G.R. No.

157870 November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), respondents.
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G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.
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G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x
x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x
x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to
the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they
are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates,
the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
 On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist
of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates
who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC]
shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed
a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution
No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected
to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No.
6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g)
of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee
deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to
sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the
constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions. 2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the
statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise
judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To
have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance,
of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. 6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the
Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in
the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax
the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the
enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need
not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It
is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8
In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v.
Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean,
are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the
powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter,
and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution
is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. 11 The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the
qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is
also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. 13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate
for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator
or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for
membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or
after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance
with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that
non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This
argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer
the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public
office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the
assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it
was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and
safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs."
This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of
planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects." 14 The primary legislative intent
is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent
or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court
to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
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School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs.
Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency.
Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its
own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of
mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue
tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school
children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court
- decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions
following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random
urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football
program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing
policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in
loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less
privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for
this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth 20 and 14th Amendments and
declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students
desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team
declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and
14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers
in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the
school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete.
It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of
the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an
adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair,
just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of the
people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective
method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is
as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the
State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the
entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea
that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165
for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in
this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is
unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," 23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 24 Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping,
and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory
drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted
extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's
ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad
guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are
agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police
power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone
of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is
judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of
some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the
nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the
probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of
the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing,
which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace
serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form,
is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search
"narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as
couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or
place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d)
of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected
to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work
place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing
methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access -
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need
to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to
protect the confidentiality of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as
a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the
citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the
medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override
the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age
group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with
their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities.
The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer
assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random
drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection
by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to
lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling
state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and
restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in
the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should
pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly
commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing
for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It
enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the
school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall
take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to
be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR
necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always
be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to
determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape. 39 In the face of the increasing
complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate
legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private
and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses
punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
"randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if
that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. 40 To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned
agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271

NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE

PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
_______________________

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
 Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition
for certiorari and mandamus,1[1] assails the Resolution2[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.
BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and
prohibition,3[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of
parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The
COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats
of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC5[5] (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to
intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900
votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the Members
of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement
the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.7[7] There were no intervenors in
BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60
proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna,
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives
(APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network
Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its
entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for
Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred
eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection
with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one
hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated
(i.e. canvass deferred) 1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from
areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City;
Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in
Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition
receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots
have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
 11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for
the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list
system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the
following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, A TEACHER
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.8[8] (Emphasis in the original)

 Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which
declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans
formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462
votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-
list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the
projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not
included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is
16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are
as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among
the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance with Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that
have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
 1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as
entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one
(1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
 Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.9[9]

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed
by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as

mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes,

should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the
same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to
be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to
every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance
with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after
deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold
rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS,
ANNEX A of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose
of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941

and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section
12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the
Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and
Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and
Local Elections resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being
moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.10[10]

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a
motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and
of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.11[11]

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-
list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of
the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),12[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13[13] and An Waray.14[14] Per the certification15[15] by COMELEC,
the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
 1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16[16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for
the First Party violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the First Party
and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those
required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under
the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is
a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and
implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.17[17]
 Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following
issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can
the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?18[18]

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable
parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent
of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast
for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.19[19]

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation,
this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
 The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum
(20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district
representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of
the House of Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total
number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to Number of seats available to

legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a
legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the
Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as
well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total
party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional
seats under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,20[20] and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in
Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula21[21] as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives.
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22[22] the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition
as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative
seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of
R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1 st
par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14 th
Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they
obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in
accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.23[23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and
apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.24[24]

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each
party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median
percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats.25[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded
under BANATs second interpretation.
 In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the
Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not
factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-
seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the
votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is
computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat
allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list.
After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders,
from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until
all the seats are filled up.26[26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the
elections.27[27]

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to
the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-
list.28[28]

Votes Garnered
Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party over Total Votes for
Garnered Seat
Party-List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS29[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are
entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors
problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This
Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in
the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of
the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60
seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
 implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.30[30]

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following
procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the
maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence
of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3
below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number
of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The
whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Additional (B) plus

Votes Guaranteed Applying
Seats (C), in
Garnered Seat the three
whole
over seat cap
integers
Total Votes
Votes for Party
Rank Party
Garnered List, in %
(Second
(First Round)
Round)
(A) (B) (E)
(C) (D)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
931[31] COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the
36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with
sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the
party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the
system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on
the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this:
Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party
list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who
would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral
lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would
the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party
list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng
diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political
parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list
system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed
to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

 xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek
common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation
of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is
now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to
which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such
parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all
the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass
organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor
organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership
of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties
and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we
set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the
same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system;
and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena
for major political parties.

x x x 32[32] (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No.
7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions.
It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On
the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33[33] In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation
of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties
are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a
problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI),
its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To
further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age
on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity34[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral
party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,35[35] that is, if the nominee represents
the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However,
we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated
20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-
list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from
the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the
Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-
list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all
of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked
whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A.
No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the
former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its
first representative to be elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as
enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal
subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district
of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law
treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section
49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the
assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI,
Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing
that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section
49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one
city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for
the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion
into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly
Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple
or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general
subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496
[1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested
in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law
of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by
the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment
of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250
members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed
Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts,
the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the
same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was
only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to
do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating
legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to
Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of
the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section
52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be
known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and,
on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of
existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and
the adjoining local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which
require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit.
It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty
in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of
a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2
of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In
language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was
not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense
of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did
not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if
they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial
notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local
government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent
Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench,
Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A.
No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
 Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated
therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and
bounds, with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities
may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as
tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial
jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring
municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical
descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the
Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government
units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of
their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but
defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way
around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33
SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means
that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends
and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall
continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that
a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices:
Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the
City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by
the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a
term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing
that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal
elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51
favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They
further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for
the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as
municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the
political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and
that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are
residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic
issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of
the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at
least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the
next national elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part
of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot
made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population,
as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides
that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase
in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable
situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period
of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have
been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court
favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution
does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we
ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such
general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, G.R. No. 176970

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
*YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
 Promulgated:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, December 8, 2008

Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,36[1] with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 937137[2] the law that
Resolution No. 7837 implements is unconstitutional.

BACKGROUND FACTS

On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oros then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No.
5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro.38[3] This law
eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.39[4] It increased Cagayan de Oros legislative district from one to two. For the
election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oros voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own representative to Congress as well
as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.

Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the Citys barangays as follows:

Legislative Districts The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to
commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon,
Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang,
Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,
Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion,
Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto,
Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second
district.40[5]
 On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 783741[6] implementing R.A. No. 9371.

Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27, 2007.42[7] On 10 April 2008,
the petitioner amended the petition to include the following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers.43[8]

In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the petitioner
argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the
issuance of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de
Oro.

Since the Court did not grant the petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,
the May 14 National and Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.

The respondents Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that: 1) the
petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over
cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in
the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the
criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.

The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Courts ruling in Del Mar v. PAGCOR,44[9] the Court may take
cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate
exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro Citys reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator the material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well as of
the people therein; 4) a voters sovereign power to decide on who should be elected as the entire citys Congressman was
arbitrarily reduced by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in
the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the
members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6) government funds were illegally disbursed without prior
approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.45[10]

THE ISSUES

The core issues, based on the petition and the parties memoranda, can be limited to the following contentious points:

1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the
division and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?

OUR RULING

Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally without merit.

The hierarchy of courts principle.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.46[11] It was pursuant to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.

While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals47[12] and the RTCs,48[13] a direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters
within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the principle of hierarchy of courts. More
generally stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.49[14]

Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to the rule, are petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our nations lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is
assailed.50[15] The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised among them, whether
legislative reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit are reasons enough for
considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition assails as well a resolution of the
COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a
COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari.51[16] For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block
in our consideration of the present case.

The Plebiscite Requirement.

The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and
does not merely provide for the Citys legislative apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of
the constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government units.

Legislative apportionment is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives
which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body.52[17] It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts.53[18] Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.54[19]
 Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules on legislative apportionment
under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.

Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the local
government units (historically and generically referred to as municipal corporations) that the Constitution itself classified into
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.55[20] In its strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as a body
politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof.56[21] The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article
provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.

Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act has been vested in the
Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts,57[22] and likewise acts
on local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and
by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other
than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they interface
and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to make a
legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative
apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts.58[23] Hence, emphasis is given to the number of
people represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and
commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In
terms of the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of population) is
entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate
and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment, Section 5(4)
specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.

In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how
local government units may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered. Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units corporate existence and territorial coverage;
and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria established in
the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified
as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services.59[24] The division or merger of existing units must comply
with the same requirements (since a new local government unit will come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce
the income, population, or land area of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code.60[25]

A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite.
The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit.61[26] In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In
Tobias v. Abalos,62[27] a case that arose from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that
no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only
followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was
needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.

The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one under Article VI, Section 5 can
best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots of these two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as
heretofore discussed, and their areas of application.

A Bit of History.

In Macias v. COMELEC,63[28] we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of our apportionment
provision, noting its roots from the
Fourteenth Amendment64[29] of the U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions of some American states. The Philippine
Organic Act of 1902 created the Philippine Assembly,65[30] the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral legislature
under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house. While the members of the Philippine
Commission were appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine
Assembly were elected by representative districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the
mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to population.
Thus, legislative apportionment first started in our country.

The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment provision, dividing the country
into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts electing one delegate each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of
the Act specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine Islands.

Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative apportionment together with
district as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican
institutions as expressed in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.66[31] The case ruled that inequality of representation is a
justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated in Montejo v. COMELEC.67[32] Notably, no issue regarding the
holding of a plebiscite ever came up in these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was required.

Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio with each district being, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution,
distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of party-list representatives. In neither Constitution was a plebiscite
required.

The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government units was not constitutionally
enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 226468[33] required, in the creation of barrios by
Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of boundaries be upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected.
In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that the Act shall take effect after a
majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their municipality into a city in a plebiscite.
This was followed up to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion
of local government units as well as the transfer of sitios from one legislative unit to another.69[34] In 1973, the plebiscite
requirement was accorded constitutional status.

Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was never a requirement in
legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always
identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the
concept of legislative apportionment.

Nature and Areas of Application.

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it is the basis
for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a
political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a
representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate
unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates
the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a
governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its
own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in
Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal
personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the
creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.

The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the territorial and political
subdivisions of the state.70[35] They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the
Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.71[36] A local
government units corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the
members of its Sanggunian.72[37]
 As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of
government.73[38] As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special
functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs74[39]
and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns.75[40] In light of these roles, the
Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the
division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean, and does
not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that
applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to and be
a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.

R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837

R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority
granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico,
Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall
comprise the second district.

Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated.
Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory
remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into
two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does
not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
 Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another congressional district in the
city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for
along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly
traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law R.A. No. 663676[41] whose Section 3 provides:

SECTION 3. Other Cities. The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of
Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district shall have eight (8) councilors for each
district who shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters therein, provided that the cities of
Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities comprising a representative district shall have
twelve (12) councilors each and all other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to
their charters be reduced.

However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and
territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council
members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000.77[42] By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the citys population. In
terms of services for city residents, this easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only
250,000 constituents as against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its
ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the fewer constituents
represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman
and each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are now concentrated in each
representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of
Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the
presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional improvement in
the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.

Equality of representation.

The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered
voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban
barangays.78[43] Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.
 A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the
inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very same question in Herrera v.
COMELEC79[44] when we interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the
Province of Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of
Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the
National Statistics Office.

The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan de Oro City.
However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows that barangays
comprising Cagayan de Oros first district have a total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.80[45] The Constitution, however, does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation.81[46] In fact, for cities, all it
asks is that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative, while ensuring
representation for every province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through commonality
of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local
government units as they are found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it
imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far
as practicable.

The petitioners contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro City into two districts
because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is largely
unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the division on the basis of the difference in the
barangays levels of development or developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards for legislative
apportionment or reapportionment. What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the
lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal
parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies.82[47]

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48641 November 24, 1941
PEDRO GALLEGO, petitioner,
vs.
VICENTE VERRA, respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
This case is before us on petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, which declared illegal and with the petitioner's election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, in
the general elections of December, 1940, on the ground that he did not have the residence qualification, ordered that he be
ousted from said office. Respondent Vicente Verra (petitioner below) was the unsuccessful opponent of the petitioner Pedro
Gallego, who was declared elected by the municipal board of canvassers with a majority of nearly 800 votes.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals may be briefly stated as follows:
Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte. After studying in the Catarman Agricultural School in the province of Samar, he was
employed as a school teacher in the municipality of Catarman, Samar, as well as in the municipalities of Burawen, Dulag, and
Abuyog, province of Leyte, and school teacher of Abuyog, Leyte, and presented his candidacy for municipal mayor of his home
town, but was defeated. After his defeat in that election, finding himself in debt and unemployed, he went to Mindanao in search
of a job. He first went to Oriental Misamis, but finding no work there he proceeded to the sitio of Kaato-an, municipality of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, whereat he arrived on June 20, 1938, and immediately found employment as nurseryman in the chichona
plantation of the Bureau of Forestry. On July 30 of the same year he returned to Abuyog because he had been offered an
employment as teacher in the public school of the barrio of Union, municipality of Sogod, Leyte; but as he did not accept the
offer he returned to Kaato-an on August 23, 1938, and resumed his employment there as nurseryman of the Bureau of Forestry.
He stayed in the chinchona plantation until he resigned in September 1940. But during the period of his stay, there, his wife and
children remained in Abuyog, and he visited them in the month of August of the years 1938, and 1940. Altho the Government
offered him a free house in the chinchona plantation, he never took his family there. Neither did he avail himself of the offer of
the Government of a parcel of the hectares of land within the reservation of the chinchona plantation. He and his wife own real
property in Abuyog, part of which he acquired during his stay in Malaybalay.
Nevertheless, On October 1, 1938 he registered himself as an elector in precinct No. 14 of Lantapan, municipality of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and voted there in the election for assemblymen held in December, 1938. The trial court noted that in his voter's
affidavit (exhibit B) he did not fill the blank space corresponding to the length of time he had resided in Malaybalay. On January
20, 1940, he obtained and paid for his residence certificate from the municipal treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate it was
stated that he had resided in said municipality for one year and a half.
Based upon the facts stated in the next preceding paragraph, namely, (1) registration as a voter, (2) his having actually voted in
Malaybalay in the 1938 election for assemblymen, and (3) his residence certificate for 1940, the trial Court of Appeals declared
that the herein petitioner Pedro Gallego had acquired a residence or domicile of origin in the municipality of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon, and had lost his domicile of origin in the municipality of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time he was elected mayor of the latter
municipality, and, that, therefore, his election was void, following the decisions of this Court in the cases of Tanseco vs. Arteche,
57 Phil., 227, and Nuval vs. Gutay, 52 Phil., 645.
In this Court the petitioner assigns the following errors:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petitioner Pedro Gallego was a legal resident of Malaybalay, Bukidon,
and not of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time of his election as municipal mayor of the latter municipality on December 10,
1940.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding the election of Pedro Gallego to the
office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, null and void and ordering the exclusion of Gallego from the office to which
he was elected.
The only question presented is whether or not Pedro Gallego had been resident of Abuyog for at one year prior to December 10,
1940. That question may be approached from either of two angles: Did he lose his domicile in Abuyog by the mere fact that he
worked in Malaybalay as a government employee, registered himself as a voter and voted there in the election for assemblymen
in December, 1938, and secured his residence certificate there for the year 1940; and assuming that he did, had he reacquired his
domicile of origin at least one year prior to his election as mayor of Abuyog on December 10, 1040?
The term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil.,
645). In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must be an animus non
revertendi and an animus manendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time. The acts of the person must conform with his purpose. The change of residence must be voluntary; the residence at the
place chosen for the domicile must be actual; and to the fact of residence there must be added the animus manendi. (17 am. Jur.,
section 16, pages 599-601.)
In the light of these principles, we are persuaded that the facts of this case weigh heavily against the theory that the petitioner
had lost his residence or domicile in Abuyog. We believe he did not reside in Malaybalay with the intention of remaining there
indefinitely and of not returning to Abuyog. He is a native of Abuyog. Notwithstanding his periodic absences from there previous
to 1937, when he was employed as teacher in Samar, Agusan, and other municipalities of Leyte, he always returned there. In the
year 1937 he resigned as a school teacher and presented his candidacy for the office of mayor of said municipality. His departure
therefrom after his defeat in that election was temporary and only for purpose of looking for employment to make up for the
financial drawback he had suffered as a result of his defeat at the polls. After he had found employment in Malaybalay, he did
take his wife and children thereto. He bought the offer of a free house by the government. He bought a piece of land in Abuyog
and did not avail himself of the offer of the Government of ten hectares of land within the chichona reservation in Malaybalay,
where he worked as a nurseryman. During the short period of about two years he stayed in Malaybalay as a government
employee, he visited his home town and his family no less than three times notwithstanding the great distance between the two
places.
The facts of his case are more analogous to those of Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36), Yra vs. Abaño (52 Phil., 380), and Vivero vs.
Murillo (52 Phil., 694) than to those of Nuval vs. Guray (52 Phil., 645) and Tanseco vs. Arteche (57 Phil., 227) which were followed
herein by the Court of Appeals. In the Teves case this Court, in reversing the judgment of the trial court, among other things said:
In this case the respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, from the year 1904 has had his own house in the municipality of
Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, wherein he has constantly been living with his family and he has never had any house in
which he lived either alone or with his family in the municipality of Bacong of said province. All that he has done in the
latter municipality was to register as elector in 1919, through an affidavit stating that he was a resident of said
municipality; run for representative for the second district of the province of Oriental Negros and vote in said
municipality in said year; run again for reelection in the year 1922; launch his candidacy for member of the provincial
board of said province 1925, stating under oath in all his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of said
municipality of Bacong.
The affidavit made by him upon registering as elector in the municipality of Bacong in the year 1919, stating that he was
a resident of said municipality; his two certificates of candidacy for the office of representative for the second district of
the Province of Oriental Negros, which were filed, the former in the year 1919 and the latter in the year 1922, and the
certificate of candidacy for the office of member of the provincial board filed by him in the year 1925 in every one of
which he stated that he was a resident of the municipality of Bacong, are at most a prima facie evidence of the fact of
his residence in the municipality of Bacong, which is required by law in order that the corresponding officials could
register him as an elector and candidate, and not conclusive, and may be attacked in a corresponding judicial
proceeding. If, according to the ruling laid down in the case of Vivero vs. Maurillo cited above, mere registration in a
municipality in order to be an elector therein does not make one a resident of said municipality; if, according to constant
rulings the word "residence" is synonymous with "home" or "domicile" and denotes a permanent dwelling place, to
which an absent person intends to return; if the right to vote in a municipality requires the concurrence of two things,
the act of residing coupled with the intention to do so; and if the herein respondent-appellant, Pedro Teves, has always
lived with his family in the municipality of Dumaguete and never in that of Bacong, he has never lost his residence in
Dumaguete. The fact that his registration as elector in the municipality of Bacong was cancelled only on April 5, 1934,
upon his petition, did not disqualify him to be a candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality of
Dumaguete on the ground that, as has been stated in the case of Yra vs. Abaño cited above, registration in the list of
voters is not one of the conditions prescribed by section 431 of the Election Law in order to be an elector; neither does
failure to register as such constitute one of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432 of said law. (61 Phil., 36, 39-
41.)
Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the facts of present case, we find sufficient ground for the revocation of the judgment
appealed from. Petitioner also contends that even assuming that he had lost his residence or domicile in Abuyog, he reacquired it
more than one year prior to December 10, 1940. In support of that contention he invokes his letter or note, exhibit 9, addressed
to "Varel"(Valeriano Tupa), vice-president of the political faction to which petitioner belongs, in which note he announced his
intention to launch his candidacy again for municipal mayor of Abuyog as early as the month of May, 1939. But we do not deem it
necessary to pass upon said contention in view of the conclusion we have reached that the petitioner did not lose his domicile of
origin.
We might add that the manifest intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve
that community; and when the evidence on the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly
appears, as in the instant case, that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of
the electorate should be respected. Petitioner is a native of Abuyog, had run for the same office of municipal mayor of said town
in the election preceding the one in question, had only been absent therefrom for about two years without losing contact with
his townspeople and without intention of remaining and residing indefinitely in the place of his employment; and he was elected
with an overwhelming majority of nearly 800 votes in a third-class municipality. These considerations we cannot disregard
without doing violence to the will of the people of said town.
Wherefore, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, with the costs of this instance against the respondent. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999]

JUAN DOMINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR.,
ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondents.
LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998i[1] of the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified
as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the
Decision of 29 May 1998ii[2] of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINOs motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of
the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to
be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.iii[3]
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P.
Lim, Sr., filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA
No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his
declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he
seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented the following evidence:
1. Annex A the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman of the Lone District of the Province
of Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof
he wrote his date of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the constituency where he seeks election
for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-1, Barangay Poblacion,
Alabel, Sarangani;
2. Annex B Voters Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 indicating respondents registration at
Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
3. Annex C Respondents Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C dated January 15, 1997;
4. Annex D Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial & Municipal Treasurer of Alabel,
Sarangani, dated February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate copy of
COMMUNITY TAX CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997,
while Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in
the name of Marianita Letigio on September 8, 1997.
5. Annex E The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino dated
September 5, 1997;
6. Annex F Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P. Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D.
Dema-ala, Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, which states:
For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping, the stub of Community Tax Certificate containing Nos.
11132201C-11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under Official Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex G Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position of Congressman in the 3 rd District of Quezon City for the
1995 elections filed with the Office of the Regional Election Director, National Capital Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item
4 thereof, he wrote his birth date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his residence in the constituency where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election as 3 years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered voter of Precinct No.
182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex H a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of
respondent dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September
22, 1997, stating among others, that [T]he undersigneds previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City,
III District, Quezon City; wherein he is a registered voter and that for business and residence purposes, the undersigned has
transferred and conducts his business and reside at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this application;
9. Annex I Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR CANCELLATION OF VOTERS [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS REGISTRATION of
respondent subscribed and sworn to on 22 October 1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani.iv[4]
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing
in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC the following
exhibits, to wit:
1. Annex 1 - Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and Administrator of the properties of
deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed and
sworn to before Notary Public Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex 2 - Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute Deed of sale executed by and between the heirs
of deceased spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes, Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on
November 4, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex 3 - True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725 captioned as In the Matter of the Petition for the Exclusion from the List
of voters of Precinct No. 4400-A Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino, Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M.
Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City, District III, and the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A, Old Balara, Quezon
City, Respondents. The dispositive portion of which reads:
1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City
as completely erroneous as petitioners were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been
residing since December 1996;
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in Quezon City as done in good faith due to an honest mistake caused
by circumstances beyond their control and without any fault of petitioners;
3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of petitioners from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon
City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer and forward all the election/voters registration records of the
petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer, the Election Registration Board and other Comelec Offices of Alabel, Sarangani
where the petitioners are obviously qualified to exercise their respective rights of suffrage.
4. Annex 4 - Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration Records due to Change of Residence addressed to Mantil
Alim, COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997.
5. Annex 5 - Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application, the roster of applications for registration
approved by the Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as
numbers 111 and 112 both under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as transferees without VRR
numbers and their application dated August 30, 1997 and September 30, 1997, respectively.
6. Annex 6 - same as Annex 5
7. Annex 6-a - Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voters Previous Registration (Annex I, Petition);
8. Annex 7 - Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a
registered voter of Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex 7-a - Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon
City, which reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their
registration records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10. Annex 8 - Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and incidents detailing
their alleged acquaintance with respondent.
11. Annexes 8-a, 8-b, 8-c and 8-d - Copies of the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda
Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying
their alleged personal knowledge of respondents residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
12. Annex 8-e - A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a
listing of the names of fifty-five(55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and certifying under oath that they personally know
the respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to present;
13. Annexes 9, 9-a and 9-b- Copies of Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively,
of respondent; and,
14. Annex 10 - The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of events and circumstances leading to his relocation to
the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes A, B, C, D, D-1, E, F, G with sub-markings G-1 and G-2 and H his CTC No.
111`32214C dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes 1, 2, 4, 5, 6-a, 3, 7, 9 with sub-markings 9-a and 9-b except
Annex H.v[5]
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position
of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings:
What militates against respondents claim that he has met the residency requirement for the position sought is his own Voters
Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex B, Petition] and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all his protestations that he established residence at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who
previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to unwittingly
forget the residency requirement for the office sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day
of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for
Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
All told, petitioners evidence conspire to attest to respondents lack of residence in the constituency where he seeks election and
while it may be conceded that he is a registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the qualification
to run for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province of Sarangani.vi[6]
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the
votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him
as candidate had not yet become final and executory.vii[7]
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers,viii[8] shows
that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of
Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINOs Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition.ix[9]
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second highest number
of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene.x[10]
INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Interventionxi[11] is asking the Court to uphold the
disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998
elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.xii[12]
The first issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings
declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be
sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to
or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to
determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among
others, the residence of the candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be
included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction, does not preclude the COMELEC, in
the determination of DOMINOs qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency
requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of
the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct
within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings
may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the
challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to
inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of
voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision
in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.xiii[13] In this
sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the
proceeding.xiv[14] Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.xv[15]
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrarxvi[16] we ruled that:
xxx It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in question has become final, the same does not
constitute res adjudicata as to any of the matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and
intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in such a summary and peremptory proceeding
as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellants petition for
inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino
citizenship would still have been left open to question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voters registration from Precinct No.
4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the
competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality.
The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of
voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voters disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place
of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No.
8189.xvii[17] The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the
Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voters registration record from the corresponding
book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.xviii[18]
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action are
indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party
in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be
excluded from the Voters List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation in his certificate of
candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the
first and the second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action.xix[19] In the present
case, the aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al.,xx[20] the Supreme Court in resolving
a similar issue ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the judgment rendered in the case of the petition
for the exclusion of Norberto Gurays name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and
the judgment rendered therein is not appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the capital or
the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first instance, with whom said two lower judges have
concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and
as a duly registered candidate for the office of president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in the
election list of said municipality. The present proceeding of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a
registered candidate voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the
same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons,
but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. ( Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of
Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was the exclusion of Norberto
Guray as a voter from the election list of the municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of
the litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither does there
exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six months legal residence in
the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is
that Norberto Guray has not the one years legal residence required for eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna.
Neither does there exist therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c) identity of
issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo warranto
proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res
judicata.
The Second Issue.

Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as
stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.xxi[21] Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.xxii[22] Domicile is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man
can have but one residence or domicile at a time.xxiii[23]
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Surxxiv[24] and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had
effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.xxv[25]
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.xxvi[26] In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.xxvii[27]
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was sufficiently
established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and certifications under oath of
the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in
that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that
intention. While residence simply requires bodily presence in a given place, domicile requires not only such bodily presence in
that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode, ones home.xxviii[28]
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent.
Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact
of physical presence without intention.xxix[29]
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract
may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to
prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how
long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.xxx[30] Thus the date of the contract of
lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of registering as
voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption
of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a
deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance is a doubtful case upon the place
the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence.xxxi[31] The fact that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a
strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.xxxii[32]
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he had no control cannot be
sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998 elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive
weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.xxxiii[33]
While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was
renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October
1997,xxxiv[34] and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on
30 August 1997,xxxv[35] DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to represent
must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.xxxvi[36] Dominos failure to do so rendered him ineligible and
his election to office null and void.xxxvii[37]
The Third Issue.

DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to
deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives
the highest number of votesxxxviii[38] and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his
oath of office.xxxix[39]
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section
17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.xl[40]
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate.xli[41] A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member
of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the Province of
Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the
suspension of DOMINOs proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC
in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of
Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral
Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.xlii[42]
Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may
INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in
case the winning candidate is disqualified.xliii[43]
In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect.
When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, no one can be declared elected in his place.xliv[44]
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.xlv[45] To simplistically assume that
the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could
not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions
would have substantially changed.xlvi[46]
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and
no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.xlvii[47]
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferredxlviii[48] from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who haS obtained a plurality of votesxlix[49] and does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a
choice and the election is a nullity.l[50] To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite
his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect officials of their choice.li[51]
INTERVENORs plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be sustained. INTERVENORs reliance
on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. caselii[52] to wit: if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may
be deemed elected, is misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although the
resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before the election, however, the same is not yet final and
executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to
be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet
attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified
candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless.liii[53]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision
dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See
Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p.
175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete;
(Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the
power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that
previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on
a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full,
clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail
it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting
such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of
the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the
Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
[1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme
of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme
Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive
privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where
there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution,
however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any
less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET
belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong
Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with
his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices.
He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and
survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the
father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the
customs and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again,
there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar.
The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were
reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank
of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder
brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a
natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there
during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of
greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes
of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no
ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship
after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935
Constitution whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or
less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be
natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision
was designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no
retroactive effect. Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the
amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not
only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
 Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that provision
of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who
was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when
we were under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority; and if they do elect, they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a
narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language.
The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity
and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed,
hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas
having their essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p.
427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-
born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed
on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in
two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat
equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of
that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and
absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for
the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is
the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite
of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The
respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He
is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the
examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a
Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him.
They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous
but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only
nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already
elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the
oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very
late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle
of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead
man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and
obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central
issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or
not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born
citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to
determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced
Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign
nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same
issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang
Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,
was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent
HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and
whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then
residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83
Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of
residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election
Protests and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It
is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code
of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China,
during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in
the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain,
necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best
the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence,
testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the
plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to
the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective
testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the
records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN,
February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and
Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is
enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44
Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned
documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former
member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest
against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the
election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding
officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long
list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could
have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not
do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the
procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by
explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both
bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full
presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions,
we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and
grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is:
What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it
was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point
that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
 concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the
same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi
(Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in
1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two
doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a
resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents,
necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v.
Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis
supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see
Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to
his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history,
there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial
diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the
great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President,
Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the privat e
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential
patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances
by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to
acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is
AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."liv[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.lv[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to
or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of
service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either
of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines:
Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking
the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his
discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and
political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on
June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.lvi[3]
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.lvii[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decisionlviii[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz
the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.lix[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that
private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss
and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered
private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.lx[7]
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship
when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.lxi[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond
to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.lxii[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."lxiii[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.lxiv[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualificationslxv[12] and none of the disqualificationslxvi[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during
the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3)
has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.lxvii[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1)
by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.lxviii[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode
for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.lxix[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualificationslxx[17] and none of the disqualifications
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.lxxi[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of
the armed forces;lxxii[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;lxxiii[20] (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time;lxxiv[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;lxxv[22] and (5) political and
economic necessity.lxxvi[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,lxxvii[24] we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine
citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last
resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.]lxxviii[25]
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.lxxix[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed
Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.lxxx[27] It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he
does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born:
(1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,lxxxi[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the
age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because
they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before
the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born
citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for
the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.lxxxii[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
latter.lxxxiii[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision
of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition
for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.lxxxiv[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA,
ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA,
MAHARLIKA, OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC.,
FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA,
AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All Being Party-List Parties/Organizations --
and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN
(AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar, PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L", AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS
(NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY (BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW,
ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA,
GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:*
Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at
least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion
to their total number of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and administer election-related laws. It has no power to
contravene or amend them. Neither does it have authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws -- not to reject, ignore, defeat,
obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary democracies - into our
presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory parameters, presents new paradigms and novel
questions, which demand innovative legal solutions convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on
time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution83[1] of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second Division, in Election Matter 98-065;84[2] and (2) the January 7, 1999
Resolution85[3] of the Comelec en banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of
thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list method of
representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on
Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the
House of Representatives as regular members.86[4] In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.87[5]
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list representatives, Congress enacted
RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to
attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847, prescribing the rules and regulations
governing the election of party-list representatives through the party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national elections. A total of
one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc
proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two
percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives belonged to Petitioner
APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and the votes cast in their favor were as follows:88[6]
Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the Comelec en banc further determined
that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.) was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388
votes, which were equivalent to 2.04 percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S.
Calderon, was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.89[7]
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and
Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by
the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two
percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25
nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations90[8] filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same relief as that
sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in
a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO,
NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW,
FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It
also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list
representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional91[9] seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent
district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two
percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable
the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should
represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-party system. (Boldface in the
original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the
party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881), Republic Act No.
7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to GRANT the instant petition and motions for
intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names submitted by their
respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996,
the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System. Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every
two percent of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method when it proclaimed
the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other qualified parties). However, for inexplicable
reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private
respondents.92[10]
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at least
two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions
for Reconsideration. They contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering
at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in
proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or
allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list
solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the
Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two percent vote requirement "will
mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen
organizations representing two political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x
x x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the legislature -- to
develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from
complying with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority -- with three commissioners
concurring93[11] and two members94[12] dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of its Second Division. It, however, held in
abeyance the proclamation of the 51st party (AABANTE KA PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of
manifest errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed by RA 7941, the Commission
blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there were more important considerations than this statutory
threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of temporary restraining
orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least
two per cent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.95[13] In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec
were the 38 parties, organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list seats in
the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their
parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a
National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties,
organizations and coalitions enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor appeared for petitioners in GR No.
136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No. 136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No.
136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor
NACUSIP; and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez appeared, not for any party but also as a
friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda in amplification of their verbal
arguments.96[14]
The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be
fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but
disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision97[15] of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats
allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation98[16] means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will
necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208
district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does
the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been left to Congress. In the
exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition
participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for
a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this legislative requirement. If there is
no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and
thereby fill up the twenty percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely.
The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise
of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that the twenty percent allocation
for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its
strict application would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress
was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for
party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to
promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to
require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a mathematical impossibility, suffice it to
say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.99[17] Our task
now, as should have been the Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical
extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it within the context of the
actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is to apply the law as we find it,
not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional, ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper
tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of
the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned
from the deliberations on the proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I think, Senator Osmea
when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to be provided in this law in order to
qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10 percent of the
votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given
by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament
through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr. President."100[18]
A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives, as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five percent ratio which would
distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned
after that of the party list of the other parliaments or congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.101[19]
Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the specification of which they left to
Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who
has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last elections. Two-
and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in
the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So,
here we are talking about 134,000 families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we
are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up the system and
that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize, should work hard, and should
earn their seats within that system.102[20]
The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very
essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but
is exercised by representatives chosen by them.103[21] But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have
the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be
the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"104[22] to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and crystalline. When the law is clear,
the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or circumvention.105[23]
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty system of representation.
Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to
open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we also wanted to avoid the problems of
mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings of classification and of double or
triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated
under the party list system. This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty. x x x.106[24]
Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified
party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership,
would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the constitutionality of the two
percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how
many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on
this - is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according
to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-
list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed
seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats "proportionally,"
bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the votes obtained equivalent to the
two percent vote requirement for the first seat.107[25] Translated in figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total
votes cast will be entitled to three seats; another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two
percent will be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of comprehension. Problems
arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example, when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast;
Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5
seats and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each uniformly have three seats
only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet
getting the same number of seats as the other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be
contravened and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed by a German mathematician and
adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional
seats to which a qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by
the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered by all the
qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is
entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending order of the decimal portions of
the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would
be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those obtaining more than the limit will have
to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts, the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats,
resulting in an overall total of 39. Note that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of
"proportional representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-
seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have
threshold requirements -- two percent for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however.
As ably pointed out by private respondents,108[26] one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More
important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941,
as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory
difference makes the Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic because of fundamental
environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted in toto here because of essential variances
between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands an equally unique formula. In
crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to,
we need to review the parameters of the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion
to their total number of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a mathematical formula that will not
contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of
this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest number
of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to
the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of
votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats. Another qualified
party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the
votes won by the first party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons: (1) the ratio between
said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off,
because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set
of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such
constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales109[27] that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole
membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x
x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature. Since Congress did not provide for
it in the present law, neither will this Court. The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party
receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive
twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula,
therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes
cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional
seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case
wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of
seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one additional seat or a total of two
seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It
cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the
same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty
percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one
obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving
six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
------------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to
that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as
well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in
order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result
in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional
representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum
number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But
the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the present number of
incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the
legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however, that our formula merely
translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to
modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties,
organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the
two percent threshold and proportional representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively arrogated unto itself what the
Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the mechanics for the
enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.110[28]
Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents - have failed to demonstrate that
our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.111[29]
The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,112[30] cannot simply disregard an act of
Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or
rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the
legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict enforcement of RA
7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal
showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.113[31]
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each), because granting such
plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a total failure of the law in fulfilling
the object of this new system of representation. It should not be deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed
by RA 7941 wholly defeated the implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already
popular in parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time to take root in
the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated
litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral
parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's
lawmaking body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular
democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be
more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in
time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED.
The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve
(12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147589. June 25, 2003]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its Secretary-General, MOHAMMAD
OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR
JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT
FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES
COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 25, 2003]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION,
respondents.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Before the Court are Motions for proclamation filed by various party-list participants. The ultimate question raised is this: Aside
from those already validly proclaimed114[1] pursuant to earlier Resolutions of this Court, are there other party-list candidates
that should be proclaimed winners? The answer to this question is circumscribed by the eight-point guideline given in our June
26, 2001 Decision in these consolidated cases, as well as by the four unique parameters of the Philippine party-list system:
First, the twenty percent allocation -- the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party-list.
Second, the two percent threshold -- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit -- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation -- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion
to their total number of votes.115[2]
The Antecedents
To fully understand the matter on hand, we deem it wise to recapitulate some relevant antecedents.
On June 26, 2001, the Court promulgated in these consolidated cases its Decision requiring Comelec to do the following:
x x x [I]mmediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list
elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such
number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court
its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner during the last
party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.116[3]
Comelecs First Partial
Compliance Report
In its First Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, Comelec recommended that the following party-list participants be
deemed to have hurdled the eight-point guideline referred to in the aforementioned Court Decision:
1. BAYAN MUNA (BAYAN MUNA)
2. AKBAYAN! CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN!)
3. LUZON FARMERS PARTY (BUTIL)
4. ANAK MINDANAO (AMIN)
5. ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA (ABA)
6. PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA (PM)
7. SANLAKAS
It also recommended the disqualification of the following party-list participants for their failure to pass the guidelines:
MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA (MAD)
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC)
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP)
ABAG PROMDI (PROMDI)
NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC)
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS)
CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC)
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP)
BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG (BUHAY)
COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED)
COOPERATIVE NATCCO NETWORK PARTY (COOP-NATCCO)
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION (NCIA)
ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG INDUSTRIYA NG AKLAT, INC. (AKLAT)
THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST (FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND PEOPLE) ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(MARCOS LOYALIST)
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CREBA)
BIGKIS PINOY FOUNDATION (BIGKIS)
AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO (AKSYON)
In response to this Report, the Court issued its August 14, 2001 Resolution which partially lifted its May 9, 2001 Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO). The Court did so to enable Comelec to proclaim BAYAN MUNA as the first winner in the last party-list
election, with the caveat that all proclamations should be made in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the
instant case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000, on how
to determine and compute the winning parties and nominees in the party-list elections.
In another Resolution dated August 24, 2001, the Court again partially lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to
proclaim AKBAYAN and BUTIL as winning party-list groups, in accordance not only with the Decision of the Court in the instant
case but also with Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec, GR Nos. 136781, 136786, and 136795, October 6, 2000.
In its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Comelec,
recommended that -- except for the modification that the APEC, BUHAY, COCOFED and CIBAC be declared as having complied
with the guidelines set forth in the June 26, 2001 Decision in the instant cases [--] the Partial Compliance Report dated July 27,
2001 be AFFIRMED.117[4] But because of (1) the conflicting Comelec reports regarding the qualifications of APEC and CIBAC and
(2) the disparity in the percentage of votes obtained by AMIN, the Court in a Resolution dated November 13, 2001, required the
parties to file within 20 days from notice their respective final position papers on why APEC, CIBAC, and/or AMIN should or
should not be proclaimed winners in the last party-list elections.
Thereafter, in another Resolution dated January 29, 2002,118[5] the Court agreed to qualify APEC and CIBAC, which had
previously been disqualified by Comelec in its First Compliance Report.
Thus, in the same Resolution, the Court once more lifted its May 9, 2001 TRO to enable the Comelec to proclaim APEC and CIBAC
as winners in the party-list elections. The Court said:
we accept Comelecs submission, per the OSG, that APEC and CIBAC have sufficiently met the 8-point guidelines of this Court and
have garnered sufficient votes to entitle them to seats in Congress. Since these issues are factual in character, we are inclined to
adopt the Commissions findings, absent any patent arbitrariness or abuse or negligence in its action. There is no substantial proof
that CIBAC is merely an arm of JIL, or that APEC is an extension of PHILRECA. The OSG explained that these are separate entities
with separate memberships. Although APECs nominees are all professionals, its membership is composed not only of
professionals but also of peasants, elderly, youth and women. Equally important, APEC addresses the issues of job creation,
poverty alleviation and lack of electricity. Likewise, CIBAC is composed of the underrepresented and marginalized and is
concerned with their welfare. CIBAC is particularly interested in the youth and professional sectors.119[6]
To summarize, after the Court had accepted and approved the First Partial Compliance Report and its amendments, the following
nominees were validly proclaimed winners: BAYAN MUNA (Satur C. Ocampo, Crispin B. Beltran and Liza L. Maza), AKBAYAN
(Loretta Ann P. Rosales), BUTIL (Benjamin A. Cruz), APEC (Ernesto C. Pablo) and CIBAC (Joel J. Villanueva).
Comelecs Second Partial
Compliance Report
In its Second Compliance Report dated August 22, 2001 and received by this Court on August 28, 2001, Comelec recommended
that the following party-list participants120[7] be deemed qualified under the Courts guidelines:
10. ABANSE! PINAY
11. ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, AT HANAPBUHAY (AKO)
12. ALAGAD
13. SENIOR CITIZENS/ELDERY SECTORAL PARTY (ELDERLY)
14. ALL TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (ATUCP)
15. MARITIME PARTY (MARITIME)
16. ANG BAGONG BAYANI OFW LABOR PARTY (OFW)
17. ANIBAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA, MANGINGISDA, AT MANGGAGAWA SA AGRIKULTURA KATIPUNAN
(AMMMA)
18. ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN)
19. ALYANSA NG MGA MAY KAPANSANAN SA PILIPINAS (AKAP)
20. MINDANAO FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (MSCFO)
21. WOMENPOWER, INC. (WPI)
22. AGGRUPATION AND ALLIANCE OF FARMERS AND FISHERFOLKS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AAAFPI)
23. ALL WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE UNIONS (AWATU)
In the same Compliance Report, the poll body classified the following party-list groups as unqualified:
GREEN PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION (GREEN PHIL)
PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP)
ANG LAKAS NG BAGONG KOOPERATIBA (ALAB)
PARTIDO NG MARALITANG PILIPINO PINATUBO PARTY (PMP-PINATUBO)
REBOLUSYONARYONG ALYANSANG MAKABANSA (RAM)
BAYAN NG NAGTATAGUYOD NG DEMOKRATIKONG IDEOLOGIYA AT LAYUNIN, INC. (BANDILA)
BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION (BAGONG BAYANI)
KABATAAN NG MASANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL)
AARANGKADA ANG MGA HANDA ORAS-ORAS (AHOY)
PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (PMA)
ALLIANCE TO ALLEVIATE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER, INC. (AASENSO KA)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO SOSYALISTA NG PILIPINAS (PDSP)
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CUP)
ATIN (FORMERLY ABANTE BISAYA)
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION (VACC)
ASSOCIATION OF BUILDERS CONSULTANTS AND DESIGNERS, INC. (ABCD)
LIBERAL PARTY (LP)
CITIZENS DRUGWATCH FOUNDATION, INC. (DRUGWATCH)
ALAY SA BAYAN PARA SA KALAYAAN AT DEMOKRASYA (ABAKADA)
ASOSASYON NG MGA TAGA INSURANCE SA PILIPINAS, INC. (ATIP)
ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW)
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PLANTERS (NFSP)
KABALIKAT NG BAYAN PARTY (KABALIKAT)
PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-LABAN)
BANTAY BAYAN FOUNDATION PARTY, INC. (BANTAY-BAYAN)
ABANTE KILUSANG KOOPERATIBA SA GITNANG LUZON [AKK COALITION]
GREEN PHILIPPINES (GREEN)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY OPERATORS (PADPAO)
ALLIANCE FOR GREATER ACHIEVEMENTS IN PEACE AND PROSPERITY (AGAP)
 ALYANSA NG KOOPERATIBANG PANGKABUHAYAN PARTY (ANGKOP)
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (NAD)
PEOPLE POWER PARTY (PEOPLE POWER)
PHILIPPINE TECHNOLOGICAL COUNCIL (PTC)
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT, INC. (PLAM)
PROFESSIONAL CRIMINOLOGIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PCAP)
CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT, AND PEACE (JEEP)
Comelecs Final Partial
Compliance Report
In its Final Partial Compliance Report dated September 27, 2001 and received by the Court a day later, Comelec recommended
that the following be considered as qualified party-list participants:
24. NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRICYCLE OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(NACTODAP)
25. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SMALL COCONUT FARMERS ORGANIZATION, INC. (SCFO)
26. TRIBAL COMMUNITIES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (TRICAP)
27. PILIPINONG MAY KAPANSANAN (PINOY MAY K)
28. VETERANS CARE AND WELFARE ORGANIZATION (VETERANS CARE)
29. UNION OF THE FILIPINO OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC. (OCW-UNIFIL)
30. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (DA)
31. PILIPINO WORKERS PARTY (PWP)
32. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS (PARP)
33. ALLIANCE OF RETIRED POSTAL EMPLOYEES AND SENIOR CITIZENS, INC. (ARPES)
34. AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC. (ARBA)
35. FEDERATION OF JEEPNEY OPERATORS AND DRIVERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FEJODAP)
36. GABAY NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO PARTY (GABAY-OFW)
37. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OF SETTLERS (AASAHAN)
38. ALLIANCE FOR YOUTH SOLIDARITY (AYOS)
39. PARTY FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS AND EMPOWERMENT AND RE-INTEGRATION (POWER)
40. KILOS KABATAAN PILIPINO (KILOS)
41. KALOOB-KA ISANG LOOB PARA SA MARANGAL NA PANINIRAHAN (KALOOB)
42. ALYANSA NG MGA MAMAMAYAN AT MANDARAGAT SA LAWA NG LAGUNA, INC. (ALYANSA)
43. DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (DFP)
44. PARTIDO KATUTUBONG PILIPINO (KATUTUBO)
Further, the Comelec recommended the disqualification of the following party-list groups:
AALAGAHAN ANG ATING KALIKASAN (ALAS)
PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERS (PSAE)
PARTIDO PARA SA DEMOKRATIKONG REPORMA (PDR)
CONSUMERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (CONSUMERS)
CONFEDERATION OF NON-STOCK SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC. (CONSLA)
PEOPLES PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND GOOD GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ALLEVIATION OF
POVERTY AND SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT (PAG-ASA)
AHONBAYAN, INC. (AHONBAYAN)
ANGAT
SAMA-SAMA KAYA NATIN TO FOUNDATION, INC. (KASAMA)
A PEACEFUL ORGANIZATION LEADERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP, SERVICE MOVEMENT (APO)
PHILIPPINE DENTAL ASSOCIATION (PDA)
PUSYON (BISAYA) PILIPINO (PUSYON)
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS)
CITIZENS ANTI-CRIME ASSISTANCE GROUP, INC. (CAAG)
ASA AT SAMAHAN NG KARANIWANG PILIPINO (ASAKAPIL)
BUSINESSMEN AND ENTREPRENEURS ASSOCIATION, INC. (BEA)
UNITED ARCHITECTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (UAP)
ABAY PAMILYA FOUNDATION, INC. (ABAY PAMILYA)
PEOPLES REFORM PARTY (PRP)
COALITION FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND WELFARE (COALITION 349)
RIZALIST PARTY (RP)
NATIONAL URBAN POOR ASSEMBLY (NUPA)
ALLIANCE FOR MERITOCRACY (AFM)
BALIKATAN SA KABUHAYAN BUHAY COALITION (BSK)
BANTAY DAGAT, INC. (BDI)
CONFEDERATION OF HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION FOR REFORMS IN GOVERNANCE AND
ENVIRONMENT, INC. (HOMEOWNERS)
PORT USERS CONFEDERATION, INC. (PUC)
 LABAN PARA SA KAPAYAPAAN, KATARUNGAN, AT KAUNLARAN (KKK)
BONDING IDEALISM FOR NATIONAL HUMAN INITIATIVE (BINHI)
KATIPUNAN NG MGA BANTAY BAYAN SA PILIPINAS (KABAYAN)
FEDERATION OF SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF PHIL. VETERANS, INC. (LAHING VETERANO)
PRIME MOVERS FOR PEACE AND PROGRESS (PRIMO)
PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE OF CITIZENS FOR DEMOCRACY (PACD)
COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS (CAP)
TAPAT FOUNDATION, INC. (TAPAT)
ALLIANCE FOR ALLEVIATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND TRUST PARTY (AKA)
ANG IPAGLABAN MO FOUNDATION (AIM)
PHILIPPINE MINE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT (PMSEA)
BICOL SARO PARTY (BSP)
AABANTE KA PILIPINAS PARTY (SAGIP BAYAN MOVEMENT) (APIL)
PHILIPPINE PEOPLES PARLIAMENT (PPP-YOUTH)
SPORTS AND HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (SHAF)
KILUSAN TUNGO SA PAMBANSANG TANGKILIKAN, INC. (KATAPAT)
CITIZENS FOUNDATION FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIMES AND INJUSTICES, INC. (CITIZEN)
NACIONALISTA PARTY (NP) (Withdrew participation in the party-list election)
SANDIGANG MARALITA (SM)
ONEWAY PRINTING TECHNICAL FOUNDATION, INC. (ONEWAY PRINT)
PHILIPPINE JURY MOVEMENT (JURY)
ALTERNATIVE ACTION (AA)
DEMOCRATIC WORKERS PARTY (DWP)
SECURITY UNITED LEAGUE NATIONWIDE GUARDS, INC. (SULONG)
ORGANISASYONG KAUGNAYAN NASYONAL SA PAG-UNLAD (O.K. NAPU)
PAMBANSANG SANGGUNIANG KATIPUNAN NG BARANGAY KAGAWAD SA PILIPINAS (KATIPUNAN)
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZER (NCCO)
NATIONWIDE ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMERS, INC. (NACI)
LUZVIMINDA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC. (LEDFI)
TINDOG PARA HAN KABUBUWASON HAN WARAYNON (TINDOG WARAY)
FEDERATION OF LAND REFORM FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES (FLRF)
KATRIBU MINDANAO, INC. (KATRIBU)
DEMOKRATIKONG UGNAYAN TAPAT SA SAMBAYANAN (DUGTUNGAN)
KATARUNGAN SA BAYAN TAGAPAGTANGGOL NG SAMBAYANAN (KABATAS)
GO! GO! PHILIPPINES MOVEMENT
PAMBANSANG SAMAHANG LINGKOD NG BAYAN, INC. (PASALBA)
PHILIPPINE REFORMIST SOCIETY (PRS)
GABAYBAYAN (GAD)
ALUHAY NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. (ALUHAI)
ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT TO ENHANCE THE NATIONAL AGENDA (OSMEA)
All these Compliance Reports have already been affirmed by this Court except that, in regard to the First Compliance Report, it
agreed -- as earlier stated -- to add APEC and CIBAC to the list of qualified groups.
Other Significant
Orders and Pleadings
Under its Resolution No. NBC-02-001,121[8] Comelec motu proprio amended its Compliance Reports by, inter alia, adding four
more party-list participants (BUHAY, COCOFED, NCIA and BAGONG BAYANI) to the list of qualified candidates for the May 14,
2001 elections.
In its Comment dated November 15, 2002, the OSG opined that Comelec acted correctly in revising its Party-List Canvass Report
No. 26, so as to reflect the correct number of votes cast in favor of qualified party-list parties and organizations.122[9]
Consequently, it moved to lift our TRO with respect to COCOFED, BUHAY, SANLAKAS and PM, because [a]s shown in the revised
COMELEC Party-list Canvass Report No. 26, movants BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM received 4.25%, 3.35%, 2.21% and
3.17%, respectively, of the total votes cast123[10] in the May 14, 2001 party-list election.124[11]
It added that the proclamation by the COMELEC of BUHAY, COCOFED, SANLAKAS and PM (as well as all other qualified parties
and organizations which received at least 2% of the total votes cast in the same party-list election) as winners in the said party-
list is in order.125[12]
However, in its November 25, 2002 Comment, the OSG contended that NCIA, which is not a qualified party or organization per
the Comelec [First] Partial Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, cannot be proclaimed as winner in the last party-list
elections.126[13] It also recommended that ABAs Motion to lift the TRO with respect to its proclamation should be likewise
granted, because it is a qualified party or organization that hurdled the 2% threshold in the last party-list elections. For, ABA
received 3.54% of the votes cast in the said party-list elections, as shown in COMELEC Resolution No. NBC-02-001. ABAs
proclamation as winner is therefore in order.127[14]
Preparatory to resolving the present Motions and in observance of due process, the Court resolved on February 18, 2003 to
require the parties, including the OSG, to submit their respective Position Papers on the following issues:
1) Whether Labo v. Comelec,128[15] Grego v. Comelec129[16] and related cases should be deemed applicable to the
determination of winners in party-list elections
2) Whether the votes cast for parties/organizations that were subsequently disqualified for having failed to meet the
eight-point guideline contained in our June 26, 2001 Decision should be deducted from the total votes cast for the
party-list system during the said elections
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, the Court needs to pass upon the claims of the OSG that the initial recommendation contained in Comelecs First
Compliance Report dated July 27, 2001, regarding BUHAY and COCOFED should be reconsidered, and that these two party-list
groups should be deemed qualified.
Qualification of
BUHAY and COCOFED
In recommending the disqualification of BUHAY for being most probably merely an extension of the El Shaddai, a religious group,
Comelec said in the above-mentioned Report:
Upon hearing the case for BUHAY, the Commission determined that, based upon BUHAYs declarations of intent in its
constitution, upon its avowed platform of government which both mirror the sentiments of the El Shaddai Movement and upon
the circumstances surrounding its relationship with the El Shaddai Movement, BUHAY is most probably merely an extension of
the El Shaddai. In this light, it is very likely that the relationship between the leader of the El Shaddai, and the nominee of BUHAY
is less a matter of serendipity than an attempt to circumvent the statutory prohibition against sects or denominations from
participating in the party-list elections.130[17]
In the same Report, Comelec also stated that COCOFED did not deserve a seat in the House of Representatives, because it was
allegedly an adjunct of the government. Explained the Commission:
COCOFED is a sectoral party representing the peasantry. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization of coconut farmers and
producers, established in 1947. It has no religious affiliations. However, the records indicate that it is an adjunct of the
government.
COCOFEDs Amended By-Laws specifically provides that:
The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority or his duly authorized representative shall automatically be a member of the
National Board.
The Philippine Coconut Authority is an administrative agency of the government which receives support and funding from the
national government. Thus, to have the Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority sit on the National Board of COCOFED
clearly amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of candidate which, as this Court has said, would be unfair to the
other parties, and deleterious to the objectives of the law.
Furthermore, in the Articles of Incorporation of COCOFED, it declared, as one of its primary purposes, the obtaining of possible
technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources.131[18]
On the other hand, in its Consolidated Reply dated October 15, 2001, the OSG -- in representation of the poll agency -- argued
that the above findings of the Comelec in regard, inter alia, to BUHAY and COCOFED are not supported by substantial evidence
and, thus, should be modified accordingly. This opinion is buttressed by the OSGs Comment dated November 15, 2002.132[19]
The OSG stressed that the Comelec report on BUHAY was merely anchored on conjectures or speculations. On COCOFED, the
OSG explained that the bylaws making the chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority an automatic member of the COCOFED
National Board has already been deleted as early as May, 1988.
It added that while the primary purposes of COCOFEDs Articles of Incorporation authorize the organization to help explore and
obtain possible technical and financial assistance for industry development from private or governmental sources x x x, this
statement does not by itself constitute such substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the COCOFED is an entity funded
or assisted by the government.
We are convinced. For the same reasons that we concurred in the earlier accreditation of APEC and CIBAC, we accept the OSGs
position that indeed Comelec erred in disqualifying BUHAY and COCOFED.133[20]
Therefore, we now add these two groups to the list of 44 qualified groups earlier mentioned and thereby increase the total to 46.
We shall now take up the main question of which parties/organizations won during the last party-list election.
Legal Effect of the Disqualifications
on the Total Votes Cast
The instant Motions for proclamation contend that the disqualification of many party-list organizations has reduced the total
number of votes cast for the party-list elections. Because of this reduction, the two-percent benchmark required by law has now
been allegedly attained by movants. Hence, they now pray for their proclamation as winners in the last party-list elections.
Recall that under Section 11(b)134[21] of RA 7941 (the Party-List Act), only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total votes cast for the party-list system are entitled to have a seat in the House of Representatives. The critical question now
is this: To determine the total votes cast for the party-list system, should the votes tallied for the disqualified candidates be
deducted? Otherwise stated, does the clause total votes cast for the party-list system include only those ballots cast for qualified
party-list candidates?
To answer this question, there is a need to review related jurisprudence on the matter, especially Labo v. Comelec135[22] and
Grego v. Comelec,136[23] which were mentioned in our February 18, 2003 Resolution.
Labo and Grego
Not Applicable
In Labo, the Court declared that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected
to the office.137[24] In other words, the votes cast for an ineligible or disqualified candidate cannot be considered stray.
However, this rule would be different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such
case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise
or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected.138[25] In short, the votes cast for a notoriously disqualified candidate may be considered stray and excluded from the
canvass.
The foregoing pronouncement was reiterated in Grego, which held that the exception mentioned in Labo v. Comelec is
predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.139[26]
Note, however, that the foregoing pronouncements (1) referred to regular elections for local offices and (2) involved the
interpretation of Section 6 of RA 6646.140[27] They were not meant to cover party-list elections, which are specifically governed
by RA 7941. Section 10 of this latter law clearly provides that the votes cast for a party, a sectoral organization or a coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted:
SEC. 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first vote is a vote for candidate for membership of
the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants
represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in
May 1998. (Emphasis supplied)
The language of the law is clear; hence, there is room, not for interpretation, but merely for application.141[28] Likewise, no
recourse to extrinsic aids is warranted when the language of the law is plain and unambiguous.142[29]
Another reason for not applying Labo and Grego is that these cases involve single elective posts, while the present controversy
pertains to the acquisition of a number of congressional seats depending on the total election results -- such that even those
garnering second, third, fourth or lesser places could be proclaimed winners depending on their compliance with other
requirements.
RA 7941 is a special statute governing the elections of party-list representatives and is the controlling law in matters pertaining
thereto. Since Labo and Section 6 of RA 6646 came into being prior to the enactment of RA 7941, the latter is a qualification of
the former ruling and law. On the other hand, Grego and other related cases that came after the enactment of RA 7941 should be
construed as inapplicable to the latter.143[30]
Subtracting the votes garnered by these disqualified party-list groups from the total votes cast under the party-list system will
reduce the base figure to 6,523,185. This means that the two-percent threshold can be more easily attained by the qualified
marginalized and under-represented groups. Hence, disregarding the votes of disqualified party-list participants will increase and
broaden the number of representatives from these sectors. Doing so will further concretize and give flesh to the policy
declaration in RA 7941, which we reproduce thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered, national and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the enactment
of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Need for Patience
and Perseverance
BAYAN MUNA contends that the deduction of votes obtained by party-list candidates disqualified after the holding of the party-
list elections will result in the instability of the system. The reason is that qualified party-list candidates would be encouraged to
seek the disqualification of the other candidates for the sole purpose of attaining the needed percentage of the votes cast.
Although such scenario may be possible, we believe that the perceived instability can be alleviated because, (1) unlike in the past
elections, Comelec now has the herein qualified and disqualified participants list, which can be used for future elections; and (2)
in the light of recent jurisprudential developments, Comelec will now be guided accordingly when accrediting new candidates for
the next party-list elections and will be able to set the period for accreditation in such time and manner as to enable it to
determine their qualifications long before the elections are held.
Indeed, it takes patience and perseverance to have the marginalized and under-represented sectors ably represented in
Congress. The controversies churned during the 1998 and the 2001 party-list elections should further embolden, not distract, the
nation in the process of implementing a genuine and sound Philippine-style party-list system. At this point, the Court needs to
stress what it said in Veterans:
[T]he dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve as a challenge to our sectoral parties and
organizations. It should stir them to be more active and vigilant in their campaign for representation in the States lawmaking
body. It should also serve as a clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information and dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are confident our people will be
more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience, perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in
time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine
style.144[31]
We also take this opportunity to emphasize that the formulas devised in Veterans for computing the number of nominees that
the party-list winners are entitled to cannot be disregarded by the concerned agencies of government, especially the Commission
on Elections. These formulas ensure that the number of seats allocated to the winning party-list candidates conform to the
principle of proportional representation mandated by the law.
The Party-List Winners
As discussed earlier, the votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining the total votes
cast for the party-list system. In the present cases, the votes they obtained should be deducted from the canvass of the total
number of votes cast during the May 14, 2001 elections. Consequently, following Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking
of qualified party-list candidates is now in order, according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total
valid votes cast nationwide.
Accordingly, we will now tally and rank the qualified party-list participants during the last elections, pursuant to the approved
Comelec Compliance Reports145[32] and our various Resolutions in these consolidated cases. Based on our foregoing discussion,
we will deduct the votes obtained by the 116146[33] disqualified candidates from the total votes cast for the May 14, 2001
elections. The votes for these disqualified groups total 8,595,630. Subtracting this figure from 15,118,815 (the total votes cast as
reported in the Compliance Reports) will result in a new total of 6,523,185 valid votes cast for the May 14, 2001 party-list
elections. This new figure representing the votes cast for the 46 qualified party-list participants will now be the basis for
computing the two-percent threshold for victory and the number of seats the winners are entitled to.
To repeat, there are only 46 qualified party-list participants. Be it remembered that the Commission recommended for
qualification only 42 party-list candidates in its three Compliance Reports. To this figure should be added the two participants we
approved in our January 29, 2002 Resolution, plus another two (BUHAY and COCOFED) per our earlier discussion in this ruling.
Table No. 1 below-lists the 46 qualified parties.
Table No. 1147[34]
Rank Party-List Votes Cast Percentage to
Group Total Votes Cast
(%)
1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19
2 APEC 802,060 12.29
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
10 PM 216,823 3.32
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07
13 AKO 126,012 1.93
14 ALAGAD 117,161 1.80
15 ELDERLY 106,496 1.63
16 ATUCP 103,273 1.58
17 MARITIME 98,946 1.52
18 OFW 97,085 1.49
19 AMMMA 65,735 1.01
20 ANAKBAYAN 63,312 0.97
21 AKAP 54,925 0.84
22 MSCFO 49,914 0.76
23 WPI 46,831 0.72
24 AAAFPI 43,882 0.67
25 AWATU 42,149 0.65
26 NACTODAP 38,898 0.60
27 SCFO 37,470 0.57
28 TRICAP 35,807 0.55
29 PINOY MAY K 32,151 0.49
30 VETERANS CARE 31,694 0.49
31 OCW-UNIFIL 29,400 0.45
32 PWP 24,182 0.37
33 DA 24,029 0.37
34 PARP 23,297 0.36
35 ARPES 22,497 0.34
36 ARBA 22,345 0.34
37 FEJODAP 21,335 0.33
38 GABAY OFW 17,777 0.27
39 AASAHAN 16,787 0.26
40 AYOS 15,871 0.24
41 POWER 13,050 0.20
42 KILOS 11,170 0.17
43 KALOOB 9,137 0.14
44 ALYANSA 7,882 0.12
45 KATUTUBO 6,602 0.10
46 DFP 6,600 0.10
Total 6,523,185
The Winners and
Their Nominees
 Using simple mathematics, we find that only 12 of the 46 qualified parties obtained at least two percent of the 6,523,185 total
valid votes cast. Two percent of this number is 130,464. Hence, only those qualified parties that obtained at least 130,464 votes
may be declared winners. On this basis, the winners are as follows:
Table No. 2
Rank Party-List Votes Cast Percentage to Total
Group Votes Cast (%)
1 BAYAN MUNA 1,708,253 26.19
2 APEC 802,060 12.29
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86
8 ABA 242,199 3.71
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51
10 PM 216,823 3.32
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07
We shall now determine the number of nominees each winning party is entitled to, in accordance with the formula in Veterans.
For purposes of determining the number of its nominees, BAYAN MUNA (the party that obtained the highest number of votes) is
considered the first party. The applicable formula148[35] is as follows:

Number of votes of first party = Proportion of votes of first party relative to

Total votes for party-list system total votes for party-list system
Applying this formula, we arrive at 26.19 percent:
1,708,253 = 26.19%
6,523,185
Having obtained 26.19 percent, BAYAN MUNA is entitled to three (3) seats. This finding is pursuant to our ruling in Veterans, the
pertinent portions of which we reproduce as follows:
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes
cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the
proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be
entitled to any additional seat.
xxx xxx xxx
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It
cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the
same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six
percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes -- say, twenty
percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional
representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one
obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving
six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party. 149[36]
As adverted to earlier, the issue of whether additional seats should be allocated to APEC, AKBAYAN, BUTIL and CIBAC will not be
addressed in this Resolution; a separate Motion (with Supplemental Motion) challenging their entitlement thereto has been filed
by BAYAN MUNA and is still pending completion as of this writing. Hence, we shall compute only the additional seat or seats to
be allocated, if any, to the other qualified parties BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS and ABANSE! PINAY.
Applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY, we arrive at 0.51:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats for First Party
Votes Cast for First Party
= 290,760 x 3
1,708,253
 = 0.51
Since 0.51 is less than one, BUHAY is not entitled to any additional seat.150[37] It is entitled to only one qualifying seat like all the
other qualified parties that are ranked below it, as shown in Table No. 3:
Table No. 3
Rank Party-List Votes Percentage(%) Additional
Seats151[38]
2 APEC 802,060 12.29 n/c
3 AKBAYAN! 377,852 5.79 n/c
4 BUTIL 330,282 5.06 n/c
5 CIBAC 323,810 4.96 n/c
6 BUHAY 290,760 4.46 0.51
7 AMIN 252,051 3.86 0.44
8 ABA 242,199 3.71 0.42
9 COCOFED 229,165 3.51 0.40
10 PM 216,823 3.32 0.38
11 SANLAKAS 151,017 2.31 0.26
12 ABANSE! PINAY 135,211 2.07 0.24
In sum, the above-named party-list winners, excluding those with a separate pending challenge, are entitled to the following
congressional seats:
1. BAYAN MUNA three (3) seats [one qualifying and
two additional seats]
2. BUHAY one qualifying seat only
3. AMIN one qualifying seat only
4. ABA one qualifying seat only
5. COCOFED one qualifying seat only
6. PM one qualifying seat only
7. SANLAKAS one qualifying seat only
8. ABANSE! PINAY one qualifying seat only
Epilogue
The determination of the winners in the last party-list elections has been neither easy nor simple. The novelty of the party-list
system in our country necessarily demanded careful study and deliberation by the Court. Principles and precedents in other
democracies of the world have not been very helpful, because our party-list law (RA 7941) has earmarked unique parameters,
giving rise to an equally distinctive Philippine-style party-list system. Our difficulties have also been aggravated by the less than
firm actions of the Commission on Elections referred to earlier, which had to be reversed based on the OSGs later submissions.
To help all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections, speed up the process of determining the party-list winners in the
future, we deem it wise to summarize the implementing process we followed in this Resolution, as follows:
1. After the promulgation of our Decision on June 26, 2001, we directed Comelec to conduct a factual
determination as to which of the various party-list candidates had passed the eight-point guideline we
instituted in that Decision. Although we gave Comelec only 30 days to undertake the work, it was able to
submit its Final Compliance Report only on September 27, 2001.
2. Of the various parties and organizations152[39] which Comelec allowed to participate in the 2001 party-list
elections, it recommended -- in its three Compliance Reports to the Court -- 42 to be qualified. Later on, four
more groups were added, for a total of 46.
3. Next, we determined which of the 46 qualified parties garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system. To do so, we subtracted the votes obtained by the disqualified candidates from the total
votes cast. Those parties, organizations and coalitions that had obtained at least two percent of this balance
were declared winners.
4. After identifying the winners, we determined, by using the formulas mandated in Veterans v. Comelec, how
many nominees each winning party was entitled to.
 5. The foregoing process would have been finished long ago and the winners proclaimed before the end of the
year 2002, had Comelec been more resolute and exacting in the factual determinations contained in its
Compliance Reports.
6. In the interest of due process, the Court required Position Papers on the issue of whether the votes of
disqualified candidates should be deducted from the total votes cast nationwide.
7. The two rollos of these two consolidated cases contain about 14,000 pages, because almost all of the original
party-list participants filed -- some repeatedly -- motions, pleas, position papers and so on, which all needed
attention. Thus, the Court had to devote an enormous amount of time and effort poring over, understanding,
and ruling upon these submissions.
8. In the interest of speedy justice, this matter was deliberated upon; and this Resolution was discussed, finalized
and promulgated by the Court within weeks after it had received the last Position Paper mentioned in item 6
above.
IN THE FUTURE, the determination of the winners can truly be made much more expeditiously, now that there are precedents to
guide all concerned, especially the Commission on Elections. For one thing, Comelec already has the herein base list of 46
qualified parties. For another, given the lessons and experiences in these proceedings, it can now more speedily, more carefully
and more prudently pass upon the qualifications of new candidates. Such process can even be done in advance under such rules
and regulations it may issue, consistent with the law and with our Decisions and Resolutions here and in Veterans, to pre-qualify
participants well in advance of the elections.
In closing, the Court hopes that, with each bit of wisdom they learned and after the arduous journey they experienced in our one-
of-a-kind Philippine-style party-list system, the marginalized and under-represented sectors of our country will be accorded ever-
widening opportunities to participate in nation-building, so that they can help develop -- in peace and harmony -- a society that is
just, humane, progressive and free.
WHEREFORE, we HOLD that, having obtained at least two percent of the total valid votes cast in the last party-list elections, the
following qualified participants are DECLARED elected with one nominee each: BUHAY, AMIN, ABA, COCOFED, PM, SANLAKAS
and ABANSE! PINAY. To enable the Commission on Elections to proclaim -- upon finality of this Resolution -- these winners and
their respective nominees, we hereby partially LIFT our Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001, in regard to them only.
It is made permanent in regard to the rest that did not qualify and win.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001]

ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its secretary-general, MOHAMMAD
OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES; PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS
MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY, ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION; SPORTS
& HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI
ORGANIZATION and others under Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO;
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-
LABAN; LIBERAL PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under Political Parties of
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS; JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in
life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of
laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of
the States benevolence, but active participants in the mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and
groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections
would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785lxxxv[1] issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties,
organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, [v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these
parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a
longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution
and individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February
2001.lxxxvi[2]
Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the
registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list
elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered
parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, but denied
those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which we quote:
We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will
encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in
this electoral window.
It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number
of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with
the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for
Reconsiderations or Oppositions.lxxxvii[3]
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that the names of [some of herein
respondents] be deleted from the Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the
Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that said certified list be accordingly amended. It also asked, as an
alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be
proclaimed.lxxxviii[4] On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration
and Nomination against some of herein respondents.lxxxix[5]
On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file Comments within three days
from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,xc[6] but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001.xci[7] During the
hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda.xcii[8]
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petitionxciii[9] before this
Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its
Resolution dated April 17, 2001,xciv[10] the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible
period of five days from notice.xcv[11]
On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,xcvi[12] docketed as GR No. 147613, also
challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,xcvii[13] the Court ordered the
consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to file their respective Comments
on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may
proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner
therein, until further orders of the Court.
Thereafter, Commentsxcviii[14] on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral Argument was
conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit their respective Memoranda
simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.xcix[15]
Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.c[16]
The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will determine, after summary
evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this Decision.
First Issue:
Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.ci[17] The Office of the Solicitor General argues that petitioners should have
filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21
and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-Acii[18]dated November 9, 2000.ciii[19]
We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the
Constitutionciv[20] and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc; hence, no motion for
reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.cv[21]
The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and
Nomination against some of herein respondents.cvi[22] The Comelec, however, did not act on that Petition. In view of the
pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at
the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioners action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally
resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, has made its position on the matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.cvii[23] It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other remedies, where the
issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency.cviii[24] Indeed, the instant case is
indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the
House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court must urgently resolve,
consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules.cix[25]
Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of
social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and
certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.cx[26]
Second Issue:
Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of political parties in the party-list system is the
most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.cxi[27] For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation
of major political parties.cxii[28] On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the
party-list system is, in fact, open to all registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.cxiii[29]
We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of
the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the
party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the
voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be
entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.cxiv[30]
During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that the participants in the
party-list system may be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO,cxv[31] Magsasaka, or a regional party in
Mindanao."cxvi[32] This was also clear from the following exchange between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:cxvii[33]
MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban, PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido.
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order to give a
chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat in Congress.cxviii[34] He
explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties
that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in
each of the districts. So, they have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the
Assembly even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote
the pertinent provision below:
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.
xxx xxx xxx
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:
Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political party -- or any
organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent
with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission declared that
the purpose of the party-list provision was to give genuine power to our people in Congress. Hence, when the provision was
discussed, he exultantly announced: On this first day of August 1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national
history, by giving genuine power to our people in the legislature.cxix[35]
The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like in accordance
with law or as may be provided by law; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this
end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list
system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole.
The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and lack [of] well-defined
constituencies.
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is
national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, because
representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.cxx[36] Concurrently, the persons nominated by the
party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties.
Finally, lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like voters of a
congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the
marginalized or underrepresented.
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and underrepresented become
members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have less in
life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the
implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is
clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.cxxi[37]
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA
7941, which states:
SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president
or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals.
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law
that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that
words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and
the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association.cxxii[38]
The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No. 7941 does not limit
the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.cxxiii[39] In fact, it
contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6cxxiv[40]of RA 7941 may participate in the elections.
Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias
Village could participate in the party-list elections.cxxv[41]
The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We stress that the party-list
system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties to be elected to the House of Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not
exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and
overrepresented can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion
owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSGs position to treat them
similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunancxxvi[42] admitted
during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as
representatives of their respective sectors.cxxvii[43]
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of ones constituency; indeed, it is
likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of ones bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow in poverty,
destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific concerns of their constituencies; and
simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly
empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in
the past the farm hands, the fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate,
as indeed many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and frustrate them
by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally
dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for
the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could
participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental
difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,cxxviii[44] in order to enhance the chance of
sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through the simplest scheme
possible.cxxix[45] Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a foothold within it -- those who
cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the simplest scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it would be
illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the
congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student dormitory open house,
which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the open house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the
dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list
system is only for the outsiders who cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or
overrepresented who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-list system would not
only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented, contrary to the intention of the law to
enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state policy must permeate every discussion of the
qualification of political parties and other organizations under the party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions
The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are anchored mainly on
the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to ascertain
constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the words in which the
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.cxxx[46] In other words, verba legis still
prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should resort be made to extraneous aids of
construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light
on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the provision being construed.cxxxi[47]
Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretarycxxxii[48] that the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views
of the individual members, and as indicating the reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large
majority who did not talk, much less of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding thereof.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the mechanics of the system
shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In understanding and implementing party-list
representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of
extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof unequivocally states
that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to enable underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined.
Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the
framers deliberations merely express their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and
purpose of the constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue here. Hence, they remain
parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel
admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-
list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution or the law,
its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.cxxxiii[49] Indeed, the function of all
judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.cxxxiv[50]
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the major political parties
Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been
accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of
this, they have the advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x.
We note, however, that this accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district
representatives for the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No.
7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether respondents herein and, for
that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary qualifications to participate in the party-list elections,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD), because it is a government
entity using government resources and privileges. This Court, however, is not a trier of facts.cxxxv[51] It is not equipped to
receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualify under the
guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and be elected under the
party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary
hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and
the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups
identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate
that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list
system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the
marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as
much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party must claim to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.cxxxvi[52]
Third, in view of the objectionscxxxvii[53] directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is allegedly a
religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the
party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by the following discussion during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of members and supporters,
in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party in emulation of those parties I had mentioned
earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this
prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the Comelec can pierce
through the legal fiction.cxxxviii[54]
The following discussion is also pertinent:
MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS, he is not, of course, prohibiting priests, imams
or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic Church, the Protestant
Church et cetera.cxxxix[55]
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be registered.cxl[56] The prohibition was
explained by a membercxli[57] of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: [T]he prohibition is on any religious organization
registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited
here; it is the registration of a religious sect as a political party.cxlii[58]
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes
cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.cxliii[59]
Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to comply with election laws
and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of
Representatives. A party or an organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the
government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a group of citizens, organized by
citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the government. The participation of the government or its officials
in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegalcxliv[60] and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of
the law: to enable citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House
of Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941
reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on
the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must
its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens who belong to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree;
neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to
give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able to
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina
explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee of a party, national or regional, is not going to
represent a particular district x x x.cxlv[61]
Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute
to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in life should have more
in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in life. It gives the great masses of our
people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute and the prejudiced, and even to those in the
underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that the party-list system
is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral chances of the marginalized and
underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it
would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941 are nothing more than
a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the altar of people empowerment. Surely, this
could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary
hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering
the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for
the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of
Representatives. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner during the last
party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied and reported its compliance with the
foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.