***OFF***

1NC – T
Our interpretation is that the resolution should define the division of affirmative and negative
ground. It was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both sides with a reasonable
opportunity to prepare to engage one another’s arguments.

This does not require the use of any particular style, type of evidence, or assumption about the role
of the judge; only that the topic should determine the debate’s subject matter.

United States federal government means the three branches.

OECD 87—Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Council [The Control and Management
of Government Expenditure, p. 179]
1. Political and organisational structure of government
of The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at
least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of
government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three
branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared
primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as
follows.

NHI is government guarantee of coverage

Thomas BODENHEIMER AND Kevin GRUMBACH 12. *Professor of Family Medicine, UCSF School
of Medicine. **Chair, Department of Family Medicine, UCSF School of Medicine. Understanding Health Policy:
A Clinical Approach. 7th ed. McGraw Hill.
http://accessmedicine.mhmedical.com/content.aspx?bookid=1790&sectionid=121192308.
For more than 100 years, reformers in the United States argued for the passage of a national health insurance program, a
government guarantee that every person is covered for basic health care. Finally in 2010, the United States took a major,
though incomplete, step forward toward universal health insurance.
The subject of national health insurance has seen six periods of intense activity, alternating with times of political inattention. From 1912 to 1916, 1946 to 1949, 1963 to
1965, 1970 to 1974, 1991 to 1994, and 2009 to 2015 it was the topic of major national debate. In 1916, 1949, 1974, and 1994, national health insurance was defeated and
temporarily consigned to the nation’s back burner. Guaranteed health coverage for two groups—the elderly and some of the poor—was enacted in 1965 through Medicare
and Medicaid. In 2010, with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, also known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) or “Obamacare,” the stage was
National health insurance means the guarantee of health insurance
set for the expansion of coverage to millions of uninsured people.
for all the nation’s residents—what is commonly referred to as “universal coverage.” Much of the focus, as well as the political contentiousness,
of national health insurance proposals concern how to pay for universal coverage . National health insurance proposals may
also address provider payment and cost containment.

Violation---they don’t defend instrumental evaluation of USFG action

Vote neg—

1. Prep and clash—post facto topic change alters balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff
because they speak last and use perms—key to engage a prepared adversary and a target of mutual
contestation.

2. Limits—specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns—open subjects create
incentives for avoidance and monopolization of moral high ground—that denies a role for the neg
and turns accessibility.

3. Refinement -- unlimited topics makes assessing the validity of the 1ac’s truth claims impossible
AND cause concessionary ground which creates incentives for avoidance
 1NC – CP
Text: The United States federal government should establish a national health program.

Only single-payer can overcome the ‘death gap’ and allow marginalized communities total access to
coverage and care.
David ANSELL 17. Senior VP for Community Health at Rush University Medical Center, Social
Epidemiologist, MD/MPH. The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills. University of Chicago Press. 137-42.
There are three major structural flaws in the Affordable Care Act, all of which could be solved by a single-payer
system . The first flaw is [END PAGE 137] that the insurance expansion is neither universal nor equitable. For example,
because mandatory Medicaid expansion was blocked by the Supreme Court, nineteen states have left millions of poor
people uninsured .26 These states account for over half of poor uninsured blacks, single mothers, and the country's
uninsured working poor. For poor people in these states, it is as if Obamacare was never enacted. Note that for the most
part these states that have refused to expand Medicaid are the former Confederate slaveholding states,
accentuating the legacy of structural racism . Access to specialty care for those who receive Medicaid coverage is limited compared to
access for patients with private insurance.27 More than one-third of US doctors refuse to take Medicaid-another
structural barrier.28
The second flaw is that premiums, copays, and deductibles for private health insurance and products on the marketplaces
are prohibitively high for many people, especially the working poor. In 2015 average annual premiums for employer-
sponsored health insurance were $6,251 for single coverage and $17,545 for family coverage. Between 2014 and 2015, premiums
increased by 4 percent, while during the same period workers' wages increased 1.9 percent. Premiums for family
coverage increased 27 percent during the last five years, while cost sharing has skyrocketed.29 The average individual deductible across the marketplace
plans in 2016 was $5,765 for bronze plans. After the deductible is paid, an individual with such a plan will face 40 percent
copays for services.30 Insurance companies have reacted to their rising costs by creating narrow networks of
providers and hospitals.31 This limits choice of patients by restricting the doctors and hospitals whose services
they can use.
At the heart of the Affordable Care Act are subsidies for the working poor to pay for health insurance premiums.32 The goal was to keep these
premiums within reach of most Americans. It was a sweet deal for the insurance companies. The insurance companies are guaranteed to get their
premiums; the federal government poured billions of dollars into their coffers. In exchange, an individual gets an insurance card. But with that card
came unprecedented out-of-pocket expenses that kicked in before the insurance company paid one cent.33 The belief is [END PAGE 138] that
without "skin in the game;' the newly insured will overuse the system. As a result, coinsurance and deductibles that many Americans
now are forced to pay have skyrocketed across the insurance markets. Yet every study ever done on the impact
of copays and deductibles (even for middle-class people) is that they cause individuals to delay medical care .34 Under
a single-payer health care system there would be no copays or deductibles .
Obamacare Bullshit
The third flaw of the Affordable Care Act was that long-term
doctor patient relationships have been disrupted by
insurance restrictions. President Obama said, "No matter how we reform health care, I intend to keep this promise: If you like your doctor,
you'll be able to keep your doctor; if you like your health care plan, you'll be able to keep your health care plan:'35 This turned out to be untrue.
Windora Bradley, a year before her stroke, struggled to pay her health insurance premiums. Faced
with the dilemma to buy food or go
without medications, she chose to go without medications. At one of her office visits, she let loose.
'Tm tired about this Obamacare bullshit;' she shook her head, frowning as her jowls quivered. "I worked for thirty-five years. Those people on welfare
who never worked are getting free health care. I am paying $700 each month and there is not enough left for medicines and food. That's not right.
That's why I call it Obamacare bullshit:'
Windora lived on a pension of about $1,000 per month. Most went for the premiums on her health insurance,
which she still received through the Chicago Board of Education. She
scrimped and saved to pay for her medications for her
diabetes, hypertension, asthma, and vascular disease. Her situation is common among the working poor.
Windora was ultimately able to get insurance on the marketplace that reduced her premium costs but not her out-of-pocket expenses. At first she
purchased a Blue Cross insurance plan that she was told my hospital accepted, but this proved incorrect. She then had to purchase a more expensive
plan to stay with me. Meanwhile her two sisters, who [END PAGE 139] had also been my patients for over thirty years, had to switch doctors because
my group did not accept the insurance they enrolled in. A number of my long-term patients found themselves in this dilemma. In 2015, after her
stroke, Blue Cross dropped my hospital and many others from the plan Windora had just purchased. There was
only one plan, from United Health Care, in all of Cook County that included my hospital and me in the network. The week after Windora signed up
for it, United Health Care let it be known that it was considering withdrawing from all the exchanges in 2017.36
In three years of the Affordable Care Act, Windora had purchased three different insurance policies just to retain me as
her physician. In the fall of 2016, United Health Care announced it would drop my hospital from its network, and Windora, now
wheelchair bound and speechless, is forced to find another doctor (to say nothing of her many specialitsts) after thirty-six
years. For someone like Windora with complex medical and social obstacles, keeping a team of providers who
are familiar with her medical travails is essential to getting good care. For me, her longtime doctor, it is a gut-
wrenching experience.
The fact is that Obamacare, despite its modest benefits, does not remedy American health care inequity. It will
never achieve universal coverage. Eleven million noncitizen residents will never be eligible for its benefits.
Thirty million people will remain uninsured. While insurance coverage has increased for all races, there is still a large racial
and ethnic gap in insurance coverage, which will perpetuate health disparities. For those with health
insurance, spiraling copays and deductibles have made access to care more difficult. Finally, by allowing a
dizzying array of for-profit insurance carriers with high administrative overhead expenses, the Affordable Care
Act as currently configured will not control costs.
In 2016, the third year of Obamacare, insurance companies asked for double-digit increases in premium prices, as they claimed costs of delivery had
outstripped the revenues. Meanwhile, health insurance stocks are trading at all-time highs, while patients like Windora Bradley face rocketing expenses
and uncertainty about the future. 37 [END PAGE 140]
A Call for Single Payer
I speak for many of my health care colleagues across the nation when I say that the Affordable Care Act is a disappointment. In contrast, an
improved and expanded Medicare for All would achieve truly universal care, affordability, equity, and
effective cost control . It would put the interests of our patients-and our nation's health-first. By replacing
multiple private insurers with a single nonprofit agency like Medicare that pays all medical bills, the United States would
save approximately $400 billion annually. Administrative bloat in our current private-insurance-based system
would be slashed . That waste would be redirected to clinical care . Copays, coinsurance, and deductibles
would be eliminated. A single streamlined system would be able to rein in costs for medications and other
supplies through the system's strong bargaining clout-clout directed to benefit health, not profits . Finally, it
would create an equitable system of care that would provide equal access to rich, poor, black, and white. As a
result, life expectancy gaps between rich and poor would narrow.

Hospitals that serve poor communities would have access to capital investment based on need. It has been
done in other countries, and it can be done in the United States.
Single-payer health care stands in stark contrast to the ACAs incremental reform. Yet it is important to remember that
enactment of a single-payer system requires the defeat of deeply vested, deep-pocketed ideological opponents, health insurance conglomerates, and a
thick alliance of health care constituencies along with other interest groups. The Affordable Care Act, passed by a Democratic majority and signed by a
Democratic president, was a weak compromise that left the foundations of our flawed $2.9 trillion health care system intact. It will be some time
before political conditions are again right to tackle an improved Medicare for All. So why, given these hurdles, do I (and many other health
care providers) persist? I
persist because I have watched too many patients suffer and die because they lacked
health insurance or had the wrong insurance card. I persist because I have witnessed the racial and ethnic
death gaps enabled by our current health insurance arrangements. I persist because simple fairness dictates that
health care is a fundamental human right. I persist because of patients like Win-[END PAGE 141]dora and Sarai, who
deserve better. For those who counter that single payer is too expensive or politically unfeasible, we persist
because the American ideal of "life and liberty" cannot be achieved without an equitable and universal health care
system.
Winston Churchill reportedly said, "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing ... after they have tried everything else:'38 We have
tried everything else. I look forward to being part of a single-payer health care system that values the health of
individuals, families, and communities as a common good-where health care is valued as a human right.
Someday.

The aff creates non-neoliberal care that eliminates profit incentives from health.
Howard WAITZKIN 16, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of New Mexico
and practices internal medicine part-time in rural New Mexico and Illinois; Ida Hellander, longtime advocate
for single-payer health reform in the United States [“Obamacare: The Neoliberal Model Comes Home to
Roost in the United States - If We Let It,” Monthly Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, May 2016, p. 1-18]
The Single-Payer Proposal
As a non-neoliberal model, a single-payer national health program (NHP) in the United States essentially would
create “Medicare for all.” Under such a plan, the government collects payments from workers, employers,
and Medicare recipients, and then distributes funds to health care providers for the services that Medicare
patients receive. Because it is such a simple system, the administrative costs under traditional Medicare average just 1 to 2
percent.38 The vast majority of Medicare expenditures pay for clinical services. Such a structure has achieved
substantial savings by reducing administrative waste in Canada, Taiwan, and other countries.
The following features of a single-payer option come from the proposals of Physicians for a National Health Program
(PNHP), a group of more than 20,000 medical professionals, spanning all specialties, states, age groups, and practice settings.39
According to the PNHP proposals, coverage would be universal for all needed services, including medications and
long-term care. There would be no out-of-pocket premiums, copayments, or deductibles. Costs would be
controlled by "monopsony" financing from a single, public source. The NHP would not permit competing private
insurance and would eliminate multiple tiers of care for different income groups. Practitioners and clinics
would be paid predetermined fees for services, without any need for costly billing procedures. Hospitals would
negotiate an annual global budget for all operating costs. For-profit, investor-owned facilities would be prohibited from
participation. Most non-profit hospitals would remain privately owned. To reduce overlapping and redundant facilities, capital purchases and
expansion would be budgeted separately, based on regional health planning goals.
Funding sources would include current federal spending for Medicare and Medicaid, a payroll tax on private businesses less than what businesses
currently pay for coverage, and an income tax on households, with a surtax on high incomes and capital gains. A small tax on stock transactions would
be implemented, while state and local taxes for health care would be eliminated.40 Under
this financing plan, 95 percent of families
would pay less for health care than they previously paid in insurance premiums, deductibles, copayments, other
out-of-pocket spending, and reduced wages.
From the corporate viewpoint, the insurance and financial sectors would lose a major source of capital
accumulation . At the same time, other large and small businesses would experience a stabilization or reduction in
health care costs. Companies that do not currently provide health insurance would pay more, but far less than
the cost of buying private coverage.
K
 1NC – K
Biopolitical approaches to the world reify capitalism and guarantee environmental destruction,
massive inequality, and colonial wars of conquest.
Frederick Luis ALDAMA 8. Arts & Humanities Distinguished Professor, Ohio State University. Why the
Humanities Matter: A Commonsense Approach. University of Texas Press. 66-9.
Such utopian formulations are not benign. Wittingly or not, in their fragmenting of society (youth vs. whatever) they
undermine massively the coalition-building strategies of working-class organizations . Youth subcultures typically rub
up against an underworld that is flourishing and that, with payoffs of government officials, more and more directly [END PAGE 66] helps
finance the very capitalist economy that neglects youth today promoting a complacency in the face of the massive
destruction of productive forces. Youth subcultures have not checked the lowering of salaries, massive layoffs, and huge out-sourcing of
production to undeveloped countries as well as prisons nationally. Youth groups (subway muggers, punks, and so on) have not stopped the massive
shutting down of services-schools, hospitals, day care centers, roads, public transportation, energy, water-nor the cuts in Social Security benefits.
Wittingly or not, such utopian thinking contributes to the destruction of collective bargaining agreements,
statutes, and labor codes. Wittingly or not, it contributes to an economic system that has created the highest
levels of speculation ever attained in the finance and money markets, and the highest levels in history attained
by the public and the private debts.
So the problem is not at all one of ideas or ideals. It is much deeper than that. But ideas have their place too-albeit a limited one-both in
the posing of the problems and in their solution. It's quite amazing how many present-day gurus of Left theory were formed in their youth
by the Catholic, the Protestant, or some other church: Mario Tronti, Antonio Negri, Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan,
Maurice Blanchot, Georges Bataille, Michel de Certeau, Carl Schmitt, Paul Ricoeur, Felix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze, and, of course,
the gurus of all gurus, Friedrich Nietzsche, Hans Georg Gadamer, and Martin Heidegger. Hardt and Negri and the others have a
profound aversion to the working class; they are all deeply contemptuous of the many attempts the workers
have made the world over since the nineteenth century to build their own organizations as weapons to fight
capitalism and overthrow it, and they all blame the proletariat for the defeats it has suffered up to now.
Nietzsche's aristocratism ; Blanchot's, Gadamer's, Schmitt's, and Heidegger's Naziphilia ; Bataille's dark
mysticism and fascistic leanings; Guattari's, Deleuze's, and Lacan's loathing of science while saturating their
writings with puns, portmanteau words, and neologisms based on scientific terms; Foucault's, Negri's, and Tronti's
ultra-Leftism that in fact aspires to a perpetuation of capitalism; and Althusser's striving to defend both the
Stalinist bureaucracy and the capitalist regime worldwide-all this and more have been and still are among the most effective
ideological weapons that the ruling classes have used to keep one generation after another of young students away from the
knowledge that may lead them to join the emancipation struggle of working-class populations. And yet, many
intellectuals today (in and out of the academy) believe exactly the opposite: that to further the cause of freedom from
[END PAGE 67] exploitation, oppression, and discrimination is to pour forth recklessly these ideas. It's the world
upside down.
Of course, the survival of capitalism has been lethal for humankind. Those like Hardt and Negri have blamed
(directly and indirectly) the working class for this instead of analyzing the problem rationally. What problems has the working
class encountered? Why hasn't the working class been able to build an independent party in the United States and
worldwide? What has actually happened with actual people? We have records of what has happened since the nineteenth century; we
know about Joe Hill, Emma Goldman, the Wobblies, to speak of the trade unionist and anarchist movement in the United States. Hardt and
Negri and other contemporary self-identifying Marxist theorists want the revolution without the revolution .
They want to be able to assert that the revolution has already taken place, even though they shout that it is
necessary and spend a lifetime looking for a substitute for the class that failed-the proletariat.
Capitalism has survived; it exists still and there hasn't been a revolution to overthrow it. The longer capitalism survives, the more
destructive and lethal it has become. The revolution of 1848 in Europe, the Paris commune in 1871, and Russia in 1917 all failed; the
latter degenerated into Stalinism. Capitalism continues to survive in the twentieth century and has led to two world
wars with millions of soldiers and civilians killed, plus more than a hundred regional wars that have happened
on all of the planet's continents, also taking millions of lives. Capitalism has led to the development of the
huge famines and epidemics like AIDS as well as the continued exploitation of the majority of the world's
population; huge communities still must survive without even basics like water. This is capitalism in its most
barbarous form, and not a biosupranational organism of no place-an empire where the revolution has already
happened.
The revolution has certainly not been televised-because there hasn't been a revolution. Nor will there be one
if we continue to entertain fantasies of biopolitical power and multitudinal resistance based on magical,
mystical, deceiving, disjointed, vague, openly mistaken and misguided obscurantist thinking and writing.
Much mopping up of the post-Marxist theory of the Hardt and Negri brand must take place. We must begin
by showing how, in the name of Marxism, such alchemists stew up such otherworldly concoctions: that the fight
against capitalism and all its monstrous consequences is no [END PAGE 68] longer necessary, because the de facto chaos of capitalism has provided
us with a form of communism. We must understand that such brands of Marxist theory include a long list of others who sought to reject
programmatic political organization in favor of a rhetoric of anarchy and spontaneity: the council of communism of Europe in the 1930s/1940s, and
so-called libertarian communists such as Anton Pannekoek, Karl Korsch, and Otto Ruhle. If we historicize, then we begin to see that
the working class has been struggling for more than two hundred years to achieve civil rights (representation,
emancipation, and so on) in spite of the massive obstacles put in its way, including today's so-called Marxist
theorists, who have one way or another denied them a social/political efficacy.

Biopolitics abstracts away the historical and material basis of oppression which makes challenging
capitalism impossible --- starting with the class relation is key.
Cotter 16—Professor of English at William Jewell [Jennifer, “The New Class Common-Sense: Biopolitics,
Posthumanism, and Love,” in Cotter, K. DeFazio, R. Faivre, A. Sahay, J. Torrant, S. Tumino, &, R. Wilkie
(eds.) All Too (Post)Human: The Humanities after Humanism, Lexington Books, p. 15-18]
As class contradictions have sharpened with the intensification of the crisis of profitability in global
capitalism, cultural theory in the North Atlantic retreats further and further into spiritual explanations and
resolutions of material contradictions. Rather than confronting the relationship of the poverty of workers
around the world, the concentration of wealth into fewer hands, increases in unemployment and economic
insecurity, the commodification of all aspects of life subordinating them to production for profit, and the
deepening alienation of workers to class relations founded on exploitation in production, contemporary
cultural theory has abandoned examining the social, the historical, and the material basis of these questions in
production relations. Instead, it is turning to immaterial, affective, and spiritual explanations and resolutions
of material contradictions and ideologically translating capitalism and exploitation into ontological conditions
of life as such.
The Biopolitical Turn, or, Disappearing Class from Life under Capitalism
It is in the aforementioned context that cultural theory in the global North has embraced what Christian Marazzi calls "the
biopolitical turn of the economy" -an increasing turn to "biopolitics" as a means to explain and address the
social and economic contradictions in capitalism now. 1 At the core of biopolitical theory is a substitution of
"life" -particularly the spiritualist concept of a creative "life-force" or what Hemi Bergson calls elan vital-for the historical and material
relations of the dialectical praxis of labor and class as explanations of the material basis of contradictions in
capitalism now and their transformation. In other words, central to biopolitics is a cultural spiritualism which
ideologically translates historical and material relations into a transhistorical and autonomous power of life- a
mystical vitalism - and posits this spiritual vitalism as the basis of bringing about new social relations. This
new "spiritualism" of life is offered in a variety of articulations in contemporary cultural theory, from writings that overtly address
theories of biopower and biopolitics as in the writings of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Commonwealth), Giorgio Agamben (Homo
Sacer), Maurizio Lazzarato , and Antonella Corsani , among others, to the transspecies posthumanist writings of Derrida (The Animal That
Therefore I Am), Agamben (The Open), and Donna Haraway (When Species Meet). These biopolitical theories claim to address a range of
material problems that are the effect of production for profit in capitalism: from the encroachment of commodity relations into all aspects of life,
including the private ownership of strands of DNA and whole species of plants and animals; to the degradation of the environment in the interests of
profit; to economic crisis; to the extension of the working day; to the subordination of love and sexuality to production for profit; to the estrangement
of workers from social wealth ... Yet, at the same time, biopolitical
theories abstract these problems from their origins in
class relations and exploitation . In place of addressing the material conditions and relations that have given
rise to these problems, biopolitical theories posit an "other-world" and an "other-worldly life" -a concept of spiritual
life that is prior to, constitutive of, transcendent of and/or outside of the historical and social relations of
capitalism - as the basis of a new "common" beyond the material contradictions of capitalism.
The spiritualization of life in biopolitical theories, to be clear, is represented as a new form of materialism. The
substitution of "life" for
"class" in biopolitical theories draws from Foucault's theory of "bio-power" in which he argues that "modem man is an
animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question." 2 "Bio-power," Foucault contends, is a regime of power that, rather than
ruling by threat of death, produces life through the disciplining of bodies, the regulation of populations, and through the "technologies of the self" in
which bodies come to bind themselves to identities produced through sovereign power. In fact, Foucault posits "bio-power" -the
instrumental disciplining of bodies such that they come to experience their own subjection as the norm of life
and source of pleasure-rather than the exploitation of labor, as the material basis of capitalism. Capitalism, Foucault
contends, is not possible without "bio-power": "bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter
would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production." 3 According to Foucault, "There is no
binary and all encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations." 4 In this view there is "no regulative mechanism" of
power relations. Instead, in Foucault's cultural imaginary of power, "power is everywhere ... because it comes from everywhere." 5
In this narrative, an explanatory critique of power as the effect of class relations of capitalism - relations between exploiter
and exploited -is
regarded as part of a binary metaphysics of power which discursively imposes a regime of truth
(power/knowledge) onto what is actually, so the story goes, an ineffably and mysteriously plural, diffuse, and
amorphous multiplicity of forces. On the one hand, life is assumed to spontaneously produce a discursive
proliferation of meanings (knowledges) that then discipline and contain it. On the other hand, life is regarded
as an ineffable and plural opacity that resists all conceptual explanation. The subjection of bodies is reduced to
a contingent, "spontaneous" and aleatory effect of "life" as such or the sheer fact of living. This makes it
appear as if "power over life" comes not from structural relations of exploitation, but from a non-structural,
amorphous, cultural plurality- a cultural democracy of power from below to which all have access by virtue of
living that is "everywhere."
Foucault's theory of bio-power is not a form of materialism but a form of cultural spiritualism. When
Foucault argues that "bio-politics" is at the root of capitalism, he dehistoricizes "the machinery of
production" into which he claims bodies are "inserted." The existence of "the machinery of production" -or a
"controlled insertion" of bodies-is itself the effect of the dialectical praxis of labor . This is because power is not
an autonomous, trans-historical life force nor is it an ineffable diffuse plurality beyond historical and conceptual explanation, but an effect
of definite historical and material conditions and relations. Power, in other words, rests upon material
conditions of production . Whether or not the society has the power to end starvation or to condemn the
majority of the laboring population to a lifetime of starvation, has to do with the level of development of its
material conditions of production-its forces of production-and the social relations of production (the labor
and property relations) that determine the social ends and interests toward which labor is put. This is another way of
saying that power is the historical and material effect of labor in the form of property . In a society in which
property is privately owned, power is the capacity of the ruling class to "command over the surplus-labor" of
workers in production. 6 At the root of power relations is an antagonistic class relation: the antagonism
between owners of the means of production and workers who only own their labor to sell in order to survive
and are exploited. The binary of class is historical and material, not, at root, discursive: class binaries are not
the effect of nature, God, nor are they the effect of "Western metaphysics," "discursive construction,"
"binary thinking," or conceptualization, but the effect of private ownership of the means of production.
Foucault's theory of power does the ideological work of capital by concealing and inverting the structural
relations of class in capitalism. In place of the material transformation of structural relations of capitalism,
Foucault advocates "resistance" within-a change in the discursive and cultural regimes and a re-valuing of
"life" -as the basis of a "different economy of bodies and pleasures." 7 This amounts to the updating of the
culture of capitalism as the limit of change while the needs of the masses for material abolition of
exploitation is dismissed as a reactionary nostalgia for the impossible-what Foucault dismisses as "The 'right'
to life ... beyond all the oppressions." 8 Changing the cultural values of life and regarding this as constituting
material change-i.e., as an end in itself becomes a means to ideologically update power relations without
fundamentally transforming them .
Our alternative is to build solidarity around anti-capitalist demands to build a better future. A
utopian vision is necessary to propel movements to challenge Trump and dismantle oppressive
political formations.
Klein 17—Award-winning journalist for NYT, the Intercept, Le Monde, The Guardian, and The Nation;
documentary filmmaker; and, author of several bestselling books [Naomi, No Is Not Enough: Resisting Trump’s
Shock Politics and Winning the World We Need, Haymarket Books, pp. 251-6]
Utopia-Back by Popular Demand
The Leap is part of a shift in the political zeitgeist, as many are realizing that the
future depends on our ability to come together
[END PAGE 252] across
painful divides, and to take leadership from those who traditionally have been most
excluded. We have reached the limits of siloed politics, where everyone fights in their own corner without
mapping the connections between various struggles, and without a clear idea of the concepts and values that
must form the moral foundation of the future we need.
That recognition doesn't mean that resisting the very specific attacks-on families, on people's bodies, on communities, on individual rights-is suddenly
optional. There is no choice but to resist, just as there is no choice but to run insurgent progressive candidates at every level of
government, from federal down to the local school board. In the months and years to come, the various resistance tactics described in this book are
going to be needed more than ever: the street protests, the strikes, the court challenges, the sanctuaries, the solidarity across divisions of race, gender,
and sexual identity-all are going to be essential. And we
will need to continue pushing institutions to divest from the industries
that profit off various forms of dispossession, from
fossil fuels to prisons to war and occupation. And yet even if every one
of these resistance fights is victorious-and we know that's not going to be possible-we would still be standing
in the same place we were before the Far Right started surging, with no better chance of addressing the root
causes of the systemic crises of which Trump is but one virulent symptom.
A great many of today's movement leaders and key organizers understand this well, and are planning and
acting accordingly. Alicia Garza, one of the founders of Black Lives Matter, said on the eve of Trump's inauguration that after five years of
swelling social movements,
whether it be Occupy Wall Street, whether it be the DREAMers movement or B lack L ives M atter ... there's a
particular hope that I have that all of those movements will join together to become [END PAGE 253]
the powerful force that we can be, that will actually govern this country . So that's what I'm focused on, and I
hope that everybody else is thinking about that too.
Many people are, and as they do, we're seeing a rekindling of the kind of utopian dreaming that has been sorely missing
from social movements in recent decades. More and more frequently, immediate, pressing demands-a $15-an-hour
living wage, an end to police killings and deportations, a tax on carbon-are being paired with calls for a future
that is not just better than a violent, untenable present, but ... wonderful.
In the U nited S tates, the boldest and most inspiring example of this new utopianism is the Vision for Black
Lives, a sweeping policy platform released in the summer of 2016 by the Movement for Black Lives. Born of a coalition of
over fifty Black-led organizations, the platform states, "We reject false solutions and believe we can achieve a complete transformation of
the current systems, which place profit over people and make it impossible for many of us to breathe." It goes on to place police
shootings and mass incarceration in the context of an economic system that has waged war on Black and
brown communities, putting them first in line for lost jobs, hacked-back social services, and environmental
pollution. The result has been huge numbers of people exiled from the formal economy, preyed upon by
increasingly militarized police, and warehoused in overcrowded prisons. And the platform makes a series of
concrete proposals, including defunding prisons, removing police from schools, and demilitarizing police. It
also lays out a program for reparations for slavery and systemic discrimination, one that includes free college
education and forgiveness of student loans. There is much more-nearly forty policy demands in all, spanning changes
to the tax code to breaking up the banks. The Atlantic magazine remarked that the platform -which was dropped smack in the middle
of the [END PAGE 254] US presidential campaign- "rivals even political-party platforms in thoroughness."
In the months after Trump's inauguration, the Movement for Black Lives played a central role in deepening connections with other movements,
convening dozens of groups under the banner "The Majority." The new formation kicked off with a thrilling month-long slate of actions
between April 4 (the anniversary of Dr. Martin Luther King's assassination) and May Day. Nationwide
"Fight Racism, Raise Pay"
protests linked racial justice to the fast-growing workers' campaign for a $15 minimum wage and the
mounting attacks on immigrants. "In the context of Trump's presidency," the new coalition argues, "it is imperative
that we put forth a true, collective vision of economic justice and worker justice, for all people."
And in June 2017, thousands of activists from diverse constituencies are descending on Chicago for the second annual
People's Summit, organized by National Nurses United, to continue hashing out a broad-based "People's Agenda." Several similar state-
level convergences are also under way, in Michigan as well as North Carolina, where "Moral Mondays" have been bringing movements
together for several years. As one of its founders, Reverend William Barber, has said, "You have to build a movement, not a moment ... I believe all
these movements--Moral Mondays, Fight for $15, B lack L ives M atter are signs of hope that people are going to
stand up and not stand down."
As it has in Canada, the climate crisis is pushing us to put plans for political transformation on a tight and
unyielding deadline. A powerful and broad coalition called New York Renews is pushing hard for the state to
transition entirely to renewable energy by 2050. If more US states adopt these kinds of ambitious targets, and other
countries do the same (Sweden, for instance, has a target of carbon neutrality by 2045), then [END PAGE 255] Trump and Tillerson's most
nefarious efforts may be insufficient to tip the planet into climate chaos.
It's becoming possible to see a genuine path forward-new political formations that, from their inception, will marry
the fight for economic fairness with a deep analysis of how racism and misogyny are used as potent tools to
enforce a system that further enriches the already obscenely wealthy on the backs of both people and the
planet. Formations that could become home to the millions of people who are engaging in activism and
organizing for the first time, knitting together a multiracial and intergenerational coalition bound by a
common transformational project .
The plans that are taking shape for defeating Trumpism wherever we live go well beyond finding a progressive savior to run for office and then
offering that person our blind support. Instead, communities and movements are uniting to lay out the core policies that
politicians who want their support must endorse.
The people's platforms are starting to lead-and the politicians will have to follow.

Making anti-capitalist demands is key to open space for more radical projects. Their strategy cedes
dominant institutions to reactionary forces, guaranteeing more violence.
Harvey 15—Distinguished Professor of anthropology and geography at the Graduate Center of the City
University of New York [David, “Consolidating Power,” Roar 0(Fall): 16,
https://roarmag.org/magazine/david-harvey-consolidating-power/]
So, looking at examples from southern Europe—solidarity networks in Greece, self-organization in Spain or Turkey—these seem to be very crucial for
building social movements around everyday life and basic needs these days. Do you see this as a promising approach?
I think it is very promising, but there is a clear self-limitation in it, which is a problem for me. The self-limitation is the
reluctance to take power at some point. Bookchin, in his last book, says that the problem with the anarchists is their denial of
the significance of power and their inability to take it. Bookchin doesn’t go this far, but I think it is the refusal to see the
state as a possible partner to radical transformation .
There is a tendency to regard the state as being the enemy, the 100 percent enemy. And there are plenty of examples of
repressive states out of public control where this is the case. No question: the capitalist state has to be fought, but without
dominating state power and without taking it on you quickly get into the story of what happened for example
in 1936 and 1937 in Barcelona and then all over Spain. By refusing to take the state at a moment where they
had the power to do it, the revolutionaries in Spain allowed the state to fall back into the hands of the
bourgeoisie and the Stalinist wing of the Communist movement—and the state got reorganized and smashed the
resistance .
That might be true for the Spanish state in the 1930s, but if we look at the contemporary neoliberal state and the retreat of the welfare state, what is
left of the state to be conquered, to be seized?
To begin with, the
left is not very good at answering the question of how we build massive infrastructures. How
will the left build the Brooklyn bridge, for example? Any society relies on big infrastructures, infrastructures
for a whole city—like the water supply, electricity and so on. I think that there is a big reluctance among the left
to recognize that therefore we need some different forms of organization .
There are wings of the state apparatus, even of the neoliberal state apparatus, which are therefore terribly
important—the center of disease control, for example. How do we respond to global epidemics such as Ebola and the
like? You can’t do it in the anarchist way of DIY-organization . There are many instances where you need
some state-like forms of infrastructure. We can’t confront the problem of global warming through decentralized
forms of confrontations and activities alone.
One example that is often mentioned, despite its many problems, is the Montreal Protocol to phase out the use of
chlorofluorocarbon in refrigerators to limit the depletion of the ozone layer. It was successfully enforced in the
1990s but it needed some kind of organization that is very different to the one coming out of assembly-based
politics .

From an anarchist perspective, I would say that it is possible to replace even supra-national institutions like the WHO with confederal organizations
which are built from the bottom up and which eventually arrive at worldwide decision-making.
Maybe to a certain degree, but we have to be aware that there will always be some kind of hierarchies and we will always face
problems like accountability or the right of recourse. There will be complicated relationships between, for
example, people dealing with the problem of global warming from the standpoint of the world as a whole and from
the standpoint of a group that is on the ground, let’s say in Hanover or somewhere, and that wonders: ‘why should we
listen to what they are saying?’
So you believe this would require some form of authority?
No, there will be authority structures anyway—there will always be. I have never been in an anarchist meeting
where there was no secret authority structure. There is always this fantasy of everything being horizontal, but
I sit there and watch and think: ‘oh god, there is a whole hierarchical structure in here—but it’s covert.’
Coming back to the recent protests around the Mediterranean: many movements have focused on local struggles. What is the next step to take towards
social transformation?
At some point we have to create organizations which are able to assemble and enforce social change on a broader
scale. For example, will Podemos in Spain be able to do that? In a chaotic situation like the economic crisis of the
last years, it is important for the left to act. If the left doesn’t make it, then the right-wing is the next option . I
think—and I hate to say this—but I think the left has to be more pragmatic in relation to the dynamics going on right
now.
More pragmatic in what sense?
Well, why did I support SYRIZA even though it is not a revolutionary party? Because it opened a space in which something different could happen
and therefore it was a progressive move for me.
It is a bit like Marx saying: the first step to freedom is the limitation of the length of the working day. Very
narrow demands open up
space for much more revolutionary outcomes, and even when there isn’t any possibility for any revolutionary
outcomes, we have to look for compromise solutions which nevertheless roll back the neoliberal austerity
nonsense and open the space where new forms of organizing can take place.
For example, it would be interesting if Podemos looked towards organizing forms of democratic confederalism—because in some ways Podemos
originated with lots of assembly-type meetings taking place all over Spain, so they are very experienced with the assembly structure.
The question is how they connect the assembly-form to some permanent forms of organization concerning their upcoming position as a strong party
in Parliament. This also goes back to the question of consolidating power: you have to find ways to do so, because
without it the bourgeoisie and corporate capitalism are going to find ways to reassert it and take the power
back .
What do you think about the dilemma of solidarity networks filling the void after the retreat of the welfare state and indirectly becoming a partner of
neoliberalism in this
way?

There are two ways of organizing. One is a vast growth of the NGO sector, but a lot of that is externally funded, not grassroots, and doesn’t tackle the
question of the big donors who set the agenda—which won’t be a radical agenda. Here we touch upon the privatization of the welfare state.
This seems to me to be very different politically from grassroots organizations where people are on their own, saying: ‘OK, the state doesn’t take care
of anything, so we are going to have to take care of it by ourselves.’ That seems to me to be leading to forms of grassroots organization with a very
different political status.
But how to avoid filling that gap by helping, for example, unemployed people not to get squeezed out by neoliberal state?
Well there has to be an anti-capitalist agenda, so that when the group works with people everybody knows that
it is not only about helping them to cope but that there is an organized intent to politically change the system
in its entirety. This means having a very clear political project, which is problematic with decentralized, non-
homogenous types of movements where somebody works one way, others work differently and there is no
collective or common project .
This connects to the very first question you raised: there
is no coordination of what the political objectives are. And the
danger is that you just help people cope and there will be no politics coming out of it . For example, Occupy Sandy
helped people get back to their houses and they did terrific work, but in the end they did what the Red Cross and federal emergency services should
have done.
The end of history seems to have passed already. Looking at the actual conditions and concrete examples of anti-capitalist struggle, do
you think “winning” is still an option?
Definitely , and moreover, you have occupied factories in Greece, solidarity economies across production chains being forged, radical democratic
institutions in Spain and many beautiful things happening in many other places. There is a healthy growth of recognition that we
need to be much broader concerning politics among all these initiatives.
The Marxist left tends to be a little bit dismissive of some of this stuff and I think they are wrong. But at the same time I
don’t think that any of this is big enough on its own to actually deal with the fundamental structures of power that need to be challenged. Here we
talk about nothing less than a state. So the left will have to rethink its theoretical and tactical apparatus.
 1NR – AT: Symbolic Exchange
This is not offense against T --- it’s just a reason why people need a different relationship to
exchange which doesn’t apply to debate as a competitive activity.

The premise is wrong --- it’s based on Mauss’s anthropological work which is just an ethnocentric
reading of history.
Testart 98—French social anthropologist, emeritus research director at the National Scientific Research
Center in Paris, and a member of the Laboratory for Social Anthropology at the Collège de France
specializing in primitive societies [Alain, “Uncertainties of the ‛obligation to reciprocate’: A critique of
Mauss,” in W. James & N. Allen eds., Marcel Mauss: A centenary tribute, Berghahn Books,
http://www.alaintestart.com/UK/documents/engMauss.pdf]

The first paradox of Mauss's well-known essay The gift (1) is that, despite its title, the author never tells us what a
gift is. He never gives us a definition. Nor does he explain wherein lies the specificity of the gift.
True, everyone is deemed to know. To give is to hand over something to somebody free of charge. To give is not to seek payment, it is even more or
less the opposite. I am only drawing attention to the obvious here, but it is precisely this sort of obviousness that I
should like us to reflect on. We find in the dictionary that to give is to hand over something without any return (2). Once again, it is the
opposite of an exchange, in which each party yields some possession only against a corresponding return (3). There is a natural antinomy between the
fact of giving and that of exchanging. For if to exchange is always to let someone have something against a corresponding return, to give can never
consist in yielding one thing against another: it would no longer be a gift. Here we have some of the factors which enable us to define a gift, that is, to
explain what its actual specificity is in relation to the many ways in which we can transfer something in our possession to someone else (4).
But let us return to Mauss. Not only does he fail to tell us what is specific about a gift, but he gives us to understand
that in the archaic forms of social life to which he devotes much of the Essay, it is inappropriate to
distinguish between a gift and an exchange. Often indeed, he seems to hesitate, employing one or other term to
indicate the same reality. Our categories, he says, do not apply. Why do they not apply? Because the primitive
world confuses what we try to differentiate. This argument inevitably brings to mind the thesis linked with the name of Lévy-Bruhl.
Personally, I believe that when ethnologists invoke confusion of ideas in the heads of primitive people, they are only
betraying the confusion to be found in their own . But it would take me too long to justify this point.
Finally, Mauss goes further: he tells us that everywhere, in every transfer, in an exchange as with a gift, there is an 'obligation
to reciprocate'.
I am astonished by such a statement. It is manifestly false . A short while ago, I gave a franc to somebody who was
begging in the street. Obviously, he will never give it back to me since there is very little chance that we shall meet each other
again: I even think that if this were to happen, he would not try to give me back my coin but would more probably ask me for another. Besides, there
is no obligation of any kind for him to give me back anything at all. Nor is it evident that he feels 'under an
obligation' to me, according to a somewhat old-fashioned expression. He did not even say to me: 'The good Lord will repay you'. In short, in this
entire affair there is no question either of reciprocation or of obligation. Nor is there any such question in the whole domain of
what might be called charitable donation: this is relevant to a whole chapter of our social history, given that it was an important practice for the upper
classes and the nobility in particular. It was a practice which in certain periods brought into play an impressive amount of wealth when the donations
were destined for the Church, a practice, indeed, which was almost institutionalised. That was the case in the Christian West. The charitable
donation is certainly even more important in the lands of Islam and Buddhism. We must also mention ancient
philanthropy whereby a powerful man could make a donation to a city or a political entity and, in consequence, be honoured as a public benefactor.
Veyne has shown that this practice differed significantly from Christian charity, being a distinct category both in its motivation and in the social forms
it assumed (5). But, no more than with the charitable donation, is there the least obligation to reciprocate, or anything like it.
Therefore we cannot speak, as Mauss does, of a universal obligation to reciprocate: we know of gift-giving
practices, historically important and ideologically different, from which this obligation is absent. That is my
first point. It is straightforward and easy to understand. My second will be less so. It will consist in showing that the term 'obligation'
has a multitude of very different meanings covering quite distinct social realities. The simplest thing will be to proceed
by giving a series of examples
Let us imagine that a colleague invited me to dinner several months ago, and I have not yet returned the
invitation. In this second example, there is something akin to an obligation to reciprocate, for 'I feel under an obligation' to invite this
colleague in return. Let us emphasise that the question is only one of a feeling, a feeling of obligation. In what way does this obligation oblige
me? What will happen if I do not return the invitation? Probably not much. Obviously, the colleague is not going to haul me up
before the courts to assert his right to be invited; his case would he dismissed, for I have no legal obligation to reciprocate him
anything whatever. Equally obviously, I shall not lose my job because I do not invite him; perhaps he is not even expecting such an invitation. I fee1
obliged but I am not really obliged. There is nothing obligatory in all this: there is no sanction attached to this 'obligation to reciprocate', which is
merely a feeling. Allow me to emphasise the difference between feelings of obligation and what is obligatory: we shall have to return to it later.
Let us now imagine that I am a Kwakiutl chief living in the North-west Coast region of America in the
nineteenth century – if you like, this can be our third example – and that I have, as in the previous example, been invited by a
colleague, that is to say, in this society, by another Kwakiutl chief. The given facts of the problem are slightly different
from those of the preceding case. For in not reciprocating the invitation, I run the real risk of losing my honour, of losing
'face', and at the same time my position as chief. Of course, we must not overestimate the extent to which societies of the
North-west Coast could reorganise their hierarchies according to the capacity (or otherwise) of chiefs to match
the sumptuousness of the potlatch feasts to which they had been invited. One should not overestimate the
agonistic character of the potlatch (6). Be that as it may: it is indeed the honour and the prestige or the chiefs that is at stake in the
obligation to reciprocate. It is not merely a feeling, as it was in the previous case. The difference is that the whole of society has its
eyes fixed on the chiefs who, with their people and their followers, spend months preparing the feast which will demonstrate that they are capable of
holding their rank. The difference is that the potlatch is a major, even crucial, institution of this type of society –
whereas the invitation from one colleague to another, in our society, is not. The difference is that there is now
a social sanction, a sanction implemented by society and which revolves around these questions of honour, rank, and prestige. A sanction, we
need to add, imposed by the whole of society. If the chief is not capable of reciprocating, those who should have been repaid feel contempt, but he
also surfers a fall from grace, a loss of prestige in the eyes of his own people. It is a public sanction, whilst the feeling we were speaking of earlier
remained in the private domain.
The obligation to reciprocate, then, in the case of the potlatch, is stronger and more serious, more pressing than the
obligation to reciprocate invitations among colleagues. It is more than a feeling, since it is a matter of the reputation of the person this obligation
weighs upon. Does that make it obligatory? Not at all.

Symbolic exchange is ethically devastating --- proves our args on util.

Noonan 12— Professor of philosophy at the University of Windsor [Jeff, Materialist Ethics and Life-Value, p.
54-55]
For Baudrillard, human societies are institutional structures that subsume and transform the material conditions of
human life into symbolic conditions of their own reproduction. Since human beings relate to nature through different social-
symbolic constructions, it follows that these constructions subsume and transform the body’s physical-organic requirements as well. Baudrillard
concludes that there are no universal physical-organic life-requirements because there is no direct experience of life at this material level, but only
different symbolic constructions. “Needs” he claims, “can no longer be defined adequately in terms of the materialist-idealist thesis – as innate,
instinctive power, spontaneous craving, anthropological potential. Rather, they are better defined as a function induced (in the individual) by the
internal logic of the system: more precisely, not as a consummative force liberated by the affluent society, but as a productive force required by the
functioning of the system itself, by its process of survival and reproduction. In other words, there are needs only because the system needs them.” 13
The life-grounded materialism that I constructed in chapter 1 does not deny the reality of human symbolic
constructions. However, it does not follow that because we relate to the body through different social-
symbolic from these constructions that the body is nothing real apart from these constructions . Sebastiano
Timpanaro puts this point very clearly. Human biology, he reminds culturalist critics of materialism, is “not an abstract construction,
not one of our prehistoric ancestors ... now superseded by historical and social man, but still exists in each of
us.” 14 Baudrillard’s argument ignores this reality . It is thus politically and ethically self-undermining and based
on a category mistake.
If it is true that human life-requirements are nothing but functions of the social system’s reproductive
requirements, then there is no ground to criticize even massive failures of life-requirement satisfaction. If
“eating” is a social construction then so too is “mass starvation.” Hence it follows from Baudrillard’s
argument that starvation has no more material reality than eating. Feasts as well as famines would be social constructions.
Therefore, mass starvation cannot be criticized on the basis of the life-destruction it causes because for
Baudrillard there is no material reality to require because their function within the given social system is to
not consume. They thus fulfill their function by starving to death. The political and ethical absurdity of this conclusion is
evident .
Innovation DA
 1NC – Innovation DA

Maximizing pharma profits is necessary to develop new drugs and drive innovation.
LaMattina ’14 – former president of Pfizer Global Research and Development in 2007
“High Drug Prices And Innovation”; John LaMattina; November 4, 2014;
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2014/11/04/high-drug-prices-and-
innovation/#5d4453be179e
But make no mistake: revenues from new drugs drive innovation. The pharmaceutical industry invests more of its
top line earnings into R&D than any other industry – roughly 15%. Thus, there is a direct tie to drug sales and
the amount of money available for new drug discovery and development. If it is in the public’s benefit to capitalize on the
knowledge being garnered with the understanding of the genetic causes of diseases, then new patented drugs need to be priced high
enough to enable companies to get a significant return on their investment (ROI). I have talked often about how drugs are
priced and why high prices can be justified due to the economic value that they bring to society . Dr. Bach takes issue
with this and he uses two examples: aspirin and antibiotics. “When taken after a heart attack, aspirin reduces the risk of a recurrent MI by an enormous
amount. How many thousands of dollars should it therefore cost? What about antibiotics that prevent sepsis and hospitalizations? How much for
them?” Actually, these aspirin and the older antibiotics should cost pennies a day and that’s the exact price that they cost today in spite of their life-
saving benefits. This is because once a drug loses its patent protection, roughly 12 – 15 years after it reaches the
marketplace, the price drops precipitously due to generic competition. Thus, innovator companies need to
charge a price that is justified by the value the drug brings to healthcare as well as a price that provides a ROI
to help the company continue to seek the next breakthrough. In fact, getting a good ROI is helping to set the
agenda for pharmaceutical R&D investment. It is ironic that Dr. Bach picked antibiotics as one of his examples. We have a
crisis right now with a dearth of compounds in development to treat the growing list of infections that are
becoming resistant to existing drugs. One of the drivers for the de-emphasis in antibacterial R&D at Pfizer, Merck and other major
players, is that any breakthrough antibiotic discovered will be used sparingly to slow down the eventual emergence of resistance to the new agent,
thereby limiting sales. Conversely, the potential for a high ROI is what drove the pharmaceutical industry’s extraordinary investment into oncology
drug R&D in the 1990s resulting in a pipeline of nearly 1000 drugs in clinical development today. The promise of a high ROI has also
led the industry into R&D on rare or orphan diseases and new drugs are emerging here as well. Success can also
foster altruism. Companies also have the wherewithal to invest in diseases of the developing world where no ROI can be anticipated. J&J's Sirturo for
TB and Sanofi’s Dengue fever vaccine are two examples.

A 90 day delay in developing new drugs results in 600,000 deaths annually.

Andrew Spiegel 17 is the executive director of the Global Colon Cancer Association, The tragic toll of drug
price controls in America, 5/6/17, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/332205-the-tragic-toll-
of-drug-price-controls-in-america, DOA: 8-10-17, y2k

Breakthrough
Colon cancer is one of the biggest killers in the developing world. The disease claims more than 600,000 lives every year.
treatments can contain this disease and dramatically extend life. However, many colon cancer patients are currently denied access to
these breakthrough treatments because of short-sighted government policies. In hopes of driving down drug costs, public authorities all over the world
have installed price controls in the pharmaceutical market. This approach, though it generates some short-term savings, is ultimately
counterproductive. Price controls significantly restrict patients' access to life-saving medications , condemning many to die
from eminently treatable conditions. One of the most popular forms of drug price controls is "reference pricing." Officials group drugs into
therapeutic classes, based on how the drugs attack disease. They then set a single price for each class. In fact, several forms of reference pricing do not
distinguish between innovative new medications and older generic alternatives. So, for instance, a new, breakthrough medication gets priced exactly the
same as an older, less effective drug that's been off-patent for years. By doing this, reference pricing fails to value the innovative nature of the next
generation of treatments and cures. The Canadian province of British Columbia has incorporated reference pricing into its public health system. So
have Italy, Spain, and Germany. Less developed economies have resorted to even more nefarious means. By issuing so-called "compulsory licenses,"
they have broken patent protections on innovative medicines. Compulsory licenses were designed to be used only in the event of a public health
disaster, but some countries are now using them to drum up discounts for drugs without any plausible connection to an emergency. In Indonesia,
compulsory licensing is an industrial policy tool. If a new treatment isn't manufactured locally, anyone can petition the government to break the patent
on that product. And, of course, several major economies have installed straight-up caps on drug prices. South Korea's public insurance system
imposes some of the most stringent caps in the world, tightly controlling even generics. Newly introduced generics can't be sold for more than 60
percent of the price of the brand name upon which they're based. And that cap drops to 53 percent after a year. Likewise, India's National
Pharmaceutical Price Authority aggressively controls product prices, dictating down the cost of diabetes drugs by 40 percent over the last year and
cancer drugs by nearly 90 percent. And these controls are only going to get tighter. Just this February, the World Health Organization released a draft
report criticizing industry pricing practices and sketching out a spreadsheet for governments to calculate a "fair price" for medicines. That's a barely
disguised call for lower caps. The justification for these controls rests on a simple story: drug prices as a whole are spiraling
skyward, preventing sick patients from affording needed medications. That's pure fiction . Drugs actually represent a relatively small
slice of global medical spending. Just consider: over the next decade, spending on prescriptions will account for less than
10 percent of total healthcare spending growth in the OECD, the economic association encompassing the U nited
S tates, Canada, and much of Europe. And the price control process significantly degrades patient well-being. Pharmaceutical
firms have to undergo a long, drawn-out negotiating process every time they want to sell a new medication in
a controlled market. All the while, sick people aren't getting the medicines they need. In America, which has a relatively free
drug market, the average medicine is approved 90 days quicker than in Europe and about a year quicker than in Canada. This
delay can be deadly, especially for colon cancer patients . The drug industry has invented advanced drugs proven to beat back this
disease, including specialty chemotherapy agents such as panitumumab and "angiogenesis inhibitors," which prevent colon cancer cells from growing
by cutting off their blood supply. Obviously, these
drugs can only help patients if regulators approve them. Too often,
that approval is slow to come . And such delays are now common across a wide variety of drug classes , leading
to serious carnage: some 600,000 European deaths could be avoided each year if the continent's healthcare
systems simply offered "timely and effective medical treatments," according to the European Union's own
data.

Independently prevents European economic collapse.

Jane Griffiths, 2013. Investing in European health R&D, A pathway to sustained innovation and stronger economies, Jane Griffiths, Company
Group Chairman Janssen Pharmaceutical Companies of Johnson & Johnson Europe, Middle East & Africa. http://www.janssen-
emea.com/sites/default/files/Janssen_RnD_Study_Report.pdf

The collaborative research efforts of academia and the pharmaceutical

industry in developing new treatments have resulted in the
most spectacular increase in life expectancy and quality of life in the history of mankind. It has been
estimated that around 40% of the increase in life expectancy in the last decades is because of the introduction
of innovative new drugs46 . Yet, for the first time in recent years, there is a stagnation in health R&D funding, both by
public and by private organisations, as you can read in this report. This is extremely worrying if we consider that for the last
decade the cost of conducting clinical research has increased by 10% on average per year.88 It is even more

worrying in the context of the increasing burden of disease and an ageing population in Europe, and the
millions of people whose health cannot be improved without new therapeutic approaches. The development of
new pharmaceuticals is crucial to meeting these challenges, and while pharmaceuticals in general only represent around 17% of
healthcare budgets 27, their innovative value has a much greater impact, helping to reduce overall treatment costs

significantly across many areas of care. Pharmaceutical R&D expenditure is typically generated from company revenue, rather than from public
funding. At Janssen R&D investments represent 21% of our sales, and as our business grew, so did our R&D investments, reaching more than $5.3 billion last year.
Pharmaceutical research is primarily encouraged by offering the appropriate price to innovative new drugs. Very few industries incur the same financial risks as the
innovative pharmaceutical industry, and with on average only 4% to 6% of early development (phase I) compounds ever reaching the market, it is critical that a fair reward
system is in place for those molecules that actually become medicines. Today, with
effective treatments being available for many diseases, we are
moving into an era of transformational innovation, trying to tackle diseases of very high complexity, where
breakthrough science is needed to deliver value to patients. All this comes at a price , but the initial cost of innovation to
society is small compared to the long term economic benefits of having new treatments. Europe as a whole has historically
lagged behind the US in terms of investment in research and development (R&D) in healthcare and life sciences
technologies. Since the start of the economic crisis in 2007/8, R&D investments in Europe – from both public and private sources –
have been under further pressure. Janssen commissioned this study from Deloitte’s European Center on Health Economics and Outcomes Research to
draw together the relevant data and information into one document and to evaluate this issue in detail. The aim was to present a thorough analysis of the potential
consequences of current trends and, based on the evidence, to explore possible scenarios for the future with relevant stakeholders. R&D
investments in
health have generated substantial and positive outcomes for us today. The most self-evident direct benefit of investing in
health R&D is the subsequent improvement in health outcomes and longevity . There are numerous examples over recent
decades of how new medical interventions have greatly improved population health and wellbeing. In addition, there are
also several other benefits of health R&D, such as improving the efficiency of healthcare provision, gains in

productivity as a result of the improved health status of the working age population, and the positive
contributions of health R&D to overall economic growth and to the knowledge economy in Europe. Each of these benefits has been
documented and demonstrated to be crucial by various commentators, academics, clinicians, health policy experts and patients alike.
Draws in Russia --- goes nuclear.
Adrian Bonenberger 1/27/2017. Vocativ Staff, Where Could The European Cold War Go Hot Again? Think a war in Europe won't happen?
Here's a look at the issues most likely to spur a military confrontation. http://www.vocativ.com/397190/europe-cold-war-military-conflict/

Since 2014, however, and the West’s failure to protect an avowedly pro-European Ukraine, it has become increasingly popular to describe the West’s
Moscow and Europe are one badly-aimed
relationship with Russia as a new Cold War. Reading the headlines, it certainly seems like
missile or bomb away from World War III. As political realities in the US and abroad are challenged, what are the lines or issues most
likely to lead to war in Europe? Imperial Russia By A Different Name One variable that seems constant right now is Russia. Whether one sees things
from Russia’s perspective (wherein Russia is surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on its destruction) or those of its nearest neighbors (which see
Russia as an aggressive and expansive imperial bully), Russia’s actions are indisputable. It has invaded and occupied portions of Ukraine and Georgia.
It has countenanced cyberattacks on Estonia, Ukraine (which included the first deaths attached to cyberwarfare), the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan and
NATO. It is pursuing a long game to undermine and destabilize any and all political alliances that do not include it, as well as those that do include it.
The weaker everyone else is, the greater the room for Russian opportunism. Russia has also taken the side of America’s primary antagonists in the
Middle East. This has made it the friend of isolationists, nationalists, and left-wingers who (paradoxically, given Russia’s own actions) oppose an
American and European hegemony, backed by the increasingly questionable threat of military intervention. Whether it is lashing out in righteous self-
defense or as part of an unethical attempt to grow larger and more powerful at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, there is no question
that Russia is looking to expand its brand. The Return Of Nationalism Across Europe, explicit nationalism is on the rise at levels
unseen since the early 20th century. While hard to quantify, the success of so-called “populist” political parties with nationalist agendas
suggests a growing dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, and the U.S.. Over the last two years, far-right parties have won political power,
gained credibility, or advanced substantial nationalist agendas in Poland (Law and Justice), Hungary (Jobbik), Romania (the recent founding of a new
nationalist party) Austria, Italy (rejection of judicial and legal reform), the U.S. (Trump/Alt-Right), Germany (Alternative for Germany), UK (Brexit),
France (Le Pen’s National Front) and others. Nationalism overlaps well with Russia’s agenda , because it erodes federalism—the idea
that different people in different countries could lay aside tribal instincts like linguistic or ethnic affinities to cooperate. This
makes it easier for
Russia to project power at a local or regional level without sacrificing much in the way of money or manpower. Even nationalists like those in
Poland and Germany who tend to dislike Russians for a variety of actual and perceived historical slights seem to receive financial support from Russia.
This seems based on the principle that a Europe of many countries will be less unified in opposing Russia’s agenda. In principle, those countries that
have a strong nationalist political voice end up pursuing policies that strengthen (relatively) Russia. For people who believe that NATO, the U.S., or
the EU are too strong, that may not be a particularly troublesome issue. Immigration There are at least three different types of national responses to
the question of (largely Middle Eastern and African) immigration into Europe. The first draws on 20th century legal precedents guaranteeing humans
fair and dignified treatment regardless of their national background. This response, exemplified by Germans and Scandinavians, tends to view
immigrants as refugees fleeing war or economic oppression for which Europe or the West have some kind of responsibility given the global economy.
Nations like Germany, Denmark and Sweden are considered among the most generous to refugees. Germany especially has embraced modern
attitudes toward immigration, in the wake of its catastrophic spasm of ethnic cleansing during WWII. Other countries with colonial legacies have
maintained generous post-colonial policies. Absent active restitution, countries like France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and
Portugal—any country that had its finger in the exploitative pie that was 17th-20th century Africa, South America, and Asia—provide expedited or
dual-citizenship options for many people living in countries formerly touched by European sails and soldiers. This is similar to the posture of countries
like Germany. It also results in specific ethnic and religious traffic flowing from the formerly colonized to the colonizer. A critical difference between
the experience of countries like Germany and those like France or the UK (for example) is that Germany’s posture toward immigration and citizenship
embraces an assumed modern, cosmopolitan future, and exists without any natural enemies safe for the white supremacists and Neo-Nazis who nearly
destroyed Europe during World War II (until recently, not a credible source of dissidence). Colonialism did not die easily in the UK, France, or other
similar countries, and much military blood and cash was expended in attempting to keep colonial holdings within the fold. Groups nostalgic for former
imperial glory tend to see immigration as an affront to national dignity, beyond being unwise policy. Groups that evaluate immigration through the lens
of colonial nostalgia are not Nazis or necessarily white supremacists, though the practical implications of their attitudes end up being similar enough to
warrant comparison. Finally, there are nations in Central and Eastern Europe whose attitudes on immigration were shaped by their experiences in
WWI and WWII, as well as life behind the Iron Curtain. Ethnic cleansing and population movements by the Nazis and the Kremlin-led USSR left
countries with the idea that ethnic homogeneity was an absolute good, and ethnic diversity was an existential threat. During the first part of its life, the
USSR viewed ethnicity as threatening to the ideal of a classless society, although that slowly devolved into a view that non-Russian ethnicities were
dangerous. This is not to diminish or excuse a powerful racial element in resistance to immigration, simply to frame it in the context of places that
experienced the Holocaust firsthand, often actively participating in it in a way that ended up shaping every subsequent generation. Religion The
European immigration “crisis” is complicated by the issue of religion. There are two key fault lines at play here: Orthodox versus non-Orthodox, and
Christian versus Islam. Countries like Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia tend to be Catholic. The primary factor in considering their
political preferences is their experience with Soviet-style governance, wherein Orthodox Christianity was a proxy for Russian intelligence agencies, and
Catholicism was part of resistance to totalitarianism and Russian nationalism. Orthodox countries tend to be pro-Russian: Greece, Bulgaria Macedonia
and Serbia all share religious and cultural affinity for one another, as well as Russia. They tend to be hostile to the idea of immigration from the Middle
East and Africa based on religious grounds, given the relationship between church and state. This has been the case for centuries. Religious
constituencies within all European countries tend to view the EU’s stance toward religion with skepticism, and see efforts to resettle non-Christians
within their borders as direct attacks on both their Christianity and ethnicity. Still, there are substantial differences between Orthodox countries (which
tend to be pro-Russian) and Catholic countries that spent time behind the Iron Curtain (which tend to be anti-Russian). Countries Formerly Occupied
Or Annexed By Russia Polish voters empowered the “Law and Order” party based partly on its promises to block non-Christian (most importantly,
Islamic) immigration and the expansion of EU power at the expense of Polish autonomy. At the same time, Poland is among the most staunch and
enthusiastic NATO member-states. Its army is the fourth largest in Europe behind Russia, Ukraine, and France. Its chief foreign policy priorities have
nothing to do with Middle Eastern immigration, and everything to do with preventing a repeat of the 20th century, where Poland was occupied by
Russian soldiers on three separate occasions, and forced to adopt Soviet governance at bayonet-point. Similar in their opposition to recent Russian
militancy to Poland are the Baltic States, as well as countries like Sweden, Finland, and Romania. The fate of the Baltics and Finland were determined
as part of agreements between Nazi Germany and the USSR to enforce German and Russian “spheres of influence” according to Hitler and Stalin’s
vision for Europe. The Baltics were made into independent SSRs within the USSR, while Sweden maintained its independence. Finland was invaded
and had large portions of territory annexed into Russia, and Romania was partitioned before and after WWII, first by agreement between the USSR
and the Nazis, and later by conquest. Within the Baltics, anti-Russian attitudes are tempered by former Russian citizens of the USSR who lost their
national standing when the USSR collapsed. This is most conspicuous in Latvia, but is also true for Lithuania and Estonia. Broadly speaking, any
country with an ethnic or Russian-speaking population that borders Russia or was part of the USSR’s sphere of influence. It is a visible reminder of
Russia’s de facto colonization of other nations within the USSR, the consequences of which—the current war in Ukraine, as well as the past war in
Georgia—explain why national security is among the most urgent priorities for these countries now (satirically represented here, though more recent
developments suggest that Germany would remain part of the EU and France perhaps would not). Another way of stating this European dynamic
would be thus: countries with no direct experience of the USSR tend not to see Russia as an imminent military threat. Those with direct experience of
the USSR (and which therefore have vocal Russian-speaking minorities as viable political entities) see Russia as an existential threat. Economic Ideals
Those countries that have had difficulty adjusting their economies to meet the EU’s standards, or which have not
prospered during their time in the EU have become powerful passive allies of Russia. Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria have
all come to view sanctions on Russia as damaging to their own economies. They view competition with Russia as
harmful to their economic interests, either “someone else’s problem” or somehow the fault of the U.S.. The EU’s structure (exposed
during Greece’s economic crisis of 2012) does not privilege every country equally, nor is it designed to—its design offers benefits to those countries
that are best able to leverage Europe’s many markets and industries. Those in favor of the EU would stress that each country that joined the EU did so
transparently and freely, and expected to benefit from its structure by investing time and energy—these people would say that countries
failing to maximize their income within the EU have themselves to blame. Those opposed to the EU (many Greek
nationalists) believe that it is an exploitative system. Energy Dependence The final factor that determines a country’s relationship with
Europe versus Russia is its dependence on Russian oil and gas. After the fall of the USSR, some countries that had existed behind the Iron Curtain
were able to maintain privileged relationships with Russian energy producers. Dependence on the Russia used to be the single greatest European
weakness, and still is for certain countries (most conspicuously Hungary, which goes out of its way to propitiate Russia, but also other Central
European powers as well as Ukraine itself). Lately, though, low oil prices, longtime pushes for energy independence using renewable sources, as well as
the opening of alternate energy markets in the Middle East have made it increasingly difficult for Russia to monopolize Europe’s energy, and therefore
have reduced its political influence there. This places Russia in a serious bind, as the US’s development of new technology to access additional energy
reserves means that as the price of oil and gas rises, it becomes profitable for it to reenter the energy market—meaning European countries will never
again be entirely dependent on Russia for energy.The Prospect of War Although there are many fault lines that could lead to conflict, it still
seems unlikely that European war will spread west from Ukraine. Still, it’s worth paying attention to these various collisions between
Russian and European countries. No century in history has seen a Europe free from war—the question is
always one of degree and intensity . So far, the 21st century still has all the elements in place for a truly epic
struggle between European countries and Russia. And this conflict, unlike those of the last century, may be adjudicated
by nuclear weapons .

Attempting to wish away the basic economic question by prioritizing communal relations is actually
meaningless.
Kevin D. Williamson, 5/7/2017. National Review’s roving correspondent and director of the National Review Institute’s William F. Buckley Jr
Fellowship Program in Political Journalism. “The ‘Right’ to Health Care,” National Review. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/447389/there-
isnt-one
*Modified for Ableist Langauge

The ‘Right’ to Healthcare

There isn’t one.
With the American Health Care Act dominating the week’s news, one conversation has been unavoidable: Someone — someone who pays attention to
public policy — will suggest that we pursue policy x, y, or z, and someone else — someone who pays a little less careful attention, who probably
watches a lot of cable-television entertainment masquerading as news — responds: “The first thing we have to do is acknowledge that health care is a
human right!” What follows is a moment during which the second speaker visibly luxuriates in his display of empathy and virtue, which is, of course,
the point of the exercise.
It’s kind of gross, but that’s where we are, politically, as a country.
Here is a thought experiment: You have four children and three apples. You would like for everyone to have
his own apple. You go to Congress, and you successfully persuade the House and the Senate to endorse a joint
resolution declaring that everyone has a right to an apple of his own. A ticker-tape parade is held in your honor,
and you share your story with Oprah, after which you are invited to address the United Nations, which passes the International
Convention on the Rights of These Four Kids in Particular to an Individual Apple Each. You are visited by the souls of Mohandas
Gandhi and Mother Teresa, who beam down approvingly from a joint Hindu-Catholic cloud in Heaven.
Question: How many apples do you have?
You have three apples, dummy. Three. You have four children. Each of those children has a congressionally endorsed, U.N.-approved,
saint-ratified right to an apple of his own. But here’s the thing: You have three apples and four children. Nothing has changed.
Declaring a right in a scarce good is meaningless. It is a rhetorical gesture without any application to the
events and conundrums of the real world. If the Dalai Lama were to lead 10,000 bodhisattvas in meditation, and the subject of that
meditation was the human right to health care, it would do less good for the cause of actually providing people with health care than the lowliest temp
at Merck does before his second cup of coffee on any given Tuesday morning.
Health care is physical, not metaphysical. It consists of goods, such as penicillin and heart stents, and services, such as oncological
attention and radiological expertise. Even if we entirely eliminated money from the equation, conscripting doctors into
service and nationalizing the pharmaceutical factories, the basic economic question would remain.
We tend to retreat into cheap moralizing when the economic realities become uncomfortable for us. No
matter the health-care model you choose — British-style public monopoly, Swiss-style subsidized insurance,
pure market capitalism — you end up with rationing: Markets ration through prices, bureaucracies ration
through politics. Price rationing is pretty straightforward: Think of Jesse James and his “Pay Up, Sucker!” tattoo on his palm.
Political rationing is a little different: Sometimes it happens through waiting lists and the like, and sometimes it is just a
question of money and clout. American progressives love the Western European medical model, but when Italian prime minister Silvio
Berlusconi needed a pacemaker, he came to the United States to have it implanted.
Rich people always get better stuff. That’s what it means to be rich. And money is only one resource: Political connections matter enormously in some
places, as might a good family name or employment in a powerful firm. If you live in one of the poorer corners of the world, you may have “free”
health care, meaning that if you should become infected with HIV, you will get a free aspirin. On the other hand, the Coca-Cola Company distributes
antiretroviral drugs, free of charge, to employees around the world being treated for HIV. That may seem unfair to us. That may be unfair. It may
be unfair that you have four kids and three apples. After we are done lamenting the unfairness of it all, what
do we do?
Ideally, we’d plant some apple trees. We would find ways to invest in medical care with an eye toward making it
more effective and less expensive. There is no substitute for abundance. And the great enemy of abundance is
the bias against profit. There is something deeply rooted in us that instinctively thinks we are being abused if someone else makes a profit on a
deal. That is a dumb and primitive [overly-simplistic] way of thinking — our world is full of wonders because it is profitable to
invent them, build them, and sell them — but the angel is forever handcuffed to the ape.
 1NR – O/V
US-Russia war goes nuclear --- hybrid tactics.
Malcolm DAVIS 17. Senior Analyst, ASPI; PhD in Military Strategic Studies, University of Hull. , “Russia,
military modernisation and lowering the nuclear threshold.” Australian Strategic Policy Institute. January.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-military-modernisation-lowering-nuclear-threshold/.
Three developments suggest a willingness by Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks in a
manner that lowers the threshold of nuclear war. First, the concept of preventative de-escalation is important.
A recent IISS analysis explained de-escalation in which limited nuclear war could be used to:¶ ‘…de-escalate and terminate combat actions on terms
acceptable to Russia through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage upon the enemy. Such limited nuclear use may deter both nuclear and
conventional aggression.’¶ Second, the integration of conventional pre-nuclear and nuclear forces reinforces Russia’s
coercive power against NATO in the pre-war ‘Phase Zero’ in a future regional crisis—for example, in the Baltics .
And third, the Russians are clearly conscious of that coercive power given their recent nuclear signaling that
suggests Russia continues to see such weapons as a means of national strength. Russia has undertaken sabre
rattling through simulated nuclear strikes in large-scale exercises and aggressive probing of NATO airspace
with nuclear-capable bombers. It has demonstrated the dual-role Kalibr NK sea-launched cruise missile in deadly strikes against Syria, and
deployed dual-role Iskander short-range ballistic missiles into Kaliningrad in a manner that was highly threatening to NATO. That has been
backed by public statements which reinforce Russia’s nuclear weapons capability and even explicit nuclear
threats to NATO states, notably Denmark.¶ Russian nuclear forces are being swiftly upgraded with the focus on
ICBM modernisation, based on introducing the SS-27 ‘Yars’ road-mobile missile, and from 2018 the silo-based RS-28 ‘Sarmat’ heavy ICBM.
Yars and Sarmat replace much of Russia’s aging Soviet strategic rocket forces with significantly more capable delivery systems. Russia’s Navy is
transitioning to modern Sineva and Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles, on the modern Borei class SSBNs, while the Russian Air Force is
restarting the Tu-160 Blackjack production line to produce the updated Tu-160M2 bomber that eventually will be
complemented by the ‘PAK-DA’ advanced bomber sometime in the 2020s.¶ The strategic nuclear force modernisation is important but it’s the
integration of Russia’s conventional pre-nuclear forces with its large ‘non-strategic nuclear forces’ that’s of
greatest significance. That’s shaping Russian thinking on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during
Hybrid Warfare, in a way that makes the risk of a crisis with Russia much more dangerous. Russia is
increasingly focusing on the use of its nuclear forces to enhance its ability to undertake military adventurism
at the conventional level in a manner that’s highly threatening to NATO. However the reliance on nuclear
signaling, the changing operational posture of dual-role forces and concepts like ’preventative de-escalation’,
increases the risk of miscalculation in a crisis that could lead to an escalation through the nuclear threshold.

Nuke winter --- causes extinction.

Steven STARR 17. Director, University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program; senior scientist,
Physicians for Social Responsibility. “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject
Nuclear Winter Studies.” Federation of American Scientists. January 9. https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-
blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/.
Now 10 years ago, several of the world’s leading climatologists and physicists chose to reinvestigate the long-term environmental impacts of nuclear war. The peer-reviewed

studies they produced are considered to be the most authoritative type of scientific research, which is
subjected to criticism by the international scientific community before final publication in scholarly journals.
No serious errors were found in these studies and their findings remain unchallenged .¶ Alan Robock et al., “Nuclear winter
revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 112 (2007).¶ Owen Brian Toon et al., “Atmospheric
effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7 (2007).¶ Michael Mills et al., “Massive global ozone
loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 14 (2008).¶ Michael Mills et al., “Multidecadal global
cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a regional nuclear conflict,” Earth’s Future 2.¶ Alan Robock et al., “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and
Physics 7 (2007).¶ Working at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado-Boulder, the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers, and the Department of

these scientists used state-of-the-art computer modeling to evaluate the

Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at UCLA,

consequences of a range of possible nuclear conflicts. They began with a hypothetical war in Southeast Asia, in which a total of 100 Hiroshima-size atomic
bombs were detonated in the cities of India and Pakistan. Please consider the following images of Hiroshima, before and after the detonation of the atomic bomb, which had an explosive power of
15,000 tons of TNT.¶ The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists
calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated
for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would
likely result in a vast global famine.¶ The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level
into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a
decade. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight, which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas. This
would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central
Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals.¶ As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching
the Earth’s surface, it would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a
five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people
to perish from famine.¶ The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia,
China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb.¶ During the last 30 years, the average
each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by
size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today,

the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-
Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of
TNT.¶ Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a

standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square
miles.¶ A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite
immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square
miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke,
which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for
10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the
Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight.¶ Under such conditions, it would

only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest
agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years.
Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of
the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing
seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark to grow food
crops, which would doom the majority of the human population .
 1NR – Link
Perception’s key.
Santerre et al 2006, Rexford E. Santerre, John A. Vernon, and Carmelo Giaccotto are Professors of Finance
in the Department of Finance’s Center for Healthcare and Insurance Studies in the School of Business at the
University of Connecticut. THE IMPACT OF INDIRECT GOVERNMENT CONTROLS ON U.S.
DRUG PRICES AND R&D, Cato Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2006), DOA: 8-10-17, y2k

The threat of more direct price controls in the future provides a second method by which government may
influence both the level and rate of increase of drug prices. Threat considers that the actions taken by government today may
provide a signal about the invasiveness of actions that the government might take tomorrow . For example, some
prominent government representatives might voice the opinion that the government should adopt a more rigid drug-pricing policy unless the industry
disciplines itself. Facing the increased prospect of direct controls and lowered expected profits, individual drug companies might moderate their price
increases. As another example, state or federal politicians
might attempt to initiate new laws to regulate drug prices.
Regardless of whether laws actually pass , the drug industry might perceive that more direct controls are
inevitable unless appropriate actions are immediately implemented. Several proposed laws in the past provide instances where
threats of this kind may have worked. As one example, in response to persistently high pharmaceutical profits, Senator Kefauver
introduced in 1961 a provision contained in Senate bill 1552 that would have limited pharmaceutical patents to three years of full
exclusivity (Comanor 1986). After that period, patent holders would have been required to license their drugs to all approved companies at a
prespecified royalty rate. The compulsory licensing provision, however, never passed the parent committee on the judiciary and was not
included in the final 1962 drug amendment.3 As another example, in 1966, Senator Long introduced a bill stipulating that
drugs purchased under federally aided programs should be prescribed under the generic rather than the brand name of
the drugs (Schwartzman 1976). While the proposal only applied to individuals covered by public drug insurance programs,
it was believed that the approval of the bill would have caused a national trend in private plans as well. Similarly, in
1967, Senator Montoya introduced a bill providing for the reimbursement of the costs of qualified drugs only, which were defined as those drugs
acceptable to a formulary committee. Drug reimbursement would have been made on the basis of the lowest drug cost, provided that the drug was of
an acceptable quality to the formulary committee. Different aspects of these two bills were merged, modified, and then proposed over the next five
years but never progressed beyond the House-Senate Conference Committee. Nevertheless, the threat that these proposed laws generated
likely affected the pricing behavior of drug companies at that time.4

Prefer cross-country empirical analysis --- their ev is junk science emanating from political pundits.
RAND 2008, Regulating Drug Prices, U.S. Policy Alternatives in a Global Context,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9412.readonline.html, DOA: 8-10-17, y2k

The Effect of Regulation on Pharmaceutical Revenues: Recent Experience in 19 Nations Research points to an underlying link
between manufacturer revenues and the pace of pharmaceutical innovation: Though some have challenged this
link, evidence suggests that lower profits delay the development and introduction of new drugs . Therefore, an
important first step in understanding the impact of drug price regulation is examining how regulation affects revenues. To date, there has been
little systematic study of this relationship across the full range of developed countries. To remedy this gap, the RAND
team examined the regulatory environment from 1992 to 2004 and the impact of regulation on pharmaceutical revenues in 19
nations that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. They also looked at the full array of
regulatory mechanisms , ranging from direct price controls to policies for increasing the use of generics, and
used a microsimulation model to estimate the effects of regulation on drug revenues. The main results showed that (1)
drug price regulation increased during the period in question; (2) most regulations significantly reduced revenue, with direct price
controls having the greatest effect; (3) the effect of regulation in a previously unregulated market was greater
than the effect of added regulation in a regulated market; and (4) the revenue-reducing impact of regulation
increased over time.
Trump’s economic platform depends on deregulation --- Aff independently kills bizcon across-the-
board.
Jim Puzzanghera 3/14/2017. Business and Economics reporter. “CEOs express optimism about Trump's plans for taxes, spending,” Los
Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-ceo-survey-trump-20170314-story.html#

The nation’s top chief executives like what they’re seeing and hearing from President Trump and his fellow
Republicans, according to survey results released Tuesday by the Business Roundtable.
The economic expectations of the heads of the nation’s largest companies jumped in the first quarter by the most in more than
seven years amid optimism about corporate tax cuts, reduced regulations and a boost in infrastructure spending promised by
Trump and congressional leaders, the trade group found.
“I think it validated what I’ve already felt and have already seen … that there’s more optimism around the future
of the economy than we’ve had in quite some time,” said Michael Burke, chief executive of Los Angeles engineering giant Aecom.
“I think validating that optimism among a CEO group that is responsible for a big part of the investments that
are going to be part of the U.S. economy is encouraging,” said Burke, a member of the Business Roundtable.
The organization, composed of the heads of about 200 of the largest U.S companies, said its quarterly CEO Economic Outlook Index shot up to 93.3
from 74.2 in the fourth quarter of last year.
It was the biggest increase since the third quarter of 2009 and the highest level in nearly three years. The index is based on
projections for sales, capital spending and hiring over the next six months, and ranges from -50 to 150, with a reading
above 50 indicating that the economy is expanding .
Since the survey began in 2002, the average has been 79.8. The first quarter was the first time that the index has been above its historical average in
nearly two years.
The increased optimism from major corporate chieftains echoed surveys showing small-business owners and
consumers also are feeling much better about the economy since Trump’s election. Investors also have been
bullish since the election, pushing the Dow Jones industrial average up about 14% to record highs.
Also on Tuesday, the National Federation of Independent Business said its Small Business Optimism Index was near a 43-year high in February after
ticking down a bit from the previous month.
“It is clear from our data that optimism skyrocketed after the election because small-business owners anticipated a
change in policy ,” NFIB President Juanita Duggan said.
“The sustainability of this surge and whether it will lead to actual economic growth depends on
Washington’s ability to deliver on the agenda that small business voted for in November,” she said. “If the healthcare and tax policy
discussions continue without action, optimism will fade.”
 1NR – AT: Extinction Inevitable
Extinction does not make our efforts worthless --- we should do the best we can while we’re here.
Brooke TRISEL 4. Medical Facilities Consultant, Ohio Department of Health. “Human Extinction and the
Value of Our Efforts." The Philosophical Forum 35(30): 390-1. Emory Libraries.
Although our works will not last forever, this should not matter if we accomplished what we set out to
do when we created these works. Wanting our [end page 390] creations to endure forever was not
likely part of our goal when we created them. If we accomplish our goals and then later in life conclude that these
accomplishments were of no significance, then this is a sign that a desire for long-lastingness has crept into the standards that we use to judge
significance. Escalating desires can lead to escalating standards since the standards that we establish reflect our goals and desires.¶ Including
long-lastingness as a criterion for judging the significance of our efforts is unreasonable. If one
includes long-lastingness as part of the standard, then one will feel that it is necessary for
humanity to persist forever. There is no need for humanity to live forever for our lives and works to
be significant. If the standard that we adopt for judging significance does not include long-
lastingness as part of the standard, then it will not matter whether humanity will endure for a
long time.¶ Like Tolstoy, we may be unable to keep from wanting to have our achievements
remembered forever. We may also be unable to keep from wanting our works to be appreciated
forever. But we can refrain from turning these desires into standards for judging whether our
efforts and accomplishments are significant. If we can keep from doing this, it will be to our
advantage. Then, during those times when we look back on life from an imagined perspective
that encompasses times after humanity has become extinct, we will not conclude that our efforts
amounted to nothing. Rather, we will conclude that many people made remarkable
accomplishments that made their lives, and possibly the lives of others, better than they would
have been if these goals had never been pursued. And if we expand our evaluation, as we should,
to take into account all experiences associated with living, not just goal-related experiences, we
will conclude not that life was empty, but that living was worthwhile .
Case
 1NC – Case

Util.
Cummisky, 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and
summed this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one
person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of
each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for
the loss of one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot
claim that saving two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme
interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus
compensate for the loss of one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear
how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more
persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

Ethics of the crusades.

Isaac 02 – Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of
Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and
Politics,” p. Proquest)

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability
to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of
power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to
bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that
power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo
Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with
moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of
personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does
not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with
morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard
to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that
in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form
of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is
always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose
certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended
consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most
significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that
generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be
sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to
judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment.
It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

Any other moral calculus is illogical and arbitrary.

Joshua Greene, 2010. Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University. Moral Psychology: Historical
and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-
KantSoul.pdf

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational
enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves
were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it
is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can
accommodate our moral intuitions . Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost
certainly doesn't . Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.
It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us
against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of
normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been
inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a
rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).
Missing the Deontological Point
I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will
insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about . Deontology, they will
say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is
about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere
objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many
deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading . The problem, more
specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological , though they may
appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain
the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people,
looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the
phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from
other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a
community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think
religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well
as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be
secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.
In the same way, I believe that most of the
standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish
deontology from other approaches to ethics . (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me
that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons , are against treating people

as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects
other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the
decision-making process . Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational
creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are
impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take
them to be.
What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between
deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge
cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong
to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers.
Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the

means." "You have to respect people's rights." But , as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the
same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment , even though their
initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and
reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find
ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although
these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice

to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they
don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

No eugenics
Mike OJAKANGAS 5. Professor of Political Thought, University of Jyväskylä. “Impossible Dialogue on Bio-
power: Agamben and Foucault.” Foucault Studies 2(May): 26-8. Emory Libraries. Gender Modified.
In fact, the history of modern Western societies would be quite incomprehensible without taking into account that
there exists a form of power which refrains from killing but which nevertheless is capable of directing people’s
lives. The effectiveness of bio‐power can be seen lying precisely in that it refrains and withdraws before every
demand of killing, even though these demands would derive from the demand of justice. In bio‐ political societies,
according to Foucault, capital punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the
criminal: “One had the right to kill those who represented a kind of biological danger to others.”112 However, given that the “right to kill” is precisely
a sovereign right, it can be argued that the bio‐political societies analyzed by Foucault were not entirely bio‐political. Perhaps, there neither has
been nor can be a society that is entirely bio‐political. Nevertheless, the fact is that present‐day European societies
have abolished capital punishment. In them, there are no longer exceptions. It is the very “right to kill” that has
been called into question. However, it is not called into question because of enlightened moral sentiments, but rather because of the
deployment of bio‐political thinking and practice.
For all these reasons, Agamben’s thesis, according to which the concentration camp is the fundamental bio‐political paradigm of the West, has to be
corrected.113 The bio‐political paradigm of the West is not the concentration camp, but, rather, the present‐day
welfare society and, instead of homo sacer, the paradigmatic figure of the bio‐political society can be seen,
for example, in the middle‐class Swedish social‐democrat . Although this figure is an object – and a product – of
the huge bio‐political machinery, it does not mean that he [or she] is permitted to kill without committing
homicide. Actually, the fact that he [or she] eventually dies, seems to be his greatest “crime” against the
machinery. (In bio‐political societies, death is not only “something to be hidden away,” but, also, as Foucault stresses,
the most “shameful thing of all”.114) Therefore, he is not exposed to an unconditional threat of death, but rather to an unconditional
retreat of all dying. In fact, the bio‐political machinery does not want to threaten him [or her], but to encourage him
[or her], with all its material and spiritual capacities, to live healthily, to live long and to live happily – even
when, in biological terms, he [or she] “should have been dead long ago”.115 This is because bio‐power is not
bloody power over bare life for its own sake but pure power over all life for the sake of the living . It is not
power but the living, the condition of all life – individual as well as collective – that is the measure of the
success of bio‐power .
Another important question is whether these bio‐political societies that started to take shape in the seventeenth century (but did not crystallize until
the 1980s) are ideologically, especially at the level of practical politics, collapsing – to say nothing about the value of the would‐be collapse. One thing
is clear, however. At the global level, there has not been, and likely will not be, a completely bio‐political society.
And to the extent that globalization takes place without bio‐political considerations of health and happiness of individuals and populations, as it has
done until now, it is possible that our entire existence will someday be reduced to bare life, as has already occurred, for instance, in Chechnya and Iraq.
On that day, perhaps, when bio‐political care has ceased to exist, and we all live within the sovereign ban of Empire without significance, we can only
save ourselves, as Agamben suggests, “in perpetual flight or a foreign land”116 – although there will hardly be either places to which to flee, or foreign
lands.

Give people the choice to live --- our status as beings creates an affirmation of life in the face of
extinction and non-being.
Richard BERNSTEIN 2. Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research. Radical Evil: A
Philosophical Interrogation. 188-92.
This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many
of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that
there is no
metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there
is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In
defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims,
but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives.
"But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course
has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's
philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It
also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest,
this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. ¶ Contemporary
existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the
habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it
withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts,
must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record
may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the
theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues
"this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions:
metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and
peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases
this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature
that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that
underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies.
Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical
understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out
misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of
Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies
and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the
first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the
first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. ¶ " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively
discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by
no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of
freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological

metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises . Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all
organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need —
not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the
threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This
broad, ontological understanding of
freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life"
(PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are
normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even
inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas
is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues
that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the
nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the
dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such
categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic
insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive
manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he
presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a
regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of
being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to
stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive
voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas
appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place
for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective
grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is
a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding
ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological
facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature
freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he
for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that

argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. There
is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation,
"The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death.
Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the
active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). ¶ Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all
organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing
freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its
destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this
transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that
become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-
affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle
of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics.
Modern technology has
transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of
traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to
destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more
invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the
environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently
exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems
that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be
any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance
where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We
need, Jonas argued, a new
categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are
compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your
action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite
continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)
Survialism is inevitable --- it’s better to manage it with order instead of making life unlivable.
Tom PYSZEZYNSKI 4. Professor of psychology, University of Colorado. “What are we so afraid of? A
terror management theory perspective on the politics of fear.” Social Research: An International Quarterly 71(4):
827-48. Emory Libraries.
TMT starts with a consideration of how human beings are both similar to, and different from, all other animals. We start with the assumption that,
like all other animals, humans are born with a very basic evolved proclivity to stay alive and that fear, and all
the biological structures of the brain that produce it, evolved, at least initially, to keep the animal alive. This, of
course, is highly adaptive, in that it facilitates survival, and an animal that does not stay alive very long has little chances of
reproducing and passing on its genes. But as our species evolved, it developed a wide range of other adaptations that helped us
survive and reproduce, the most important being a set of highly sophisticated intellectual abilities that enable us to: a) think and
communicate with symbols, which of course is the basis for language, b) project ourselves in time and imagine a future including
events that have never happened before, and c) reflect back on ourselves, and take ourselves as an object of our own attention--self-
awareness. These are all very adaptive abilities that play central roles in the system through which humans regulate their behavior--usually referred to as
the self (cf. Carver and Scheier, 1998). These abilities made it possible for us to survive and prosper in a far wider range of environments than any
other animal has ever done, and accomplish all that we humans have done that no other species ever has been capable of doing. However, these
unique intellectual abilities also created
a major problem: they made us aware that, although we are biologically
programmed to stay alive and avoid things that would cut our life short, the one absolute certainty in life is that we must die. We are also
forced to realize that death can come at any time for any number of reasons, none of which are particularly pleasant--a predator, natural disaster,
another hostile human, and an incredible range of diseases and natural processes, ranging from heart attacks and cancer to AIDS. If we are "lucky" we
realize that our bodies will just wear out and we will slowly fade away as we gradually lose our most basic functions. Not a very pretty picture. ¶ TMT
posits that this clash of a core desire for life with awareness of the inevitability of death created the potential for
paralyzing terror. Although all animals experience fear in the face of clear and present dangers to their survival, only humans know what it is that
they are afraid of, and that ultimately there is no escape from this ghastly reality. We suspect that this potential for terror would have
greatly interfered with ongoing goal-directed behavior, and life itself, if it were left unchecked. It may even
have made the intellectual abilities that make our species special unviable in the long run as evolutionary
adaptations--and there are those who think that the fear and anxiety that results from our sophisticated intelligence may still eventually lead to the
extinction of our species. So humankind used their newly emerging intellectual abilities to manage the potential for
terror that these abilities produced by calling the understandings of reality that were emerging as a result of these abilities into service as a way of
controlling their anxieties. The potential for terror put a "press" on emerging explanations for reality, what we refer to as cultural worldviews, such that
any belief system that was to survive and be accepted by the masses needed to manage this potential for anxiety that was inherent in the recently
evolved human condition. ¶ Cultural worldviews manage existential terror by providing a meaningful, orderly, and
comforting conception of the world that helps us come to grips with the problem of death. Cultural worldviews
provide a meaningful explanation of life and our place in the cosmos; a set of standards for what is valuable behavior, good and evil, that
give us the potential of acquiring self-esteem, the sense that we are valuable, important, and significant contributors to this meaningful
reality; and the hope of transcending death and attaining immortality in either a literal or symbolic sense. Literal immortality refer to those aspects of
the cultural worldview that promise that death is not the end of existence, that some part of us will live on, perhaps in an ethereal heaven, through
reincarnation, a merger of our consciousness with God and all others, or the attainment of enlightenment--beliefs in literal immortality are
nearly universal, with the specifics varying widely from culture to culture. Cultures also provide us with the hope of attaining
symbolic immortality, by being part of something larger, more significant, and more enduring than ourselves, such as our families, nations,
ethnic groups, professions, and the like. Because these entities will continue to exist long after our deaths, we attain symbolic immortality by being
valued parts of them.

Fear of death is inevitable --- humans cannot change the orientation towards threats --- evolution.
Tom PYSZCZYNSKI, Sheldon SOLOMON, AND Jeff GREENBERG 6. *Professor of Psychology,
University of Colorado. **Sheldon Solomon, Professor of Psychology, Skidmore College. ***Professor of
Psychology, University of Arizona. “On the Unique Psychological Import of the Human Awareness of
Mortality: Theme and Variations.” Psychological Inquiry 17(4): 328-56. Emory Libraries.
Kirkpatrick and Navarette’s (this issue) first specific complaint with TMT is that it is wedded to an outmoded
assumption that human beings share with many other species a survival instinct. They argue that natural selection can only build
instincts that respond to specific adaptive challenges in specific situations, and thus could not have designed an instinct for survival because staying
alive is a broad and distal goal with no single clearly defined adaptive response. Our use of the term survival instinct was meant to
highlight the general orientation toward continued life that is expressed in many of an organism’s bodily
systems (e.g., heart, liver, lungs, etc) and the diverse approach and avoidance tendencies that promote its survival and
reproduction, ultimately leading to genes being passed on to fu- ture generations. Our use of this term also reflects the classic psychoanalytic,
biological, and anthropological influences on TMT of theorists like Becker (1971, 1973, 1975), Freud (1976, 1991), Rank (1945, 1961, 1989), Zilborg
(1943), Spengler (1999), and Darwin (1993). We concur that natural selection, at least initially, is unlikely to design a unitary survival instinct, but rather,
a series of specific adaptations that have tended over evolutionary time to promote the survival of an organism’s genes. However, whether one
construes these adaptations as a series of discrete mechanisms or a general overarching tendency that encompasses many specific
systems, we think it hard to argue with the claim that natural selection usually orients
organisms to approach things that facilitate
continued existence and to avoid things that would likely cut life short. This is not to say that natural selection doesn’t also select for
characteristics that facilitate gene survival in other ways, or that all species or even all humans, will always choose life over other valued goals in all
circumstances. Our claim is simply that a general orientation toward continued life exists because staying alive is essential for reproduction in most
species, as well as for child rearing and support in mammalian species and many others. Viewing an animal as a loose collection of independent
modules that produce responses to specific adaptively-relevant stimuli may be useful for some purposes, but it overlooks the point that adaptation
involves a variety of inter-related mechanisms working together to insure that genes responsible for these mechanisms are more numerously
represented in future generations (see, e.g., Tattersall, 1998). For example, although the left ventricle of the human heart likely evolved to solve a
specific adaptive problem, this mechanism would be useless unless well-integrated with other aspects of the circulatory system. We believe it useful to
think in terms of the overarching function of the heart and pulmonary-circulatory system, even if specific parts of that system evolved to solve specific
adaptive problems within that system. In addition to specific solutions to specific adaptive problems, over time, natural selection favors integrated
systemic functioning(Dawkins, 1976; Mithen, 1997). It is the improved survival rates and reproductive success of lifeformspossessing integrated
systemic characteristics that determine whether those characteristics become widespread in a population. Thus, we think it is appropriate and useful to
characterize a glucose-approaching amoeba and a bear-avoiding salmon as oriented toward self-preservation and reproduction, even if neither species
possesses one single genetically encoded mechanism designed to generally foster life or insure reproduction, or cognitive representations of survival
and reproduction. This is the same position that Dawkins (1976) took in his classic book, The selfish gene: The obvious first
priorities of a survival machine, and of the brain that takes the decisions for it, are individual survival and
reproduction. … Animals therefore go to elaborate lengths to find and catch food; to avoid being caught and
eaten themselves; to avoid disease and accident; to protect themselves from unfavourable climatic conditions;
to find members of the opposite sex and persuade them to mate; and to confer on their children advantages similar to those they enjoy themselves.
(pp. 62–63) All that is really essential to TMT is the proposition that humans fear death. Somewhat ironically, in the early days of the theory,
we felt compelled to explain this fear by positing a very basic desire for life, because many critics adamantly
insisted, for reasons that were never clear to us, that most people do not fear death. Our explanation for the fear of
death is that knowledge of the inevitability of death is frightening because people know they are alive and
because they want to continue living. Do Navarrete and Fessler (2005) really believe that humans do not fear
death? Although people sometimes claim that they are not afraid of death, and on rare occasions volunteer for suicide
missions and approach their death, this requires extensive psychological work, typically a great deal of anxiety, and
preparation and immersion in a belief system that makes this possible (see TMT for an explanation of how belief systems do
this). Where this desire for life comes from is an interesting question, but not essential to the logic of the theory. Even if Kirkpatrick and Navarrete
(this issue) were correct in their claims that a unitary self-preservation instinct was not, in and of itself, selected for, it is indisputable that many discrete
and integrated mechanisms that keep organisms alive were selected for. A
desire to stay alive, and a fear of anything that
threatens to end one’s life, are likely emergent properties of these many discrete mechanisms that result from
the evolution of sophisticated cognitive abilities for symbolic, future- oriented, and self-reflective thought. As Batson and Stocks
(2004) have noted, it is because we are so intelligent, and hence so aware of our limbic reactions to threats of death and of our many systems oriented
toward keeping us alive that we have a general fear of death. Here are three quotes that illustrate this point. First, for psychologists, Zilboorg (1943), an
important early source of TMT: “Such constant expenditure of psychological energy on the business of preserving life
would be impossible if the fear of death were not as constant ” (p. 467). For literature buffs, acclaimed novelist Faulkner (1990)
put it this way: If aught can be more painful to any intelligence above that of a child or an idiot than a slow and gradual confronting with that which
over a long period of bewil- derment and dread it has been taught to regard as an irrevocable and unplumbable finality, I do not know it. (pp. 141–142)
And perhaps most directly, for daytime TV fans, from The Young and the Restless (2006), after a rocky plane flight: Phyllis: I learned something up in
that plane Nick: What? Phyllis: I really don’t want to die. An important consequence of the emergence of this general fear of
death is that humans are susceptible to anxiety due to events or stimuli that are not immediately present and
novel threats to survival that did not exist for our ancestors, such as AIDS, guns, or nuclear weapons.
Regardless of how this fear originates, it is abundantly clear that humans do fear death. Anyone who has ever
faced a man with a gun, a doctor saying that the lump on one’s neck is suspicious and requires further
diagnostic tests, or a drunken driver swerving into one’s lane can attest to that. If humans only feared evolved specific
death-related threats like spiders and heights, then a lump on an x-ray, a gun, a crossbow, or any number of weapons pointed at one’s chest would not
cause panic; but obviously these things do. Of what use would the sophisticated cortical structures be if they didn’t have the ability to instigate fear
reactions in response to such threats?

Heidegger’s philosophical project is intrinsically anti-Semitic—the search for “Dasein” requires

poisonous hostility towards “rootless”, liberal subjects.
Gregory FRIED, Professor of Philosophy at Suffolk University, 14 [“What Heidegger was hiding: unearthing
the philosopher's anti-semitism,” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2014, Accessed Online through
Emory Libraries]
It is hard to exaggerate just how ambitious Heidegger was in publishing his breakout work, Being
and Time, in 1927. In that book, he sought
nothing less than a redefinition of what it meant to be human, which amounted to declaring war on the entire philosophical
tradition that preceded him. Western thought, Heidegger argued, had taken a wrong turn beginning with Plato, who had
located the meaning of being in the timeless, unchanging realm of ideas. In Plato's view, the world as humans knew it was like a
cave; its human inhabitants could perceive only the shadows of true ideals that lay beyond. Plato was thus responsible
for liberalism in the broadest sense: the notion that transcendent, eternal norms gave meaning to the mutable realm of human affairs. Today, modern
liberals call those rules universal values, natural laws, or human rights.
But for Heidegger, there was no transcendence and no Platonic God--no escape, in effect, from the cave. Meaning
lay not in serving abstract ideals but in confronting one's place within the cave itself: in how individuals and peoples
inhabited their finite existence through time. Heidegger's conception of human being required belonging to a specific,
shared historical context or national identity. Platonic universalism undermined such collective forms of
contingent, historical identity. In the eyes of a transcendent God or natural law, all people--whether Germans, Russians, or Jews-
-were essentially the same. As Heidegger put it in a 1933 lecture at Freiburg: "If one interprets [Plato's] ideas as representations and thoughts that
contain a value, a norm, a law, a rule, such that ideas then become conceived of as norms, then the one subject to these norms is the human being--not
the historical human being, but rather the human being in general."
It was against this rootless, "general" conception of humanity, Heidegger told his students, that "we must
struggle."
By "we," Heidegger meant Germany under Hitler's National Socialist regime, which he hoped would play a central role in such an
effort. Heidegger followed in a long line of German intellectuals, going as far back as the eighteenth century, who believed that the country was
destined to play a transformative role in human history--a kind of modern rejoinder to the creative glory of ancient Greece. For Heidegger,
this
meant replacing the old, Platonic order with one grounded in his vision of historical being. In the early 1930s,
he came to see Hitler's National Socialist movement, with its emphasis on German identity, as the best chance of bringing
about such a revolutionary change. And in the Jews, he saw a shared enemy .
FOLLOWING PROTOCOL
As Trawny's title suggests, both Hitler's and Heidegger's view of the Jews grew out of a particular form of German anti-Semitism that was rampant
after World War I. This strain of thinking, which saw Jews as part of a monolithic, transnational conspiracy, was crystallized in "The Protocols of the
Elders of Zion," a forged document that first appeared in Russia in 1903 and made its way to Germany in 1920. Originally published by Russian
monarchists to scapegoat the Jews for the tsar's military defeats and the subsequent upheaval, the protocols purported to be minutes from a series of
meetings held by Jewish leaders bent on world domination. According to the alleged transcript, the plotters sought to manipulate international finance,
culture, and media; promote extreme ideas and radical political movements; and foment war to destabilize existing powers. Hitler devoured the tract,
which he swiftly employed as Nazi propaganda. It hit a nerve in Germany, still traumatized by World War I, beset by economic chaos, and subject to
extreme political instability--all of which could now be attributed to the Jews.
Trawny does not argue that Heidegger read the protocols or agreed with all their contentions. Rather, he suggests that like so many other Germans,
Heidegger accepted their basic premise, which Hitler hammered home in his speeches and in Nazi propaganda. As evidence, Trawny cites the German
philosopher and Heidegger colleague Karl Jaspers, who recalled in his memoir a conversation he had with Heidegger in 1933. When Jaspers brought
up "the vicious nonsense about the Elders of Zion," Heidegger reportedly expressed his genuine concern: "But there is a dangerous international
alliance of the Jews," he replied.
Yet Hitler and Heidegger embraced anti-Semitic conspiracy theories for different reasons. Whereas the former argued that the Jews posed a racial
threat (a fear for which the protocols offered evidence), the latter saw them as a philosophical one. The Jews, as uprooted nomads
serving a transcendent God--albeit sometimes through their secular activities-- embodied the very tradition that Heidegger
wanted to overturn. Moreover, as Trawny points out, Heidegger found race deeply problematic. He did not dismiss the concept altogether; if
understood as a biological feature of a particular people, race might well inform that people's historical trajectory. But he rejected using race as the
primary determinant of identity. For Heidegger, racism was itself a function of misguided metaphysical thinking, because it presumed a biological,
rather than historical, interpretation of what it meant to be human. By "fastening" people into "equally divided arrangement," he wrote in the
notebooks, racism went "hand in hand with a self-alienation of peoples--the loss of history." Instead of obsessing over racial
distinctions, Germans needed to confront their identity as an ongoing philosophical question. Heidegger overtly
criticized the Nazis for their fixation on biological identity, but he also lambasted the Jews for the same sin. "The Jews," he wrote in the notebooks,
"have already been 'living' for the longest time according to the principle of race."
Heidegger's anti-Semitism differed from that of the typical Nazi in other important ways. To many of Hitler's supporters, for example, the
protocols reinforced the view that the Jews were essentially un-German, incapable of properly integrating with Germany's way
of life or even understanding its spirit. But Heidegger took this notion further, arguing that the Jews belonged
truly nowhere . "For a Slavic people, the nature of our German space would definitely be revealed differently from the way it is revealed to us,"
Heidegger told his students in a 1934 seminar. "To Semitic nomads, it will perhaps never be revealed at all." Moreover, Heidegger said, history
had shown that "nomads have also often left wastelands behind them where they found fruitful and cultivated land."
By this logic, the Jews were rootless; lacking a proper home, all they had was allegiance to one another.
Another anxiety reflected in the protocols and in Hitler's propaganda concerned the perceived power of this stateless, conspiratorial Jewry--be it in
banking, finance, or academia. But for Heidegger, the success of Europe's Jews was a symptom of a broader
philosophical problem. Playing on the tired cliche of Jews as clever with abstractions and calculation, the notebooks make a more general
critique of modern society: "The temporary increase in the power of Jewry has its basis in the fact that the
metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development, served as the hub for the spread of an otherwise empty
rationality and calculative skill, which in this way lodged itself in the 'spirit.'"
In forgetting what it meant to be finite and historical, in other words, the West had become obsessed with
mastering and controlling beings--a tendency Heidegger called "machination,

" or the will to dominate nature in all its forms, ranging from raw materials to human beings themselves. And with their "calculative skill,"
the Jews had thrived in this distorted "spirit" of the modern age.
At the same time, the Jews were not, in Heidegger's view, merely passive beneficiaries of Western society's "empty rationality" and liberal ideology;
they were active proponents of them. "The role of world Jewry," Heidegger wrote in the notebooks, was a "metaphysical
question about the kind of humanity that, without any restraints, can take over the uprooting of all beings from
Being as its world-historical 'task.'" Even if the Jews could not be blamed for the introduction of Platonism or for its hold over
Western society, they were the chief carriers of its "task." By asserting liberal rights to demand inclusion in such nations as
Germany, the Jews were estranging those countries' citizens from their humanity--the shared historical identity
that made them distinct from other peoples. This reasoning formed the basis for a truly poisonous hostility toward
the Jews, and it was perhaps Heidegger's most damning judgment of them. Now that the notebooks have come into the light, however, such
passages constitute the most damning evidence against the philosopher himself.
So what did Heidegger think should be done about the Jews? Did he agree with the Nazi policies? The notebooks give readers little to go on;
Heidegger seems to have had no taste for detailed policy discussions. Nevertheless, the philosopher spoke through his silence. Despite his criticism of
the Nazis and their crude biological racism, he wrote nothing against Hitler's laws targeting the Jews. Although Heidegger resigned as rector of
Freiburg before Hitler passed the Nuremberg Laws, which classified German citizens according to race, he had assumed the role in 1933, just after the
Nazis enacted their first anti-Jewish codes, which excluded Jews from civil service and university posts (and which Heidegger helped implement).
During a lecture in the winter of 1933-34, he warned a hall full of students that "the enemy can have attached itself to the
innermost roots" of the people and that they, the German students, must be prepared to attack such an enemy "with
the goal of total annihilation." Heidegger did not specify "the enemy," but for the Nazis, they included Germany's communists; its Roma,
or Gypsies; and, above all, its Jews. This chilling prefiguration of Hitler's Final Solution is unmistakable , and Heidegger never
explained, let alone apologized for, such horrendous statements.
 2NC – Death Bad

The relationship towards death is, and must be, an individual determination—if a person perceives
their interests as valuable, or that death will be a different state, then our obligation would be to
prevent their death
Paterson, 03 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth
Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, attention should be focused upon an array of
‘interests’ of the person, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the
patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging
assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well
decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For
Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If
a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable, precisely to the extent that he or she
values it. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It
follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think
valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of
consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — friendships, family,
life goals, etc. — which are subjected to de facto self-assessment for the further determination of meaningful
value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of
the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or
preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

Death is the ultimate evil—it is a metaphysical lightning strike that obliterates what it is to be
human in our present state—there is no possible warrant for their argument
Paterson, 03 - Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth
Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not
because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being.
It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the
sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the
current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. 80 The evil of death is
truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about
better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for
the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a
change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused
naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the
process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake
here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a
radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death
itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they
are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. 81 In
conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life
itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject,
namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to
weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue
(pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and
condition of all human possibility.
 2NC – Heidegger’s a Nazi

Heidegger’s world historical project of “Being” creates a fantasy object of world Jewry onto which
violence such as pogroms and the Shoah are displaced. Alt can’t just wish this away --- the parts of
the 1AC about “Dwelling” are inextricably linked to anti-Semitism.
Babette BABICH, Philosophy, Fordham University, 16 [“Heidegger's Jews: Inclusion/Exclusion and
Heidegger's Anti-Semitism,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2016, p. 133-156,
Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

The question of Jewish calculation and power acquisition was obscenely of interest to Heidegger well beyond
the typically anti-Semitic slander disseminated after World War I regarding the non-military inclination of Jewish citizenry and
Heidegger continues here to contrast the growth of world Jewry by contrast with what then precisely world-historical
ambitions of what we might call “World Germany”, that is the Reich. In this light, we can read Heidegger's
denunciation, whereby what costs the Germans their very ontic, all-too-ontic blood, is consummated quite
differently for this other, Semitic and supposedly world-historiale, movement. And if the constellation can also remind us
not a little of Asterix's immortal characterization of the essential antinomy of the German spirit (one can be a barbarian and still love flowers), we
appreciate Trawny's guidance as he points to the contaminating danger of this same “being-historical construction”.25
The issue exceeds religious confession, comprising the erotic, just as Sartre suggests. And if Sartre originally makes the suggestion, it took Klaus
Theweleit to write a two-volume study: Men's Fantasies.26 If Theweleit's book in fact might have been better titled German Men's Fantasies, Sartre's
point demonstrates that it describes the French as it also applies in the Anglophone world. Here we know that it
is no fun to “be” a fantasy
object, not for the subjugated subject, not for the human being subject to racial counting out, i.e. persecution,
expulsion, under threat, realized in horrifying fact, of extermination . Along with an entire generation of political theorists,
Foucault, to this extent, turns out to have been terribly, fatally wrong, and here we may include recent feminist scholars of pornography, most
especially in philosophy. Fantasies always cost their victims: there is no power ‘traded’, that is a lie exacted by those
in power. As the current context makes more than plain, as today's growing emigrant crisis foregrounds some of the reasons Michael Walzer two
decades ago could issue a new edition of Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew with a new subtitle: An Exploration of the Etiology of Hate, this is no
game.27 Here we are talking about blood and force: force because the theme is violence, blood because the
theme is murder, inestimably heightened when the theme is war.
Finding Heidegger guilty of world-historical anti-Semitism is no lesser variety of anti-Semitism (were we minded
here to rank anti-Semitic kinds in the context of a reflection on identity and difference and as philosophers are fond of making distinctions and ranking
orders of rank) than the more vulgar anti-Semitism, the highly personalized anti-Semitism of the kind Sartre
relates, physically, physiologically, viscerally, in his account of the Jewish question in Paris, October 1944. The kind of anti-Semitism we
discern in Heidegger's Black Notebooks – especially the notebook he numbers XV28 – is the anti-Semitic thinking that
works on the level of world history itself , just as Hegelian as we please. It is this kind of anti-Semitism that leads to
pogroms as it also leads to the conception of and physically protracted execution of “final solutions” as this
corresponds to the technological question that is the Shoah on several levels on the world stage in Heidegger’s day and in our own. Above all,
this is the kind of anti-Semitism that excludes people from the land of their birth, of their livelihood, their life's work. This
last horrific point resides in Heidegger's indictment of “the emigrants allowed out of Germany.”29