows, if she affirmed all her answers appearing in the transcript of stenographic notes taken during her testimony at the
trial of accused-appellant Go:

[Private prosecutor Atty. Sarte]

Q Are you the same Adela Brutas who on January 10, 1996 testified at RTC Branch [16] in the Criminal Case of People vs. Donel Go
and Val de Los Reyes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you remember that you were asked a question by this representation you stated that your name is Adela Brutas the victim,
what is your relation to the victim Imelda Brutas in these cases and your answered she is my daughter do you affirm same
answer profounded by you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then again the question is: In whose house? and you answered, In our house, sir.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Likewise you were asked the question: Where is your daughter living in December 1994? and you answered, In Tayhi, Tabaco,
Albay. do you affirm that that was your answer when youre asked that question?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In like manner on December 22, at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of 1994 do you remember of any unusual incident that
happened to your daughter and you answered I know it.
[Defense counsel]
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Objection your Honor, I object your Honor to the question it is not stated your Honor to the purpose for which this witness will
testify as either narrated in order to prove morale damages; that the witness is looking for her daughter and her daughter
was allegedly sent to an errand to deliver pictures.
JUDGE SARTE:
Your Honor my question is not yet finished your Honor, because I am referring to the sending by her sister
COURT:
Conditional.
xxx
JUDGE SARTE:
Then you answered: I heared that Imelda was sent for an errand by your sister Clara, I heard Clara telling Imelda to bring pictures
to a house in front of a demolished house. Is that your answer to the question that was confronted to you?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Your Honor I object to the way it was being profounded, it would not be in a manner be the form direct testimony because the
witness direct questions pertaining to the alleged declaration relative to the purpose for which she is being offered to testify,
but not to affirm an earlier declaration your Honor.
COURT:
What is your purpose Judge?
JUDGE SARTE:
The purpose that we present the same testimony as we presented in the case of People versus Donel Go and Val de los Reyes,
because would supposedly jointly to be tried in Branch 16, but for reason that the other accused was no where to be
 found Branch 16 proceeded only with the trial of Donel Go excluding Val de los Reyes so, we have the same testimony we have
the same evidence to be submitted.
ATTY. LEVI RAMIREZ:
Well your Honor the manner of this witness being presented is that there is a question and the counsel is already stating the
answer.
JUDGE SARTE:
That is why I am asking her whether she affirm that because that is her answer in Branch 16.
COURT:
To obviate objection Panero why dont you just proceed directly with your direct-examination?
JUDGE SARTE:
But your Honor there would be a variation in the answer which we do not want to happen here, because she cannot remember all her
answer that she gave in Branch 16.
COURT:
That will be the risk of the prosecution Paero.
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Because your Honor there is a question profounded and at the same time counsel is answering already.
JUDGE SARTE:
I am not answering it it is in the transcript.
COURT:
Anyway that particular piece of evidence was offered here, you can offer it here subject to cross-examinations. Anyway that is the
direct testimony of this witness.
xxx
All right you proceed with the direct testimony of this case.
JUDGE SARTE:
Yes, your Honor.
Q. All right, do you affirm all your answers you told, you made by this representation on January 10, 1996?
COURT:
Cross?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
No cross your Honor.
COURT:
Whatever testimonies he testified to other than that? So you are waiving the cross-examination Paero?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
As far as their documents are concerned, the identification of the contents yes, the refusal of admission to that.
COURT:
You will refuse admission when it is presented in evidence?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Yes, your Honor, because so far a mere declaration is limited to fact that she was a witness of a case before RTC, Branch 16, on
that aspect we have no cross.
COURT:
So discharge the witness.[9] (Underscoring supplied.)
When called to the witness stand, Imelda, after relating on direct examination the events immediately preceding the alleged rapes, the
following transpired, also quoted verbatim:
Q. Now do you remember whether on June 21, 1995 in Branch 16 you testified regarding this matter?
A. Yes, sir.
JUDGE SARTE:
Now your Honor please for purpose of evidence we would request that this transcript be marked as Exhibit F dated June 21, 1995.
COURT:
Mark it.
JUDGE SARTE:
And also pages 4-37 be consecutively marked as Exhibit F-1 etc.
Q. Now in said transcript you were asked a question -- Because of that heavy rain what did you do. And you made an answer,
According to Donel Go I should take shelter in his house.
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Objection your Honor.
JUDGE SARTE:
No question yet.
COURT:
Let him finish.
JUDGE SARTE: (continuing)
Q. Is this the question and your answer when you testified in Branch 16?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Well, your Honor I would object because the question would be very leading the question profounded was already made by the
counsel.
JUDGE SARTE:
Well that is on record, whether he said that?
COURT:
Lay the basis first Judge.
JUDGE SARTE:
Now you declared that there was something that happened, because of that what did you do and you said you take shelter in his
house, do you confirm that that is the answer you gave?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
I will object because that would be improper for direct testimony.
COURT:
Well that is in the transcript.
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
 No your Honor, because the question and answer being conferred with the witness would be improper for direct testimony because
there is already that answer.
COURT:
Anyway Judge that transcript has already been marked, it is not necessary for you to take the individual questions asked and that
has been adopted and marked already.
JUDGE SARTE:
Now in view of that your Honor, we are adopting all the direct-examinations all the answers of the witness appearing on the
transcript which was taken from Branch 16, dated June 21, 1995 this already marked Exhibit F.
xxx

That is all your honor.[10] (Underscoring supplied.)

At the succeeding hearing, defense counsel cross-examined Imelda but only on matters preceding and following the alleged rapes.[11]

The prosecution employed the same procedure when it presented Imeldas sister Clara, [12] and Dr. Marissa Saguinsin, Medical Officer of
the Rural Health Unit in Tabaco, Albay.[13]

Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered its evidence including the panty (Exhibit A) and the wristwatch (Exhibit B) worn by Imelda
when the alleged rapes occurred; the Certification of Entry in the Police Blotter of the Tabaco Police Department (Exhibit C); the Medico-Legal
Certificate issued by the Dr. Saguinsin (Exhibit E); the Referral Form of the ABS-CBN program (Exhibit H) to prove, among other things, the
extent to which Clara Brutas went through in order to seek justice for the cause of her younger sister; and the decision of the Tabaco, Albay
RTC, Branch 16, (Exhibit I) to show that Donel Go was convicted by said court.

Also offered in evidence were the transcripts of the testimonies of Adela (Exhibit D), Dr. Saguinsin (Exhibit E-2-A to E-2-I), Imelda
(Exhibit F) to prove that she was raped by accused-appellant Val de los Reyes, and Clara (Exhibit G) to corroborate Imeldas testimony taken at
the trial of accused-appellant Go were also in evidence.

The defense objected to the admission of, among others, Exhibits A, B, D and F, they having never [been] identified and presented in
court, it adding that the court cannot take judicial notice thereof as accused [de los Reyes] was never a party to the trial of accused-appellant
Go. The objection of the defense notwithstanding, the trial court admitted all the exhibits offered by the prosecution.

After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented three witnesses. And it presented a letter[14] to accused-appellant de los
Reyes allegedly written by Imelda who returned to the witness stand to rebut the defense evidence.

In its Decision of February 22, 1999, the Tabaco, Albay RTC, Branch 15 found accused-appellant de los Reyes guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua in each.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, accused-appellant de los Reyes appealed to this Court. His appeal, G. R. Nos. 139331
and 140845-46, and that of accused-appellant Go, G. R. Nos. 130714 and 139634, were consolidated.

Accused-appellant de los Reyes assigns to the trial court the following errors:

1. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING A SUMMARY PROCEEDING INSTEAD OF A FULL DRESS
TRIAL.

2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

3. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS. [15]

As for accused-appellant Go, he assigns these errors:

I THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INDING THAT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT DONEL GO HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

In view of the discussion which follows, this Court shall first pass on accused-appellant de los Reyes appeal.

Accused-appellant de los Reyes questions the regularity of the procedure adopted by the trial court by allowing prosecution witnesses
Adela, Clara, Imelda, and Dr. Saguinsin to merely affirm on direct examination their previous testimonies taken during the trial of accused-
appellant Go. Such proceeding, he contends, violated his right to confront and cross-examine said witnesses.

In People v. Estenzo,[16] after the therein accused had testified, the defense counsel manifested that for the subsequent witnesses, he
was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters therein and on all matters pertinent and material
thereto. The trial court acceded to the manifestation over the objection of one of the private prosecutors.

This Court held that such procedure violated Sections 1 [17] and 2,[18] Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 [19] of the then Revised Rules of Court,
which required that the testimonies of witnesses be given orally. Those provisions are substantially reproduced in the Revised Rules of Court as
follows:

SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open
court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of
answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.

SEC. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial or hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his
answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties, counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be
recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court.

A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall
be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.(Rule 131.)
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number. (Rule 133, underscoring
supplied.)

The Court, still in Estenzo, elaborated:

The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
opportunity o f cross-examination. The opponent, according to an eminent authority, demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing
upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination which cannot be had except by the direct and
personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. There is also the advantage to be obtained by the personal appearance of the
witness before the judge, and it is thisit enables the judge as the trier of facts to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness
deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the
weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory,
and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness
testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his
having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. x x x.

Thus, Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside
from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the witness manner of testifying which can only be done if the witness gives his
testimony orally in open court. If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and
his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply
reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and
utterances of the witness.

There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony of the witness be given orally in court. Rules governing
the examination of witness are intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Under
the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to
prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness may testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
knowledge. Thus, on direct examination, leading questions are not allowed, except on preliminary matters, or when there is difficulty in getting
direct and intelligible answer from the witness who is ignorant, a child of tender years, or feebleminded, or a deaf-mute. It is obvious that such
purpose may be subverted, and the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted, if trial judges are allowed, as in the case at bar, to
adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

The ruling in Estenzo was reiterated in Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan[20] where, at the close of her direct examination, a witness was asked to
confirm the truth of the contents of her sworn statement. This Court held that the witness should have been examined directly on the
statements in her affidavit. The same rule applies in the present cases against accused-appellant de los Reyes where the prosecution witnesses
were merely asked to confirm their testimonies given at the trial of another in which he took no part.

The apprehensions of the prosecution that the lapse of time may have compromised the memory of the witnesses are understandable. But
following this line of thought, would not the witnesses have just the same gone over the transcripts of their testimonies during the trial of
accused-appellant Go to refresh them to thereby enable them to answer the questions of accused-appellant de los Reyes counsel on cross-
examination?

In any event, lapse of time is a matter that the trial court would consider in weighing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies; it
does not justify the abbreviated procedure adopted by the trial court, especially considering that the case against accused-appellant Go was
tried before another branch of the RTC.

As irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused were committed during the trial, the accused is entitled to a new
trial.[21] All the proceedings and evidence affected by such irregularities must thus be set aside and taken anew. [22]

Accordingly, the Court, with respect to the cases against accused-appellant de los Reyes, sets aside Exhibits D, E-2, E-2-I, F and G, the
transcripts of the testimonies of witnesses Adela, Dr. Saguinsin, Imelda, and Clara Brutas, respectively, in the trial of accused-appellant Go.

Exhibits A (the panty), B (the wrist watch), C (the Certification of entry in the Police Blotter), and H (the Referral Form of the ABS-CBN
program), none of which were identified by any of the witnesses during the trial of accused-appellant de los Reyes, are likewise set aside for
lack of basis.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to VACATE the judgment of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay in Criminal Case
Nos. T-2639-41, People v. Val de los Reyes, and to SET ASIDE Exhibits A, B, C, D, E-2, E-2-A to E-2-I, F, G and H. Said criminal cases
are REMANDED to Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay for the immediate rehearing of the testimonies of witnesses Adela
Brutas, Imelda Brutas, Clara Brutas and Dr. Marissa Saguinsin, in accordance with this Courts above disquisition. The trial court is further
directed to conduct said proceedings and render a decision thereon within 90 days from receipt of this Resolution. Following Section 6 (a), Rule
121 of the Revised Rules of Court, the trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

Pending these rehearing proceedings in the trial court, the automatic review of the cases against Donel Go in G. R. Nos. 130714 and
139634 is held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Be

SANTAMARIA VS CLEARY

FACTS: This case stems from a motion for court authorization to take deposition in Los Angeles by respondent Thomas Cleary, an American
citizen and Los Angeles resident who filed a civil suit against petitioners Ingrid Sala Santamaria, Astrid Sala Boza, and Kathryn Go-Perez
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

We resolve whether a foreigner plaintiff residing abroad who chose to file a civil suit in the Philippines is allowed to take deposition abroad for
his direct testimony on the ground that he is "out of the Philippines" pursuant to Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court.

These two separate Petitions[1] assail the Court of Appeals' (1) August 10, 2010 Decision [2] that granted Thomas Cleary's (Cleary) Petition for
Certiorari and reversed the trial court's Orders [3] denying Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition [4] before the Consulate-
General of the Philippines in Los Angeles; and (2) May 11, 2011 Resolution [5]that denied reconsideration.

On January 10, 2002, Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint [6] for specific performance and damages
against Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Ingrid Sala Santamaria (Santamaria), Astrid Sala Boza (Boza), and Kathyrn Go-
Perez (Go-Perez) before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

The Complaint involved shares of stock of Miranila Land Development Corporation, for which Cleary paid US$191,250.00. [7] Cleary sued in
accordance with the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement he entered into with Miranila Land Development Corporation, Manuel S. Go, Santamaria,
Boza, and Go-Perez. Paragraph 9.02 of the Agreement provides:

Any suit, action or proceeding with respect to this Agreement may be brought in (a) the courts of the State of California, (b) the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, or (c) the courts of the country of Corporation's incorporation, as Cleary may elect in his
sole discretion, and the Parties hereby submit to any such suit, action proceeding or judgment and waives any other preferential jurisdiction by
reason of domicile.[8]
Cleary elected to file the case in Cebu.

Santamaria, Boza, and Go-Perez filed their respective Answers with Compulsory Counterclaims. [9] The trial court then issued a notice of pre-
trial conference dated July 4, 2007.[10]

In his pre-trial brief, Cleary stipulated that he would testify "in support of the allegations of his complaint, either on the witness stand or by
oral deposition."[11] Moreover, he expressed his intent in availing himself "of the modes of discovery under the rules." [12]

On January 22, 2009, Cleary moved for court authorization to take deposition. [13] He prayed that his deposition be taken before the Consulate-
General of the Philippines in Los Angeles and be used as his direct testimony. [14]

Santamaria and Boza opposed[15] the Motion and argued that the right to take deposition is not absolute. [16] They claimed that Cleary chose the
Philippine system to file his suit, and yet he deprived the court and the parties the opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound
questions on him.[17]

Go-Perez filed a separate Opposition, [18] arguing that the oral deposition was not intended for discovery purposes if Cleary deposed himself as
plaintiff.[19] Since he elected to file suit in the Philippines, he should submit himself to the procedures and testify before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu.[20] Moreover, Go-Perez argued that oral deposition in the United States would prejudice, vex, and oppress her and her co-
petitioners who would need to incur costs to attend. [21]

The trial court denied Cleary's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition in the Order [22] dated June 5, 2009. It held that depositions
are not meant to be a substitute for actual testimony in open court. As a rule, a deponent must be presented for oral examination at trial as
required under Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. "As the supposed deponent is the plaintiff himself who is not suffering from any
impairment, physical or otherwise, it would be best for him to appear in court and testify under oath[.]" [23] The trial court also denied
reconsideration.[24]

Cleary elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

On August 10, 2010, the Court of Appeals granted Cleary's Petition for Certiorari and reversed the trial court's ruling. [25] It held that Rule 23,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions, and that it is immaterial that Cleary is the plaintiff himself. [26] It likewise
denied reconsideration.[27]

Hence, the present Petitions were filed.

Petitioners Ingrid Sala Santamaria and Astrid Sala Boza maintain in their appeal that the right of a party to take the deposition of a witness is
not absolute.[28] Rather, this right is subject to the restrictions provided by Rule 23, Section 16 [29] of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
[30]
They cite Northwest Airlines v. Cruz,[31] in that absent any compelling or valid reason, the witness must personally testify in open court
according to the general rules on examination of witnesses under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. [32]

Likewise, petitioners Santamaria and Boza submit that Cleary cannot, for his sole convenience, substitute his open-court testimony by having his
deposition taken in the United States.[33] This will be very costly, time-consuming, disadvantageous, and extremely unfair to petitioners and
their counsels who are based in the Philippines.[34]
Petitioners Santamaria and Boza argue that the proposed deposition in this case is not for discovery purposes as Cleary is the plaintiff himself.
[35]
The Court of Appeals Decision gives foreigners undue advantage over Filipino litigants in cases under similar circumstances, where the
parties and the presiding judge do not have the opportunity to personally examine and observe the conduct of the testifying witness. [36] Thus,
the court's suggestion for written interrogatories is also not proper as open-court testimony is different from mere serving of written
interrogatories.[37]

Lastly, petitioners Santamaria and Boza claim that Cleary's sole allegation that he is a resident "out of the Philippines" does not warrant
departure from open-court trial procedure under Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. [38]
In her Petition, petitioner Kathryn Go-Perez makes two (2) arguments. First, she contends that granting a petition under Rule 65 involves a
finding of grave abuse of discretion, but the Court of Appeals only found "error" in the trial court orders. [39] She cites Triplex Enterprises v.
PNB-Republic Bank[40] and Yu v. Reyes-Carpio,[41] in that a writ of certiorari is restricted to extraordinary cases where the act of the lower
court is void.[42] It is designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. [43] People v. Hubert Webb[44] has held that the use of
discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and certiorari will be issued only to correct errors of jurisdiction.
[45]
It cannot correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions by the lower court. [46]

Second, petitioner Go-Perez submits that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, which imposes
limits on the right to take deposition. [47]Cleary's self-deposition in the United States, which is not for discovery purposes, is oppressive,
vexatious, and bordering on harassment.[48] The Court of Appeals also erred in ignoring applicable jurisprudence such as Northwest, where this
Court found that the deposition taken in the United States was to accommodate the petitioner's employee who was there, and not for discovery
purposes. Thus, the general rules on examination of witnesses under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should be observed. [49]

Lastly, petitioner Go-Perez contends that the Court of Appeals ignored Rule 132, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a witness
must testify in open court.[50] That Cleary is the plaintiff himself is material as there is nothing for him to discover when he deposes himself. [51]

On the other hand, respondent Thomas Cleary maintains that Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on the taking of deposition applies. [52] He
is "out of the Philippines" as an American citizen residing in the United States. This is true even when he entered the Stock Purchase and Put
Agreement with petitioners in 1999 and filed the case in 2009. [53] Cleary cites Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes[54] and San Luis v. Rojas.[55] The
trial court even "previously scheduled the hearing subject to the notice from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the taking of
deposition."[56] However, this was later disallowed upon petitioners' opposition. [57]

Respondent submits that the rules on depositions do not authorize nor contemplate any intervention by the court in the process. All that is
required under the rules is that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action[.]" [58] Thus, the trial court's
discretion in ruling on whether a deposition may be taken is not unlimited. [59]

Respondent adds that this Court has allowed the taking of testimonies through deposition in lieu of their actual presence at trial. [60] He argues
that with the new rules, depositions serve as both a method of discovery and a method of presenting testimony. [61] That the court cannot
observe a deponent's demeanor is insufficient justification to disallow deposition. Otherwise, no deposition can ever be taken as this objection
is common to all depositions.[62]

Respondent contends that Northwest does not apply as the deposition in that case was found to have been improperly and irregularly taken. [63]

Lastly, respondent argues that the presiding judge of the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion for Court
Authorization to Take Deposition.[64] That he is an American residing in the United States is undisputed. The trial court even issued the Order
dated January 13, 2009 directing him to inform the court of the "steps he . . . has taken and the progress of his request for a deposition taking
filed, if any, with the Department of Justice."[65] In later disallowing the deposition as he is "not suffering from any impairment, physical or
otherwise," the presiding judge acted in an arbitrary manner amounting to lack of jurisdiction. [66] The deposition sought is in accordance with
the rules. The expenses in attending a deposition proceeding in the United States cannot be considered as a substantial reason to disallow
deposition since petitioners may send cross-interrogatories. [67]

These consolidated Petitions seek a review of the Court of Appeals Decision reversing the trial court's ruling and allowing Cleary to take his
deposition in the United States. Thus, the issues for resolution are:

First, whether the limitations for the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court apply in this case; and

Second, whether the taking of deposition under Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court applies to a non-resident foreigner plaintiff's
direct testimony.

I
Utmost freedom governs the taking of depositions to allow the widest scope in the gathering of information by and for all parties in relation to
their pending case.[68] The relevant section in Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 23
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION

SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken . - By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a
party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories . The attendance
of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules.
The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis supplied)
As regards the taking of depositions, Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories at the instance of any party.

San Luis explained that this provision "does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition." [69] Thus, this Court found
it immaterial that the plaintiff was a non-resident foreign corporation and that all its witnesses were Americans residing in the United States.
[70]

On the use of depositions taken, we refer to Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. This Court has held that "depositions may be used
without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes."[71] These exceptional cases are enumerated in Rule 23, Section 4(c) as follows:

SEC 4. Use of depositions. - At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who
had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

. . . .

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is
dead; or (2) that the witness resides at distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to
attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure
the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable,
in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the
deposition to be used[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The difference between the taking of depositions and the use of depositions taken is apparent in Rule 23, which provides separate sections to
govern them. Jurisprudence has also discussed the importance of this distinction and its implications:

The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition
shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court
during the trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.

The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in
taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. As a result, there is accorded the widest possible opportunity for knowledge
by both parties of all the facts before the trial. Such of this testimony as may be appropriate for use as a substitute for viva
voce examination may be introduced at the trial; the remainder of the testimony, having served its purpose in revealing the facts to the parties
before trial, drops out of the judicial picture.

. . . [U]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery — with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated — and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege have been
placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony wherever
practicable.[72] (Emphasis supplied)
The rules and jurisprudence support greater leeway in allowing the parties and their witnesses to be deposed in the interest of collecting
information for the speedy and complete disposition of cases.

In opposing respondent's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition, petitioners contest at the deposition-taking stage. They maintain
that the right to take deposition is subject to the restrictions found in Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court on orders for the protection
of parties and deponents.[73]

II
Rule 23, Section 16 of the Rules of Court is on orders for the protection of parties and deponents from annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression. The provision reads:

SEC. 16. Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. — After notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make an
order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that
it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination shall be
held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be
opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the parties shall
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court or the court may
make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression . (Emphasis
supplied)
The provision includes a full range of protective orders, from designating the place of deposition, limiting those in attendance, to imposing that
it be taken through written interrogatories. At the extreme end of this spectrum would be a court order that completely denies the right to
take deposition. This is what the trial court issued in this case.

While Section 16 grants the courts power to issue protective orders, this grant involves discretion on the part of the court, which "must be
exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that
its purpose may be attained."[74]

A plain reading of this provision shows that there are two (2) requisites before a court may issue a protective order: (1) there must be notice;
and (2) the order must be for good cause shown. In Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[75] this Court discussed the concept of good cause
as used in the rules:

The matter of good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Good cause means a substantial reason—one
that affords a legal excuse. Whether or not substantial reasons exist is for the court to determine, as there is no hard and fast rule for
determining the question as to what is meant by the term "for good cause shown."

The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly
adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to
establish good cause for the issuance of a protective order. What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective
order that is sought.
In light of the general philosophy of full discovery of relevant facts and the board statement of scope in Rule 24, and in view of the power of
the court under Sections 16 and 18 of said Rule to control the details of time, place, scope, and financing for the protection of the deponents
and parties, it is fairly rare that it will be ordered that a deposition should not be taken at all . All motions under these subparagraphs of
the rule must be supported by "good cause" and a strong showing is required before a party will be denied entirely the right to take a
deposition. A mere allegation, without proof, that the deposition is being taken in bad faith is not a sufficient ground for such an order. Neither
is an allegation that it will subject the party to a penalty or forfeiture. The mere fact that the information sought by deposition has already
been obtained through a bill of particulars, interrogatories, or other depositions will not suffice, although if it is entirely repetitious a
deposition may be forbidden. The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking
of a deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade
secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing.
[76]
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, we consider the trial court's explanation for its denial of respondent's Motion for Court Authorization to Take Deposition. The trial
court's Order was based on two (2) premises: first, that respondent should submit himself to our court processes since he elected to seek
judicial relief with our courts; and second, that respondent is not suffering from any impairment and it is best that he appear before our courts
considering he is the plaintiff himself.[77]

III
On the first premise, apparent is the concern of the trial court in giving undue advantage to non-resident foreigners who file suit before our
courts but do not appear to testify. Petitioners support this ruling. They contend that the open-court examination of witnesses is part of our
judicial system. Thus, there must be compelling reason to depart from this procedure in order to avoid suits that harass Filipino litigants before
our courts.[78] Moreover, they argue that it would be costly, time-consuming, and disadvantageous for petitioners and their counsels to attend
the deposition to be taken in Los Angeles for the convenience of respondent. [79]

In the Stock Purchase and Put Agreement, petitioners and respondent alike agreed that respondent had the sole discretion to elect the venue
for filing any action with respect to it.

Paragraph 9.02 of the Agreement is clear that the parties "waive any other preferential jurisdiction by reason of domicile." [80] If respondent
filed the suit in the United States—which he had the option to do under the Agreement—this would have been even more costly, time-
consuming, and disadvantageous to petitioners who are all Filipinos residing in the Philippines.

There is no question that respondent can file the case before our courts. With respondent having elected to file suit in Cebu, the bone of
contention now is on whether he can have his deposition taken in the United States. The trial court ruled that respondent should consequently
submit himself to the processes and procedures under the Rules of Court.

Respondent did avail himself of the processes and procedures under the Rules of Court when he filed his Motion. He invoked Rule 23, Section
4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court and requested to have his deposition taken in Los Angeles as he was "out of the Philippines."

Moreover, Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court no longer requires leave of court for the taking of deposition after an answer has been
served. According to respondent, he only sought a court order when the Department of Foreign Affairs required one so that the deposition may
be taken before the Philippine Embassy or Consulate. [81]

That neither the presiding judge nor the parties will be able to personally examine and observe the conduct of a deponent does not justify
denial of the right to take deposition. This objection is common to all depositions. [82] Allowing this reason will render nugatory the provisions in
the Rules of Court that allow the taking of depositions.

As suggested by the Court of Appeals, the parties may also well agree to take deposition by written interrogatories [83] to afford petitioners the
opportunity to cross-examine without the need to fly to the United States. [84]

The second premise is also erroneous. That respondent is "not suffering from any impairment, physical or otherwise" does not address the
ground raised by respondent in his Motion. Respondent referred to Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court, in that he was "out of the
Philippines."[85] This Section does not qualify as to the condition of the deponent who is outside the Philippines.

IV

Petitioners argue that the deposition sought by respondent is not for discovery purposes as he is the plaintiff himself. [86] To support their
contention, they cite Northwest, where this Court held that Rule 132 of the Rules of Court—on the examination of witnesses in open court—
should be observed since the deposition was only to accommodate the petitioner's employee who was in the United States, and not for discovery
purposes.[87]

Jurisprudence has discussed how "[u]nder the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of
discovery—with use on trial not necessarily contemplated—and a method of presenting testimony." [88] The taking of depositions has been allowed
as a departure from open-court testimony. Jonathan Landoil International Co. Inc. v. Spouses Mangundadatu [89] is instructive:

The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial.
Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the
deponent being actually called to the witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking of the witnesses' testimonies
through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.

Thus, "[d]epositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient . There is no rule that
limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can
be no valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have
become numerous or complicated.

In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed
as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge." Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that
is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a
circumstance for their admissibility exists.

When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party, its
taking should not be allowed. This was the primary concern in Northwest Airlines v. Cruz. In that case, the ends of justice would be better
served if the witness was to be brought to the trial court to testify. The locus of the oral deposition therein was not within the reach of
ordinary citizens, as there were time constraints; and the trip required a travel visa, bookings, and a substantial travel fare. In People v. Webb,
the taking of depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court had already admitted the Exhibits on which the witnesses would have testified.
(Emphasis supplied)[90]
Petitioners rely on Northwest in that absent any compelling or valid reason, the witness must personally testify in open court. [91] They add that
the more recent Republic v. Sandiganbayan[92] reiterated the rulings in Northwest,[93] specifically, that Northwest emphasized that the "court
should always see to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained." [94] Moreover, "[w]here the
deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in
evidence."[95] Northwest and Republic are not on all fours with this case.

Northwest involved a deposition in New York found to have been irregularly taken. The deposition took place on July 24, 1995, two (2) days
before the trial court issued the order allowing deposition. [96] The Consul that swore in the witness and the stenographer was different from
the Consulate Officer who undertook the deposition proceedings. [97] In this case, on the other hand, deposition taking was not allowed by the
trial court to begin with.

In Northwest, respondent Camille Cruz's opposition to the notice for oral deposition included a suggestion for written interrogatories as an
alternative.[98] This would have allowed cross-interrogatories, which would afford her the opportunity to rebut matters raised in the deposition
in case she had contentions. However, this suggestion was denied by the trial court for being time-consuming. [99] In this case, petitioners argued
even against written interrogatories for being a mile of difference from open-court testimony. [100]

In Republic, the issue involved Rule 23, Section 4(c)(3) of the Rules of Court in relation to Rule 130, Section 47 on testimonies and depositions
at a former proceeding.[101] The deposition of Maurice Bane was taken in London for one case, and what the court disallowed was its use in
another case.[102]

In sum, Rule 23, Section 1 of the Rules of Court gives utmost freedom in the taking of depositions. Section 16 on protection orders, which
include an order that deposition not be taken, may only be issued after notice and for good cause shown. However, petitioners' arguments in
support of the trial court's Order denying the taking of deposition fails to convince as good cause shown.

The civil suit was filed pursuant to an agreement that gave respondent the option of filing the case before our courts or the courts of
California. It would have been even more costly, time-consuming, and disadvantageous to petitioners had respondent filed the case in the United
States.

Further, it is of no moment that respondent was not suffering from any impairment. Rule 23, Section 4(c)(2) of the Rules of Court, which was
invoked by respondent, governs the use of depositions taken. This allows the use of a deposition taken when a witness is "out of the Philippines."

In any case, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court still allows for objections to admissibility during trial. The difference between admissibility of
evidence and weight of evidence has long been laid down in jurisprudence. These two are not to be equated. Admissibility considers factors such
as competence and relevance of submitted evidence. On the other hand, weight is concerned with the persuasive tendency of admitted evidence.
[103]

The pertinent sections of Rule 23 on admissibility are:

SEC. 6. Objections to admissibility . - Subject to the provisions of section 29 of this Rule, objection may be made at the trial or hearing to
receiving in evidence any deposition or part thereof for any reason which would require the exclusion of the evidence if the witness were then
present and testifying.

SEC. 29. Effect of errors and irregularities in depositions..

(c) As to competency and relevancy of evidence . — Objections to the competency of a witness or the competency, relevancy [sic], or materiality
of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one
which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time[.]
As regards weight of evidence, "the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the
appropriate time."[104] In resorting to depositions, respondent takes the risk of not being able to fully prove his case.

Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals in granting the Petition for Certiorari and reversing the trial court's denial of respondent's Motion
for Court Authorization to Take Deposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
(EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

FACTS The Facts and the Case Spouses (Lee) and Keh entered the Philippines in the 1930sas immigrants from China. They had 11 children. In
1948, Leebrought from China a young woman (Tiu), as housemaid. Respondent Lee-Keh’snchildren believed that Tiu left the household and had a
relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other
children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the (NBI) to investigate the
matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report it is not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN. The NBI found, for example,that in the hospital records Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when
she supposedlygave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two
separate petitions, one of them before the (RTC) for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s
other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name. In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children
filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify
in the case. However, later on, the subpoena was quashed by the RTC as it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule130 of the Rules of
Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s stepmother.

CA rendered a decision setting aside the RTC’s Order on the ground that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be
quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of CivilProcedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age
alonedoes not render her incapable of testifying. The party seekingto quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that shewould be unable
to withstand the rigors of trial, something thatpetitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

ISSUE: WON TIU CAN BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY

HELD: Witnesses; It is the trial court’s duty to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true
where the witness is of advanced age.—Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at
her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About
five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC
would have to update itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being
questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her. Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to
badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially
true where the witness is of advanced age. Lee vs. Court of Appeal, 625 SCRA 66, G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

PEOPLE VS ORTILLAS Y GAMLANGA

ISSUE: WON THE RTC deprived the accused of his Constitutional Right to meet the witness face to face

HELD: Witnesses; Right of Confrontation; The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or
half truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him. —As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit: The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is
embodied in Art. III, §14 (2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in
Rule 115, §1 (f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
confront and cross-examine the witness against him. The cross-examination of a witness is essential to test his or her credibility, expose
falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate
inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional
right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. People vs. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659, G.R. No. 137666 May 20, 2004

No better test has been found to measure the value of a witness’ testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of
mankind.—The testimony of Russel that he helped Joey when the latter was hit and fell down, but, at the same time, he saw appellant run and
hide in his (appellant’s) house that was six meters away from the place where appellant threw the pillbox, is not credible. It goes beyond human
experience for Russel to be able to follow the movements of a culprit right after Joey, his companion, had been hit at the same time that he
was helping Joey when the latter fell to the ground, not to mention the fact that he was also hit on the right side of his face. Does it mean that
Russel just stood by watching appellant’s movements while the latter threw the pillbox at them and hit him and Joey? The failure of the
prosecution to explain this incredible feat is fatal to its cause. No better test has been found to measure the value of a witness’ testimony than
its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. People vs. Ortillas, 428 SCRA 659, G.R. No. 137666 May 20, 2004

PEOPLE VS ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG

ISSUE:

HELD: The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay tanodand the police are part
of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious
deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened
AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had
clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under the immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now
led by another powerful compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.

Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original declarant was not placed under
oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the
statement is considered part of the res gestae.

To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-
examine her adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing
be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtformalizes this solution, viz.:

"Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.– The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under
oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode ofanswer, the answers of the witness shall be
given orally."

The second solution is to require that allwitnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
ensures this solution thusly:

"Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987
Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x,"
the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence
due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the
perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out of-court statement
depends. (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the original)
60

Hearsay Evidence Rule; Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res gestae, the appealed decision runs contrary
to the well-settled rule against admitting hearsay evidence, aptly described as “evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he
has heard from others.”—Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res gestae, the appealed decision runs contrary
to the well-settled rule against admitting hearsay evidence, aptly described as “evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he
has heard from others.” The hearsay rule puts in issue the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence, since the statement testified to
was not given under oath or solemn affirmation, and more compellingly, the declarant was not subjected to cross-examination by the opposing
party to test his perception, memory, veracity and articulateness, on whose reliability the entire worth of the out-of-court statement depends.
It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His
testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what he learned or heard from others. But equally important, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights
guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x.” By
allowing the accused to test the perception, memory, and veracity of the witness, the trial court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and
reliability of his testimony. There is no gainsaying that the right to confront a witness applies with particular urgency in criminal proceedings,
for at stake is a man’s personal liberty, universally cherished among all human rights

RECALLING WITNESS

PEOPLE VS ORTILLAS Y GAMLANGA

On January 6, 1995, an Information [1] was filed against Marlon Ortillas with the Makati Regional Trial Court, and assigned by raffle to
Branch 255 (Las Pias), then presided over by Judge Florentino M. Alumbres. [2] The Information reads:
The undersigned 3rd Assistant Prosecutor accuses MARLON ORTILLAS Y GAMLANGA of the crime of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of December, 1994, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one Jacob Relox whose true identity and present whereabout is
still unknown and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable motive and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery and use of explosive (pillbox), did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and throw a Pillbox to one Jose Mesqueriola y Labarosa, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds, which directly caused his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Las Pias, Metro Manila
December 28, 1994.
(signed)
APOLINAR C. QUETULIO, JR.
3rd Assistant Prosecutor[3]
Despite the fact that it is stated in the title of the Information that appellant was a minor, detained at the Municipal Jail, Las Pias,
Metro Manila, Presiding Judge Alumbres failed to ascertain and verify the alleged minority of appellant and determine if the provisions of P.D.
No. 603, otherwise known as The Child and Youth Welfare Code should be applied to Ortillas.
After arraignment of appellant who pleaded not guilty to the offense with which he is charged, the trial court dispensed with the pre-trial
and proceeded to trial on the merits.
On June 8, 1995, the prosecution presented Russel [4] Guiraldo, an alleged eyewitness. After Russels direct examination, Atty. Jose G. de
Leon, the then counsel for Ortillas moved for postponement as he had a very important appointment to keep which Judge Alumbres
granted. Subsequently, Atty. de Leon had to withdraw as counsel because of eye ailment which the trial court approved. The only other hearing
that took place after the testimony of Russel on June 8, 1995, was on September 5, 1995 when NBI Medico-Legal Officer Roberto Garcia
testified for the prosecution. All in all, the continuation of the hearing was postponed thirteen times from June 8, 1995 until May 8, 1996 when
the prosecution finally rested its case [5] with the submission of its documentary evidence. [6] Witness Russel was never presented for cross-
examination. The last time he was subpoenaed was for the hearing set on November 6, 1995, [7] but records do not show that he appeared on said
date. Although several hearings were scheduled thereafter, Russel was not subpoenaed anymore.
On the basis of the testimonies of Russel and Dr. Garcia, Judge Alumbres rendered a decision [8] dated September 21, 1998 with the
following findings:
Roselle Guiraldo positively identified and pointed to the accused as the one who threw the pillbox to his companion Jose Mesqueriola in the
morning of December 21, 1994. He even specified the exact location where the accused was at the time he threw the pillbox. According to him,
the accused was standing in front of a gate of a house along Calle Real, near Plaza Quezon, Las Pias, Metro Manila. He could not be mistaken of
the identity of the accused because they were former classmates at the Las Pias Municipal High School and members of rival fraternities. As
could be deduced from the facts, the pillbox was intended for Roselle Guiraldo because the accused has the strongest motive of killing him. It
will be recalled that three (3) days after the opening of classes at the Las Pias Municipal High School, Roselle Guiraldo and the accused could
not see eye to eye already because Roselle Guiraldo was stoned and the stone came from the direction of the accused while seated inside the
classroom. Roselle Guiraldo tried to get even with the accused by waiting for him outside of the school premises every after classes. Afraid
that a personal encounter may happen and he will be in big trouble, the accused sought transfer to the Las Pias Municipal High School North,
which is located at the Vergonville Subdivision in Barangay Pulanglupa II. This is now very far from his residence at San Francisco St. in
Barangay Aldana. While if he was not transferred, his school (Las Pias Municipal High School) is only walking distance from his residence at San
Francisco St. His ill-feelings against Roselle Guiraldo became intense because of the increasing problem he has to face or handle. He has his
work and a common-law wife to support and who was now getting pregnant. But all the while, he has not severed his relationship with his
gangmates, although according to him, he already quit from being an active member of Crime buster fraternity after he became a working
student in July 1993.[9]
...
The defense put up by the accused is alibi, a very weak defense because it is easy to fabricate. Just like in the present case, he was still able to
tell the authorities that he was in his house when his friend Jose Mesqueriola was killed. If there was truth that he was in his house when Jose
Mesqueriola was killed, how come not one occupant in his house came forward to testify for him during the trial. Alibi is considered the weakest
defense because it can easily be fabricated and cannot stand in the light of clear, positive and precise evidence of the prosecution establishing
the identity of the accused (People vs. Magallanes, 218 SCRA 109; People vs. Santos, 221 SCRA 715; People vs. Bescana, 220 SCRA 93; People vs.
dela Cruz, 217 SCRA 283). It is a fundamental dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
(People vs. Tanco, 218 SCRA 494).
The charge against the accused is murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. The
commission of the crime in the present case was attended by the circumstance of explosion (the use and exploding of the pillbox). In the
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination (Exh. C) which Dr. Garcia issued, he placed that the cause of death which is Traumatic-head injury was
the result of an alleged explosion. On whether there was the circumstance of evident premeditation, the evidence does not clearly show.
There is present in the circumstancial evidence of flight. As earlier established, the accused was one of those who escaped from detention in
the jail of Las Pias City on April 17, 1997. It is well-settled rule that flight is indicative of guilt of the accused. Flight is a silent admission of
guilt, and is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty mind (People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712; People vs. Cruz, 213 SCRA 601; People vs. Alabaso,
204 SCRA 458; People vs. Babac, 204 SCRA 968; People vs. Lorenzo, 204 SCRA 361). [10]
 The dispositve portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Marlon Ortillas y Gamlanga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge against him in the
information, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Jose Mesqueriola in the sum of P100,000.00; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT COMMITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO THE CARE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL WELFARE WHICH SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS APPEARANCE IN COURT WHENEVER REQUIRED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ATTY. TERESITA CARANDANG-PANTUA OF THE PUBLIC
ATTORNEYS OFFICE TO CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION DURING THE HEARING ON
JUNE 8, 1995.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ROSELLE
GUIRALDO AND IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. [12]
Anent the first assigned error:
In his Brief, appellant points out that the first counsel of appellant, Atty. Jose de Leon, raised the minority of appellant and invoked the
provisions of P.D. No. 603 during the initial hearing conducted on June 8, 1995 but Judge Alumbres outrightly denied his request. Atty. de Leon
submitted to the ruling and prosecution witness Russel was called to the witness stand.There is merit to the complaint of appellant. Judge
Alumbres was remiss of his duty to ascertain the minority of appellant at the onset of the proceedings. The records further disclose that he
likewise ignored the letter of Director Milda S. Alvior of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) filed with his court on
January 31, 1996 informing him that appellant at that time was sixteen years old and alleging that his prolonged stay in the Las Pias Jail for one
year and one month at the time, mixed with hundred criminals affected him physically, intellectually, emotionally and socially. [13]
The Presiding Judge should be sanctioned for his negligence in the performance of his duties with respect to accused minor - but these
particular omissions are not sufficient grounds to merit the reversal of the assailed decision.
As to the second assigned error:
The Court finds merit to appellants claim that the judgment of the trial court has unduly deprived him of his constitutional right to meet
the witness face to face[14] which includes the right to cross-examine the witness.
Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the then prevailing Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Rights of the accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
...
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. . . .
Section 6, Rule 132 of the then prevailing Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom from interest
or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue.
As the Court held in People vs. Rivera, to wit:
The right of a party to cross-examine a witness is embodied in Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that the accused shall have
the right to meet the witnesses face to face and in Rule 115, 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him. The cross-examination of a witness is
essential to test his or her credibility, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination testimonies may
successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
thus give substance to the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. [15]
Records disclose that there was never a valid waiver on the part of appellant or his counsel to cross-examine the prosecution witness
Russel. The first counsel, Atty. de Leon, in the hearing of June 8, 1995 requested for postponement of the cross-examination of Russel in view
of his professional engagement, without objection on the part of the prosecution. [16] The next hearing was also postponed in view of the eye
problem of Atty. de Leon.[17] And on August 3, 1995, the hearing was again postponed due to the withdrawal of appearance of Atty. de Leon on
ground of eye-ailment.[18] Subsequent dates of hearing were postponed because the Presiding Judge went on leave. [19] It is only on September 25,
1995 that Atty. Leopoldo Macinas appeared as new counsel for appellant. [20] However, although it appears in the Minutes of the hearing
scheduled on said date that the same is for cross-examination of Russel, [21] there is no showing that Russel was present during that day. In fact,
the Minutes show that Russel had to be notified for the next hearing set on November 6, 1995. [22] But on November 6, the hearing was again
postponed to November 11, 1995 due to typhoon Rosing. The Minutes again does not show that on November 6, Russel appeared in court as only
complaining witness Grace Mesqueriola signed thereon.[23] Thereafter, Russel was never notified of the hearings set on December 11, 1995,
January 17, 1996, January 22, 1996, January 31, 1996, February 26, 1996, March 25, 1996 and May 8, 1996.
Judge Alumbres refusal to give opportunity for Atty. Teresita Carandang-Pantua of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), the new counsel
for appellant, to cross-examine prosecution witness Russel on the ground that prosecution had already rested its case, is patently a grave abuse
of discretion on his part. Although Atty. Pantua had adequately explained appellants predicament, on the first scheduled date of hearing for the
presentation of defense evidence, Judge Alumbres, upon the perfunctory objection of the prosecution, unreasonably refused to heed Atty.
Pantuas request.
It was well within the trial courts discretion to allow the recall of witness Russel under the then prevailing Section 9, Rule 132 of the
Rules on Evidence, to wit:
SEC. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of
the court. The Court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require.
Certainly, under the foregoing circumstances, Judge Alumbres should have known that the interest of justice required that appellant should
have been given the opportunity to cross-examine Russel, as it was not his fault that Russel had not been cross-examined. While a petition for
certiorari could have been duly availed of by counsel for appellant to rectify the judges grave abuse of discretion, appellant should not be made
to suffer for the failure of his counsel to do so; as a layman, he could not have known better as to what must be done under the
circumstances. On this matter, the PAO, as de oficio counsel for appellant was remiss of its duty to protect the interest of its client.
Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that appellant had not been given the opportunity to cross-examine
the lone prosecution witness. In the absence of cross-examination, which is prescribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept, [24] the
direct examination of the witness should have been expunged from the records, in which case, the trial court would have had no valid basis to
deny the demurrer to evidence.
Nevertheless, the Court will resolve the third issue so as to put an end to the question whether or not the trial court erred in giving
weight and credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Russel and in disregarding the testimony of appellant.
The trial court declared that the issue in this case hinges mainly on credibility of the witnesses, both of the prosecution and the defense.
[25]
 The prosecution evidence is principally based on the testimony of Russel which is narrated by the trial court, as follows:
. . . He testified that at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of December 21, 1994, he was with one Jose Mesqueriola, alias Joey, hearing Misa de
Gallo at the Bamboo Organ Church in Las Pias, Metro Manila.After the mass, he and Jose Mesqueriola were walking side by side at the side of
the road leading to the direction of Quezon Plaza. Upon reaching a point at the side of the road near Plaza Quezon, and at a distance of about
fifteen (15) meters, he saw the accused in front of a gate of a house threw (sic) a pillbox towards their direction and the pillbox exploded on
the head of his companion Jose Mesqueriola. He was also hit at a portion of his right face. After the bomb exploded on the head of Jose
Mesqueriola, the latter fell down so he helped him by bringing him to the Las Pias Emergency Hospital which is just nearby. However, the next
day, he died. After the accused threw the bomb, he ran away and hid. He came to know of the accused since June 1994 (they being classmates
in the Municipal High School, according to the accused). . . [26]
On the other hand, the defense evidence consist only of the testimony of appellant which is aptly narrated by the trial court, as follows:
. . . he testified that on December 21, 1994, at around 6:00 oclock in the morning, he was in his house at his given address when he heard an
explosion. He then ran towards the direction where the explosion was to find out what was it all about. Reaching the place, he found some people
around and he saw a person lying prostrate on the street and blooded. He was being assisted and brought to the hospital by his classmate
Roselle Guiraldo. After the wounded person was brought to the hospital, he learned from his neighbors that the person lying on the street was a
victim of pillbox explosion and he came to know that his name was Joey and his friend. When he ran out of his house, he saw his classmate Jacob
Relox was running away from the scene of the explosion, together with companions, and he was also told by Aling Itang, one of his neighbors,
that the one who threw the pillbox to Joey was Jacob Relox. He learned also from his neighbor, Aling Itang, that the reason why Jacob Relox
threw pillbox at Joey is because on December 20, 1994, Jacob was mauled by Joey Mesqueriola and his companions.
The accused revealed during the trial that he was a working student enrolled at the Las Pias Municipal High School near Saint Joseph Church in
Las Pias Poblacion. In their school, there were two rival fraternities, the Crimebuster and the Taugamma. He was a member of the Crimebuster
together with Roselle Guiraldo and Jose Mesqueriola, his classmates. He left the Crimebuster because he did not like the rules and he joined
the Taugamma.
After one (1) week of attending classes at the Las Pias Municipal High School, he asked for transfer to Las Pias North Municipal High School
because in the Las Pias Municipal High School, every after classes, his classmate Roselle Guiraldo always waited for him outside (inaabangan) and
look (sic) for trouble, and this Roselle Guiraldo has a bad blood or grudge against him. It started when there was stone throwing inside their
classroom on the third day of their classes. Roselle Guiraldo was hit and he thought that he (accused) was the one who threw the stone because
it came from the direction where he was sitting, not knowing that it was his sitmate (sic) who threw the stone. So that even if he was not the
one who threw the pillbox in the early morning of December 21, 1994 which cause the death of Jose Mesqueriola, he was the one pointed to by
Roselle Guiraldo because of this grudge against him.
He also testified that Jacob Relox has the motive for killing Jose Mesqueriola because on December 20, 1994, Jacob Relox was mauled by Jose
Mesqueriola and the other members of the Crimebuster fraternity. Jacob Relox then was a member of the rival fraternity, the Taugamma. [27]
Considering that appellant was unlawfully deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witness Russel, his testimony should
have been strictly scrutinized and analyzed with utmost care and any doubt thereon should have been interpreted by the trial court in favor of
appellant.
We reproduce hereunder the testimony of Russel on direct examination:
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q How long have you been rather how long have you know (sic) this Marlon Ortillas?
WITNESS
A June, 1994, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, will you please tell us, at around 6:00 oclock in the morning of December 21, 1994, where were you?
WITNESS
A I was in the church, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where is that church located, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A Las Pias, Sir.
...
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, at around that time also, who were your companions, if any in going to church?
WITNESS
A Joey, Sir. His name, true name is Jose Miscariola, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, where is this Jose Miscariola now, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A He died already, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q When did he die?
WITNESS
A December 22, 1994, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, when you and Jose Miscariola were in the church, was there, at around 7:00 rather 6:00 oclock in the morning of December
21, 1994, was there any unusual incident that happened?
WITNESS
A Yes, there was, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q What was that incident, if any, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A When we were about to leave the church, Joey or Jose Miscariola was hit with the pillbox that was thrown by the
accused, Marlon Ortillas.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, when this incident happened, how far were you then from the church, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A We were already far from the church because the incident happened in the plaza, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, what happened at the plaza, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A The incident was about the throwing of pillbox by Marlon Ortillas, Sir, to Jose Miscariola.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, this pillbox that was allegedly thrown to Joey, what happened to him, if any?
WITNESS
A It exploded in his head, Sir, or in the head of Jose Miscariola, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q And what happened to Joey Miscariola after the pillbox thrown by Marlon Ortillas exploded in his head?
WITNESS
A He fell down, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q And how about you, what did you do when you saw Joey Miscariola fell down?
WITNESS
A I helped him, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, this Joey Miscariola, when he was hit with the pillbox that exploded in his head, how far were you then, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A I was beside him, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Were you not also hit by the pillbox, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A I was also hit, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where were you hit, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A In my face, Sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to the right portion of his face.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, Now, where was Marlon Ortillas at that time when you saw him threw (sic) the pillbox to your direction?
WITNESS
A At the gate located at the opposite side of the street.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q What is this gate, gate of a house or gate of the plaza?
WITNESS
A Gate of house, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, how far was Marlon Ortillas from both of you and Joey when you saw Marlon throwing the pillbox towards you?
WITNESS
A It is just near, Sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness pointing to a distance from the chair where he is sitting to the door of the courtroom which was estimated by the
prosecution and counsel for the accused to be about fifteen (15) meters, more or less.
COURT
Q Do you agree that the distance is about fifteen (15) meters more or less, Fiscal?
FISCAL QUETULIO
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. DE LEON
No objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Now, you said that you helped Joey when he fell down, what help did you do, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A I brought him to the Las Pias Emergency Hospital which was located nearby, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q What about Marlon Ortillas, after throwing the pillbox or after it exploded, did you notice what happened to him?
WITNESS
A He hid, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where did he hide, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A In their house, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q Where is this house of Marlon located, Mr. Witness?
WITNESS
A It was just located nearby, Sir.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q How far from the gate where Marlon was standing from where Marlon threw the pillbox up to his house, how far is that, if you
know?
WITNESS
A From here up to that distance, Sir.
INTERPRETER
Witness is pointing to a distance of more or less six (6) meters from the place where he is sitting.
FISCAL QUETULIO
Q More or less six meters, is that agreed, Counsel?
ATTY. DE LEON
A Yes, Your Honor.[28]
 It is doctrinal that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the credibility of witnesses, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misapprehended or misinterpreted.[29]
The trial courts assessment of Russels testimony is not only perfunctorily done but its decision is also partly based on the evidence
presented by the defense, in stark violation of the well-settled rule that the conviction of appellant must not act on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the prosecution. [30]
First, it cannot be over-emphasized that there is no direct, positive testimony that Russel actually saw appellant throw the pillbox. He only
testified that when he and victim Joey or Jose Miscariola [31] were about to leave the church, Joey was hit with the pillbox that was thrown by
the accused, Marlon Ortillas. This statement is a conclusion of fact rather than a declaration of what he actually saw . He did not testify
that he actually saw appellant in the act of throwing the pillbox at them. It was only the Fiscal who expressed in his question or who presumed
that Russel saw appellant throw the pillbox to the place where they were, which although not objected to by counsel for appellant, should not
have been a basis for appellants conviction. The purported eyewitness should at least have declared, positively and explicitly, having seen
appellant throw the pillbox or an unidentified object. There is not even a testimony that Russel saw appellant holding the pillbox before he
threw it.
Second, it is difficult to reconcile the contradiction in the declaration of Russel that it is when they were about to leave the church that
Joey was hit with the pillbox thrown by appellant as against his succeeding answer to the next question of the Fiscal as to how far were they
from the church when the incident happened and he replied that they were already far from the church because the incident happened in the
plaza. Where did the throwing of the pillbox actually take place, when he was about to leave the church or in the plaza? Why the discrepancy?
Did he really see the actual throwing of the pillbox? These are questions, the answers to which are not found in the testimony of Russel.
Third, Russel testified that appellant was fifteen meters away from them at the opposite side of the street. To be able to testify that he
saw appellant throw a pillbox, Russel should have seen the actual throwing by appellant before the pillbox left the hand of appellant; otherwise,
how could Russel say for certain that it was appellant who threw the pillbox? And if Russel did see the actual throwing of an object thrown at
their direction, how could he not have at least attempted to avoid the same when the distance between them and appellant is fifteen meters.At
the normal speed of a hand thrown object as big as a pillbox, if Russel had actually seen appellant in the act of throwing the pillbox from that
distance, instinct would have naturally spurred him, at least, to attempt to dodge the same, even if he would not have succeeded in doing so. As
it is, Russel did not testify that upon seeing the pillbox or the object being thrown by appellant at their direction, he tried to evade the
same. Neither is there any testimony on the part of Russel that when he saw the pillbox being thrown at him and Joey, there was no time to
evade the same.
Fourth, the testimony of Russel that he helped Joey when the latter was hit and fell down, but, at the same time, he saw appellant run and
hide in his (appellants) house that was six meters away from the place where appellant threw the pillbox, is not credible. It goes beyond human
experience for Russel to be able to follow the movements of a culprit right after Joey, his companion, had been hit at the same time that he
was helping Joey when the latter fell to the ground, not to mention the fact that he was also hit on the right side of his face. Does it mean that
Russel just stood by watching appellants movements while the latter threw the pillbox at them and hit him and Joey? The failure of the
prosecution to explain this incredible feat is fatal to its cause. No better test has been found to measure the value of a witness testimony than
its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. [32]
Fifth, the motive attributed by the trial court to appellant in throwing a pillbox at Russel is based not on the testimony of prosecution
witness Russel but on the testimony of appellant. It is a hornbook doctrine that the prosecution must rely on its own evidence to prove the guilt
of appellant beyond reasonable doubt[33] and therefore, the trial court should not depend on the evidence of the defense to support the
conviction of appellant. However, considering that the presiding judge had given probative weight or credibility to the testimony of appellant by
using his testimony to establish motive on his part to commit the crime, the same testimony may be used likewise to prove that witness Russel
had an ill-motive to testify against appellant. And when the evidence admits of two interpretations, that which is favorable to appellant should
prevail.[34]
Sixth, while indeed, it is true that flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience, [35] the escape of appellant from jail pending trial of his
case, cannot, under the attendant circumstances, be considered as evidence of his guilt in the commission of the offense, or as basis of his
conviction in this case. Appellant had sufficiently explained that he escaped from detention because he got bored in jail, he wanted to see his
first new born child and to look for his own father. [36] It is quite surprising why the trial judge in his decision only mentioned and denigrated the
explanation of appellant that he wanted to look for his father and not mention at all the other reasons of appellant for bolting out of jail. At any
rate, it is not refuted that appellant subsequently surrendered to a member of the Office of the Assistant Regional Director, BJMP, because
of fear for his life.[37]
On the other hand, in denying that he threw the pillbox, no other witness was presented by appellant to corroborate his
testimony. Nonetheless, the testimony of appellant fully explains why Russel testified against him. Russel was of the belief that appellant was
the one who earlier threw a stone at him in the classroom. Unfortunately, the trial court misapprehended the import of his testimony and
interpreted it against him to explain the latters purported motive in throwing the pillbox at Russel and Joey.
Although denial, like alibi, can be fabricated, it is not always false and without merit, and when coupled with the improbabilities and
uncertainties of the prosecution evidence, the defense of alibi deserves merit. [38] Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength
of evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. [39] The weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this
responsibility.[40] And when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of an accused, an accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.[41] A judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty. [42] It is thus required that every circumstance
favoring his innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. [43] There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who committed the
crime. Absent this required quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. [44]
As the Court declared in People vs. Tajada:
While we strongly condemn the senseless and gruesome crime and sincerely commiserate with the suffering and emotional stress suffered by
the bereaved family of the victim, nevertheless, we find the pieces of circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused-
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. They do not pass the requisite moral certainty, as they admit of the alternative inference that other
persons, not necessarily the accused-appellant, may have perpetrated the crime. Where the evidence admits of two interpretations, one which
is consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, the accused must be acquitted. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might
be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. [45]
Thus, the Court is constrained to set aside the conviction of appellant.
Had not Judge Alumbres been compulsorily retired in 2001, he together with the Public Attorneys Office would have been admonished to
be more circumspect in the performance of their respective duties so as to prevent miscarriage of justice.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Another judgment is entered ACQUITTING appellant MARLON
ORTILLAS y GAMLANGA for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY RELEASED
from prison, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt of copy of herein Decision.
 The Public Attorneys Office is admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of its duties so as to prevent miscarriage of
justice. Let copy of herein decision be furnished the Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorneys Office so that appropriate steps may be
taken to ensure the improvement of the service of that office.
SO ORDERED.

ISSUE: WON the judge committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the proceedings and setting the case anew for pre-trial

HELD: Evidence; Witnesses; Recalling Witnesses; What the trial court should have done to correct any “perceived” procedural lapses committed
during the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence was to recall the prosecution’s witnesses and have them identify the exhibits mentioned in
their respective affidavits. This is explicitly allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.—The CA, likewise,
correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it nullified the proceedings previously conducted and ordered anew
a pretrial of the case. Note that one of the main reasons presented by Judge Catilo in nullifying the pretrial proceedings was that the
proceedings conducted after the pretrial conference did not comply with the prescribed procedure in the presentation of witnesses. But as
propounded by the CA, and even the OSG who appeared for Judge Catilo, what the trial court should have done to correct any “perceived”
procedural lapses committed during the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence was to recall the prosecution’s witnesses and have them
identify the exhibits mentioned in their respective affidavits. This is explicitly allowed by the rules, specifically Section 9, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 9. Recalling witnesses.—After the examination of a witness by both sides has been concluded, the witness
cannot be recalled without leave of court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion as the interest of justice may require. The trial
court may even grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question, for strict observance of
the order of trial or trial procedure under the rules depends upon the circumstance obtaining in each case at the discretion of the trial judge.

DULLA VS CA

FACTS: On February 2, 1993, Andrea, who was then three years old, came home crying, with bruises on her right thigh. She told her
guardian, Iluminada Beltran, that her uncle, herein petitioner, touched her private part. In her own words, she said, " Inaano ako
ng uncle ko," while doing a pumping motion with the lower part of her body to demonstrate what had been done to her. She also said that
petitioner showed his penis to her.
The matter was reported to Barangay Councilor Carlos Lumaban who, with the child, the latter’s guardian, and three barangay tanods,
went to the house of petitioner to confront him. As petitioner’s father refused to surrender his son to Lumaban and his party, Lumaban sought
assistance from the nearby Western Police District (WPD) Station No. 7. It appears; however, that petitioner took advantage of the situation
and ran away.
On February 8, 1993, Lumaban was informed that petitioner was in the nearby barangay. Together with some barangay tanods,
Lumaban went to the place where petitioner was reported to be, but petitioner’s employer refused to surrender the latter to the authorities.
Later, however, with the aid of two policemen from the WPD Police Station No. 1, Lumaban and his party were able to take petitioner to
Precinct 1 and later to Precinct 7.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge of rape, whereupon trial ensued. In her testimony in court, Andrea said
that petitioner fondled her organ and showed her his penis. She said that when petitioner did a pumping motion, she had no panties on and that
she was lying down. Petitioner was also lying down, according to her. The medical report on Andrea prepared by Dr. Maximo Reyes, who examined
the child on February 3, 1993, showed that hymen of the victim is still intact.
Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the accusation against him. He said that Andrea was coached by her guardian. He likewise denied
that he escaped from Lumaban and his men on February 2, 1993, and said that he only went away to avoid any trouble that time. The trial court
found petitioner guilty of acts of lasciviousness hence this appeal.

Petitioner questions the competence of Andrea as a witness. He argues that Andrea is not capable of understanding the questions propounded
to her. Moreover, she did not take an oath and the fact that she was asked purely leading questions shows that she was only coached by her
guardian.

ISSUE: WON Leading questions are allowed considering the age of the witness at the time she testified in court

HELD: With respect to the fact that leading questions were propounded to Andrea during her direct examination, suffice it to say that under
the Rules of Court, such questions are allowed considering the age (three years and 10 months) of the witness at the time she testified in court.
The contention has no merit. As a general rule, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses.10 Under Rule 130, §21 of the Rules of Court, only children who, on account of immaturity, are incapable of perceiving the facts
respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully are disqualified from being witnesses.

It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception
to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.

In this case, the defense did not even object to the presentation of Andrea as a witness, nor questioned her competence to testify. On the
contrary, the defense cross examined her, and the result of her examination showed that she was intelligent and could make her answers known
to others.

Leading and misleading questions.—–A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question.
It is not allowed, except:

(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble
mind, or a deaf-mute; . . . .