01 - PALAFOX VS ILOCOS NORTE

GR No. L.10659 January 31, 1958

FACT: Protacio Palafox work as a construction worker of a road was hit by a truck driver employed by the provincial government of
Ilocos Norte. The injury caused in the course of the performance of a government function, as a rule,unless there is an existing statute
on that matter, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith.
ISSUE: The government of Ilocos Norte a municipal corporation can be held liable for the injuryof the third person.
RULING: The municipal corporation which is Ilocos Norte Municipality has no duty to pay monetary consideration due to the
performance of the duty honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly and maliciously

02 – Torio vs Fontanilla

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2 resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta
celebration and the other for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn,
organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of
P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While the zarzuela was being held, the
stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a
complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality, the municipal council and the municipal council
members. In its Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign
functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for
the negligence of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not
liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing
the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and
dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages.

Issues:

1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a corporate function of the municipality?

2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee liable for the death of Fontanilla?

Held:

1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function
of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate
a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious
or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the
public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain
but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a
source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the
like which are for public service. No governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers and

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agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as
such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or
corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance
of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power.

2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because
the accident was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the

damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those

of persons for whom one is responsible.

It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages
and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the post and braces used were of bamboo material. The collapse of
the stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of
the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality
acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior
mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal consequence thereof is
that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of
directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by
the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records
do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they
personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability. (Torio vs. Fontanilla, GR No. L-29993,
October 23, 1978)

03 - Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

97 Phil. 143 – Political Law – Control Power – Revised Administrative Code – Supervision
Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The information reached
the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then
summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for
prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue o the
order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct
such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor.
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HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already
stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he may order the
investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par
1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to “receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption
or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.” And if the charges
are serious, “he shall submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the
accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question.” Sec 86 of the
Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration
of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondano’s office. If the issue is not related to his office
but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must first be a final conviction before a
suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not because he’s acting as an agent of the Executive but
because of the power granted him by the Revised Administrative Code.

03 - Jose Mondano vs Fernando Silvosa

G.R. No. L-7708 May 30 1955

FACTS:
The Assistant Executive Secretory indorsed the complaint for rape and concubinage against Mondano, duly elected and qualified
mayor of Mainit, Surigao,to Silvosa, provincial governor of Suriga, for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. Silvosa
issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from
further proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING:
Yes. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his
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jurisdiction as provided for in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local
governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over
which the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the RAC are to
be construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local
governments and that for that reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution. If “general supervision over all
local governments” is to be construed as the same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the RAC, then there would
no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of RAC.

04 - Andaya vs RTC, Cebu City, Br. 20 [319 SCRA 296; GR 126661,

Dec 3, 1999]
(Public Officers, Appointments, PNP)
Facts: Petitioner Andaya, Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7, submitted to the City Mayor of Cebu a list of 5 eligibles
for the mayor to choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone from the list
because the name of his protégé was not included therein.
The City of Cebu filed a complaint against the petitioner to require him to include the mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be
recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor.
Petitioner refuses stating that aside from the fact that said protégé is not qualified; the power to designate the chief of police of Cebu
City is vested with the Regional Director. However, the mayor is authorized to choose the chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles
submitted by the Regional Director.
Under RA 6975, Sec 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized as representative of the National Police Commission in his
territorial jurisdiction and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police from a list of 5 eligibles recommended by
the Police Regional Director. Then the Regional Director, RPC No.7, appoints the officer selected by the mayor as the Chief of Police,
Cebu City.

Issue: WON the mayor has the authority to appoint the Chief of Police.

Held: No. As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has
only the limited power of selecting one from among the list of 5 eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to appoint
the chief of police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director.
Moreover, it is the prerogative of the Regional Police Director to name the 5 eligibles from a pool of eligible officers without interference
from local executives. Hence, the mayor cannot require the petitioner to include the mayor’s protégé in the list of 5 eligibles to be
recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor.

05 - Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012

FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old
and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his
brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence,
he was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he
renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From
the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential property in the same village where he lived. He applied for registration as a voter
in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board approved it
and included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name
from the official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009
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Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo
filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material misrepresentation in the same
since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government
Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because it failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the
elections

ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement

HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. His domicile was changed
from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for
26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to
live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that
he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

06 - Torayno vs COMELEC GR No 137329 09 August 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995 election and his certificate of candidacy
showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he executed a voter registration
record in Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy
for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio
Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to meet the residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and
proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.

Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro.
The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot be given the fullest
effect. Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and even paid his community tax
certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the possibility of a “stranger unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of the community from seeing an elective office to serve that community.”

07 - COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002 [Citizenship; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a
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citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001. On
February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his
statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath
as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001,
COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as
what he represented in his COC.

RULING:
No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two years” at the time
he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an
office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of
petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

10 - Borja vs Comelec
(Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Facts:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2,
1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and
served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he
would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en
banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is
considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

Held:

No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco
was qualified to run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply
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found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted
by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance
than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to
enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the
members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with
preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the
officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a
third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to
govern them.

10 - Borja vs COMELEC
[295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two
succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the
latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified
from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local officials… …shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that “…no local elective official shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.