Estrada vs Sandiganbayan

Erap was charged of violation of the Plunder Law.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
"combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec.1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern"

in Sec. 4.These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.

Ruling. When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling
under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury
in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3). On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be
two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1,
par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 - the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth.

Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has
been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a
criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a
saving clause or by construction

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." The overbreadth doctrine, on the
other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may
well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

Contention #2: petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00.

There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury.

The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least
two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.

Issue #3. Plunder is a malum in se. Which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven
in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part
of petitioner.

When the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not
matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se.
People vs Dacuycuy

Petition at bar seeks to set aside the decision of the then CFI of Leyte penned by herein respondent
judge and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein
private respondents.

Private respondents Matondo, Caval, and Zendoria are public school officials of Leyte, who were
charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for violation of
Republic Act No. 4670 through a complaint filed by the chief of police of Leyte.

At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over
the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the
offense.

They contend that sec. 32 of said law is unconstitutional because (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being
solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the
Government.

Respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in substance that Republic Act
No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal
and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for
preliminary investigation.

The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions of law: (1)
Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and (2)
Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional

In viewing sec.32 of the law, two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a)
a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no
prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment.

The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to punishments which
never existed in America, or which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete. That the penalty
is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the
ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel or unusual.

We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in question should
be invalidated as an "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court.
The respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided
for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of
imprisonment.

We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no
points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and
sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must
be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated
limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or
assumption, of legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with
neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are
thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from
one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a
power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the
rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the
preumption of constitutionality has to yield.

It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in
force at the time of the commencement of the action. With the deletion by invalidation of the provision
on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for
violations of said law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00,
the same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover.

When the complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a fine of
not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former municipal courts.
Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private respondents falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
Liang vs People

A Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), alleging
that on separate occasions, petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member
of the clerical staff of ADB.

MTC Mandaluyong City, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that petitioner enjoyed immunity
from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. RTC reversed and set aside.

Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. SC rendered the assailed Decision denying
the petition for review. Ruled, in essence, that the immunity granted to of officers and staff of the ADB
is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the
immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of
official duty.

The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner
were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case to fall squarely
under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the "Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian Development
Bank," to wit:

Officers and staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

(a)Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except
when the Bank waives the immunity.

As we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling
within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner argues that the
Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. We wish to
stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander, in general, cannot be considered as
an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether or not petitioner's utterances constituted
oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.

People v Lacson
Respondent and his co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven
male persons bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration for the determination of several factual issues relative to
the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the
said court.
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal
Cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said provisional
dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
witnesses.

The Court also held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its
application are attendant.

The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined whether it
shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of
receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new rule.

According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year bar, the State must be given
the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule
fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court.

However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases
beyond the two-year bar.

In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases mentioned; and (b) the time-
bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.

Ruling: a.) Since the conditions sine qua non (there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court,
the public prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the
respondents motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said
cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the respondents motion and to
protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate court.)for the application of the new
rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time
limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases or file new Informations for multiple
murder against the respondent.

b.) The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal
law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be punished.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions.

The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arisefrom, procedural laws. It has been held that
a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of
his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.

The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period
Commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the
State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so.

Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only
one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short
of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the
State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.

This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the
State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be
emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to
benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the
administration of justice in general and of criminal laws in particular.

Go vs Dimagiba
Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a
rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the Bouncing
Checks Law. When the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment -- is
the preferred penalty. As the Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a
given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence,
it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final judgments
of conviction.

Facts:

Before us is a Petition for Review over an order releasing Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from
confinement and required him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.

Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when
presented to the drawee bank for encashment or,payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the
reason account closed. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 in
MTCC Baguio. The appeal was raffled to RTC Baguio who then issued an Order directing the immediate
release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment.
In justifying its modification, the RTC invoked (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the
imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a
recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of
Dimagiba.

It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would
be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through
the levy of his properties.

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-
2000, because he is not a first time offender.

This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred
penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. It
is the trial courts discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law.

The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of
SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders. On this point, Dimagiba contended that
his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be
imposed on others similarly situated.

The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the
accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code, has been expanded in certain instances to
cover special laws.

SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to
cases already terminated by final judgment.

Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of
preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22,
nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts
to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused --
whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other
circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.

The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondents supposed unhealthy
physical condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension, cited by the RTC in
its October 10, 2001 Order, is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did
not make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus.
LONEY V PEOPLE
Loney et al. were officers of Marcopper mining corporation in the province of marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,

It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. Some time, tailings gushed
out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Water
Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), National Pollution

Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Philippine Mining Act of 1995

("RA 7942"),and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property.

Petitioners contend

1.) That the Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the
RPC"proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers
thru dumping of mine tailings"

2.)that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property — because (1) all the charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge
for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "lack of
necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among them.

MTC-dismissed other cases except mining act and art.365

RTC- There can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by
these laws are separate and distinct from each other. It set aside the dismissal by the MTC.

CA- affirmed RTC.

Ruling:

No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.
The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.

Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with
each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as
a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

The contention has no merit.

(1) Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or

more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for
more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense."

In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
—x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
x x x.

In a comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which
petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:

In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element - absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This
element is not indispensable in the prosecution for violation of the other charges..

In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of actual pollution.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the
part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the
Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers

On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the
part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the previous
laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing
pollution to the Boac river system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate.

Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished
by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same
incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.

On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for
violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those
violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942).

What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.
GARCIA v CA
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, charging Garcia et al. of willfully, and
unlawfully decreasing the votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from (6,998)
votes to (1,921) with a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

The RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted of
Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b). The CA affirmed.

Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an election
law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or
mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. intentionally increasing or decreasing
the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and
intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of
are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law.

Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime
is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral
but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board of canvassers
in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the
voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the
municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes
as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on
record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to
another. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED
DE GUZMAN VS PEOPLE(“Alexander”) was fetching water below his rented house at Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo, the brother of his land lady, (“Lucila”), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed
Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, “Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter
to just go up.

Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander
went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of
Alexander and

stabbed him on his left face and chest. Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of

his body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into
his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors
mmediately rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the Polymedic General
Hospital where he was subjected for further medical examination. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who
treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s
death without timely medical intervention.

Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by
Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to throw
invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit
Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face.

The RTC convicted the petitioner, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE

On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical
element of the crime charged, was not establish.

RULING: Appeal without merit. The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill
the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State
must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general
criminal intent, which is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of
the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People we considered the following factors to
determine the presence of intent to kill, namely:

(1) the means used by the malefactors;

(2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused.

We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting
the injuries on the victim.

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the
petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the
result of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records
indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left
side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his
submission, and firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest
being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
Rivera v People
An Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all
surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder using a hollow block against one Rodil.

Ruben was going to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for being jobless and dependent
on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled invectives at Edgardo. A heated
exchange of words ensued.

At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look for his wife.
His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two brothers, Ismael and
Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with
fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position, Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a
hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael continued mauling Ruben.

People who saw the incident shouted: “Awatin sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand
up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived,
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.

Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, signed a medical certificate in which he
declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma
periorbital left. Doctor prescribed medicine for Ruben to take for one month.

Petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that the CA erred in affirming the
RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intention to kill Ruben
when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block. Petitioners aver that, based on the testimony of Dr.
Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a superficial wound in the parietal area; hence, they should be held
criminally liable for physical injuries only.

CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners' intent to kill Ruben.

RULING: The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist,
inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the
victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.

— Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial
evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

CONCEPT OF AN OVERT OR EXTERNAL ACT. — The Court in People v. Lizada elaborated on the concept
of an overt or external act, thus: An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is
that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has
never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime
itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no
one can say with certainty what the intenT of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should
have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first
or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is
necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words
of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the
victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion
of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

ROQUE vs PEOPLE
One night in bulacan, brothers Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in
the house of one Bella Santos. Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela Cruz (delaCruz) and shouted to him to join
them. At that instant, petitioner and his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that
Rodolfo's shout was directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo
apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before leaving, he warned the
Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to them if they continue to perturb him.

Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao (Tayao) to ask for assistance in
settling the misunderstanding. Because of this, Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by
dela Cruz and brought to the house

of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just proceeded to petitioner's house to
follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioner's residence,
Reynaldo again apologized to petitioner

but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and when he came out, he was
already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then
shot Reynaldo who fell to the ground after being hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo
on the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since petitioner warned those
around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldo's parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for
emergency medical treatment. He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila
where he was operated on and confined for three weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him and
issued a medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldo's skull and exited at the
back of his right ear.
Petitioner filed a petition for review but on the issue based on questions of facts.

Ruling: The Petition must be denied. The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to
"appreciation of evidence" or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTC's ruling that petitioner is guilty
of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly stated
by the CA:

In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is no
intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable for physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of
whether the victim only suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is
sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-266). Usually, the intent to
kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the offender and the parts of the victim's body at which the
weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is
used to stab the victim in the latter's abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed (Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code, 13th ED., P. 431). It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in
the head. Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used are ready indications
that the accused-appellant's objective is not merely to warn or incapacitate a supposed aggressor.
Verily, had the accused-appellant been slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would
have killed him outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accused-appellant
even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping . . . the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact
that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum
injuries does not mean that the crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious
physical injuries. After all, as was mentioned above, what should be determinative of the crime is not
the gravity of the resulting injury but the criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger.