CONFLICT OF LAWS

CASE DIGESTS upto CONTRACTS

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS

297 SCRA 469 – CONFLICT OF LAWS – PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – SITUS – LOCUS ACTUS
FACTS: Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and
some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to rape her in a hotel room.
Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and detained in
Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia
Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was
brought to a Saudi court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and
289 lashes; she allegedly violated Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah got wind of
her conviction and the Prince determined that she was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and
sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines
for damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi Arabia.
Saudia Airlines also prayed for other reliefs under the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines’ contention is correct.
HELD:
No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with
petition for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make a determination of
Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction.
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she
is bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law. Morada then
has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may elect whether to file an
action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or where the defendant resides. Obviously, it
is well within her right to file the case here because if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very
disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the
so called ―locus actus‖ or where an act has been done. In the case at bar, Morada was already working in
Manila when she was summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer.
She was not informed that she was going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into appearing
before a court trial which led to her wrongful conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was
committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and suffering. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place).

LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
FACTS:The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from Japan
pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was once located,
before it transferred to the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the Roppongi
property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.
HELD:The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was
specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The
respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State
as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the

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object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesn’t
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
being such.
GREGORIO ARANETA VS RODAS
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of this Court dismissing the secial ci!il action of certiorari
and
mandamus
"led #$ the etitioners against the resondents% &hich as'ed that order of the resondent (udge den$ing the
etitioner)s motion to comel the other resondents to ans&er certain interrogatories su#mitted #$ the former
to the latter #e set aside% and that the resondent #e ordered to issue an order comelling the resondent
cororation to ans&er said interrogatories*Issue:&hether or not there is a rule of la& &hich controls or guides
the resondent (udge in deciding &hether an interrogator$ should #e allo&ed or not*+eld:Since the scoe of
deositions and &ritten interrogatories is limited to matters &hich are not ri!ileged and rele!ant to the su#(ect
matter in!ol!ed in a ending action% and the determination of &hether or not an interrogator$ is ri!ileged or
material is not left tothe discretion of the court or (udge% for there is a la& alica#le &hich ser!es as norm or
guide for the court or (udge to follo&% the resondent (udge could not commit a gra!e a#use of discretion
&hich it did not ha!e in deciding &hether or not the interrogatories in ,uestion are immaterial to the su#(ect
matter in!ol!ed in the ending action% and therefore the$ can not #e allo&ed* If the resondent (udge has
acted contrar$ to la& in deciding that the &ritten interrogatories roounded #$ the etitioners to the other
resondents are immaterial% he &ould ha!e committed an error of la& &hich this court can not correct in the
resent case- #ut not a gra!e a#use of discretion*.hat the resolution means to sa$% and &e no& e/ressl$ so
hold is that certiorari does not lie at all for the reasons a#o!e stated% and the roer remed$ is to rise the
,uestion of admissi#ilit$ of such interrogatories on aeal from the "nal (udgment of the resondent court or
(udge* It is o#!ious that the ,uestion &hether certiorari or aeal is the roer and ade,uate remed$ ma$ onl$
come u &hen the court has acted &ithout or in e/cess of (urisdiction and the act comlained of is
aeala#le*0rincile:.hen the la& does not ro!ide a rule or norm for the court to follo& in deciding a ,uestion
su#mitted to it% #ut lea!es it to the court to determine it in one &a$ or another at his discretion% the (udge is
not a#solutel$ free to act at his leasure or &ill or ar#itraril$* +e must decide the ,uestion% not in accordance
&ith la& for there is none% #ut in conformit$ &ith (ustice% reason and e,uit$% in !ie& of the circumstances of
the case* Other&ise the court or (udge &ould a#use his discretion

HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.versusSUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA

G.R. No. L-5731 – June 22, 1954
FACTS:
Subject of this petition is the endowment policy which insured Aihara andGayapan and upon its maturity the
proceeds were payable to said insured.Brownell instituted this case to compel Sun Life to comply with the
demand topay representing the half of the proceeds of endowment policy and payable toone Naogiro Aihara, a
Japanese national. Such claim is based on Section 5(b)(2) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United
States. Which claim wasapproved and granted by the lower court ordering SLACOC to pay hereinpetitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such Act is still binding despite the completeindependence of the Philippines from American
government?
HELD:
Yes. The extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is clearly impliedfrom the acts of the President of the
Philippines and the Secretary of ForeignAffairs, as well as by the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7, 8 and 477.

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KING MAU WU v. FRANCISCO SYCIPGR No. L-5897 April 23, 1954
Doctrine:

A non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of this country where thedefendant may be summoned and his
property leviable upon execution in the case of a favorable, final, and executory judgment.
FACTS:
This is an action to collect filed by King Maw Wu against Francisco Sycip forthe amount of P59,082.92,
together with lawful interests from 14 October 1947, thedate of the written demand for payment, and costs.
King Mau Wuu, agent of Francisco Sycip, sold and delivered 1,000 tons ofcoconut oil emulsion to Jas Maxwell
Fasset. Fasset in turn assigned it to FortradeCorporation. Under an agency agreement executed in New York,
which was addresseand accepted by Francisco Sycip on November 22, 1945, King Mau Wu was made
theexclusive agent of Sycip in the sale of coconut oil and its derivaties outside thePhilippines and was to be
paid 2 ½ percent on the actual sale price of sales obtainedthru his efforts, in addition to 50 percent of the
difference between the authorized saleprice and the actual sale price.King Mau Wu claims that for the sale to
Fasset, he is entitled under the agencycontract to a commission of 2 ½ percent on the total actual sale price of
1,000 tons ofcoconut oil emulsion and 50 per cent of the difference between the authorized saleprice of $350
per ton and the actual selling price of $400 per ton. As Sycip alreadymade previous payments, King Mau Wu is
just collecting on balance payments due tohim.Sycip, on the other hand, contends that the sales transaction
was not covered by the agency contract dated November 22 as the sales was agreed upon on October16 and
that it was an independent and separate transaction for which King Mau Wuhad been duly compensated.
Lower Court Ruling:
Rendered judgment in favor of King Mau Wu and denied boththe motion for reconsideration and new trial filed
by Sycip. Sycip filed an appeal,contending that the Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction over the
caseas the agency contract was executed in New York.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction.
RATIO:
CFI has jurisdiction. A non-resident may sue a resident in the courts of thiscountry where the defendant may
be summoned and his property leviable uponexecution in the case of a favorable, final, and executory
judgment. It is a personalaction for the collection of a sum of money which the Courts of First Instance have
jurisdiction to try and decide. There is no conflict of laws involved in the case, becauseit is only a question of
enforcing an obligation created by or arising from contract; and

unless the enforcement of the contract be against public policy of the forum, it must be enforced. The plaintiff is
entitled to collect P7,589.88 for commission and P50,000 forone-half of the overprice, or a total of P57,589.88,
lawful interests thereon from thedate of the filing of the complaint, and costs in both instances

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sheman

HSBC VS. SHERMAN
MARCH 28, 2013 ~
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) vs. SHERMAN et al
G.R. No. 72494
August 11, 1989

FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (COMPANY), a company
incorporated in Singapore applied with and was granted by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the
maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable monthly, on
amounts due under said overdraft facility.

As a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it through the aforesaid
overdraft facility, in 1982, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, all of whom were directors of the
COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby private

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respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to
petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and determined
under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that
the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. …

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded payment and inasmuch as the private
respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed A complaint for collection of a sum of money against private
respondents Sherman and Reloj before RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court
denied the motion. They then filed before the respondent IAC a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. The IAC rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon City
from taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper court of Singapore
which is the proper forum. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee stipulation regarding
jurisdiction?

HELD: YES

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction in
the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in
personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is based merely on
technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed
the action here just to harass private respondents.

ISAE vs. QUISUMBING

OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B.
TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY
in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL,
INC., respondents.,

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either
locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable
laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the
protection of employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary
rate 25% more than local-hires.

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When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the
collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary
rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the
DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is entitled to “humane conditions of
work.” These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace – the factory, the office or the field – but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18,
Article II of the constitution mandates “to afford labor full protection”. The State has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the
common good.

However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal
rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.

The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together
with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows
that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security
of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-
hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably related to their status
as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining
unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PAR

Reagan etc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA, G.R.No. L-26379, December 27, 1969

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Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. In
April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443.83. Two months later, hegot permission to
sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to
Willie Johnson Jr for $6600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale tookplace within Clark Air Base. As a result
of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenuecalculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at
P17912.34 and that his income tax would beP2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he
sought for a refund because heclaims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign
soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that
under theMilitary Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax? HELD: The
Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entiredomain. There is no
portion there of that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees aresupreme, its commands paramount. Its
laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies mustsubmit to its terms. That is the extent of its
jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement
that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. TheBase has not become foreign soil or territory. This country's
jurisdictional rights therein, certainly notexcluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines
merely consents that the USexercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and
expediency. It islikewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US
sourcebut the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable

Sison vs. Board of Accountancy

G.R. No. L-2529

Facts:

The Board of Accountancy issued a CPA certificate to a British national named Robert Orr Ferguson to practice
his profession in the Philippines without examination. The issuance of the said certificate was questioned by
herein petitioner on the ground that there is no reciprocity between the Philippines and the United Kingdom as
regards the practice of accountancy.

To resolve this matter, the Board of Accountancy suspended the validity of the CPA certificates until it can be
proven that (a) Filipinos are allowed to take the professional accountant examination given by the British
government, if any, and (b) Filipino certified public accountants can, upon application, be registered as
chartered accountants or granted similar degrees by the British Government." This resolution is based on the
findings that there is no law which regulates the practice of accountancy in England. However, the Philippine
Accountancy Law explicitly provides that the suspension or revocation of the certificate issued under the said
Act may be done by the board for unprofessional conduct of the holder or other sufficient cause. The Secretary
of Justice further said that he believes that "the change in administrative interpretation with respect to the
existence of reciprocity between the Philippines and Great Britain as to the practice of accountancy," does not
constitute sufficient cause for the suspension or revocation of the certificates in question within the meaning of
said provision.

Issue:

W/N the issuance of the CPA certificates was valid in the absence of reciprocity between the Philippines and
the British Government?

Ruling:

Yes it is valid as it comes within the realm of comity as contemplated in our law. Comity is defined as the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory the acts of foreign governments and tribunals, having
due regard both to the international duty and convenience and the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws.

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The British minister in a note sent to the President of the Philippines wrote that that qualified Philippine citizen
are allowed to practice the profession of accountancy including income tax accounting, in the United Kingdom
since there is no governmental control of the accounting profession in the said country and any resident of the
United Kingdom, of whatever nationality, may engage in the profession of accounting without formality.

Therefore, the SC finds no reason why Robert Orr Ferguson who had previously been registered as certified
public accountants and issued the corresponding certificate public accountant in the Philippine Islands, should
be suspended from the practice of his profession in these Islands.

CADALIN VS POEA 238 SCRA 721 Facts: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and
Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs)
instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII . BRII
is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a
domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for
overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals. The amended complaint principally sought the
payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the
unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted
to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as
well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of B Issue: Whether or not the proceedings
conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the
requirements of due process. Whether or not what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of
Labor Code or Art. 1144 of Civil Code. Ruling: Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed. The three
petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such
abuse of discretion. NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Code which the
petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than
those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the
laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country
shall form part of the overseas employment contract." Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion
where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the
employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against
the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.

Oh Hek How v. Republic

29 SCRA 94
Petitioner Oh Hek How having been granted naturalization through his petition filed a motion alleging that he
had complied with the requirements of Republic Act No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of
allegiance as such citizen and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. The Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the petitioner took it and the certificate of
naturalization was issued to him. The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said
order of February 9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal among the grounds that the oath was taken prior to
judgment having been final and executor.

Issue:
Is the oath valid?
Whether or not a permission to renounce citizenship is necessary from the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist
China.

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Held:
First issue:
The order of February 9, 1966 (oathtaking)
had not — and up to the present
has not — become final and executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government.
2nd Issue:
It is argued that the permission is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an alien, as a citizen of
the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot be controlled by any foreign law. However,
the question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed — pursuant to
Articles 15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines. As a
consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines, unless he has complied
with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the
renunciation of nationality. · Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides, however, that before the
naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall "solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces
"absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state
"of which" he is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his former
nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship,because, otherwise, he would have two nationalities and owe
allegiance to two
(2) distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the
acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic
Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that
country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the
Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired."

Nazareno vs. CA
Facts:
The husband and wife, in order to avoid paying estate tax, while they are alive, executed several Deeds of
Sale in favor of their children. The sale was proven to be without consideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the subject properties of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of the deceased.

Held:

No, the children never acquired ownership because the sale was void for lack of consideration. The sale to a
Natividad, one of the children, is deemed in trust for the other children of the deceased. The properties should
be collated as part of the estate.

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of PioFragante, 80 Phil 776

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to
install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate
of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate applied to the
estate is a contravention of law.

ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality

HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical
person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties.” Fragante has rights and fulfillment of
obligation which survived after his death. One of those rights involved the pending application for public
convenience before the PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights left by the decedent, instead of heirs

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directly, become vested and charged with his rights and obligations. Under the present legal system, rights and
obligations which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

G.R. No. L-42780 January 17, 1936

MANILA GAS CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is a corporation that operates a gas plant in the City of Manila and furnishes gas service to the
people of the metropolis and surrounding municipalities by virtue of a franchise granted to it by the Philippine
Government. Associated with the plaintiff are the Islands Gas and Electric Company domiciled in New York,
United States, and the General Finance Company domiciled in Zurich, Switzerland. Neither of these last
mentioned corporations resides in the Philippines. For the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, dividends in the sum of
P1, 348,847.50 were paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric Company in the capacity of
stockholders upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totaling P40, 460.03. For the
same years interest on bonds in the sum of P411,600 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric
Company upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totaling P12,348. Finally for the
stated time period, interest on other indebtedness in the sum of P131, 644, 90 was paid by the plaintiff to the
Islands Gas and Electric Company and the General Finance Company respectively uponwhich withholding
income taxes were paid to the defendant totaling P3,949.34.
An action was brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against theCollector of Internal Revenue for the recovery
of P56, 757.37, which the plaintiff
was required by the defendant to deduct and withhold from the various sums
paid it to foreign corporations as dividends and interest on bonds and other
indebtedness and which the plaintiff paid under protest. On the trial court
dismissing the complaint, with costs, the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Did the trial court err in holding that the dividends paid by the plaintiff
corporation were subject to income tax in the hands of its stockholders?
2. Did the trial court err in not holding the interest on bonds and other
indebtedness of the plaintiff corporation, paid by it outside of the Philippine
Islands to corporations not residing therein, were not, on the part of the
recipients thereof, income from Philippine sources, and hence not subject
to Philippine income tax.
HELD:
1. Appellant first contends that the dividends paid by it to its stockholders,
the Islands Gas and Electric Company , were not subject to tax because
to impose a tax thereon would be to do so on the plaintiff corporation, in
violation of the terms of its franchise and would, moreover, be oppressive
and inequitable. This argument is predicated on the constitutionalprovision that no law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be enacted.
The particular portion of the franchise which is invoked provides:
The grantee shall annually on the fifth day of January of each year
pay to the City of Manila and the municipalities in the Province of
Rizal in which gas is sold, two and one half per centum of the gross
receipts within said city and municipalities, respectively, during the
preceding year. Said payment shall be in lieu of all taxes, Insular,
provincial and municipal, except taxes on the real estate, buildings,
plant, machinery, and other personal property belonging to the
grantee.
The trial judge was of the opinion that a corporation has a
personality distinct from that of its stockholders, enabling the taxing
power to reach the latter when they receive dividends from the
corporation. It must be considered as settled in this jurisdiction that

9
dividends of a domestic corporation, which are paid and delivered
in cash to foreign corporations as stockholders, are subject to the
payment in the income tax, the exemption clause in the charter of
the corporation notwithstanding.
For that reason, the decision of the trial court is sustain and
to overrule appellant's first assigned error.
2. The appellant contends that, as the Islands Gas and Electric Company
and the General Finance Company are domiciled in the United States and
Switzerland respectively, and as the interest on the bonds and other
indebtedness earned by said corporations has been paid in their
respective domiciles, this is not income from Philippine sources within the
meaning of the Philippine Income Tax Law.
Taking first under observation that last point, it is to be observed
that neither in the pleadings, the decision of the trial court, nor the
assignment of errors, was the question of the validity of Act No. 3761
raised. Under such circumstances, and no jurisdictional issue being
involved, we do not feel that it is the duty of the court to pass on the
constitutional question, and accordingly will refrain from doing so.
(Cadwaller-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario [1913], 26 Phil., 192;
Macondray and Co. vs. Benito and Ocampo, P. 137, ante; State vs. Burke
[1912], 175 Ala., 561.)
In the case at bar there is some uncertainty concerning the place of
payment, which under one view could be considered the Philippines and
under another view the United States and Switzerland, but which cannot
be definitely determined without the necessary documentary evidence
before, us.
The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within
its jurisdiction without violating the due process clause of the constitution.
The taxing power of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits, but
within such it may tax persons, property, income, or business. If an interest
in property is taxed, the situs of either the property or interest must be
found within the state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must
have a domicile within the state or the property or business out of which
the income issues must be situated within the state so that the income may be said to have a situs therein.
Personal property may be separated
from its owner, and he may be taxed on its account at the place where the
property is although it is not the place of his own domicile and even
though he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes the tax.
But debts owing by corporations are obligations of the debtors, and only
possess value in the hands of the creditors. These views concerning situs
for taxation purposes apply as well to an organized, unincorporated
territory or to a Commonwealth having the status of the Philippines.
Pushing to one side that portion of Act No. 3761 which permits
taxation of interest on bonds and other indebtedness paid without the
Philippine Islands, the question is if the income was derived from sources
within the Philippine Islands.
In the judgment of the majority of the court, the question should be
answered in the affirmative. The Manila Gas Corporation operates its
business entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings, therefore come from
local sources. The place of material delivery of the interest to the foreign
corporations paid out of the revenue of the domestic corporation is of no
particular moment. The place of payment even if conceded to be outside
of the country cannot alter the fact that the income was derived from the
Philippines. The word "source" conveys only one idea that of origin, and

10
the origin of the income was the Philippines.
Judgment affirmed.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Testate of Amos Bellis vs. Edward A. Bellis, et al
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with
his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally,
three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition
claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine
law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law,
thus the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s
successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law,
which is the national law of the deceased.

GIBBS VS GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINES, 59 PHIL 293 (1933)

FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of the State of California and domiciled
therein; that he and Ea !ohnson Gibbs "ere married at Columbus, #hio, in!uly 190$; that there "as no antenu
%tial marria&e contract bet"een the %arties; that durin& the e'istence of said marria&e the s%ouses ac(uired
the real %ro%erties in the )hili%%ine *slands, as con+u&al %ro%erty. December 2$, 190, -llison D. Gibbs
filed in the said court a %etition for an order re(uirin& the re&ister of deeds to issue the corres%ondin& titles/
to the %etitioner "ithout re(uirin& %reious %ayment of any inheritance ta'.he a%%ellee contends that the la"
of California should determine the nature and e'tent of the title, if any that ested in Ea !ohnson Gibbs under
the three certificates of title os. 200, 2$ and 21 aboe referred to, citin& article 9 of the Ciil
Code. 3ut that, een if the nature and e'tent of her title under said certificates be &oerned by the la" of the )hili
%%ine *slands, the la"s of California &oern the succession to such title, citin& the second %ara&ra%h of
article 10 of the Ciil Code.
ISSUE:
4hether or not the transfer of title in faor of -llison Gibbs from the con+u&al o"nershi% "ith Ea Gibbs, his "ife,
be sub+ect to succession or inheritance ta' by the &oernment of the )hili%%ines5
HELD:
6ES. he nature and e'tent of the title "hich ested in 7rs. Gibbs at the time of the ac(uisition of the
community lands here in (uestion must be determined in accordance "ith the le' rei sitae.he descendible
interest of Ea !ohnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid "as transmitted to her heirs by irtue of inheritance and
this transmission %lainly falls "ithin the lan&ua&e of section 18$ of -rticle * of Cha%ter :0 of the
-dministratie Code "hich leies a ta' on inheritances.he +ud&ment of the court belo" of 7arch 10, 191, is
reersed "ith directions to dismiss the %etition

11
Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935. March 23, 1909.
FACTS: In 1903 in the state of Illinois, Mr. Frank, a US citizen and a representative of theInsular Government
of the Philippines entered into a contract whereby the former shall serve asstenographer in the Philippines for
a period of 2 years. The contract contained a provision thatin case of violation of its terms, Mr. Frank shall be
liable for the amount incurred by thePhilippine Government for his travel from Chicago to Manila and one-half
salary paid duringsuch period. After serving for 6 months, defendant left the service and refused to make
further compliance with the terms of the contract, therefore the Government sued him to recover theamount of
$269.23 plus damages. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, hence thedefendant appealed presenting
minority as his special defense. By reason of the fact that under the laws of the Philippines, contracts made by
person who did not reach majority age of 23 areunenforceable. Defendant claim that he is an adult when he
left Chicago but was a minor whenhe arrived in Manila and at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the
contract.ISSUE: Whether or not the contract is valid.RULING: Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a
contract at the place and time thecontract was made, he cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the
place where thecontract is being enforced. Although Mr. Frank was still a minor under Philippine laws, he
wasnevertheless considered an adult under the laws of the state of Illinois,the place where thecontract was
made.No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,interpretation and validity of
a contract are determined by the law of the place where thecontract is made. Matters connected to its
performance are regulated by the law prevailing atthe place of its performance. Matters respecting a remedy,
such as bringing of a suit,admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place wherethe suit is brought. Although generally, capacity of the parties to enter into a contract is governed
by national law.This is one case not involving real property which was decided by our Supreme Court,
whereinstead of national law, what should determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci
celebrationis. According to Conflict of Laws writer Edgardo Paras, Frank‟s capacity shoul
d be judged by his national law and not by the law of the place where the contract was entered into.
In the instant case whether it is the place where the contract was made or Frank‟s nationality,
the result would be the same. However,as suggested by the mentioned author, for the conflictsrule in capacity
in general, national law of the parties is controlling

M.E GRAY V. INSULAR LUMBER CO. No. 45144 April 3, 1939

FACTS:
Insular Lumber Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York,
licensed to engage in business in the Philippines, with offices in the City of Manila, in Fabrica, Occidental
Negros, in New York and in Philadelphia. M. E Gray is the owner and possessor of 6, shares of the capital
stock of the defendant corporation. The dispute arises when he asked the offices of insular lumber in Manila
and in Fabrica to permit him to examine the books and records of the business of said defendant, but he was
not allowed to do so. According to Insular Lumber, applying the law of New York, the rights of a stockholder to
examine the books and records of a corporation organized under the laws of that State, have been, during the
entire period material to this action, only those provided in section 77 of the Stock Corporation Law which
substantially provides that only stockholder owning at least three percent of the capital stock has the right to
examine the books and records of the corporation. M.E Gray, not being a stockholder owning at least three
percent of the capital stock has not right to examine. M.E Gray, contends that under our Corporation code,
under which insular lumber company was registered to do business in the Philippines, he is entitled, as
stockholder, to inspect the record of the transactions of the defendant corporation (sec. 51, Act No. 1459), and
this right, which is recognized in the common law, has not been altered by section 77 of the Stock Corporation
Law of New.
Lower Court’s Decision:
The petition for mandamus compelling the company to allow him examine the books and records was denied.
ISSUE
: 1. Whether the M.E Gray is entitled, as stockholder of the Insular Lumber Company, to inspect and examine
the books and records of the transactions of said company.
HELD

12
: No. The decision of the CFI was affirmed denying the mandamus against the company and absolving it from
the complaint. 1. The stipulation of facts is binding upon both parties and cannot be altered by either of them>
On the strength of that principle M.E Gray is bound to adhere to the agreement made by him with the Insular
Lumber Co. in paragraph four of the stipulation of facts, to the effect that the rights of a stockholder, under the
law of New York, to examine the books and records of a corporation organized under the laws of said State,
and during the entire period material to this action, are only those provided in section 77 of the Stock
Corporation Law of New York. Under this law, plaintiff has the right to be furnished by the treasurer or other
fiscal officer of the corporation with a statement of its affairs embracing a particular account of all its assets and
liabilities. The right under the common law cannot be granted by insular lumber in the present case, since the
same can only be granted at the discretion of the court, under certain conditions, to wit:

(a) That the stockholder of a corporation in New York has the right to inspect its books andrecords if it can be
shown that he seeks information for an honest purpose(b) That said right to examine and inspect the books of
the corporation must be exercised ingood faith, for a specific and honest purpose, and not to gratify curiosity,
or for speculative orvexatious purposes.The M.E Gray has made no effort to prove or even allege that the
information he desired to
obtain through the examination and inspection of defendant’s books was necessary to protect
his interests as stockholder of the corporation, or that it was for a specific and honest purpose,and not to gratify
curiosity, nor for speculative or vexatious purposes

Sy Kiong v. Sarmiento Case No. 150 G.R. No. L-2934 (November 29, 1951) FACTS: Petitioner is the owner
of a duly licensed grocery store located in the City of Manila and an importer of flour who sells either to
bakeries or to retail dealers for purposes of retail. Sometime in September 1948, the Treasurer of the City
of Manila assessed against him the sum of 566.50php which represents the alleged deficiency municipal
license tax due from him on his gross sales of flour to bakeries after deducting the sales made to retail
dealers for purposes of resale. ISSUE: W/N the sales of flour made by the Petitioner to bakeries to be
manufactured into bread are retail or wholesale. HELD: The sale of flour to bakeries to be manufactured
into bread and to be resold to the public, in the absence of any express provision of law on the matter,
should be treated as a sale at retail and should subject the vendor to the retail tax law

Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. vs Court of Appeals

342 SCRA 213 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Proof of Foreign Law

In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to
the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to
pilot the ship in the Orinoco River. Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while
being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not
able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for
the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and
Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and owner of
the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed
to check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan laws.

HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only mere photocopies of
the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:

13
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and

(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.

And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.

Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be
the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the
negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel.
Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals 288 SCRA 23 (1993)

FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets
from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles
on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets represented
confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their daughter received a notice of
reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and
their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed
on the wait-list because the number of passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually allowed to board the flight to Los
Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not
able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers.
Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife
and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the next TWA flight to Los
Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they
were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for damages based on breach of
contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the TWA to
pay the price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral damages and attorney’s fees. On
appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically
allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith
could be imputed on TWA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?

HELD:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and
her daughter to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation
allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

14
1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate
that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied
solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of
the Civil Aeronautic Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.

"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to board
their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her
deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,
respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has
no basis in fact."

"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar
in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline
ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the
forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in
the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law."
Other Issues:

2.) Even if the claimed US Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at
bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the place where the
airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and nationals of
the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the airline.

3.) Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers
concerned to an award of moral damages. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of
having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for check in. for the
indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to
an award of moral damages. This is so, for a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty
--- a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest
or enrichment. Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not
informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed
tickets if there was overbooking. Moreover, TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged
policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of the
spouses Zalamea and their daughter under their contract of carriage. Such conscious disregard make
respondent TWA liable for moral damages, and to deter breach of contracts by TWA in similar fashion in the
future, the SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

15
G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and ECTOR T. RI!ER", pet#t#oner$, %$.TE
CO&RT O' "((E")S, ON. G&I))ER*O ). )O+", SR., (RESIDING +&DGE,REGION") TRI") CO&RT O' *"NI)",
BR"NC 2, and (EO()E O' TE(I)I((INES, re$pondent$.
Statement of the case: Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May 23, 1996, by
theCourt of Appeals in CA-!"! S# $o! 3%92& and CA-!"! S# $o! 3%'19! CA-!"! S#$o! 3%92& had affirmed the
order dated September 6, 199(, of the "e)ional *rial Court,Manila, +ranch 26, insofar as it denied petitioners
respectie Motions to .uash the/nformations in t0enty-fie 2% criminal cases for iolation of Central +an
Circular $o!964! *herein included 0ere informations inolin): a consolidated Criminal Cases$os! 91-
141&'9 to 91-141&&3 filed a)ainst Mrs! /melda "! Marcos, "oberto S!+enedicto, and 5ector *! "iera b
consolidated Criminal Cases $os! 91-141&&( to91-141&92 filed a)ainst Mrs! Marcos and +enedicto and c
Criminal Cases $os! 92-1419%9 to 92-141969 also a)ainst Mrs! Marcos and +enedicto! $ote, ho0eer, that
theCourt of Appeals already dismissed Criminal Case $o! 91-141&&(!Statement of the facts:7n 8ecember 2',
1991, Mrs! /melda Marcos and Messrs! +enedicto and "iera 0ere indicted for iolation of Section 14 of
Circular $o! 964 1 in relation to Section3( of the Central +an Act "epublic Act $o! 26%, as amended in
fie /nformations filed 0ith the "e)ional *rial Court of Manila! 8oceted as Criminal Cases $os! 91-141&'9 to
91-141&&3, the char)e sheets alle)ed that the trio failed to submit reports of their forei)n echan)e earnin)s
from abroad andor failed to re)ister 0ith the ;orei)n <chan)e 8epartment of the Central +an 0ithin the
period mandated by Circular $o! 964! Said Circular prohibited natural and =uridical persons from maintainin)
forei)n echan)e accounts abroad 0ithout prior authori>ation from the Central +an! 7n Au)ust 11, 199(,
petitioners moed to ?uash allthe /nformations filed a)ainst them in Criminal Cases $os! 91-141&'9 to 91-
141&&3 91-141&&( to 91-141&92, and 91-1419%9 to 91-141969! *heir motion 0as )rounded on lac of
=urisdiction, forum shoppin), absence of a preliminary inesti)ation and etinction of criminal liability 0ith the
repeal of Circular $o! 964!7n September 6, 199(, the trial court denied petitioners@ motion! A similar motion
filed on May 23, 199( byMrs! Marcos seein) to dismiss the dollar-saltin) cases a)ainst her due to the repeal of
Circular $o! 964 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order dated une 9,199(! #etitioners then filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the trial court lie0ise denied this motion on 7ctober 1&, 199(!!
ISS&E
:1!Bhether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denyin) the Motion to .uash for absence of a alid preliminary
inesti)ation!2! Bhether or not the repeal of Central +an Circular $o! 964 and "epublic Act $o! 26% by
Circular $o! 13%3 and "epublic Act $o! '6%3 respectiely, etin)uish the criminal liability of petitioners!
E)D
:1!
NO
! #reliminary inesti)ation is not part of the due process )uaranteed by the Constitution! /t is an in?uiry to
determine 0hether there is sufficient )round to en)ender a 0ell-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably )uilty thereof! /nstead, the ri)ht to a preliminary inesti)ation is personal! /t is
afforded to the accused by statute, and can be 0aied, either epressly or by implication! Bhen the records of
the case 0ere disclosed to them, in optin) to enter their respectie pleas to the char)es, and filed arious
motions and pleadin)s, they are deemed to hae made an epress 0aier of their ri)ht to hae a preliminary
inesti)ation!2!
NO.
/n the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular $o! 964,Circular $o! 13%3 retained the
same reportorial re?uirement for residents receiin) earnin)s or profits from non-trade forei)n echan)e
transactions! <en the most cursory )lance at the repealin) circulars, Circular $os! 131& and 13%3 sho0s that
both contain a sain) clause, epressly proidin) that the repeal of Circular $o!964 shall hae no effect on
pendin) actions for iolation of the latter Circular! A sain) clause operates to ecept from the effect of the
repealin) la0 0hat 0ould other0ise be lost under the ne0 la0! /n the present case, the respectie sain) clauses
of Circular $os! 131& and 13%3 clearly manifest theintent to resere the ri)ht of the State to prosecute and
punish offenses for iolations of the repealed Circular $o! 964, 0here the cases are either pendin) or under
inesti)ation
DIS(OSITION- ERE'ORE,
the instant petition is
DIS*ISSED
! *he assailed consolidated 8ecision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in CA-!"! S# $o! 3%92& and

16
CA !"! S# $o! 3%'19, is
"''IR*ED IT *ODI'IC"TION
that the char)es a)ainst deceased petitioner, "oberto S! +enedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases $os! 91-
141&'9 to 91-141&&3, 91-141&&( to 141&92, and 92-1419%9 to 92-141969, pendin) before the "e)ional *rial
Court of Manila, +ranch 26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal as 0ell as ciil liability
ex delicto
that mi)ht be attributableto him in the aforesaid cases are declared etin)uished by reason of his death on May
1%, 2444
.
$o pronouncement as to costs

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs Venicio Escolin

6 SCRA 266 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Application of Laws – Nationality Principle

In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she
was domiciled here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated
in her will that should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of
Charles filed a motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a
certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee
of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same was
in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as administratrix.
Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Since said will
basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank was appointed as administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister
and since that is her will, the same must be respected. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the
time of her death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed
by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of
legitimes (Charles’ share in the estate).

PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled
outside Texas at the time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

HELD: The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as
to the law of Texas. The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact
to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. The Supreme Court however
emphasized that Texas law at the time of Linnie’s death is the law applicable (and not said law at any other
time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., v. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN,

EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN
G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

17
Doctrine: As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions
are to be governed by the national law of the testator provided that the law be evidenced in the court.

FACTS: Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on
May 20, 1922.
Decedent in this case gave out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in
cash, his grandson P90,819.67 and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his
brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each, or a total of
P12,000.
The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions
disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate
that the laws of the form concede to them.

Lower Court Ruling: Dismissed the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward
Bohanan to the project of partition submitted by the executor and approving the said project.
The testator permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or
desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that
state.
Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United
States and of the State of Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance
with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Magdalena C. Bohanan can claim. NO
2. Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given
them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid NO.

RATIO: The court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30,
1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan
married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator. Since no right to
share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had
already found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter
can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left by the testator.
Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have
not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds
of the estate left by the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession
is in question.
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen
of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See
Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is whether the testementary dispositions,
especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines,
are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec.
9905, Complied Nevada Laws of 1925, supra). The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in
our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules, which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal
custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that the foreign law

18
was introduced in evidence by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2".
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws
of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of
Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us,
without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

Petitioner: Juan Gallanosa FrivaldoRespondent: COMELECPonente: Justice Cruz Nature of Action: Petition for
CertiorariFacts:-

Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988.-

On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a petition to COMELEC
requesting to disqualify Frivaldo from his office on the grounds thathe was a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America.-

Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen in Januray 20, 1983.-

Frivaldo admitted but said that he was only forced to do so since the time of Marcos regimehe was considered
as an enemy and he went to USA seeking refuge and his naturalization isnot impressed with voluntariness as
he went back after the Marcos Regime to the country tohelp the restoration of democracy.-

He implies that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election.-

The case was approved by COMELEC and motion to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was deniedto which Frivaldo
filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court.Issue:-

Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his electionon January 18,
1988?Ruling:-

Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines and disqualified fromserving as the
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vacancy shall be filled by the electedVice-Governor.-

Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for local elective office must be a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where is running.-

Omnibus Election Code section 117 states that a qualified voter, among other qualifications,must be a citizen
of the Philippines.-

The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his electionas the evidence
shown from the certification of US District Court of North California statingthat he is a citizen of the Philippines.-

Frivaldo’s argument that

he reacquire his Philippine citizenship through the participation inthe election which in his view repatriated him
to which the Court refutes that there
are proper methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship either through Direct Act ofCongress,
Naturalization or Repatriation to which Frivaldo did not access to.-

Only citizens of the Philippines which have one allegiance can run in local elective office

Pedro Palting vs San Jose Petroleum, Inc.

19
18 SCRA 924 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Parity Rights – Nationality – Nationalized Areas of
Activity

In 1956, San Jose Petroleum, Inc. (SJP), a mining corporation organized under the laws of Panama, was
allowed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to sell its shares of stocks in the Philippines.
Apparently, the proceeds of such sale shall be invested in San Jose Oil Company, Inc. (SJO), a domestic
mining corporation. Pedro Palting opposed the authorization granted to SJP because said tie up between SJP
and SJO is violative of the constitution; that SJO is 90% owned by SJP; that the other 10% is owned by
another foreign corporation; that a mining corporation cannot be interested in another mining corporation. SJP
on the other hand invoked that under the parity rights agreement (Laurel-Langley Agreement), SJP, a foreign
corporation, is allowed to invest in a domestic corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not SJP is correct.

HELD: No. The parity rights agreement is not applicable to SJP. The parity rights are only granted to American
business enterprises or enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by US citizens. SJP is a Panamanian
corporate citizen. The other owners of SJO are Venezuelan corporations, not Americans. SJP was not able to
show contrary evidence. Further, the Supreme Court emphasized that the stocks of these corporations are
being traded in stocks exchanges abroad which renders their foreign ownership subject to change from time to
time. This fact renders a practical impossibility to meet the requirements under the parity rights. Hence, the tie
up between SJP and SJO is illegal, SJP not being a domestic corporation or an American business enterprise
contemplated under the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

Valles v. COMELEC
– Australian citizenship; governor of Davao Oriental - Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of
the place of birth; The signing into law of the 1935 Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as
basis for acquisition of Philippine citizenship; The mere fact of a person is a holder of an Australian passport
and has an ACR are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and don’t militate against her claim of Philippine citizenship; For candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship; A declaration to support and
defend the Constitution is effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

CO vs. HRETFacts:
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was
held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislativedistrict are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed
election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of thePhilippines and not a
resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong
Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court
an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a
Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino

20
fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privaterespondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in thePhilippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a
person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in
the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to
be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires
that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements

BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS VGO,25SCRA890

Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, started living maritally in Malitbog,
Leyte, in 1934. They bore the following childred: Beato, Manuel, Gonzalo, and Julio. In 1946, they went to
Amoy, China, on vacation, but Go died there the same year. In 1961, the children applied with the Philippine
Consul General in Hongkong for entry into the Philippines as Filipino citizens. The Consulate then received a
cablegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs authorizing it to investigate whether the petitioners for entry
were the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano a Filipino citizen. After investigation, the office issued a
certificate of registration and identity to the effect that the applicant had submitted sufficient evidence
of their citizenship and identity and had been allowed to register in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to
travel directly to the Philippines. But Department of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner of Immigration
that, on the basis of the findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the signatures of former
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M. Serrano, on certain documents, authorizing the documentation of
Beato Go Callano and others, were not authentic. All this was done without previous notice served nor hearing
granted to said parties.

Board of Immigration Commissioners , upon review, found that:

1.that, in view of the fact that the cable authorization referred to heretofore is a forgery, all the proceedings
had in connection therewith are void and, as a result, the private respondents must be deported as aliens not
properly documented;
2.that, granting that they were Filipino citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946,they lost that citizenship,
firstly, by staying in China for a period of 15 years, and secondly, because they wererecognized by their
common-law father, they bcam citizens of the Republic of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality
Law.

Ruling:
First
, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth subsequently
acquired
Chinese citizenship under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition or a prolonged stay in
China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law and the Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved by a
Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system of China. For, the settled rule of international law,
affirmed by the Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April 12, 1930 and by the International
Court of Justice, is that
Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state should be determined in
accordance with laws of that state
.
Second
, the petitioners are admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be governed by Philippine law
wherever they may be, in conformity withArticle 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code which provides as
follows: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to thestatus , conditions and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the
Philippine Constitution , "Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law," which
implies that the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine citizenship shall be determined by no

21
other than the Philippine law.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63
, as amended by Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship 1.

by naturalization in a foreign country; 2.

express renunciation of citizenship; 3.

subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country; rendering service
to, or 4.

accepting a commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country; 5.

cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; d 6.

declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; 7.

in the case of a woman by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she
acquires his nationality.
Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among the ground for losing Philippine citizenship
under Philippine law
, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by reason of such recognition.
Renunciation must be express
. Where Ong, a natural child of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, born in the Philippines, was brought by
his parents to China when he was 4 years old, where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the
Philippines at 25 years of age,
The fact that a minor child in those conditions was taken to China and remained there for several years is not
sufficient ground upon which to hold that he has changed his nationality, when, after reaching his majority, he
did not express his desire to choose the nationality of his father
. Respondents were all minors when they were brought to China. Upon reaching the age of majority, Beato
even applied registration as a Philippine citizen and sought entry into the country (
having clear indicia of intent to continue his former status
)

MERCADO VS MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999 [Dual Citizenship; Dual Allegiance]

FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the ground that he is both
an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC
granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code
RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the local position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

22
Antonio Bengson III vs The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
357 SCRA 545 – Political Law – The Legislative – “Natural Born” Requirement – Requirements to be a
Congressman

Antonio Bengson and Teodoro Cruz were rivals in the 1998 elections in the 2nd District of Pangasinan. They
were running for Congress. Cruz won by a significant margin over the incumbent Bengson. Bengson then filed
a quo warranto proceeding in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) alleging that Cruz is not
a natural born citizen, as defined by law; hence he should be disqualified from holding office. The HRET
subsequently declared and affirmed Cruz as the winner. Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration alleging
that Cruz was indeed born a Filipino and he is defined under the 1935 Constitution as a natural born citizen.
Cruz however lost his citizenship when he enlisted in the US Army in 1985. He also swore allegiance to the US
without consent from the Philippines. Cruz, on the other hand, argued that he regained his Filipino Citizenship
by virtue of Republic Act No. 2630 which provides that:

Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the
Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired
United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines…

Bengson insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cruz is a natural-born citizen.

HELD: Yes. Bengson’s contention that Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act
to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term “natural-
born citizen” was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

In Cruz’s case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United
States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Under said law,
repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a natural-born Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

ANGAT VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 132244, 14 September 1999 [Naturalization; Reacquisition; RA No. 8171]

FACTS:
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a Philippine citizen before the RTC
Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC
declared him as citizen of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition should have been dismissed
by the court for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.

RULING:
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with the
RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for repatriation of Filipino

23
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have
lost the Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630, since these laws could only
apply to persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in,
the armed forces of an allied country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition.
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine citizenship would not even
required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register the said oath with the proper civil registry.

Republic v. CFI of Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974].

DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 99358 30 January 1995
Petitioner: Dyumantan
Respondents: Hon. Andrea D. Domingo, Commissioner of the Board of Immigration, Hon. Regino R. Santiago
and Hon, Jorge V. Sarmiento, Commissioners Bureau of Immigration and deportation

FACTS: Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. On April 3,
1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with
Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two
children with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a
friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January
13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them. As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in
the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors under
Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was
issued an alien certificate of registration. Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter,
petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. The CID issued an order revoking the status of permanent
resident given to petitioner, the Board found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the laws of
the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of permanent residence, since she was an
Indonesian citizen and her marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid. Thus this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: Whether the courts may review deportation proceedings

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of Article 8 says Judicial Power includes 1) settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable 2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under the law the CID can
validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Generally, the
right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. However, under clause
1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of
this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to
deportation. The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and "shall
not be effected ... unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause for
deportation arises". Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when Leonardo C. Banez
informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the
issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990

24
Romualdez v. RTC etal, Sept. 14, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece of Imelda Marcos. In
1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the days of People
Power, relatives of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled the country. One of
them are the Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United States.

However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the U.S. or else they’ll be deported.
Upon receipt of the information, Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay his return to his
residence in Leyte and immediately registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of the voters
alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter. However, the
MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition to the RTC, the appellate court
reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolos, Leyte despite his sudden
departure to the U.S?

Ruling:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because he is still considered a resident
of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused great fear to
the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is understandable.
Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment of residence’.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of every citizen
enabling them to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the people.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

Facts:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First
District. On March 2, !""#, private respondent $irilio Monte%o, also a candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for dis&ualification of the petitioner 'ith $OM(L($ on the )round that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional re&uirement for residency. On March 2", !""#, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy,
chan)in) the entry of seven months to *since childhood+ in item no.  in said certificate. o'ever, the amended
certificate 'as not received since it 'as already past deadline. he claimed that she al'ays maintained /aclo0an
$ity as her domicile and residence. /he econd Division of the $OM(L($ 'ith a vote of 2 to ! came up 'ith a
resolution findin) private respondent1s petition for dis&ualification meritorious.
ssue:
hether or not petitioner lost her domicile of ori)in 0y operation of la' as a result of her marria)e to the late
3resident Marcos.
!eld:
For election purposes, residence is used synonymously 'ith domicile. /he $ourt upheld the &ualification of
petitioner, despite her o'n declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only
4 months, 0ecause of the follo'in)5 6a7 a minor follo's the domicile of her parents8 /aclo0an 0ecame
petitioner1s domicile of ori)in 0y operation of la' 'hen her father 0rou)ht the family to Leyte8 607 domicile of
ori)in is lost only 'hen there is actual removal or chan)e of domicile, a 0ona fide intention of a0andonin) the

25
former residence and esta0lishin) a ne' one, and acts 'hich correspond 'ith the purpose8 in the a0sence of clear
and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of ori)in should 0e deemed to continue8 6c7 the
'ife does not automatically )ain the hus0and1s domicile 0ecause the term *residence+ in $ivil La' does not
mean the same thin) in 3olitical La'8 'hen petitioner married 3resident Marcos in !"#9, she :ept her domicile of
ori)in and merely )ained a ne' home, not a domicilium necessarium8 6d7 even assumin) that she )ained a ne'
domicile after her marria)e and ac&uired the ri)ht to choose a ne' one only after her hus0and died, her acts
follo'in) her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose /aclo0an, her domicile of ori)in, as her domicile
of choice

Davis V. Winship v. Phil. Trust Co., 90 Phil. 744 [1952]

Facts:
Prior to December, 1941, the Eastern Isles
Import corporation organized under an existing by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines, all of the capital
stock of which was and has been owned by American
citizens, had a current account deposit with the
Philippine Trust Company, and as of December 29,
1941, the balance in favor of said depositor was
P51,410.91. Prior to December, 1941, the Eastern
Isles, Inc., a corporation organized under and existing
by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, all of the
capital stock of which was and has been owned by
American citizens, had a current account deposit with
the Philippine Trust Company, and as of December
29, 1941, the balance in favor of said depositor was
P34,827.74.
On October 4, 1943, the Japanese Military
Administration in the Philippines issued an order
requiring all deposit accounts of the hostile people
(including corporations) to be transferred to the Bank
of Taiwan, as the depository of the Japanese Military
Administration, which order the Philippine Trust
Company was specifically directed to comply with. In
compliance with said order, the Philippine Trust
Company transferred and paid the credit balances of
the current account deposits of the Eastern Isles
Import Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. to
the Bank of Taiwan.
The pre-war current deposit accounts of the
Eastern Isles Import Corporation and of the Eastern
Isles, Inc. were subsequently transferred to S. Davis
Winship who, on August 12, 1947, presented to the
Philippine Trust Company checks Nos. A-79212 and
H-579401 covering the aforesaid deposits. The
Philippine Trust Company, however, refused to pay
said checks, whereupon, on September 6, 1947, S.
Davis Winship instituted the present action against
the Philippine Trust Company in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to recover upon the first cause of
action the sum of P51,410.91 and under the second
cause of action the sum of P34,827.74.
In its answer, the defendant Philippine trust
Company invoked the order of the Japanese Military
Administration by virtue of which it transferred the

26
current deposit accounts in question to the Bank of
Taiwan as the depository of the Bureau of Enemy
Property Custody of the Japanese Military
Administration.
Issue: Whether or not Philippine Trust Company is
liable to the pre-war deposits from petitioner.
Ruling: In view of this pronouncement, we have to
affirm the appealed judgment. As it has been
stipulated by the parties that the defendant
transferred the deposits in question to the Bank of
Taiwan in compliance with the order of the Japanese
Military Administration, the defendant was released
from any obligation to the depositors or their
transferee. Appellant's contention that there is no
positive showing that the transfer was made by the
Philippine Trust Company in compliance with the
order of the Japanese Military Administration, and its
logical effect is to make such act binding on said
company. At any rate, the defendant corporation has
not impugned its validity.
In the case of Filipinas Compañia de Seguros vs.
Christern Henefeld and Co., Inc., Phil., 54, we Ruling
that the nationality of a private corporation is
determined by the character or citizenship of its
controlling stockholders; and this pronouncement is
of course decisive as to the hostile character of the
Eastern Isles, Inc., as far as the Japanese Military
Administration was concerned, it being conceded that
the controlling stockholders of said corporations were
American citizens.

Crieostomo v. SEC, 179 SCRA 146 [1989].

179 SCRA 146 – Legal Ethics – Duty Against Forum Shopping

Crisostomo is a minority stockholder of the United Doctors Medical Center. He is also the director and legal
counsel of UDMC. The said hospital was unable to pay its P55 million debt incurred from the Development
Bank of the Philippines hence it faced foreclosure. In order to avoid foreclosure, Crisostomo and some others
were able to convince Japanese doctors to invest in the hospital. Eventually, these Japanese doctors invested
P57 million in said hospital. Pursuant to the Memorandum in lieu of the investment, the Japanese doctors were
promised to be part of the hospital’s board of directors. But then, instead of holding an election for the new
board of directors, Crisostomo opposed the same citing constitutional grounds. The issue reached the
Securities and Exchange Commission which ordered UDMC to hold the election.

Meanwhile, Crisostomo filed an action to annul the Memorandum agreed with the Japanese doctors before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The said RTC denied Crisostomo’s petition.

Crisostomo then appealed the two decisions (SEC’s and the RTC’s) before the Court of Appeals. Not only that,
while the two cases were pending appeal, he also filed a petition for certiorari directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Crisostomo is guilty of forum shopping.

HELD: Yes. All three actions he filed raise the same issues that he raised in the different tribunals. There is
forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion

27
(other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the
courts but also in connection with litigations commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is
pending, as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable
administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling.

Forum-shopping makes the Crisostomo subject to disciplinary action and renders his petitions in the Supreme
Court and in the Court of Appeals dismissible. He and his counsel are guilty of contempt. Crisosotmo is
ordered by the Supreme Court to pay double the costs of the suit.

G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA,
in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor son
MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla
bought from United Airlines,
through the Philippine Travel Bureauin Manila,
three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minorson, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington
DC, Chicago and Los Angeles.All
All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the firstcoupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changedtheir itinerary,
paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issuedtickets with corresponding boarding passes with the
words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but were denied boarding becausethe flight was
overbooked. The
CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirementwill not defeat his claim as
the denied boarding rules were not complied with applyingthe laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal
Regulation Part on Oversales of theUSA.ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.HELD:No.
According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where acontract is made or entered into
governs with respect to its nature and validity,obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to
be the rule even thoughthe place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to
beperformed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticketwas issued, where the
passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and theticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Therefore, although, the contractof carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were
purchasedthrough petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,however, such
fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage enteredinto by the parties in Manila.

Boman Environmental Dev. v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 540 [1988]

167 SCRA 540 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Jurisdiction – Intra-Corporate Dispute

Nilcar Fajilan was a stockholder and the president of Boman Environmental Development Corporation
(Boman). In 1984, he wrote a letter to the Board tendering his resignation and his offer to sell his shareholdings
for P300k. The Board accepted the resignation as well as his offer to sell. The Board advised Fajilan that
Boman will be paying the shares in installment. Fajilan is to transfer the shares upon completion of payment.
Boman paid the first two P50k installments but defaulted in paying the remaining P200k. Fajilan then sued
Boman in the RTC of Makati.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction.

HELD: No. This is an intra-corporate dispute and as such the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
jurisdiction. This case involves an intra-corporate controversy because the parties are a stockholder and the
corporation. Fajilan is still a stockholder. There has been no actual transfer of his shares to the corporation. In

28
the books of the corporation he is still a stockholder. Fajilan’s suit against the corporation to enforce the latter’s
promissory note or compel the corporation to pay for his shareholdings is cognizable by the SEC alone which
shall determine whether such payment will not constitute a distribution of corporate assets to a stockholder in
preference over creditors of the corporation. The SEC has exclusive supervision, control and regulatory
jurisdiction to investigate whether the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings to cover the payment for
the shares, and whether the purchase is for a legitimate corporate purpose.

NOTE: This is a 1988 case, now the RTC has expanded jurisdiction. Some RTCs are granted special
jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate disputes.

"Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [1994].

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT –
Amendment by Substitution

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as
HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for
after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own
version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197
by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and
the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note that Tolentino
and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is
no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

General Milling Corporation vs. Torres

196 SCRA 215 [G.R No. 9366, April 22, 1991]

FACTS:
Earl Timothy Cone is a US citizen, who was hired by General Milling as a sports consultant and assistant
coach. He possessed an alien employment permit which was changed to pre-arranged employee by the Board
of Special Inquiry of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. GMC requested that Cone’s
employment permit be changed to a full-fledged coach, which was contested by The Basketball Coaches
Association of the Philippines. Alleging that GMC failed to show that there is no competent person in the
Philippines to do the coaching job. Secretary of Labor cancelled Cone’s employment permit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment
Permit?

HELD:
The Secretary of Labor did not act with grave abuse of discretion in revoking Cone’s Alien Employment Permit.
GMC’s claim that hiring of a foreign coach is an employer’s prerogative has no legal basis. Under Section 40 of
the Labor Code, an employer seeking employment of an alien must first obtain an employment permit from the

29
Department of labor.
GMC’s right to choose whom to employ is limited by the statutory requirement of an employment permit. The
Labor Code empowers the Labor Secretary to determine as to the availability of the services of a “person in the
Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of the application to perform the services for which
an alien is desired.” DOLE is the agency vested with jurisdiction to determine the question of availability of
local workers.

Ang Yu Asuncion vs CAG.R. No. 109125, December 2, 1994 FACTS:Petitioners allege that they are tenants or
lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by defendantsin Ongpin Street, Binondo, Manila since
1935 and that on several occasions before October 9, 1986,defendants informed plaintiffs that they are offering
to sell the premises and are giving them priority toacquire the same. During the negotiations, Bobby Cu
Unjieng offered a price of P6-million while petitionersmade a counter offer of P5-million. On October 24, 1986,
petitioners asked the respondents to specify theterms and conditions of the offer to sell. Petitioners now raise
that since respondents failed to specify theterms and conditions of the offer to sell and because of information
received that the latter were about to sellthe property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to compel
defendants to sell the property tothem. The trial court found that the respondents’ offer to sell was never
accepted by the petitioners for the reasonthat they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the
proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court. This decision was brought to theSupreme Court by petition for review on certiorari which
subsequently denied the appeal on May 6, 1991“for insufficiency in form and substance”. On November 15,
1990, while CA-G.R. CV No. 21123 was pending consideration by this Court, the CuUnjieng spouses executed
a Deed of Sale transferring the property in question to herein respondent BuenRealty and Development
Corporation, for P15,000,000.00. On July 1, 1991, respondent as the new owner of the subject property wrote
a letter to the petitioners demanding that the latter vacate the premises. On July16, 1991, the petitioners wrote
a reply to respondent corporation stating that the latter brought the propertysubject to the notice of lis pendens
regarding Civil Case No. 87-41058 annotated on TCT No. 105254/T-881in the name of the Cu Unjiengs. The
lessees filed a Motion for Execution dated August 27, 1991 of the Decision in Civil Case No. 87-41058as
modified by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21123. On August 30, 1991, the RTC ordered the Cu
Unjiengs to execute the necessary Deed of Sale of the property in litigation in favor of plaintiffs Ang Yu
Asuncion, Keh Tiong and Arthur Go for the considerationof P15 Million pesos in recognition of petitioners’ right
of first refusal and that a new Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in favor of the buyer. The court also set
aside the title issued to Buen Realty Corporation for having been executed in bad faith. On September 22,
1991, the Judge issued a writ of execution. On 04 December 1991, the appellate court, on appeal to it by
private respondent, set aside and declaredwithout force and effect the above questioned orders of the court a
quo. ISSUEWhether or not Buen Realty can be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis
pendens,carried over on TCT No. 195816 issued in the name of Buen Realty, at the time of the latter’s
purchase of the property on 15 November 1991 from the Cu Unjiengs. HELDWe affirm the decision of the
appellate court. In the law on sales, the so-called “right of first refusal” is an innovative juridical relation.
Needless to pointout, it cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code.In a
right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however,would be
dependent not only on the grantor’s eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relationwith another but
also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior thereto,it can at best be so
described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed not

by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite
andinconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the
CivilCode on human conduct. The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be stressed, has merely
accorded a “right of firstrefusal” in favor of petitioners. The consequence of such a declaration entails no more
than what hasheretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners are aggrieved by the
failure of private respondents to honor the right of first refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the
judgment,since there is none to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the purpose.
Furthermore, Buen Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot be held subject
tothe writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership and possession of the
property, without first being duly afforded its day in court.

30
Issue:Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction?Ruling:Private respondents have anticipated the possibility
that the courts will not find that K.K.Shell is expressly bound by the Agency Agreement, and thus they fall back
on the argument thateven if this were so, the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid ground to
cause thedismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention.K.K. Shell counters this argument by invoking its
right as maritime lienholder. It citesPresidential Decree No. 1521, the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, which
provides:SEC. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; person entitled to such lien-Any
personfurnishing repairs, supplies, to wage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or othernecessaries,
to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner ofsuch vessel, or of a person
authorized by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on thevessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it
shall be necessary to allege or provethat credit was given to the vessel.Private respondents on the other hand
argue that even if P.D. No. 1521 is applicable,K.K. Shell cannot rely on the maritime lien because the fuel was
provided not exclusively for thebenefit of the MV Estella, but for the benefit of Crestamonte in general. Under
the law it must beestablished that the credit was extended to the vessel itself. Now, this is a defense that
callsprecisely for a factual determination by the trial court of who benefitted from the delivery of thefuel. Hence,
again, the necessity for the reception of evidence before the trial court.In other words, considering the dearth of
evidence due to the fact that the privaterespondents have yet to file their answer in the proceedings below
and trial on the merits is stillto be conducted, whether or not petitioners are indeed maritime lienholders and as
such mayenforce the lien against the MV Estella are matters that still have to be established.Neither are we
ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine offorum non conveniens, as the exact
nature of the relationship of the parties is still to beestablished. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of
the trial court judge who is in the bestposition, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstancesrequire that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit

PIA VS OPLE
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as
Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B.
FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of employment,
one with private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which
became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:

5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY

This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this agreement at
any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in
lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts of
Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing training. Base station was in
Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.

roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar
Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them that they will
be terminated effective September 1, 1980.

31
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits
and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both private
respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities
of “personal effects”; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by
customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA further claimed that the
services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the status of
regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting
the period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the provisions of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal,
having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private
respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law
of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute
arising out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise
applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other
law to govern their relationship.
the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private
respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is
licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private
respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All
the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the
resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust
Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event,
the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must
therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable
provisions of Philippine law.
[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]
Petition denied.

G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (TE! "#$ AC%&%C SEAMEN
SER'%CES,%NC.,petitioners, vs.
NAT%ONAL SEAMEN OAR), *ON. CRESCENC%O M. S%))A+AO, OSCARM. TORRES, REENE C.
CARRERA "#$ REST%TTA C.AOR)O,
respondents.
Bito, Misa & Lozada Law Ofces or petitioners.The Solicitor General and Jose A. Rico or respondents
Facts:Restituta Abordo is the wife of the deceased Napoleon Abordo, who died of stroke in the course of his
employment as engineer in a vessel owned byherein petitioner Norse Mgt. n Restituta!s claim for
compensation, shealleges that the law of "ingapore, where the vessel is registered, shouldgovern the amount
of compensaton. #n the other hand, Norse Mgt contendsthat the law of "ingapore should not be applied in this
case because theNational "eaman $oard cannot take %udicial notice of the &orkmen!snsurance 'aw of
"ingapore. As an alternative, they o(ered to pay privaterespondent Restituta Abordo the sum of )*+,+++ as

32
death benets based onthe $oard!s Memorandum -ircular No. / which they claim should apply inthis
case.0earing o1cer of Ministry of 'abor and 2mployment ruled that petitionershould pay the respondent among
other things, )*+,3++ 4the *3 monthsalary of the deceased5)etitioner appealed to the Ministry of 'abor. Ministry
of labor ruled that law of "ingapore should govern. 2ven if the law of "ingapore was not alleged andproved in
the course of the hearing, the %urisprudence on this matter wasnever meant to apply to cases before
administrative or 6uasi7%udicial bodiessuch as the national seaman board. For well7settled is the rule
thatadministrative and 6uasi7%udicial bodies are not bound strictly by technicalrules. Motion for
reconsideration denied.ssue: whether the "ingaporean law 8law of the registry of the vessel9 wouldapply in
this administrative case for compensation despite its not beingproperly alleged and proved"- Ruling: ;es. <he
strict rules of pleading and proving foreign laws does notapply to administrative bodies as the national seaman
board. "ince the=2mployment Agreement> between petitioners and the late Napoleon $.Abordo clearly states
that compensation shall be paid under )hilippine 'awor the law of registry of the petitioners! vessel, whichever is
greater, andprivate respondent Restituta -. Abordo was o(ered only )*++++ by thepetitioners, "ingapore law
was properly applied in this case.

Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines

on 6:56 AM in Case Digests, Political Law, Private International Law 0
G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international transportations of persons
by aircraft for hire." Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties,
which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of
the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the
provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline
and its passenger.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-vis Agreed Stopping
Place: The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the
ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the
Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An
intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a
foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a
branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A.
In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his
departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no
reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the
petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the constitution so as to deprive
the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the case

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HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or
where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place
of destination.

BRITISH AIRWAYS VS CA
FACTS:
On April 16, 1989, Mahtani decided to visit his relatives in Bombay, India. He asked Mr. Gumar to prepare his
travelplans.Mr. Gumar purchased a ticket from British Airways (BA).Since BA had no direct flights from Manila
to Bombay, Mahtani had to take a flight to Hongkong via PAL, and upon arrivalin Hongkong he had to take a
connecting flight to Bombay on board BA.Before departure, Mahtani checked in at PAL counter his two pieces
of luggage containing his clothings and personaleffects, confident that upon reaching Hongkong, the same
would be transferred to the BA flight bound for Bombay.when Mahtani arrived in Bombay he discovered that his
luggage was missing and that upon inquiry from the BA representatives, he was told that the same might have
been diverted to London. After waiting for 1 week, BA finally advised him to file a claim by accomplishing the
"Property Irregularity Report.In the Philippines, on June 11, 1990 Mahtani filed his complaint for damages and
attorney's fees against BA and Mr.Gumar before the RTC.L alleging that the reason for the non-transfer of the
luggage was due to the latter's late arrival inHongkong, thus leaving hardly any time for the proper transfer of
Mahtani's luggage to the BA aircraft bound for Bombay.The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Mahtani.BA is
ordered to pay Mahtani P7,000 for the value of the 2 suitcases$400 for the value of the contents of the
luggageP50,000 for moral and exemplary damages and 20% for attorney’s fees and cost of the action.
This decision was affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
WON the award of the damages was without basis since Mahtani failed to declare a higher valuation w/
respectto his luggage.

RULING:
The SC ruled in the negative.the nature of an airline's contract of carriage partakes of two types, namely: a
contract to deliver a cargo or merchandiseto its destination and a contract to transport passengers to their
destination. A business intended to serve the travelingpublic primarily, it is imbued with public interest, hence,
the law governing common carriers imposes an exactingstandard.
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Neglect or malfeasance by the carrier's employees could predictably furnish bases for an action for damages.

Admittedly, in a contract of air carriage a declaration by the passenger of a higher value is needed to recover a
greateramount. Article 22(1) of the Warsaw ConventionHowever, , we have held that benefits of limited liability
are subject to waiver such as when the air carrier failed to raisetimely objections during the trial when
questions and answers regarding the actual claims and damages sustained by thepassenger were asked.

Given the foregoing postulates, the inescapable conclusion is that BA had waived the defense of limited liability
when itallowed Mahtani to testify as to the actual damages he incurred due to the misplacement of his luggage,
without anyobjection.Indeed, it is a well-settled doctrine that where the proponent offers evidence deemed by
counsel of the adverse party tobe inadmissible for any reason, the latter has the right to object. However, such
right is a mere privilege which can bewaived. Necessarily, the objection must be made at the earliest
opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity tospeak may operate as a waiver of objections.
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BA has precisely failed in this regard.To compound matters for BA, its counsel failed, not only to interpose a
timely objection, but even conducted his owncross-examination as well

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