CASE 1:

Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000
Petitioner: Leslie Ui
Respondent: Atty. Iris Bonifacio

Facts of the case:

Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of immoral
conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui,
whom they begot two children. According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship
between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop their illicit affair
but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is a victim in the situation. When respondent met
Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is
already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their
relationship. When respondent knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship.
Respondent further claims that she and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to
allow them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent however presented a misrepresented copy of her
marriage contract.

Issue:

Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law?

Held:

NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the
legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral
character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character
is also requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.

Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. A lawyer
may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that something was amiss in her
relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. Respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered as an immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and to opinion of good and respectable
member of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.

A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . .
. but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards.

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status
belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession.
Case 2:
In Re: Cunanan

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino
Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972
popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains
a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams
the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations
(1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and
feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no.
12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the
senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill
then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of
justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be
developed constantly and maintained firmly.
The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this court.
Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by
the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the
power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them,
in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar
(since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered
the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and
being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the
said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is
valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952
are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o
getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed
petitions for admissions or not.)

Case 3:
In Re: Guarina 24 Phil. 37 SC Admin

Case 4:
In Re Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling

Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the
Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to
have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding
with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three
cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and
terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the
Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant
would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer.
By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.

Case 5:
Zoreta vs. Atty. Heherson Alnor Simpliciano

FACTS:
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of COntract and Damaes
against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter’s failure to
honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a dully commissioned Notary
Public in 2002 per Certifications issued by teh CLerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan,
performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by presented documents.

ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules of Court.

RULING:
Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the
laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, “Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility). The lawyer violates, likewise, Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to
uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

Case 6:
Ducat, Jr. vs. Villalon

Case 7:
Ronquilo vs. Cesar 491 SCRA 1

Case 8:
Radjaie vs. Alovera
Case 9:
Edrial vs. Quilat-Quilat 339 SCRA 760

Case 10:
Thermochem Inc. and Jerome Castro vs. Leonora Naval and CA

Case 11:
Quingwa vs. Puno

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with
gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher
for a number of years. The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel
register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's
promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual
passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and
to show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified
that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that
the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of
the former Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court). It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to
maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant
that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a
settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as
a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the
court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney
will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law
confer upon him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the
fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned
profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated
in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or
unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Case 12:
Royong vs. Oblena 7 SCRA 859

FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar and bench,
with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found out that there was no
rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General made another
complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same
time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice
law, praying that this Court render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer
and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous cohabitation
of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its
loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as ground for
disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as
to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good
moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the
bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him sqemed to
have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that
his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.

Case 13:
Bolivar vs. Simbol

FACTS: Concepcion Bolivar lived with and financially supported Abelardo Simbol y Manuel in his
studying for law school and other personal necessities since he promised marriage to Bolivar. But as
soon as Simbol finished his studies he married another woman while keeping it a secret from Bolivar and
continuing to get money from her. But when Bolivar found his secret, Simbol still tried to ask money from
her and persuade her to continue their relationship. This prompted Bolivar to file a Civil Case of the
Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court against Simbol but this did not prosper since Atty. Simbol and Miss
Concepcion had executed a compromise agreement. But the Sol Gen filed for disbarment proceedings on
moral grounds against Atty. Simbol. So, on October 31, 1963, the Clerk of Court sent a mail to respondent
thru Atty. Valentino G. Castro, his counsel of record, a letter with a copy of the foregoing complaint. Atty.
Castro replied that after the execution of the compromise agreement between Bolivar and Atty. Simbol, he
no longer heard from Atty. Simbol. He further stated that he tried to get in touch with the respondent but
was unable to do so and he requested that copy of the complaint be sent directly to said respondent†™s
address. So the Court did as what was requested but the letter returned with the notation on the envelope
that said respondent was no longer in that city. At the hearing set by the Court on February 3, 1964,
Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty. Tomas Yumul for complainant appeared and they submitted the
case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for respondent.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the case against Atty. Simbol can prosper even though he did not respond to the letter of
the Solicitor General.

2. Whether or not Atty. Simbol is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court.

RULING:
1. Under Section 30, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states that Attorneys has to be heard before
removal or suspension. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court
may proceed to determine the matter. In view of this rule, respondent knew that the disbarment
proceedings were pending. His right to practice his profession was at stake. He could ill-afford to just
stand by and wait. It was his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hidebound by his obligation to inform
this Court of his whereabouts. Furthermore, notice of hearing was sent to him at both his Manila and
Dumaguete addresses and he did not bother to get it from the post-office. Even his two attorneys of
record, who received said notice, did not appear before this Court. On the face these facts, respondent gave
the Court ample reason to believe that he purposely stayed away and waived his right to be heard.
Therefore, the case can prosper.

2. Respondent's acts of making a dupe of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for
his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying
another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to
demand money from complainant, and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his immoral acts, are indicative of a character not worthy of a
member of the bar. The fact that complainant has withdrawn her complaint against respondent does
not wipe out the grievous offense he had committed. Respondent "has failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar†. Therefore, he is guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court

Case 14:
People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 692

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension
from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda
received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on
commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250, she issued 3
checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation. Criminal
cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-
Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further
suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense involves moral turpitude.
Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension
was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing
further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of
the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:
• Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied)
• Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large.
Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall
remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.

Case 15:
MARIA ELENA MORENO VS. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA
A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005

Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11,
000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is
closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter,
the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further
made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been
convicted by final judgment of estafa through falsification of a commercial document.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed
account.

Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held
that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s suspension from the practice
of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however,
herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise
involves moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held
that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral
turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on
him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself
unfit to protect the administration of justice.”

Case 16:
A1 Financial Services Inc. vs. Valerio 622 SCRA 616

Attorney; gross misconduct. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-
year suspension from the practice of law. However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the
sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was ordered suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years, because, aside from issuing worthless checks and failing to pay her debts, she has also shown
wanton disregard of the IBP’s and Court Orders in the course of the proceedings. A-1 Financial Services,
Inc. vs. Atty. Laarni N. Valerio

Case 17:
In Re: Abesamis 102 Phil 1182

Case 18:
Aniano vs. Dizon Admin Case

Case 19:
In Re: Del Rosario 52 Phil 399

52 Phil 399 – Legal Ethics – Practice of Law is a Privilege

Felipe Del Rosario took the bar in 1925 for the second time and he failed. He again took it in 1926 and he
failed again. In 1927, he filed a motion before the Supreme Court in which he alleged that there was a
mistake in the computation of his exam results in the 1925 bar exams. He was then admitted to the bar.
HOWEVER, a subsequent investigation by the city fiscal uncovered that Del Rosario, together with one
Juan Villaflor – a former employee of the Supreme Court, falsified some documents to make it appear that
Del Rosario actually passed the 1925 bar exams. The two were subsequently charged with falsification.
Villaflor was convicted as he pleaded guilty but Del Rosario was acquitted for lack of evidence. The fiscal
however recommended Del Rosario to surrender his certificate of attorney.

ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the fiscal is correct.

HELD: Yes. The mere fact that Villaflor was convicted proves that Del Rosario is unworthy of the
certificate of attorney. The crime which Villaflor is proven guilty of has benefited only Del Rosario and it
is impossible that the latter has no knowledge of this illegal machination.

But shouldn’t the Supreme Court just allow Del Rosario to take the bar exams again?

No. The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of
the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as
a duly authorized member of the bar.

Case 20:
Nunez v Ricafort (382 SCRA 381)

Facts:
An administrative complaint was by Soledad Nuñez, a septuagenarian represented by her attorney-in-fact
Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave misconduct.
Sometime in October 1982, Soledad authorized Atty. Ricafort to sell her two parcels of land located in
Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to the lawyer 10% of the price as commission. Atty. Ricafort
succeeded in selling the lots, but despite Soledad’s repeated demands, he did not turn over the proceeds of
the sale. This forced Soledad to file an action for a sum of money before the RTC, Quezon City.

The court rendered its decision ordering the Atty. to pay Soledad the sum of P16,000 as principal
obligation, with at the legal rate from the date of the commencement of the action.

An appeal to the CA was made. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket
fee within the reglementary period despite notice.

Soledad filed a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution. But it appears that only a partial
satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 unsatisfied. In payment for the latter,
Atty. issued four postdated checks but was dishonored because the account against which they were drawn
was closed.

Hence, Soledad was forced to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC,
Quezon City.

In a joint affidavit, Atty. Ricafort admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of
Soledad. Allegedly believing in good faith that said checks had already been encashed by Soledad, he
subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said
four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he
would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.

The court required Atty. to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite the favorable action on his
three motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled Soledad to file a
motion to cite Atty. in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of
time to submit the comment “smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar
and a law dean.”

The IBP findings show that the Atty. had no intention to “honor” the money judgment against him. It
recommended that Atty. be declared “guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant” and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the
complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.

Held:

YES. There is a blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers. Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably
failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession.

His act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by
the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite
demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial
processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.

To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, he even had the temerity
of making a mockery of the court’s generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time
to file his comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well
did not even bother to explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived
the filing of the comment. To the SC, Atty. openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to
willful disobedience to its lawful orders.

Atty. Ricafort then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility stating that:

Lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or
misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their
failure to do so.

The SC indefinitely suspended Atty. Ricafort from the practice of law and directed to pay Soledad P13,800.

Case 21:
2003 Bar Exam Matter No. 1222
Re: Uploading Questions – De Guzman

Case 22:
Bon vs. Ziga Adm. Case

Case 23:
Marina Gonzales vs. Atty. Calixto Ramas

Case 24:
Castaneda vs. Ago 65 SCRA 512