7. Boto vs.

Villena, 706 SCRA 1 (18 September 2013)

FACTS:

 An information for Libel against complainant Mary Rose A. Boto (Boto) filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch LXXIV, Taguig City (MeTC).
 The information was prepared by Assistant City Prosecutor Patrick Noel P. De Dios (De
Dios), the investigating prosecutor; and approved by City Prosecutor Archimedes
Manabat (Manabat). Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Vincent Villena (Villena) was the
trial prosecutor assigned to Branch LXXIV.
 Subsequently, Boto charged respondents Villena, Manabat and De Dios with gross
ignorance of the law for filing the information for libel before the MeTC and for
opposing the motion to quash despite the knowledge that the said first level court had no
jurisdiction over the case.
 On that libel case, she filed the Motion to Quash the information on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction as the crime of libel falls within, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and not with the MeTC and that there was no crime as internet libel;
 Boto added that Manabat, De Dios, and Villena had all been practicing law for quite a
number of years and it would be impossible for them not to know that the crime of
libel falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. She asserted that the respondents were all
ignorant of the law, whose incompetence was a disgrace not only to the Department of
Justice but to the legal profession as a whole.
 Apparently, when the libel case was quashed in the MeTC, the Information was
properly filed with the RTC, Taguig City.
 The respondents denied liability.
 De Dios (Ass. Prosec)averred that the information for libel against complainant was
filed before the MeTC due to inadvertence and that no malice or gross ignorance of
the law attended it. He added that the information was later on filed with the RTC-
Pasig;
 1Manabat (City Prosec) stated that the libel was filed based on the uncontroverted

evidence of the complainant therein; that the information, however, was filed
inadvertently with the MeTC; that there was no ignorance of the law or malice
involved as they had previously filed cases of libel with the RTC; that the inadvertent
filing was already corrected when the information was later on filed with the RTC
 The trial prosecutor, Villena, in his Comment,13 countered that the filing of the
information was not within his discretion as he was not the investigating prosecutor
and that it was not his duty to review the resolution of the investigating prosecutor as
he had no authority to approve or disapprove an information or its filing in court and
that . He could not be charged with gross ignorance of the law since he was not the
person whose judgment was called on to decide on whether or not the court had
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be held administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:

YES.

The Court finds that Boto has valid reasons to file this complaint against the
respondents who, being prosecutors, are members of the bar and officers of the
court.

Article 360 of the RPC explicitly provides that jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged
with the RTC.

De Dios candidly admitted that inadvertence attended the filing of the information for libel
with the MeTC. He did not, however, proffer any justification or explanation for the
error. He did not claim that the mistake was either typographical or was a result of
the application of a default form or template. In the Court's view, it was plain
carelessness.

Manabat, on the other hand, should have been more cautious and careful in
reviewing the report and recommendation of his subordinate. He should not have
approved the information and its filing in the wrong court considering that his office
was very knowledgeable of the law that jurisdiction in libel cases lies with the RTC

While De Dios and Manabat can validly claim inadvertence, Villena cannot invoke the
same defense. Though he didn’t file the information, he mishandled the case which
prejudiced the complainant.

When the motion to quash was filed by Boto for lack of jurisdiction, Villena should have
immediately acted on it by not opposing the dismissal of the case. The records disclose that
in his Comment,16Villena prayed that the motion to quash be DENIED.

Patently, this responsive pleading of Villena demonstrates that he did not know the
elementary rules on jurisdiction Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred
by law and is not within the courts, let alone the parties themselves, to determine or
conveniently set aside. It cannot be waived except for those judicially recognizable grounds
like estoppel. And it is not mooted by an action of a court in an erroneously filed case. It has
been held in a plethora of cases that when the law or procedure is so elementary, not to
know, or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even
without the complainant having to prove malice or bad faith. 19cralawlibrary

Villena should have even initiated the move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. His dismal failure to apply the basic rule on jurisdiction amounts to
ignorance of the law and reflects his lack of prudence, if not his incompetence, in the
performance of his duties.

As a responsible public servant, a prosecutor's primary duty is not to simply convict

but to see that justice is done.21 He is obliged to perform his duties fairly, consistently and
expeditiously, and respect and protect human dignity and uphold human rights in
contributing to ensuring due process and the smooth functioning of the criminal justice
system.22 As such, he should not initiate or continue prosecution, or shall make every
effort to stay the proceedings when it is apparent that the court has no jurisdiction over
the case. This is where Villena failed.
Note: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC to hear and try libel cases. In fact, the language of the law cannot be any clearer; its
meaning is free from doubt. All that is required is application.

De Dios: As no malice can be attributed, he merely deserves a reprimand.

Manabat: . As the head of office, he should be admonished to be more careful as his office is in the
forefront in the administration of criminal justice.

Villena: is found liable for Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, payable within 30 days from receipt of this resolution with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely
 8. Garcia v Executive Secretary (July 30, 2012)

FACTS:

 Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of
violation of:
o the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman); and
o Violation of the 97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military
Discipline) for;
o Failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Net worth for the year 2003 as required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA
6713.
 Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the Office of the
President(OP) directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary had already been
fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised
Penal Code).
 He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for six years and
two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
 Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court
martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2
years, at the maximum security compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
 The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and
distinct from ordinary courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts

RULING: The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within
which the petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence
confirmed by the Office of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.

The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the
word and acts as a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that
are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary.
“[A]bsent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and
execution of the General Court Martial’s decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of
confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
9. People vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division). 630
SCRA 489 (15 September 2010)

FACTS:
 Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Cebu, at the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445,
or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he
received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos
(P33,000.00).
 Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss[3]
 Petitioner filed its Opposition[5] to the Motion to Dismis.
 Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court.
 Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases
involving public officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not
occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not
only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed
in relation to office.
 Respondent Plaza argued that in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, it is apparent that the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the
general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section
4;
 Respondent added that Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original
jurisdiction only over the following cases:
o (a) where the accused is a public official with salary grade 27 and higher;
o (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a)
to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A.
3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
and
o (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three
aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a
position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan
could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code
of the Philippines.

RULING: YES. Held: Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.

Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the same law.
Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-govenors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial
department heads ( Sec. 4 (1) (a) of P.D. 1606); city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads
(Sec. 4 (1) (b) of P.D. 1606); officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and
higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP
chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.

In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of P.D. 1606 provides that other offenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

So, those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only
be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to
their office. The Supreme Court ruled in earlier cases that: as long as the offense charged in the
information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while
the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions, there
being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have committed it had he
not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for “an offense committed in
relation” to his office. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation
to the public officials or employees' office.