VII.
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION - instrument shall be regarded as registered only from
A. Voluntary Dealings with Registered Lands
I. PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK (SEC. 56)
Section 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified
copies. Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary
entry book in which, upon payment of the entry fee, he
shall enter, in the order of their reception, all
instruments including copies of writs and processes filed
with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a
preliminary process in registration, note in such book the
date, hour and minute of reception of all instruments, in
the order in which they were received. They shall be
regarded as registered from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument, when made on the
certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national government as well as
the provincial and city governments shall be exempt
from the payment of such fees in advance in order to be
entitled to entry and registration.
Every deed or other instrument, whether voluntary or
involuntary, so filed with the Register of Deeds shall be
numbered and indexed and endorsed with a reference to
the proper certificate of title. All records and papers
relative to registered land in the office of the Register of
Deeds shall be open to the public in the same manner as
court records, subject to such reasonable regulations as
the Register of Deeds, under the direction of the
Commissioner of Land Registration, may prescribe.
All deeds and voluntary instruments shall be presented
with their respective copies and shall be attested and
sealed by the Register of Deeds, endorsed with the file
number, and copies may be delivered to the person
presenting them.
Certified copies of all instruments filed and registered
may also be obtained from the Register of Deeds upon
payment of the prescribed fees.
Voluntary dealing
- in accordance with the will of the registered owner;
- necessary to surrender the owner’s duplicate.
Primary Entry Book or Day Book
- record of all instruments, including copies of writs and
processes, affecting registered lands;
- preliminary process in registration;
the moment it is noted in the day book;
- record is constructive notice of its contents and all
interests, legal and equitable.
Requirements for registration of voluntary
dealings
a. Filing and registration in the day book of the
notarized deed or instrument;
b. Surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title;
and
c. Payment in full of the proper registration fees within
15 days from date of entry.
DBP v. RD of Nueva Ecija (1988)
Principle: Entry in the primary entry book alone is
considered a complete act of registration as long as all
the requirements are present.
Facts: DBP presented for registration a sheriff's
certificate of sale in its favor of two parcels of land
covered, both in the names of the Sps. Bautista and
Calison. The transaction was entered in the Registry's
Primary Entry Book. DBP paid the requisite registration
fees on the same day. Annotation of the sale on the
covering certificates of title could not, however be
effected because the originals of those certificates were
found to be missing from the files of the Registry, where
they were supposed to be kept, and could not be
located. DBP instituted proceedings to reconstitute said
certificates, and reconstitution was ordered in a decision
rendered on June 15, 1982. For reasons not apparent on
the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted
only on June 19, 1984.
Issue: Whether the certificate of sale could be
registered using the old entry made in 1980
notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of the
reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on
June 19, 1984.
Held: Yes. DBP, complied with all that was required of it
for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the
certificate of sale. So long as the registrant has complied
with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, nothing more remains to be done but a duty
incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
 NHA v. Basa (2010)
Principle: (Reiteration of principle in DBP)
Facts: Sps. Basa procured a loaned from NHA secured
by real estate mortgage. The loan remained unpaid and
NHA foreclosed the mortgage. The sheriff's certificate of
sale was registered and annotated only on the owner's
duplicate copies of the titles in the hands of the
respondents, since the titles in the custody of the RD
were among those burned down when a fire gutted the
QC City Hall. After the redemption period, NHA
consolidated ownership over the foreclosed properties,
and the same was inscribed by the RD on the certificates
of title in the hand of NHA. Respondents theorized that
since the sheriff's certificate was only inscribed on the
owner's duplicate certificate of title, and not on the
certificate of title in the possession of the RD, then there
was no effective registration and the one-year
redemption period had not begun to run. Thus,
respondents sought to redeem the property.
Issue: Whether the annotation of the sheriff's certificate
of sale on the owner's duplicate certificate of titles is
sufficient registration considering that the inscription on
the original certificates could not be made as the same
got burned.
Held: Yes. The prevailing rule is that there is effective
registration once the registrant has fulfilled all that is
needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so
that what is left to be accomplished lies solely on the
register of deeds.
Durawood v. Bona (2012)
Principle: All the requirements must be complied with
in order to confer jurisdiction upon the RD.
Facts: Durawood filed an action for sum of money plus
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against LBB Construction as
payment for construction materials. RTC then issued an
Order for the issuance of a writ of attachment. On June
17, 2004, A Notice of Levy on Attachment was
annotated on the TCT of LBB’s property. Candice Bona
filed a Motion seeking leave to intervene claiming
therein that LBB Construction had sold the property to
her and her siblings through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
She asserted that the sale is the subject of an entry
dated June 16, 2004 in the books of the RD, while
the levy on attachment is subject to an entry dated later
on June 17, 2004.
Issue: Whether the sale annotated earlier should
prevail over the levy on execution.
Held: No. While it was true that the levy came later, it
turned out that the fee required in the sale was not
paid. There was one requirement that was not complied
with which was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the
RD. As such, there was no complete act of registration.
For failure to pay the fee, the levy on execution takes
precedence over the Deed of Absolute Sale.
Things to remember before invoking DBP
principle
1. There should be compliance with the essential
requisites of a valid contract.
2. Legal formalities of certain documents should be
complied with i.e. notarized or in a public instrument,
signature of parties and witnesses in each page, etc.
Absent any mandatory requirement, RD may refuse
the registration of a voluntary dealing.
3. Performance of the jurisdictional requirements. You
have to show the owner’s duplicate copy should be
presented in a voluntary dealing and then the
registration fee should be paid. In the absence of
payment of registration fee, the RD has no
jurisdiction to entertain the transaction.
4. It should be accompanied with supporting documents
i.e. BIR Capital gains tax, transfer tax, SPA, etc.
II. DOUBLE SALES (ART. 1544)
ART. 1544, NCC. If the same thing should have been
sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
Note: Registration contemplated in this provision refers
to registration under the Torrens System, which
considers the act of registration as the operative act that
gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land. This rule precisely applies to cases involving
conflicting rights over registered property and those of
innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of the
properties. Thus, we held that registration must be done
in the proper registry in order to bind the same.
(Melencio v. CA)
San Lorenzo v. CA (2005)
Principle: He who is first in time is preferred in right.
“Prior est temporae, prior est in jura.” When the thing
sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it first
and records it in the Registry of Property, both made in
good faith, shall be deemed the owner.
Facts: Sps. Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land
to Pablo Babasanta. However, SLDC claims that the
subject parcels had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute
Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it was a buyer in
good faith and for value and therefore it had a better
right over the property in litigation. SLDC further alleged
that it only learned of the filing of the complaint
sometime in the early part of January 1990. SLDC
argued that it had no obligation to look beyond the titles
submitted to it by the Sps. Lu particularly because
Babasanta’s claims were not annotated on the
certificates of title at the time the lands were sold to it.
Admittedly, SLDC registered the sale with the RD in June
1990 after it had acquired knowledge of Babasanta’s
claim. Babasanta, however, strongly argues that the
registration of the sale by SLDC was not sufficient to
confer upon the latter any title to the property since the
registration was attended by bad faith. Specifically, he
points out that at the time SLDC registered the sale,
there was already a notice of lis pendens on the file with
the RD, the same having been filed one year before in
June 1989.
Issue: Did the registration of the sale after the
annotation of lis pendens obliterate the effects of
delivery and possession in good faith which admittedly
occurred prior to SLDC’s knowledge of the transaction in
favor of Babasanta?
Held: No. SLDC qualifies as a buyer in good faith since
there is no proof that it had knowledge of the prior
transaction in favor of Babasanta at the time they
acquired the property from Sps. Lu. At the time of the
sale to SLDC, Sps. Lu were still the registered owners of
the property and were in fact still in possession of the
lands. Note that the rule on constructive notice operates
as such from the time of the registration of the notice of
lis pendens which in this case was affected only in June
1989, at which time the sale in favor of SLDC had long
been consummated.
Melencio v. CA (2007)
Principle: Registration should be made in the proper
registry in order to bind the land. If a parcel of land
covered by a Torrens title is sold, but the sale is
registered under Act 3344, and not PD 1529, the sale is
not considered registered and the registration of the
deed does not operate as constructive notice to the
whole world.
Note: Act 3344 is the system for registration of
unregistered lands.
Facts: The entire property was brought under the
operation of the Torrens System but the title thereto
was lost during the Second World War. The Amodias
allegedly conveyed the subject property to respondent
AZNAR. This transaction was registered under Act 3344.
Subsequently, the Amodias conveyed the subject
property in favor of Go Kim Chuan. A TCT was issued in
the name of Go Kim Chuan under Act 496. AZNAR filed a
case against petitioners Amodias and Go Kim Chuan for
Annulment of Sale and Cancellation of TCT alleging that
the sale to Go Kim Chuan was an invalid second sale of
the subject property which had earlier been sold to it.
Issue: Who between Go Kim Chuan and AZNAR was
able to validly register the property.
Ruling: Since the sale in favor of AZNAR was registered
under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, the said
document is deemed not registered. Rather, it was the
sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan which was registered
under Act No. 496. AZNAR insists that since there was
no Torrens title on file in 1964, insofar as the vendors,
AZNAR, and the Register of Deeds are concerned, the
subject property was unregistered at the time. The
contention is untenable. The fact that the certificate of
title over the registered land is lost does not convert it
into unregistered land.
Antonio v. Santos (2007)
Principle: When two certificates of title are issued to
different persons covering the same land in whole or in
part, the earlier in date must prevail; and in case of
successive registrations where more than one certificate
is issued over the same land, the person holding a prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against a person who
relies on a subsequent certificate.
Facts: Antonio filed an application for the registration of
two parcels of land, one of which His application was
docketed as LRC No. 142-A. RTC declared him the true
and absolute owner in fee simple of the two parcels of
land he applied for but set aside its decision with respect
to the second lot to avoid duplication of issuance of
titles. After investigation, he discovered that the second
lot was already titled in the name of respondents
Santos. He argued that the OCT in respondents' names,
insofar as it included the second lot, is, null and void
because it was obtained through fraudulent
misrepresentations and machinations. On the other
hand, respondents averred that OCT No. 108 was duly
issued to them by the RD and further alleged that prior
to the issuance of OCT No. 108, they, as registered
owners, had always been in peaceful possession of the
property and at no time had Antonio possessed the
property, nor did he ever make any claim against the
said property.
Issues: Was the decision in LRC No. 142-A sufficient
basis of petitioner's claim of ownership over the subject
property?
Ruling: Petitioner cannot rely on the decision in LRC
No. 142- A. Even if a title had been issued to petitioner
based on said decision, his title would be of a later date
than the title of respondents, hence inefficacious and
ineffective.
III. INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE (SEC. 53)
Section 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon
entry of new certificate. No voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the owner's
duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument,
except in cases expressly provided for in this Decree or
upon order of the court, for cause shown.
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate,
whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration, shall be conclusive authority from the
registered owner to the Register of Deeds to enter a
new certificate or to make a memorandum of
registration in accordance with such instrument, and the
new certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon
the registered owner and upon all persons claiming
under him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in
good faith.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner
may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to
the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title. After the entry of the decree of
registration on the original petition or application, any
subsequent registration procured by the presentation of
a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or
other instrument, shall be null and void.
Things to Remember regarding Sec. 53
1. Surrender of owner’s duplicate certificate is authority
for the RD to enter registration. No voluntary
instrument shall be registered by the RD unless the
owner’s duplicate certificate is presented with such
instrument, except in cases upon order of the court
for cause shown.
- The issuance of a new TCT by the RD to the
purchaser, w/o the presentation of the owner’s
duplicate, is unwarranted and confers no right on
the purchaser.
- In case of refusal or failure to surrender owner’s
duplicate certificate, the party in interest may file
a petition in court to compel surrender of the
same to the RD pursuant to Sec. 107.
- Original owner may seek annulment of transfer on
the ground of fraud.
2. Generally, a forged deed is a nullity and conveys no
title. But a forged deed may be the basis of a valid
title if the certificate of title has already been
transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger, and while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser for value.
Peralta v. Abalon (2014)
Principle: A forged instrument may be a root of a valid
title.
Caveat: According to Sir, he’s a little bit disturbed by
the ruling in this case. Yes, the rule is that a forged
instrument may be a root of a valid title. But remember,
not when the title itself is null and void. The owner’s title
was issued from a petition filed in court by Rellama
claiming that the title was lost. The court in a situation
like this has no jurisdiction. The second owner’s copy is
considered as null and void because the court has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate when it has not been proved
that the original was lost. Here, the real title was still in
the possession of the heirs of Abalon. So you mean to
say you will just disregard it by the mere issuance of a
second owner’s duplicate? Sir believes that the Torres
decision cited in this case should be the proper doctrine.
Torres Principle: “XXX the doctrine relied upon by the
appellate court that a forged instrument may become
the root of a valid title, cannot be applied where the
owner still holds a valid and existing certificate of title
covering the same interest in a realty.”
Facts: A parcel of land originally covered by an OCT
under the name of Abalon was conveyed to Rellama,
thus cancelling the OCT and a new TCT was issued in
favor of Rellama. Subsequently the lots were subdivided
into three wherein one portion of such land was sold to
Sps. Peralta and another to the Andals. Claiming that
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor
of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further
that they acquired the subject property by succession,
plaintiff-appellees filed the case below against
defendants Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the Andals.
The Abalons allege that they have always been in
possession of the owner’s duplicate certificate of the
OCT. More so, Abalon claimed that the respondents are
not buyers in good faith as they were aware that the
subject land was in the possession of the Abalons.
Issue: Whether not a forged instrument may become
the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, even if the true owner thereof has
been in possession of the genuine title, which is valid
and has not been cancelled.
Held: Yes. Under fraudulent circumstances, Rellama
succeeded in obtaining a title in his name and selling a
portion of the property to the Andals, who had no
knowledge of the fraudulent circumstances involving the
transfer from Abalon to Rellama. To the Andals, there
was no doubt that Rellama was the owner of the
property being sold to them, and that he had
transmissible rights of ownership over the said property.
Since the Andals are considered as innocent purchasers
in good faith, they had every right to rely on the face of
his title alone.
Legarda v. CA (1997)
Principle: When the subject property is already in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, it can no
longer be returned to its original owner.
Facts: Cathay filed a complaint against Legarda alleging
that Legarda entered into a lease agreement with it,
through its representative Cabrera, and that there was a
breach of the terms thereof. Pursuant to a court order,
the property of the Legarda was eventually sold to
Cabrera at a public auction and thereafter registered
under his name. After learning the unfortunate turn of
events, Legarda sought to annul the judgment at the
CA. Howver, Legarda was declared in default due to
negligence of counsel. Later, the SC (Gayanco decision)
ruled in favor of Legarda on account that the negligence
of her counsel affected her right to due process. It
ordered Cathay to reconvey the property to Legarda and
to cancel the registration of the said property in the
name of Cathay. However, after this decision, Cathay
was not able to return the property to Legarda because
it nor longer possessed nor owned the property since
such has already been subject to a series of transfers to
innocent third parties at the time of promulgation of the
said judgment.
Issue: Whether or not the subsequent transfers of the
property are valid as the sucessors in interest were
considered as innocent purchasers for value.
Held: Yes, the transfers were valid and the successors
of interest of Cabrera are innocent purchasers of good
faith. The successors relied on the clean title of the
subject land that were presented by their predecessors.
Since the property is already in the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, it can no longer be returned to its
original owner by Cabrera, much less by Cathay itself.
Chua v. Soriano (2007)
Principle: When a person who deals with registered
land through someone who is not the registered owner,
he is expected to look behind the certificate of title and
examine all the factual circumstances in order to
determine if the vendor has the capacity to transfer any
interest in the land..
Facts: Soriano executed a SPA authorizing his cousin
Celestino to mortgage his property. Due to fire that
gutted a portion of the Quezon City Hall, the original
copy of the TCT was destroyed. Soriano also executed a
SPA authorizing Celestino to initiate administrative
reconstitution. During the pendency of the
administrative reconstitution proceedings, Soriano
discovered that the TCT under his name had been
cancelled and another one had been issued in the name
of the Chuas. Soriano filed a complaint
against Celestino and the Chuas seeking annulment of
title and reconveyance. The Chuas assert that they are
purchasers in good faith since they bought the property
from Celestino by virtue of a SPA which was duly
inscribed and annotated on the owner's duplicate of the
TCT, and that they have duly inspected the property
before purchasing it.
Issue: Whether the Chuas are purchasers in good faith,
and as such, have validly acquired the subject property.
Held: Yes, The Chuas are purchasers in good faith, and
as such have already acquired valid title to the
property. As a general rule, every person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title. However, when a person who deals
with registered land through someone who is not the
registered owner, he is expected to look behind the
certificate of title and examine all the factual
circumstances. In the present case, an examination of
the assailed SPA shows that it is valid and regular on its
face. The reliance by the Chuas on
the notarial acknowledgment found in the duly notarized
SPA is sufficient evidence of good faith. The fact
that Soriano's purported signature in the SPA was later
on declared to be a forgery does not alter
the Chuas status as purchasers in good faith.
Cusi v. Domingo (2013)
Principle: A purchaser of property, without taking the
ordinary precautions of honest persons doing business
and examining the records of the proper RD, cannot be
in good faith where the title thereof shows that it was
reconstituted or reissued owner’s copy of certificate of
title.
Facts: The disputed property was a vacant unfenced lot
covered by a TCT in the name of respondent Domingo.
Representing herself as the owner of the property, Sy
petitioned for the issuance of a new owner’s copy of
Domingo’s TCT, appending to her petition a deed of
absolute sale purportedly executed in her favor by
Domingo; and an affidavit of loss whereby she claimed
that her bag containing the owner’s copy of said TCT
had been snatched. RTC granted Sy’s petition and Sy
eventually procured a TCT her name. Sy subsequently
subdivided the property into two, and sold each half by
way of contract to sell to Spouses De Vera and to
Spouses Cusi. All the while, the transactions between Sy
and the De Veras, and between Sy and the Cusis were
unknown to Domingo, whose TCT remained in her
undisturbed possession. Domingo commenced this
action against Sy and the De Veras and the Cusis in the
RTC seeking the annulment or cancellation of titles,
injunction and damages.
Issue: Whether the Cusis and De Vera, having relied on
a reissued title, are purchasers for value and good faith.
Held: The petitioners were not innocent purchasers in
good faith and for value. The petitioners were shown to
have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the
property. It was not enough for them to show that the
property was unfenced and vacant nor was it safe for
them to simply rely on the face of Sy’s TCT in view of
the fact that they were aware that her TCT was derived
from a duplicate owner’s copy reissued by virtue of the
loss of the original duplicate owner’s copy. That
circumstance should have already alerted them to the
need to inquire beyond the face of Sy’s TCT.
Saberon v. Ventanilla (2014)
Principle: Registration is the operative act that conveys
ownership or affects the land insofar as third persons
are concerned. Registration is constructive notice to
third persons.
Facts: The Ventanillas sought the recovery of two
parcels of land which the vendors, MRCI and AUVC, sold
to another party. The Ventanillas caused the attachment
of a notice of levy covering the subject property and was
annotated in the entry book of the RD of QC. MRCI dealt
the same property to Marquez, however, the notice of
levy was not carried over to Marquez’s title. Marquez
subsequently sold the property to the Saberons. The
Saberons filed a case on one central argument—that
they were purchasers in good faith, having relied on the
correctness of the certificates of title covering the lots in
question. Admittedly, the notice of levy covering the
subject property was annotated in the entry book of the
RD of QC prior to the issuance of a TCT in the name of
the Saberons.
Issue: Did the notice on levy annotated in the entry
book of the RD of QC serve as constructive notice to the
Saberons?
Held: No bad faith can be ascribed to the parties alike.
Nevertheless, the equal footing of the parties necessarily
tilts in favor of the superiority of the Ventanillas' notice
of levy. The fact that the notice of levy on attachment
was not annotated on the original title on file in the RD,
which resulted in its non-annotation on the title of
Marquez should not prejudice petitioner. As long as the
requisites required by law in order to effect attachment
are complied with and the appropriate fees duly paid,
attachment is duly perfected. What remained to be done
was not within the Ventanillas’ power to perform but
was a duty incumbent solely on the RD. Clearly, the
Ventanillas’ levy was placed on record prior to the sale.
This shows the superiority and preference in rights of
the Ventanillas over the property as against the
Saberons.
IV. REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE [REM] (SEC. 60)
Section 60. Mortgage or lease of registered
land. Mortgage and leases shall be registered in the
manner provided in Section 54 of this Decree. The
owner of registered land may mortgage or lease it by
executing the deed in a form sufficient in law. Such deed
of mortgage or lease and all instruments which assign,
extend, discharge or otherwise deal with the mortgage
or lease shall be registered, and shall take effect upon
the title only from time of registration.
No mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate of title
shall hereafter be issued by the Registers of Deeds, and
those issued prior to the effectivity of this Decree are
hereby deemed canceled and the holders thereof shall
immediately surrender the same to the Register of
Deeds concerned.
Requisites of mortgage (Art. 2085, NCC)
1. That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a
principal obligation;
2. That the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the
thing mortgaged; and
3. That the persons constituting the mortgage have the
free disposal of their property, and in the absence
thereof, that they be legally authorized for the
purpose.
Things to Remember Regarding REM
- Mortgage lien is a right in rem which follows the
property;
- A REM is a voluntary transaction, as such, you have
to present the owner’s duplicate of copy for purposes
of registration;
- The REM is the accessory contract; the primary
contract is the contract of loan.
Home Bankers v. CA (2005)
Principle: The one who mortgaged the property must
be the absolute owner of the property. With respect to
banks, they have to go beyond the title and exercise
extraordinary diligence.
Facts: Each of private respondents namely, entered into
separate contracts to sell with TransAmerican through
the latter's Owner/General Manager, Engr. Jesus Garcia,
involving certain portions of land. On May 30, 1989,
Engr. Garcia and his wife obtained a loan from petitioner
Home Bankers without the prior approval of the HLURB
and mortgaged eight lots as collateral. Home Bankers
registered its mortgage on these titles without any other
encumbrance or lien annotated therein. However, five
out of these eight titles turned out to be private
respondents' townhouses subject of the contracts to sell
with TransAmerican. Home Bankers eventually
foreclosed the mortgage, and a sheriff’s certificate of
sale in its favor was annotated on the titles of the
subject lots.
Issue: Whether the mortgage was valid and
enforceable against respondents.
Held: No, the mortagege was null and void. Garcia was
not the absolute owner of the subject parcels. Moeover,
Home Bankers cannot be innocent purchasers because
judicial notice can be taken of the uniform practice of
banks to investigate, examine and assess the real estate
offered as security for the application of a loan. We
cannot overemphasize the fact that the Bank cannot
barefacedly argue that simply because the title or titles
offered as security were clean of any encumbrances or
lien, that it was thereby relieved of taking any other step
to verify the over-reaching implications should the
subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure.
 Dela Merced v . GSIS
Facts: The Zulueta spouses mortgaged several lots
contained to the GSIS, which eventually foreclosed on the
mortgaged properties. Upon consolidation of GSISs
ownership, TCT in Zuluetas name was cancelled, and TCT
was issued in GSISs name. Upon learning of the foreclosure,
petitioners Dela Merced filed a complaint praying for the
nullity of the GSIS foreclosure on the subject properties on the
ground that he, was the owner of these lots at the time of the
foreclosure. Dela Merced caused the annotation of lis pendens
on GSISs TCT in order to protect his interests in the subject
properties. GSIS then sold the properties to Victorino and
Dimaguila and the TCT was subsequently cancelled and
new individual titles were issued. Both titles had the
notice of lis pendens which was carried over from the
previous TCT.
Issue: Whether a judgment against GSIS is binding to
purchasers pendente lite Victorino and Dimaguila.
Held: When a transferee pendente lite takes property
with notice of lis pendens, such transferee undertakes to
respect the outcome of the litigation. An order to cancel
the transferor's title may be enforced against his
transferee, whose title is expressly subject to the
outcome of the litigation by the fact of the annotation of
lis pendens. The existence of these entries on
Dimaguila's and Victorino's titles bars any defense of
good faith against petitioners and effectively makes
Dimaguila and Victorino mere privies of GSIS and
subject to whatever rights GSIS might have in the
subject properties, which (as it turns out) is none at all.
What Dimaguila and Victorino possess are derivative
titles of the GSIS's over the subject parcels, which this
Court has finally adjudicated to be null and void.
Erena vs Querrer-Kaufman
Principle: The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith
presupposes that the mortgagor who is not the rightful
owner of the property, has already succeeded in
obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his name
and that, after obtaining the said title, he succeeds in
mortgaging the property to another who relies on what
appears on the said title. It does not apply to a situation
where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner
and the mortgagor is a different person pretending to be
the owner.
FACTS:
Vida Dana Querrer-Kauffman is the owner of a
residential lot with a house constructed thereon. The
owner’s duplicate copy of the title as well as the tax
declaration covering the property, were kept in a safety
deposit box in the house. She went to the US and
entrusted the key to the safety deposit box to Victor, her
live-in partner and the latter entrusted to his sister
Bernal the key when the latter went to the US as well.
However, the owner’s duplicate title and the tax
declarations went missing. Respondent and her sister
Pares went to the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas City
and found out that the lot had been mortgaged to
Rosana Ereña herein petitioner, on August 1, 1997. It
appeared that a "Vida Dana F. Querrer" had signed the
Real Estate Mortgage as owner-mortgagor, together
with Victor’s daughter Jennifer V. Ramirez, as attorney-
in-fact.
Kauffman filed a complaint against Ereña, Bernal and
Jennifer Ramirez for Nullification of Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage and Damages with prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
in the RTC of Las Piñas City. Ereña interposed the
defense of being a mortgagee in good faith. She likewise
interposed a cross-claim against Bernal and Jennifer
Ramirez for the refund of the P250,000.00 she loaned to
"Vida Dana Querrer." Kaufman alleged that the signature
in the real estate mortgage contract was a forgery.
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether or not the real estate mortgage
is void
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is a mortgagee
in good faith
RULING: Yes, it is void.
The trial and appellate courts found that respondent, as
plaintiff below, adduced clear and convincing evidence
that she is the owner of the property and that the
signature on the Special Power of Attorney and Real
Estate Mortgage are not her genuine signatures. When
respondent and her sister, Evelyn Pares, confronted Mira
Bernal (Jennifer Ramirez’s aunt), Bernal pleaded for
mercy, on bended knees, after admitting that she and
Jennifer Ramirez stole the owner’s duplicate copy of the
title and the tax declarations covering the property
impliedly admitted that they forged the respondent’s
signature on the Real Estate Mortgage.
One of the essential requisites of a mortgage contract is
that the mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the
thing mortgaged. A mortgage is, thus, invalid if the
mortgagor is not the property owner. In this case, the
trial court and the CA are one in finding that based on
the evidence on record the owner of the property is
respondent who was not the one who mortgaged the
same to the petitioner.
This last proviso in Sec. 55 of the Land Registration Act
is a limitation of the first part of par. 2 in the sense that
in order that the holder of a certificate for value issued
by virtue of the registration of a voluntary instrument
may be considered a holder in good faith for value, the
instrument registered should not be forged. When the
instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by
the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered
owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does
the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or
title to the property.
Atty. G’s comments: In this case the mortgage
contract is registered in the ROD so it is presumed that
it was notarized but as long as you can prove in court
that there was really forgery then it is considered as null
and void. The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith
applies if although the mortgagor is not the rightful
owner, he has already succeeded in obtaining the title in
his name. In this instance, the mortgagor is not the
registered owner but just a mere forger. The title during
the execution of the mortgage was still registered in the
name of respondent and hence the doctrine will not
apply.
v. SALE INVOLVING REAL ESTATE
Types of Pricing Agreement
(In Sales involving Real Estate)
Unit Price Contract – purchase price is determined by
way of reference to a stated rate per unit area
Lump Sum Contract – full purchase price is stated for
an immovable, the area of which may be declared based
on an estimate or where both the area and boundaries
are stated
Where both the area and the boundaries of the
immovable are declared, the area covered within the
boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated
area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries,
it is the latter which should prevail. It is well established
that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any statement with respect to the area
contained within its boundaries.
The use of “more or less” or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.
The words are intended to cover slight or unimportant
inaccuracies in quantity and ordinarily to be interpreted
as taking case of unsubtantial differences compared to
the whole number of items inferred.
Esguerra v. Trinidad
Facts: Felipe Esguerra and Praxedes de Vera (Esguerra
spouses) were the owners of several parcels of land.
Half of which (17,642 square meters) they sold to their
grandchildren, herein petitioners; and a 23,989-square
meter parcel of land of which they also sold to
petitioners, and the remaining 500 square meters they
sold to their other grandchildren, the brothers Eulalio
and Julian Trinidad (Trinidad brothers).
Also sold to the Trinidad brothers were a 7,048-square
meter parcel of land and a 768-square meter parcel of
land. The Esguerra spouses executed the necessary
Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners and Trinidad
brothers. Both documents were executed before a
notary public.
Eulalio Trinidad later sold his share of the land to his
daughters-respondents herein, a portion of the land
consisting of 1,693 square meters was later assigned Lot
No. 3593 during a cadastral survey conducted in the late
1960s.
Respondents applied for registration of title of Lot No.
3593 and was issued OCT No. 0-3631. Meanwhile,
petitioners sold to respondents' parents Eulalio Trinidad
and Damiana Rodeadilla (Trinidad spouses) a portion of
about 5,000 square meters of the 23,489-square meter
of land which they previously acquired from the
Esguerra spouses.
During the same cadastral survey conducted in the late
1960s, it was discovered that the about 5,000-square
meter portion of petitioners' parcel of land sold to the
Trinidad spouses which was assigned Lot No. 3591
actually measured 6,268 square meters.
Respondents applied for registration of title of Lot No.
3591 and was issued OCT No. 0-6498.
Petitioners, alleging that upon verification with the LRA
they discovered the issuance of the above-stated two
OCTs, filed on August 29, 1994 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan two separate complaints
for their nullification on the ground that they were
procured through fraud or misrepresentation.
Issues:
Whether or not the provisions of Article 1542 of the Civil
Code were properly applied;
Ruling:
Yes, the provisions of Article 1542 of the New Civil Code
were properly applied.
In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not
at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or
number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the
price, although there be a greater or less areas or
number than that stated in the contract. The lower
courts correctly characterized the sale of Lot No. 3591
as one involving a lump sum contract. The Bilihan ng
Lupa shows that the parties agreed on the purchase
price of P1,000.00 on a predetermined, albeit
unsurveyed, area of 5,000 square meters and not on a
particular rate per unit area. As noted by the Court of
Appeals, the identity of the realty was sufficiently
described
Under Article 1542, what is controlling is the entire land
included within the boundaries, regardless of whether
the real area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. Though measured as 5,000 square
meters, more or less, such measurement is only an
approximation, and not an exact measurement.
Moreover, we take note of the fact that the said deed of
sale mentioned the boundaries covering the whole area
of 33,489 square meters, including the "bahaging
palayan." Had appellants intended to sell only a portion
of the "bahaging palayan," they could have stated the
specific area in the deed of sale and not the entire
"bahaging palayan".
Atty G’s comments: Lump sum contract rule is that it
should be the boundaries that should be controlling and
not the area stated. How did the document describe as
to the boundary? The instrument stated the “bahaging
palayan”, although it was measured as 5000 sq.meters
more or less. It was considered by SC as lump sum
contract as part of the sale because of the description
“bahaging palayan”. There was an increase by 1/4th of a
fraction in the area contemplated in the deed of sale and
it cannot be considered as unconscionable excess. So
the excess 1,268 sq.meters is deemed part of the sale.
Del Prado vs Caballero
Facts: Spouses Antonio L. Caballero and Leonarda B.
Caballero obtained a favorable judgment over several
parcels of land situated in Guba, Cebu City, one of which
was Cadastral Lot No.11909, the subject of this
controversy. Consequently, on May 25,1987, the same
court, ordered the National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration to issue the decree of
registration and the corresponding titles of the lots in
favor of the Caballeros. Therein, the technical
description of Lot No. 11909 states that said lot
measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less.
On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner,
Carmen del Prado, Lot No. 11909 on the basis of the tax
declaration covering the property. On March 20, 1991,
petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a
"Petition for Registration of Document Under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1529" in order that a certificate of title be
issued in her name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909.
In the petition, petitioner alleged that the tenor of the
instrument of sale indicated that the sale was for a lump
sum or cuerpocierto, in which case, the vendor was
bound to deliver all that was included within said
boundaries even when it exceeded the area specified in
the contract.
Respondents opposed, on the main ground that only
4,000 sqm of Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner. They
claimed that the sale was not for a lump sum. They
moved for the outright dismissal of the petition on
grounds of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the land was for a
lump sum or not.
Ruling: Sale is for a lump sum.
The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating
quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A
vendee of land sold in gross or with the description
"more or less" with reference to its area does not
thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land.
Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of
unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area.
Courts must consider a host of other factors.
In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit
price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price
of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m,
more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903,
on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos.
11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific
boundaries stated in the contract must control over any
other statement, with respect to the area contained
within its boundaries.
It is to be noted that the records reveal that when the
parties made an ocular inspection, petitioner specifically
pointed to that portion of the lot, which she preferred to
purchase, since there were mango trees planted and a
deep well thereon. After the sale, respondents delivered
and segregated the area of 4,000 sq m in favor of
petitioner by fencing off the area of 10,475 sq m
belonging to them.
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be
considered a slight difference in quantity. The difference
in the area is obviously sizeable and too substantial to
be overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or
deficiency that should be deemed included in the deed
of sale.
Atty G’s comments: This is between the area stated in
the contract versus the boundary. The 10,000 square
meter difference compared to the 4000 sq m is
substantial to be considered in the” more or less”phrase.
Although the instrument specifically provides the lot
numbers, when they checked the lot numbers they
cannot find lot 11919 anymore, the SC cannot anymore
tell the difference of the specific lot numbers so the SC
went to the ocular inspection providing the entire form.
vi. Caveat Emptor Principle (“Buyer beware”)
-the rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be
aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who
buys without checking the vendor’s title takes all the
risks and losses consequent to such failure.
How to conduct Due Diligence Verification of title:
1. Verify the origin, history, authenticity and validity of
the title with the Register of Deeds and Land
Registration Authority
2. Engage the services of a competent and reliable
geodetic engineer to verify the boundary, metes and
bounds of the lot subject of said title based on the
technical description in the said title and the approved
survey plan in the Land Management Bureau
3. Conduct an actual ocular inspection
4. Inquire from the owners and possessors of adjoining
lots with respect to the true and legal ownership of the
lot in question
5. Put up signs that said lot is being purchased, leased
or encumbered
6. Undertake such other measures to make the general
public aware that said lot will be subject
to alienation, lease or encumbrance by the parties
(Domingo Realty Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,
MIRROR PRINCIPLE: Where there is nothing on the
certificate of title to indicate cloud or vice in ownership
or encumbrance, the purchaser is not required to
explore further than the Torrens title.
Sy v. Capistrano
Facts: Sometime in 1980, Nenita Scott (Scott)
approached respondent and offered her services to help
him sell his 13,785 square meters of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 76496 of the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City. Capistrano gave her
a temporary authority to sell which expired without
any sale transaction being made.
To his shock, he discovered later that TCT No. 76496,
which was in his name, had already been cancelled on
June 24, 1992 and a new one, TCT No. 249959, issued
over the same property on the same date to Josefina A.
Jamilar. TCT No. 249959 likewise had already been
cancelled and replaced by three (3) TCTs (Nos.
251524, 251525, and 251526), all in the names of the
Jamilar spouses. TCT Nos. 251524 and 251526 had also
been cancelled and replaced by TCT Nos. 262286 and
262287 issued to Nelson Golpeo and John B. Tan,
respectively.
Respondent filed an action for reconveyance, alleging
that his and his wife's signatures on the purported deed
of absolute sale in favor of Scott were forgeries; that
the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 76496 in his
name had always been in his possession; and that Scott,
the Jamilar spouses, Golpeo, and Tan were not innocent
purchasers for value because they all participated in
defrauding him of his property.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners and the Jamilar spouses
are innocent purchasers for value
Ruling:
No, they are not innocent purchasers for value. In
finding that the Jamilar spouses were not innocent
purchasers for value of the subject property, the CA
properly held that they should have known that the
signatures of Scott and Capistrano were forgeries due to
the patent variance of the signatures in the two deeds of
sale shown to them by Scott, when Scott presented to
them the deeds of sale, one allegedly executed by
Capistrano in her favor covering his property; and the
other allegedly executed by Scott in favor of Capistrano
over her property, the P40,000.00 consideration for
which ostensibly constituted her initial and partial
payment for the sale of Capistrano’s property to her.
The CA also correctly found the Gilturas not innocent
purchasers for value, because they failed to check the
veracity of the allegation of Jamilar that he acquired the
property from Capistrano.
In ruling that Sy was not an innocent purchaser for
value, we share the observation of the appellate court
that Sy knew that the title to the property was still in the
name of Capistrano, but failed to verify the claim of the
Jamilar spouses regarding the transfer of ownership of
the property by asking for the copies of the deeds of
absolute sale between Capistrano and Scott, and
between Scott and Jamilar. Sy should have likewise
inquired why the Gilturas had to affix their conformity to
the contract to sell by asking for a copy of the deed of
sale between the Jamilars and the Gilturas. Had Sy done
so, he would have learned that the Jamilars claimed that
they purchased the property from Capistrano and not
from Scott.
Notable likewise is that the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 76496 in the name of Capistrano had always
been in his possession since he gave Scott only a
photocopy thereof pursuant to the latter’s authority to
look for a buyer of the property. On the other hand, the
Jamilars were able to acquire a new owner’s duplicate
copy thereof by filing an affidavit of loss and a petition
for the issuance of another owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 76496. The minimum requirement of a good
faith buyer is that the vendee of the real property should
at least see the owner’s duplicate copy of the title. A
person who deals with registered land through someone
who is not the registered owner is expected to look
beyond the certificate of title and examine all the factual
circumstances thereof in order to determine if the
vendor has the capacity to transfer any interest in the
land. He has the duty to ascertain the identity of the
person with whom he is dealing and the latter’s legal
authority to convey.
Atty. G’s Comments: This is one instance where you
look beyond the certificate of title because its
represented by someone else and not the registered
owner. What kind of title was presented? Just a
photocopy. The minimum requirement of good faith
according to SC, the vendee should at least have an
owner’s duplicate of the title and not a mere photocopy.
Domingo Realty v. Court of Appeals
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent,
who conducted business under the firm name A.M.
Acero Trading, David Victorio, John Doe, and Peter Doe,
for recovery of possession of three (3) parcels of
land. The said lots have an aggregate area of 26,705
square meters, more or less, on a portion of which Acero
had constructed a factory building for the manufacture
of hollow blocks, as alleged by Domingo Realty.
Acero alleged that he merely leased the land from his
co-defendant David Victorio, who, in turn, claimed to
own the property on which the hollow blocks factory of
Acero stood. In the Answer, Victorio assailed the validity
of the TCTs of Domingo Realty, alleging that the said
TCTs emanated from spurious deeds of sale, and
claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the property for more than 70
years.
Mariano Yu representing Domingo Realty, Luis Recato
Dy, and Antonio M. Acero, all assisted by counsels,
executed a Compromise Agreement: the salient
provisions are as follows:
1. That defendants admit and recognize the ownership
of the plaintiff over the property subject of this case,
covered by TCT No. S- 107639 (75600), S-107643
(67007), and S-107640 (67006) with a total area of
26,705 square meters;
3. That defendant Acero admits that the property he is
presently occupying by way of lease is encroaching on a
portion of the property of the plaintiff and assume and
undertakes to vacate, remove and clear any and all
structures erected inside the property of the plaintiff
by himself and other third parties, duly authorized
and/or who have an existing agreement with defendant
Acero, and shall deliver said portion of the property
of the plaintiff free and clear of any unauthorized
structures, shanties, occupants, squatters or lessees
within a period of sixty (60) days from date of signing of
this compromise agreement. Should defendant Acero fail
in his obligation to vacate, remove and clear the
structures erected inside the property of the plaintiff
within the period of 60 days afore-mentioned, plaintiff
shall be entitled to a writ of execution for the immediate
demolition or removal of said structure to
fully implement this agreement; and ejectment of all
squatters and occupants and lessees, including the
dependents to fully implement this agreement.
However, respondent file a Motion to Nullify
the Compromise Agreement, claiming that the Order
authorizing the survey plan of petitioner Domingo Realty
as the basis of a resurvey would violate the Compromise
Agreement since the whole area he occupied would be
adjudged as owned by the realty firm.
Issues: Whether or not the adjudged property should
be adjudicated to Acero
Ruling: No, it should not the adjudged to Acero. The
court does not have the power to make or alter
contracts in order to save him from the adverse
stipulations in the Compromise Agreement. Hopefully
this case will serve as a precaution to prospective parties
to a contract involving titled lands for them to exercise
the diligence of a reasonably prudent person by
undertaking measures to ensure the legality of the title
and the accurate metes and bounds of the lot embraced
in the title. It is advisable that such parties (1) verify the
origin, history, authenticity, and validity of the title with
the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Land
Registration Authority; (2) engage the services of a
competent and reliable geodetic engineer to verify the
boundary, metes, and bounds of the lot subject of said
title based on the technical description in the said title
and the approved survey plan in the Land Management
Bureau; (3) conduct an actual ocular inspection of the
lot; (4) inquire from the owners and possessors of
adjoining lots with respect to the true and legal
ownership of the lot in question; (5) put up signs that
said lot is being purchased, leased, or encumbered; and
(6) undertake such other measures to make the general
public aware that said lot will be subject to alienation,
lease, or encumbrance by the parties.
Atty G’s comments: There were two verification
survey conducted, which of the two was considered by
SC as the more reliable one? The determination by the
Bureau of Lands because it was a finding of an
administrative agency. It found out that they weren’t
only encroaching a portion of it but the entire land.
The SC suggested some guidelines how to conduct due
diligence. And In addition to those guidelines, it is also
very important for you to:
1. Conduct a history of the tax declaration which is
available in the Assessor’s office. Thats one way of
determining whether the property is valid or not.
2. Its useful to verify to the local treasurer’s office the
payment of real estate tax, there should be a history
and it shall also be consistent. Because tax declarations
are secondary source to prove ownership.
B. Involuntary Dealings
i. Attachments (Sec 69)
Section 69. Attachments – An attachment, or a copy
of any writ, order or process issued by a court of record,
intended to create or preserve any lien, status, right, or
attachment upon registered land, shall be filed and
registered in the Registry of Deeds for the province or
the city in which the land lies, and, in addition to the
particulars required in such papers for registration, shall
contain a reference to the number of the certificate of
title to be affected and the registered owner or owners
thereof, and also if the attachment, order, process or
lien is not claimed on all the land in any certificate of
title a description sufficiently accurate for identification
of the land or interest intended to be affected. A
restraining order, injunction or mandamus issued by the
court shall be entered and registered on the certificate
of title affected, free of charge.
Attachment- is the legal process of seizing another’s
property in accordance with a writ or judicial order for
the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgement yet
to be rendered.
ii. Adverse Claims (Sec. 70)
Section 70. Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part
or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this
Decree for registering the same, make a statement in
writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest,
and how or under who acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner,
the name of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to,
and shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This
statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse
claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall
be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration. After the lapse of said period, the
annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing
of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, That after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any
party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First
Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation
of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy
hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse
claim, and shall render judgement as may be just and
equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid,
the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in
any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find
that the adverse claim this registered was frivolous, it
may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in
its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the
claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with
the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
Formal requisites of an adverse claim (Agcaoili
book)
1. The adverse claimant must state the following in
writing
a.) his alleged right or interest
b.) how and under whom such alleged right or interest is
acquired
c.) the description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed; and
d.) the number of certificate of title
2.) The statement must be signed and sworn to before a
notary public or other officer authorized to administer
oath; and
3.) The claimant should state his residence or the place
to which all notices may be served upon him
*Non-compliance with the above requisites renders the
adverse claim non-registrable and ineffective
Legal requisites of an adverse claim
1. There must be a claim on the land
2. Claim must be adverse to the registered owner
3. Claim must have a reason subsequent to the original
registration- meaning if the basis of the adverse claim
happened BEFORE the title was issued this is no longer
a valid case for adverse claim. It should be subsequent
because registration is proceeding in rem so if you have
any objection by that time they should have raised it
during the application for registration
4. No other remedy is provided for under the property
registration decree to register the interest or the right of
the party
Sajonas v. CA, Pilares, Garcia & Register of
Deeds
Facts: On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto
Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel of
residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses
Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment
basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
September 22, 1983. The property was registered in
the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-
79073 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On
August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the
annotation of an adverse claim based on the said
Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property,
which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full
payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed
a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in
favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984. The
deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after,
or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-
appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850 for collection of
sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25,
1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the
parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo
Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the
same in two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde
failed to comply with his undertaking in the compromise
agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the decision
based on the compromise agreement, which the court
granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a
writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the
CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending.
Pursuant to the order of execution dated August 3,
1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on
February 12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant
sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds
of Marikina and the same was annotated at the back of
TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
Issues: Was the adverse claim inscribed in the Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 still in force when
private respondent caused the notice of levy
on execution to be registered and annotated in the said
title, considering that more than thirty days had already
lapsed since it was annotated?
Ruling: Yes.
The law, taken together, simply means that the
cancellation of the adverse claim is still necessary
to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription will
remain annotated and shall continue as a lien upon the
property. For if the adverse claim has already ceased to
be effective upon the lapse of said period, its
cancellation is no longer necessary and the process
of cancellation would be a useless ceremony.
The reason why the law provides for a hearing where
the validity of the adverse claim is to be threshed out is
to afford the adverse claimant an opportunity to be
heard, providing a venue where the propriety of his
claimed interest can be established or revoked, all for
the purpose of determining at last the existence of any
encumbrance on the title arising from such adverse
claim.
Atty G’s comments: An adverse claim not ipso facto
cancelled after 30 days; hearing necessary. Register of
deeds cannot unilaterally cancel the adverse claim.
There must be a court hearing for the purpose.
Cancellation of an adverse claim is still necessary even
after the lapse of thirty days to render it ineffective.
The 30 days rule is only for filing a complaint with the
office of the Register of Deeds NOT before the regular
courts. It is supposed to be just a preliminary step
before you file a regular complaint in court. The reason
behind this is that under Sec 110 of Act 496 which is the
provision of adverse claim, there is no limit as to the
effectivity of an adverse claim. So in PD 1529 the
framers sought to it that there should be a limits since it
has been abused, because by mere affidavit you can
already question and burden the registered owner.
PD1529 wanted to put a stop to this and gave a limit of
only 30 days but only for the filing in the ROD and not in
the regular court.
Sps. Rodriquez v. CA, Sps. Barrameda &
Sps. Antonio and Calingo
Facts: Respondent Spouses Calingo were the registered
owners of a house and lot located in Parañaque, Metro
Manila. The property was mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines, which mortgage
was later absorbed by the Home Mutual Development
Fund (HMDF) or Pag-ibig.
In 1992, respondents Calingo and respondent Spouses
Barrameda entered into a contract of sale with
assumption of mortgage where the former sold to the
latter the property in question and the latter assumed to
pay the outstanding loan balance to DBP.
On May 29, 1992, respondents Barrameda filed with the
Register of Deeds of Parañaque an affidavit of adverse
claim on the property. The adverse claim was inscribed
at the back of the certificate of title as Entry No. 3439.
Respondents Barrameda moved into the property.
On July 13, 1992, a notice of levy with attachment on
real property by virtue of a writ of execution was
annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the
property in question in connection with a Civil Case
involving a claim by herein petitioners, Spouses
Francisco and Bernardina Rodriguez, against
respondents Calingo. Judge Abad Santos issued the writ
in favor of petitioners Rodriguez.
Issue: Whether respondents Barrameda’s adverse claim
on the property should prevail over the levy on
execution issued by another court in satisfaction of a
judgment against respondents Calingo?
Ruling: No. In the case at bar, the reason given for the
non-registration of the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage was that the owner’s duplicate copy of the
certificate of title was in the possession of HMDF. It was
not shown, however, that either respondents Barrameda
or respondents Calingo exerted any effort to retrieve the
owner’s duplicate copy from the HMDF for the purpose
of registering the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage.
The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure
designed to protect the interest of a person over a piece
of property where the registration of such interest
or right is not otherwise provided for by the law
on registration of real property.
The deed of sale with assumption of mortgage executed
by respondents Calingo and Barrameda is a registrable
instrument. In order to bind third parties, it must be
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. It
was not shown in this case that there was justifiable
reason why the deed could not be registered. Hence,
the remedy of adverse claim cannot substitute for
registration.
Atty G’s comments: The annotation of an adverse claim
is a measure designated to protect the interest of a
person over a piece of real property where the
registration of such interest or right is not otherwise
provided by the Land Registration Act, and such serves
as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with said
property that someone is claiming an interest on the
same or better right than the registered owner thereof.
In case at bar, the deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage was a registrable instrument and therefore
should have been registered to bind third parties like
herein petitioners.
Golden Haven Memorial Park v. Filinvest
Facts: Yap, Victoriano and Policarpio Vivar (the Vivars),
Cruz, Aquino, Corpuz, and Sobremesana, and some
other relatives inherited a parcel of land in Las Piñas City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 67462 RT-
1. Subsequently, the heirs had the land divided into 13
lots and the court distributed four of the lots as follows:
a) Lots 1 and 12 to Aquino; b) Lot 2 to Corpuz and
Sobremesana; and (c) Lot 6 to Yap, Cruz, and the
Vivars. The other lots were distributed to the other heirs.
Yap acting for herself and for Cruz and the Vivars,
executed an agreement to sell Lot 6 in favor of Golden
Haven Memorial Park, Inc. (GHM), payable in three
installments. On July another heir, Aquino, acting for
himself and for Corpuz and Sobremesana, also executed
an agreement to sell Lots 1, 2, and 12 in favor of GHM,
payable in the same manner. In both instances, GHM
paid the first installment upon execution of the contract.
On August 4, 1989 GHM caused to be annotated a
Notice of Adverse Claim on TCT 67462 RT-1 (the mother
title). On September 20, 1989 the sellers of the four lots
wrote GHM that they were still working on the titling of
the lots in their names and wanted to know if GHM was
still interested in proceeding with their agreements. GHM
replied in the affirmative on September and said that it
was just waiting for the sellers' titles so it can pay the
second installments.
Sometime in August of 1989, Filinvest Development
Corporation (Filinvest) applied for the transfer in its
name of the titles over Lots 2, 4, and 5 but the Las Piñas
Register of Deeds declined its application. Upon inquiry,
Filinvest learned that Lot 8, a lot belonging to some
other heir or heirs and covered by the same mother title,
had been sold to Household Development Corporation
(HDC), a sister company of GHM, and HDC held the
owner's duplicate copy of that title. Filinvest immediately
filed against HDC a petition for the surrender and
cancellation of the co-owners' duplicate copy of TCT
67462 RT-1. Filinvest alleged that it bought Lots 1, 2, 6,
and 12 of the property from their respective owners as
evidenced by three deeds of absolute sale in its favor
dated September 10, November 18, and December 29,
1989 and that Filinvest was entitled to the registrations
of such sales.
On January 14, 1991 GHM filed against the sellers and
Filinvest a complaint fo rthe annulment of the deeds of
sale issued in the latter's favor before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
Issue: Which of the two real estate developers acted in
good faith?
Ruling: GHM was in good faith.
Filinvest was on notice that GHM had annotated on the
mother title, as early as August 4, 1989 a notice of
adverse claim covering Lot 6. This notwithstanding,
Filinvest still proceeded to buy Lots 1, 2, 6, and 12. The
notice is a warning to third parties dealing with the
property that someone claims an interest in it or asserts
a better right than the registered owner. Such notice
constitutes, by operation of law, notice to the whole
world. Here, although the notice of adverse claim
pertained to only one lot and Filinvest wanted to acquire
interest in some other lots under the same title, the
notice served as warning to it that one of the owners
was engaged in double selling.
One who has knowledge of facts which should have put
him upon such inquiry and investigation cannot claim
that he has acquired title to the property in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest in it.
The Court upholds the validity of the contracts between
GHM and its sellers. As the trial court aptly observed,
GHM entered into valid contracts with its sellers but the
latter simply and knowingly refused without just cause
to honor their obligations. The sellers apparently had a
sudden change of heart when they found out that
Filinvest was willing to pay more. \
Atty G’s comments: take note in this case, in RTC it said
that the adverse claim was actually confined to one lot it
didn’t cover the entire lot subject of the transaction
between the sellers and Filinvest but CA reversed RTC
ruling and said when you buy a property you should not
limit yourself only to the four corners of the title. CA
may have stretched the application of the adverse claim.
Atty G personally doesn’t agree with this case ruling.
Martinez v. Garcia
Facts: Respondent Edilberto Brua was the registered
owner of a parcel of land located in Mandaluyong, Rizal.
He mortgaged the land to the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), and such mortgage was
annotated at the back of the title. Respondent Brua
obtained a loan from his brother-in-law, respondent
Ernesto Garcia, in the amount of P150,000.00 and, to
secure the payment of said loan, respondent Brua
mortgaged the subject property to respondent Garcia, as
evidenced by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed
in respondent Garcia's favor. Since the title to the
subject property was in the possession of the GSIS and
respondent Garcia could not register the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage, he then executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim and registered it with the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal which remained uncancelled up
to this time.
Brua requested Garcia to pay the former's loan with the
GSIS, so that the title to the subject property would be
released to the latter.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between them
over the subject property, where Brua sold the property
in the amount of P705,000.00. Respondent Garcia then
registered the Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds
and a new title was issued in the names of Garcia and
his wife. However, the annotations at the back of the
previous title were carried over to the new title, to wit: a
Notice of Levy on Attachment and/or Levy, a Notice of
Levy on Execution in favor of petitioner Flor Martinez, a
Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner, a Notice of Levy
on Execution in favor of Pilipinas Bank a cancellation of
respondent Brua's mortgage with GSIS.
A decision was rendered in favor of petitioner. The
decision became final and executory as respondent Brua
failed to appeal the same, and a notice of levy on
execution was issued. A public auction was subsequently
conducted, where the subject property was awarded to
petitioner as the sole bidder.
Respondents Garcia and Brua filed an Action to Quiet
Title, initially against petitioner due to the
encumbrances/liens annotated on respondent Garcia's
new title. They contended that these
encumbrances/liens were registered subsequent to the
annotation of respondent Garcia's adverse claim made in
1980, and prayed that these be canceled.
Issue: Whether or not the adverse claim annotated by
Garcia prior to the inscription of the levy by Petitioners
should prevail.
Ruling: Petition was dismissed. The levy does not make
the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied
upon. He merely obtains a lien. Such levy on execution
is subject and subordinate to all valid claims and liens
existing against the property at the time the execution
lien attached, such as real estate mortgages.
Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the
deed of mortgage executed by respondent Brua in his
favor, was annotated on respondent Brua's title
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on June
23, 1980. The adverse claim was already existing when
the Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the
Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner, was inscribed
and, hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to constitute
constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject
property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy
on Execution on the title of the subject property, she
was charged with the knowledge that the subject
property sought to be levied upon on execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than
that of the registered owner thereof.
Atty G’s comments: This is not a very important case
haha
iii. Enforcement of Liens on Registered Land and
Application of New Certificate
Upon Expiration of Redemption Period (Sec. 74-75)
Sec. 74 Enforcement of liens on registered land. --
- Whenever registered land is sold on execution, or
taken or sold for taxes or for any assessment or to
enforce a lien of any character, or for any costs and
charges incident to such liens, any execution or copy of
execution, any officer’s return, or any deed, demand,
certificate, or affidavit, or any other instruments made in
the course of the proceedings to enforce such liens and
required by law to be recorded, shall be filled with the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies and registered in the registration book, and a
memorandum made upon the proper certificates of title
in each case as lien or encumbrance.
Sec. 75 Application for new certificate upon
expiration of redemption period --- Upon the
expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for
redemption after registered land has been sold on
execution taken or sold for the enforcement of a lien of
any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser
at such sale or anyone claiming under him may petition
the court for the entry of a new certificate of title to him.
Before the entry of anew certificate of title, the
registered owner may pursue all legal and equitable
remedies to impeach or annual such proceedings.
(Padilla Jr. vs Phil Producer’s Cooperative G.R. No.
141256, July 2005)
Padilla, Jr. vs. Phil. Producer's Cooperative
Facts: Petitioner and his wife are the registered owners
of the properties; respondent is a marketing cooperative
which had a money claim against petitioner.
Respondent filed a civil case against petitioner for
collection of a sum of money. The Court issued a writ of
execution. The three lots were levied by virtue of that
writ. The sheriff auctioned off the lots to satisfy the
judgment, with respondent as the only bidder. Ex-officio
provincial sheriff and clerk of court executed a certificate
of sale in favor of respondent. On August 13, 1990, the
certificate of sale was recorded in the Register of Deeds.
When petitioner failed to exercise his right of
redemption within the 12-month period allowed by law,
the court, on motion of respondent, ordered on February
5, 1992 the issuance of a writ of possession for the
sheriff to cause the delivery of the physical possession of
the properties in favor of respondent.
On May 17, 1995, respondent filed a motion to direct
the Register of Deeds to issue new titles over the
properties in its name, alleging that the Register of
Deeds (RD) of Bago City would not issue new titles (in
respondent's name) unless the owner's copies were
first surrendered to him. Respondent countered that
such surrender was impossible because this was an
involuntary sale and the owner's copies were with
petitioner.
Issue:
whether or not respondent's right to have new
titles issued in its name is now barred by
prescription
whether or not the motion in question is the
proper remedy for cancelling petitioner's
certificates of title and new ones issued in
its name.
Held:
Petitioner is correct in assailing as improper respondent's
filing of a mere motion for the cancellation of the old
TCTs and the issuance of new ones as a result of
petitioner's refusal to surrender his owner's duplicate
TCTs.
The proper remedy is a separate cadastral action
initiated via petition.
The proper course of action was to file a petition in
court, rather than merely move, for the issuance of new
titles.
The reasons behind the law make a lot of sense; it
provides due process to a registered landowner (in this
case the petitioner) and prevents the fraudulent or
mistaken conveyance of land, the value of which may
exceed the judgment obligation.
ATTY G’s comments:
Steps leading to issuance of title pursuant to levy
on execution:
1. Levy on execution (issued by court; annotated)
2. Certificate of sale (result of auction sale; right of
highest bidder is still inchoate because
there is right of redemption available to judgment debtor
to redeem property within 12 months; take note that at
this stage, ROD is already mandated to notify the
registered owner to surrender the duplicate’s copy for
the purpose of registration; even if ROD fails to comply
with required notification, the validity of the involuntary
transaction presented for registration is valid because
entry in the primary entry book is sufficient to comply
with the requirement)
3. Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale (after lapse of redemption
period; highest bidder is considered to have absolute
title over property)
4. File petition in court for issuance of new certificate of
title (pursuant to Sec 75 of PD 1529)
iv. Lis Pendens (Sec. 76)
Sec. 76. Notice of lis pendens. – No action to recover
possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to
remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or
other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting
the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon, and no judgement, and no proceeding
to vacate or reverse any judgement, shall have any
effect upon registered land as against persons other
than the parties thereto, unless a memorandum or
notice stating the institution of such action or proceeding
and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as
the date of the institution thereof, together with a
reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an
adequate description of the land affected and the
registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
registered.
Requisites of a Valid Lis Pendens
i. There must be an action or proceeding affecting the
title of real property on the possession thereof
ii. The court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the property
iii. That the property is sufficiently described in the
complaint
VIEWMASTER CONSTRUCTION VS
MAULIT, ET AL
Principle: A notice of lis pendens may be registered
when an action or a proceeding directly affects the title
to the land or the buildings thereon; or the possession,
the use or the occupation thereof. Hence, the
registration of such notice should be allowed if the
litigation involves the enforcement of an agreement for
the co-development of a parcel of land. What is
established here is enforcement of joint-venture
agreement which is well within the definition of notice of
lis pendens.
FACTS:
Allen Roxas is one of the stockholders of State
Investment Trust, Inc. In order to gain control and
ownership of the said company, Roxas applied for a loan
with First Metro Investment, Inc. First Metro agreed to
grant the loan provided Roxas could procure a guarantor
to secure the payment of the loan.
Petitioner Viewmaster agreed to act as guarantor for the
loan in consideration for its participation in a joint
venture project to codevelop the real estate assets of
State Investment Trust, Inc. As a result of the
loans granted, Roxas gained control and ownership of
the State Investment Trust, Inc.
However, notwithstanding the lapse of two years since
becoming the controlling stockholder, Roxas failed to
take the necessary action to implement the joint venture
project with Viewmaster to co-develop the subject
properties.
His continued inaction forced Viewmaster to file
a complaint for speci0c performance against State
Investment Trust, Inc., its subsidiary companies, and
Allen Roxas.
In connection with this, Viewmaster filed a Notice of Lis
Pendens with the Register of Deeds for the annotation
of a Notice of Lis Pendens on a particular title in the
name of State Properties Corporation, a subsidiary of
State Investment Trust, Inc.
The respondent Register of Deeds of Las Piñas denied
the request. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the ruling and held that petitioner failed to adequately
describe the subject property in the complaint and in the
application for the registration of a notice of lis pendens.
The CA also ruled that a notice of lis pendens can only
be registered when an action directly affects the title to
or possession of the real property, which is not present
in this case. Petitioner's complaint clearly warranted
the registration of a notice of lis pendens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the property was not particularly
described
Whether or not a notice of lis pendens is proper
HELD:
 Yes. A copy of the TCT was attached to and
made an integral part of both documents.
Consequently, the notice of lis pendens
submitted for registration, taken as a whole,
leaves no doubt as to the identity of the
property, the technical description of
which appears on the attached TCT. We stress
that the main purpose of the requirement that
the notice should contain a technical description
of the property is to ensure that the same can
be distinguished and readily identi0ed. In this
case, we agree with petitioner that there was
substantial compliance with this requirement.
Yes. The Complaint shows that the loan
obtained by Allen Roxas (one of the defendants
in civil case) from First Metro was guaranteed by
petitioner for two distinct considerations: (a)
to enable it to purchase 50 percent of the stocks
that the said defendant may acquire in
State Investment and (b) to co-develop with the
defendants the Quezon City and the Las
Piñas properties of the corporation. In other
words, the co-development of the said
properties is a separate undertaking that did not
arise from petitioner's acquisition of the
defendant's shares in the corporation. To
repeat, the co-development is not merely
auxiliary or incidental to the purchase of the
shares; it is a distinct considerations for
Viewmaster's guaranty.
Atty G’s comments: When it is a personal action like
specific performance normally it does not pre detach of
the ownership or possession of property. The property
should be the list mota (subject proper) of the litigation.
But SC expanded the interpretation of the notice of lis
pendens, it includes also all suits that seeks to establish
a right to or an interest to the property for the
enforcement of a lien, an encumbrance or a charge
against him and it is under the 2nd category where it was
applied directly.
Generally a notice of Lis Pendens covers actions pending
before the regular courts however, cases involving real
property pending before administrative agencies such as
the HLURB, SEC and the DARAB which are endowed
with quasi-judicial functions have been recognized as
proper basis for the annotation of a Lis Pendens.
Availability of lis pendens is not confined to cases
involving the title to or possession of real property. It
applies to suits brought to “establish an equitable estate,
interest or right in specific real property or to enforce
any lien, charge or encumbrance against it.
Atlantic Erectors, Inc. vs Herbal Cove
Realty (G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003)
Principle: Not all liens are subject of lis pendens. The
pendency of a simple collection suit arising from the
alleged nonpayment of construction services, materials,
unrealized income and damages DOES NOT justify the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the title to a
property where construction has been done.
FACTS: Respondent and petitioner entered into a
construction contract whereby petitioner agreed to
construct several townhouse units on respondent's land
for a total of almost P17M. Later, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent for sum of money with
damages and notice of lis pendens annotated on
respondent's land titles.
Petitioner averred that its money claim on the cost of
labor and materials for the townhouses it constructed on
respondent's land was a proper lien that justi9ed
the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the land
titles.
ISSUE: Whether or not the annotation of lis pendens is
proper
HELD: No.
A careful examination of petitioner's Complaint, as well
as the reliefs it seeks, reveals that no such lien or
interest over the property was ever alleged. The
Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction
services and materials plus damages, without
mentioning — much less asserting — a lien or an
encumbrance over the property. Verily, it was a purely
personal action and a simple collection case. It did not
contain any material averment of any enforceable right,
interest or lien in connection with the subject property.
Even assuming that petitioner had sufficiently alleged
such lien or encumbrance in its Complaint, the
annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens would still be
unjustified, because a complaint for collection and
damages is not the proper mode for the enforcement of
a contractor's lien.
Article 2242 finds application when there is a
concurrence of credits, i.e., when the same specific
property of the debtor is subjected to the claims
of several creditors and the value of such property of the
debtor is insufficient to pay in full all the creditors.
WHEN ANNOTATION IS PROPER
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of
lis pendens may be availed of are as follows:
(a) an action to recover possession of real estate;
(b) an action for partition; and
(c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the
title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the
occupation thereof.
Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis
pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve
title to or possession of real property.
This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish
a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific
real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an
encumbrance against it.
WHEN ANNOTATION IS NOT PROPER
By express provision of law, the doctrine of lis pendens
does not apply to attachments, levies of execution, or to
proceedings for the probate of wills, or
for administration of the estate of deceased persons in
the Court of First Instance. Also, it is held generally that
the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to
a proceeding in which the only object sought is the
recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right
of possession to property be incidentally affected. It
is essential that the property be directly affected, as
where the relief sought in the action or suit includes the
recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien,
or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title,
possession, or the right of possession to specific
property, or requiring its transfer or sale"
Atty G’s comments: In comparison to Viewmaster’s
case we were taught that a notice of lis pendens covers
all the cases that seeks to enforce a right of lien. It is
what Atlantic Erectors is doing here, enforce a lien.
Art.2242 of civil code applies on it when it comes to
preference of creditors, when there’s several creditors
and they want to be preferred than that’s the rule but it
doesn’t have anything to do about the lien. The proper
remedy should be an insolvency proceedings and not in
the case for collection of money.
Sec 77 Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final
judgment, a notice of lispendens may be canceled upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice
isfor the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that
it is not necessary to protect therights of the party who
caused it to be registered. It may also be canceled by
the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof.
At any time after final judgment in favor of the
defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the
land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a
memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been
registered as provided in the preceding section, the
notice of lis pendens shall be deemed canceled upon the
registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which
the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof.
ST. MARY VS. RD MAKATI [G.R. NO.
174290, JANUARY 20, 2009]
Facts: The consolidated cases presently before this
Court originated from the Complaint by the private
respondent for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Assignment, Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCTs No.
156249, No. 156250, and No. 156251 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila, registered in the name
of Oro Development Corporation (ODC); and TCT No.
175029, registered in the name of petitioner SMWSI.
In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that during
the marriage of his parents, Tomas Q. Soriano and
Josefina P. Soriano, the couple acquired both real and
personal properties, including the subject properties.
The Soriano couple allegedly executed a Deed of
Assignment in favor of ODC involving the subject
properties to pay for Tomas Q. Soriano's subscription of
stocks in the said corporation.
By virtue of the said Deed of Assignment, the ownership
and title over the subject properties were transferred to
ODC.
Thereafter, on 26 April 1991, ODC executed in favor of
petitioner SMWSI a Deed of Sale over the subject
property covered by TCT No. 156249. By virtue of the
sale, petitioner SMWSI acquired ownership and title over
the particular property.
Private respondent claimed that several years after his
father Tomas Q. Soriano's death, he discovered that the
latter's signature in the Deed of Assignment in favor
of ODC was a forgery. Being very familiar with his
father's signature, private respondent compared Tomas
Q.
A notice of lis pendens were annotated on the TCTs of
the subject properties.
RTC, however, dismissed the complaint and ruled that
the private respondent has no interest on the case.
Consequently, the RTC cancelled the notice of lis
pendens.
The private respondent appealed to the CA which ruled
in his favor. Consequently, it order the reinstatement of
the lis pendens.
Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of lis pendens be
cancelled during the pendency of the case
Ruling: Yes. The notice of lis pendens can be cancelled
if it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party
who caused it to be recorded. In this case, the [herein
private respondent's] interest should be considered on
whether the notice of lis pendens should be cancelled or
not. As it is the Court believes that the cancellation is
proper in this case. First, the Court still has jurisdiction
of the case considering that the Notice of Appeal was
only filed on [17 May 2005], while the Motion to cancel
Notice of Lis Pendens was filed on [16 May 2005].
Second, [private respondent] Hilario P. Soriano has no
interest to be protected insofar as the subject properties
are concerned because of his acknowledgment that he
already received his share in the estate of Tomas
Soriano. Lastly, the contention of the [private
respondent] that the motion is premature is not tenable.
The authority of the Court to Cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens is even evident in the Comment/Opposition of
the [private respondent] which states that "While it may
be true that the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens
may be ordered at any given time even before final
judgment
Atty G’s comments: May a notice of lis pendens be
cancelled during the pendency of the case? Yes it may
be cancelled anytime during the pendency of the case.
First, where it is shown that it is not necessary to protect
the interest as the one purported by the law.
NOTE: The following two cases are not in the
syllabus but the principles are specifically
discussed by Atty. G
CASIM CONSTRUCTION v. Register of
Deeds of Las Pinas G.R. No. 168655
(2010)
Atty G’s comments: A very important ruling is that
when an RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
cancels a notice of lis pendens pending before another
court, according to SC the notice of lis pendens is under
the control of the court that has taken a cognizance of
the main case. This is because a notice of lis pendens is
only an ancillary remedy. So another regular court
cannot exercise jurisdiction to have the notice of lis
pendens cancelled except the court hearing the main
case.
MR HOLDINGS, LTD v RTC G.R. No 153478
(2012)
Atty G’s comments: An important issue here is whether
or not a golf club membership may be a valid basis for a
notice of lis pendens. In this case its Manila Golf Club
membership worth 30M, what the party sought to do
was to file a notice of lis pendens in the chattel registry
book.
May a stock certificate a proper subject matter of notice
of lis pendens in the chattel book in the register? SC said
NO, because strictly a notice of lis pendens involve
only real property. Definitely CHATTEL cannot be
registered as notice of lis pendens.
IV. LIS PENDENS (Sec. 76)
Section 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover
possession of real estate, or to quiet title thereto, or to
remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition, or
other proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting
the title to land or the use or occupation thereof or the
buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding
to vacate or reverse any judgment, shall have any effect
upon registered land as against persons other than the
parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating
the institution of such action or proceeding and the court
wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the
institution thereof, together with a reference to the
number of the certificate of title, and an adequate
description of the land affected and the registered owner
thereof, shall have been filed and registered.
Tan v. Binolirao (2009)
Facts: Sps. Benolirao and Sps. Taningco were the co-
owners of a parcel of land located The co-owners
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over the property in
favor of Tan. Upon the death of Lamberto Benolirao, an
extrajudicial settlement of his estate was executed and a
new TCT was issued in the names of the Sps. Taningco,
Erlinda Benolirao and her children, and an annotation
was made on the title, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules (that. . . any liability to credirots (sic), excluded
heirs and other persons having right to the property, for
a period of two (2) years, with respect only to the share
of Erlinda, Andrew, Romano and Dion, all surnamed
Benolirao). Tan refused to comply with the vendors’
demand of the remaining balance claiming that the
annotation on the title created an encumbrance over the
property that would prevent the vendors from delivering
a clean title to him. Tan prayed for the refund of the
down payment and the rescission of the contract.
Issue: Was the annotation on the certificate of title
considered an encumbrance on the property?
Held: Yes. An annotation is placed on new certificates
of title issued pursuant to the distribution and partition
of a decedent's real properties to warn third persons on
the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid
creditors in these properties. The annotation, therefore,
creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real property
in favor of the excluded heirs or creditors. Where a
buyer purchases the real property despite the
annotation, he must be ready for the possibility that the
title could be subject to the rights of excluded parties.
Here, the encumbrance would remain so attached until
the expiration of the 2-year period. At this time, the
vendors could no longer compel Tan to pay the balance
of the purchase since considering they themselves could
not fulfill their obligation to transfer a clean title over the
property to Tan.
Discussion: Order of Liabilities. In the Sajonas case, in
order to cancel a liability after the expiration of the 2-
year period, you have to file a verified petition in the RD.
Take note in a judicial settlement of estate (intestate
proceeding), there is no restriction or reservation
annotated in the certificate of title. In an intestate
proceeding, you have to notify all the heirs. On the other
hand, on an extrajudicial settlement of estate, like this
case, there is such reservation annotated on the
certificate of title. Another helpful purpose for liabilities.
If you want to know if this particular land is the
exclusive property of the person named in the certificate
of title, one way of looking is for you to check the title.
You can find on the COC an annotation of liabilities, that
this is an inherited property.
V. LEVIES ON EXECUTION
Pineda v. Arcalas (2007)
Facts: Stemming from a civil case for Sum of Money,
Arcalas obtained a judgment in his favor against
Tolentino. To execute the judgment, the subject
property was levied upon and the Notice of Levy on Alias
Writ of Execution was annotated at the back of the TCT.
Asserting ownership of the subject property, Pineda filed
a Third Party Claim alleging that he bought the subject
property from Tolentino. She further alleged that upon
payment of the purchase price, she took possession of
the subject property but failed to register the subject
property under her name. Pineda filed with the RD
another Third Party Claim and caused the inscription of a
notice of adverse claim at the back of TCT. Meanwhile,
Arcalas purchased the subject property at an auction
evidenced by a Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, and filed an
action for the cancellation of the entry of Pineda’s
adverse claim.
Issue: Whether the portion bought by Pineda can be
exempted from the registered notice of levy.
Held: No. The doctrine is well settled that a levy on
execution duly registered takes preference over a prior
unregistered sale. A registered lien is entitled to
preferential consideration. Here, Arcalas’ lien was
registered and annotated at the back of the title of the
subject property and accordingly amounted to a
constructive notice thereof to all persons. A registered
writ of attachment was a superior lien over that of an
unregistered deed of sale because an attachment is a
proceeding in rem.
Discussion: As between a registered levy and an
unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale, the levy would
prevail.
X. REGISTRATION OF PATENTS
A. Certificates of Titles Pursuant to Patents
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents.
Whenever public land is by the Government alienated,
granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be
brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. It
shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of
alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the
Government to cause such instrument to be filed with
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land lies, and to be there registered like other deeds and
conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be
entered as in other cases of registered land, and an
owner's duplicate issued to the grantee. The deed,
grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the
Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a
contract between the Government and the grantee and
as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration. It is the act of registration that shall
be the operative act to affect and convey the land, and
in all cases under this Decree, registration shall be made
in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province or
city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be
paid by the grantee. After due registration and issuance
of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to
be registered land to all intents and purposes under this
Decree.
Alonzo v. CCC (2010)
Facts: Petitioner Francisco discovered documents
showing that his father had acquired Lot No. 727 of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or
about the year 1911; that the original vendee of Lot No.
727 had assigned his sales certificate to Tomas N.
Alonso, who had been consequently issued Patent No.
14353; and that on the Director of Lands had executed a
final deed of sale in favor of Tomas N. Alonso, but the
final deed of sale had not been registered with the
Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements, like
the approval of the final deed of sale by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required by law.
Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title
covering Lot No. 727-D-2 had been "administratively
reconstituted from the owner's duplicate" of TCT in the
name of the predecessor of respondent CCC; and
subsequently registered in the name of CCC. Petitioner
filed against respondent an action for the declaration of
nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the cancellation
of certificates of title, and the recovery of property.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest.
Held: No. They petitioner is not a proper party to assail
the questioned orders. Under Act No. 1120, which
governs the administration and disposition of friar lands,
the purchase by an actual and bona fide settler or
occupant of any portion of friar land shall be "agreed
upon between the purchaser and the Director of Lands,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (mutatis mutandis). The approval
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is
indispensable for the validity of the sale. Here, the deed
of sale executed by the Director of Lands was not
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Hence, the deed of sale was void.
Consequently, petitioner Francisco's father did not have
any registrable title to the land in question. Having
none, he could not transmit anything to his sole heir,
petitioner Francisco Alonso or
the latter's heirs.
Discussion: In a reconstituted title (administrative
reconstituted title), the only basis is the owner’s
duplicate copy. So there is no need for CCC to show a
mode of transfer in its favor. After all, when they applied
for the reconstitution, their only basis is the owner’s
duplicate copy of the title (RA 9443).
Taguinod v. CA (2007)
Facts: When Operation Land Transfer under PD 27 was
launched, Salud Alvarez Aguila was the registered owner
of the disputed lots with corresponding TCTs under the
RD of Isabela, Cagayan. Both TCTs were derived on the
basis of a homestead patent. Subsequently, the lot
covered by the first TCT was transferred to and
registered in the name of petitioner Vic Aguila (who was
then 14 years old) under, while the other TCT was
transferred to petitioner Taguinod. Taguinod averred
that she inherited the lot from her biological mother,
Patrocinia Alvarez, and was
only mortgaged in 1971 to
her adoptive mother, Salud Aguila, for which she
executed a deed of sale with a right to repurchase.
Petitioner Taguinod further contended that she had
already redeemed said property which was allegedly
rightly hers.
Issue: Whether the subject lots previously covered by
homestead patents are outside the ambit of PD 27.
Held: No, since there was no substantial evidence to
show ownership through homestead patent. Petitioners
never averred before the DAR and OP that Salud Aguila
was the original homestead patentee of the OCT and
that petitioner Aguila is a direct compulsory heir of the
homestead patentee to whom the OCT was issued.
Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing that
petitioner Taguinod
had indeed repurchased or redeemed
subject property from landowner Salud Aguila.
Discussion: A homestead patent does not fall under
the coverage of Land Reform. In this case, they failed to
prove that they were the legitimate successors of the
patentee.
B. An act authorizing the issuance of a free patent
to residential lands (RA 10023)
Things to Remember
- This is an important piece of legislation;
- A free patent covers only agricultural lands, not
residential lands. But because there is a need to
expedite the titling of residential size lots, this law was
passed;
- Importance of this law: There is no restriction (CA
141). the only limitation is the area. For urban areas,
maximum area is 200 sq meters only. For rural, 1000 sq
m. Under the free patent law, the period that is required
is similar to Sec. 14 of PD 1549 which is June 12, 1945
but under the residential free patent law it is only for 10
years. You can sell it anytime.
XII. PETITIONS AND ACTIONS AFTER ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION
A. Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate
(Sec. 107)
Section 107. Surrender of withhold duplicate
certificates. Where it is necessary to issue a new
certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument
which divests the title of the registered owner against
his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be
registered by reason of the refusal or failure of the
holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate of
title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to
compel surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner
or any person withholding the duplicate certificate to
surrender the same, and direct the entry of a new
certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the
person withholding the duplicate certificate is not
amenable to the process of the court, or if not any
reason the outstanding owner's duplicate certificate
cannot be delivered, the court may order the annulment
of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate
of title in lieu thereof. Such new certificate and all
duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Ligon v. CA (1995)
Facts: Respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages against
the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP).
Respondent INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of
an Absolute Deed of Sale IDP sold to it two (2) parcels
of land. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that
the IDP, shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal
occupants in the property within forty-Fve (45) days
from the execution of the contract. IDP failed to fulfill
this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court
order IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing the
subject lots of illegal occupants and pay damages to
INK. Thereafter, INK filed a motion in the same case
praying that petitioner Ligon, who was in possession of
the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee
of IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the
RD of QC for the registration of the Absolute Deed of
Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document could
not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of
petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite
repeated requests. Petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to
the motion on the ground that the IDP was not served
copy of the motion, and the ownership of INK over the
property was still in issue since rescission was sought by
the IDP as
a counterclaim.
Issue: Whether or not a separate petition for the
surrender of owner's copy be filed.
Held: No.
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits,
registration proceedings have been simplified by
conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to
act not only on applications for original registration but
also over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions. Even while
Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be
filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender
the certificates of title to the RD, this does not preclude
a party to a pending case to include as incident therein
the relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject
certificates of title to be surrendered are intimately
connected with the subject matter of the principal
action. This principle is based on expediency and in
accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
Discussion: Even while Sec. 107 of PD 1529 speaks of
a petition which can be filed by one who wants to
compel another to surrender the certificates of title to
the RD, this does not preclude a party to a pending case
to include as incident therein, the relief stated under
section, especially if the subject certificate of title to be
surrendered is intimately connected with the subject
matter of the principal action. This principle is based on
expediency and in accordance with the policy against
multiplicity of suits.
Toledo Banaga v. CA (1999)
Facts: Petitioner Banaga and respondent were parties
to a case of redemption where a decision was rendered
in favor of the latter which then became final.
 executor judgment of the court.
Consequently, petitioner Banaga tried to redeem the
property by depositing with the trial court the amount of
redemption which was financed by her co-petitioner
Tan. However, private respondent opposed the
redemption arguing that it was made beyond the time
given to her by the court in the earlier case. Private
respondent caused the annotation of said petition as
another notice of lis pendens on the Certificates of Title.
 3. There’s already an order of the issuance of Certificate
Meanwhile, petitioner Banaga sold the subject property
to petitioner Tan with the deed of absolute sale
mentioning private respondent's certificate of title which
was not yet cancelled. Thereafter, the CA categorically
declared private respondent as the absolute owner of
the land subject of this case. That decision was affirmed
by this Court, became final and executory and was
remanded to the lower court for execution.
But the RD
frustrated private respondent's judicially determined
right as it refused to issue Certificates of Title in his
name on the ground that the matter should be referred
"en consulta" to the RD before petitioner's title can be
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the
winning party — herein private respondent.
Issue: Whether the remedy of private respondent to
secure the titles in his name is by consulta to the LRC
and not through contempt.
Held: No.
Private respondent's remedy is not a direct or
independent civil action for cancellation of petitioner
Tan's titles. The surrender of the duplicate is implied
from the executory decision since petitioners themselves
were parties thereto. Besides, as part of the execution
process, it is a ministerial function of the RD to comply
with the decision of the court to issue a title and register
a property in the name of a certain person, especially
when the decision had attained finality, as in this case.
Moreover, it is axiomatic that where a decision on the
merits is rendered and the same has become final and
executory, as in this case, the action on procedural
matters or issues becomes moot and academic. Thus,
the so-called consulta to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, which is not applicable herein, was only a
naive and belated effort resorted to by petitioners in
order to delay execution.
Discussion: This is the exception to the rule of
surrender of duplicate certificate of title. To require the
surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy (ODC) is
preposterous. The surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate
Copy is already considered implied in the final and
Instances Where the Surrender of the ODC May
Be Dispensed With
1. The registered owner is a party of the case;
2. There’s already a final and executory decision of the
court;
of Title in favor of the prevailing parties.
B. Amendment and Alteration of Certificates (Sec.
108)
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates.
No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made
upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate
of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation
of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the
proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner of
other person having an interest in registered property,
or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the
approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may
apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the
registered interests of any description, whether vested,
contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the
certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new
interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen
or been created; or that an omission or error was made
in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon,
or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any
person on the certificate has been changed; or that the
registered owner has married, or, if registered as
married, that the marriage has been terminated and no
right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be
affected; or that a corporation which owned registered
land and has been dissolved has not convened the same
within three years after its dissolution; or upon any
other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and
determine the petition after notice to all parties in
interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a
new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a
memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other
relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security
or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper;
Provided, however, That this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to reopen the
judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing
shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair
the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a
certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and
assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the
owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar
petition may be filed as provided in the preceding
section.
All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as
under any other provision of this Decree after original
registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case
in which the decree or registration was entered.
Grounds for the Amendment or Alteration of a
Certificate of Title
a. That the registered interests of any description
whether vested, contigent, expectant or inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and
ceased;
b. That new interests not appearing upon the certificate
have arisen or been created;
c. That an omission or error was made in entering a
certificate or any memorandum thereon, or, on any
certificate has been changed;
d. That the same or any person on the certificate has
been changed
e. That the registered owner has married, or, if
registered as married, that the marriage has been
terminated and no rights or interests of heirs or
creditors will thereby be affected;
f. That a corporation which owned registered land and
has been dissolved has not convinced the same
within 3 years after its dissolution;
g. Upon any other reasonable ground.
Oliva c. Republic (2007)
Facts: Petitioner Doris Chiongbian-Oliva is the
registered owner of a parcel of land as evidenced by a
TCT. This title originated from a free patent granted in
1969 under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
The free patent OCT and TCT contained the condition
that a forty-meter legal easement from the bank of any
river or stream shall be preserved as permanent
timberland.
On October 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition
for reduction of legal easement. Petitioner alleged that
the property is residential as shown by the tax
declaration and the Certification of the Office of the City
Assessor. Thus, the applicable legal easement is only
three meters pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No.
99-21, and not forty meters, which applies to
timberlands and forest lands. Petitioner also alleged that
enforcing the forty-meter legal easement would virtually
deprive her of the use and enjoyment of the property
since it consists only of 1,000 square meters.
The DENR
countered that the property is inalienable. It also
claimed that the applicant agreed on the forty-meter
legal easement when the free patent was applied for.
Issue: Is the applicable legal easement forty or three
meters?
Held: Three meters.
The trial court properly took judicial
notice that Talamban, Cebu City is an urban area. The
DENR promulgated A.O. No. 99-21 which provided that
when administratively titled lands are to be subdivided,
consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the strip of
three (3) meters which falls within urban areas shall be
demarcated. Since the property in this case was
originally alienable land of the public domain, the
application for free patent contained the condition that a
forty-meter legal easement from the banks on each side
of any river or stream found on the land shall be
demarcated and preserved as permanent timberland.
However, after the property was administratively titled,
it underwent several surveys for purposes of subdivision,
consolidation, or consolidation-subdivision as evidenced
by TCT No. 5455. Thus, presently only three meters is
required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent
timberland.
Phil. Cotton Corp. v. Gagoomal (2008)
Facts: Pacific Mills, Inc. originally owned the lands in
issue. These properties were subsequently purchased by
respondents on an installment basis from Pacific Mills.
On
June 23, 1983, petitioner filed a collection case against
Pacific Mills on the ground of alleged failure to fulfill its
obligation under a contract of loan. After hearing, the
trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment in
favor of petitioner. Thereafter, the writ of preliminary
attachment was annotated.
During the pendency of the
appeal the QC Hall was razed by fire thereby destroying
the records of the RD of QC, including the TCTs of
Pacific Mills.
Thereafter, Pacific Mills filed a petition for
reconstitution of the burned TCTs through administrative
reconstitution, in accordance with Republic Act No.
6732. However, the aforesaid alleged annotations of the
preliminary attachment in favor of petitioner were not
incorporated in the reconstituted TCTs, but annotated
therein was the sale made by Pacific Mills to
respondents and their payment in full. On even date, the
reconstituted TCTs were cancelled in favor of the
respondents.
Petitioner wrote the RD of QC requesting
for the annotation of the notice of levy, and,
subsequently, the annotation of a favorable decision of
this Court on the new TCTs issued to respondents.
Consequently, the RD informed respondents that the
letter-request for re-annotation of notice of levy had
been entered in the Primary Entry Book and asked them
to surrender their owners' duplicate copies. Thereafter,
respondents filed a Petition for the Cancellation of
Annotations in Land Titles before the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not it is the ministerial duty of the
Register of Deeds to re-annotate
Held: No. It is not the ministerial function of the
Register of Deeds to record a right or an interest that
was not duly noted in the reconstituted certificate of
title.
As a matter of fact, this task is not even within the
ambit of the Register of Deed's job as
the responsibility is
lodged by law to the proper courts. Sections 8 and 11 of
RA No. 26 provide for the procedure for the notation of
an interest that did not appear in the reconstituted
certificate of title, mandating that a petition be filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction.
The court's
intervention in the amendment of the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a
memorandum thereon is categorically stated under Sec.
108 of the Property Registration Decree.
Discussion: Under present reconstitution laws now,
only Republic Act 26 governs reconstitution of originals
lost. The only time that administrative reconstitution is
allowed is under RA 6732, in case of fire or force
majure, this may be availed of, subject to the approval
of the Administrator. To avail of this, there should be a
mass destruction.
Note: Massive Destruction under RA 6732 is defined as
where the records of a particular registry is destroyed or
at least 5,000 titles.
Paz v. Republic (2011)
Facts: The petitioner brought a petition for the
cancellation of OCT No. 684. The petition, ostensibly
made under Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529, impleaded
the Republic, FDC, and Filinvest Alabang, Inc. (FAI) as
respondents.
The petition averred that the petitioner was
the owner of 2 parcels of land; that OCT No. 684 was
registered in the name of the Republic; that Lot 392 was
segregated from OCT No. 684, resulting in the issuance
of TCT 185552, also in the name of the Republic; that
FDC and FAI developed Lot 392 into a subdivision based
on their joint venture agreement with the Government;
that pursuant to the joint venture agreement, Lot 392
was further subdivided, causing the cancellation of TCT
No. 185552. Respondents were not validly served with
summons but only a copy of the Petition, docket fees for
the Petition have not been paid, and the petition does
not contain the requisite certificate of non-forum
shopping.
Issue: Whether or not the petition under Sec. 108 of PD
1529 is proper.
Held: No. Petitioner was in reality seeking the
reconveyance of the property covered by OCT No. 684,
not the cancellation of a certificate of title as
contemplated by Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, his
petition did not fall under any of the situations covered
by Section 108.
Discussion: The requirements for the court to acquire
jurisdiction are payment of the docket fees (initiatory
pleading) and the service of summons. What Paz tried to
do in this case was make it appear that it was a
continuation of the original registration case, when in
fact, it was still an initiatory pleading. This was so he
could do away from paying the docket fees.
Dawson v. RD of QC (1998)
Facts: On May 2, 1967, during his lifetime. Louis P.
Dawson offered to buy on installment from the SISKA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, per contract to sell, a
parcel of land in Quezon City, consisting of 638 square
meters for P27,632.00, now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-58706 (248057)
On June 3, 1971, Louis P. Dawson died intestate. Upon
his death, the petitioners assumed the rights and
obligations of deceased Louis P. Dawson in the
aforementioned contract to sell, paying in full the selling
price of the lot from their own funds, which payment
was completed in 1978.
With said full payment, vendor SISKA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION executed on March 16, 1978 a deed of
absolute sale in favor of deceased Louis P. Dawson who
had died seven (7) years earlier, instead of in favor of
the petitioners who assumed and to whom [were]
transferred the rights and obligations of deceased Louis
P. Dawson upon the latter's death.
Because of the obvious error, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-58706 (248057) was issued in the name of
deceased Louis P. Dawson instead of those of petitioners
hence, the petition for the cancellation and correction of
TCT No. RT - 58706 (248057) in the name of Louis P.
Dawson and the issuance of a new title in the names of
herein petitioners, to wit: Dr. Ernesto C. Dawson (1/5),
Louis P. Dawson, Jr. (1/5), Benjamin C. Dawson (1/5),
Josephine Dawson Soliven (1/5), Ralph D. Cudilla (1/15),
Eliza C. Isip (1/15) and Larry D. Cudilla (1/15). This
petition is filed pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. 1529.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court ruled that
petitioners could not avail themselves of the summary
proceedings under the said provision, because the
present controversy involved not the cancellation of a
certificate of title but the partition of the estate of the
deceased.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 108 of PD 1529 can be
availed of as remedy?
Held: Yes, Sec. 108 applies.
It is undisputed that Louis P. Dawson died in June 1971,
without having completed the installments on the
property. His heirs, herein petitioners, then took over
the contract to sell, assumed his obligations by paying
the selling price of the lot from their own funds, and
completed the payment in 1978. Accordingly, the
ownership of the lot had not been vested in Louis P.
Dawson during his lifetime.
Indeed, on March 16, 1978, Siska Development
Corporation could not have transferred the title over the
lot, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to Louis P. Dawson
who had died seven years earlier in 1971. In 1978, the
deceased had no more civil personality or juridical
capacity.
In view of the circumstances of this case, Section 108 of
PD is clearly available as a remedy to correct the
erroneous issuance of the subject TCT in the name of
Louis P. Dawson.
C. Notice and Replacement of Lost Duplicate
Certificate (Sec. 109)
Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate
certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owner's
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall
be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a
duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced by a person applying for the entry of a new
certificate to him or for the registration of any
instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or
destruction may be filed by the registered owner or
other person in interest and registered.
Procedural Requirements
a. The registered owner or other person in interest shall
send notice, under oath, of the loss or destruction of
the owner’s duplicate certificate of title to the RD of
the province or city where the land lies as soon as
the loss or destruction is discovered;
b. The corresponding petition for the replacement of the
loss or destroyed owner’s duplicate certificate shall
then be filed in court and entitled in the original case
in which the decree of registration was entered;
c. The petition shall state under oath the facts and
circumstance surrounding such loss or destruction;
d. The court shall set the petition for hearing, after due
notice to the RD and all other interested parties as
shown in the memorandum of encumbrances noted
in the original or transfer certificate of title on file in
the office of the RD;
e. After due notice and hearing, the court may direct
the issuance of a new duplicate certificate which shall
 contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in
place of the lost or destroyed certificate and shall in
all respects be entitled to the same faith and credit
as the original duplicate.
Things to Remember
- There is no requirement for publication of the petition
for replacement of lost or destroyed certificate.
- If the owner’s duplicate certificate of title was never
lost or destroyed, a petition for the issuance of a new
owner’s duplicate copy is unwarranted, as in fact, the
court has no jurisdiction over the petition, and any
issuance pursuant to such is null and void.
- Petition shall be filed with the RTC of the place where
the land lies.
Feliciano v. Zaldivar (2006)
Facts: Remegia Feliciano filed against the Sps. Zaldivar
a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17993 and reconveyance
of the property registered in the name of Aurelio
Zaldivar.
 Remegia alleged that she was the registered
owner of a parcel of land but sometime in 1974, Aurelio,
allegedly through fraud, was able to obtain TCT No. T-
17993 covering the portion of Remegia's lot as described
in her TCT No. T-8502. A petition for cancellation of title
was filed by Aurelio where it was allegedly made to
appear therein that Aurelio and his spouse Luz acquired
the subject lot from a certain Dalman, who, in turn,
purchased it from Gil. Remegia denied that she sold the
subject lot either to Gil or Dalman. She alleged that she
never parted with the certificate of title and that it was
never lost. In their answer, the Sps. Zaldivar denied the
material allegations in the complaint and raised the
affirmative defense that Aurelio is the absolute owner
and possessor of the subject lot.
Issue: Whether or not the reconstitution of the title is
proper.
Held: No.
The CFI which granted respondent Aurelio's
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy
of TCT No. T-8502 did not acquire jurisdiction to issue
such order. It has been consistently ruled that "when
the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been
lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person,
then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the
court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of
the original certificate." In such a case, the decision
authorizing the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
certificate of title may be attacked any time. Respondent
Aurelio cannot raise the defense of indefeasibility of title
because "the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title
does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the
title. The Torrens title does not furnish a shield for
fraud."
Tan Po Chu v. CA (2016)
Facts: FiberTech owns the land in question. FiberTech’s
registration was revoked by SEC.
Respondent Chingkoe
executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No. 157923
allegedly on behalf of FiberTech.
 FiberTech filed a
petition for the reissuance/replacement of its owner's
duplicate of TCT No. 157923. The petition was based on
the affidavit of loss that Felix executed.
The petition
alleged, among others, that Felix asked the former
directors and officers of FiberTech to turn over the
owner's duplicate of TCT No. 157923, but the latter
denied knowledge or possession thereof and that after
conducting an exhaustive search, the subject title was
nowhere, to be found.
Tan Po Chu — mother of
Fibertech's incorporators Faustino and respondent
Chingkoe — filed a petition for annulment of judgment
against the RTC's decision. Tan alleged that the missing
owner's duplicate of TCT was in her custody as the
responsible officer of FiberTech; that Felix was aware of
this fact; that Felix committed perjury when he executed
the Affidavit of Loss; and that the respondents had no
authority to file the petition for reissuance of the owner's
duplicate copy on behalf of FiberTech.
Issue: Whether or not the reconstitution is proper.
Held: No.
We have consistently held that when the
owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost,
but is in fact in the possession of another person, then
the reconstituted certificate is void because the court
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter —
the allegedly lost owner's duplicate. The correct remedy
for the registered owner against an uncooperative
possessor is to compel the surrender of the
owner's
duplicate title through an action for replevin.
A judgment
void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It has
been held to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as
an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its ugly head. It may be attacked at
any time.
Gocheco V. Estacio (1962)

Facts: Cesario Gocheco is a legitimate son of Paulino P.
Gocheco, registered owner of a parcel of land, with
improvements as evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title No. O-1385 of the Register of Deeds for the said
province. The owner's duplicate copy of the said original
certificate of title was lost, and notwithstanding diligent
search to ascertain its whereabouts, the said owner's
duplicate copy has not been found.
However, in the
records of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur,
the original of the above number certificate No. O-1385
of title is found intact and complete in Sp. No. 695 Book
No. I-5 — patentee Paulino P. Gocheco. Cesario
Gocheco, in his capacity as heir of the registered owner,
filed a petition before the trial court to require the
Register of Deeds to issue another owner's duplicate
copy of the O.C.T. No. O-1385, in lieu of the owner's
copy which was lost. Francisco T. Estacio and others
opposed the petition, claiming that they have been in
continuous, peaceful, lawful, public and adverse
possession of the property covered by O.C.T. No. O-
1385.
Issues: (1) Whether or not he is required to publish the
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy
of O.C.T. No. O-1385; (2) Whether or not he is required
to secure the appointment of a legal representative to
the estate of the original registered owner
Held: (1) No.
In view of the existence of the complete
record in the register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur, of
the original of the certificate of title in question, which
appears in Book No. 1-5 of the said Register of Deeds'
Office (Exh. A) and of the fact that the present petition
is not one for reconstitution as provided by Republic Act
No. 26, there is no necessity for publishing notice of the
hearing thereof.
(2) No.
Under the provisions of Section 109, aforequoted,
there is likewise no need to first secure
the appointment
of a legal representative of the estate and the
declaration of the lawful heirs of the deceased Paulino P.
Gocheco. The petition does not at all seek the
distribution of the decedent's estate. The owner's
duplicate copy to be issued will be only an owner's
duplicate copy of O.C.T. No. O-1385 and the petitioner is
a person in interest as he is a legal heir, according to his
uncontroverted verified petition.
Discussion: If the owner’s copy is lost and the original
of that owner’s copy is with the RD, there’s no need for
publication. Another significance of this case is that, an
heir cannot just file a claim representing the estate of
the deceased until a declaration of heirship (heirs are
identified). It is only after this, where an heir can file a
case in behalf of the estate. Now, in the absence of such
declaration, the case can be dismissed. But in this case,
there is no need since it is only a petition for the
reissuance of the owner’s duplicate. Provided, that
pursuant to Sec.109, the original copy is always intact in
the RD otherwise, it would be void. It is a jurisdictional
requirement under Sec.109 that an affidavit of loss is
filed with the RD and when you file the petition, you are
going to attach this. Yet not only an affidavit of loss, but
also a certified copy of the title where the affidavit of
loss has been annotated.
D. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original
Torrens Title (Sec. 110)
Section 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed
original of Torrens title. Original copies of certificates of
title lost or destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds
as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands
covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic
Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this Decree.
The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of
lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act is
hereby abrogated.
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial
reconstitution shall be given to the Register of Deeds of
the place where the land is situated and to the
Commissioner of Land Registration. No order or
judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of
title shall become final until the lapse of thirty days from
receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the
Commissioner of Land Registration of a notice of such
order or judgment without any appeal having been filed
by any of such officials.
Note: The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes
the restoration in its original form and condition of a lost
or destroyed original or transfer certificate of title on file
in the office of the RD.
Purpose: To have the title reproduced in exactly the
same way it was at the time of its loss or destruction.
Proof Required for Reconstitution
a. That the certificate of title had been lost or
destroyed;
b. That the documents presented by petitioner are
sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the
lost or destroyed certificate of title;
c. That the petitioner is the registered owner of the
property or had an interest therein;
d. That the certificate of title was in force at the time it
was lost or destroyed; and
e. That the description, area and boundaries of the
property are substantially the same and those
contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Sources of Reconstitution for OCT (Sec. 2, RA 26)
a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
b. The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of
the certificate of title;
c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously
issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof;
d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or
patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which
the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or
an authenticated copy of said document showing that
its original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the
court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting
the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Sources of Reconstitution for TCT (Sec. 3, RA 26)
a. The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
b. The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of
the certificate of title;
c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously
issued by the register of deeds or by a legal
custodian thereof;
d. The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the
registry of deeds, containing the description of the
property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing
that its original had been registered, and pursuant to
which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title
was issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which
the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or
an authenticated copy of said document showing that
its original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the
court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting
the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Note: PD 1529 discontinued administrative reconstitution
which was provided under RA 26.
However, administrative reconstitution was reinstated by
RA 6732 to address the problem of the Quezon City fire.
This does not apply only to the Quezon City incident, but
also where at least 10% of the records of a city is
destroyed, or at least 500 titles, the administrator will
declare that the city/province where the RD is located
may avail of RA 6732.
XIX. The Condominium Act (RA 4726)
Discussion:
It is an indispensable requirement that all incorporators
of a condominium corporation must be shareholders
thereof. To be a shareholder, one must necessarily be
an owner of a condominium unit. (p. 834, Agcaoili)
Atty G: An owner or developer may convert a property
into a condominium project by executing a legal
document called Master Deed. The Master Deed is the
act that creates the condominium. It is submitted in the
Office of the Register of Deeds and it is annotated prior
to the issuance of the corresponding Condominium
Certificate of Title. They will have to secure a clearance
from the HLURB and they have to submit a plan
including the brochures regarding warranties prior to the
HLURB granting them a license to sell.
Same with subdivisions: In subd, the lot that is
considered to be a subd project under P.D. 957, there
must also be a deed that will be submitted to the RD.
They will also submit a license to sell coming from
HLURB.
A. Definition
Sec. 2 (RA 4726) A condominium is an interest in real
property consisting of separate interest in a unit in a
residential, industrial or commercial building and an
undivided interest in common, directly or indirectly, in
the land on which it is located and in other common
areas of the building. A condominium may include, in
addition, a separate interest in other portions of such
real property. Title to the common areas, including the
land, or the appurtenant interests in such areas, may be
held by a corporation specially formed for the purpose
(hereinafter known as the "condominium corporation")
in which the holders of separate interest shall
automatically be members or shareholders, to the
exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant
interest of their respective units in the common areas.
The real right in condominium may be ownership or any
other interest in real property recognized by law, on
property in the Civil Code and other pertinent laws.
B. Warranties and Representations
Sec 19 (PD 957) Advertisements. Advertisements
that may be made by the owner or developer through
newspaper, radio, television, leaflets, circulars or any
other form about the subdivision or the condominium or
its operations or activities must reflect the real facts and
must be presented in such manner that will not tend to
mislead or deceive the public.
BPI v ALS Management Corp.
FACTS: ALS bought a condominium unit from BPI.
Despite the stipulation in the Deed of Sale that ALS,
as vendee should shoulder the expenses for the
registration of the Deed of Sale and issuance of the
Certificate of Title, BPI advanced such amount and
shouldered such expenses. Now, ALS refuses to pay BPI
the amount advanced by the latter based on Sec. 25 of
PD 957 which provides that no fee shall be required
from buyers except that for registration of deed of sale
but BPI has jacked up or increased the amount by
including amounts that should not be collected from
buyers of condo units. Hence, BPI filed a case for
collection of sum of money before the RTC of Makati.
ALS also filed a Compulsory Counterclaim alleging that
BPI has not fulfilled the specifications of the condo unit
as in that of the brochures also stating that the units are
deficient and defective
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not there was a breach in the
warranties provided in the brochure?
HELD:
1. No, ALS’ counterclaim being one of “specific
performance and damages” falls under the
jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by Sec. 1
of PD No. 1344. The jurisdiction of the HLURB
over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD No.
1344 is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the
board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of
specific performance for the delivery of a
certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision
lot; for claims of refund regardless of whether
the sale is perfected or not and for determining
whether there is a perfected contract of sale.
2. Yes, petitioner BPI violated the warranties
stipulated in the brochures since it failed to
deliver certain items stated therein. The
brochure says that “the particulars stated . . . as
well as the details and visuals shown are
intended to give a general idea of the project to
be undertaken, and as such, are not to be relied
upon as statements or representations of fact”.
Petitioner claims that this general disclaimer
should apply only apply to the general concept
of the project and not to apply to the features
and the amenities. However, SC rejected this
contention by stating that Sec. 19 of PD 957.
Atty G.’s comments: It is important to remember that
before you buy a condo, you should insist that the items
they place in the brochures and the warranties are part
of the contract and if they violate such, the aggrieved
party has remedies. It is very clear that the HLURB has
the exclusive jurisdiction, the SC enumerated the
different grounds for said agency to have jurisdiction:
(1) unsound real estate business practices, (2) claims
involving refund, (3) cases involving specific
performance. Always remember Sec. 19 of PD 957 (on
advertisements).
C. Redemption of Mortgaged Amortization
SEC 25. (PD 957) Issuance of Title. — The owner or
developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the
buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee,
except those required for the registration of the
deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected
for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage
over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the
issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or
developer shall redeem the mortgage or the
corresponding portion thereof within six months from
such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid
lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in
accordance herewith.|||
De Vera v CA
FACTS: Respondent Q.P. San Diego Construction, Inc.
(QPSDCI), entered into a Syndicate Loan Agreement
with respondent banks (hereafter collectively known
as Funders) to finance the construction and
development of Lourdes I Condominium. QPSDCI
mortgaged to the creditor banks as security its Panay
Avenue Property and the condominium constructed
thereon. Petitioner and QPSDCI entered into a
Condominium Reservation Agreement where petitioner
undertook to buy Unit 211-2C of the condominium.
Petitioner's remaining balance of the purchase price
was to be secured through his housing loan. As
petitioner failed to obtain said loan, he was not able to
pay the balance of the purchase price.
Meanwhile, QPSDCI failed to pay its obligations to
the Funders. Asiatrust extra-judicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the condominium units, including
that of petitioner.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the court has jurisdiction
over the case
(2) Who has a better right over the condominium unit
in question?
RULING:
(1) No, the HLURB has jurisdiction.
The regular courts have no jurisdiction over the
case since the proper venue is with the HLURB.
Petitioner is partly to blame for filing it with the
regular courts and since the respondents also
filed their counterclaims in the lower court, then
they are estopped.
(2) The petitioner De Vera has better right.
The mortgage in favor of the FUNDERS did not bind
petitioner in as much as it is not registered with the NHA
contrary to the mandate of Sec. 18 of PD 957. QPSCDI
also violated its contract with petitioner by its failure to
remit the latter’s payment.
In, Sec 25 of PD 957, it is clear that upon full payment,
the seller is duty-bound to deliver the title of the unit to
the buyer. Even with a valid mortgage over the lot, the
seller is still bound to redeem said mortgage without any
cost to the buyer apart from the balance of the purchase
price and registration fees. It has been established that
respondent QPSDCI had been negligent in failing to
remit petitioner's payments to ASIATRUST. If QPSDCI
had not been negligent, then even the possibility of
charges, liens or penalties would not have
arisen. Therefore, as between QPSDCI and petitioner,
the former should be held liable for any charge, lien or
penalty that may arise.
Atty G’s comments: The rule is when it comes to a
condominium project, it is not supposed to mortgage the
unit without the approval of the HLURB. The moment a
mortgage is constituted on a condominium, it starts first
with the lot, with the title to the land. The moment we
issue the corresponding condominium title, the
mortgage constituted on the lot will be carried over to
the condominium certificate of titles. So every time
somebody buys a condominium unit, under the law, the
developer is under obligation to cause the release of the
mortgage. So the title should be issued to him, it must
be clean and the developer must pay for the mortgage
constituted.
So in this case, De Vera was not bound by the mortgage
constituted on the property and even if there was a valid
mortgage, assuming the approval of the HLURB, the
seller or developer is mandated under the law to redeem
the real estate mortgage and deliver the title or unit to
him as soon as it is paid in full without any additional
charge in the registration fee or outstanding balance. So
this PD 957 really provided protection both to
condominium and subdivision buyers.
D. Suspension of Monthly Amortizations
Gold Loop Properties Inc. v CA
FACTS: Respondents Bhavna Harilela and Ramesh
Sadhwani submitted through St. Martin Realty
Corporation, a realtor agent of petitioner Gold Loop
Properties, Inc. a signed pro forma reservation
application addressed to GLPI for the purchase of one
(1) condominium unit at Gold Loop Towers residential
complex..
Respondent Ramesh J. Sadhwani demanded a copy of
the contract to sell, noting that his wife had no official
document to show that she bought a condominium unit
from GLPI and there were conditions and/or stipulations
in the contract which she could not be expected to
comply with, unless a copy of the same be given to her.
Spouses Sadhwanis failed to pay any of the monthly
amortizations in the payment plan. Petitioners sent a
letter demanding payment of the balance and informed
the Sadhwanis that GLPI will rescind the Contract to Sell
and automatically forfeit their down payment should
they fail to pay.
Spouses Sadhwanis filed with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (hereinafter referred to as HLURB), a
complaint for specific performance (give them a copy of
the Contract to Sell) with an alternative prayer for
refund against GLPI.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may suspend
payment of their monthly amortizations due to failure of
petitioners to furnish them copy of the contract to sell.
RULING: Yes, Private respondents may suspend their
payment.
and the written conformity or consent of the duly
organized homeowners association, or in the absence of
the latter, by majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision
G.O.A.L Inc. v CA
FACTS: GOAL and the National Housing Authority (NHA)
entered into an agreement whereby NHA extended to
GOAL a loan for the construction of Gemin I
Condominium. A Contract Agreement was entered into
between GOAL and Matson International Corporation for
the construction of the condominium.

However, the contractor abandoned the project with

Respondents were indeed justified in suspending
only 60% of it finished. GOAL offered the condominium
payment of their monthly amortizations. The failure of
units for sale with private respondents among its
petitioners to give them a copy of the Contract to Sell
buyers. To remedy the situation brought about by the
sued upon, despite repeated demands therefor, and
abandonment of the project by the first contractor,
notwithstanding the private respondents payment of
GOAL subsequently pursued the construction of the fifth
P878,366.35 for the subject condominium unit was a
floor with NHA granting additional funding on the
valid ground for private respondents to suspend their
condition that it would hold on to the condominium
payments.
certificates of title of private respondents.

The private respondents are entitled to a copy of the

Private respondents filed with the Housing and Land Use
contract to sell, otherwise they would not be informed of
Regulatory Board (HLURB), Office of Appeals,
their rights and obligations under the contract.
Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA), a complaint
against GOAL. Among the issues raised were the illegal
Atty G’s comments: In this case, as you have noticed,
construction of the fifth floor of Gemin I Condominium,
the developer Gold Loop always refused to give a copy
the failure to deliver the title of private respondent
to the respondents of the Contract to Sell because at the
Filomeno Teng despite his repeated demands, and the
back of their minds, they already have an intention to
failure to provide adequate parking spaces for the
rescind the contract because of the default in the
unit owners.
payments by the spouses.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the construction of the floor

That’s why if you enter into contracts like this, you
is illegal.
should insist for a copy as a matter of fact you can ask
that the contract to sell be annotated in the cert of title
RULING:
or in the condominium cert of title. So, this is a valid
ground to suspend the payment of the monthly
(1) Yes, it is illegal.
amortizations. The spouses Sadhwani in this case were
saved because they have in fact defaulted in their
The written approval of the National Housing Authority
payments and they were able to use this defense and
alone is not sufficient. It must be coupled with the
they were also aided by a lawyer to guide them.
written conformity or consent of the duly organized
homeowners association or the majority of the lot
D. Alteration of Plans
buyers. Failing in this, the construction of the fifth floor
is violative of the decree (Sec. 22 of PD 957) invoked.
Sec. 22. (PD 957) Alteration of Plans. — No owner
or developer shall change or alter the roads, open Atty G’s comments: If the developer has a claim from
spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or the buyer, does the HLURB have jurisdiction? Again,
other form of subdivision development as contained in there are grounds for the HLURB to have jurisdiction (3
the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its grounds as cited in Dela Cruz case). Applying this to the
advertisements, without the permission of the Authority case, when there are claims by the developer to buyer
or when the developer asks for rescission, the HLURB
has no jurisdiction so the one who has the jurisdiction
are the regular courts.
XX. SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM
PROTECTIVE BUYER’S DECREE (P.D. 957)
A. Jurisdiction of HLURB
According to P.D. No. 1344, the National Housing
Authority (now the HLURB) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:
a) Unsound real estate business practices;
b) Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman; and
c) Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer,
dealer, broker or salesman.
FACTS: Petitioners Miniano and Leta dela Cruz and
respondents Archimedes and Marlyn Aguila entered into
a Contract to Sell of a house. Upon payment of the initial
amount by respondents, petitioners delivered the keys
to the house. Whereupon respondents entered and
occupied the property.
But, petitioners filed a Complaint for cancellation of the
contract to sell, with penalties and damages. Petitioners
claimed that despite the delivery of the keys and TCT of
the property to the respondents and countless demands
to pay the installments, respondents failed to make the
subsequent monthly payments. Hence, petitioners
sought the cancellation of the contract, the forfeiture of
the downpayment, and the payment of the accumulated
interests and penalties including attorney’s fees and cost
of suit.
Both parties filed a Compromise Agreement instead.
The respondents countered with a Motion to Dismiss.
They alleged that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over the case
under Presidential Decree No. 957 and filed with the
HLURB an action for the recovery of the down payment
and the cancellation of the contract.
ISSUE: Does the HLURB have jurisdiction over the
case?
RULING: No, the HLURB does not have jurisdiction.
P.D. No. 957 provides that a subdivision owner shall
refers to the registered owner of the land subject of a
subdivision or a condominium project. Also, a
subdivision developer shall mean the person who
develops or improves the subdivision project or
condominium project for and in behalf of the owner
thereof.
The law clearly defines who is considered a subdivision
owner or developer, and the petitioners are neither.
They are merely owners of a number of lots within the
subdivision owned and developed by Pasig Properties,
Inc. But even if petitioners were subdivision owners or
developers, this would not bar them from seeking
redress from the courts.
The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court
or agency is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It cannot be made to depend on the defenses
made by the defendant in his Answer or Motion to
Dismiss. Therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case contrary to respondents’ contention that the
jurisdiction is with the HLURB.
LAST MEETING REVIEW:
Atty G: In the exams, I might have to ask a thing or two
about original registration, then the rest will be based on
the cases that we have studied.
Always remember P.D. 1529.. Almost all Land Titles
books discuss the Malabanan case, the Naguit case, also
the Carag spouses case. These are important decisions
of the Supreme Court. Prior to 1919, there is no law yet
that requires land classification, all lands are considered
alienable except that the burdens are with the part of
the state to show that it is either timber or mineral land.
But after 1919, a law is enacted which requires the Gov.
Gen and authorizes him to classify lands. There is an
exception to that law which provides that where the land
is already clean or considered a private land, then it is
no longer covered by the classification requirement for
purposes of disposition.
I consider that law as very important since in the 1935
constitution, we have already inducted the Regalian
Doctrine and the Regalian Doctrine provides that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State unless it
is classified as agricultural or alienable land, so that
explains titles issued prior to 1935 even without the
classification, provided that it is clean or agricultural or
alienable, they are considered as valid even if there is no
formal declaration that it is A&D. I think that is a very
important ruling because it answers the question on
“how come those titles issued in 1930, there was no
land classification yet these titles are considered valid?”
The Carag spouses case answered that question. I think
I mentioned earlier in class that Escolta in Manila was
formally classified as A&D only in 1955 and we already
know that Escolta was already around at that time. So,
that should answer questions regarding unclassified
lands prior to 1935.
So then we have the Naguit case, it was reiterated and
declared by the SC as the ruling case as in the
Malabanan v Republic. What is important to remember
reiterating the Naguit case that the land be A&D AT THE
TIME OF THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION. It
may not be A&D in June 12, 1945 but definitely you
have to prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation since June 12, 1945.
Now, in the Malabanan case, what about prescription on
Sec. 14(par. 2), it applies prescription to patrimonial
property of the State. Definitely prescription does not lie
to a land which has not been classified as A&D. It is not
enough that the land is A&D, it should also be declared
as patrimonial property of the State before it may be
susceptible to acquisition. Now, par. 3 – accession, you
start counting the period before you can invoke
prescription at the time the land was classified as A&D.
You don’t have to provide possession since June 12,
1945 because the Civil Code itself provides that “To the
owners of lands that adjoins banks of rivers, belongs the
accession.”
Then regarding voluntary registration, voluntary
dealings and subsequent registrations, always remember
that where a land is already covered by an existing title
which operates under the Torrens System, it is not an
act of tradition that binds the land but it is the act
of registration.
Sec. 52 - Constructive Notice. Registration in
the Register of Deeds is a constructive notice to
the whole world, nobody can feign ignorance on
the fact of registration.
Sec 56 – Entry in a Voluntary Dealing.
Under the case of DBP v RD of Nueva Ecija, SC
said that entry in the primary entry book,
complying with all the requirements for
registration is a complete act of registration. It
produces the effects of registration. In this case,
they have complied with all the requirements; it
is considered a complete act of registration.
However in the case of Candice Bona v CA,
where it was shown that Candice Bona failed to
pay the registration fees, then according to SC,
it did not comply with all that is required for a
valid registration.
So long as all the requirements are complied with, when
it is entered in the book of the RD, then it has produced
already the act of registration. So that is voluntary
dealings.
In INVOLUNTARY DEALINGS FOR SUBSEQUENT
REGISTRATION,
Sec. 70 – Adverse Claims. The leading case is
the Sajonas v CA, even after the lapse of 30
days, there is still a need to file a petition in
court for the cancellation of the adverse claim.
What is important to remember in an adverse
claim is that THERE SHOULD BE NO OTHER
REMEDY as provided for in any provision in the
decree to cause an adverse claim to be availed
of. So, if it is registrable as a mere voluntary
sale, for example a Deed of Absolute Sale, as
what is illustrated in the Sajonas case and the
other cases, that instead of registering the
Contract to Sell, what they did was file an
adverse claim, technically this is not valid
registration of an adverse claim because there is
a remedy available under the provisions of the
decree under PD 1529 to register such interest.
Sec 71 – Surrender of Certificate in
Involuntary Dealings. So there are two
provisions in the decree that require the
surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of the
title.
o One, is Sec 71, it provides that
whenever an involuntary dealing is
registered in the Office of the RD (lis
pendens, adverse claims, etc.) The RD
is mandated under this Section to
require the registered owner to
surrender his Owner’s Duplicate for the
purpose of annotating the involuntary
dealing. In the ruling in one of the cases
decided by the SC, even if the
 registered owner refuses to surrender
the owner’s duplicate copy of the title,
the involuntary transaction will still be
considered as valid. It is just a formality.
o The other one is Sec. 107 – Petitions
and Actions after Original
Registration. So, under Sec. 107, the
leading case of Toledo Banaga, normally
where it is necessary to require the
surrender of the owner’s duplicate copy
of the title in a voluntary/involuntary
dealing for the purpose of issuing a title
in favor of the prevailing party for
example in a deed of absolute sale, for
one reason or another, the seller refuses
to surrender the owner’s duplicate copy
of the title, of course the buyer can
invoke Sec. 107 compelling to surrender
the owner’s duplicate copy but if he
refuses you can ask the court for an
alternative remedy to declare the title as
null and void and ask the RD to issue a
new one. The same is true in an
involuntary dealing, but in the case of
Toledo Banaga v CA, the SC held that
where there is already a final and
executory decision of the court the
registered owner or the one who was in
possession of the title was a party to the
case, and there is already an order for
execution there is no need any more to
require the surrender of the owner’s
duplicate copy because it is already
considered as implied in the final and
executory judgment of the court.
Sec. 76 – Lis Pendens. The leading case is
Viewmaster Construction v Maulit, it is not
confined only to issues about ownership and
possession but also includes for the purpose of
the establishment of registrable estate private
corporation and real property??(unclear because
of the rain T_T) and also issues on liens and
encumbrance pertaining to real property. It
elaborates further in the Atlantic Erectors case
where the lien as understood the Viewmasters
case is not the kind of lien… (sorry, di na clear
iyang mga words here)
In matters of execution pursuant to a levy, the
leading case is Padilla v Phil. Producer’s
Cooperative, it is not enough that you file a
motion or a petition pursuant to Sec. 75 of PD
1529 for the application of a new certificate of
title. There is no need any more to file a petition
in court in Sec 107 for the surrender of the
owner’s duplicate because it is implied already in
the proceeding.
Sec. 108 – Amendment and Alteration of
Certificates. The leading case of Paz v
Republic, where the purpose for the petition to
cancel the title is to reconvey the same in favor
of the plaintiff, then it is considered as a simple
reconveyance, therefore it is an initiatory
pleading. So the plaintiff has to comply with the
payment of docket fees, notice of summons and
certification of non-forum shopping.
So, strictly petitions under Sec. 107, 108, 109, these
are just continuations of the original registration
proper. Last paragraph of Sec 108 provides that the
petition should be captioned and entitled under the
original proceedings. That’s why in the petition for
reconstitution, it’s always captioned LRC case so and
so.. which information can be found on the face of
the title. Now where the title is issued pursuant to a
public land application for patent, you can also
indicate in the patent itself the patent number and
the OCT issued pursuant to that patent. That is in
compliance with the provision on the last par. of Sec
108.
Sec 109 - Notice and Replacement of Lost
Duplicate Certificate. So I want you to
remember that a title consists of 1 set, 1 for the
owner (owner’s duplicate) and the original copy
is the one stored in the vault of the RD. Where
the owner’s copy is lost, it can be replaced
under Sec 109 and under Sec 109, in the case of
Gocheco v Estacio, the court will sometimes
require to cause the publication but the SC in
this case said that there is no need to cause
publication if the original copy is intact in the
Register of Deeds. Neither is it necessary to
appoint a legal representative to file a petition
because this is just a simple petition for
replacement of the owner’s duplicate copy.
Sec. 110 – Reconstitution of Lost or
Destroyed Original Torrens Title. If the
original title is lost, we have RA 26, it is to allow
administrative reconstitution but it is already
discontinued under PD 1529. This is a special
 law, under Sec. 32 of RA 26, if there is a mass
destruction of 10% of the records then
administrative reconstitution is allowed. That -end-
was during the time it was allowed. It is crucial
to remember the rule on EJUSDEM GENERIS
under Sec 110, that under par. (f) Sec 2 and 3
(Other Sources of Reconstitution), it should
belong to the same class.

Regarding PATENTS:

Sec 103 - Registration of Patents. Upon

registration of patents, they are considered
indefeasible just like a certificate of Torrens
Title. It enjoys the attributes and characteristics
of a title issued pursuant to a Torrens System of
registration. One year after the issuance of a
patent, the patent also becomes
incontrovertible.
RA 10023 – An Act Authorizing the
Issuance of Free Patents to Residential
Lands. We should also remember this law, this
is very important. This allows residential free
patent, as you know a free patent application
covers only agricultural land but because of this
law, residential lands may also be applied for a
patent application. What is nice about this law is
that, the possession that must be required is
only 10 years and there is no restriction like an
ordinary patent where there is a restriction of 5
years that you cannot alienate it. In the
residential free patent law, immediately after the
issuance of the patent you can sell it to another
person. But of course in the area there is a
limitation, it must not exceed – 200 sqm for
urban, 2nd and 3rd class cities – 500sqm and 700
sqm for 1st and 2nd class municipalities and
1000sqm for 5th class municipalities.

Remember that an unregistered land is not

covered under PD 957 and Subd and
Condominium Act, it only recovers registered
lands.

For the finals, I want to really be assured that

you have mastered the rules on Original
Registration. The lessons that I want you to
remember are really covered by these important
provisions.