Co Kim Cham vs.

Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon

75 Phil 113
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PEOPLE V. MANAYAO

FACTS:

-Appellant Pedro Manayao was among those who were charged with the aggravating circumstances of
1.) the aid of armed men and 2.) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of the
crime, he was sentenced to death.

-The guerrillas raided the Japanese in Angat, Bulacan. In reprised, Japanese soldiers and a number of
Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea
of killing the residents. Appellant killed six women.

-Appellant’s counsel contends that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject
to military law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Court. Appellant had lost his
Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.

-He further contends certain provisions of CA 63 states that:

A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events.

-By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more.

-By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country.

-By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air
Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted.

ISSUE: Whether the accused is guilty of treason

HELD: Yes, the appellant was found guilty of the crime of treason.

The Makapili, although organized to render military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during
the late war, was not a part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors.

There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution
or laes of Japan.

The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan in the war without necessarily swearing
to support her constitution and the laws.

Neither was there any showing too that they have lost their citizenship in connection with the
provisions stated in CA 63. No person even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his
nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of felony and treason,
of he does not strictly observe this duty.

As to appellant’s contention that he only acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is
therefore exempt from criminal, liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty
incidental to his service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 11 of RPC
states that compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign sovereign is considered an illegal order.

The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his Japanese masters under
pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should be considered as committed under the
impulse of an irresistible force or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. Appellant joined
the Makapili with the full knowledge of its avowed purpose of rendering military aid to Japan. He knew
the consequences to be expected- if the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently
arose, he brought them about himself freely and voluntarily.

People v. Bangalamis No Case

6 Phil 581

US v. Francisco Bautista

G.R. No. L-2189, November 3, 1906

Ponente: Justice Carson

Facts: Appellants convicted in CFI Manila of conspiracy to overthrow by force US government and PH
government as defined in Act292. Francisco Bautista was sentenced with Aniceto de Guzman and
Tomas Puzon to imprisonment with fine and hard labor. During latter 1903 a junta was organized and a
conspiracy entered into by Filipino residents in HK for overthrowing the government by force of arms
and establishing in its stead a government known as Republica Universal Democratica Filipina. Toward
the end of 1903, Artemio Ricarte would come to Manila from Hong Kong and hold meetings to further
the conspiracy hatched in HK, like for the plan to enlist a revolution army and raising money for it. The
conspirators took to the field and offered armed resistance, only failing because of their failure to
combat and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in response to their propaganda. Bautista, a
Manila resident, was an intimate friend of Ricarte, notified by Ricarte of his coming to Manila, Bautista
giving him money for the trip, present in meetings, “held the people in readiness.” Puzon distributed
the bonds and appointed certain officials for the revolutionary forces. Puzon said he only acted to not
vex his friend, that “joking tone,” that he did not know Ricarte was organizing a conspiracy.

Issue: Whether or not appellants are guilty.

Held: No. Puzon himself signed a written statement at the time he was arrested saying he was part of
the new revolution presided over by Ricarte, that he was brigadier-general, chief of signal corps since
they were childhood friends. Puzon did not deny this statement. His confession was clear and in no way
supports his pretense that he was excited as not to know what he was saying when he made it. The
accused voluntarily accepted the appointment and in doing so assumed all obligations implied by such
acceptance. “Mere possession of such an appointment, when it is not shown that the possessor
executed

some external act by the virtue of the same, does not constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the
defendant," applies only the case of Enrique Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was
„the fact that a so-called appointment of sergeant was found at his house.‟” It may be the case that
conspirators may send appoints to an unsuspecting person in the hope that such person would accept
it, and the person is entirely innocent of all intention to join. A genuine conspiracy must be shown to
exist, and it must be proven that accused voluntarily accepted the appointment. The twowitness rule
cannot apply in proving conspiracy to commit treason, only in treason. Aniceto de Guzman cannot be
convicted on his acceptance of a number of bonds from conspirators. It does not mean he knew about
the conspiracy, receiving the wrapped bonds not knowing what they were, then destroying them
thereafter.

United States Vs. Apolonio Caballeros

Mapa, J.;

March 29, 1905 G.R. No. 1352

FACTS: § Roberto Baculi was in his banana plantation gathering bananas when he heard some shots
fired. He tried to run, but was seen by Damaso and Isidro, leaders of the band who fired the shots and
striking him with the butts of their guns, forced him to bury the victims: four American school teachers
shot to death.

§ Apolonio Caballeros and Baculi was then arrested for the crime.

§ The two confessed their guilt and was sentenced to seven years of presidio mayor as accessories.

Issues:

§ Whether or not the penalty was correct.

Held:

§ No. Decision reversed and defendants acquitted.

Ratio:

§ Baculi is exempt from liability for he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force since he was
under threat by the band.

§ As for Caballeros, ther was no proof of his participation in any way to the crime charged. Witnesses
confirm that he was not even in the place where the burial took place. Covarrubias, a witness, said
that his confession of guilt was made through a promise that “nothing will be done to them”. Under
such circumstance, the confession cannot be accepted as proof on trial, for it was not made freely and
voluntarily.

§ Their failure to report the crime to the authorities is not a crime punishable by the RPC.

People v. Lol-lo

Facts:

On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which were on its way in the
midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were
manned by 24 armed Moros. The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children.
At first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch boats, they asked for
themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
except the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that
it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the
Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the
two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu. They were
arrested there and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of
piracy.

Issue:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of piracy alleged in this
case.

Held:

Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a villainy not against any
particular state but against all mankind. It should be tried and punished in the sufficient
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits.

US. V. Braganza

Short case
1. ARBITRARY DETENTION; PENAL CODE. — A public functionary who, except by
reason of a crime, detains a person without authority of law or of general
regulations in force in the Islands, is punishable under article 200 of the Penal Code
as for an act of arbitrary detention.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

We take the same view of this case as to the guilt of the defendants as that taken
by the Attorney-General. He says in his brief: jgc:chanrob les.com .ph

"Article 200 of the Penal Code reads: jgc:chan rob les.com. ph

"The public official who, unless it be by reason of a crime, should detain a person
without being authorized to do so by a law, or by regulations of a general character
in force in the Philippines, shall incur the penalty of a fine of from 325 to 3,250
pesetas if the detention should not have exceeded three (3) days; . . ." cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry

"At the time when the crime herein was committed the accused were municipal
officials, Hilario Braganza being then a councilor of the municipality of Sagay and
Martin Salibio a lieutenant of the barrio of Vito in said municipality; therefore, they
were public officers . . .

"There is no doubt as to the accused having detained Father Feliciano Gomez,

inasmuch as, according to the evidence, they themselves seized him within the
church and took him out of it, telling him that he was under arrest; they made him
pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal
building and there told him that he was under arrest . . . he accused detained
Father Gomez, not by reason of a crime but arbitrarily. He had committed no crime,
rather on the contrary, he was the victim of coercion and other outrages. As a
priest of the Roman Church, and the question herein referring also to a Roman
church which he is alleged to be in possession of, he went there to say mass, but a
group of Aglipayano women violently prevented him from carrying out his purpose.
No law or regulation of a general character in force authorizes the accused to
commit the act which they committed . . ." c rala w virtua1aw l ibra ry

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, without taking into consideration,
however article 11 of the Penal Code as an extenuating circumstance. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., dissenting: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

I think this complaint should be dismissed.

The accused, the consejal and the teniente of the barrio of Vito, having been called
to the village chapel to quell a disturbance, found the partisans of the Roman
Catholic and Aglipayano Churches violently disputing with each other, asserting
their respective rights of possession thereto. In this dispute a number of women
took an active part, and when the accused arrived blows were passing and feeling
was running very high. The accused, who were the only officers of the law in the
barrio, placed the Roman Catholic priest under arrest, and took him to the
schoolhouse which served as a sort of a village tribunal, and in less than half an
hour after the arrest was made, set him at liberty, upon the verbal recognizance of
one of the villagers and his assurance that the priest would appear before the
justice of the peace the next day.
It appears, that later, a number of the participants in the disturbance, including
women of both the Catholic and Aglipayano faith were brought before the justice of
the peace and fined, but it does not appear that any further action was taken
against the priest.

It does not appear from the record whose was the property of the chapel, or who
had the right of possession, though both parties laid claim thereto. The priest
testified that prior to the day in question, he had never celebrated mass there, and
there are indications in the record that the reason for being there on that day was
to assert his church’s right of property in the chapel by holding a religious service
therein. It is clear, however, from the record that the question as to the possession
of this chapel, and the dispute arising therefrom, was but one incident in the long-
drawn-out controversy between the Roman Catholic Church and the Aglipayano
Church over questions of ownership and possession of church property in these
Islands.

It does not appear that the accused maltreated the complaining witness in any way,
other than by putting him under arrest, and requiring him to accompany them to
the local tribunal.

There is nothing in the record to show whether the accused were adherents of the
Roman Catholic or Aglipayano faith, though from the fact that the wife of the
concejal was one of those who sided with the Aglipayano party it may be suspected
that he himself was an adherent of that church.

Under these circumstances, I can not obtain my own consent to join with the
majority in declaring that these officers of the law were guilty of a crime in
performing their duty as they saw it.

If the Aglipayano Church had a right to the possession of the chapel, or even if they
were actually in possession thereof, I do not think it will be pretended that these
accused did other than their sworn duty in removing from the scene of the
disturbance the priest, who under such circumstances must be recognized as the
chief cause of the disturbance; indeed their conduct, marked as it was by the
utmost consideration for the dignity and sacred office of the offender, would be
worthy of the highest commendation, and evidence of a proper and admirable
appreciation of their duties and responsibilities as officers of the law.

There is, as I see it, absolutely nothing in the record upon which to base a finding
that the Roman Catholic Church was in actual possession or had the right to
possession of the chapel in question at the time when, against the resistance of the
Aglipayanos at the door, the priest forced his way inside. Surely, in the absence of
proof, the accused should have the benefit of the doubt on this point; especially
when it is considered that at the time when the incident occurred (March 1906) the
rights of property and possession in churches, chapels, and cemeteries in these
Islands was a subject of widespread litigation, and many cases pending in this court
leave no room for doubt that de facto the Aglipayano Church had secured
possession of more or less so-called church property in nearly every province in the
Islands.

And even granting that the Roman Catholic Church had the right to possession, if it
be remembered that this right as to this particular chapel was vehemently resisted
and that its rights in similar cases were gravely questioned throughout the Islands,
and that the record appears to disclose that the Roman Catholic priest went there
on that day for the express purpose of asserting the disputed right, I do not think
that these ignorant village officials should be held criminally responsible for making
a mistake as to the rights of the parties, and found guilty of "arbitrary detention"
because they mistakenly believed that the priest, who was evidently the center of
the disturbance, was the creator of that disturbance by his assertion of rights which
the accused officials believed did not exist.

I might be inclined to scrutinize their technical responsibility more searchingly if

their conduct evidenced any malicious tendency to abuse their authority, and to
exercise extreme rigor toward the church dignitary whom they arrested, but, other
than the mere act of making the arrest, there is nothing in their conduct to justify
an imputation of improper motives to the accused officials, or to suggest that they
were doing otherwise than honestly endeavoring to quiet the disturbance and
perform their official duty to the best of their ability.