G.R. No.

L-2321 January 31, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARSENIA NUÑEZ, defendant-appellant.

Antonio Gaw for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal by Arsenia Nuñez from a judgment of the People's Court which convicted her of
the crime of reason on an information consisting of one count, and after proper trial sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of
P10,000 and the costs.

In the brief filed in her behalf by counsel de oficio it is contended that the alleged overt acts alleged
in the information and which were made the basis of her conviction were not clearly proven to
establish the guilt of appellant was predicated merely on circumstantial evidence and that the
accused in accordance with the requirement of the treason law.

The charge brought against Arsenia Nuñez before the People's Court appears in the following:

That during the period comprised between December 8, 1941, and March, 1945, more
specifically on or about the dates hereinbelow mentioned, and in different places in the
Philippines hereinafter designated, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines in violation of the said oath of allegiance, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully feloniously and treasonably adhere to the enemy, the Empire of
Japan and the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, against which the United States
and the Philippines were then at war, by extending, facilitating and giving assistance, aid and
comfort to the above-mentioned enemy, in the following manner and form to wit:

The herein accused, with intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy, on about July 32,
1944, wilfully, unlawfully and treasonably acted as the finger-woman when the barrio of
Tapia, General Trias, Cavite, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, was
"zonified" by the Japanese, pointing out to the Japanese several men whom she accused as
guerrillas, among whom were Carlos Guarin, Cayetano Asistores, Dionisio Carandang,
Carlos de los Reyes, Dionisio Asistores and Severino Portugues, who were then and there
loaded in a truck and taken away by the Japanese and were never heard of since that time;
on the same occasion the herein accused wilfully and treasonably pointed to the Japanese
soldiers several women whom she accused as wives of or connected with guerrillas, among
whom were Balbina Rosa whom she pointed out as the wife of a guerrilla and as a result of
which the said Balbina Rosa was imprisoned by the Japanese for two months and seven
days.

Contrary to law.

It appears from the evidence that Arsenia Nuñez, according to her own admission, a native-born
citizen of the Philippines, was a resident of barrio Pasong Kawayan, municipality of General Trias,
Province of Cavite, where she lived with her family up to the month of July, 1944. She was married
to Albino Torres, but her husband having abandoned her, she moved to the City of Cavite where, in
consonance with he loose morals, particularly during the Japanese occupation, she became the
mistress of Magno Garcia, a Japanese mestizo and a notorious spy in the service of the
Japanese Kempei-tai in Cavite.

No less than four witnesses took the stand before the People's Court to substantiate the allegations
made in the above-quoted charge. They are Teodoro Guarin, Marcelina Reyes, Perpetua Cadava,
Florencia Luneta.

Teodora Gluarin, a sexagenarian and a merchant of Pasong Kawayan, General Trias, Cavite, stated
that one afternoon in the month of July, 1944, Arsenia Nuñez, in company with a man named Garcia
and four truckloads of Japanese soldiers arrived in Pasong Kawayan for the zoning of the barrio.
The Japanese soldiers rounded up the inhabitants, including women and children, and herded them
into a pre-designated place; they also rounded up Ceferino Portuguez, son of the witness, and
Carlos Guarin. During the process of zoning, the appellant pointed out those two persons to her
Japanese companions by telling them that they are bad men and guerrillas. Immediately thereafter,
the Japanese soldiers tied the hands of Portuguez and Guarin and loaded them on a truck, and the
two prisoners, with other persons from the same barrio, were taken away by the Japanese and
brought to the City of Cavite. Teodora Guarin said that after that she never saw her son Ceferino
again. She also testified that Garcia, known as "the fat man," was accompanying the appellant and
the Japanese soldiers in the zoning of that place and was a notorious Japanese spy in Cavite.
Appellant was living in Cavite with Garcia as his mistress, and, during the zoning of the barrio of
Pasong Kawayan, she saw the appellant wearing a Japanese cap and clothing similar to that worn
by Japanese soldiers.

Marcelina Reyes, a resident of barrio Tapia, General Trias, Cavite, testified that she knew the
appellant since her childhood. In July, 1944, Arsenia Nuñez was in company with Japanese soldiers
when they conducted a zona in her barrio and arrested Perputua Cadava, Ceferino Portuguez,
Carlos de los Reyes, Dionisio Colanting and a man who answered to the name of Tano. The witness
was also arrested by the Japanese pursuant to the indication of appellant who informed them that
her husband, Alonso Saliba, was a guerrilla. Marcelina was therefore loaded on a truck together with
Ceferino Portuguez and a few others, and brought to the Military Police garrison in Cavite City,
where she was investigated regarding the guerrilla activities of her husband. While she was detained
in Cavite for two months and seven days, she saw the appellant sitting on a chair and holding office
at the Kempei-tai headquarters in Cavite. Appellant was married to a guerrilla by the name of Albino
Torres and the accused joined the Japanese to compel the surrender of her husband. When the
prisoners were brought to the City of Cavite, appellant was on the front seat of the vehicle, next to
the chauffeur, and on that occasion she was wearing a Japanese uniform. Marcelina further stated
that Carlos de los Reyes, one of those arrested and taken to the City of Cavite from the place of
the zona, has never returned nor seen after his arrest; likewise, her brother Carlos de los Reyes and
many others who were arrested have never to their respective homes.

The third witness Perpetua Cadava declared that she was acquainted with the appellant since her
childhood. She narrated practically the facts testified by the two previous witnesses and added that
when she was arrested together with Marcelina Reyes, Ceferino Portuguez and others, her hands
were tied and she was loaded on a truck together with those persons already mentioned. They were
taken to Kempei-tai garrison in the City of Cavite and investigated regarding her guerrilla
connections. During her questioning in the Kempei-tai garrison, appellant was pacing up and down
the floor of the premises and once approached her saying, "Is it true that your house is being used
as headquarters of Magirog and is it also true that your husband is a guerrilla?" after which, she was
slapped on the face by appellant. Perpetua corroborated the other two witnesses when she stated
that appellant was dressed in Japanese uniform, was wearing sun glasses, and frequently pointed
out by her were immediately tied by the hands and loaded on trucks by the Japanese. This witness
kept in the Kempei-tai garrison for one month and one day.
The fourth witness is Florencio Luneta, a merchant in the town of Tanza, Cavite. According to her, in
1944, she lived with the appellant and some guerrillas in the same house in the barrio of Tapia,
General Trias. In July, 1944, the appellant suddenly left the house and lived with some Japanese in
the City of Cavite. One afternoon, appellant came to the barrio of Tapia with Japanese soldiers
traveling in four trucks and in order to conduct a zona in that place. The appellant pointed out the
witness to the Japanese as the laundry woman of Magno Mairoguin, a guerrilla leader in Cavite; she
also pointed out the Japanese Marcelina Reyes, Perpetua Cadava and Balbina Posas. In fact, these
women were wives of guerrillas and being pointed out by appellant their hands were tied and they
were loaded by the Japanese on trucks and brought to the Kempei-tai headquarters in the City of
Cavite. Florencia was investigated regarding her connections with guerrilla she leader Magno
Mairoguin, and during her questioning she was confronted by her accusers, the appellant herein.
She told the appellant, "Woman you might be mistaken; I am not a laundry woman of the guerrillas."
She was detained in the Japanese garrison for one month and a half. During her confinement
therein she saw appellant frequently in the Japanese headquarters. She saw appellant wearing a
cap and a suit similar to that worn by the Japanese soldiers and when going out on a expedition with
the Japanese, she usually sat near the chauffeur.

In the light of the above-stated facts, it is undeniable that this appellant has been acting as the
"finger woman" of the Japanese when the latter zoned the inhabitants in the barrios of Tapia and
Pasong Kawayan, municipality of General Trias, Cavite. All the witnesses for the prosecution have
attested that she was always in the company of Japanese soldiers, that she was always in the
company of Japanese soldiers, and that appellant was wearing sun glasses, a Japanese cap and
uniform, and that she was the one who pointed her accusing finger at the persons already
mentioned above who were immediately put under arrest by the Japanese members of the Kempei-
tai and transferred to their headquarters, investigated and tortured.

It is distinctly shown that in taking part in the zoning activities of the Japanese, appellant was
responsible for the arrest of several persons such as Ceferino Portuguez, Carlos Guarin, Carlos de
los Reyes and others, with the added circumstance that the three named persons have never bee
seen alive again, and although it is not the purpose of the prosecution to make her directly and
personally responsible for the disappearance, and perhaps the killing by the Japanese, of Ceferino
Portuguez, Carlos Guarin, and Carlos de los Reyes, yet the conclusion is inevitable that, by pointing
them out to her Japanese masters, she had greatly cooperated in their arrest, detention,
disappearance, and perhaps death, by the positive act of accusing them and pointing them out to
Japanese kempei.

Appellant admitted that she pointed out to the Japanese and caused the arrest of Ceferino
Portuguez and three other persons; she also admitted that she had been living in the house of
Magno Garcia, a notorious Japanese spy in the City of Cavite from July, 1944 up to the date of
liberation thereof. She alleged, however, that a group of armed bandits locally known as "Texas"
kidnapped her from the home of her parents in Pasong Kawayan, General Trias; that Ceferino
Portuguez, a rejected suitor, was a member of that band; that her kidnappers brought her to a place
called Santol where she was outraged; that after abusing her, her kidnappers brought her to the
house of Perpetua Cadava where she was made to stay overnight guarded by Portuguez and three
others. The day following the zoning referred to by the witnesses for the prosecution, the house of
Perpetua Cadava was raided by the Japanese soldiers and they found her there in premises with
Ceferino Portuguez and the latter's companions. When she was investigated by the Japanese, she
reported to them what happened to her, and that she was kidnapped by the "Texas" band; but the
Japanese did not believe her story and instead brought her to the City of Cavite and placed her
under the custody of Magno Garcia. Upon the arrival of the American troops she escaped from the
house of Garcia and proceeded to Batangas, Batangas, and stayed in the house of a friend. Then an
American member of the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) arrested her on the charged of being a
Japanese spy.
The above denials and assertions made by the defendant fail to counteract the evidence presented
by the prosecution. For instance, one Felix Cubal who claims to be a next-door neighbor of the
Nuñez family, testified that one day previous to the zoning of Pasong Kawayan, the appellant was
kidnapped by the "Texas" band, but the appellant's father, Placido Nuñez, put on the witness stand
by the defense, declared that he had no close neighbors, that his house was isolated and very far
away from others, that he was working on his land when this happened and learned about it when
he returned home. Alleging that he was afraid of the Japanese, he said, however, that he did not
notify the local authorities about it nor take any steps to ascertain the whereabouts of his daughter,
and that it was only on the following year, when the American forces were already occupying the
province of Cavite, that the witness learned that his daughter, the appellant, was in the city of Cavite.
The attitude of utter indifference shown by Nuñez in the connection with the matter of the alleged
kidnapping of his daughter is so unnatural, so contrary to the well-known strength and closeness of
the family ties of the Filipinos, that we hardly believe the accuracy of this story of the kidnapping, and
that appellant voluntarily left her home for the city of Cavite to join the Japanese.

This shows that the evidence of appellant is based on a shaky foundation. In fact, even assuming
that her contention that she was criminally assaulted and kidnapped by the "Texas" bandits is true,
yet, we fail to understand how such acts could justify her treasonable acts and adherence to the
enemies of her country and fellow citizens. We find that the testimonies of the four women who were
put on the stand by the prosecution ring, true, and it is unbelievable that they would have concocted
such accusations against this appellant, one of their own sex, if the facts related by them on the
witness stand were mere fabrications.

The Solicitor General, agreeing to the plea of counsel for defendant, invites our attention to the
attendance of the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority of this offender when she committed
those treasonable acts. (Rev. Penal Code, art. 13, par. 2.) The transcript of her testimony shows that
this appellant, answering to questions of her counsel, said that, according to her mother, she was
born on the 17th of August, but she did not know what year." Her mother just told her that she "was
18 years old." However, when on January 5, 1948 she was put on the stand, after being sworn as a
witness, she said that she was 21 years of age. Considering that the evidence shows that her
treasonable acts were committed after her alleged kidnapping and raping by the "Texas" bandits in
July, 1944, we may safely conclude that she was over 15 and under 18 years of age when she
violated the treason law, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary (Judgment of the Supreme
Court of Spain of June 9, 1890, Viada, Vol. 2, page 14, cuestion 2; U.S. vs. Agadas, 36 Phil., 246)
when the culprit is over 15 and under 18 years of age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period," upon this culprit (Art. 68, par. 2, Rev.
Penal Code).

Treason is punished by reclusion temporal to death and a fine not to exceed P20,000. According to
the rules for graduating penalties provided in article 61 of the Revised Penal Code, "when the
penalty prescribed for the crime in composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or more divisible
penalties to be imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." In this instance,
the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor, to be imposed in its medium period, on account of
the absence of modifying circumstances.

Pursuant to section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended, this appellant, herein
convicted of treason, is, however, not entitled to the benefits of the said law.

In view of all foregoing, Arsenia Nuñez is, therefore, sentenced to ten years of prision mayor. Thus
modified, the judgment appealed from is otherwise affirmed, with costs.
Xxxxxxxxxxxx

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO
DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS
V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX
D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer,
PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS

ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:

ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu
vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party
or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the
decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as
the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify
them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule
113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial
admissions;
 4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

The writ of habeas corpus exists as a

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3

speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of
the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is
illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked
into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would
follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

The law
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6

expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which
states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which,
like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such

crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That
Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which
compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual
facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case,
that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has
just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by

A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded

circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10

on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow
man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was
listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot
wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third
— as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man
was in reality Rolando Dural.

believe
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13

that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being
treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital
management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable
sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the
officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was
made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was
thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers).
On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were
found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore,
caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule
113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests
without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within
judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to
remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA
about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied
by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information,
the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when
Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the
firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he
was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
 2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that
he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military
agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the
agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose
house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of
Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make
the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the
other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple),
which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of
the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the
safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by
the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That
would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to

An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to

prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21

arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are
met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed
guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable
cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties
and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent

But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers
and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24

can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November

Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
1988. 28

uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to
sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist,
during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For
Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14
days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police
were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events
surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two
(2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein
as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
 On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering
said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case
and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against
him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests
of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section
5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.

that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30

Roque, she admitted that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in
31

her possession during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in
the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It
pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the
light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps
with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant
be tested as to its legality viahabeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into — and all
other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so
that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are
not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then
the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that
he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the
arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some
groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9951. December 3, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A. A. ADDISON, Defendant-Appellant.

W. H. Booram, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. SEARCH WARRANTS; PROSECUTION FOR WRONGFUL ISSUANCE. — The statute requires that both malice
and the absence of probable cause must exist concurrently in order to justify a conviction.

2. ID.; ID.; MALICE. — Malice cannot be inferred from the fact that the search warrant failed of its purpose.

3. ID., ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE. — Probable cause required to justify the issuance of a search warrant is such
antecedent facts and circumstances as would induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance
thereof.

4. ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. — Testimony examined and held insufficient to show either malice or
the absence of probable cause.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendant A. A. Addison, having been condemned to pay a fine of P100, to indemnify the injured party
in the sum of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to the payment of the costs of
the cause, for a violation of the provisions of section 106 of General Orders No. 58, appealed to this court.

On the 23d of December, 1912, the appellant subscribed and swore to an affidavit wherein he stated that on
or about the 20th of that month at 8.30 a. m. he saw various bottles containing compounds of opium in an
aparador situated in the upstairs sala of the house of John McStay in Lucena, Tayabas. On the same day the
Court of First Instance issued a search warrant, based upon that affidavit, directing the sheriff to search the
house of McStay and seize the opium. In compliance with this warrant the sheriff proceeded immediately to
search the house, but found nothing of a contraband nature, and so reported to the court. Subsequent
thereto, and on the 3d day of January, 1913, John McStay filed a sworn complaint (denuncia), charging the
appellant with the "crime of malicious prosecution" and alleging that the appellant did, on the 23d day of
December, 1912, willfully and maliciously, with the sole intent and purpose of gratifying his personal
resentment against the complainant, procure and obtain, without any probable cause whatever, a search
warrant "of the person, residence, and place of business of the undersigned, by signing and swearing before
the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge of the Court of First Instance, certain malicious, false, and defamatory
statements, known to be false and defamatory by said accused." On the 11th of April, 1913, the provincial
fiscal filed a formal complaint against the appellant charging him with the same crime and setting forth the
same allegations as in the complainant’s denuncia. After trial, the judgment above stated was duly entered.

For the purpose of showing that the search warrant was procured "maliciously and without probable cause,"
the prosecution presented seven witnesses, who testified substantially as follows: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw libra ry

Juan Merchan, clerk of the court, and Agapito Villasenor, sheriff, testified only in reference to the filing of the
affidavit upon which the search warrant was based, the issuing of the warrant, and the search of the
complainant’s premises.

John McStay, the complainant, testified that for some time prior to the 23d of December, 1912, he was
running a hotel and canteen in Lucena, Tayabas; that the appellant lived in his hotel from the 28th of
September until the 23d of December; that on the 23d of December the appellant left his hotel on account
of certain disturbances which occurred therein on the previous night; that these disturbances were caused
by three of four guests, and disturbed the appellant’s sleep; that on the following day the appellant had a
quarrel with one of these guests; that at the time he left he was angry and stated that he desired to leave
the hotel and would arrange his account on the following day; that when he (the witness) bought the hotel
he also bought the beds and the aparadores; and that he and the appellant were friends, never having had
any trouble. As to the damages suffered by the complainant on account of the search of his premises, he
stated that some persons did not know whether he was guilty or not, and, therefore, stayed away from his
hotel during those days, resulting in damaging him in the sum of P500.

James R. Gittings testified that he was one of the persons who were making the noise in the hotel on the
night of the 22d, while the appellant was sleeping upstairs; that the appellant called their attention to these
disturbances and asked them to stop so that he could sleep; and that on the following day he and the
appellant had a quarrel.

Thomas Hoey, an internal-revenue agent, testified that he accompanied the sheriff at the time the
complainant’s hotel was searched; and that he induced the appellant to present the affidavit upon which the
search warrant was based, after the appellant had stated to him that opium could be found in McStay’s
possession.

Guy B. Shiller, principal of the Lucena High School, testified that he had a conversation with the appellant
and Hoey at the government building, and that he heard Hoey ask the appellant if the latter would make an
affidavit for the purpose of securing the search warrant, and the appellant answered that he would.

Jose Nieva, an employee in the Bureau of Agriculture, stated that he was acquainted with Benigna Robles, a
witness for the defendant; that on the 24th of December he returned to Lucena from Manila, and that when
the train stopped at Calamba about 10 a. m., he saw Benigna Robles in the train.

The defense presented four witnesses; Joseph Rosemblatt, Charles R. Duffin, Benigna Robles, and
the Appellant.

Rosemblatt testified that he lived in Lucena up until some time in the month of August, 1912; that at that
time a Mr. Salmon owned the canteen and hotel which was searched by the sheriff; that he was in an
automobile accident when one of the passengers had his arm dislocated and, upon returning to Lucena after
the accident, they went to the drug store to get some opium liniment; that the pharmacist refused to sell
them this medicine without a doctor’s prescription; that the following day he went to the canteen, which was
located in the hotel, and was then informed by a Mr. Henson that the canteen had some 25 bottles of
various kinds of medicines; that these bottles were shown him in an aparador; and that on taking hold of
one of the bottles he discovered that it contained an opium mixture.

Duffin, who was a mechanical engineer at that time, stated that he knew the canteen owner, at the time the
search warrant was issued, to be McStay; that when he first knew the hotel it was owned by one Henson;
that at the time he left Lucena McStay was negotiating for the purchase of that hotel; that he saw in this
hotel on various occasions opium in an aparador; and that this aparador was upstairs.

Benigna Robles testified that she was a dancing girl in McStay’s saloon in December, 1912; that two days
before Christmas she saw Hoey and McStay talking together in the hotel and heard Hoey use the word
"Addison;" that after Hoey and McStay terminated their conversation, Henson entered the room upstairs and
took out of the aparador some bottles and put them in his pocket; and that that same afternoon the search
was made.

Section 106 of General Orders No. 58 reads: "Any person who shall procure a search warrant maliciously
and without probable cause, and any officer who shall unlawfully exceed his authority or use unnecessary
severity in executing the same, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine
of not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by both such fine and imprisonment." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

This section requires that both malice and absence of probable cause must exist concurrently in order to
justify a conviction. If the appellant’s act in making the affidavit was malicious and unfounded, but there
was probable cause for such act, he must be acquitted. "In a legal sense," says Greenleaf (vol. 2, sec. 453,
16th Ed.) , "any unlawful act done willfully and purposely to the injury of another, is, as against that person,
malicious." Malice cannot be inferred from the fact that no opium was found in the house of the complainant
by the sheriff.

"Probable cause may be defined as such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and
proper." (Burton v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn., 189.)

Addison lived in McStay’s hotel from September 28 to December 23, when he left on account of certain
disturbances in the hotel on the night of the 22d. McStay took no part in these disturbances. He and Addison
were, according to his own testimony, friends. But it is said that the fact that Addison in effect charged
McStay with the commission of a serious crime is inconsistent with the latter’s testimony to the effect that
they were friends. McStay said that they were friends, and he is the person who claims to have been
injured. Again, Addison was induced by the internal-revenue agent to make the affidavit. In so doing he was
carrying out his obligation as an "informer," and as such informer he had reasonable cause to believe that
he would be rewarded therefor in accordance with certain provisions of the Opium Law.

Rosemblatt testified that he saw opium in the aparador before McStay bought the hotel. Duffin testified to
the same effect and, also, that at the time he saw the opium McStay was negotiating for the purchase of the
hotel. Benigna Robles said that she saw opium in the hotel two days before Christmas. She also testified in
effect that McStay was notified of the issuance of a search warrant and caused the opium to be removed.
The prosecution attempted to show that this witness was not in Lucena on the 23d of December, and for this
purpose presented Jose Nieva, who testified that on his return to Lucena on the 24th he saw Benigna in the
train at Calamba. It does not appear that Benigna could not have come to Manila on the afternoon or night
of the 23d, or even on the morning of the 24th. We must, therefore, conclude that there was an absence of
malice on the part of the defendant in making the affidavit and that there existed probable cause for making
the affidavit.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and the defendant acquitted, with costs
de officio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.