[G.R. No. L-5731. June 22, 1954.
]
HERBERT  BROWNELL, JR., as Attorney General of the
United States,  petitioner-appellee,  vs. SUN LIFE
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,respondent-
appellant
FACTS: (recognition of bill)
Subject of this petition is the endowment policy which
insured Aihara and Gayapan and upon its maturity the
proceeds were payable to said insured. Brownell
instituted this case to compel Sun Life to comply with the
demand to pay representing the half of the proceeds of
endowment policy and payable to one Naogiro Aihara, a
Japanese national. Such claim is based on Section 5(b)(2)
of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States.
Which claim was approved and granted by the lower
court ordering SLACOC to pay here inpetitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such Act is still binding despite the
complete independence of the Philippines from American
government?
DECISION:
Yes. The extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946
is clearly implied from the acts of the President of the
Philippines and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well
as by the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7, 8 and 477.
[G.R. No. L-26379. December 27, 1969.]
W I L L I A M C .  R E A G A N , E T C . ,  p e t i t i o n e r,  v s .
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent
FACTS: (sale of car)
William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base
to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force
(USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car
valued at $6,443.83. Two months later, he got permission
to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car
to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to
Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of
Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a
result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to
be at  17,912.34 and that his income tax would
be  2,797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the
same time he sought for a refund because he claims that
he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in
“foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation
is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that
under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his
employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: 
Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to
Philippine income tax?
DECISION: 
No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There
is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its
limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases
Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The
Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This
country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not
excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the
Philippines merely consents that the US exercise
jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of
comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that
he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is
derived from US source but the income derived from the
sale is not of US source hence taxable
Townsend vs Jemisson
13 Led. 194
Facts: (lex fori, not lex loci contractus)
Jemison brought suit in the district court of US for
the Middle District of Alabama against Townsend, who is
in Alabama.
Townsend was liable by note, to the Commercial Bank
of Columbus, Mississippi, for one John B. Jones, as his
security for about the sum of nine thousand eight
hundred and six 50/100 dollars, besides interest thereon;
and was also indebted to the Mississippi Union Bank, at
its branch in Macon, in the county of Noxubee, about the
sum of three thousand dollars, on a note of four thousand
dollars, executed by the said defendant and others,
payable at Jackson, at the banking house of the said
Mississippi Union Bank at Jackson, and in consideration
that the said plaintiff would take up the said last-
mentioned note to the Mississippi Union Bank, and would
also take up the note of the said Jones in the Commercial
Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, on which the said
Townsend was liable as security as aforesaid, except an
amount equal to the amount of said Townsend's liability
to the said Mississippi Union Bank, and release the said
Townsend from the balance of his said liability to the said
Commercial Bank, he, the said defendant, then and there
agreed with the said plaintiff, to pay on his said liability,
in the said Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi, the
same amount which the said plaintiff might take up for
him, the said Townsend, in the said Mississippi Union Bank
Issue:
In the validity of contract what rule governs?
Held:
All suits must be brought within the period prescribed
by the local law of the country where the suit was
brought-lex fori; otherwise it would be barred unless the
plaintiff can bring himself within one of the exemptions
of the statues, if pleaded.
Where all remedies are barred or discharged by lex
loci contracrus, and have operated upon the case, then
the bar may be pleaded in a foreign tribunal, to repel any
suit brought to enforce the debt.
Positive, or the Roman usucaptio, is the acquisition of
property, real or personal, immovable or movable, by the
continued possession of the acquirer for such a time as is
described by the law to be sufficient.
Negative prescription is the loss or forfeiture of a right,
by the proprietor's neglecting to exercise or prosecute it
during the whole period which the law hath declared to
be sufficient to infer the loss of it. It includes the former,
and applies also to all those demands which are the
subject of personal actions
The obligations of the contract upon the parties to it,
except in well- known cases, are to be expounded by the
lex loci contractus. Suits brought to enforce contracts,
either in the State where they were made, or in the
courts of other States, are subject to the remedies of the
forum in which the suit is, including that of statutes of
limitation.
The obligation of every law is confined to the state in
which it is established, that it can only attach upon those
who are its subjects, and upon others who are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the State; that debtors can only
be sued in the courts having jurisdiction of where they
are; that courts must judge in respect to remedies from
their own laws, except when conventionally, or from the
decision of courts, a comity has been established
between States to enforce in the courts of each
particular law or principle.
[G.R. No. L-41518. June 30, 1976.]
G U E R R E R O ' S  T R A N S P O R T  S E R V I C E S ,
INC.,  petitioner,  vs.  BLAYLOCK TRANSPORTATION
SERVICES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-KILUSAN (BTEA-
KILUSAN), LABOR ARBITER FRANCISCO M. DE LOS REYES
and JOSE CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS: (obligation bound by treaty agreement, has force
and effect of other judgment or res judicator)
In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted
a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to
operate and/or manage the transportation services inside
the naval base. This bidding was won by Santiago
Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerrero’s Transport
Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion Blayblock, the
then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the
name of Blayblock Transport Services Blayblock.
Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union
BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).
When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to
employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed
a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to
employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-
US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC
upon Guerrero’s MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there
being no employer-employee relationship between the
parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the
case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering
Guererro to “absorb all complainants who filed their
applications on or before the deadline” set by Guerrero,
except those who may have derogatory records w/ the US
Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.
Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the
decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC
Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable
to the individual complainants who failed to submit
themselves for processing & examination. The Labor
Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The
Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.
The order wasn’t appealed so it was declared final
&executory
Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise
Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of
Labor the determination of members of the Union who
shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall
be final. The agreement is deemed to have superseded
the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered
the absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2
conditions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said members of the Union were
entitled to be reinstated by Guerrero?
DECISION:
YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor
Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent
w/ military requirements, "to provide security for
employment, and, in the event certain services are
contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the
contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration
to affected employees for employment.
A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement
between states, and as municipal law for the people of
each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the
aforesaid provision of the treaty enters into and forms
part of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval
Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new
contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give
"priority" to the employment of the qualified employees
of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in
recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into
the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.
Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to
submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who
of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or
employed by Guerrero, and that such determination shall
be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order
directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de
los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175
members into Guerrero's Transport Services, subject to
the following conditions:
that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock
Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and
that they should pass final screening and approval by the
appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.
For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and
secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval
Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and
approval, the names of the members of the Union.
Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the
parties is more than a mere contract and has the force
and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore,
conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is
settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the
effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable by
execution upon approval by the court.

[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.]
SAUDI  ARABIAN  AIRLINES,  petitioner,  vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
FACTS: (A raped Filipina, lex loci acts - place where
tortious act causing the injury)
Morada, a Filipina flight stewardess for SAUDIA, was a
attempted raped by Saudia Arabian national
crewmembers in Indonesia. She returned to Manila and
while there, she was convinced by SAUDIA manager to go
to Jeddah and sign some papers, purporting to be release
forms in favor of her fellow crewmembers. It turned out
that the documents were court summons and orders,
trying and finding her guilty of adultery and other
violations of Islamic tradition. Upon her release and
return to Manila, she filed a case for damages based on
Art. 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
DECISION:
There is a conflicts problem as there is a foreign element
involved -- Morada is employed by a resident foreign
corporation, an international carrier, and some of the
acts complained of occurred in Jeddah. The trial court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter -- damage suit
based on Art. 19 and 21 -- and over the persons of Morada
(plaintiff) and SAUDIA (voluntary submission by filing
answer). For characterization, the point of contact
considered is the lex loci actus or the place where the
tortuous act causing the injury occurred -- Manila,
Philippines since this is where SAUDIA deceived Morada.
The State of the Most Significant Relationship rule was
also applied, SC holding that the Philippines is where the
over-all harm of the injury to the person, reputation,
social standing and human rights of Morada had lodged.
IN SUM: Morada is entitled to recovery for damages.
[G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.]
SALVADOR H.  LAUREL,  petitioner,  vs.  RAMON  GARCIA,
as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL
MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
C ATA L I N O M A C A R A I G , a s E x e c u t i v e
Secretary, respondents.
FACTS: (lex re sitae does not apply, no conflict of law, it
only exist when a. ownership, b. manner of conveyance
with domestic law)
The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in
Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the
Reparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification to
the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during WWII. The Roppongi property
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to another site when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
property has remained undeveloped since that time.
After many years, the Aquino administration advanced
the sale of the reparation properties, which included the
Roppongi lot. This move was opposed on the ground that
the Roppongi property is public in character. For their
part, the proponents of the sale raised that Japanese law
should apply, following the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conflict of law rule on lex loci rei
sitae should apply?
DECISION:
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply
when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law
situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the
title or ownership of an immovable, such that the
capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities
of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the
transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is
asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply. In the instant case, none of the above elements
exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of
ownership or title. There is no question that the property
belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of
the respondent officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures
adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply. The assertion
that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on
the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The
opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real
properties procured through reparations nor the
existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In
discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which
should determine who can acquire the properties so that
the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the
public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why
should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when
there is no showing that it can be sold?
Northern P.R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190, 38 L. ed.
516
FACTS:(controlling law is ex delicto - the place where
right is acquired)
This was an action by Albert L. Babcock , as administrator
of Hugh M. Munro, deceased, against the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company (“the Company”), for damages
for the death of said Munro.
Munro was a locomotive engineer employed by the
Company within the territory of Montana. In January 10,
1888, Munro was assigned to operate Train No. 161.
During that day, there was a severe snowstorm in
progress yet it was alleged that the Company negligently
refused to send a snow plow ahead of Train No. 161 to
clear the snow and ice that had accumulated from the
track where the train was to pass. This made the passage
of the train unsafe and improper. As a result, the train
got derailed when it ran into an accumulation of snow
and ice near Gray Cliff (also in Montana), and Munro was
instantly killed.
The estate of Munro filed a case for $25,000 in damages
in the district court of Minnesota.
ISSUE:
Was the amount of damage to be controlled by the law of
the place of employment and where the accident
occurred (lex loci), or by the law of the forum in which
the suit was pending (lex fori)?
* Under the law of Minnesota, when the death occurred,
the limit of recovery in case of death was $5,000, but at
the time of the trial of the case in the court below, this
limit had been increased to $10,000 by amendment of
the Minnesota statutes.
**Under the law of Montana, where the death of a person
is caused by the negligence of another, the only
limitation for the amount of damages which may be given
is “as under all the circumstances of the case may be
just."
DECISION:
The law of Montana applies. The statute of another state
has, of course, no extraterritorial force, but rights
acquired under it will always, in comity, be enforced if
not against the public policy of the laws of the former. In
such cases, the law of the place where the right was
acquired or the liability was incurred will govern as to
the right of action, while all that pertains merely to the
remedy will be controlled by the law of the state where
the action is brought. The principle is the same whether
the right of action be ex contractu or ex delicto.
Therefore, as a general rule, where the lex
locicontractus and the lexfori are altogether different,
and they are construed these contracts and enforce rights
under them according to their force and effect under the
laws of the state where made. As an exception, which is
to justify a court in refusing to enforce a right of action
which accrued under the law of another state because
against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is
against good morals or natural justice or that for some
other such reason the enforcement of it would be
prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens.
194 U.S. 451 (1904)
DAVIS

v.

MILLS.
Supreme Court of United States.(It is said that a statute of
limitations cannot take away an existing right but only
remedies, it cannot bar the plaintiff in this suit)
If the laws of Montana can set the limitation to the
domestic suit, it is the least possible stretch to say that
they may set it also to a foreign action
Facts: 'The plaintiff is a citizen of Montana, and the owner
by assignment of three causes of action (for goods sold
and on a promissory note) against the Obelisk Mining &
Concentrating Company, a Montana corporation. The
defendants are and always have been citizens and
residents of Connecticut, and at all the times mentioned in
the complaint were trustees of the said Obelisk Mining
Company. The statutes of Montana provide that within
twenty days from the 1st day of September every such
company shall annually file a specified report, and if it
'shall fail to do so, all the trustees of the company shall be
jointly and severally liable[194 U.S. 451, 452]   for all of the
debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be
contracted before such report shall be made.' Section 460
of chapter 25 of the 5th division, Compiled Statutes of
Montana, which was in force when the cause of action
arose. Re-enacted as 451 of the Civil Code of Montana,
which went into effect July 1, 1895
'The Obelisk Company failed to file certain of the required
reports, and the causes of action sued upon here, against
the defendants as trustees, to recover debts of the
company, accrued September 22, 1893, or prior thereto.
This action was brought to enforce the joint and several
liability of the defendants under the statute on July 30,
1897.
Held: The general theory on which an action is maintained
upon a cause which accrued in another jurisdiction is that
the liability is an obligation, which, having been attached to
the person by the law then having that person within its
power, will be treated by other countries as accompanying
the person when brought before their courts. But as the
source of the obligation is the foreign law, the defendant,
generally speaking, is entitled to the benefit of whatever
conditions and limitations the foreign law creates.
Slater v. Mexican National Railroad, 194 U.S. 120.
It is true that this general proposition is qualified by the fact
that the ordinary limitations of actions are treated as laws
of procedure and as belonging to the lex fori, as affecting
the remedy only and not the right. But in cases where it
has been possible to escape from that qualification by a
reasonable distinction courts have been willing to treat
limitations of time as standing like other limitations and
cutting down the defendant's liability wherever he is sued.
The common case is where a statute creates a new
liability and in the same section or in the same act limits
the time within which it can be enforced, whether using
words of condition or not.  The Harrisburg,  119 U.S. 199.
But the fact that the limitation is contained in the same
section or the same statute is material only as bearing on
construction. It is merely a ground for saying that the
limitation goes to the right created and accompanies the
obligation everywhere. The same conclusion would be
reached if the limitation was in a different statute, provided
it was directed to the newly created liability so specifically
as to warrant saying that it qualified the right.
It is said that a statute of limitations cannot take away an
existing right but only remedies, and therefore that,
whatever the effect of § 554 on subsequently accruing
liabilities, it cannot bar the plaintiff in this suit. Before
considering this it is to be observed in the first place that,
so far as the State of Montana was concerned, the only
practical difference made by the statute was to take away
the allowance for absence from the State while giving over
a year for the prosecution of the action within it. The cause
of action accrued on September 22, 1893, and the new
statute went into effect on July 1, 1895, so that the
plaintiffs had at least until September 22, 1896, in which to
sue there. As to action within the State, it could not be
contended that the change took away constitutional rights.
It did not shorten liability unreasonably. The only way in
which it could be made out that the attempt to take away a
remedy outside the State after the same lapse of time was
unconstitutional is through the theoretical proposition
which we have stated. It is said that remedies outside the
State can be affected only by destroying the right, and that
no statute of limitations can do that.
In the case at bar the question comes up in the most
attenuated form. The law is dealing not with tangible
property, but with a cause of action of its own creation. The
essential feature of that cause of action is that it is one in
the jurisdiction which created it; that it is one elsewhere is
a more or less accidental incident. If the laws of Montana
can set the limitation to the domestic suit, it is the least
possible stretch to say that they may set it also to a foreign
action, even if to that extent an existing right is cut down.
We can see no constitutional obstacle in the way, and we
are of opinion that they have purported to do it and have
done it.
The question is answered in the affirmative, and it will be
so certified.
[G.R. No. L-2363. September 23, 1948.]
GREGORIO  ARANETA, INC., FRANCISCO JAVIER DE
PITARQUE Y ELIO, ISABEL MARIA DE YNCHAUSTI, and
ANA MARIA DE P I TA R Q U E Y DE
YNCHAUSTI,petitioners,  vs. SOTERO RODAS, Judge of
First Instance of Manila, COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE
TABACOS DE FILIPINAS and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE
TARLAC, respondents.
FACTS:(whether there is law that guides in deciding
interrogatory, it must be decided not law, for there is
none, but by reason and equity).
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
this Court dismissing the special civil action of certiorari
and mandamus filed by the petitioners against the
respondents, which asked that order of the respondent
judge denying the petitioner's motion to compel the
other respondents to answer certain interrogatories
submitted by the former to the latter be set aside, and
that the respondent be ordered to issue an order
compelling the respondent corporation to answer said
interrogatories.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a rule of law which controls or
guides the respondent judge in deciding whether an
interrogatory should be allowed or not?
DECISION:
Since the scope of depositions and written interrogatories
is limited to matters which are not privileged and
relevant to the subject matter involved in a pending
action, and the determination of whether or not an
interrogatory is privileged or material is not left to the
discretion of the court or judge, for there is a law
applicable which serves as norm or guide for the court or
judge to follow, the respondent judge could not commit a
grave abuse of discretion which it did not have in
deciding whether or not the interrogatories in question
are immaterial to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, and therefore they cannot be allowed. If
the respondent judge has acted contrary to law in
deciding that the written interrogatories propounded by
the petitioners to the other respondents are immaterial,
he would have committed an error of law which this
court cannot correct in the present case; but not a grave
abuse of discretion.
What the resolution means to say, and we now expressly
so hold is
that certiorari does not lie at all for the reasons above
stated, andbut leaves it to the court to determine it in
one way or another at his discretion. Principle: When the
law does not provide a rule or norm for the court to
follow in deciding a question submitted to it. He must
decide the question. .the proper remedy is to rise the
question of admissibility of such interrogatories on appeal
from the final judgment of the respondent court or
judge. not in accordance with law for there is none. in
view of the circumstances of the case. reason and equity.
Otherwise the court or judge would abuse his discretion.
but in conformity with justice. the judge is not absolutely
free to act at his pleasure or will or arbitrarily. It is
obvious that the question whether certiorari or appeal is
the proper and adequate remedy may only come up when
the court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
and the act complained of is appealable..
[G.R. No. L-5897. April 23, 1954.]
KING  MAU  WU,  plaintiff-appellee,  vs.FRANCISCO
SYCIP, defendant-appellant
FACTS: (There is no conflict of laws involved, it is only a
question of enforcing an obligation created by or arising
from contract; and unless the enforcement of the
contract be against public policy).
This is an action to collect filed by King Maw Wu against
Francisco Sycip for the amount of P59,082.92, together
with lawful interests from 14 October 1947, the date of
the written demand for payment, and costs.
King Mau Wuu, agent of Francisco Sycip, sold and
delivered 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion to Jas
Maxwell Fasset. Fasset in turn assigned it to Fortrade
Corporation. Under an agency agreement executed in
New York, which was addresse and accepted by Francisco
Sycip on November 22, 1945, King Mau Wu was made the
exclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of coconut oil and its
derivaties outside the Philippines and was to be paid 2 ½
percent on the actual sale price of sales obtained thru his
efforts, in addition to 50 percent of the difference
between the authorized sale price and the actual sale
price.
King Mau Wu claims that for the sale to Fasset, he is
entitled under the agency contract to a commission of 2
½ percent on the total actual sale price of 1,000 tons of
coconut oil emulsion and 50 per cent of the difference
between the authorized sale price of $350 per ton and
the actual selling price of $400 per ton. As Sycip already
made previous payments, King Mau Wu is just collecting
on balance payments due to him.
Sycip, on the other hand, contends that the sales
transaction was not covered by the agency contract
dated November 22 as the sales was agreed upon on
October 16 and that it was an independent and separate
transaction for which King Mau Wu had been duly
compensated.
Lower Court Ruling: Rendered judgment in favor of King
Mau Wu and denied both the motion for reconsideration
and new trial filed by Sycip. Sycip filed an appeal,
contending that the Court of First Instance of Manila has
no jurisdiction over the case as the agency contract was
executed in New York.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has
jurisdiction?
DECISION:
CFI has jurisdiction. A non-resident may sue a resident in
the courts of this country where the defendant may be
summoned and his property leviable upon execution in
the case of a favorable, final, and executory judgment. It
is a personal action for the collection of a sum of money
which the Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction to try
and decide. There is no conflict of laws involved in the
case, because it is only a question of enforcing an
obligation created by or arising from contract; and unless
the enforcement of the contract be against public policy
of the forum, it must be enforced.
The plaintiff is entitled to collect P7,589.88 for
commission and P50,000 for one-half of the overprice, or
a total of P57,589.88, lawful interests thereon from the
date of the filing of the complaint, and costs in both
instances.
[G.R. No. 72494. August 11, 1989.]
H O N G K O N G  A N D  S H A N G H A I  B A N K I N G
CORPORATION,  petitioner,  vs.  JACK ROBERT SHERMAN,
DEODATO RELOJ AND THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
FACTS: (SC held that the parties did not stipulate that
only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the
rest, has jurisdiction).
A Singaporean company applied with and was granted by
the Singapore branch of HSBC an overdraft facility,
secured by a Joint and Several Guarantee executed by
the former’s directors (Filipino residents). In the
Guarantee, there is a clause stipulating that jurisdiction
over any dispute arising from the transaction is vested
with the Singaporean courts. When the Singaporean
company defaulted, HSBC filed suit against the directors
in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the choice of law clause should be
upheld?
DECISION:
Jurisdiction, which finds its source in sovereignty, cannot
be bargained away by the parties. The State can assume
jurisdiction when there is a reasonable basis of exercising
it. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on
some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions on fair play and substantial justice.
In the present case, the minimum contact considered is
the Philippine residence of the private respondents. In
assuming jurisdiction, SC held that the parties did not
stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction.
(Because jurisdiction cannot be stipulated upon, the
choice of jurisdiction was treated as a choice of venue.
And applying thus, the choice of venue is only permissive,
in the absence of restrictive words to lend exclusivity to
the chosen forum.)
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000.]
INTERNATIONAL  SCHOOL  ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
(ISAE),  petitioner,  vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and
Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his
capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as
the Superintendent of  International  School-Manila;
and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
FACTS:(Foreign-hired employees should not be included in
bargaining unit of local hires).
Foreign-hired employees does not indicate their intention
to be group together with local hires) so no bargaining
unit.
In bargaining unit,one factor in determining is affinity
and unity of employees.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the
School), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. The School hires both foreign and
local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The
School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local
hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic
allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work
in the School and was the School responsible for bringing
that individual to the Philippines?
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not
accorded local-hires. These include housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The
School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure. The School grants such benefit to the foreign-
hires because of economic factor, better opportunities
are often available in the country where he foreign-hires
are from. They have to adjust because they have to leave
their country, family and friends. The School also
reasoned that it is also their means of attracting
competent professionals and to stay competitive.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining
agreement were held, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members" of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue,
as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually
caused a deadlock between the parties. A notice of strike
was filed and DOLE eventually acquired jurisdiction
because of the failure to have a compromise. DOLE ruled
in favor of the School.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is discrimination (equal protection)
in the hiring and compensation method used by the
School?
DECISION:
YES. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification
employed by respondent School to justify the distinction
in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be
an invalid classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by foreign-
hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes
public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the
sympathy of this Court.
The Court held that there must be “equal pay for equal
work” Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This
rule applies to the School, its "international character"
notwithstanding. If an employer accords employees the
same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work. This presumption is
borne by logic and human experience. If the employer
pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to
injury. The employer has discriminated against that
employee; it is for the employer to explain why the
employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this
burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires
perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the
local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and
responsibilities, which they perform under similar
working conditions. The School cannot invoke the need to
entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize
the distinction in salary rates without violating the
principle of equal work for equal pay.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract
foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-
hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they
ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the
same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-
hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for
the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and
limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately
compensated by certain benefits accorded them which
are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances.
SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested
for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal
detention against Karen Salvacion. He escaped from
prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees
amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar
deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the
latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
garnishment. Salvacion therefore filed for declaratory
relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended
by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to
comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case
and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli
in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes
futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that
Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then
proceeded to show that the economic basis for the
enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and
even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when
enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality such
as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General
who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. The foreign
currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035
and given incentives and protection by said laws because
such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist
or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court
processes.
Chapter 2
G.R. No. L-2529 December 31, 1949
J. A. SISON, petitioner,
vs.
THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY and ROBERT ORR
FERGUZON, respondents.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 342, persons
possessing certificates as chartered accountants issued by
various incorporated private accountant's societies in
England and other parts of the British Empire, were,
without examination, granted by the respondents Board
of Accountancy, certificates as public accountants to
practice their profession in this jurisdiction. The
respondent Robert Orr Ferguson was granted certificate
No. 713-W on January 14, 1939 pursuant to resolution No.
24 of the Board of Accountancy, series of 1938.
J. A. Sison prays that this Court render judgment
"ordering the respondent Board of Accountancy to revoke
the certificate issued to Robert Orr Ferguson, a British
subject admitted without examination because there
does not exist any reciprocity between the Philippines
and the United Kingdom regarding the practice of
accountancy."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can validly revoke the
certificate issued by the Board of Accountancy to Robert
Orr Ferguson.
DECISION:
No, the certificate will remain valid.
We are bound to take notice of the fact that fact that the
Philippine and the United Kingdom, are bound by a treaty
of friendship and commerce, and each nation is
represented in the other by
corresponding diplomatic envoy. There is no reason
whatsoever to doubt the statement and assurance made
by the diplomatic representative of the British
Government in the Philippines, regarding the practice of
the accountancy profession in the United Kingdom and
the fact that Filipino certified public accountant will be
admitted to practice their profession in the United
Kingdom should they choose to do so.
Under such circumstances, and without necessarily
construing that such attitude of the British Government
in the premises, as represented by the British Minister,
amounts to reciprocity, we may at least state that it
comes within the realm of comity, as contemplated in our
law.
It appearing that the record fails to show that the
suspension of this respondent is . . . based on any of the
cause provided by the Accountancy Law, we find no
reason why Robert Orr Ferguson, who had previously
been registered as certified public accountants and
issued the corresponding certificate public accountant in
the Philippine Islands, should be suspended from the
practice of his profession in these Islands. The petition is
denied, with cost.
G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO
B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-
COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact,
Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION,
respondents
FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l
Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation,
for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l
Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with
headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit
with the POEA for money claims arising from the
unexpired portion of their employment contract which
was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for
BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the
termination of their employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the
Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim
arising out of a contract of employment shall not be
actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the
expiry of the contract,” it appears that their suit has
prescribed.
Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be
10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as
their claim arise from a violation of a contract.
The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of
prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a
different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of
the Phils with a 3 years prescription period should be
applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal
point of view that the 1 year period provided by the Amiri
Decree should be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bahrain law should be applied on the
question of prescription of action.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign
procedural law will not be applied in our country as we
must adopt our own procedural laws.
EXCEPTION:
Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the
Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure
Rule stating “if by the laws of the State or country where
the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also
barred in the Philippines.” Thus, Bahrain law must be
applied. However, the court contends that Bahrain’s law
on prescription cannot be applied because the court will
not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy and the 1 yr. rule on prescription is
against public policy on labor as enshrined in the
Philippine Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to
the case should be Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines with a 3 years prescription period since the
claim arose from labor employment.
G.R. No. L-27429 August 27, 1969
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES.
OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Pe t i t i o n e r O h H e k H o w h a v i n g b e e n g r a n t e d
naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging
that he had complied with the requirements of Republic
Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his
oath of allegiance as such citizen and issued the
corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an
order authorizing the taking of said oath. On that same
date, petitioner took it and the certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. The Government
seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from
said order of February9, 1966 and filed its record on
appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior
to judgment having been final and executory.
ISSUE:
- Whether or not the oath is valid
- Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is
necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist
China.
DECISION:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oath-taking) had not —
and up to the present has not become final and
executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the
Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our
laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen
of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws
and cannot be controlled by any foreign law.
However, the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip
himself of that status is necessarily governed —pursuant
to Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of
China, not by those of the Philippines. As a consequence,
a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of
the Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of
Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its
Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of
nationality.
Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No.473 provides,
however, that before the naturalization certificate is
issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," interalia,
that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and
particularly to the state "of which" he is "a subject or
citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to
divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring
Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would have
two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct
sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the acquisition of
citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of
the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American
countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his
Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants
the same privilege to its citizens and such had been
agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the
foreign country from which citizenship is acquired."
G.R. No. 55380 September 26, 1994
IN RE: PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE
REGISTER OF DEATHS OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY OF DAVAO
CITY, FROM THE NAME "FLAVIANO CASTRO ZAPANTA" TO
"FLORENCIO B. ZAPANTA," GLICERIA S. ZAPANTA,
petitioners,
vs.
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF THE CITY OF DAVAO
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gliceria Zapanta is the widow of Florencio B.
Zapanta. When Florencio died, the local civil registrar of
Davao City issued a death certificate. However, she found
that the name appearing therein was “Flaviano Castro
Zapanta” albeit the date of death and all other
circumstances and information reflected therein clearly
and conclusively revealed that the person referred to
therein was no other than her late husband, Florencio.
Gliceria, therefore, filed a petition for correction of
entry in the register of death. The trial court dismissed
the petition on the ground that the correction of the
name “Flaviano Castro Zapanta” to “Florencio B.
Zapanta” was not merely clerical but substantial in
nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error
DECISION:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.
The general perception was that the judicial proceeding
under Art. 412 of the Civil Code, implemented by Rule
108 of the Rules of Court, could only justify the
correction of innocuous or clerical errors apparent on the
face of the record and capable of being corrected by
mere reference to it, such as misspellings and obvious
mistakes.
However, in later cases, the Court has held that it
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
Adversary Proceeding, defined
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adversary proceeding” as
follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished
from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party,
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it...”
Thus, provided the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel has been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered, the suit or proceeding is “appropriate.”
G.R. No. 138842. October 18, 2000
NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR.,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF
MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P. NAZARENO and
ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents.
FACTS:
The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate
tax, while they are alive, executed several Deeds of Sale
in favor of their children. The sale was proven to be
without consideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of
Sale are part of the estate of the deceased.
DECISION:
No, the children never acquired ownership because the
sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to a
Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the
other children of the deceased. The properties should be
collated as part of the estate.
G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, respondent.
FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate
of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said
intestate estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-
half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to
sell the ice produced from the said plant in the
Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as
party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate
applied for is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial
judicial personality.
DECISION:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial
judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying.
The situation has not changed except for his death, and
the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the
mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for
this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person
is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising
such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of
the decedent as survived after his death unless the
fiction is indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial
or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, include the exercise
during the judicial administration of those rights and the
fulfilment of those obligations of his estate which
survived after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of
the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. It includes those rights and fulfilment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like
his pending application at the commission.
G.R. No. L-42780 January 17, 1936
MANILA GAS CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-
appellee.
FACTS:
This is an action brought by the Manila Gas Corporation
against the Collector of Internal Revenue for the recovery
of P56,757.37, which the plainT³ was required by the
defendant to deduct and withhold from the various sums
paid it to foreign corporations as dividends and interest
on bonds and other indebtedness and which the plainT³
paid under protest.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue was
justified in withholding income taxes on interest on
bonds and other indebtedness paid to non-resident
corporations
DECISION:
YES. The approved doctrine is that no state may tax
anything not within its jurisdiction without violating the
due process clause of the constitution. The taxing power
of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits,
but within such it may tax persons, property, income, or
business. If an interest in property is taxed, the situs of
either the property or interest must be found within the
state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must
have a domicile within the state or the property or
business out of which the income issues must be situated
within the state so that the income may be said to have a
situs therein. Personal property may be separated from
its owner, and he may be taxed on its account at the
place where the property is although it is not the place of
his own domicile and even though he is not a citizen or
resident of the state which imposes the tax. But debts
owing by corporations are obligations of the debtors, and
only possess value in the hands of the creditors. The
Manila Gas Corporation operates its business entirely
within the Philippines. Its earnings, therefore come from
local sources. The place of material delivery of the
interest to the foreign corporations paid out of the
revenue of the domestic corporation is of no particular
moment. The place of payment even if conceded to be
outside of the country cannot alter the fact that the
income was derived from the Philippines. The word
"source" conveys only one idea, that of origin, and the
origin of the income was the Philippines.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
FACTS:
 governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
the United States. He had five legitimate children with illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are
children with his second wife (who survived him) and, not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
finally, three illegitimate children. 6 years prior Amos is the national law of the deceased.
Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his seven
surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions
to the project of partition claiming that they have been
deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled
according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that
the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed
by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate
wills.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case

in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933

DECISION: ALLISON G. GIBBS,

petitioner-appelle,
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the vs.
effect that his properties shall be distributed in THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national oppositor-appellant.
law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA,
Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law respondent-appellant.
should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled
in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be FACTS:

Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both
citizens of
California and domiciled therein since their marriage in
July 1906. There was no antenuptial marriage contract
between the parties and during the existence their
marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine
Islands, as conjugal property. On November 28, 1929,
Mrs. Gibbs died and that in accordance with the law of
California, the community property of spouses who are
citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous
to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the
surviving husband without administration. In intestate
proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22, 1930,
filed an ex parte petition. The court granted said petition
and entered a decree adjudicating the said Allison D.
Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said lands,
applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California.
When this decree presented to the Register of Deeds of
Manila and demanded for the issuance of a Transfer
Certificate of Title, it declined to accept as binding said
decree of court and refused to register the transfer of
title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on
the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had
not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in the said court a
petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds
"to issue the corresponding titles" to the petitioner
without requiring previous payment of any inheritance
tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her
death is the owner of a descendible interest in the
Philippine lands.
DECISION:
The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code
provides:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in
which it may be situated. The second paragraph of article
10 applies only when a legal or testamentary succession
has taken place in the Philippines and in accordance with
the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is
consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the
extent of the successional rights; in other words, the
second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when
the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke, the court said:It is
principle firmly established that to the law of the state in
which the land is situated we must look for the rules
which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and
for the effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances.
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph
of article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal
property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner
thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which
it is situated.”
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the
title which vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the
acquisition of the community lands here in question must
be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is
admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were
acquired as community property of the conjugal
partnership of the appellee and his wife.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she was vested of
a title equal to that of her husband. It results that the
wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine
Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that of
her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by
certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from
the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the
lands aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of
inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the
language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It
is unnecessary in this proceeding to determine the "order
of succession" or the "extent of the successional
rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California
which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs.
Gibbs.
G. R. No. 2935 March 23, 1909
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK
FACTS:
In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, Frank entered
into a contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff,
by which Frank was to receive a salary as a stenographer
in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition
thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred
in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and
one-half salary during said period of travel.
Said contract contained a provision that in case of a
violation of its terms on the part of Frank, he should
become liable to the Plaintiff for the amount expended
by the Government by way of expenses incurred in
traveling from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary
paid during such period.
Frank entered upon the performance of his contract and
was paid half-salary from the date until the date of his
arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Frank left the service of the Plaintiff and
refused to make a further compliance with the terms of
the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI-Manila to
recover from Frank the sum of money, which amount the
Plaintiff claimed had been paid to Frank as expenses
incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half-
salary for the period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said
contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute
a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special
defense, alleging in his special defense that
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had
amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby
materially altered the said contract, and also that
(2) he was a minor at the time the contract was entered
into and was therefore not responsible under the law.
the lower court rendered a judgment against Frank and in
favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of 265. 90 dollars.
ISSUE:
1. Did the amendment of the laws altered the tenor of
the contract entered into between Plaintiff and
Defendant?
2. Can the defendant allege minority/infancy?
DECISION:
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
1. NO; It may be said that the mere fact that the
legislative department of the Government of the
Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No.
224 by Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have the effect
of changing the terms of the contract made between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant. The legislative department
of the Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of
the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the
terms of a contract. The right which the Defendant had
acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not
been changed in any respect by the fact that said laws
had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of
the contract, still constituted a part of said contract and
were enforceable in favor of the Defendant.
2. NO; The Defendant alleged in his special defense that
he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be
enforced against him. The record discloses that, at the
time the contract was entered into in the State of
Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State and
had full authority to contract. Frank claims that, by
reason of the fact that, under that laws of the Philippine
Islands at the time the contract was made, made persons
in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had
attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine
Islands governed.
It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is
admitted — that at the time and place of the making of
the contract in question the Defendant had full capacity
to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than
that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation
and validity of a contract are determined b the law of
the place where the contract is made. Matters connected
with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing
at the place of performance. Matters respecting a
remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of
evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the
law of the place where the suit is brought.
In the matter of the petition of Vicente Rosal Pardo to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines.

G.R. No. 45144 April 3, 1939
M. E. GREY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
FACTS:
Insular Lumber Company is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of New York, licensed
to engage in business in the Philippines, with offices in
the City of Manila, in Fabrica, Occidental Negros, in New
York and in Philadelphia. M. E Gray is the owner and
possessor of 6, shares of the capital stock of the
defendant corporation. The dispute arises when he asked
the offices of insular lumber in Manila and in Fabrica to
permit him to examine the books and records of the
business of said defendant, but he was not allowed to do
so. According to Insular Lumber, applying the law of New
York, the rights of a stockholder to examine the books
and records of a corporation organized under the laws of
that State, have been, during the entire period material
to this action, only those provided in section 77 of the
Stock Corporation Law which substantially provides that
only stockholder owning at least three percent of the
capital stock has the right to examine the books and
records of the corporation.
M.E Grey, not being a stockholder owning at least three
percent of the capital stock has not right to examine.
M.E Gray, contends that under our Corporation code,
under which insular lumber company was registered to do
business in the Philippines, he is entitled, as stockholder,
to inspect the record of the transactions of the defendant
corporation (sec. 51, Act No. 1459), and this right, which
is recognized in the common law, has not been altered by
section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law of New.
Lower Court’s Decision: The petition for mandamus
compelling the company to allow him examine the books
and records was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not M.E Gray is entitled, as stockholder of
the Insular Lumber Company, to inspect
and examine the books and records of the transactions of
said company.
DECISION:
No. The decision of the CFI was affirmed denying the
mandamus against the company and
absolving it from the complaint.
1. The stipulation of facts is binding upon both parties
and cannot be altered by either of them.
On the strength of that principle M.E Gray is bound to
adhere to the agreement made by him with the Insular
Lumber Co. in paragraph four of the stipulation of facts,
to the effect that the rights of a stockholder, under the
law of New York, to examine the books and records of a
corporation organized under the laws of said State, and
during the entire period material to this action, are only
those provided in section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law
of New York. Under this law, plaintiff has the right to be
furnished by the treasurer or other fiscal officer of the
corporation with a statement of its affairs embracing a
particular account of all its assets and
liabilities.
The right under the common law cannot be granted by
insular lumber in the present case,
since the same can only be granted at the discretion of
the court, under certain conditions, to wit;
(a) That the stockholder of a corporation in New York has
the right to inspect its books and records if it can be
shown that he seeks information for an honest purpose
(b) That said right to examine and inspect the books of
the corporation must be exercised in good faith, for a
specific and honest purpose, and not to gratify curiosity,
or for speculative or vexatious purposes.
The M.E Gray has made no effort to prove or even allege
that the information he desired to obtain through the
examination and inspection of defendant’s books was
necessary to protect his interests as stockholder of the
corporation, or that it was for a specific and honest
purpose,
and not to gratify curiosity, nor for speculative or
vexatious purposes.
G.R. NO. L-2934 November 29, 1951
SY KIONG, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Treasurer of
the City of Manila, respondent-appellant.
This is an action for declaratory relief filed in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the purpose of determining
if petitioner is liable to pay the municipal license tax
upon his sales of flour to bakeries under Ordinance No.
2723 of the city of Manila, as amended.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner of a duly licensed grocery store
located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who
sells either to bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of
retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the
City of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php
which represents the alleged deficiency municipal license
tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries
after. deducting the sales made to retail dealers for
purposes of resale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sales of flour made by the Petitioner
to bakeries to be manufactured into bread are retail or
wholesale.
DECISION:
The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured into
bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of
any express provision of law on the matter, should be
treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor
to the retail tax law.
G.R. No. L-2247 January 23, 1950
VICENTE ROSAL PARDO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
FACTS:
Vicente Rosal Pardo, a Spanish citizen born in Spain in
1895 and residing in the Philippines since 1905, where he
married a Filipino woman and where he is at present
employed, in Manila, with an annual salary of P4,800, has
been adjudged by the Court of First Instance of Manila
entitled to become a Filipino citizen. That the appellee is
unable to speak and write any of the principal Filipino
languages is the first ground of appeal by the
Government.
The applicant testified that he knows enough Tagalog to
be understood in that language. Lino Gutierrez, a
respectable citizen who has intimately known the
applicant for 27 years, having had business relations with
him, conformed the applicant's testimony. Judge said the
fact that the applicant arrived in the Philippines when he
was only ten years old and has lived here 44 years
continuously except for a few months visit in Spain,
mingling and dealing by reason of his work with people
who use Tagalog in their daily intercourse, lends
credence in his testimony that he has acquired a good
working knowledge of that language.
ISSUE:
Whether the certification of the supposed naturalization
laws of Spain made by the Spanish Consul General
constitutes competent proof of that law?
DECISION:
Yes. No specific procedure is indicated in the premises, it
is only necessary that the merits of the petition be
passed on and a decision reached on a far consideration
of the evidence on satisfactory proof. Accordingly,
evidence of the law of a foreign country or reciprocity
regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice by section 41 of
Rule 123, may be allowed and used as basis for a
favorable action if, in the light of all circumstances, the
court is satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof
offered.
G.R. No. L-6801 September 28, 1954
HERBERT BROWNELL, JR., Attorney General of the
United States, as successor of the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, plaintiff-appellant, 
 On the other hand, there is no question that the Philippine
vs.
 Alien Property Administrator can now invoke section 3 of the
MACARIO BAUTISTA, defendant-appellee,
 Philippine Property Act of 1946 in order to secure the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant.
FACTS:
On October 6, 1947, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator, hereinafter referred to as Administrator, issued
vesting order No. P-394, which was amended on February 2,
and July 14, 1949, vesting in himself, among others, one-half
undivided interest in the following properties: (a) five parcel
of land situate in the city of Baguio and one parcel situate in
San Clemente, Tarlac; (b) personal properties consisting of
furniture and household equipments; (c) the sum of
P5,156.83 representing balance of a saving account with the
People's Bank and Trust Company, Baguio branch; (d) the
sum of P1,867.50 representing rents and income of the lands
mentioned above; and (e) the net proceeds of an insurance
policy in the amount of $1,451.81.
The vesting was made upon the claim that the one-half
undivided interest was owned by Carlos Teraoka and Marie
Dolores Teraoka who were found to be nationals of Japan, an
enemy country. After the vesting, the Administrator
demanded from their grandfather, Macario Bautista, who was
in possession of the aforementioned properties, the delivery
to him of the possession of one-half thereof. Because of such
refusal, the Administrator filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Mountain Province praying for the partition of the
properties and the delivery of one-half thereof to the plaintiff.
After hearing, the court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint, the court holding in effect that plaintiff failed to
prove that Carlos and Marie Dolores are Japanese Nationals;
that the evidence in fact shows that they are Filipino citizens;
and that the vesting of their interest in the property in
question was erroneous and, therefore, the vesting order
issued by the plaintiff in connection with said interest is illegal
and did not vest ownership thereof in the plaintiff.
issuance of any peremptory order from any court of first
instance in this jurisdiction to enforce a vesting order to
enable said Administrator to obtain possession of the
properties vested. (see: Thus in the case of Herbert Brownell,
Jr. vs. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada)
MAIN ISSUE:
Is the action taken by the Administrator, by its nature,
substance, and prayer, one that comes under said action
section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946?
RULING:
NO.
"The present action is not one, and could not be one, under
section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 viewed from
the standpoint of its form, substance and prayer. The present
action is clearly an action for petition of real estate, which
incidentally includes personal properties, under Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court." This can be gleaned from the nature both of
the interest involved and the relief prayed for in the
complaint.
It should be noted that the complaint prays for partition of
the properties and not merely for delivery of their possession.
Apparently, this is an action contemplated in Rule 71 wherein
the court, before proceeding with the partition, has to pass
upon the rights or the ownership of the parties interested in
the property (Section 2). In an action for partition the
determination of ownership is indispensable to make proper
adjudication. In this particular case, this acquires added force
considering that the titles of the properties appear issued in
the name of defendants, and the plaintiff contends that they
belong to enemy aliens. By filing this action of partition in the
court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has
submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his
vesting order. He cannot therefore now dispute this power. It
is true that the complaint does not specifically allege that the
Administrator is invoking the authority of the court under
section 3 of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 and that the
failure to make mention of that fact should no militate
against the stand of the Administrator. But while we agree
with this contention, the fact however remains that the very
averments of the complaint show that the real purpose of the
action is not the recovery of possession but the partition of
the properties. This makes this case come, as already said,
under Rule 71 of our Rules of Court.
We are, therefore, persuaded to conclude, and so hold, that
the lower court did not err in passing upon the nationality of
Carlos and Marie Dolores Teraoka, or in determining the
validity of the vesting order issued by the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator, wherefore we affirm the decision
appealed from, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his
father and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos,
vs. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES and COURT OF
APPEAL
FACTS:
Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines.
Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a
foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota,
U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch
office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from
NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In
December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the
NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his
departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and
re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no
reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He
therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the
petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the
plaintiff’s destination was Manila?
DECISION:
The place of destination, within the meaning of the
Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the
contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the
ticket between the passenger and the carrier.
Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his
ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date
of the return flight was left open, the contract of
carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was
bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from
Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an
agreed stopping place and not the destination.
Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a
"destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the
"destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that
controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under
the Convention.
The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning
with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate
destination. The use of the singular in this expression
indicates the understanding of the parties to the
Convention that every contract of carriage has one place
of departure and one place of destination. An
intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is
not regarded as a "place of destination."
CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES, INC. v SHUTE
Brief Fact Summary.  Plaintiff Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
opposes a suit by a passenger injured on one of their
cruise ships, because the cruise tickets contained an
agreement that all matters relating to the cruise would
be litigated before a Florida court.
 Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States held that


Synopsis of Rule of Law.  Forum-selection clauses forcing
individuals to agree to submit to jurisdiction in a
particular place are enforceable so long as they pass the
test for judicial fairness.
FACTS:
Defendant Shute purchased passage for a seven day
cruise on the Tropicale, a ship owned by Plaintiff,
through a Washington travel agent. The face of each
ticket contained terms and conditions of passage, which
included an agreement that all matters disputed or
litigated subject to the travel agreement, would be
before a Florida court. Defendant boarded the ship in
California, which then sailed to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico
before returning to Los Angeles. While the ship was in
international waters, Defendant Eulala Shute was injured
from slipping on a deck mat. Defendants filed suit in
Federal District Court in Washington. Defendant filed a
motion for summary judgment, alleging that the clause in
the tickets required Defendants to bring their suit in
Florida.
ISSUE:
Whether the court should enforce a forum-selection
clause forcing individuals to submit to jurisdiction in a
particular state.
HELD:
the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to enforce the
forum-selection clause.

Forum-selection clauses contained in form passage
contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental
fairness, but where they are not lacking in fairness, they
will be enforced. In reaching its decision, the court noted
that there is no evidence that Plaintiff set Florida as the
forum as a means of discouraging cruise passengers from
pursuing their claims. Such a suggestion is negated by the
fact that Plaintiff has its headquarters in Florida, and
many of its cruises depart from Florida.
LEDESMA v STEWARD PRODUCE INC.
Facts
On May 13, 1981, Alfonso Ledesma, Josephine Rodriguez,
Rafaela Gaytan, and Jennifer Santiago ("plaintiffs"), all
California residents, were injured on an Arizona highway
when their van was allegedly struck by a tractor driven
by defendant John Wayne Mize, an Arkansas resident, and
owned by defendants Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., an
Oklahoma corporation with its principal place of business
in Oklahoma, and Jack Stewart, an Oklahoma resident
("defendants"). On April 7, 1983, plaintiffs filed a
diversity action in the Eastern District of California,
seeking damages arising out of the accident. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the
one-year California statute of limitations applied and
barred the action against them. The district court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the action as
time-barred.  Plaintiffs appeal from the order of
dismissal.
Discussion
It is well-settled that in diversity cases federal
courts must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum
state.
the court must first determine if the laws of the
two jurisdictions differ. If they do differ, the court should
determine whether both states have an interest in
applying their respective law. If only one state has an
interest, there is no "true conflict" of laws and the court
should apply the law of the interested jurisdiction. If
both states have an interest in having their differing laws
applied, a true conflict arises; in that case the court
should apply the law of the state whose interest would be
more impaired if its law were not applied.
Arizona's interest would be significantly impaired
by a failure to apply its statute of limitations. The
Arizona legislature has established a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury claims arising out of
highway accidents. Insofar as drivers tend to be more
careful when their chances of incurring liability are more
substantial, Arizona does have an interest in ensuring
that its statute of limitations is applied in any case that
arises from accidents occurring within its state borders.
Were we to apply the California statute of limitations in
this case, we would impede the legitimate interest of the
state of Arizona in promoting highway safety by allowing
a cause of action for a two-year period.
Applying the "governmental interest" analysis of
California's choice-of-law rules, we conclude that
Arizona's interests would be impaired by the failure to
apply its statute of limitations more than California's
interests would be impaired by the failure to apply its
statute. California has little interest in applying its
statute of limitations when no California defendant is
involved and when California plaintiffs seek to recover
for injuries that occurred in a state in which the claim
was not time-barred. Arizona's legitimate government
policy would be impaired by a failure to allow the cause
of action that it has established for personal injury
claims. Accordingly, we hold that the Arizona statute of
limitations should apply in the present case and that the
district court erred in dismissing the complaint.
[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor
and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased,  Executor and Heir-appellees,  vs.  HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in
New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the
State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines
until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the
United States and stayed there for the following nine
years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and
was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in
July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again
departed the Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later,
in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came
back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more
to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at
his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at
the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Mr. Christensen was domiciled in the
Philippines at the time of his death.
DECISION:
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact
that he was born in New York, migrated to California and
resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely
and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines
and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to
denote something more than mere physical presence.
(Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken
to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode.
But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place
where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business
which would require his presence for several weeks or
months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is
clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not
giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled
New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires
the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
"Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest
temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it
is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper
one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
IN RE SHOOP
FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice
law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for
the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the
Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that
he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest
court of the State of New York.
- The said rule requires that: New York State by comity
confers the privilege of admission without
examination under similar circumstances to attorneys
admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from
comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must
show they have practiced at least 5 years in any
(district or circuit or highest) court of the US or territory
of it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits
admission without examination in the discretion of the
Appellate
Division in several cases:
1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a
member of the bar in the highest law court in any
other state or territory of the American Union or in
the District of Columbia
2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another
country whose jurisprudence is based on the
principles of the English Common Law (ECL).
ISSUE
WON under the New York rule as it exists the
principle of comity is established
HELD
- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the
US, under a civil gov't. established by the Congress.
- In interpreting and applying the bulk of the
written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its
decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the
written law, this court relies upon the theories and
precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the
limited exception of those instances where the
remnants of the Spanish written law present well-
defined civil law theories and of the few cases where
such precedents are inconsistent with local customs
and institutions.
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based
upon the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-
American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys
admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to those
privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
- Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation
of the NY rule; doesn’t establish a precedent with
respect to future applications.
G.R. No. L-2363 September 23, 1948
GREGORIO ARANETA INC.
vs
SOTERO RODAS
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
this Court dismissing the special civil action of certiorari
and mandamus filed by the petitioners against the
respondents, which asked that order of the respondent
judge denying the petitioner's motion to compel the
other respondents to answer certain interrogatories
submitted by the former to the latter be set aside, and
that the respondent be ordered to issue an order
compelling the respondent corporation to answer said
interrogatories.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a rule of law which controls or
guides the respondent judge in deciding whether an
interrogatory should be allowed or not.
DECISION:
Since the scope of depositions and written interrogatories
is limited to matters which are not privileged and
relevant to the subject matter involved in a pending
action, and the determination of whether or not an
interrogatory is privileged or material is not left to the
discretion of the court or judge, for there is a law
applicable which serves as norm or guide for the court or
judge to follow, the respondent judge could not commit a
grave abuse of discretion which it did not have in
deciding whether or not the interrogatories in question
are immaterial to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, and therefore they can not be allowed. If
the respondent judge has acted contrary to law in
deciding that the written interrogatories propounded by
the petitioners to the other respondents are immaterial,
he would have committed an error of law which this
court can not correct in the present case; but not a grave
abuse of discretion.
What the resolution means to say, and we now expressly
so hold is that certiorari does not lie at all for the reasons
above stated, and the proper remedy is to rise the
question of admissibility of such interrogatories on appeal
from the final judgment of the respondent court or
judge. It is obvious that the question whether certiorari
or appeal is the proper and adequate remedy may only
come up when the court has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and the act complained of is appealable.
Principle:
When the law does not provide a rule or norm for the
court to follow in deciding a question submitted to it, but
leaves it to the court to determine it in one way or
another at his discretion, the judge is not absolutely free
to act at his pleasure or will or arbitrarily. He must
decide the question, not in accordance with law for there
is none, but in conformity with justice, reason and
equity, in view of the circumstances of the case.
Otherwise the court or judge would abuse his discretion.
GR 133876 December 29, 1999
BANK OF AMERICA
vs
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION
FACTS:
Petitioner granted loans to 3 foreign corporations. As
security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the
Philippines owned by herein respondent ARC. ARC is a
third party mortgagor who pledged its own property in
favor of the 3 debtor-foreign corporations. The debtors
failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in
foreign courts to enforce the loan. Subsequently, it filed
a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the
said mortgage, which was granted. On 12 February 1993,
private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch
159, an action for damages against the petitioner, for the
latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate
mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before
foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit
against the principal debtors for the recovery of the loan
before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy
of foreclosure.
DECISION:
Yes.
1. Loan; Mortgage; remedies:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue
either of the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be
impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in
itself.
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the
mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates
as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is
deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection
or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor
upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice
but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where
the sale is to be made.
In the case at bar, petitioner only has one cause of action
which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless,
alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and
exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of
two remedies so as not to violate the rule against
splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that
petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits
before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy
to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over
the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein
private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil
actions and by eventually foreclosing extra-judicially the
mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules
against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in
jurisprudence and our statute books.
2. Conflicts of Law
Incidentally, petitioner alleges that under English Law,
which according to petitioner is the governing law with
regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does
not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions
for sums of money.
We rule in the negative.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-
imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same
as our local or domestic or internal

law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual
presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English
Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not
be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant
case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
G.R. NO. L-41795 AUGUST 29, 1980
PHILLIPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
vs
HON. JUAN ECHIVERRI
FACTS:
On May 29, 1974, the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCOM for short), a banking corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines that has
been engaged in normal commercial banking transactions
since 1939, filed a complaint for the recovery, jointly and
severally from therein defendants, of over P25 million
allegedly embezzled from it over a period of 16 years by
its said employees defendants, Yu Chiao Chin, alias
Nelson Yu, assistant manager, in-charge of the Auditing
Department; Paulino How, manager of the Business
Development Department; Faustino Carlos, Ildefonso
Carino, Conrado Galvez, Arsenic Lorenzo, Enrique
Lorenzo, Ricardo Carlos, Victoriano Salvador and
Felizardo Albaira, bookkeepers. PBCOM prayed for full
restitution of the amount embezzled, and payment of
attorney's fees and exemplary damages. Upon its
application, the trial court issued writs of attachment
and, through the City Sheriff of Manila, attached various
real and personal properties of the. defendants.
Separately, each of the defendants, except Victoriano
Salvador who died in the meantime, filed responsive
pleadings, either an answer or a motion to dismiss, the
last of which was filed on August 15, 1974.
The Agreement was signed by the PBCOM represented by
its president, Edward S. Go, as PARTY OF THE FIRST PART
and each of the defendants in his own behalf as PARTIES
OF THE SECOND
PART.
On March 17, 1975, the counsel for the PBCOM on one
hand, and the counsels for each of the defendants on the
other, jointly filed a "Motion for Judgment on the Basis of
Attached Compromise Agreement."
On April 17, 1975, respondent judge issued an order
resetting the hearing or the motion for judgment on the
basis of the compromise agreement and at the same time
making the observation motu proprio that "there are
certain objectionable features concerning the
compromise agreement, as submitted, such as matters
pertaining to a proposed compromise involving the
criminal aspect of the case, 'Which is contrary to law.
Therefore, the parties who have already signed the said
compromise agreement are hereby instructed to go over
the same and see how it could be properly approved by
the Court, taking into consideration the provisions of law
as well as public morals and policy."
On April 26, 1975, tile parties — the PBCOM, thru its
president, and the defendants in their own behalf and
each assisted by counsel submitted a manifestation and
motion in order to have the phrase "and criminal charge
hereinabove mentioned" (contained in paragraph 7 of the
Compromise Agreement) and "and criminal
charge" (contained in paragraph 10 of the Compromise
Agreement), supra, deleted and — praying that judgment
be rendered on the basis of the Compromise Agreement
as thus modified.
On May 12, 1975, the defendant Conrado Galvez thru his
counsel filed a Manifestation pointing out two alleged
objectionable features in the compromise agreement
signed by him, which he claimed to be "contrary to law,
public policy and decency," namely, the provision thereof
to the effect that said agreement even after its approval
by the court shall be without prejudice to charging anew
the same defendants on the basis of other anomalies
which might be discovered in the bank thereafter,
contrary to his expectation that the dismissal of the
present criminal and civil cases would terminate with
finality any and all litigations between the parties; and
the provision regarding quitclaim where said defendant
would be considered as having voluntarily resigned,
waiving his right to reinstatement in the service, his right
to retirement with the corresponding gratuity or
compensation and his right to receive the benefits under
the Staff Provident Fund. But said defendant made no
claim that he did not voluntarily sign the compromise or
that Ws consent had been obtained through mistake,
violence or fraud. 4 In fact, he based his objection on his
claim that "it was the plaintiff, from the outset, who
persuaded Galvez to turn state witness and promised him
reciprocal benefits should he agree to become such, and
to which Galvez agreed and had done his part, but
plaintiff had reneged on its promise and commitment.
Countering the manifestation of Conrado Galvez, PBCOM
thru counsel maintained the legality and validity of' the
quitclaim duly signed by said Galvez. As to the terms of
the, Agreement, viz. that it "shall not in any manner bar
or preclude the Bank from asserting the rights against the
PARTIES OF THE SECOND PART in the event that the Bank
subsequently discovers such other transactions on,
dealings ill which any or all the PARTIES OF THE SECOND
PART are directly or indirectly involved and which are
prejudicial to the Bank's interest," said counsel explained
that the agreement was intended by the bank to cover
only such matters of transactions which were known or
disclosed to it by the defendants and not those of which
it had no knowledge at the time of execution thereof.
On July 3, 1975, respondent judge issued an order setting
the case for hearing "at which all the parties will be
afforded the opportunity to individually show whether or
not there is sufficient basis for the quitclaims in question
viewed from the standpoint of law, public policy and
morals vis-a-vis employer-employee relations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered is
valid and binding among the parties?
DECISION:
The present petition is found to be meritorious.
1. Contrary to the bare conclusion of respondent judge
ordering the deletion of the names of herein
respondents-defendants from the above-quoted
Paragraph 7 of the compromise agreement, whereby he
would free them from their agreement of voluntarily
resigning from petitioner bank and waiving whatever
rights they may have against petitioner arising from their
employment or the case, including all benefits and rights
under petitioner's Staff Provident Fund and retirement
plan in consideration of petitioner's agreement to dismiss
the P25 million case against them and discharging them
from all obligations and liabilities thereunder, there is
nothing in said resignation and waiver undertakings of
respondents that "transgresses the law" or is "contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order
and, therefore is considered inexistent and void from the
beginning" — and no such law or authority was cited by
respondent judge or respondents to justify or support his
erroneous assertion.
Respondent judge's "finding" that herein respondents-
bookkeepers "all occupied an inferior position in the
negotiations on the Compromise Agreement in question,
with respect to the plaintiff-bank and/or together with
principal defendants Yu Chiao Chin alias Nelson Yu and
Paulino L. How. Be it remembered that these principal
defendants as early- as the year 1970, long before the
Complaint herein was filed, had admitted in writing and
'assumed full responsibility for whatever consequences
may arise and that we declare the bookkeepers free from
all responsibility,or even his pre-judged subjective
perception in his earlier Order of July 3, 1975
hereinabove quoted that "there was obviously an
imbalance in [their] treatment" in the "unfair" and "one-
sided compromise agreement" do not at all warrant his
rash deletion of the respondents' reciprocal undertaking
in exchange of petitioner's dismissal of the case and
waiver of its claims as "contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy and public order." This is so,
particularly considering that respondent judge approved
the very same compromise agreement in toto without any
deletion of the provisions in question as to defendants
How and Yu, who were charged in the complaint below
together with herein respondents-defendants as having
connived and acted in concert with each other to defraud
petitioner of some P25 million and respondent judge in
his above-quoted "findings" found that "the admissions of
the several defendants-bookkeepers I herein respondents]
approximated this finding [of P25 million defrauded loss
found by Sycip, Gorres, Velayo & Co., the independent
auditors]; i.e. P21 million alone by Nelson Yu." All of
them being similarly situated and having been charged
with connivance and conspiracy .n carrying out through
the years the huge defraudation of petitioner, respondent
judge could not arbitrarily declare the provisions in
question void as to the herein seven respondents-
conspirators and valid as t6 the two others above named.
2. Far from being "one-sided" and "unfair", it thus appears
that in exchange of herein respondents' voluntary
resignation (which employment they could not have clung
to anyway considering the huge defraudation of over P25
million carried out with their connivance and covered by
their admissions, as per respondent judge's own "findings"
in his decision, supra,which certainly would warrant their
dismissal even on the mere ground of total loss of trust
and confidence) and waiver of any dubious rights arising
from their employment and the case below, including all
benefits and rights under petitioner's Staff Provident
Fund and retirement plan (which they would nevertheless
have lost and forfeited upon separation from the service
all of which involved petty amounts compared to the over
P25 million sought to be recovered by petitioner, herein
respondents got a pretty good deal. Petitioner in
consideration thereof and probably realizing the futility
of collecting any amount from them, agreed to dismiss
the case against them and discharge them from all
liability and required no assumption of monetary liability
from them contenting itself with the much lesser
amounts of P600,000.00 and P6,610,000.00 undertaken to
be paid it by the defendants Paulino How and Yu Chiao
Chin alias Nelson Yu, respectively. This is the whole
essence of a compromise as provided in Article 2028 of
the Civil Code whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, whether of greater benefit or not to one or
the other party, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced.
3. The parties therefore have every freedom to enter into
a compromise agreement, as in any other contract, the
only exceptions being certain prohibited subjects of
compromise such as the civil status of persons as
provided in Article 2035 of the Civil Code (none of which
is applicable here) and the general restriction in Article
1306 of the Civil Code that 'The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
The law and the precepts of morals or good customs need
no definition. They need only to be cited and none has or
can be cited as being transgressed by the cited provisions
in question. As to the remaining fields of public order and
public policy, the Court has since the early case of
Ferrazzini vs. Gsell 15 pointed out that the two terms are
practically equivalent, citing Manresa that "Public policy
(order publico) — which does not here signify the
material keeping of public order — represents in the law
of persons the public, social and legal interest, that
which is permanent and essential of the institutions, that
which. even in favoring an individual in whom the right
lies, cannot be left to his own will." The Code
Commission however in drafting our present Code
included the two terms, stating ill its report that "Public
order, which is found in the Spanish Civil Code, is not as
broad as public policy, as the latter may refer not only to
public safety but also, to considerations which are moved
by the common good.
In Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, the Court enjoined that
"courts should not rashly extend the rule which holds that
a contract is void as against public policy" and laid down
the following criteria: "The term 'public policy' is vague
and uncertain in meaning, floating and changeable in
connotation. It may be said, however, that, in general, a
contract which is neither prohibited by law nor
condemned by judicial decision, nor contrary to public
morals, contravenes no public policy. In the absence of
express legislation or constitutional prohibition, a court,
in order to declare a contract void as against public
policy, must find that the contract as to the consideration
or thing to be done, has a tendency to injure the public,
is against the public good, or contravenes some
established interests of society, or is inconsistent with
sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights, whether of
personal liability or of private property. Examining the
contract at bar, we are of the opinion that it does not in
any way militate against the public good. Neither does it
contravene the policy of the law nor the established
interests of society.
Thus, the provisions in question which are neither
prohibited by law nor condemned by judicial decision nor
contrary to morals and good customs cannot be said to
contravene any public policy or to militate against the
public good.
4. The Civil Code in fact contains salutary provisions that
encourage and favor compromises and does not even
require judicial approval. As the Court held in Cochingyan
vs. Cloribel "Pursuant to Article 2037 of the Civil Code, 'A
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority
of res judicata ...' and this is true even if the compromise
is not judicially approved." Article 2032 of the Civil Code
provides only that "the court's approval is necessary in
compromises entered into by guardians, parents,
absentee's representatives, and administrators or
executors of decedents' estates," and in no other case.
Thus, parties-litigants who have arrived at a compromise
have many times simply asked for and obtained the
courts' dismissal of their suit without submitting their
compromise agreement for judicial approval.
Procedurally, it is preferable that such approval be
obtained, since as was held in Piano vs. Cayanong,"The
agreement ha(s) upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata (Art. 2037, New Civil Code;
Yboleon v. Sison, 59 Phil. 281, 290; Hernandez vs.
Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599, 607; De Jesus v. Go Quiolay, 65
Phil. 476, 482; Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34, 38;
Salazar v. Jarabe, 48 O.G. 2708, 2712; Morales v.
Fontanos, 64 Phil. 19, 21), and the judgment rendered
thereon ha(s) the authority of res judicata from the
moment it (is) rendered ... and such judgment is more
than a mere contract binding the parties because having
the sanction of the court, and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has all the force and
effect of any other judgment, it being conclusive upon
the parties and their privies (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73
Phil. 74)" and as provided by Article 2037, execution lies
to exact compliance only with a judicial compromise.
Article 2029 of the Civil Code provides further that "The
court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil
case to agree upon some fair compromise," and Articles
2039 and 2031 thereof provide for the suspension of
pending actions and mitigation of damages to the losing
party who has shown a sincere desire for a Compromise,
in line with the Code's policy of encouraging amicable
settlements.
5. It is settled jurisprudence that neither the courts nor
quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a
judgment different from their compromise agreement
(which as a valid contract is the law between the parties
themselves) or against the very terms and conditions of
their agreement.
We thus held in Municipal Board of Cabanatuan City vs.
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. that "a judicial or quasi-
judicial body cannot impose upon the parties a judgment
different from their real agreement or against the very
terms and conditions of the amicable settlement entered
into by them, without running the risk of contravening
the universally established principle that a contract is the
law between the parties."
We stressed therein that "(T)his Court, time and again,
has ruled that a compromise agreement entered into by
party-litigants, when not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good custom is a valid contract
which is the law between the parties themselves. (Juan-
Marcelo, et al. vs. Go Kim Pah, et al., 22 SCRA 309). It
follows, therefore, that a compromise agreement, not
tainted with infirmity, irregularity, fraud or illegality, is
the law between the parties who are duty bound to abide
by it and observe strictly its terms and conditions. It is
incumbent upon the courts of justice to help develop and
inculcate in the minds of the parties- litigants proper
respect for, and obedience to, the terms and conditions
of this kind of mutual agreement whenever it does not
exhibit any feature or taint of illegality or fraud. Thus we
would be enhancing the salutary provisions of Section 1,
Rule 20, of the Revised Rules of Court and Article 2029,
New Civil Code, which entrust to the courts the function
of enabling party-litigants in a civil suit to reach an
amicable settlement of their disputes," and cited our
previous ruling in Castro vs Castro that... Es principio
universalmente establecido que el convenio es ley entre
las partes. No debe imponerse un criterio por mas
acertado que fuese sobre el verdadero contrato de las
Partes. Que utilidad puede proporcionar la disposicion del
articulo 2029 del nuevo codigo civil que encomienda al
Juzgado la funcion de persuader a los litigantes en un
asunto civil a que procuren illegar a un arreglo si,
despues de todo, el criterio del tribunal se ha de imponer
sobre su convenio?
The only case where the court may validly intervene is "ff
the parties and their counsel are to do it ... to assist
them in attaining precision and accuracy of language that
would more or less make it certain that any dispute as to
the matters being settled would not recur, much less give
rise to a new controversy
6. As held in the case of Gonzales vs Gonzales, the court
cannot deny their approval to a compromise agreement,
voluntarily entered into by the parties, where there is no
valid serious objection, since "(T)he agreement,
therefore, partaking of the nature of a contract, is
subject to the same legal provision providing for the
validity, enforcement, rescission or annulment of
ordinary contracts. In entering in said compromise, the
parties were free to make any stipulation not contrary to
law, public interest, or principles of morality, as much as
in any other contract."
As stated above, only two of herein respondent's,
namely, Conrado Galvez and Ricardo Carlos, had
presented manifestations as to the "objectionable
features" of the compromise agreement signed by them
both following respondent judge's telegraphed but
baseless observations in his Orders of April 17, 1975 and
July 3, 1975 as to the waiver and quitclaim provisions
being "contrary to law, morals and public policy," with
Galvez complaining about petitioner having reneged on
its alleged promise to give him reciprocal benefits in
exchange of his agreement to turn state witness.
Aside from the totally untenable position in which
respondent judge placed himself by declaring the
provisions of paragraph 7 of the compromise agreement
void as to herein respondents but valid in toto as to the
defendants Paulino How and Yu Chiao Chin alias Nelson
Yu, his decision would arbitrarily substitute his own terms
for that agreed upon by the parties to the compromise
agreement and baselessly free herein respondents from
their undertaking thereunder. With their names ordered
deleted from paragraph 7 of the compromise, they would
be bound to no concession nor obligation
(notwithstanding that pursuant thereto they had in fact
executed the corresponding waiver and quitclaim therein
provided), while petitioner had complied with its part
and discharged them from all obligations and liabilities,
despite their admission of complicity, pursuant to
paragraph 8 of the same agreement (subject only to the
express exception that petitioner was not waiving its
rights as to any other anomalies which might
subsequently be discovered, notwithstanding
respondents' warranty that they had not participated in
any such prejudicial transactions other than those related
to or included in the civil case and criminal charge).
7. There can be no question that the parties voluntarily
executed and entered into the compromise agreement.
The record shows that all of the parties personally signed
the agreement. Respondents' voluntary consent to said
agreement and its due execution with assistance of
counsel was confirmed when a week thereafter, their
respective-counsels all signed the "Motion for Judgment
on the Basis of the Attached Compromise Agreement. The
signatures of the parties, petitioner and respondents, and
those of their respective counsels, were again affixed on
the Manifestation and Motion dated April 26, 1975,
reiterating their prayer for approval of the compromise
agreement as modified pursuant to respondent judge's
Order of April 17, 1978. Thus, not one of herein
respondents had ever assailed the compromise agreement
as not having been freely or voluntarily entered into.
When respondent judge issued his Order for hearing of
April 26, 1975 advancing his own observation as to
"certain objectionable features" and mentioning that the
compromise referred to compounding a felony, which is
contrary to law and directing the parties to go over the
same again so that he could approve the same "taking
into consideration the provisions of law, as well as public
morals and policy," supra, the parties deferred thereto by
filing their said Manifestation and Motion of April 26,
1975, wherein they prayed that "The phrase 'and criminal
charge herein above mentioned' found in paragraph 7,
page 5 and the phrase land criminal charge' found in
paragraph 10, page 6 of the Compromise Agreement be
deleted from the said Compromise Agreement dated
March 10, 1975," and reiterated the prayer for judgment
on the basis of the compromise agreement, as thus
modified. They made of record, though, that respondent
judge's view was in error, thus:
5. The parties wish to state that the reference to a
criminal charge in the said paragraphs is pure oversight
on inadvertence inasmuch as there is no criminal charge
mentioned in the paragraphs preceding paragraphs 7 and
10 of the Compromise Agreement and consequently the
phrase 'criminal charge hereinabove mentioned' is
meaningless. Besides, it has not been the intention of the
parties to compromise 'the criminal aspect of the case',
not only because it would be contrary to law to do so but
principally because the defendants are fully aware that
such a compromise may be taken as an admission of guilt
and the defendants entered into the 'Compromise
Agreement' dated March 10, 1975 with the clear
understanding that by so entering into such agreement,
they are not admitting nor are they deemed to admit the
commission of any criminal act.
Notwithstanding respondent judge's said Order and
subsequent Order of July 3, 1975 setting the case anew
for hearing and directing the parties once more "to
reconsider ... and reform" the waiver and quitclaim
provisions of paragraph 7 of the compromise agreement
and flatly announcing that the modification deleting all
reference to the criminal charge was "unsatisfactory" and
that "dropping the complaint is not enough" concession
for herein respondents, the stark fact remains that not
one of respondents ever repudiated the compromise
agreement nor moved to set aside or annul the same
because of alleged fraud, violence or vitiated consent -
which is the remedy available in such cases under Article
2038 of the Civil Code.
All that respondents ever asserted, following respondent
judge's line, was that the waiver and quitclaim provisions
constituting their reciprocal concession was "contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy and public
order" — which we have held to be totally untenable.
ACCORDINGLY, the modification of and deletions from the
compromise agreement ordered in respondent judge's
decision are hereby set aside as null and void, and in lieu
thereof, judgment is hereby rendered approving the
compromise agreement in toto. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR TENCHAVEZ
vs
VICENTA ESCAÑO
FACTS:
Vicenta Escaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic
chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local
civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live
together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they
were already estranged. Vicenta left for the United
Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against Tenchavez in the State of
Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely
mental in character.” A decree of divorce, “final and
absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
She married an American, lived with him in California,
had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired
American Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and
Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,
decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way
influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta
Escaño is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s
parents were sufficient in form.
DECISION:
1. No. Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine
Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage cannot be
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escaño
was bound since in the time the divorce decree was
issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her
wifely duties, deserting her husband without any
justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to
secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting
married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal
separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are
not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of
Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him
strikes the court to be merely conjecture and
exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters
written before the suit had begun. An action for
alienation of affections against the parents of one
consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
unworthy motives on their part.Plaintiff Tenchavez, in
falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and
pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,
unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling
them to recover damages.
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION
vs
HON. BLAS OPLE

FACTS:
Pakistan International Airline (PIA) is a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the PH. 2 separate
contracts of employment with Farrales and Mamasig were
entered into by PIA in Manila. The contracts became
effective in 1979. The contracts contained provisions—
Providing for the term of 3 years extendible upon
mutual consent of the parties
That PIA reserves the right to terminate the
employee either by giving notice 1 month before the date
of termination or one month’s salary
“This agreement shall be construed and governed
under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of
Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider
any matter arising out of or under this agreement.”
After their training period, Farrales and Mamasig
commenced their services as flight attendants with base
station in Manila.
1 year and 4 months before the lapse of the 3-year
period, counsel for the local branch of PIA sent Farrales
and Mamasig notices expressing that their services will be
terminated a month thereafter.
Farrales and Mamasig filed a joint complaint for
illegal termination and non-payment of company benefits
before the then Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE)
PIA submitted a position paper claiming that
Farrales and Mamasig were habitual absentees; that both
were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable
quantities of "personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at
the Manila International Airport had been discreetly
warned by customs officials to advise private respondents
to discontinue that practice.
Regional Director ordered reinstatement and
payment of full back wages or in the alternative payment
of their salaries for the remainder of the 3-year period.
They have attained status of regular employees
The provision stipulating a three-year period of
employment is null and void for violating LAbor Code
provisions on regular employment
Dismissal without clearance from MOLE entitles
employees to reinstatement Deputy Minister affirmed the
RD’s order.
PIA filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
PIA’s relationship with Farrles and Mamasig was
governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by
the general provisions of the Labor Code
ISSUES:
What law governs the relationship of the parties to the
contract?
DECISION:
PHILIPPINE LAW
Art 1306 of the Civil Code provides: The contracting
parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
The governing principle is that parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law especially
peremptory provisions dealing with matters heavily
impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor
and employment is clearly such an area and parties are
not at liberty to insulate themselves and their
relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other. It is
thus necessary to appraise the contractual provisions
invoked by petitioner PIA in terms of their consistency
with applicable Philippine law and regulations.
The employment contracts were inconsistent with Arts.
280-281 of the Labor Code
In the case of Brent School vs Zamora, the Court
ruled that contracts of employment providing for a fied
period are not necessarily unlawful. The presence or
absence of a substantial indication that the period
specified in an employment agreement was designed to
circumvent the security of tenure of regular employees
which is provided for in Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor
Code is crucial.
The provision in the contracts with PIA allowing for
termination of services upon notice or payment of one
month’s salary was intended to prevent any security of
tenure from accruing in favor of private respondents even
during the limited period of three (3) years, and thus to
escape completely the thrust of Articles 280 and 281 of
the Labor Code by rendering their employment at the
pleasure of PIA.
PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its
employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law
of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and,
secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute
arising out of or in connection with the agreement "only
in courts of Karachi Pakistan".
The relationship is much affected with public
interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws
and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the
parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their
relationship.
A cursory scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this
case will show the multiple and substantive contacts
between Philippine law and Philippine courts, on the one
hand, and the relationship between the parties, upon the
other:
i. the contract was not only executed in the
Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;
ii. private respondents are Philippine citizens and
respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign
corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing
business) and hence resident in the Philippines;
iii. private respondents were based in the Philippines
in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and
Europe.
All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and
administrative agencies as a proper forum for the
resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the
employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to
oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction
vested upon them by Philippine law.
Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not
undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan
law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that
the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the
same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law
G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998
TERESITA FABIAN
vs.
DESIERTO
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering
District. PROMAT participated in the bidding for
government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official
position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried
to terminate their relationship, private respondent
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent
of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and
threats. Petitioner filed an administrative complaint
against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved
for reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the
private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate
and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The
case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman
w h o e x on e ra t e d p ri v a t e re s p on d e n t from t h e
administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for
appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the
Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid
DECISION:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present
Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof.
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a
verified petition for review, under the requirements and
conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and
adopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of the SC.
G.R. No. L-5915 March 31, 1955
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE CO., LTD., KURR STEAMSHIP
CO., INC., ROOSEVELT STEAMSHIP AGENCY, INC., and
LEIF HOEGH & COMPANY, A/S., petitioners,
vs.
CHIA YU, respondent.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1946, Atkin, Kroll & Co., loaded on the S.
S. Roeph Silverlight owned and operated by Leigh Hoegh
& Co., A/S, of San Francisco California, 14 bales of
assorted underwear valued at P8,085.23 consigned to
Chia Yu in the City of Manila. The shipment was insured
against all risks by Eagle Star Ins. Co. of San Francisco,
California, under a policy issued to the shipper and by
the latter assigned to the consignee. The vessel arrived in
Manila on February 10, 1946, and on March 4 started
discharging its cargo into the custody of the Manila
Terminal Co., Inc., which was then operating the arrastre
service for the Bureau of Customs. But the 14 bales
consigned to Chia Yu only 10 were delivered to him as the
remaining 3 could not be found. Three of those delivered
were also found damaged to the extent of 50 per cent.
Chia Yu claimed indemnity for the missing and damaged
bales. But the claim was declined, first, by the carrier
and afterward by the insurer, whereupon Chia Yu brought
the present action against both, including their
respective agents in the Philippines. Commenced in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on November 16, 1948,
or more than two years after delivery of the damaged
bales and the date when the missing bales should have
been delivered, the action was resisted by the
defendants principally on the ground of prescription. But
the trial court found for plaintiff and rendered judgment
in his favor for the sum claimed plus legal interest and
costs. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and the case is now before us on appeal by
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff's action has prescribed.
DECISION:
bring his action "within one year after the delivery of the
goods or the date when the goods should have been
delivered" discharged the carrier from all liability. This
dispenses with the necessity of deciding how much could
be recovered from the carrier under the terms of the bill
of lading.
The case for the insurer stands on a different footing, for
its claim of prescription is founded upon the terms of the
policy and not upon the bill of lading. Under our law the
time limit for bringing a civil action upon a written
contract is ten years after the right of action accrues.
(Sec. 43, Act 190; Art. 1144, New Civil Code.)

On the part of the carrier the defense of prescription is

made to rest on the following stipulation of the bill of
lading:
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged
from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit
is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods
or the date when the goods should have been delivered.
The stipulation is but a repetition of a provision
contained in section 3 (6) of the United States Carriage of
Goods by Sea, Act of 1936, which was adopted and made
applicable to the Philippines by Commonwealth Act 65
and by express agreement incorporated by reference in
the bill of lading. Following our decision in Chua Kuy vs. [G.R. No. 119602. October 6, 2000.]
Everett Steamship Corporation,1 G. R. No L-5554 (May WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. COURT
27, 1953) and in E. R. Elser, Inc., et al., vs. Court of OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES
Appeals,. et al.,2 G. R. No. L-6517 (November 29, 1954) INC., respondents
giving force and effect to this kind of stipulation in bills FACTS:
of lading covering shipments from the United States to
the Philippines, we have to hold that plaintiff's failure to
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships
passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to
the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master
of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President
Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez,
a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in
the Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran
aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by
Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other
vessels. One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping
Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of
losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make its
delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of
Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it
incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento
General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la
Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws
provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable
for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was
proven to be negligent when he failed to check on
certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while
traversing the river.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable
under the said Venezuelan laws.
DECISION:
No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as
fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws
were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign
public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody
of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or Foreign Service
officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony
of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of
the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual
presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the
same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor
Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of
Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in
selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is
competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela
in good standing when he was engaged.
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA
ZALAMEA
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD
AIRLINES, INC.
FACTS:

Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,
Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from
the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc.
(TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on June
6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were purchased at a
discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full
fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed
reservations.While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the
spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On
the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and
their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier
than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on
the wait-list because the number of passengers who
checked in before tem had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names
were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the
other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to
fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given
first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr.
Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his
daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife
and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were
denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los
Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they
were constrained to book in another flight and purchased
two tickets from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea
filed an action for damages based on breach of contract
of air carriage before
the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their
favor ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets
bought from American Airlines together with moral
damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that
moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only
where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that
since it is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is
a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of
Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board,
neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on TWA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no
fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA?


DECISION:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the
part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her
daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of
confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. 1.)
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied
solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in
her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of
the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside
from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of
respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to
board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed
tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts
take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved. Written law may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate
may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms.
Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her
deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of
Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official
publication of said code was presented as evidence.
Thus, respondent court's finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
Regulations has no basis in fact."
"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar
in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus
which require that the law of the place where the airline
ticket was issued should be applied by the court where
the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum
and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be
Philippine law."
Benedicto v CA
Facts:
September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and
for some time thereafter, both the accused, conspiring
and confederating with each other and with the late
president Ferdinand E. Marcos, all residents all of Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of his Honorable
Court did and then there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed from
and/or register with the foreign exchange department of
the central bank within 90 days from October 21, 1983
as required of them being residents habitually/
customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign
change from whatever source or from invisibles locally or
from abroad, despite the fact they actually earned
interests regularly every six (6) months for the first two
years and then quarterly thereafter for their investment
of $50-million, later reduced to $25-million in December
1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated treasury
notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name
of Bank Hofmann, AG, Zuring, Switzerland, for the
benefit of Avertina Foundation, their front organization
established for economic advancement purposes with
secret foreign exchange account Category (Rubric) C.A.R.
No. 211925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as SKA) in
Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received
for the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late
husband an interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16,
1985 which was remitted to Bank Hofmann, AG, through
Citibank, New York, United States of America, for the
credit of said Avertina account on December 19, 1985,
aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the
original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly
remitted from the Philippines in the amounts of
$7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 on December 18, 1985
for further investment outside the Philippine without first
complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering
requirements.1âwphi1.nêt
The Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 which revised
the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange
transactions. It took effect on January 20, 1992.
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the
government’s policy of further liberalizing foreign exchange
transactions, came out with Circular No. 1356, which
amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 1353 deleted the
requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign
exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking
system.
Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a
saving clause, excepting from their coverage pending
criminal actions involving violations of Circular No. 960
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners claimed that they did not
incurred any criminal liability for the violations of
circular no 960 since they were exempted from its
coverage?
Ruled:
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular
No. 960 exempts from the reporting requirement foreign
currency eligible for deposit under the Philippine Foreign
Exchange Currency Deposit System, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order to avail of the
aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall
within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements
for eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No.
6426. Not only do we find the record bare of any proof to
support petitioners’ claim of falling within the coverage of
Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find from a reading of
Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that said
law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in
question. Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of
"deposit with such Philippine banks in good standing, as
may…be designated by the Central Bank for the
purpose.” The criminal cases filed against petitioners for
violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency
accounts maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine
banks. By invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided
for by Swiss banking laws, petitioners admit such reports
made. The rule is that exceptions are strictly construed
and apply only so far as their language fairly warrants, with
all doubts being resolved in favor of the
general proviso rather than the exception. Hence,
petitioners may not claim exemption under Section 10(q).
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by
petitioners, the rule is that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged
and proved. Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon,
either by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certification from the
secretary of the Philippine embassy or legation in such
country or by the Philippine consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent stationed in such country, or by any
other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign service
assigned to said country that such officer has custody. Absent
such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial cognizance of
the foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera.
[G.R. Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. September 30, 1975.]
PHILIPPINE  COMMERCIAL  AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo),  petitioner,  vs.  THE HONORABLE
VENICIO ESCOLIN, presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A.
MAGNO, respondents.
FACTS:
In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American
citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she
was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she
died.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband,
Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her
will that should her husband later die, said estate shall
be turned over to her brother and sister.
In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also
domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of
Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there
was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a
certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted
employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty.
Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but
the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence,
in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the
motion.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for
probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as
admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said
petition. Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was
granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank was appointed as administrator. But
Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles
to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister
and since that is her will, the same must be respected.
Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the
time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article
16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by
Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will
shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes
(Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back
to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside
Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi
doctrine).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower
court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law
of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas
law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved
by the evidence that would be presented in the probate
court. The Supreme Court however emphasized that
Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law
applicable (and not said law at any other time). NOTE:
Dynamics of law.
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.
PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and
MARY LYDIA BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
C. O. Bohanan, deceased, executed a will on April 23,
1944 in Manila. The decedent was born in Nebraska and
therefore a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding the
long residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay
here was merely temporary, and he continued and
remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the
state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of his
days in that state. His permanent residence or domicile
in the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and
therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of
that state. Nobody can choose his domicile or permanent
residence for him. That is his exclusive personal right.

The Philippine Trust Company was named as the executor
of the will. The executor filed a project of partition
dated January 24, 1956, making, in accordance with the
provisions of the will, the following adjudications: (1)
one-half of the residuary estate, to the Farmers and
Merchants National Bank of Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. in trust only for the benefit of testator's grandson
Edward George Bohanan, which consists of several mining
companies; (2) the other half of the residuary estate to
the testator's brother, F.L. Bohanan, and his sister, Mrs.
M. B. Galbraith, share and share alike. This consist in the
same amount of cash and of shares of mining stock
similar to those given to testator's grandson; (3) legacies
of P6,000 each to his (testator) son, Edward Gilbert
Bohanan, and his daughter, Mary Lydia Bohanan, to be
paid in three yearly instalments; (4) legacies to Clara
Daen, in the amount of P10,000.00; Katherine Woodward,
P2,000; Beulah Fox, P4,000; and Elizabeth Hastings,
P2,000;
The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan and her two children
question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated,
claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimes
that the laws of the forum conferred to them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the
testator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to
receive. The will has not given her any share in the
estate left by the testator. The court below refused to
recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the
laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen,
allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his
wife. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925
provides:
Every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound
mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate,
real and personal, the same being chargeable with the
payment of the testator's debts.
Moreover, the court below had found that the testator
and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30,
1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20,
1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at
the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists
in the State of Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal property
between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the
latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the
estate left by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's
children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received
legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and,
therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate
which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should
be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.
ISSUES:
Is the failure old the testator to give his children two-
thirds of the estate left by him at the time of his death,
in accordance with the laws of the forum valid?
DECISION:
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case
because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides
that successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property and the country in
which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old Civil Code, which is
the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
It was decided that the testator was a citizen of the
State of Nevada because he had selected this as his
domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision
dated April 24, 1950, supra) and the same was never
questioned. So the question at issue is whether the
testamentary dispositions, especially those for the
children which are short of their legitimes given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not
disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to
dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied
Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). It does not appear that at
time of the hearing of the project of partition, the
above-quoted provision was introduced in evidence, as it
was the executor's duly to do.
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator,
do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of
the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances,
we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada
Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed
by the national law of the testator, and as it has been
decided and it is not disputed that the national law of
the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already
indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all
his property according to his will, as in the case at bar,
the order of the court approving the project of partition
made in accordance with the testamentary provisions,
must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
[G.R. No. L-54204. September 30, 1982.]
NORSE  MANAGEMENT  CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN
SERVICES, INC.,  petitioners,  vs.  NATIONAL SEAMEN
BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M.
TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C.
ABORDO, respondents.
FACTS:
The deceased, husband of complainant herein, was
employed as a Second Engineer by respondents and
served as such in the vessel, “M.T. Cherry Earl.” While at
sea, he suffered apoplectic stroke and died four days
later. Complainant widow thus filed a claim for death
benefits and contended that in determining amount of
the claim, the law of Singapore, where the vessel is
registered, should be considered. For its part, the
respondents argue that Philippine laws should govern
considering that the law of Singapore was never
presented and the NSB cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied
in the case.
DECISION:
SC held in the affirmative.
On the issue that Singapore law was not presented before
the NSB, SC held that NSB, being an administrative and
quasi-judicial body, is not bound strictly by technical
rules It has always been the policy of this Board that in
cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or
death while in the course of employment, the law of the
country in which the vessel is registered shall be
considered.
Moreover, the employment agreement stipulated that
compensation shall be paid under Philippine law or the
law of registry of the vessel, whichever is higher. Thus,
the amount under Singapore law being higher, the same
should apply in accordance with the stipulation.
Ibanez de Aldecoa vs. HSB
G.R. No. L-6889, August 26, 1915
TRENT, J.
Facts:
 
Under the Old Civil Code, the principle of
Patria  Potestad, granted the parent  of a child the
administration and usufruct of the property of their
minor child until  the formal emancipation of said child
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1901, the New Civil
Code impliedly repealed this law by  introducing the
concept of  guardianship and removing the parent’s
administration over the child’s property. Petitioners were
formally emancipated by their parents on  1903,
thereupon  obtaining full administration over their
property. Following subsequent events,  Aldecoaand
Co.,  wherein petitioners were partners thereof, became
heavily indebted and entered into mortgage agreement
with the HSB. Upon the liquidation of said firm,
petitioners filed a proceeding and procured a  judgment
annulling the articles of co-partnership
with  Aldecoaand  Co., and decreeing that they were
creditors and not partners of the firm. It is contended by
the  petitioners that under the New Civil Code, their
emancipation was null and void since they were no longer
under the principle of Patria  Potestad, and thus had no
capacity to enter into a mortgage agreement. 
 
Issues:
 
WON Isabel Palet, mother of the petitioners, could legally
emancipate the  plaintiffs under the law in force
in  the  Philsin 1903, and  thus confer upon them capacity
to execute a valid mortgage on their real property.
 
HELD: YES.
 
RATIO:  That the patria  potestad  (parental  authority) of
the mother did not terminate upon the enactment of the
new  Code of Civil Procedure, but was saved from the
operation of the new law by section 581 thereof. Hence,
her rights and duties as to her children as well as theirs,
should be regulated by the provisions of the old Civil
Code. Under the old  Civil Code the mother could validly
emancipate the children, and, subsequent to  such
emancipation, the  children could execute a binding
mortgage upon their real property with the  consent of
their mother.  It is urged, lastly, that the mortgage
contract is void as to the plaintiffs by reason of a lack of
consideration. It is asserted that they executed the
mortgage under the impression that they were partners
in the firm of Aldecoa & Co., when, as decided by a final
judgment of the Court of First Instance, they were not
such partners.
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.]
JUAN G.  FRIVALDO,  petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the
highest number of votes in three successive elections but
who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified
to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who
now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation.
ISSUES:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so,
did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify
him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from
when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for
lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his
eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the
governorship of Sorsogon?
DECISION:
Under Philippine law, 21 citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654
22 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried
to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of
the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to
the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural
defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the
same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from
holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he
comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now
boasts of having successfully passed through the third and
last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation
under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor
General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in
the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-
respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in
addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes,
Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is
not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee --
should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected
governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since,
clearly and unquestionably, he garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections and since at that time,
he already reacquired his citizenship.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also
hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the
date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which
is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date
of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason
for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
of the legislative authority that the law should apply to
past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being -- in order to
benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such
legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the
law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to
take effect as of date of his application. As earlier
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar
this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the
legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result
the impairment of any contractual obligation,
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the
people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail.
Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or
iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having
become effective as of the date of his application, i.e.,
on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his
possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at
the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of
election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of
candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's
status as a registered voter would also be deemed
settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been
repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored -- as
of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently
reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under
any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 56 we
held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
[G.R. No. L-14441. December 17, 1966.]
PEDRO R.  PALTING,  petitioner,  vs.  SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM INCORPORATED, respondent.
FACTS:
On September 7, 1956, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed with
the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission a
sworn registration statement, for the registration and
licensing for sale in the Philippines Voting Trust
Certificates representing 2,000,000 shares of its capital
stock of a par value of $0.35 a share, at P1.00 per share.
It was alleged that the entire proceeds of the sale of said
securities will be devoted or used exclusively to finance
the operations of San Jose Oil Company, Inc. (a domestic
mining corporation hereafter to be referred to as SAN
JOSE OIL) which has 14 petroleum exploration
concessions covering an area of a little less than
1,000,000 hectares, located in the provinces of
Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, La Union, Iloilo,
Cotabato, Davao and Agusan. It was the express condition
of the sale that every purchaser of the securities shall
not receive a stock certificate, but a registered or
bearer-voting-trust certificate from the voting trustees
named therein James L. Buckley and Austin G.E. Taylor,
the first residing in Connecticut, U.S.A., and the second
in New York City. While this application for registration
was pending consideration by the Securities and Exchange
Commission, SAN JOSE PETROLEUM filed an amended
Statement on June 20, 1958, for registration of the sale
in the Philippines of its shares of capital stock, which was
increased from 2,000,000 to 5,000,000, at a reduced
offering price of from P1.00 to P0.70 per share. At this
time the par value of the shares has also been reduced
from $.35 to $.01 per share.1
Pedro R. Palting and others, allegedly prospective
investors in the shares of SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission an
opposition to registration and licensing of the securities
on the grounds that (1) the tie-up between the issuer,
SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, a Panamanian corporation and SAN
JOSE OIL, a domestic corporation, violates the
Constitution of the Philippines, the Corporation Law and
the Petroleum Act of 1949; (2) the issuer has not been
licensed to transact business in the Philippines; (3) the
sale of the shares of the issuer is fraudulent, and works
or tends to work a fraud upon Philippine purchasers; and
(4) the issuer as an enterprise, as well as its business, is
based upon unsound business principles. Answering the
foregoing opposition of Palting, et al., the registrant SAN
JOSE PETROLEUM claimed that it was a "business
enterprise" enjoying parity rights under the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution, which parity right, with
respect to mineral resources in the Philippines, may be
exercised, pursuant to the Laurel-Langley Agreement,
only through the medium of a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines. Thus, registrant which
is allegedly qualified to exercise rights under the Parity
Amendment, had to do so through the medium of a
domestic corporation, which is the SAN JOSE OIL. It
refused the contention that the Corporation Law was
being violated, by alleging that Section 13 thereof applies
only to foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines, and registrant was not doing business here.
The mere fact that it was a holding company of SAN JOSE
OIL and that registrant undertook the financing of and
giving technical assistance to said corporation did not
constitute transaction of business in the Philippines.
Registrant also denied that the offering for sale in the
Philippines of its shares of capital stock was fraudulent or
would work or tend to work fraud on the investors. On
August 29, 1958, and on September 9, 1958 the Securities
and Exchange Commissioner issued the orders object of
the present appeal.
ISSUES:
These concepts clarified, is herein respondent SAN JOSE
PETROLEUM an American business enterprise entitled to
parity rights in the Philippines?
DECISION:
The answer must be in the negative, for the following
reasons:
Firstly — It is not owned or controlled directly by citizens
of the United States, because it is owned and controlled
by a corporation, the OIL INVESTMENTS, another foreign
(Panamanian) corporation.
Secondly — Neither can it be said that it is indirectly
owned and controlled by American citizens through the
OIL INVESTMENTS, for this latter corporation is in turn
owned and controlled, not by citizens of the United
States, but still by two foreign (Venezuelan) corporations,
t h e PA N T E P E C O I L C O M PA N Y a n d PA N C O A S TA L
PETROLEUM.
Thirdly — Although it is claimed that these two last
corporations are owned and controlled respectively by
12,373 and 9,979 stockholders residing in the different
American states, there is no showing in the certification
furnished by respondent that the stockholders of
PANCOASTAL or those of them holding the controlling
stock, are citizens of the United States.
Fourthly — Granting that these individual stockholders
are American citizens, it is yet necessary to establish that
the different states of which they are citizens, allow
Filipino citizens or corporations or associations owned or
controlled by Filipino citizens, to engage in the
exploitation, etc. of the natural resources of these states
(see paragraph 3, Article VI of the Laurel-Langley
Agreement, supra). Respondent has presented no proof to
this effect.
Fifthly — But even if the requirements mentioned in the
two immediately preceding paragraphs are satisfied,
nevertheless to hold that the set-up disclosed in this
case, with a long chain of intervening foreign
corporations, comes within the purview of the Parity
Amendment regarding business enterprises indirectly
owned or controlled by citizens of the United States, is to
unduly stretch and strain the language and intent of the
law. For, to what extent must the word "indirectly" be
carried? Must we trace the ownership or control of these
various corporations ad infinitum for the purpose of
determining whether the American ownership-control-
requirement is satisfied? Add to this the admitted fact
that the shares of stock of the PANTEPEC and
PANCOASTAL which are allegedly owned or controlled
directly by citizens of the United States, are traded in
the stock exchange in New York, and you have a situation
where it becomes a practical impossibility to determine
at any given time, the citizenship of the controlling stock
required by the law. In the circumstances, we have to
hold that the respondent SAN JOSE PETROLEUM, as
presently constituted, is not a business enterprise that is
authorized to exercise the parity privileges under the
Parity Ordinance, the Laurel-Langley Agreement and the
Petroleum Law. Its tie-up with SAN JOSE OIL is,
consequently, illegal.
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]
C I R I L O
R. VALLES, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS an
d ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents
|||
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a
Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila.
Since then, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate,
as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she
ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in
a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54,
alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that
respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT the act of holding a foreign
passport and alien certificate of registration are acts
constituting effective renunciation of Philippine
citizenship.
2. WHETHER OR NOT dual citizens are not allowed to
run for public office.
DECISION:
1. NO. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are
not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result
in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As
held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an
application for an alien certificate of registration does
not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of
one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and
her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced
the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual
citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
2. NO. In the aforecited case of Mercado vs.
Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in
the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with
Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance.9Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40
(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as
referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled
that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough
that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of
candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Re: Vicente Ching
Facts:
Vicente ching the legitimate child of the spouse Tat
ching, a Chinese citizen and Prescilla A Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in Tubao, La Union april 11 1964. Since birth
ching has resided in the Philippines.
July 17 1998 ching completed his law degree at St. louis
university in baguio city and filed his application to take
the bar examination subject to the condition that he has
to submit to the S.C. of his proof of citizenship.
In compliance with the resolution ching only submitted
the following:
Certification issued by the board of accountancy showing
that he is a CPA
Voter certification
Certification issued by Elizabeth Cerezo issuing that he is
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of La Union.
April 5 1999 the result of the bar exams were released
and Ching was one of the successful examinees.
The oath taking was scheduled on May 5 1999 however
Ching was not allowed to take the oath because he was
required to submit further proof his citizenship pursuant
to the resolution of the court.
The OSG opined that Ching being the “legitimate child of
a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the
1935 constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to
be so unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship”.
“Commonwealth act 625 entitled “an act providing for
the manner in which the option to elect Philippine
citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is
a Filipino citizen.”
The OSG further explained that “(a) what he acquired at
the best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship
which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age
of majority.
“the clause upon reaching the age of majority “ has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the
age of majority which has been interpreted by the
secretary of justice to be 3 YEARS. Said period may be
extended under certain circumstance as when a person
concerned has always considered himself as a Filipino,
but in Cuenco it was held that an election done after
over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable
time.”
In conclusion the OSG points out that ching has not
formally elected Philippine citizenship.
Aggrieved, on July 27 1999 ching filed a manifestation
attaching his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and his oath of allegiance both dated july 15 1999.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ching has elected Philippine citizenship
within a reasonable time?
Whether or not his citizenship by election retroacted to
the time he took the bar exam?
RULING:
NO.
The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to
mean that the election should be made within 3 years
from the age of majority, however in Cuenco vs.
Secretary of justice that the 3 year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age majority and
that the secretary of justice has ruled that the 3 years in
the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under
the constitutional provision adverted above, which period
may be extended under certain circumstance as when the
person concerned has always considered himself as a
Filipino.
In the present case, ching was already 35 years old and it
was already 14 years after reaching the age of majority,
chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable
yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise
the privilege. It should be stated that the special
circumstance invoked by ching that his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and being a CPA, a
registered, a former elected officer of the sangguniang,
cannot vest him a Philippine citizenship by election.
Chings argument based on the in re: Florencio mallare is
quite different since mallare was born before the 1935
constitution and the enactment of the C.A. 625.
Philippine Citizenship can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to
elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to
such citizenship. As such he should avail such right with
fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and as a result this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]
ANTONIO  BENGSON  III,  petitioner,  vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO
C. CRUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998
elections in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They were
running for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin
over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed a quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET (House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal) alleging that Cruz is
not a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he
should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET
subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner.
Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that
Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is defined under
the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen. Cruz
however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US
Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US without
consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand,
argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship by virtue
of Republic Act No. 2630 which provides that:
Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines…
Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the
Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens
are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.
DECISION:
Yes. Bengson’s contention that Cruz is no longer a
natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly
explained by the HRET in its decision, the term “natural-
born citizen” was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
In Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Under said law,
repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a natural-born Filipino who
lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]
ANTONIO Y.  CO,  petitioner,  vs.  ELECTORAL  TRIBUNAL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the seAcond legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
DECISION:
1. YES. There is no dispute that the respondent's
mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or
not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino
citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
2. YES.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which
was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present.
[G.R. No. L-24530. October 31, 1968.]
B O A R D  O F  I M M I G R AT I O N  C O M M I S S I O N E R S a n d
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. BEATO
GO CALLANO, MANUEL GO CALLANO, GONZALO GO
CALLANO and JULIO GO CALLANO and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the seAcond legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
DECISION:
1. YES. There is no dispute that the respondent's
mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or
not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino
citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
2. YES.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which
was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present.
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.]
ERNESTO S.  MERCADO,  petitioner,  vs. EDUARDO
B A R R I O S  M A N Z A N O  a n d t h e C O M M I S S I O N O N
ELECTIONS, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting
aside and reversal of a decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a
natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the
HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the
second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the seAcond legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the
Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found
for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines.
2. WHETHER OR NOT Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar.
DECISION:
1. YES. There is no dispute that the respondent's
mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or
not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino
citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV
of the Constitution accords natural born status to
children born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing
elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have
divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have
filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In
1969, election through a sworn statement would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who
had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
2. YES.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent
residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other
words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which
was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang,
Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed
therein even up to the present.
[G.R. No. 86564. August 1, 1989.]
RAMON L .  LABO,
JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (CO
MELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS LARDIZABAL, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio
City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo
warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is
an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was
naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an
Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best
he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even
if he indeed became an Australian when he married an
Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his
marriage with the Australian was later declared void for
being bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s
considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just
a mere technicality which should not frustrate the will of
the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast
majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second
highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in
the event Labo is disqualified.
DECISION:
1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an
Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of
subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to
the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he
needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines
in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It
cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino
citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He
cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his
Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated
or be declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress –
none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His
claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the
will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of
Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously,
would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is
Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a
foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside
over them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the
Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through
the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared
the mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because
Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote.
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they
do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public
elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected
and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.
[G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989.]
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE  YU,
WILLIE  YU,  petitioner,  vs.  MIRIAM  DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR
PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ,
BENNY REYES AND JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally
issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5)
years and renewed for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen
on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied
for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial
N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While
still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon
his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial
documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry
of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in
April 1980.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Petitioner’s acts constitutes an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
DECISION:
YES. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts
considered together constitute an express renunciation of
petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through
naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us,
Go Gallano, 21express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly
and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with
full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as
a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior
status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of
his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as
such in official documents even after he had become a
naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
citizenship.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a
commodity or were to be displayed when required and
suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse
to the petitioner his motion for clarification and other
motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of
this Decision.

[G.R. No. 132244. September 14, 1999.]
GERARDO  ANGAT,  petitioner,  vs.  REPUBLIC  OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of
the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. Now
residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village,
Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the
RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his
S t a t u s a s a c i t i z e n o f t h e Ph i l i p p i n e s u n d e r
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and
Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK).
On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take
his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by the
trial judge in his order of 12 July 1996. Another motion
filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial
reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a
quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996.
After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996,
another order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October
1996
On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a
motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted
that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the
court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper
forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization
consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO
285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V.
Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on
Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A
8171.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the trial court has jurisdiction over the
petition for repatriation.
DECISION:
No. R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23
October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a)
of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on
account or political or economic necessity. The pertinent
provisions of the law read:
Sec. 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship,
including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 631, as amended: Provided,
That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated
with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for
the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude:
or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8
dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No.
63, an application for repatriation could be filed by
Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by
marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos
who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special
Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by
the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created
pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11
April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491
issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29
December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by
virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of
27 March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo
vs. Commission on Elections, 9 the Court observed that
the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had
merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization
"to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270."
10
The Office of the Solicitor General was right in
maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed
with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC
which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of
04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not
acquire finality 14 nor could be a source of right on the
part of petitioner. 15 It should also be noteworthy that
the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for
repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to
initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 16 and R.A. No. 2630
17 since these laws could only apply to persons who had
lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign
country or the armed forces of the United States of
America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition,
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring
to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil
registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines.

[G.R. No. L-30728. October 15, 1974.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner,  vs.  COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, BRANCH I, HON.
PERFECTO QUICHO, PRESIDING JUDGE, and DOMINGO
ONG CHUA, respondents.
||
FACTS:
On March 30, 1959, respondent Court rendered a decision
granting the Petition for Naturalization of private
respondent Domingo Ong Chua. On April 6, 1961,
respondent Court issued an order allowing Domingo Ong
Chua to take his oath as a Filipino citizen, and directing
the issuance to him of a Certificate of Naturalization.
Domingo Chua thereafter took his Oath of Allegiance and
was issued a Certificate of Naturalization. Copies of the
decision of March 30, 1959 and the order of April 6, 1961,
were, however, only served upon the Solicitor General on
September 29, 1966. On October 11, 1966, petitioner
Republic through the then Solicitor General Antonio P.
Barredo, now Associate Justice of this Court, filed with
respondent Court an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
of the decision of March 30, 1969, to declare null and
void the order of April 6, 1961 as well as the Oath of
Allegiance, to cancel the Certificate of Naturalization,
and, pending final determination of Republic's Omnibus
Motion, to enjoin Domingo Ong Chua from using his
Certificate of Naturalization or acting in any manner as a
citizen of the Philippines.
Respondent Domingo Ong Chua opposed the Omnibus
Motion on the grounds that (1) by reason of inexcusable
laches the State could no longer question the decision of
March 30, 1959, much less appeal therefrom, said
decision having already become final; and (2) assuming
that the State may still re-open the case, the points
raised in the motion do not have any factual and legal
basis.
ISSUE:
When is the 30-day period of appeal in naturalization
cases commenced to run?
DECISION:
There is no question that the 30-day period of appeal in
naturalization cases allowed the Government is counted
from notice of, or receipt by, the Solicitor General of the
decision, and not from the date of its receipt by the
Provincial Fiscal. The Naturalization Law prescribes that
the Solicitor General shall appear on behalf of the
Government "either himself or through his delegate, or
the Provincial Fiscal concerned." It is evident that the
Fiscal appears not in substitution, but merely as
representative, of the Solicitor General who remains the
counsel of record for the Republic in the naturalization
case. 1 In Lim v. Republic, 2 We ruled that the validity of
naturalization proceedings is vitiated by the failure of the
court to serve notice of hearings to the Solicitor General,
as required by law. This rule applies even if the notices
were sent to the Provincial Fiscal who was duly
authorized by the Solicitor General to appear in his
behalf. It is evident, therefore, that since the decision of
the respondent Court granting the petition for
naturalization was only served upon the Solicitor General
on September 29, 1966, the period to appeal should be
counted from the aforesaid date.
[G.R. No. 99358. January 30, 1995.]
DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO,
COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON.
REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to
Indonesia as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to
Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the
Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children
with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old
Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The
latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the
family of petitioner and was merely repaying the
hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship
of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for
"concubinage" with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan against the two. This case was, however,
dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner
was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent
resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14,
1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo,
filed a letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who
subsequently referred the letter to the CID.
The CID revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted
to her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s power to deport petitioner
had prescribed.
DECISION:
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino
citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given
permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws
governing the admission and exclusion of aliens.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the
Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means
of false and misleading statements or without inspection
and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designated port of entry or at any place other than at a
designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section
37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall not be
effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has
prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the
Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and
misleading statements in her application and in the other
supporting documents submitted to the immigration
authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the
CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner
was admitted into the country and asked for her
deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution,
he sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on
his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).
Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980,
when Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal
entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years
had elapsed before the issuance of the order of her
deportation on September 27, 1990.
[G.R. No. L-24252. January 30, 1967.]
IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to possess all
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization under  Commonwealth Act 473  for the
purpose of cancelling her alien registry with the
Bureau of Immigration, ZITA NGO  BURCA,  petitioner-
appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
||
FACTS:
On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo
Burca — "as possessing all qualifications and none of the
qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act
473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with
the Bureau of Immigration".1 She avers that she is of
legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen,
and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her
marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of
Nationalist China, with ACR No. A-148054; that she was
born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and holder
of Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After
making a number of other allegations and setting forth
certain denials, she manifests that "she has all the
qualifications required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications required under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473" aforesaid.
The Solicitor General opposed and moved to dismiss the
petition on two main grounds, viz: (1) that "there is no
proceeding established by law, or the rules for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual";
and (2) that as an application for Philippine citizenship,
"the petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or
mention the essential allegations required under Section
7 of the Naturalization Law", such as, among others,
petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence
of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Burca automatically became a Filipino
citizen by the mere fact of marriage.
DECISION:
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who
marries a Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of
marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen.
Jurisprudence has since stabilized the import of the
constitutional and statutory precepts just quoted with a
uniform pronouncement that an alien wife of a Filipino
citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be
lawfully naturalized.2 Which means that, in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine
citizenship, the wife must possess the qualifications
under Section 2, and must not be laboring under any of
the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4, of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
Moreover, respondent failed to allege a former place of
residence. The case was also submitted solely on the
testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were
presented. This does not meet with the legal
requirement.
Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition
dismissed, without costs.
Smith vs Smith 206 Pa. Super 310 213 A. 2d 94
Smith vs smith
Parties were married in 1956, on May 11 1961, the
husband filed a indignities to the person while the wife
contested, Morris Zimmerman, Esquire, was the
appointed master. Hearings were held before and
testimonies were taken, prior to the transcript of the
testimony Mr. Zimmerman died without filing any report
and the court appointed another master and directed him
to review the testimony already taken and make his
report. The order was amended directing the master to
review the testimony and take such further testimony as
he deemed necessary, another order was issued by the
court amending the prior orders to provide that the
parties might recall any witness for additional
examination and cross examination of the evidence
provided by the master. However the counsel of the wife
asked the master be directed a case de novo, the
petition was granted and the case was succeeded by
another master and directed to review the case. The
successor master proceeded the case base on the last
order of the court and that the husband be granted
divorce.
The wife’s counsel argues that the successor should have
heard the testimonies of the case de novo
This she claims is required by Pa. R.C.P. No. 1133, which
provides, inter alia, that after an action is at issue "the
court shall hear the testimony, or . . . may . . . appoint a
master to hear the testimony and return the record and a
transcript of the testimony to the court, together with
his report and recommendation."
However the court of Pennsylvania convinced us that the
rule shall not compel retaking of the testimony of the
successor since it is not controlling because it would be a
financial burden to the husband.
The wife objected that the husband is not a bona fide
resident of the state of Pennsylvania for at least 1 year to
file a divorce complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband has complied with the
residence requirement of filing a divorce complaint?
Ruled;
Yes.
The law defines that domicile is meant that a person has
a true, fixed, permanent home and principal
establishment to which whenever he is absent he has the
intention to return.
The husbands testimony has proved that he moved to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1933 and since that time
always intended to make Pittsburgh his home. Plaintiff
owned an apartment building there where he and his wife
lived from 1956-1959.
They also travelled to Europe and New Jersey but
Pittsburgh was the place where he always returned.
[G.R. No. L-20997. April 27, 1967.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO CHANGE NAME
OF  ONG  HUAN TIN TO TERESITA TAN,  ONG  HUAN
TIN,  petitioner-appellant,  vs.  REPUBLIC  OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:
Petition to change the name of Ong Huan Tin to Teresita
Tan (Special Proceeding 03521, Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court). Due publication was had. The petition
was set for hearing. But, be¬fore the petition could be
heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order
of November 6, 1962 expressed the opinion "that an alien
cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of
Court relating to change of name" and thereupon denied
the petition. A move to recon¬sider was rejected in the
court's order of November 24, 1962. Off¬shoot is the
present appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien may petition for a change of
name.
DECISION:
In a recent judicial test (In the Petition for the Change of
Name of JOSELITO YU, G.R. L-20874, May 25, 1966) we
held that Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a
prerequisite for a petition to change name; and that,
accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name.
Nonetheless, we pause to consider whether every alien in
this country may petition for a change of name.
The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien
individual is governed and controlled by the lex domicilii.
2 Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed
to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the
Philippines. And "domicile" means "permanent home, the
place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts
and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose
intent."3
An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not
there avail of the right to change his name.
We, accordingly, lay down the rule that only alien
domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change of
name in the courts thereof.
Considering that the petition herein complies with the
requisites set forth in the Rules of Court, we vote to set
aside the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of November 6, 1962 and November 24, 1962; and
to direct said Court to proceed with the hearing and
determination of Special Proceeding 03521, entitled "In
the Matter of the Petition to Change Name of Ong Huan
Tin to Teresita Tan." No costs. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.]
I M E L D A  ROMUALDEZ-
MARCOS,  petitioner,  vs.  COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938,
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she
studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her
college degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now
Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently,
she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She
went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When
Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang
Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner,
in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile
or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency
due to the fact that she became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of
the First District of Leyte.
DECISION:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for
election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the
following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban
became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s
domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does
not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her
marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only
after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her
brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary
intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET
ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner
as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
[G.R. No. 100150. January 5, 1994.]
BRIGIDO R.  SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO
ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO,  petitioners,  vs.  COMMISSION  ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN
DOES, respondents.
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending
the resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before
the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear
before the CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental
motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990
stating that Commissioners' authority should be
understood as being confined only to the investigation of
violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights
allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political
rights, but their privilege to engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying
petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss.
And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied
also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying
for a restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further
hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled
"Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an"order to desist" within the extent of
the authority and power of the CRH?
DECISION:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the
extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII,
Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the
CHR to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any
part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil
and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in
character but an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to
provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to
the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection may not be construed to
confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an
restraining order or writ of injunction, for it were the
intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no
jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any court
in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or
of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR
Case No. 90-1580.
[G.R. No. L-6379. September 29, 1954.]
In the matter of the petition of WILFRED UYTENGSU to
be admitted a citizen of the Philippine.
WILFRED UYTENGSU, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6, 1927. He
began his primary education at the Saint Theresa’s
College in said municipality. Subsequently, he attended
the Little Flower of Jesus Academy, then the San Carlos
College and, still later the Siliman University — all in the
same locality — where he completed the secondary
course. Early in 1946, he studied, for one semester, in the
Mapua Institute of Technology, in Manila. Soon after, he
went to the United States, where, from 1947 to 1950, he
was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in
California, and was graduated, in 1950, with the degree
of Bachelor of Science. In April of the same year he
returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation.
Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950, his present
application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he
returned to the United States and took a postgraduate
course, in chemical engineering, in another educational
institution, in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He finished this
course in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines
until October 13, 1951. Hence, the hearing of the case,
originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had
to be postponed on motion of counsel for the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the application for naturalization may be
granted, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner left the
Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition
and did not return until several months after the first
date set for the hearing thereof.
DECISION:
No. The Government has not had any chance whatsoever
to thus keep a watchful eye on petitioner herein.
Immediately after the filing of his application — and —
notwithstanding the explicit promise therein made him,
under oath, to the effect that he would reside
continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the
filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship" — he returned to the United
States, where he stayed, continuously, until October 13,
1951.
In short, we are of the opinion that petitioner herein has
not complied with the requirements of section 7 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, and with the
aforementioned promise made by him in his application,
and, accordingly, is not entitled, in the present
proceedings, to a judgment in his favor. Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the case
dismissed, with costs against the petitioner, but without
prejudice to the filing of another application, if he so
desires, in conformity with law.
[G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.]
A G A P I T O
A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
M O V E M A K AT I , M AT E O B E D O N , a n d J U A N I TO
ICARO, respondents.
FACTS:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a
resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended
the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy
to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections
dismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to
run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a
motion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the
Commission on Election later issued an order suspending
the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved
the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found
Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office
for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
ISSUE:
Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy
actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the
electoral district.
DECISION:
The place “where a party actually or constructively has
his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a
previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident
and a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for
more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s
connection to the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims
to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated
domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in
Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in
transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a
new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the
Commission on Elections.
[G.R. No. 43592. May 17, 1935.]
JUAN L. ALCANTARA, MIGUEL VALDES, ADOLFO ALMEDA
a n d D I O N I S I O PA N G I L I N A N ,  p e t i t i o n e r s ,  v s .
THE  SECRETARY  OF THE INTERIOR, and the CHAIRMAN
and MEMBERS, BALALA ELECTORAL BOARD OF
INSPECTORS, CULION, PALAWAN, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners are confinees at the Culion Leper Colony in
Culion, Palawan, having voted in previous decisions in the
Philippine Islands. That after a public meeting, they
adopted a resolution demanding a right to vote in the
upcoming Plebiscite and requesting the electoral
precincts be established within the radius of the colony
so that qualified voters therein could register. The
resolution was sent to the Governor-General who
referred the same to the Secretary of Interior, and
through its legal division ruled that no new electorate
precincts could be created because the Plebiscite was
considered a special election.
Because of the ruling, Petitioners requested by
telegram, the Interior Department to authorize the Balala
Electoral Board of Inspectors to register the qualified
voters of the colony. The request was denied on the
ground that Petitioners were not bona fide residents of
Culion Palawan, not having been residents of Culion for
six months next preceding the day of the plebiscite, for
they have not acquired residence in Culion as they are
confined as lepers against their will and having no
intention to reside therein as provided in Secs. 430-431 of
the Administrative Code, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners are residents of Culion,
Palawan, and as such, qualified to register and vote
therein in the upcoming plebiscite.
DECISION:
The Court ruled that, in the United States, the
Constitution limits the right of the States to discriminate
against person by reason of race, color or previous
condition of servitude in their exercise of the right of
suffrage.
That at present, the closest thing the Philippines
to a Constitution is the Jones Law which only provision
contained in that law as to the qualification of voters are
found under Sec. 15.
Also, the Philippine Legislature has prescribed the
qualifications and disqualifications of voters in Sec. 431
and 432, respectively, of the Revised Administrative
Code.
There being nothing in the above-mentioned
provisions which could provide a definite answer to the
issue at hand, the Court resorted to law and
jurisprudence of similar issue from the different States of
the limited States. The Court found that in one State, it
held that 'for the purpose of voting, no person shall be
deemed to have gained or lost a residence while a
student at any seminary of learning.
In other jurisdictions, a contrary conclusion was
reached upon the theory that under such a constitutional
provision, an inmate of such institution may acquire a
residence at the home. In another case, it was held that
'in the absence of such constitutional prohibition, the
rule in is that a permanent member of a soldier's home
has a residence at such home for the purpose of voting'.
After comparing such, the Court ruled that under
our liberal, petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan,
and entitled to register and vote in the upcoming
plebiscite, but the case must be remanded to the Balala
Electoral Board of Inspectors to determine if petitioners
have the prescribed qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under Sec. 431 and 432 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
[G.R. No. 104960. September 14, 1993.]
P H I L I P
G. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY, DONATO ADVINCULA,
BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, PRECINCT No. 9,
MALBOG, TOLOSA, LEYTE, and the MUNICIPAL
REGISTRAR COMELEC, TOLOSA, LEYTE, respondents.
|||
FACTS:
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural born citizen
of the Philippines, the son of the former Governor of
Leyte, Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos. Sometime in the early
part of 1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his
decision to establish his legal residence at Barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, 1 caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter also served
as Barangay Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan
Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential Election, Romualdez
acted as the Campaign Manager of the Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) in Leyte where he voted. 2
When the eventful days from the 21st to the 24th of
February, 1986, came or were about to come to a close,
some relatives and associates of the deposed President,
fearing for their personal safety, whether founded or not,
"fled" the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one,
together with his immediate family, left the Philippines
and sought "asylum" in the United States which the
United States (U.S.) government granted. 3 While abroad,
he took special studies on the development of Leyte-
Samar and international business finance.
When Romualdez arrived back in the Philippines, he did
not delay his return to his residence at Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. During the registration of voters conducted by the
Commission on Election ("COMELEC") on 01 February 1992
for the Synchronized National and Local Election
scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner registered himself
anew as a voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. The chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors,
who had known Romualdez to be a resident of the place
and, in fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of Malbog in
1982, allowed him to be registered.
Romualdez's registration, however, was not to be
unquestioned. On 21 February 1992, herein private
respondent Donato Advincula ("Advincula") filed a petition
with the Municipal Trial Court of Tolosa, Leyte, praying
that Romualdez be excluded from the list of voters in
Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte, under BP 881 and
RA 7166. 8 Advincula alleged that Romualdez was a
resident of Massachusetts, U.S.A.; that his profession and
occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had just recently
arrived in the Philippines; and that he did not have the
required one-year residence in the Philippines and the
six-month residence in Tolosa to qualify him to register as
a voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner have voluntarily left the
country and abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.
DECISION:
No. The political situation brought about by the "People's
Power Revolution" must have truly caused great
apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious
concern over the safety and welfare of the members of
their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions
favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is
understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from
the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as
"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that
these terms are used in applying the concept of "domicile
by choice."
We have closely examined the records, and we find not
that much to convince us that the petitioner had, in fact,
abandoned his residence in the Philippines and
established his domicile elsewhere.
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.]
AT T Y. ROMULO
B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTI
ONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions
the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on
the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already
considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter
must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6
months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do
so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.
DECISION:
No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee
voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines
within the period required for non-absentee voters.
Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and
resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a
resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes
an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines
is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of
being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If
the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is
not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could
not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to
include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-
presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that
way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC to
usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the
presidential and vice presidential elections is still lodged
in Congress and was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
CHAPTER THREE
CITIZENSHIP AND
DOMICILE
30. ALEEM VS PERRYMAN 114 F3D672 (1997)
FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Aleem are citizens of India.   Mr. Aleem
immigrated to the United States and became a lawful
permanent resident in 1977.   Four years later, his wife
followed suit.   In 1984, Mr. Aleem completed a Masters
degree in Computer Science at DePaul University in
Chicago, but was unable to find work in his field.  1984 he left no family here, he left no real or personal
Because of his mounting debt and inability to find work in
the United States, he applied and was accepted for a
teaching position at Gulf Polytechnic University (later
named University of Bahrain) in the country of Bahrain.  been in Bahrain for approximately five years and
He accepted this position and left for Bahrain in
September 1984 accompanied by his wife and two
children, a three-year-old and a newborn.2   When the
Aleems left for Bahrain, they abandoned their apartment,
disposed of their personal property, and had no relatives
remaining in the United States.   Prior to leaving the
United States, Mr. Aleem obtained a reentry permit from
the INS valid for a two-year absence from the United
States.
Upon their return from an extended stay in Bahrain, an
immigration judge determined that Mohammed Aleem
and his wife Rahmatunnisa, both of whom are permanent
resident aliens of the United States, should be excluded
from this country, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §   1182(a)(20),1
because they had abandoned their permanent resident
status.
ISSUE:
Whether the Aleems' stay in Bahrain qualifies as a
“temporary visit abroad.”
DECISION:
The record is quite clear that the Aleems left the United
States in 1984 because of mounting debt and Mr. Aleem's
inability to find suitable employment.   He found that
employment in Bahrain, and when he left the States in
property here, and he had no significant business ties to
the United States.   At the time that the exclusion
proceedings were initiated in this case, the Aleems had
intended to return so that Mr. Aleem could continue
teaching under the terms of a contract that had been
extended for a third time.   This evidence substantially
supports the Board's conclusion that, “it appears that the
applicant's employment with the University of Bahrain
would continue as long as he wished to remain there․  It
appears that the applicant intended to work indefinitely
with the University of Bahrain, as long as the
employment was available.”   Certified Administrative
Record at 6. While Mr. Aleem's employment with the
University of Bahrain might not have been “permanent,”
that is not the pertinent inquiry.  Chavez-Ramirez, 792 F.
2d at 936.   His employment was plainly indefinite and
not fixed by any early event.   Against this backdrop of
repeatedly renewing his teaching contract with the
University of Bahrain, Mr. Aleem testified that he
intended to return to the United States for good after
serving out his fourth contractual term with the
University.   Absent any indication that Mr. Aleem's job
prospects in the United States had changed, we find no
fault with the Board's failure to credit this self-serving
testimony.5   Notwithstanding his professed intention to
return, Mr. Aleem's course of conduct demonstrated that
he had no definite plan to return but was “merely
planning to let future events determine his course” and
thus was not on a temporary visit.
[G.R. No. L-7068. December 22, 1954.]
P E R F E C T O  F A Y P O N ,  p e t i t i o n e r ,  v s .
ELISEO QUIRINO, respondent
FACTS:
Respondent was born in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur; came to
Manila to pursue his studies; went to United States for
the same purpose; returned to the Philippines; and
engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo.
When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of
Ilocos Sur, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of
canvassers as the governor. A petition for quo warranto
was filed by the petitioner on the ground of respondent's
ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of
residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the
respondent registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and
1947.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent's acts, activities, and
utterances constitute abandonment or loss of his
residence of origin.
DECISION:
NO. The Court ruled out that mere absence from one's
residence or origin - domicile - to pursue studies, engage
in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for
"greener pastures" to improve his lot. When election is to
be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his
lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reason, he may not
be absent himself from the place of his activities; so
there he registers as voter. Despite such registration, the
animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus,
registration of a voter in another place has not been
deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence.
[G.R. No. L-8409. December 28, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased
Andres  Eusebio. EUGENIO  EUSEBIO,  petitioner-
appellee,  vs. AMANDA  EUSEBIO, VIRGINIA  EUSEBIO,
JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and
CARLOS EUSEBIO, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio
Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a
petition for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition,
in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda,
Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed
Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are
illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter
was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying,
therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground
that venue had been improperly filed.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the late Andres Eusebio was domiciled
in San
Fernando, Pampanga.
DECISION:
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952,
Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in
San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well
as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in
bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated
him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot
at 889-A España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While
transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter,
the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart failure),
for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr.
Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the
decedent remained until he was brought to the UST
Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometimes before
November 26, 1952. On this date, he contracted marriage
in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion
Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died
therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to
hypertensive heart disease", at the age of seventy-four
(74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or
even slept in said house at España Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of
origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the
presumption is that he retained such domicile, and,
hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to
the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once
acquired is retained until a new domicile is
gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70; Restatement of
the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of
Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances
surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established
another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for
which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1)
capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay
therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp.
109-110; Googrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs.
Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220).
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of
choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several
days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to
whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does
the decedent appears to have manifested his wish to live
indefinitely in said city. His son, petitioner-appellee, who
took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite
the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention,
opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased
(had) decided to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in
Quezon City". Moreover, said appellee did not introduce
the testimony of his legitimate full brother and son of the
decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice,
presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España
Extention was purchased, and who, therefore, might
have cast some light on his (decedent's) purpose in buying
said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held
that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in Quezon
City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said property
and the transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion
is untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the
decedent because he had been adviced to do so "due to
his illness", in the very words of herein appellee. It is not
improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice
was given and followed in order that the patient could be
near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is
well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by
presence in a place merely for one's own health", even if
coupled with "knowledge that one will never again be
able, on account of illness, to return home." (The
Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see, also,
Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight,
D. C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his
house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his
children, who used to live with him in San Fernando,
Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in
the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at
No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was conveyed
to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before
his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga,
as his residence. Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence
certificates used by the decedent in aknowledging said
Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract
Exhibit 1, signed by the deceased when he was married,
in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST
Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to
his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando,
Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio,
one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee,
was a witness to said wedding, thus indicating that the
children of the deceased by his first marriage, including
said appellee, were represented on that occasion and
would have objected to said statement about his
residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from
appellee's failure to prove satisfactory that the decedent
had decided to establish his home in Quezon City, the
acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his
death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption
in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is
particularly strong when the domicile is one of the origin
2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards
said decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of
record.
[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999.]
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIO
NS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P.
BAYONITO, JR., ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM,
SR., respondents.
FACTS:
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating
in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1)
year and two (2) months immediately preceding the
election. 3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra.
Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario
Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and
assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private
respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a
resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT petitioner is a resident of the Province
of Sarangani.
DECISION:
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used
in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile,"
which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. 21 "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever
absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one
intends to return. 22 "Domicile" is a question of intention
and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind,
namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one
residence or domicile at a time. 23
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was
Candon, Ilocos
Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old
Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election.
Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has
established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of
Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. 25 To successfully effect a change of
domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be
animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual. 27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical
presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot
located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place
that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in
their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself
sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred
his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of
choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. While
"residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given
place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence
in that place but also a declared and probable intent to
make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's
home. 28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile,
physical presence in the locality involved and intention to
adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a
new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either
of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a
domicile without actual residence in the locality does not
result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of
physical presence without intention. 29
The lease contract entered into sometime in January
1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile.
The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's
intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual
from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss
or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a
house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e.,
15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his
act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in
Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence,
it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his
former barangay. Exercising the right of election
franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of
residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in
a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or
believes to be, his residence. 31 The fact that a party
continously voted in a particular locality is a strong factor
in assisting to determine the status of his domicile. 32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was
erroneous and was caused by events over which he had
no control cannot be sustained. The general registration
of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was
scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June
14, 15, 21, and 22. 33
While, Domino's intention to establish residence in
Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought
the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he
sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon
City on 22 October 1997, 34 and that he applied for
transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by
reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, 35
DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency
requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement,
both intent and actual presence in the district one
intends to represent must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to
do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office
null and void. 37
[G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999.]
M A R C I T A of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining
MAMBA PEREZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIO
NS and RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy for Representative of the
Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter
and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on
the ground that he had not been a resident of the district
for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of
the elections as required by Art. VI, Section 6 of the
Constitution. On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the
COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution, dismissed the
petition for disqualification, finding private respondent
Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the Third
District of Cagayan.
ISSUE:
Whether “residency” in the respondent’s certificate of
candidacy for governor actually connotes “domicile” to
warrant his disqualification from the position in the
electoral district.
DECISION:
No. As this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC: It
is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement. The
said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. There is substantial evidence
supporting the finding that private respondent had been
a resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is
nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this
factual finding. The private respondent was actually a
resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year
prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than
seven (7) years since July 1990.
[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002.]
RODOLFO V. JAO,  petitioner,  vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PERICO V. JAO, respondents
|
FACTS:
Petitioner, allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother, filed a petition for
repatriation claiming that she is a Philippine citizen due
to the invalid marriage of her parents. Trial court issued
an Order declaring the petitioner as judicially
repatriated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not repatriation through judicial proceeding
is valid.
DECISION:
No, because there is no law requiring or authorizing such
judicial repatriation. All that is required for a female
citizen of the Philippines who lost her citizenship to an
alien to reacquire her Philippine citizenship, is for her to
take necessary oath in the proper civil registrar, upon the
termination of her marital status. Decision revoked and
set aside.
Davis V. Winship v. Phil. Trust Co., 90 Phil. 744 [1952]
Facts:
Prior to December, 1941, the Eastern Isles, Inc., a
corporation organized under and existing by virtue of the
laws of the Philippines, all of the capital stock of which
was and has been owned by American citizens, had a
current account deposit with the Philippine Trust
Company.
On October 4, 1943, the Japanese Military Administration
in the Philippines issued an order requiring all deposit
accounts of the hostile people (including corporations) to
be transferred to the Bank of Taiwan, as the depository of
the Japanese Military Administration, which order the
Philippine Trust Company was specifically directed to
comply with. In compliance with said order, the
Philippine Trust Company transferred and paid the credit
balances of the current account deposits of the Eastern
Isles Import Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. to
the Bank of Taiwan.
The pre-war current deposit accounts of the Eastern Isles
Import Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. were
subsequently transferred to S. Davis Winship who, on
August 12, 1947, presented to the Philippine Trust
Company checks Nos. A-79212 and H-579401 covering the
aforesaid deposits. The Philippine Trust Company,
however, refused to pay said checks, whereupon, on
September 6, 1947, S. Davis Winship instituted the
present action against the Philippine Trust Company in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, to recover upon the
first cause of action the sum of P51,410.91 and under the
second cause of action the sum of P34,827.74.
In its answer, the defendant Philippine trust Company
invoked the order of the Japanese Military Administration
by virtue of which it transferred the current deposit
accounts in question to the Bank of Taiwan as the
depository of the Bureau of Enemy Property Custody of
the Japanese Military Administration.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Trust Company is liable
to the pre-war deposits from petitioner.
Ruling: It has been stipulated by the parties that the
defendant transferred the deposits in question to the
Bank of Taiwan in compliance with the order of the
Japanese Military Administration, the defendant was
released from any obligation to the depositors or their
transferee. Appellant's contention that there is no
positive showing that the transfer was made by the
Philippine Trust Company in compliance with the order of
the Japanese Military Administration, and its logical
effect is to make such act binding on said company. At
any rate, the defendant corporation has not impugned its
validity.
In the case of Filipinas Compañia de Seguros vs. Christern
Henefeld and Co., The SC ruled that the nationality of a
private corporation is determined by the character or
citizenship of its controlling stockholders; and this
pronouncement is of course decisive as to the hostile
character of the Eastern Isles, Inc., as far as the
Japanese Military Administration was concerned, it being
conceded that the controlling stockholders of said
corporations were American citizens.
[G.R. Nos. 89095 & 89555. November 6, 1989.]
SIXTO P. CRISOSTOMO,  petitioner,  vs.  SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SPOUSES SHOJI YAMADA and
MICHIYO YAMADA and SPOUSES TOMOTADA ENATSU and
EDITA ENATSU, respondents.
|
FACTS:
Sixto Crisostomo, Felipe Crisostomo, Juanito Crisostomo
et al were the original stockholders of the United Doctors
Medical Center (UDMC), which was organized in 1968 with
authorized capital stock of P1 million (later increased to
P15 million in 1972). They owned 40% of the outstanding
stock while the majority belonged to the members of the
United Medical Staff Association (UMSA)
1. Despite their minority status, the Crisostomo group has
managed UDMC from its inception with Juanito
Crisostomo as president and petitioner Sixto Crisostomo
as director and legal counsel
2. In 1988, UDMC defaulted in its obligation to pay P55
million to DBP. In the last quarter of 1987, UDMC’s assets
and those of the Crisostomos which had been given to
DBP as collateral, faced foreclosure by the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), which had taken over UDMC’s
loan.
3. As such, UDMC, through Ricardo Alfonso and Juanito
Crisostomo, persuaded the Yamadas and Enatsu (Shoji
Yamada and Tomatada Enatsu are Japanese doctors) to
invest fresh capital in UDMC. The wife of Enatsu is a
Filipina. They invested P57 million in UDMC
4. The investment was effected by means of a stock
purchase agreement and an amended memorandum of
agreement whereby the private respondents subscribed
to 82.09% of the outstanding shares of UDMC. Both
transactions were authorized by the BOD and
stockholders of UDMC, and approved by BSP and SEC
5. The said capital not only saved the assets of UDMC
from foreclosure but also freed the Crisostomos group
their individual and solidary liabilities as sureties for the
DBP loan
6. However, petitioner Sixto Crisostomo filed an SEC case
against Juanito Crisostomo, Yamada and Enatsu to stop
the holding of the stockholder’s and BOD meeting and to
disqualify the Japanese investors from holding a
controlling interest in UDMC
7. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case with RTC Makati
seeking a preliminary injunction and identical reliefs
prayed for by him in the SEC case.
8. Petitioner alleged that Yamada and Enatsu violated the
Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practicing a
profession in the Philippines (Sec 14, Art XII 1987
Constitution
ISSUE:
WON the investments made by Yamada and Enatsu
constitute illegal practice of profession by foreigners in
the Philippines
DECISION:
No. The investments in UDMC of Doctors Yamada and
Enatsu do not violate the
Constitutional prohibition against foreigners practicing a
profession in the Philippines (Sec 14, Art XII, 1987
Constitution) for they do not practice their profession
(medicine) in the Philippines, neither have they applied
for a license to do so. They only own shares of stock in a
corporation that operates a hospital. No law limits the
sale of hospital shares of stock to doctors only. The
ownership of such shares does not amount to engaging
(illegally) in the practice of medicine, or, nursing. If it
were otherwise, the petitioner's stockholding in UDMC
would also be illegal.
[G.R. No. L-22238. February 18, 1967.]
CLAVECILLA  RADIO SYSTEM,  petitioner-appellant,  vs.
HON. AGUSTIN ANTILLON, as City Judge of the
Municipal Court of Cagayan de Oro City and NEW
CAGAYAN GROCERY, respondents-appellees
||
FACTS:
1. New Cagayan Grocery (NECAGRO) filed a complaint for
damages against Clavecilla Radio system. They alleged
that Clavecilla omitted the word ―NOT‖ in the letter
addressed to NECAGRO for transmittal at Clavecilla
Cagayande Oro Branch.
2. NECAGRO alleged that the omission of the word ―not‖
between the word WASHED and AVAILABLE altered the
contents of the same causing them to suffer from
damages.
3.Clavecilla filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action and improper venue.
4.City Judge of CDO denied the MTD. Clavecilla filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary Injunction with
the CFI praying that the City Judge be enjoined from
further proceeding with the case because of improper
venue.
5.CFI – dismissed the case and held that Clavecilla may
be sued either in Manila (principal office) or in CDO
(branchoffice).
6.Clavecilla appealed to the SC contending that the suit
against it should be filed in Manila where it holds its
principaloffice.
ISSUE:
WON the present case against Clavecilla should be filed
in Manila where it holds its principal office.
DECISION:
YES
It is clear that the case from damages is based upon a
written contract. Under par. (b)(3) Sec. 1 Rule 4 of the
New Rules of Court, when an action is not upon a written
contract then the case should be filed in the municipality
where the defendant or any of the defendant resides or
maybe served upon with summons. In corpo. Law, the
residence of the corporation is the place where the
principal office is established. Since Clavecilla’s principal
office is in Manila, then the suit against it may properly
be file in the City of Manila. As stated in Evangelista v.
Santos, the laying of the venue of an action is not left to
plaintiff’s caprice because the matter is regulated by the
Rules of Court
[G.R. No. L-56763. December 15, 1982.]
J O H N  S Y  a n d U N I V E R S A L P A R T S S U P P L Y
CORPORATION,  petitioners,  vs.  TYSON  ENTERPRISES,
INC., JUDGE GREGORIO G. PINEDA of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch XXI and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1979, Tyson Enterprises, Inc. filed a collection suit
against Universal Parts Supply Corporation and its
president John Sy. The suit was filed in Pasig, Rizal. John
Sy filed a motion to file for a bill of particulars which was
denied. Subsequently, Sy filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of improper venue. Sy alleged that Tyson
Enterprises should have filed the case either in Bacolod
City (business address of Universal Parts) or in Manila
(business address of Tyson Enterprises). Sy alleged that it
is improper for Tyson Enterprises to file the case in Pasig
even if it is the residence of Tyson’s president and
general manager, Dominador Ti.
The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals denied Sy’s
motion on the ground that he waived the defense of
improper venue when he filed his motion to file for a bill
of particulars; that the prior motion placed Sy under the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a plaintiff-corporation may file a civil
case not in its business address nor the business address/
residence of the defendant but in the place of residence
of its incorporators/officers.
DECISION:
No. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality
from its incorporators. Its place of business is its
residence and not the residence of its president or any
other officer. Hence, venue is improperly laid in this
case. The trial court of Pasig has no jurisdiction.
Anent the issue that there was a waiver, as a rule, the
defense of improper venue is waived if it is not alleged in
a motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, Sy was able to file
his motion to dismiss in a timely manner. It is of no
moment that there was a prior motion for a bill of
particulars that was filed. There is nothing in the rule
that states that no other motion should have been filed
prior to filing a motion to dismiss before a motion to
dismiss grounded on improper venue may be allowed.
[G.R. No. 112573. February 9, 1995.]
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES,
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP
& COMPANY, INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Rolando Torres, allegedly on a special mission to purchase
firearms for the Philippine Senate, purchased a round trip
ticket from defendant Northwest Airlines for his travel to
Chicago and back to Manila. Via defendant’s flight, Torres
left for the US. After purchasing firearms and upon arrival
in Manila, one of the baggages could not be claimed,
allegedly because Northwest sent it back to the US for US
Customs verification. The baggage was eventually
returned but when Torres opened it, the firearms were
missing. A Personal Property Missing Damage Report was
subsequently filed but Northwest continuously refused to
settle the case amicably, thus prompting Torres to file
this claim for actual, moral, temperate and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. For its part, Northwest
argued that granting, arguendo, the firearms were lost,
its liability was limited to $9.07 per pound (or $640 in
total) under the Warsaw Convention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Northwest is entitled to the limited
liability under the Warsaw Convention
DECISION:
SC held that Northwest’s liability for actual damages may
not be limited to that prescribed in Sec. 22(2) of the
Warsaw Convention. As held in Alitalia v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, the Warsaw Convention does not
operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances of
an airline’s liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent
of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne out by
the language of the Convention. Moreover, slight
reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should
be deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where
the cause of the death or injury to person, or
destruction, loss or damage to property or delay in its
transport is not attributable to or attended by any willful
misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise
improper conduct on the part of any official or employee
for which the carrier is responsible, and there is
otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting
injury. The Convention’s provisions, in short, do not
“regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of
contract by the carrier” or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage.
[G.R. No. 37682. November 26, 1932.]
CLAUDE NEON LIGHTS, FEDERAL INC.,
U.S.A.,  petitioner,  vs. PHILIPPINE ADVERTISING
CORPORATION and FRANCISCO SANTAMARIA, Judge of
First Instance of Manila, respondents.
||
SUMMARY
Respondent Philippine agent filed a suit for damages
against petitioner foreign principal corp. An application
for a writ of attachment was also filed based on Sec. 242
of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that
plaintiff may have the property of the defendant
attached "in an action against a defendant not residing in
the Philippine Islands.” RTC granted the writ. SC
reversed, stating that such provision applies only to
natural persons.
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Advertising Corporation (agent)
filed suit against the petitioner (principal) in the CFI
Manila, claiming P300,000 as damages for alleged breach
of the agency contract existing between the said
respondent and the petitioner. At the same time,
respondent filed an application for writ of attachment
duly verified in which it is stated that the petitioner is a
foreign corporation having its principal place of business
in the City of Washington, District of Columbia. It is not
alleged in said application that petitioner was about to
depart from the Philippine Islands with intent to defraud
its creditors or that it was insolvent or had removed or
disposed of its property or was about to do so with intent
to defraud its creditors. The only statutory ground relied
upon is paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that plaintiff may have the
property of the defendant attached "in an action against
a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.”
The petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the
laws of the District of Columbia; it had complied with all
the requirements of the Philippine laws and was duly
licensed to do business in the Philippine Islands on the
date said writ of attachment was issued.
CFI issued the writ of attachment, and the sheriff has
attached all the properties of the petitioner in the
Philippine Islands. CFI also appointed Manuel C. Grey as
receiver of said properties of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N paragraph 2 of section 424 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is applicable to this petitioner – NO, only for
natural persons. Writ of attachment set aside.
DECISION:
It may be observed at the outset that the words of
section 424 taken in their literal sense seem to refer to a
physical defendant who is capable of being "arrested" or
who is "not residing in the Philippine Islands". It is only by
a fiction that it can be held that a corporation is "not
residing in the Philippine Islands". A corporation has no
home or residence in the sense in which those terms are
applied to natural persons. For practical purposes, a
corporation is sometimes said, in a metaphorical sense,
to be "a resident" of a certain state or a "citizen" of a
certain country, which is usually the state or country by
which or under the laws of which it was created. But that
fiction or analogy between corporations and natural
persons by no means extends so far that it can be said
that every statute applicable to natural persons is
applicable to corporations.
There is not the same reason for subjecting a duly
licensed foreign corporation to the attachment of its
property by a plaintiff under section 424, paragraph 2, as
may exist in the case of a natural person not residing in
the Philippine Islands. The law does not require the
latter, as it does the former, to appoint a resident agent
for service of process; nor to prove to the satisfaction of
the Government before he does business here, as the
foreign corporation must prove, that he "is solvent and in
sound financial condition,” or to produce evidence of
"fair dealing.” He pays no license fee nor is his business
subject at any time to investigation by the Secretary of
Finance and the Governor General; nor is his right to
continue to do business revocable by the Government.
His books and papers are not liable to examination "at
any time" by the Attorney General, the Insular Auditor,
the Insular Treasurer, "or any other officer of the
Government" on the order of the Governor General. He is
not, like a foreign corporation "bound by all laws, rules
and regulations applicable to domestic corporations,”
which are designed to protect creditors and the public.
He can evade service of summons and other legal
process, the foreign corporation never.
Corporations, as a rule, are less mobile than individuals.
This is a specially true of foreign corporations that are
carrying on business by proper authority in these Islands.
They possess, as a rule, great capital which is seeking
lucrative and more or less permanent investment in
young and developing countries like our Philippines. Some
of them came here as far back as the Spanish regime and
are still important factors in our financial and industrial
life. They are anything but "flybynight" concerns. The
latter, we believe, are effectually excluded from our
Islands both by our laws and by our geographical and
economic situation.
Paragraph 2 of section 424, supra does not apply to a
domestic corporation. Our laws and jurisprudence
indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations,
duly licensed to do business here, to the status of
domestic corporations. We think it would be entirely out
of line with this policy should we make a discrimination
against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and
subject its property to the harsh writ of seizure by
attachment when it has complied not only with every
requirement of law made especially of foreign
corporations, but in addition with every requirement of
law made of domestic corporations.
[G.R. Nos. 79926-27. October 17, 1991.]
STATE  INVESTMENT  HOUSE, INC. and  STATE  FINANCING
CENTER, INC., petitioners, vs. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF
AMERICA, NT & SA, HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
C O R P O R AT I O N , a n d t h e C O U RT O F
APPEALS, respondents
FACTS:
Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI) obtained loans from
Citibank, Bank of America and HSBC, all foreign
corporations but with branches in the Philippines.
Meanwhile, State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) and State
Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI), also creditors of CMI, filed
collection suits against the latter with writs of
preliminary attachment. Subsequently, the three banks
jointly filed with the court a petition for involuntary
insolvency of CMI. SHI and SFCI opposed the petition on
the ground that the petitioners are not resident creditors
in contemplation of the Insolvency Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a foreign corporation with a branch in the
Philippines and doing business therein can be considered
a resident
DECISION:
Foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines are considered “residents” of the Philippines,
as the word is understood in Sec. 20 of the Insolvency
Law, authorizing at least three resident creditors of the
Philippines to file a petition to declare a corporation
insolvent. The Tax Code declares that the term “resident
foreign corporation applies to foreign corporation
engaged in trade or business within the Philippines” as
distinguished from a “non-resident foreign corporation”
which is not engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines. The Offshore Banking Law sates that:
“Branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, extension offices or
any other units of corporation or juridical person
organized under the laws of any foreign country
operating in the Philippines shall be considered residents
of the Philippines.” The General Banking Act places
“branches and agencies in the Philippines of foreign
banks” in the category as commercial banks, rural banks,
stock savings and loan association making no distinction
between the former ad the latter in so far as the terms
“banking institutions” and “banks” are used in said Act.
[G.R. No. 60714. October 4, 1991.]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,  petitioner,  vs.  JAPAN AIR LINES, INC., and
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
I957: JAL constituted PAL as its general sales agent in the
Philippines, whereby PAL sold for and in behalf of JAL
plane tickets and reservations for cargo spaces
1959-1963 : JAL did not have planes that landed or
lifted passengers and cargoes in the Philippines
: having had no CPCN (certificate of public convenience
and necessity), CIR assessed against JAL deficiency
income tax for the years 1959-1963.
: JAL protested, claiming it was a non-resident foreign
corporation and, therefore, taxable only on income from
Philippine sources
The absence of flight operations to and from the
Philippines is not determinative of the source of income
or the situs of income taxation. The test of taxability is
the ‘source’; and the source of an income is that activity
which produced the income.”.
When JAL constituted PAL as its sales agent, there is no
doubt that JAL is a resident foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines. Sale of plane tickets, after
all, is the very lifeblood of the airline industry.

DECISION:

For CIR, the Court adopted the BOAC doctrine: “The

source of income is the property, activity or service that
produced the income. For the source of income to be
considered as coming from the Philippines, it is sufficient
that the income is derived from activity within the
Philippines. In BOAC’s case, the sale of tickets in the
Philippines is the activity that produces the income. The
tickets exchanged hands here and payments for fares
were also made here in the Philippine currency. The situs
of the source of payments is the Philippines. The flow of
wealth proceeded from, and occurred within, Philippine
territory, enjoying the protection accorded by the
Philippine government. In consideration of such
protection, the flow of wealth should share the burden of
supporting the government.