IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS

249 SCRA 538

October 25 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in order, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of
5 years, and when ISA’s original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation, which is
itself an entity wholly owned by the National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among other
things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC,
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or
settlement a large tract of public land located in Iligan City and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of
NSCs.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-operational
chemical fertilizer plant owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated
16 November 1982, was issued directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the
Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the subject land.” LOI No. 1277 also directed
that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of the
LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate expropriation
proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject public land as well as the
plant itself and related facilities and to cede the same to the NSC.

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's term.

HELD:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality but did not
possess general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines. ISA may thus be properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines.

When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and
liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties,
functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the charter of that agency
and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly
regarded as folded back into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or
agency of the Republic.

In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272.

From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
ISA's statutory term did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
Antonio Mecano vs. COA (G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992)

Ponente: CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS:

Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement, denied
petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec.
Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter. Petitioner also
anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code. The COA, on the
other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to revoke or supplant in its
entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917.

HELD:

NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

RATIO:

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a
repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate
the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same
from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to
have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora

During the time of President Corazon Aquino, she created the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In the year 2000,
President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB. He subsequently ordered the employees of EIIB to be separated
from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force “Aduana”, which EIIB employees claim
to be essentially the same as EIIB. The employees of EIIB, through the Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB, invoked the Supreme
Court’s power of judicial review in questioning the said orders. EIIB employees maintained that the president has no power
to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in the legislature; and that the abolition violates their
constitutional right to security of tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition has merit.

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The exception is when it
comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive department, the president may deactivate them
pursuant to control power over such offices, unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the
president’s power to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws i.e., PD 1772
and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations has always exceeded P100 million per
year. To save the government some money, it needed to abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation
just P50 million. Further, TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.

Lastly, EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith in the abolition of EIIB, such
abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office
ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office or its salary.
Bagaoisan vs Nat'l Tobacco Administration. G.R. No. 152845 : August 5, 2003. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE. BY C Y.

DRIANITA BAGAOISAN, FELY MADRIAGA, SHIRLY TAGABAN, RICARDO SARANDI, SUSAN IMPERIAL, BENJAMIN DEMDEM,
RODOLFO DAGA, EDGARDO BACLIG, GREGORIO LABAYAN, HILARIO

JEREZ, and MARIA CORAZON CUANANG, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, represented by ANTONIO
DE GUZMAN and PERLITA BAULA, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

FACTS:

1. The petitioner was terminated from there position in the national tobacco administration as a result of the executive
order issued by president Estradawhic

mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco administration, a government agency under the department of
agriculture.

2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil service commission to recall the ossp.

3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction
and a temporary restraining

order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination and from
austing the petitioners in there

respective offices.

4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the national tobacco administration to appoint the petitioner to the
osspto position similar to the

one that they hold before.

5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the court of appeals who reversed the decision of the RTC.

6. Petitioner appealed to the supreme court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the reorganization of the national tobacco administration is valid true issuance of executive orderby the
president.

According to the supreme court,The president has the power to reorganized an office to achieve simplicity ,economy and
efficiency as provided under executive

order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which provides that activities of executive agencies may be scaled down if it is
no longer essential for the

delivery of public service.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are DENIED for
lack of merit. Let entry of judgment

be made in due course. No costs.