G.R. No.

206666 Case Digest

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, Alfredo Lim
vs COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Ponente: Leonardo-de Castro

Facts:
September 2007, Sandiganbayan convicted Estrada for the crime of
plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua and accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence
and perpetual absolute disqualification.

October 2007, President Arroyo extended executive clemency, by

way of pardon to Estrada with "WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office,IN VIEW HEREOF and pursuant to the authority conferred
upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant executive clemency
to JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
Plunder and imposed a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Which
Estrada received and accepted by affixing his signature.

November 2009, Estrada filed a certificate of candidacy for the

position of President and has earned 3 oppositions in the
COMELEC. In 2012, Estrada filed a COC vying for the position of
Manila City Mayor. Then, Risos-Vidal filed a petition for
disqualification against Estrada.

COMELEC: petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Risos-Vidal

failed to present cogent proof sufficient to reverse Estrada's
right to seek public office as effectively restored by the
pardon vested by Arroyo.

Risos-Vidal then invoked the Court's jurisdiction saying that

the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it failed
to disqualify Estrada for having been convicted of plunder, an
offense involving moral turpitude. And for failing to consider
the perpetual disqualification of Estrada.

Issue: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted
for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.

Ruling:
ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.– A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon.

A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of

the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – Their

accessory penalties.– The penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of civil
interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as
the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute disqualification
which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon.

Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all

his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the
right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this
controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to

make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular

clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to
suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly

impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part
of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by
the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the
operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas
clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the
pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make
the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent
upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.