[ GR No.

200748, Jul 23, 2014 ]

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ v. PEOPLE

SERENO, C.J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the Decision[1] dated 22 June 2011
issued by the Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) and Resolution[2] dated 2 February 2012 issued by the
Former Twentieth Division of the CA in CA- G.R. C.R. No. 00670.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman Visayas, in an Information[3] dated 14 February 2006, which reads:

That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and qualified to
such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of
the Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an
entrapment operation, was found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known
as "Shabu", the dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The records do not reveal
whether De la Cruz was likewise charged for extortion.

VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION

The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at 8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and special investigators of the
National Bureau of Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office (NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a Complaint from
Corazon Absin (Corazon) and Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day,
Ariel Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was picked up by several unknown male persons
believed to be police officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the complainants, and when the
latter gave the number a ring, they were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located along Gorordo
Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they met "James" who demanded from them ?100,000, later lowered to
?40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. After the meeting, the complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to file a
complaint and narrate the circumstances of the meeting to the authorities. While at the NBI-CEVRO, Charito even
received calls supposedly from "James" instructing her to bring the money as soon as possible.

The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages received by the complainants. A team was
immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the corner of
Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz by using a pre-marked
?500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder, which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and handed by
Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was done
by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was required to submit his urine for drug testing. It later yielded a
positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology
(Dangerous Drugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402 dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE

The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges and testified that while eating at the said
Jollibee branch, he was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was required to
extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his
lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.

THE RULING OF THE RTC

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision[4] dated 6 June 2007, found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of
Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.[5]

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTC's validation of the result of the urine test despite its dubiousness
having been admitted in spite of the lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory
examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional
right. Secondly, he was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis to
convict him.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the CA overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which
states that drug testing conducted under circumstances similar to his would violate a person's right to privacy. The
appellate court nevertheless denied the motion.

Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the use of hearsay evidence as
basis for his conviction and the questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.

Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment,[6] saying that "petitioner's arguments cannot
be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, as they involve questions of facts which may not be the
subject thereof; after his arraignment, he can no longer contest the validity of his arrest, less so at this stage of the
proceedings; his guilt has been adequately established by direct evidence; and the manner in which the laboratory
examination was conducted was grounded on a valid and existing law.

THE ISSUE

We deem it proper to give due course to this Petition by confronting head-on the issue of whether or not the drug test
conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

OUR RULING

We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law or jurisprudence.

We gloss over petitioner's non-compliance with the Resolution[7] ordering him to submit clearly legible duplicate originals
or certified true copies of the assailed Decision and Resolution.

Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent provision of which reads:

Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a
government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any
dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (?50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(?200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her
possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the provisions
stated therein shall apply.[8]

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements of Section 15 were established: (1) the
accused was arrested; (2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a
dangerous drug.

Disregarding petitioner's objection regarding the admissibility of the evidence, the lower court also reasoned that "a
suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is already in custody, he
is not compelled to make a statement or testimony against himself. Extracting urine from one's body is merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three
counts.

The drug test in Section 15 does not cover

persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.

First, "[a] person apprehended or arrested" cannot literally mean any person apprehended or arrested for any crime.The
phrase must be read in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested
or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law.

Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for, among others, the
"importation,"[9] "sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",[10] "manufacture"[11] and "possession"[12] of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession thereof "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"[13]; being "employees and visitors
of a den, dive or resort";[14] "maintenance of a den, dive or resort";[15] "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors
and essential chemicals"[16]; "manufacture or delivery"[17] or "possession"[18] of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous
drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"[19]; "unnecessary"[20] or "unlawful"[21] prescription thereof;
"cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof";[22]and "maintenance and keeping
of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals."[23]To make
the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to
unduly expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of extortion.

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to rehabilitate persons
apprehended or arrested for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of other crimes
with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez[24]as follows:

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec.
15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court
notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as
basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec.
11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in
order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required
under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of
twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate the
objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the
accused were found positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or
for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14 (Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the possession of such equipment,
apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and
prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous
drugs is only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving
possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere
residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase "a person apprehended or arrested" in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug
testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. To overextend the application of this provision would run
counter to our pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency,[25]to wit:

x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless
are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person's right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)

The drug test is not covered by

allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment and raises the issue only
now before this tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest curing whatever
defect may have attended his arrest.[26] However, "a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest."[27]

We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases
where non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence obtained were
all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. Purely
mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance
and guiding hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of the right against self-
incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People
vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999])
Hence, it has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical examination to
determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 [1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to whether he was
suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine
from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity
with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil. 337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244 [1950]) [28] (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of petitioner's urine for purposes of drug testing was "merely a
mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation."

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In Gutang v. People,[29] the petitioner therein and
his companions were arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A PNP-NARCOM
team found and confiscated shabu materials and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were
also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime
of illegal possession and use of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latter's urine sample was inadmissible in
evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled extrajudicial confession.

In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be
material." The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to
ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-
accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were
requested to undergo a drug test.

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial
court that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
which point to the culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the circumstances of petitioner in the instant
case. First, Gutang was arrested in relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there were
other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was
arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available
evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs.

The drug test was a violation of

petitioner's right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer
prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.

The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they vigorously track down offenders in their laudable
effort to curb the pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must, however, be constantly
mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its
lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its citizens including even
members of its own police force.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and
the Resolution dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. C.R.
No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS PDEA

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x
The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x

xxxx

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they
are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg.
881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates,
the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National
and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC]
shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated
under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10,
2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate.He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision
in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers
to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination,
and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and
Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which involves
the statute sought to be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to
exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as
senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has
substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]

Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are
unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers
of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules
and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate
of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the
1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of
little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state
that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision
deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its
terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its
validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having
infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and
serve as senator.

SJS Petition

(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal
drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by
the state of an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and
projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a
result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug dependent or
any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to
undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

xxxx

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

xxxx

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of
drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy
has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion
through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the
focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among
school children, we turn to the teachings ofVernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18] both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions
following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random
urinalysis drug testing for the schools athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the
football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the schools
drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools
stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school
gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the former observe communal
undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a
higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous
effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constitutedreasonable search under the
Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes
violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non-athletes on the basis
of the schools custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and
an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of
safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the
Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the
people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools
is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use
by our Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws against the
importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are
visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner
Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what
he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory
drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizens constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted
extensively hereinbelow.[25]

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the
guarantee against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers
to the states exercise of police power.[29]

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.[31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand
students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable.
Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of
drug testing requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question
form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?[32]

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the companys work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that
access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;[34] that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of
the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through
the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial
enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale,
manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal
and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-
day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other
modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard
of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]
Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly
commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give
unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the companys work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned
way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other
agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug
testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers
have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the
increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power
of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],

[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutors office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test
as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f)
and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

CASE DIGEST:

THE FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) students of secondary and
tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutor’s
office of a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by
any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x
The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The
following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution?

2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court
thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a
candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate
of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the
1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of
little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent School District No.
92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following principles: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures
as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA
9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause
to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees—and students for that matter—
under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal
disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review
should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug
testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of
drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question
form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the
employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be
tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that
access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know” basis; that the “drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.” Notably, RA 9165
does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision
and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard
of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all
times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
“randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive
their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as
a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
RUBY VS PROVINCIAL BOARD

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.

Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

MALCOLM, J.:

In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet.,
515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an
Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion — This
cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the
controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal
liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.

To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the
issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that
of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.

I. INTRODUCTION.

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged
that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is
said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the
reservation.

The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:

1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:

The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:

"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro,
which were all a failure,

"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this
province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.

"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement,

"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites
on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for
the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it

"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the
Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and

"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior of February 21, 1917.

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.

"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the
revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their
habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.

"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."

4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of
the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as
well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to
be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.

6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is
so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.

It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in
question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and
approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge
the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is
called upon the decide.

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:

SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized,
when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read as
follows:

SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply
with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of
this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a
period not exceeding sixty days.

The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this
section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section
62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the
Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is also
found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order
to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the
Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-
Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the subject.

II. HISTORY.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in
the following language.

LAW I.

The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19,
1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the
poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,

THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).

In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that they may
forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized
manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to
the attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious
persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in
the year one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our
Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided
and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits
and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities
which men are obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our
predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with
great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such
forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would
see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves,
and it is ordained that they be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been
executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining
parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws
of this title.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW VIII.

Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.

THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.

The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands, and
mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live
stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.

LAW IX.

Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.

With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived
of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made
in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.

xxx xxx xxx

LAW XIII.

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.

No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove thepueblos or
the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal
district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by
offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those
of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this
law.

LAW XV.

Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.

THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."

We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be
more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one,
there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less
than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the
presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.

LAW XXI.

Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10,
1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law
and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.

THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND
MULATTOES.

We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and
towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios
are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the
wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their
blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-
mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great
care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly
honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indiasand born
among them, and who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a
harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)

A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less advanced
inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:

It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation
should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance,
lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns
under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.

It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian
races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations,
precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question, and
that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even
sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the
means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have
the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving
and customs of isolation.

As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the prestige
which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to
the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by
giving the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and
material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics,
and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held
with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object
so indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a
task.

For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the following:

DECREE.

1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common law, save
those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of
the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.

2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided into three classes;
one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up
of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and
rebellious pagans — shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the
provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules
shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be
observed in the manner prescribed below.

3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal
may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall
adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of
courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the
administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at
the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the
archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other
than those previously indicated.

4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants
thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence
be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their
interest; and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the
bell.

5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed precisely of
native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the
abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting them
and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only
exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other
producers, and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any
other transaction with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and
whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.

8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact
along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.

9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following
advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands
and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year,
and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to
natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of
missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the
purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones
who elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.

10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the
obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual
residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of
families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.

11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace,
protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from now
on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall
proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall
have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors,
and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year,
and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones
where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.

12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities, local
authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid
and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.

13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.

14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent
commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that
may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.

15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about due
compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions.
(Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)

B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing
with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.

1. Organic law.

The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was President
McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by
subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress
in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under
which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable
or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs.

Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The
purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the
prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine
Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine
Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian
tribes.

The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916,
commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore
exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve
senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators
and representatives for the territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the
Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of
non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented
in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).

Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

2. Statute law.

Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82,
the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No.
7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial
Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements;
Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major
portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an d1917.

Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act
No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306
were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro,
Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua (Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these
laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:

No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:

SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make
it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-
seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of
Nueva Vizcaya."

SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized, when he
deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to
comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.

SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and
experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be
exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to
make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act
Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by
the provincial board.

SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited in
accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,'
passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Enacted, December 4, 1902.

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named
Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.

These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with
reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement.

C. TERMINOLOGY.

The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.

"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.

The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in
section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the
Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature,
carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws
which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.

"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in
lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in
sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code
of 1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the
Philippine Commission.

The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans.
(Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)

D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."

If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious
signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those
who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the
last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuñiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor
Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See
Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to
1898," vol. I. p. 107.)

Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning.

In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many laws.
Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the
Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the
authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The
Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the
Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.

Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article,
preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially
organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the
provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do
not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation.
Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.

It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and some of
whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)

If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it
that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of
its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.

At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The so-
called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under
his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples,
commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States
Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United
States as to the future political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the
Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to
legislative, judicial, and executive authority.

The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections
2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to
conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."

As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga]
([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the
Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes
use of the following language:

. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or
members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by
General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of
a low order of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked
extenuating circumstance.

Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and
enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to
the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under
date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial
Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive
Secretary, reading as follows:

Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christian but have
recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396
and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.

It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in
civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is
almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-
Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people
having any particular religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own
advantage, be brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.

The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized has
attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-
called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized
municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they have
attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.

I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and
who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial
Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)

The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say on the
subject:

As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification has as yet
been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the
expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of
civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the
law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.

Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The
question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the
Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No.
188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):

The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of
Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian
worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all
persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all
others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or
towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious
worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is
living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a
non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila
claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs
and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also
exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these
Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal
relations are not subject thereto.

(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,

Collector of Internal Revenue.

On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of
Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:

In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of
non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the
body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:

Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess
Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is
concerned . . .

Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal
relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby
makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after
the date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other
members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to
persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a
regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him
to pay the tax for former years.

In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subject to the
regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or
failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in
civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados"
and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the
Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree
of advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-
Christina tribes.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,

Collector of Internal Revenue,

Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.

The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated
by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino
Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.

The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the
Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise
questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing
intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the
provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore
set out, concludes:

In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question remains a
non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable
to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place
upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.

Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:

With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code
which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-
Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those
uncivilized members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the
mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .

The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes
as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not
intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties
which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.

The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and
2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the
evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as
making distinctions base the religion of the individual.

The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild
Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio
Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos."
In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular
Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the
non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.

In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join in
the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more
directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
settled communities.

E. THE MANGUIANES.

The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them
into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.

Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de
Filipinas, says:

In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this
word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of
Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its
employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders,
in whose language they were called the "ancients."

The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the
Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000.
The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See
Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)

III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.

Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the
Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-
Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its
dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian
policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The
recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian
and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always
subject to the plenary authority of the United States.

Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an
Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion
goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United
States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."

A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375).
Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to
indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found
in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:

The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the
people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.

Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were found
here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a
possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an
ultimate title in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples
without the consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State
or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The
United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise.
With the Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as
having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a
possessed of the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.

The opinion then continues:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their
political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling,
the people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the
Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General
Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never
has existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States,
because it has never been denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.

In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the
status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor
into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the
different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the
fostering care and protection of the government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that
during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where
subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not
only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued
legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a
superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or
without the limits of a state."

With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the
judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the
jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909],
215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the
Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs.Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264;
Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216
U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911],
29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian
reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be necessary to give to the
Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs.Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)

All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.

The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas
corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ
of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians,
formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have
formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously
withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the
whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the
general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United
States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of the
return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they
had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed
therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the
Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.

The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second
question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for
the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this
question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then,
continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade
and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the
persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is
wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power
rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:

The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:

1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a
writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody
under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the
United States.

2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, has the
custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.

3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has
been directed to do.

4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and have the
inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on
forbidden ground. And,

5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators
must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.

As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the
Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas
Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed.,
598.) We so decide.

As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting
similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken
from different parts of the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own
wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the
general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the
determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided
upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful
reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial
authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full
responsibility.

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, we
agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a
multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice
Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department
or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing
tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the
Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the
provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?

The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior
to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United
States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The
Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations
as the President may prescribe, have the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian
relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the
welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated
as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the absence of special
provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority, it any is
needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)

There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by
immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the
provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better
qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with
the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which
have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine
Legislature to provincial official and a department head.

B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says that —
"The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language
can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law
"constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is,
consequently, unconstitutional."

Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be understood to mean
what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law;
the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free
to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according
to religious belief leads the court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-
Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious differences.

C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission, the
Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This
constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these
provisions, it has been said "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded
the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.

The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:

Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by every
other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)

Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. That
authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which
the savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more
restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)

Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not do desire.
(Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)

Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is only freedom
from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)

Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto
himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual
may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of
any free government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true
that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual
in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced
by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts
[1905] 197 U.S., 11.)

Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of
the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right
to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and
the right of locomotion.

In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men.
(There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627;
Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114
Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)

One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the
good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can
do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if
exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must
yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the
public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242
U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the
argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature,
said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often
held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule
which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of
liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in
the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs.California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of
law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of
the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the
situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., 82.)

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable
to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.

We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.

D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.

The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution
particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor
shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is
quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United
States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these
crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced,
compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly
involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude
may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)

So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a
description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.

E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching
scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so
as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See
Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty
by the exercise of the police power.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly
termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it
to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873],
70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of
legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.

The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police
power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the
police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of
Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill
and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)

With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any
constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be
effectuated.

F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be
remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of
the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.

The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the following:

To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior
on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable
progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging
reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest
after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one
year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.

Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But the
Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:

"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence
of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to educate their
children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately
result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation, or if not
they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."

The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has adopted
as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and
unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:

(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat
and settle in organized communities.

(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the
non-Christian people.

(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the extention of
government control.

(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social and
commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.

(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.

( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and
Sulu.

The Secretary adds:

To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people. These
people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of
civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and
settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize
them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and
objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more
highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to
promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts
Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the
Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:

It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the
region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete
manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian
elements populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)

May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By
the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?"
Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the
ultimate good of these people?

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have on the
Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors,
uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the
Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes,
and to improve the health and morals — was in fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in
Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that
they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances
voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.

Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely
accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more
fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true,
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos
who are a drag upon the progress of the State.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law,
and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons
protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the
Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be
encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the
Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and order.

Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness
are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard.
The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.

To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:

Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the
works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to
the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of
liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to
the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.

There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way.
They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going from one place to another in the mountains, burning
and destroying forests and making illegal caiñgins thereon.

Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived
thereof without due process of law?

xxx xxx xxx

But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a
class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?

To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will
mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of
the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent
state of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.

In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of either
letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord
with humanity and with national conscience.

xxx xxx xxx

The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education and
civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the
Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will
become useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most
of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal
interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead
this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people
from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their
favor that Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them
to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the
works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become
a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward
brothers.

The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to
improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to organize them
politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated
in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or
put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.

But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of imprisonment.
Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have
permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering
from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is
necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will
always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make
them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.

G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.

Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion.

In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not,
however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of
Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom
of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and
other similar were accepted and followed time and again without question.

It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a
prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The
answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not
motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the
purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists
the power of removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When,
however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention
of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment
of its laudable purpose.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual
members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence
of government from the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force,
it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that
the very existence of government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of
course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and
the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for
the courts to determine.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory,
are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of
governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the
government in this progressive march.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has
exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally
drastic remedy.

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one
say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection
of the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination
that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In
a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before
the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a
prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that
one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as
a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all
possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may
dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we
fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present.
The idea to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to
be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful
country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch,
be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts
whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly
famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs.Nelson [1911],
222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a
chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will
make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to
the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the
true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST:

Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still
in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been
ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are
a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.

One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi
and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:

With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
provincial board.

was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the
Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code.
Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the
provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is
necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but
that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief,
but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In
this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their
seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.

The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of
due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”

VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas
corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy,
yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of
popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power
of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men
instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other
departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all
reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined
to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government
office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At
any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and
the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their
belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart
from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers.
The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by
Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes
who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing
out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say,
generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to
work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return
to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for
the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a
member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of
the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will
be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that
the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city
fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and
deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the
action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend
beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women
were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their
consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty,
on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for
petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named
in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts,
were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the
Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed
between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that
the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered
alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as
laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore
it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a
second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court
nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the
court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written
statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or
unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further
stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for
the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen,
and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents
technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others
who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again
recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance,
it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with
their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could
return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to
Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban,
Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax,
members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney
for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that
the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck
from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We
will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and
then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the
women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police
and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their
secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what law did the Mayor and the
Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General
can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission
and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of
justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the
commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is
done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the
right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and
these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized
by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise
more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less,
therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of
police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same
privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official
can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against
her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over
the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large,
7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual
liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations
which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very
idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or
the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886],
118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the
very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of
laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil
action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest
with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such
situation as that now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who
shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of
the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than
three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the
Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a
fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has
violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty
thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case
which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully
confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might
be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure."
(In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this
instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a
assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and
that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees.
The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas
corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a
court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly
imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.)
Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have
been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this
is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.)
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of
the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that
court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their
attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown
that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish
its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior
court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel,
the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the
jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable
position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ
of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose
of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited
them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty
of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in
the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality,
and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under
no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be
that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus
to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed
has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not
issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of
Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to
change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty
has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it
may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable
courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor
child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of
the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell,
and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred
Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-
writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was
predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English
courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was
laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the
Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his
speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the
extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature
may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the state — seems
to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the
court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to
give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served
upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person
who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the
oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the
means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording
relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement
is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he
can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being
beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of
control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57
Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the
respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and
her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to
produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed
over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ.
He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to
have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the
writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and
must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown
that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant
had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to
produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many
efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing
that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done
before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not
producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the
same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case
[1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to the defendant to have
before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his
return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he
believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that
they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the
negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and
insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce
them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise
discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the
negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the
last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also
Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a
legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the
writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as
purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present
the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The
respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the
Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of
Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in
Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted
debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the
day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account
of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show
impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested.
Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a
considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in
the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the
second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the
respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all
tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things
by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would
only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every
possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials
and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to
mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a
better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined
in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-
charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a
failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding
to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is
now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained
of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this
connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the
city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and
Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does
not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience
to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns
[1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of
the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its
authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while,
under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of
telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the
legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to
strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position,
must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for
the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and
the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the
Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His
regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for
disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did
comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of
the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of
respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to
such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once
command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred
pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may
serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

CASE DIGEST:

FACTS:
Justo Lukban, mayor of Manila, ordered the district of ill-repute women closed. One hundred and seventy women were
deported to Davao without their knowledge and consent. The women were received as laborers in a banana plantation.
Some of the women were able to escape and return to Manila. The attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable
number of the deportees presented an application for heabes corpus to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and
2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao

HELD:
The respondents had no authority to deport the women. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are
the forum which function to safeguard liberty and to punish official transgressors. The essential object and purpose of writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. If the mayor and the chief of police could deport the women, they must have the means to return them from Davao
to Manila. The respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not be easily evaded. No one of the
defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.

VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN

G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS. JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M.
MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F.
ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

RESOLUTION

EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8) to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding
that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare
and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu,
Hawaii. In a statement, President Aquino said:

In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and
for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to
our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise
decide. [Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]

On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following major arguments:

1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent
right of citizens to return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all of the rights guaranteed
to Filipinos under the Constitution;

2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and

3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court
reconsider its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M. Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the
Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr.
Marcos, and the other petitioners, to the Philippines.

Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot
and academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being invoked by the
Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right'
to destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy orchestrated efforts at destabilization."
[Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.

We deny the motion for reconsideration.

1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to
show that there are compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.

2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no
compelling reasons have been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's decision.

The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario under
which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been
viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to
the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to
bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the
"legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."
[Comment, p. 1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]

3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction
to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly
those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is recognized
under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers among three (3)
separate branches.

Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive
authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton stressed the difference between the sweeping language of
article II, section 1, and the conditional language of article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . ." Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31
ought therefore to be considered, as intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution
power; leaving the rest to flow from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the
Constitution...

In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal executive,
unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by the constitutional
text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as
appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ." The language of Chief Justice Taft in
Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a synonym for power without limit; rather, the
concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration,
so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of "executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere
expressly limited. [TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 158-159 (1978).]

And neither can we subscribe to the view that a recognition of the President's implied or residual powers is tantamount to
setting the stage for another dictatorship. Despite petitioners' strained analogy, the residual powers of the President under
the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant
to Amendment No. 6 which provides:

Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence
thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately
on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue
the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land,

There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the 1987 Constitution and the power of the
President under the 1973 Constitution pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an express
grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a grant to the President of the specific power of
legislation.

4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and
promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the
remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In
the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."

CASE DIGEST:

FACTS:

Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to
enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.

RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles
on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the Congress (S.16), control of
all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making power (Section
21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to
be executive.
SANTIAGO VS MANGLAPUZ

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor; SANDIGANBAYAN and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.

Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.

Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:

Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's so-called "Motion to
Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety
of the mode adopted in elevating the issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in
the interest of an early resolution hereof.

The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear understanding and
perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:

1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against
petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1

3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:

xxx xxx xxx

3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which required surgical intervention. As of
this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme
pain. Further, she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain. . . . .

4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is
posting in cash be accepted.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of
P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of
this Honorable Court and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have recovered
sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.

Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond for her
provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time her
condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May 15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in
the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees.4

5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation "that
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building located in
Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a
brother who represented himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left
unaided, after staying for about fifteen minutes. 5

6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991, setting the arraignment of
the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance
before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said court on or before June 5, 1991.6

7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed provisional
liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may imply to other people
that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would like to prove as baseless.7

8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of
Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos. 12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555
(violation of Presidential Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining
order was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into
consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably
advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any
remedial right to meet said contingency.

9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner until further advice
from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further
initiative from her through counsel.8

10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and setting aside
the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually
denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.

11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against
petitioner which reads as follows:

Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to leave the country soon for an
extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition
promulgated on January 13, 1992, although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration from the accused,
considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having
been by reason of her earlier claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining order
issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24, 1991, the accused is ordered not to leave
the country and the Commission on Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused
unless authorized from (sic) this Court.10

The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was widely publicized in
both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States to accept a fellowship supposedly offered
by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be
addressing Filipino communities in the United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of
graft and corruption.

In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:

1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and due deference owing to a superior
tribunal when it issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this
Honorable Court.

3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights
enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired
only under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.

4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing circumstances which suggest political
harassment and persecution.

5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her characteristic transparency and candor,
there is no reasonable ground to fear that petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes.11

I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has
neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since
she never personally appeared before said court. We reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued
by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to
quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering
trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a
rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.13

In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court
upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed
"that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise
for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized
the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as evidenced by
Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under
consideration. This is further buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said
cash bond and for the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the
propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity
in dealing with the courts of justice.

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before respondent court to file her
cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion
for the acceptance of the cash bond, who requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she
shall have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around and
fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and accommodating her own request for
acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.

II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order
despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. She
claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by
a coordinate court, with more reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from
interfering with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She contends
further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order previously issued by this court enjoining
the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case pending before it.

It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is
petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order,
hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.

Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a judgment in an action for
injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And,
the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal,14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations
should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken
from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule
applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action.15

It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective, even though it is not
final.16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been
granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction17 and no formal order of dissolution is
necessary to effect such dissolution.18 Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an
injunction.19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power.20

The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:

. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that an appeal from an order dissolving an
injunction continued the injunction in force. The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by
Judge Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so insufficient on their face or so false in
their allegations that if he should apply on notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant
one, yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will improvidently grant one ex parte,
which the court on the first and only hearing ever had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex
parte injunction impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . . Such a result is so
unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity practice that no court should adopt such a construction
unless absolutely shut up to it by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . .21

This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in point and of more recent
vintage:

The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of UDMC to call a stockholders'
meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared
the way for the implementation by the SEC's en banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the
Court of Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a
preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or
during the pendency of an appeal. . . . .22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the Sandiganbayan from acting on and
proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner. At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992.

Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan
of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition
which, in the first place, had no reason for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural
scenarios.

The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation for the exercise of its
supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly
acquired over the case pending before them. It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari,
commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there
is no writ of injunction restraining it.23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or restraining
order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is nothing to prevent the lower court
from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is
issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.

III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and
freedom of speech.

First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is made by petitioner of the
fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the
same was issued ex mero motu by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
those expressly conferred on them.24 These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction;25 or essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts,26 as well as to the due
administration of justice;27 or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted
powers;28 and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.29

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to
do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence,
demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original
causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.

Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction.30 Such
being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a
proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court
would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends upon the particular circumstances. 31

Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement that she
had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies abroad. We uphold the course of action
adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further studies, there is no
sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law.

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete despite the absence of
petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and
which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by
petitioner in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down
in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,32 to the effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence
of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at
the same time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and
to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.

The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):

. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach
of the courts.

This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of
"national security, public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired
even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary
discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public
health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso &
Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.33

One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts
in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower
courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This
practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of petitions or motions
involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission
to leave the country from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such
applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and
the ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued ex
parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate remedies therein, through a
motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only
where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
indubitably obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked
through the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.

WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CASE DIGEST:

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for
acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post
cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred
it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that
she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C.
she argues that her right to travel is impaired.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioner’s right to travel is impaired.

Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement, that she he every intension of
leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure
order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction
over the case and the person of the accused.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and process of eth court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
(Manotoc v. C.A.)