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Dalloway
Ban Wang
MFS Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 38, Number 1, Spring 1992, pp. 177-191
(Article)
irfr
Ban Wang
1A small portion of this essay was presented on 20 September 1991 at the Sixteenth
Annual Colloquium on Literature and Film held at West Virginia University. I wish to
thank Professor Kathleen Komar of UCLA for her helpful comments.
2For example, J. Hillis Miller has noted that critics have paid much attention to the
"minutiae of the mind." For him Woolf's novel can be considered as a transition to "a
new self-consciousness." See Miller 176, and James Naremore 240-248.
Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 38, Number 1, Spring 1992. Copyright © by Purdue Research Founda-
tion, All rights to reproduction in any form reserved.
177
Private consciousness would not appear to be so private and intimate,
however, as soon as one examines the ways in which consciousness, or
various forms of subjectivity of characters in this novel are constructed
in language, discourse, systems of signification, and, in short, the sym-
bolic order. The symbolic order here is taken in the Lacanian sense. It
consists of images, symbols, icons, representations, myths, and discourse
that envelope the conscious as well as unconscious life of the individual,
and on which the individual depends for the structuration of the psyche
and constitution of her subjectivity (Lacan 65-68). They are also the means
whereby she recognizes and establishes her social identity as a member
of a social group. It is obvious that this concept of the symbolic in some
ways overlaps the concept of ideology advanced by Louis Althusser. The
major difference may be that Althusser's definition of ideology as "the
representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real
conditions of existence" (162) is posited in relation to a "real" that is
different from the Lacanian real.3 It is theoretically necessary, it seems
to me, to confront the two concepts with regard to the problem of the
subject. Althusser's concept of the imaginary representation strongly im-
plies a dimension of language and social structure, that is, the dimension
of the symbolic, whereas Lacan's symbolic realm, in which the mature
subject constitutes his subjectivity, cannot be viewed independently of the
imaginary identification. Such a confrontation allows us to see the sub-
ject not as some entity foreclosed in the structure of language and con-
stituted once and for all, but as a dynamic and unstable process involv-
ing both the imaginary and the symbolic, the unconscious and conscious,
thus putting the subject "in process/on trial" (Kristeva, Revolution 22).
Special attention will be paid in this essay to that part of the symbolic
order that is closely related to the state. I will proceed on the assumption
of a network of symbols and representations that functions to sustain the
political powers that be, and to define the identity of individuals and pro-
duce them as subjects of the state. The anthropologist Clifford Geertz's
formulation of what he calls the "symbolics of power" may help define
this state-oriented symbolic network:
3In the Lacanian scheme the "real" designates the phenomenal world and the biological
status of the subject prior to entry into the realm of the symbolic. Althusser's notion of
the "real" refers to the complex of socioeconomic facts, the relations of production and
class relations. But the Lacanian "symbolic" bears an affinity with the Althusserian "ideology"
in that it stresses the role of social systems of representation, especially language, in con-
stituting the individual as the subject, with perhaps a difference in modality. In Lacan the
subject, before entry into the symbolic, has to go through an imaginary register marked
by the "mirror stage," where the subject identifies with the ideal image of itself, and this
stage is assumed to be spontaneous and somehow less culturally initiated. Althusser seems
to overlap the imaginary identification and the symbolic in his discussion of "interpella-
tion, which, according to Kaja Silverman, indicates the conjunction of the imaginary and
symbolic transactions resulting in the subject's insertion into social discourse. For a more
detailed account of the similarity and difference between the two theorists, see Silverman
215-222 and Fredric Jameson.
178 MODERN FICTION STUDIES
At the political center of any complexly organized society . . . there is both a
governing elite and a set of symbolic forms expressing the fact that it is in truth
governing. No matter how democratically the members of the elite are chosen
(usually not very) or how deeply divided among themselves they may be . . .
they justify their existence and order their actions in terms of a collection of stories,
ceremonies, insignia, formalities and appurtenances that they have either inherited,
or in more revolutionary situations, invented. It is these—crowns and corona-
tions, limousines and conferences—that mark the center as center and give what
goes on there its aura of being not merely important but in some odd fashion
connected with the way the world is built. (124)
This symbolics of power is already Woolfs acute perception in Three
Guineas. In this work Woolf expresses her astonishment, first at the ar-
chitectural structures that house the state machine and ideological state
apparatuses—St. Paul, the Law Courts, the Bank of England, the House
of Parliament, and Westminster Abbey; then at the impressive splendor
of the public attire and decorations of the men who move in these august
spheres—plumes and gowns, button and stripes, badges, and medals. This
ostentatious attire imposes its authority in the even more impressive
ceremonies, processions, coronations, speeches, homages, and rituals.
Woolf sees this official pageantry as a symbolic network of power that
functions to "constrict, to stereotype and destroy" (TG 207). It "hyp-
notized the human mind" (208) and encourages "a disposition towards
war" (40), even toward Fascism (207). Here Woolf raises a question that
Foucault addresses in his preface to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus:
how can one keep from being submitted to the powers that be, from desir-
ing one's own domination and becoming a fascist in one's heart (viii)?
Mrs. Dalloway provides a good occasion to investigate the connections
between the symbolic network of power, the constitution of the subject,
and the psychic resistance. The novel can be read not so much as a
systematic penetration into individual consciousness as an exploration of
the ways in which the individual tries or fails to establish his or her iden-
tity as the subject of the state. Thus it is the concern of this essay to
examine the subtle and complex ways in which the symbolic network of
the state functions, at the most intimate level of private consciousness,
to forge the subject in the service of ideology and the state in Mrs. Dalloway.
At the same time I will demonstrate that however insidious and powerful
may be the sway that the symbolic order holds over the minds of the
individuals, it is shown to be losing its grip on the ever elusive psychic
subterranean and running up against psychic resistance in the form of
schizophrenia.
In one of the most memorable and frequently discussed episodes in
Mrs. Dalloway, a motorcar, which presumably carries British dignitaries,
travels slowly down the streets, attracting a large crowd of people. Nobody
knows whether it is the Queen, the Prince, or the Prime Minister who
is sitting inside the car, but there is no doubt among the curious crowds
WANG 179
that "greatness was seated within; greatness was passing" (MD 23). The
car and the figure seated in it represent the "enduring symbol of the
state" (23). The traveling car exerts a tremendous emotional impact on
the people in the streets, and for a moment seems to unite them—despite
their difference in social class, belief, sex, and occupation—in a spiritual
communion. People look at each other, and look at the nobility, and are
keenly aware that their looks are returned: royalty is "looking at them"
(27). This mutual recognition in an exchange of looks, as in a mirror
reflection, establishes a common identity and communion. Through shifts
from one consciousness to another, we have some glimpses of what is
going on in the minds of the onlookers. They think of the dead, of the
Flag, of Empire. To these symbols or signifiers of the state are added
some others that carry each separate thought process in a homogeneous
stream of consciousness: the ancestors, the flowing corn, the manor houses
of England, the House of Windsor, and Buckingham Palace. Despite the
public and communal nature of these images and symbols, this moment
is also an intensely personal and private one, in which each individual
recognizes himself or herself as the subject of the state and finds his or
her personal identity. For Moll Pratt the person inside the car is the
Prince of Wales for certain, and she wishes to toss a bunch of roses to
express "an old Irishwoman's loyalty" (MD 27). For Clarissa the passing
car must carry the Queen, and the car triggers off a flow of consciousness
that is composed of blazing candelabras, flittering stars, gentlemen of
England, and the Queen's party in Buckingham Palace. She immediately
identifies with the Queen: "for a second she wore a look of extreme
dignity" (23-24): "Clarissa, too, gave a party" (25).
When private consciousness is seen as constructed in this way, the
identity of self becomes an issue that has lost its underlying assumption
of an original, innate essence. It is the social structure, ideology, language,
in short, the symbolic order that constitutes the self or rather the subjec-
tivity of these characters. If the subject is constructed in language, as
Lacan tells us, and subjectivity is no more than a sense of self that is
actually the effect of being interpellated into an ideology, it is particularly
true of such characters as Lady Bruton, Hugh Whitbread, and Sir William
Bradshaw. Virginia Woolf does not endow these characters with the com-
plex subjectivity that Septimus, Peter Walsh, and Clarissa seem to manifest
and experience. These characters are living examples of the typical and
proper subjects of the state that are produced by the ideological state ap-
paratus. The ideological state apparatus, which I take to mean the same
as the symbolic order in the more empirical form of institution,
functions—through language, social and educational institutions, church,
and the media—to reproduce the appropriate subjects for the perpetua-
tion of the political order of the state. Hugh Whitbread, for instance,
is "a perfect specimen of the public school type" (110). As Sally Seton
WANG 181
Dropping dead down the aeroplane soared straight up, curved in a loop, raced,
sank, rose, and whatever it did, wherever it went, out fluttered behind it a thick
ruffled bar of white smoke which curled and wreathed upon the sky in letters.
But what letters? A C was it? an E, then an L? Only for a moment did they
lie still; then they moved and melted and were rubbed out up in the sky, and
the aeroplane shot further away and again, in a fresh space of sky, began writing
a K, an E, a Y perhaps? (29)
The crowd immediately starts trying to figure out what the smoky letters
mean. This scene, close at the heel of the motor-car scene, is not simply
a case of ironic deflation of solemnity to triviality, of a hot bath of sen-
timents followed by a cold shower of irony (quoted in Booth 329). The
smoky letters only look like letters. They are pure, opaque signs, whose
meaning is not readily available. They can be seen as language in its
"naked" state, in its intractable materiality. They are emblematic figures
waiting to be "figured out." Each person in the crowd tries to recognize
the shape of the letters and connect them up into a word as she or he
sees fit. Mrs. Coates says "Glaxo," Mrs. Bletchley utters "Kreemo," and
Mr. Bowley murmurs "toffee." The dancing and shifting letters in the
sky become a theater where a free play of signifiers is set in motion. These
signs are open to whatever possible meaning the onlookers might settle
on and elusive to any positive meaning. In the arbitrary and random
ways in which individuals try to read meaning into them, there is no
longer any natural bond between the signifier and the signified, any
necessary and transparent relation between language and meaning: the
signifier takes flight from the signified and becomes free-floating.
In a less obvious and exaggerated way, this scene is already prefigured
by the motorcar scene, of which the skywriting airplane is only its more
abstract and geometrical version. Although the very sight of the motorcar
and Buckingham Palace carry with them the meanings of authority, of
power, of nation and tradition—a looking glass in which people immediate-
ly and automatically recognize themselves, these authoritative meanings
are subject to qualification and démystification through multiple con-
sciousness. Clarissa pays homage to the "enduring symbol" of the state,
but at the back of her mind, which is obsessed with human mortality, the
solemn symbol also seems transient, and the mysterious figure in the car
will be known to antiquaries when all the people in the street on that
fine morning become bones mixed with dust. Emily Coates, as she ranges
over the Palace windows, thinks only of "innumerable housemaids," "in-
numerable bedrooms" (MD 28). There is also an erotic dimension in the
response to the symbol of the state: it thrills the nerves in the onlookers'
thighs and echoes in the ears of the girls buying white "underlinen thread-
ed with pure white ribbon for their weddings" (26). By opening up the
symbol of the state to such heterogeneous play of meanings and mental
associations, Woolf reveals through analogy the arbitrary relation of the
WANG 183
of Experience 110). It can be viewed positively as a joyous and intense form
of subjectivity that comes about through escaping or breaking through
the delimiting categories of the symbolic order. Such is the line of thinking
and investigation that has resulted in persuasive studies by Gilles Deleuze
and Felix Guattari, Julia Kristeva, Hélène Cixous, and others. Deleuze
and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia is a compelling study
of schizophrenia in relation to the symbolic system of capitalism and pro-
vides us with an effective method of schizoanalysis that pays due atten-
tion to the flow of the unconscious desire with regard to the symbolic.
Of particular pertinence to this essay is their discussion of the ways in
which the unconscious forces disrupt the slots of "identity" that the sym-
bolic order imposes on the individual so as to produce him or her as
a subject.
Deleuze and Guattari take issue with the proposition, or a misconcep-
tion of Lacan's theory, that the unconscious is already structured like
language. The subject thus conceived is an Oedipalized subject, already
foreclosed in the symbolic. They define the unconscious as a flow of un-
bound libido, much in the same way Kristeva defines "drives" (Revolu-
tion in Poetic Language 25). They compare the unconscious to "a body
without organs" (9). This means that the body has not yet been "ter-
ritorialized" into its parts, has not been "organized" by the sign-system;
it has not yet been subject to a single unit within a state-system, accept-
ing its castration. The unconscious is thus a flux, a flow, a life force that,
although implicated in systems of representation as a semiotic process,
tends to disrupt and escape them. With such an unbounded flow, what
has been territorialized into Nation, Family, the triangle Mommy-Daddy-
Me, Party, Church, and Tradition can be deterritorialized (9-16). The
body can break through the organizing distinctions that cut it into organs,
into mouth, anus, penis, and so on (for example, for Septimus, hearing
music is to "see" the color of music).
There seem to be two tendencies in the flow of the unconscious as
exemplified by the schizophrenic experience of Septimus. On the one hand
the unconscious tends toward a total union with nature, with other bodies
(for example, with Evans), with nonhuman objects, and with death. Yet,
seen from the perspective of the symbolic, it tends toward multiplicity,
proliferation of sensations and thought, partial objects, fragmentation of
normal experience, and memory. This disruptive tendency, which
fragments the logical construction of language and normal experience,
threatens to break down the boundaries of the established order of what
Sir William Bradshaw calls "Proportion": as soon as Septimus enters
his clinic, he can see "it is a case of complete breakdown" (MD 144).
It would seem to be stating the obvious or a critical commonplace
to claim that Sir William and his psychiatric profession are the target
of Woolfs satire and social criticism. But something still remains to be
WANG 185
the heads of the Hôpital Général were high-ranking parliamentary of-
ficials. At the party he talks to Richard Dalloway about a bill he wants
to get through Parliament. Foucault writes that the Hôpital Général is
in fact a " 'police' matter" (46). Sir William not only acts like a moral
and ideological policeman; he is quite ready to deal with his "mad"
patients with actual police force if they get out of hand: "If they failed
him, he had to support police and the good of society . . ." (MD 154).
"He swooped; he devoured. He shut people up" (154). For Sir William,
as for his predecessors who instituted the Hôpital Général, "the laws of
the State and the laws of the heart" are in the final analysis identical
(Foucault 61). They work to make sure that everybody submits to and
internalizes the laws and becomes the perfect subject of the state.
Viewed in the larger context of ideology and the symbolic order, the
relation between Septimus and Sir William proves to be much more than
an interpersonal relationship. It is not, as some critics would claim, a
question of "one ego trying to impose its will on another" (Naremore
107-108). It is rather a relationship or tension between the subjectivity
of Septimus and the symbolic system, which, through Sir William, at-
tempts to mold Septimus into a fixed and stable subject of the state. This
does not mean that Septimus possesses a self-identical "self or "identity"
that deviates from social norms. For his schizophrenic experience, un-
conscious drives, and imaginary union with nature, with animals, and
with the dead are exactly part of the process that annuls and disrupts
any sure foundation of self and identity—a foundation that stems from
the assumption of a unified, fully conscious, and self-identical self. His
diverse and multifarious forms of subjectivity are a process, a flow that
is impossible to pin down, define, categorize, and socialize into the iden-
tity which Sir William and the social system demand of him. Thus his
schizophrenic symptoms, his moments of madness and abstraction can
be read as signs that he constantly escapes and eludes the coding process
of the symbolic order.
Septimus, as Woolf indicates, is the double of Clarissa Dalloway. And
Peter Walsh is another double of Clarissa. These three characters share
a close affinity with each other in that they tend to participate in the
psychical tendency to escape the imposition of the social system and sym-
bolic order and let their imagination, their sensitivity, their bodily rhythms,
their unconscious desires break through the dominant signifying practice.
It is true that there can be no complete break or rupture with the sym-
bolic. A complete break with the symbolic amounts to a break with
language, thought, logic, and any means of signification. It means a com-
plete shutdown of communication, a complete blackout of consciousness,
and ultimately a plunge into darkness and death, as exemplified by
Septimus' fatal plunge out of the window to the street. But this is only
one side of the escape from the symbolic. There is, however, a positive,
creative, and liberating side to this escape. This is depicted in the
WANG 187
loose, it not only overflows the symbolic but also runs over its own moment
of revelation and meaning toward a state of ego-loss. Identity, character,
and personality are dissolved. One can become everybody or nobody.
The self is always on the run, on the run toward nonself.
Crisis of identity not only is manifest in the characters of Mrs. Dalloway
but also is part of Virginia Woolfs personal experience. Numerous studies,
biographical as well as theoretical, have traced the parallels between the
schizophrenic symptoms of Septimus Smith and the "bouts of madness"
that Virginia Woolf suffered, especially during the period of 1912-1913.
Like Septimus Smith, Woolf also experienced an inability to feel, "raved"
in an incoherent language, suffered from hallucinations and illusions,
was seized with an overwhelming sense of fusion with outward things,
made suicide attempts, and was treated as a psychotic patient by
neurologists and psychologists in psychiatric institutions. What is notewor-
thy in the more recent studies is a persistent refusal to treat Woolf and
Smith as "mad" in psycho-medical terms and an insistent attempt to
question and redefine the very category of madness or insanity. It is also
a critical consensus that Woolf, in creating Septimus Smith, gives a com-
pelling artistic expression to her problems.4
The point I would like to suggest apart from such rich scholarship
about the Woolf-Smith parallel is that the "madness" of Smith and Woolf
can hardly be assessed positively and sympathetically without reference
to the prevalent sign system of the symbolic order. The problem of Smith
and Woolf is first of all a tension and conflict-ridden relationship with
the reigning sign system and the dominant form of language. We have
already noted Smith's trouble with grammar and his lack of the "sub-
ject" while writing poetry. Coming back from the war, we recall, Smith
feels that literature is but a boy's intoxication with language that has
shrivelled utterly (MD 133). One of his "serious symptoms" that Sir
William notes in his card is that he is "attaching meanings to words of
a symbolic kind" (145). The War, as Poole points out (189), means heroic
distinction and national glory for Sir William, but to Smith it is "that
little shindy of schoolboys with gunpowder" (MD 145). Indeed while using
English in his "ravings," Septimus Smith always suffuses the public
language with a large residue of private significance and often overturns
the established values of conventional words. Similarly Woolf also grap-
ples with the conventional form of language. In her diary she often records
her acute feelings that words are painfully inadequate to her sensations
and perceptions. What a wonder it would be, she writes, if one can catch
works of art "hot and sudden as they rise in the mind" before resorting
'Among numerous studies on the parallels between Woolf and Smith, Roger Poole's
The Unknown Virginia Woolf offers a detailed analysis and refreshing perspectives and is a
sustained effort to question the traditional view of Woolf established by such critics and
biographers as Leonard Woolf and Quentin Bell. For other studies also see Stephen Trombley,
Lyndall Gordon 51-67, and Jean Guiguet 228-248.
188 MODERN FICTION STUDIES
to a process of linguistic signification; "for the process of language is slow
and deluding. One must stop to find a word. Then, there is the form
of the sentence, soliciting one to fill it" (WD 93-94). Contemplating trees
and rooks in a tranquil summer scene, she asks: "What's the phrase for
that?" But she immediately finds that ready-made words are no vehicle
for the colored nuances and the ineffable depths of her sensations and
feelings: "But what a little I can get down into my pen of what is so
vivid to my eyes, and not only to my eyes; also to some nervous fibre,
or fanlike membrane in my species" (WD 128).
Septimus Smith is of the same species as Virginia Woolf. Their bodies
have nerve fibers reaching and spreading out like a veil on the rock of
the world—and running up against the rock of the dominant form of
language. Their difficulty with language is not just an artistic difficulty
of groping for the apt phrase or a communicative difficulty with the right
expression. It runs in the depths of their very beings. For them the domi-
nant sign system is not only inadequate but also constraining and
repressive. Their unconscious desires and bodily impulses constantly ex-
ceed the boundaries of the sign system. Woolf and Smith are fellow
travelers in a constant flight from the well-marked territories of language,
convention, normality, and the symbolic order. Their flight may assume
various forms: incoherent babbles and ravings, nervous "breakdowns,"
a lapse into silence, or even a strong desire for death. Abhorred and ex-
asperated in a mental institution by the nurse's untiring words "the old
Queen the Queen mother & the present Queen represent the highest
womanhood," Woolf wrote to her sister that to escape such talk "I
shall soon jump out of a window" (quoted in Gordon 52). While making
Smith jump out of the window to achieve a symbolic death in the novel,
Woolf also opens a window onto a vista where the socially instituted struc-
ture of meaning collapses, where the mind becomes blank and the
"[cjharacter and idiosyncrasy as Virginia Woolf completely sunk out"
(WD 94), where identity fades and dissolves. It is a horizon where "I"
is on the run toward a space bereft of cultural constraints and linguistic
shackles, and merges with a total fusion with things. It is a death-like
realm, and it is the death of the human, all too human, personified by
the "human nature" of Dr. Holmes and constituted in the symbolic; it
is "a snow field where even the print of birds' feet is unknown," where
the "naked soul looking at emptiness has its independence" (quoted in
Gordon 53)—it is indeed Julia Kristeva's abject realm of imaginary
darkness and chora.5 But this psychic state of ego-loss and selflessness
seems to Woolf to be life-enhancing rather than depressing. In such a
state, she writes, she is "more attuned to existence" (WD 94) and she
has a consciousness of what she calls " 'reality' . . . something abstract;
5For Kristeva's concept of the abject, a preverbal, pre-objectal and death-like realm
of imaginary abyss where meaning and signification collapse, see Julia Kristeva, Pouvoirs
de l'horreur: Essai sur l'abjection.
WANG 189
but residing in the downs or sky ... in which I shall rest and continue
to exist" (WD 129-130). Such a reality recalls the "wedged-shaped core
of darkness" that Mrs. Ramsay experienced and cherished in To the
Lighthouse, a psychic state where one joyfully loses one's personality and
"things came together in this peace, this rest, this eternity" (TTL 63).
In this light Woolfs breakdowns can be seen as signs of breaking through
the constricting social code that makes individual existence false and
inauthentic.
This psychic resistance to the symbolic order is articulated in Mrs.
Dalloway. It is a resistance against the identity that society confers on the
infinitely complex individual human being and the incessantly mobile and
fluid unconscious. In Three Guineas Woolf proclaims, posing as a feminist
outsider to the symbolic order of patriarchy, "as a woman I have
no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country
is the whole world" (TG 197). She vehemently tries to absent her-
self, through a strategy she calls indifference and "experiment in passivi-
ty" (216), from patriotism, from nationality, from liberal humanist values
on the verge of bankruptcy, from those "chalk marks" scored on the
floor of the earth by the symbolic order, "within whose mystic bound-
aries human beings are penned, rigidly, separately, artificially" (191).
If Mrs. Dalloway gives an expression to this idea, then it is very political
indeed. It is not simply political in its criticism of the social system, but
in its profound and radical questioning of the symbolic order, of the very
stuff that makes us what we are and who we are in society.
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WANG 191