FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100643. August 14, 1992.]

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED , petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT

OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 79, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Morong, Rizal, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL,
Morong, Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Quezon City, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO , respondents.

Benjamin M. Dacanay for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT; FINAL UPON LAPSE OF REGLEMENTARY

PERIOD OF APPEAL AND NO APPEAL PERFECTED. — Petitioner fails to refute the ruling of
respondent appellate court that the issues presented in the instant case had been
previously raised before and decided upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392,
which decision became nal and executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment
book by reason of petitioner's failure to seasonably le an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration. This is fatal. It has been repeatedly held that finality of judgment becomes
a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. The
decision therefore of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained nality,
there being no appeal nor motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled
jurisprudence that once a decision becomes nal, the Court can no longer amend, modify,
much less set aside the same.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDING; PROCEEDING IN REM;
PERSONAL NOTICE NOT REQUIRED TO VEST AUTHORITY TO COURT. — As early as 1910,
i n Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, We already ruled that land registration proceedings are
proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not necessary to give personal
notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be registered, in order to vest the
courts with power or authority over the res. Thus, while it may be true that no notice was
sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial reconstitution of title was sought,
such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional defect.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLICATION THEREOF, SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO VEST COURT
JURISDICTION. — In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br . 170 ,
We said that "[t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for
reconstitution in the Of cial Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has
been led and that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty
(30) days before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the
Of cial Gazette is suf cient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a
person purporting to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice
is not sufficient ground to invalidate the proceedings.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 4. ID.; ID.; CAUSE OF ACTION; CANNOT BE LITIGATED TWICE BY VARYING FORMS OF
ACTION. — Shorn of its nery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in
CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 which has become res judicata. Verily, petitioner's action to annul
the order of the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside
the said order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which
reversal became nal and executory due to petitioner's failure to le an appeal within the
reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
5. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; RULE 10.02 OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED WHEN LAWYER MISREPRESENTS CONTENTS OF DECISION.
— However, the phrase " without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty, in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not
found in the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court
of Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the
court a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to
mislead [Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious
offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer's solemn duty to act at all times in a
manner consistent with truth.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO , J : p

The petition led on December 28, 1990, by Adez Realty Incorporated before the Court of
Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 23773, sought to annul the order of the
accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, dated November 20, 1984, allowing the reconstitution
of Transfer Certi cate of Title No. 12662. The petition likewise sought to set aside in
effect the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 dated July 31, 1990.
On April 30, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals 1 dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
On June 26, 1991, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. The respondent
court, in dismissing the petition, said that: (a) the petition is a reiteration of the issues
raised before it 2 earlier in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, promulgated July 31, 1990, and since no
motion for reconsideration or appeal by certiorari with the Supreme Court was led, the
same became nal and executory, and consequently entered in the judgment book on
October 11, 1990; and, (b) the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, had jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the issue then being one of venue and not of jurisdiction, which can be
waived if not timely objected to in a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 4, of the
Rules of Court.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner raises
four (4) issues which nevertheless may be simpli ed into the following: whether the
accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, may acquire jurisdiction over reconstitution
proceedings involving real property situated in Quezon City, and whether publication of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 notice of the petition in two (2) successive issues of the Of cial Gazette and its posting in
the bulletin board of the accused-appellant of Morong, Rizal, is suf cient compliance with
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 26.
Wittingly or unwittingly, petitioner fails to refute the ruling of respondent appellate court
that the issues presented in the intent case had been previously raised before and decided
upon the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392, which decision became nal and
executory, and in fact already entered in the judgment book by reason of petitioner's failure
to seasonably file an appeal or a motion for reconsideration. This is fatal.
It has been repeatedly held that nality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected. 3 The decision therefore of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 had attained nality, there being no appeal nor
motion for reconsideration interposed. Likewise, it is settled jurisprudence that once a
decision becomes nal, the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the
same. 4 In fact, in Dueñas v. Mandi, 5 We held that the "trial court and the appellate court
may have committed an error in the assignment or partition of the eight parcels of land to
the parties in this case, but considering that their judgments are now nal, the error,
assuming that one was committed, can no longer be amended or corrected." In Icao v.
Apalisok, 6 We ruled that even the subsequent discovery of an erroneous imposition of a
penalty will not justify correction of the judgment after it has become nal. We have also
declared that, subject to settled exceptions, once a judgment becomes nal, all the issues
between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. 7 To allow the Court to amend or
reverse a decision which has attained nality will result in endless litigations. 8 Indeed,
every litigation, CA-G.R. CV No. 21392 included, must come to an end.
Moreover, petitioner already had the opportunity to set aside the questioned order of the
trial court when its Motion to Set Aside and/or Annul the Order of Reconstitution, led
more than a year after the issuance of the questioned order, was granted by the trial court,
however erroneous may be the procedure pursued and the consequently relief granted.
Petitioner then simply failed to maintain vigilance over its perceived rights when it did not
le a timely appeal from the adverse decision of the appellate court, thus allowing the said
decision to become final.
Besides, as early as 1910, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 9 We already ruled that land
registration proceedings are proceedings in rem, not in personam, and therefore it is not
necessary to give personal notice to the owners or claimants of the land sought to be
registered, in order to vest the courts with power or authority over the res. 1 0 Thus, while it
may be true that no notice was sent by registered mail to petitioner when the judicial
reconstitution of title was sought, such failure, however, did not amount to a jurisdictional
defect. 1 1 In Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila, Br . 170 , 1 2 We
said that "[t]he purpose of the publication of the notice of the petition for reconstitution in
the Of cial Gazette is to apprise the whole world that such a petition has been led and
that whoever is minded to oppose it for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days
before the date set by the court for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it." Thus, notice of hearing by proper publication in the Of cial Gazette is
suf cient to clothe the court with jurisdiction, and the mere fact that a person purporting
to have a legitimate claim in the property did not receive personal notice is not suf cient
ground to invalidate the proceedings.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 Shorn of its nery, CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 merely re-echoes the issues raised in CA-G.R. CV
No. 21392 which has become res judicata. Verily, petitioner's action to annul the order of
the trial court allowing reconstitution duplicates its earlier motion to set aside the said
order, which was granted but later reversed by the appellate court — which reversal
became nal and executory due to petitioner's failure to le an appeal within the
reglementary period. A party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the
same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 1 3
Be that as it may, there appears to be no cogent reason to disturb, as to other matters, the
ndings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 21392,
promulgated July 31, 1990, the same having become nal and executory. Accordingly, We
af rm the assailed decision promulgated April 30, 1992, and resolution issued June 26,
1991, by respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the Court adverts to the Petition for Review led in behalf of petitioner Adez
Realty, Inc., by ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY. On pages 2-4 of the Petition, counsel
purports to quote, as he does, the questioned decision when he alleges —
"The facts of the case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are the following:

xxx xxx xxx

'After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the questioned order dated
November 20, 1984, without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez
Realty, granting the applicant's petition for reconstitution in the name of the deceased
Elias Eugenio'" (italics supplied)

However, the phrase " without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty ,
in the above quoted second paragraph on page 3 of the Petition for Review, is not found in
the decision penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera for respondent Court of
Appeals. It now appears as part of a material statement of fact in the decision of the court
a quo when actually it is not. This to Us is a prima facie case of attempting to mislead 1 4
this Court, a serious offense which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer's solemn duty
to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ve (5) days from
notice why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the
judgment of the court a quo thereby altering and modifying its factual ndings with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment, and
thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs against petitioner Adez Realty Incorporated.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 1. Twelfth Division, penned by Associate Justice Manuel C. Herrera (Chairman) and occurred in
by Associate Justices Regina C. Ordoñez Benitez and Cancio C. Garcia.
2. Twelfth Division (old composition), penned by Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and
concurred in by Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno and Artemon D. Luna.
3. Republic v. Associacion Benevola de Cebu , G.R. No. 77243, October 26, 1989, 178 SCRA 692,
among a litany of other cases.
4. Marquez v. CA , G.R. No. 79743, November 6, 1989, 178 SCRA 74, citing International School,
Inc. v. Min. of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 54243, July 21, 1989, 175 SCRA 507.
5. G.R. No. 65889, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 530.
6. G.R. No. 59581, December 29, 1989, 180 SCRA 680, citing Castillo v. Donato, G.R. No. 70230,
June 24, 1985, 137 SCRA 210.
7. See Sealand Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90500, October 5,
1990, 190 SCRA 347.
8. Fabular v. CA, G.R. No. 52118, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 329, citing Fariscal Vda. de
Emnas v. Emnas, No. L-26095, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA 470.
9. 17 Phil. 49.
10. This ruling has been reiterated in Roxas v. Enriquez, 29 Phil. 31; Sepagan v. Dacillo , 63 Phil.
412, and in a host of much later cases decided by the Supreme Court.
11. See PNB v. De la Vina and Zamacoma, 109 Phil. 342.

12. G.R. No. 88623, February 5, 1990, 181 SCRA 788.

13. Ibabao v. IAC, G.R. No. 74848, May 20, 1987, 150 SCRA 76, 85, citing Valera v. Bañez , No. L-
27886, September 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 648 and Ramos v. Pangasinan Transportation
Co., Inc., No. L-26986, September 30, 19777, 79 SCRA 170.
14. Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment,
or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com