Michael Ortega

Exam I

1. In Meditation 2 Descartes denies that he knows that he is “that structure of limbs which
is called a human body,” but he affirms that he knows that he is “a thing that thinks.” That
is: he does not take himself to know (a) I am that structure of limbs which is called a
human body; but he does take himself to know (b) I am a thing that thinks. Why does
Descartes take himself to know (b), but not (a)?

Descartes presents a number of skeptical arguments, namely, the dreaming argument and
the evil deceiver argument. He then uses these arguments to reject as knowledge any beliefs
justified by perception, such as having a human body. However, he reasons that both skeptical
arguments require an object on which to act; he must exist, and he must think, in order for his
thinking to be deceived. Therefore, Descartes justifies his argument, that while he cannot know
that he is “that structure of limbs which is called a human body,” he can take himself to be, at
minimum, “a thing that thinks.”

2. In section III of “Can I know That I Am Not Dreaming?” Blumenfeld and Blumenfeld
address Anthony Kenny’s challenge to the dreaming argument for skepticism. Explain
Kenny’s challenge and explain the Blumenfelds’ response to it.

Kenny challenges the dreaming argument for skepticism by arguing that there is a way to
know if you’re not dreaming other than the qualitative character of your experiences in the
dream, namely that you cannot make judgements in dreams. Kenny’s challenge, therefore,
proceeds through the following argument, sidestepping Descartes’ concerns about experience:

(i) If I judge that I am awake, I know that I am awake.

(ii) I judge that I am awake.
(iii) Therefore, I know that I am awake.

The Blumenfelds’ respond by challenging Kenny’s underlying premise, that making

judgements in dreams is impossible, by citing correct mathematical judgements while dreaming
or the judgement that one is dreaming while dreaming. So, (i) fails because one can judge that
one is awake while dreaming, and then Kenny’s argument is defeated. They also argue against
(ii), claiming that one can dream that they are judging instead of actually judging, so the
perception of judgement that underlies (ii) is not sufficient to establish (ii).

3. Why can’t we define knowledge as true belief?

For a belief to count as knowledge, being true is necessary but not sufficient, because the
belief may not have been formed by reliable processes i.e. not justified, but be true nonetheless.
For example, if a superstitious person forms a belief that something bad will happen to them
after walking under a ladder, something bad may happen to them, but we wouldn’t say that they
knew that was going to happen. I am not arguing that knowledge is solely justified, true belief,
only that defining knowledge as true belief is not sufficient.

4. In “Is Knowing a State of Mind?” Williamson identifies and rejects a claim he calls
“transparency.” What is the claim? Why is the transparency claim incompatible with
Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind? What is Williamson’s argument
against the transparency claim?

Transparency is the claim that for every mental state, when you are suitably alert and mentally
sophisticated, you are in a position to know you are in that mental state. This claim is
incompatible with William’s “knowledge as a state of mind” thesis because the fact that
something is the case can change unbeknownst to someone, who can no longer say to know that
something is the case. At most, this person falsely believes that something is the case, but that
mental state is no longer knowledge because it is no longer factive. Williamson argues that
mental states need not be transparent; other mental states also fail the transparency test.
5. Pick one of Oakley’s arguments against the coherence theory of justified belief. Explain
what Oakley’s argument is, then evaluate it. By evaluating it I mean state whether you
think the argument is successful or not and give reasons for your view.

The coherence theory of justified belief states that a belief is justified if it coheres with a
justified belief system. One of Oakley’s arguments against this theory is an argument against
circularity. If beliefs are only justified if they cohere with other justified beliefs, then no belief is
independently justified, and so the entire system of beliefs lack justification.

The success of this argument depends on whether one holds a linear or holistic view of
justification. A linear view argues that each belief must be independently supported by a
justification. A holistic view would argue instead that a system of beliefs and how they interact
can give those beliefs justification. The contrast is similar to that between stacking bricks, with
one standing alone supporting the next, and building a house of cards, which only stands if
arranged if the individual cards are arranged so that they mutually support each other. I think that
Oakley’s argument against the coherence theory of justified belief is ultimately unsuccessful
because he assumes a linear view of justification; nothing about the coherence theory is
problematic if one holds a different view of justification.