3. PEOPLE v. MACABANDO, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013.

FACTS:
- On Dec. 21, 2010 the accused burned his house. The fire spread to several other inhabited houses in
their barangay.
- The RTC convicted him with Destructive Arson.
- This finding was based on the accused’s statement shortly before the fire that he would get revenge and
burn his house. Neighbors of the accused further testified that when they arrived at the accused’s burning
house he prevented them from putting out the fire and even threatened them with a gun.
- Defense denied all the allegations and evidence of the prosecution, the accused alleged that he made no
such statements and threats, that the fire was accidental and occurred while he was sleeping.

ISSUE: Does the burning of inhabited houses or dwellings constitute Destructive Arson under Art. 320 of
the RPC?

RULING: No, while the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient, destructive arson was not the proper
crime based on the factual findings of the court. Art. 320 of the RPC governing destructive arson does not
include the burning of any inhabited house or dwelling. Rather, it contemplates the malicious burning of
structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other
military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons.

In the instant case, the SC concluded that, based on the testimonies of the witnesses and the accused
himself, as well as the reports from the Bureau of Fire Protection and the City Social Welfare and
Development Department, the houses affected were residential or used as dwellings. It further ruled that
the fact that many families were affected will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established
evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to
the neighboring houses.

Notes: (no need to write this down)

Difference between DA and SA: The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson
are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than
Destructive Arson.
Elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally
burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.

8. PEOPLE v. BUSTINERA, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004.

FACTS:
- Accused was a driver of one of the taxis owned by Elias Cipriano, an operator of several taxicabs under
the name of ESC transport.
- It was agreed that he would drive the taxi assigned to him, a Daewoo Racer GTE taxi, from 6 AM to 11
PM, return it to the ESC garage and remit the daily boundary fee.
- On Dec. 25, 1996, he took out the taxi however he failed to return the same within the day. He
contended that he failed to bring it back because was still short of his boundary. The lower court
convicted the accused for qualified theft.
- Accused, for his part, does not deny his failure to return the taxi on that day but maintains that his
reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the boundary fee, his earnings that day not
having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in
character, he having returned it.

ISSUES:
 (1) In view of the passage of the Anti-Carnapping Law or R.A. 6539, was the conviction of the accused for
qualified theft still proper?
(2) Can the accused be convicted of carnapping instead?

RULING:
(1) No. By the passage of R.A. 6539, jurisprudence holds that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is
now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
Since Bustinera is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping
law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
(2) Yes. All the elements of carnapping are present.
Unlawful taking
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no
opportunity to dispose of the same.
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi
driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is
contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the
possession into an unlawful one.
Intent to gain
Intent to gain is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain
is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely
limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without
the owner’s consent constitutes gain.
Besides, it is well-entrenched in jurisprudence that when one takes the motor vehicle of another
without the latter’s consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft - there being
intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain. In this case, the SC concluded
that there was no return even.

13. LIM v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 130038, September 18, 2000.

FACTS:
- On two occasions, petitioner bought several pieces of jewelry from Seguan. She paid through the checks.
She sent the checks through a certain Nadera.
- Upon deposit by Seguan however, the checks were dishonored by the bank and petitioner promised
Seguan that she would pay the amounts in cash but she never did.
- As a consequence, she was charged for violation of B.P. 22.. Trial court convicted her in the two cases. ---
- Petitioner, for her part, argues that she never knew Seguan and much more, had any "transaction" with
her. According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan.
She gave the two checks to Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a "security
arrangement" or "guarantee" that she would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell
them.

ISSUE: Should the conviction be sustained in light of the accused’s claim that she did not issue the checks
as payment for the jewelry to Seguan but only as security to Nadera?

RULING: Yes. All the elements of a B.P. 22 violation are present. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) The
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) The subsequent
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
 Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. The accused’s defenses cannot save the day for her. The
first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability, she must prove that the
second element was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in
the bank account were insufficient - she did not prove this. Since Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption
juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense
are present, the conviction should be sustained. She failed to rebut the presumption.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make
arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum
prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to
guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in
determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also
irrelevant.
Unlike in estafa, under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an
obligation, or that there was damage. The damage done is to the banking system.

18. QUE v. PEOPLE and IAC, G.R. No. 75217-18 September 21, 1987.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING: