276 Guevera vs. Hon. Placido C.

Ramos
G.R. No. L-24358, 38 SCRA 194, March 31, 1971

Facts:

The petitioner files an action for the satisfaction of a final judgment for
damages rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal Quezon City. The
provincial sheriff of Rizal scheduled the auction sale of the property levied upon
on February 25, 1963. But prior thereto the brothers and sisters of the deceased
David Guevara, together with the judgment debtors, sought to prevent the sale at
public auction by staking third-party claims, asserting rights of ownership by way
of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land levied upon and
one-half of the value of the house situated thereon. On account, however, of an
indemnity bond posted by Bernabe Flores, one of the judgment creditors the
provincial sheriff of Rizal proceeded with the auction sale at which said Bernabe
Flores was the successful bidder. Immediately thereafter Bernabe Flores assigned
his right as such purchaser to Maximo Calalang, the judgment creditors' own
counsel.

The judgment debtors in civil case having failed to redeem the property
within the one-year period for redemption, the provincial sheriff of Rizal executed
in favor of Bernabe Flores an "Officer's Deed of Absolute Sale". Thereafter
Bernabe Flores moved in the court below for a writ of possession directing the
judgment debtors to vacate the above-described property or relinquish possession
of the same to Bernabe Flores, his heirs, representatives and assigns. This was
opposed by the judgment debtors, who pointed out that the parcel of land sold at
the execution sale was owned and possessed by the third-party claimants who had
filed their claim with the provincial sheriff and, in fact, had earlier brought the
corresponding action in court to vindicate the same. The opposition was overruled;
the court a quo granted the writ of possession prayed for and accordingly directed
the provincial sheriff of Rizal to place Bernabe Flores and/or his representative in
possession of the property. But the provincial sheriff of Rizal was unable to
enforce the writ of possession due to the resistance of the third-party claimants,
who had meanwhile taken possession by virtue of their claim of ownership over
the same.
 In an order dated March 23, 1965, the lower court served notice upon the
third-party claimants to vacate the premises in question on or before March 31,
1965, on pain of being punished for contempt. Soon thereafter they and the
judgment debtors came to this Court on the instant petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction principally to prevent enforcement of the aforementioned
"writ of possession." On March 31, 1965 this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction asked for, enjoining respondents . . ." from enforcing the order of March
23, 1965, in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the purpose of
preserving the rights of the parties to the case, until further orders from this Court.

Issue :

1. Whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants' assertion of

ownership over a portion of the land sold on execution may defeat the
purchaser's right to have possession of the same after the expiration of
the one-year redemption period allowed by law.
2. Would such right to possession be defeated by the fact that a third party,
not privy to the judgment debtor, claims to be the owner of the same
property?

Held:

The petition is dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore

issued is dissolved.

It has been held that where a parcel levied upon execution is occupied by a
party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing
to determine the nature of said adverse possession. Such a hearing, however, was
not necessary in this case for two reasons: The third party-claimants here were not
in possession of the disputed land when it was sold at public auction on February
25, 1963, pursuant to the writ of execution. By the judgment-debtors' own
admission in their opposition to the motion for a writ of possession, the third-party
claimants occupied the said land only after they had commenced Civil Case on
June 10, 1963. They were not in possession when they filed their third-party claim
February 13, 1963. (2) When the land was levied upon and when it was sold on
execution it was declared for taxation in the names of the judgment debtors, who
were the ones then in possession. Quite obviously the third-party claimants belated
move to take possession was designed to defeat the purchaser's right to the same in
accordance with the provision of Section 35 of Rule 39, by virtue of the definite
deed of sale in his favor, which may be defeated and set aside only by an adverse
final adjudication against him of the third parties' claim of ownership.

The said claim is not foreclosed by the writ of possession issued by the lower
court, being precisely the subject of litigation in Civil Case No. 7720 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. Since the issuance of such writ was proper, the court a
quo acted within its jurisdiction when it poised the threat of contempt against any
willful defiance thereof by the third-party claimants.
 277 Delta Motors Corporation Vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 78012. November 29, 1988, 168 SCRA

Facts:
In this case, notice of levy was filed with the City Assessor’s Office
on two tax declarations covering the properties in question and not on the
title itself as provided for by the Land Registration Act, which requires all
transactions respecting property covered by Torrens Titles to be recorded
with the Register of Deeds. Consequently, the levy made by the Special
Sheriff herein could not bind the land nor create a lien on the property.

The spouses Manuel and Natalia Carpena Opulencia became indebted

to petitioner Delta Motor Corporation for the construction of the building,
supply and installation of their ice plant equipment the total amount of
P1,438,090.58. As security for the payment of these obligations, they
executed a real estate mortgage over their land, building and ice plant
equipment in favor of Delta. Ms. Opulencia failed to pay their obligation,
Delta filed a complaint against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch.

Opulencia entered into a compromise agreement confessing to an

obligation plus 12% annual interest, payable without need of demand in
eighty-four (84) equal monthly installments beginning 30 April 1978. The
Trial Court approved the aforesaid agreement, for failure of the Opulencias
to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, the
Trial Court issued a Writ of Execution for the full compromise amount. The
sale, however, was not registered and annotated at the back of the covering
title of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, until approximately four (4) years
later, for the reason that the title still had to be judicially reconstituted after
the said title was burned when the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Batangas City was razed by fire and the owner’s copy was also lost.

Issue :
Whether or not the the levy and sale on execution and of the Writ of
Possession ensued is valid.

Held:

It was held that on a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, the

Appellate Court, in its Decision promulgated on 19 February 1987, reversed
 the Trial Court holding that the actuations of the special sheriff from levy on
the properties to the issuance of certificates of sale. Not only are the
foregoing findings of fact of respondent Appellate Court entitled to the
highest respect from, and binding, on this Court but its conclusions derived
from those facts are supported by law and jurisprudence.

It is basic that sales on execution must be preceded by a prior levy

on execution. The levy on execution of a judgment consists in the act or acts
by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of the
property of the judgment debtor for purposes of the prospective execution
sale. Levy is the essential act by which the property is set apart for the
satisfaction of the judgment and taken into custody of the law. And in case
of levy upon a realty, notice of levy is required to be filed with the Register
of Deeds.

278 Philippine Surety and Insurance vs. Beatriz Zabal

G.R. No. L-21556, 21 SCRA 682, October 31, 1967

Facts:

In this petition for review, petitioner Philippine Surety and Insurance

Company, Inc. takes exception from the ruling of the Court of Appeals that notice
to the occupant of a real property is a prerequisite to a valid levy of execution upon
that property, and reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The Sheriff of Manila, on June 17, 1960, levied on all the interests and
participation of Candido Fajardo in a parcel of land registered in his name. Beatriz
Zabal presented for registration a deed of sale whereby Candido Fajardo appeared
to have conveyed to her the parcel of land. Thereupon, the Registrar of Deeds
cancelled the certificate in the name of Fajardo and issued in the name of Beatriz
Zabal. But, as the notice of levy in favor of the surety company was carried at the
back of the new certificate, Zabal went to the Court of First Instance of Manila
praying for the cancellation of the annotation, on the ground that she was already
the owner of the land when it was registered, and that the levy on the property was
irregular and improper.
 Therein defendants Philippine Surety & Insurance Company, the Sheriff of
Manila and the Register of Deeds for Manila, set up as defense the alleged
superiority of the lien, created by the prior registration of the levy, over the sale in
favor of the plaintiff. The trial court thereafter ruled adversely against the plaintiff
and ordered dismissal of the complaint.

On appeal by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals, however, the decision of

the trial court was reversed. The appellate court, ordering the dissolution of the
attachment and the cancellation of the notice of levy at the back of TCT No.
64730.

Issue:

Whether or not the appeal by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals

cancellation of the notice of levy is valid. And how various classes of real and
personal property attached.

Held:

The Rule has been held essential to the validity of an attachment lien;
so where the return of the sheriff shows that this step was not taken, the
attachment is invalid and no lien in favor of the attachment creditor is
acquired thereby. It results that the notice to the occupant is essential to the
validity of the attachment, non-compliance with which renders the
attachment invalid and ineffective particularly to herein plaintiff who was in
possession as vendee.

The property of the defendant shall be attached by the officer

executing the order of the following manner , that registration of an
attachment makes it superior to a prior unregistered sale presupposes a valid
levy and plaintiff challenges the efficacy of the levy. In violation of the
requirements of Section 7(a) of Rule 59. A proceeding by attachment being
in derogation of the common law, the officer must comply with the statutes
in making the levy. Under a statute similar to Section 7(a), Rule 59, it has
been held that failure to comply with such a requirement is fatal to the
validity of the levy. Otherwise stated, service on the occupant, if any must
 appear from the return or else the service on its face is unauthorized and
invalid.

To effect a levy upon a realty, the sheriff is required to do two specific

things: (1) file with the register of deeds a copy of the order, description of
the attached property and notice of attachment, and (2) leave with the
occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.
These are prerequisites to a valid levy, non-compliance with any of which is
fatal. For the weight of authority is to the effect that a special statutory
provision, respecting the manner of carrying out levy of attachment, must be
strictly complied with, and departure there from shall invalidate th

279 Top Rate International Services Inc.. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

July 7, 1986, 142 SCRA 467

Facts:

The two consolidated petitions before us seek to annul the decisions of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in G.R.
No. 68257 dated June 6, 1984, respectively. The two decisions both upheld the
validity of the levy made on two properties whose ownership is claimed by
petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the value of said properties are far in
excess of the amount of the liens thereon. The decisions are based on the ground
that what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but only
the vendor's equity of redemption. The petitioner also asks that the resolutions of
the appellate court denying its motions for reconsideration be set aside,

The Petitioner Top Rate International, Inc. (Top Rate) filed a third-party
claim in Civil Case alleging that the properties involved therein had been sold to it
for Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000.00) with the approval of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Special Proceeding in the course of the involuntary insolvency
proceedings filed against Consolidated Mines. Petitioner, therefore, asked that the
attachment made on these properties be discharged.

After hearing on the merits, the trial court ordered the lifting and setting
aside of the levy on attachment on the two properties involved while in Civil Case
No. 142443, the trial court issued the same order maintaining, however, the levy on
attachment on the property covered by TCT No. 79776 in favor of plaintiff
Rodrigo Tan. The plaintiffs in the above civil cases appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of

discretion when it ruled.

Held:

It was ruled that levy upon the mortgagor's incorporeal right or equity of
redemption, it was not necessary for the sheriff to have taken physical possession
of the mortgaged taxicabs. Levying upon the property itself is distinguishable from
levying on the judgment debtor's interest in it. That interest could be levied upon
by means of writ of execution issued by the Manila Court as had been done in the
case of property encumbered by a chattel mortgage. It is, therefore, error on the
part of the petitioner to say that since private respondents' lien is only a total of
P343,227.40, they cannot be entitled to the equity of redemption because the
exercise of such right would require the payment of an amount which cannot be
less than P40,000,000.00.

The decisions are based on the ground that what was attached and levied
upon are not the properties themselves but only the vendor's equity of redemption.
It was found that no merit in the contention of respondent Top Rate International
Services that its right over the properties in question based on the deed of sale in its
favor confirming the contract to sell of in favor of El Grande Development
Corporation, should be recognized as superior to the right of petitioner under the
writ of attachment issued in his favor and registered on October 1, 1981 because it
succeeded to the rights of the twelve (12) consortium of banks which hold a
mortgage over said properties registered on December 20, 1978. Said sale was not
actually a sale or assignment by the banks of their rights as mortgagee over said
properties but a sale of said properties by the mortgagor, Consolidated Mines, Inc.
with the consent of the mortgagee. The consortium of banks could not have sold
the properties to Top Rate International Services except through foreclosure
proceedings, for as mortgagees they have no right to appropriate for themselves or
dispose of the mortgaged properties (Article 2088, Civil Code Appropriation of the
mortgaged properties of sale by the mortgagee of said property even if stipulated
by the parties would be nun and void being what is known as pactum
commissorium. In the present case the sale of the properties by Consolidated
Mines, Inc. to Top Rate International Services with the consent of the mortgagee
banks under an arrangement where the purchase price of P40,000,000.00 would be
paid directly to the banks did not adversely affect the rights of plaintiff under the
writ of attachment issued in the present case.

The appellate court also found that the Regional Trial Court in the
insolvency proceedings dismissed the petition to declare Consolidated Mines, Inc.
insolvent on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the same because the
petitioners in said case were not residents of the Philippines and, thus, not qualified
to file said petition. It, therefore, ruled that the claim of Top Rate over said
properties based on the approval of the sale in its favor by the insolvency court
must necessarily fail.

280 De Leon v. Salvador

December 28, 1970, 35 SCRA 567

Facts:

Eusebio Bernabe’s (judgment debtor) properties were garnished and sold in

an auction sale to satisfy a judgment in a civil case for damages, ordered by the
court of Judge Fernando Cruz, in favor of EnriqueDe Leon. The highest bidder for the
total sum of P 30,194.00 was Aurora de Leon, sister of judgment creditor and herein
petitioner. Bernabe was given a redemption period of one (1) year commencing from the
time of the auction sale, however, instead of redeeming his properties, he filed a case to annul
the auction sale on the ground of gross inadequacy of price and for the ordering of a
new auction sale. He claimed that his properties, taken together, can cost around P400,
000.00. This second case was assigned to the court of Judge Serafin Salvador who
issued a writ of injunction against respondents and summarily granted the motions
of Bernabe. Hence, Aurora files this case questioning the jurisdiction of Judge
Salvador to issue such orders.

Issue:
1. Can the auction sale be annulled on the ground of inadequacy of price?

Held:

No. In ordinary sales, by reasons of equity, a transaction may be invalidated

on the ground of inadequacy of price. In forced sales, as when a sale is made at a
public auction, the owner has the right to redeem. When there is a right to redeem,
inadequacy of price is immaterial because judgment debtor can better acquire the
property or also sell his right to redeem and thus recover the loss claims to have
suffered by reason of the price obtained from the auction sale.

281 Hector L. Ong vs. Marilyn Tating and Robert Tating,

April 15, 1987; 149 SCRA 265
Facts:

An action of desahucio was instituted in the City Court of Quezon City by

petitioner Ong against his lessee, Evangeline Roces. In Court of First Instance, the
judgment of the City Court was set aside and Roces was then ordered vacate
plaintiff's premises and to pay rentals in arrears. The decision became final and
executory. The City Court then directed execution of the judgment. Accordingly,
the sheriff cleared the premises of its occupants, which included Anacleto Tating
(Evangeline's stepfather and lawyer), Marilyn Tating and Robert Tating.

The sheriff also levied on certain chattels found in the place. Marilyn
and Robert sought to retrieve these appliances from the sheriff, alleging that the
articles belonged to them and not to Roces. Robert and Marilyn then filed with
the sheriff a third party claim. They later filed with the City Court an urgent
motion for suspension of Sheriff Sale and for Release of Properties Wrongfully
levied upon on execution. In order for the execution Saleto proceed, Ong posted
two surety bonds to indemnify the sheriff for any liability for damages. However,
the City Court later restrained the sale and set the Tatings' motions for hearing.
Ong presented an "Omnibus Opposition" contending that the Tatings' motions
should have been filed with the Court of First Instance since it was the latter's
decision which was being executed; and that, the Tatings' remedy was to file an
action for damages against the indemnity bonds after the auction sale. A motion to
inhibit was later filed by Ong but was denied by the City Court . Ong then filed
with the CFI a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for
preliminary injunction but the CFI directed the maintenance of the status quo and
commanded that the City Court refrain from hearing and deciding the third party
claims and the urgent motion for suspension of Sheriff's Sale, etc. until
the resolution of the injunction.
 Later, the CFI ruled that the procedure followed by said private respondents
in vindicating their rights over levied appliances is not the one sanctioned by law
for they should have filed a separate and independent action. Thus, the parties, the
deputy sheriff and the petitioner are responsible for the execution and Ong is
entitled to relief.

Thus, the Tatings appealed to the CA via a petition for review. The CA
expressed puzzlement why the matter of the execution and related incidents were
passed upon by the lower court, when the only issue was the correctness of the
City Judge's refusal to inhibit himself. The CA then denied the motion for Judge
Laquio, Jr. to inhibit himself from the ejectment case and remanded the case to
the City Court presided over by Judge Laquio, Jr. for further proceedings. Ong
now prays for the reversal of the decision of the CA, and the perpetual inhibition of
the City Judge from further hearing and deciding the Tatings' third-party claims.

Issue:

Whether the correct remedy by the Tatings to the CA from the decision of
the CFI was appeal a petition for review and not appeal?

Held:

Yes. Money judgments are enforceable only against property unquestionably

belonging to the judgment debtor. Therefore, the sheriff acts properly only when he
subjects to execution property undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor. When the
sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor holds no
right or interest, the supervisory power of the Court which has authorized execution may
be invoked by the third person. Upon due application by the third person, and after summary
hearing, the Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and
restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these instances
however is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or
wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment. The Court can
require the sheriff to restore the property to the claimant's possession if warranted
by the evidence. It is rather simply an invocation of the Court's power of supervision
and control over the actuations of it officers and employees.
282
China Banking Corporation Vs. Ortega
January 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 355,

Facts:

Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest
Development Corporation. To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the
garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest
development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation (CBC).
Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial
court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was
ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the CBC of B & B
Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same
intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and
Liong refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a
judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any information
concerning to bank deposits.

Issue:

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a

court processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:

No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit
of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely
required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B
Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China
Banking Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that
the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further
order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against examination of
or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished
to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case,
and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to
the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of
Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by
the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing
the same in a bank.

283 Philippine National Bank Corporation Vs. Pabalan

83 SCRA 595, June 15, 1978

Facts:

On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution

followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PVTA) in the sum of P12,724.66 deposited with
the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La Union filed an administrative
complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter
failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character and therefore
may not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB La Union
Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability, putting a bar on the notice of
garnishment.

Issue:
Whether or not PNB may be sued.

Held:
Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not
exempt from garnishment. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same
attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has entered with them
into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has
stepped down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules
governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued. Therefore, the petition
of PNB La Union is denied.
284 City of Naga Vs. Asunsion
557 SCRA 526, July 9, 2008
Facts:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeks the reversal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA which
denied the Application for a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction filed by
petitioner.

Challenged as well is the Orderdated August 17, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 26 in Civil Case No.RTC 2005-0030 for
unlawful detainer which granted respondents Motion to Issue Writ of
Execution filed on August 16, 2005 and denied petitioners Motion for Inhibition
filed on June 27, 2005. Concomitantly, the processes issued to enforce said Order
are equally assailed, namely: the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated August
22, 2006; the Notice to Vacate dated August 23, 2006; and the Notice of
Garnishment dated August 23, 2006.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner can validly avail of the extraordinary writs of

certiorari and prohibition in assailing the challenged resolution, orders and
notices.
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Forum shopping.

Held:

1. Yes. In the interest of justice, it was decided to give due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition concerning the order of the RTC.
As a rule, petitions for the issuance of such extraordinary writs against an
RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of
this Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. Under the present circumstance
however, we agree to take cognizance of this case as an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. For while it has been held by this Court
that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant
of a writ of certiorari, nevertheless such requirement may be dispensed
 with where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.

2. No. The filing by a party of two apparently different actions, but with the
same objective, constitutes forum- shopping. Here, the special civil
action of certiorari before us is an independent action. The ultimate
purpose of such action is to keep the inferior tribunal within the bounds
of its jurisdiction or relieve parties from arbitrary acts of the court. In
contrast, the petition for review before the Court of Appeals under Rule
42 involves an evaluation of the case on the merits. Clearly, petitioner did
not commit forum-shopping.

285 City of Caloocan v. Allarde

410 SCRA 526, July 9, 2008

Facts:

In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of

Assistant City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The
affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. The CFI in 1973 declared
abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City Government
appealed the decision but such was dismissed.

In 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-
wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City appropriated funds for
her unpaid back salaries but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The
City of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27,
1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one of the motor vehicles of
the City Government for P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The City
Government questioned the validity of the motor vehicle; properties of the
municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and
directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction three (3) more vehicles.
On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages,
plus interest. Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the
check but the City Treasurer can not do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the
check. On May 7, 1993. Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish
the funds of the City Government of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of
Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City Treasurer
sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold
PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the withholding the funds of
the city.

Issue:

Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished to

satisfy Santiago’s claim.

Held:

Garnishment is considered a species of attachment by means of which

the plaintiff seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a
third person, or money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant.
The rule is and has always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or
any other official depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies
or instrumentalities whether by general or special deposit, remain government
funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence of a
corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as to
immunity of a state from suie is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when
the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially
ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such
statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy judgments recovered,
and only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as
final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof. However, the rule is not
absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
corresponding appropriation as required by law.

In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial

processes. Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for
Santiago’s back-wages plus interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the
exception. The judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced against
such funds.

286

Doronilla v. Vasquez
72 Phil. 572, June 27, 1941

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant Carlos Doronilla filed civil case in the Court of First

Instance of Iloilo in which it was asked that the auction sale above referred to be
set aside and that he be declared the sole owner of the property in question, it being
claimed by him that the same was conveyed to him by Mariano B. Arroyo first,
under a sale by installment executed on June 10, 1933 and, later, under a definite
sale executed on February 11, 1935. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo rendered
judgment declaring the transfer relied upon by Carlos Doronilla null and void of
the levy and sale sought to be annulled. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals this
judgment was affirmed on March 31, 1937. On April 12, 1937, Carlos Doronilla
offered to redeem the controvert property, at the same time depositing with the
provincial sheriff of Iloilo the sum of P4,608.00 covering the full amount of the
purchase price at the auction sale plus the corresponding interest. Redemption was
refused on the ground that the period provided by law for that purpose had already
expired. In view of such refusal on the part of the provincial sheriff to allow the
tendered redemption, Carlos Doronilla instituted this civil case in the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo for the purpose of annulling the deed of absolute sale
executed by the provincial sheriff in favor of Dolores Vasquez and of compelling
the latter and the said sheriff to permit Carlos Doronilla to redeem the land in
question. The trial court dismissed the complaint principally on the ground that the
period for the redemption of the land sold at public auction by the provincial
sheriff to Dolores Vasquez on July 27, 1935 had already expired. it is from this
decision that plaintiff-appellant Carlos Doronilla had brought the present appeal.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the rights of Carlos Doronilla to redeem the property in

question.
2. Is there error on the expiration of the time of redemption.
Held:

Following the line of approach of the trial judge, we do not consider it

necessary to determine the first question for the reason that if, as found by the trial
court, the time for redemption had already expired, it would serve no purpose to
consider whether the appellant had that right.

Section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the judgment
debtor or redeemer may redeem the property from the purchaser at any time
within twelve months after the sale, and it is admitted by the appellant that, if the
time during which civil case was pending from September 23, 1935 to March 31,
1937 is not deducted, the tendered redemption was made beyond the twelve
months period fixed in the aforesaid legal provision. The appellant, however,
invokes equitable considerations in favor of the redemption and argues with
vehemence that it would be unfair to count the period during which civil case No.
10269 was pending, because he could not be expected to claim merely the right of
redemption when in said action he sought a judicial declaration of absolute
ownership. While redemption must be effected within the time prescribed, there
are indeed cases where, having in view the purpose sought to be achieved by
statutory provisions of this kind and principally to promote justice and avoid
injustice, courts may be reasonable construction allow redemption notwithstanding
the actual expiration of the period fixed in the statute. We have, however, inquired
into the equities of this case and have come to the conclusion that the judgment of
the lower court should not be disturbed.

As herein before mentioned, the conveyance alleged to have been made by

Mariano B. Arroyo in favor of the appellant and relied upon by the latter in
claiming ownership in civil case was found to be fraudulent. The appellant cannot
be said to have had no conscious collaboration in the fraud intended by Mariano B.
Arroyo to defeat the judgment for alimony rendered against him in civil case No.
9031 in favor of the herein appellate, Dolores Vasquez.

In view of all the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we are

convinced that the appellant has not come to the court with clean hands and we are
accordingly constrained to rule that this case is not a fitting example that calls for
the extension, on equitable considerations, of that period of redemption fixed in
section 465 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the sense desired by the appellant.
287 Illigan Bay Manufacturing v. Dy

524 SCRA 55, June 8, 2007

Facts:
In the late 1970s, petitioner Iligan Bay Manufacturing Corp. (IBMC)
constructed its oil mills on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-4,789 in the Province of Lanao del Norte. Respondent Henry Dy was
one of the suppliers that provided electrical and construction supplies for the said
oil mills. IBMC subsequently became part of co-petitioner United Coconut Oil
Mills (UNICOM), a conglomerate of oil mills which thrived during the martial law
era. In 1984, when UNICOM took over its management, IBMC became bankrupt
which led to its creditors initiating suits for the collection of unpaid
obligations. Also, on September 24, 1984, UNICOM acquired the right, title, and
interest of the Development Bank of the Philippines over the loan accounts of
IBMC, including the mortgage on the land , where IBMCs oil mill was located.
UNICOM, as assignee of IBMCs loan obligations, foreclosed the mortgage
and acquired the lot covered by TCT No. T-4,789 in a public auction sale as it was
the highest bidder for twenty million pesos (PhP 20,000,000). In 1988, the
Provincial Treasurer of Lanao del Norte certified that IBMC and/or UNICOM was
delinquent in paying its real estate taxes since 1984, which prompted the provincial
government to levy on the disputed lot. On November 9 of the same year, it was
then sold at public auction where respondent Henry Dy emerged as the highest
bidder for PhP 290,692.26 plus PhP 10,000. Due to IBMCS unpaid obligations,
respondent filed collection suits in Civil Case No. 1300 on January 4, 1989 and
Civil Case. TCT No. T-4,789. The respondent, as an attachment creditor in Civil
Case exercised his right of redemption in the tax delinquency sale pursuant to
Sections 78 and 80 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 464 by tendering to the
Provincial Treasurer a check amounting to PhP 319,718.34.

Issue:

Whether or not UNICOM had validly redeemed the subject property.

Held:
 No. his claim has no merit. Petitioners maintain that the CA committed
grave and reversible error when it declared that the Compromise Agreement
between petitioner IBMC and respondent Dy did not preclude the filing of the
mandamus case.
The CA held that the May 7, 1990 Compromise Agreement did not bar the
filing of the present suit. It ratiocinated that while there was an identity of parties
between Civil Case and the petition for mandamus, there was no identity of subject
matter; hence, res judicata did not apply.

On the issue of redemption, the CA concluded that UNICOM failed to

pay the additional amount demanded by the Provincial Treasurer as
additional redemption price. Due to such failure, UNICOM failed to satisfy
the total redemption price; thus, the redemption made by UNICOM was not
valid. The CA also held that since UNICOM failed to properly redeem the
subject property, respondents purchase of the disputed lot at the tax
delinquency sale had become final; thus, Henry Dy was entitled to the
issuance of a final bill of sale.
288.
Magno v Viola
facts:
In a partition case in the court of origin between the predecessors in interest of the parties herein and others, the
two parcels of land here in question were adjudicated as follows: Lot No. 2, 4/6 to Vidal and Cecilia Salvanera, 1/6
to Santiago and Dorotea Padua, and 1/6 to Francisco Magno, plaintiff herein. Lot No. 3, 2/3 to Vidal and Cecilia
Salvanera, and 1/3 to Tomas Joson. In the same case, Vidal and Cecilia Salvanera were ordered to pay Francisco
Magno 4/6 of the sum of P3,490, or P2,326.66. Upon failure to pay this amount, the shares of Vidal and Cecilia
Salvanera in the two lots were levied on execution and sold at public auction to Francisco Magno, the 4/6 share in
lot No. 2 for P2,000, and the 2/3 share in lot No. 3 for P992.34. Within the period of redemption prescribed by law,
Monica Viola, defendant and appellant herein, believing that the two lots were sold at public auction in their
entirety, offered to redeem them on the strength of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her codefendant and
coappellant Vicente Sotto, who conveyed to her 1/2 of lot No. 2 and 1/2 of lot 3, of which portions the latter
claimed to be the owner by virtue of a contract of retainer he had with Vidal and Cecilia Salvanera. Sotto claimed
that he was entitled to redeem as a coowner, not only his own shares just mentioned, but also the other halves of
said two lots. On the strength of the offer to redeem, Monica Viola in October 1930 took possession of the two
lots. Claiming that he was the exclusive owner of the two lots mentioned, Francisco Magno instituted the present
action.

Issue:

Is there a right of the defendants for redemption under the rules of Court

held:

This court has held that a surety cannot redeem the property of the principal sold on execution because the surety,
by paying the debt of the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of the debtor, and consequently is not a
successor in interest in the property.

"The rule is that the term ‘successor-in-interest’ includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory
right of redemption,one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
redemption , one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law, one or more joint debtors who
were joint owners of the property sold, the wife as regards her husband’s homestead by reason of the fact that
some portion of her husband’ title passes to her.

Section 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by
the judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Vicente Sotto or
his assignee fall within the term "successor in interest" The rule is that the term "successor in interest" includes
one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs. Cochran, 276 Fed.,
216, 223); one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption
(Southern California Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal., 99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644;
Schumacher vs. Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61; 127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law (XI McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99); one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of
the property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal., 50; 85 Pac., 122); the wife as regards her.

289. Palicte v ramolete

facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu declaring the deed
of redemption executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the petitioner’s motion that the Registrar of
Deeds of the City of Cebu be directed to transfer the Owner’s Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051,
and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her
name.cralawnad

On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued on February 5, 1979 by the
respondent judge and to a court order dated June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, Et. Al. v. Marcelo Sotto,
Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.

Issue/s:

whether or not "RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR ENTITLED TO REDEEM
UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION AGAINST
THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.

held:

Yes.Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:

"SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property sold as provided in the last preceding
section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the
following persons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of the property;"

(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part
thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a
redemptioner."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by the judgment debtor or his
successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-
in-interest"

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court’s orders declaring the deed of redemption
null and void and denying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilde Palicte are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as stated above.

290. Guevara v ramos

Facts: petitioners are precisely claiming title adverse to that of the judgment debtor. The judgment debtors are
the widow and children of the deceased David Guevara, while petitioners are brothers and sisters of said deceased
who are "asserting rights of ownership by way of inheritance over a ten-eleventh portion of the parcel of land
levied upon and one-half of the value of the house situated thereon.

Issue: whether or not under the facts the third-party claimants’ assertion of ownership over a portion of the
land sold on execution may defeat the purchaser’ s right to have possession of the same after the expiration of the
one-year redemption period allowed by law.

Held: No. redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property (sold on execution). This of course, is on the assumption
that the property belonged to the judgment debtor or to one who claims under him as his successor after the
execution. As the purchaser in the present case has already received the definitive deed of sale and become the
owner of the property bought, he should be entitled to its possession and cannot be excluded therefrom by one,
who, according to the same complaint, merely claims to be a successor in interest of the judgment debtor. unless it
is adjudged that this alleged successor has a better right to the property than the purchaser.

291 . Uchuan v CA

facts: On November 3, 1976, Flora Jaldon, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Manuel Jaldon, Jr., mortgaged a
parcel of land located in Cagayan De Oro City, containing an area of 184 square meters, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-7564, to the Philippine Banking Corp. On December 10, 1976, petitioner Unchuan,
claiming to be the owner of one-half of the mortgaged property, caused to be annotated on the title an adverse
claim.

Hearing was set several times. On July 16, 1986, notice was sent setting the hearing for August 19, 1986,
but due to the failure of Unchuan’s counsel to appear, said hearing had to be reset for September 2, 1986. The
hearing set for September 2, 1986 had to be reset again for September 23, 1986 upon motion of counsel for
Unchuan. Finally, on September 23, 1986, hearing proceeded as scheduled and the case was submitted for
resolution upon agreement of the parties. However, on September 25, 1986, Unchuan filed a manifestation
praying for the dismissal/suspension of the petition for writ of possession on the ground that he had filed an action
for quieting of title on the property.

On October 3, 1986 the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the bank. Unchuan brought a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which denied the petition for lack of
merit. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of possession even without a
full-blown trial to resolve the claim of Unchuan, and despite the pendency of the action to quiet title.

Held: Even as Unchuan concedes that proceedings were held to determine the nature of his possession, he
questions the summary manner by which his claim was resolved. It is too late in the day for Unchuan to question
the summary nature of the proceedings in the lower court. In the hearing of September 23, 1986, his counsel
agreed to submit the case for resolution, even as on said date, all that he had submitted for consideration of the
court was his Opposition to the Petition of Philippine Banking Corporation. He is now estopped from questioning
the procedure adopted by the trial court.

There is nothing objectionable in the summary disposition of third-party claims. On several occasions, the Court
had sanctioned summary proceedings to determine the nature of the possession of third-party claimants.

292. Gtachalian v arlegui

Before the war Francisca Gatchalian (Aling Kikay) and Paz Tanwangco (who are now both over eighty-seven years
old) were good friends who lived together in the same house located at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Whether they were
partners and acquired properties with common funds is a matter of controversy. They were separated because of
the war. Paz Tanwangco evacuated to Pangasinan. Francisca Gatchalian presumably remained at Solano.

In 1965 Paz Tanwangco sued Francisca Gatchalian in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya for the recovery
of her alleged share in Lots 25 and 28 which were registered in Francisca’s name (Civil Case No. 1454).

Francisca Gatchalian appealed to the Court of Appeals. Her appeal was dismissed because she did not file her brief
on time (Tanwangco v. Gatchalian, CA-G.R. No. 45054-R, Resolutions of October 16, 1970 and August 31, 1971).

Former Judge Tupasi, as guardian ad litem of his minor grandson, Florante, filed in Civil Case No. 1454 a petition
dated January 21, 1974 to declare Tan Chiao Chay, Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay, as alleged occupants of Lot 28-A, in
contempt of court for having disobeyed the writ of possession (the same writ that Judge Tupasi issued on January
25, 1972). He prayed that an order be issued for the demolition of respondents’ improvements.

Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay, in their answer to the petition to declare them in contempt of court, alleged that the
parents of the minor, Florante Tupasi, should act as his guardians and not Judge Tupasi; that the lower court had
no jurisdiction over them, and that the building on the lot sold to Florante Tupasi belongs to Solodonia Ramos and
Rogelio Tiu and not to Tang Tee and Tiu Tik chay and, therefore, they (Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay) did not disobey
any court process and were not guilty of contempt of court.

She filed in this Court a petition for certiorari to annul those resolutions. Her petition was dismissed for lack of
merit Gatchalian v. Tanwangco, L-34138, Resolution of October 26, 1971. Entry of judgment therein was made on
November 16, 1971).

issue: Whether Tang Tee and Tiu Tik Chay could be adjudged in contempt of court

held:

We hold that in civil Case No. 1454 the lower court has no jurisdiction to adjudge petitioners Tang Tee and
Tiu Tik Chay in contempt of court and to eject them from Lot 28-A.

The 1969 judgment of Judge Parayno is a judgment in personam, requiring Francisca Gatchalian to deliver to Paz
Tanwangco the possession of "one-half undivided portion of" Lot 28. It is not a judgment in rem. It is conclusive,
not against the whole world, but only "between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action", "litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity.

293. Cardina building Owners v Asset Recovery and Management

facts:

Cardinal Building Owners Association, Inc., petitioner, is a corporation organized and existing under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 4726 (The Condominium Act) with office located at 999 Stanisco Towers, Pedro Gil corner Agoncillo
Streets, Malate, Manila.

Benjamin Marual is a member of petitioner association being the owner of two condominium units at the Cardinal
Office Condominium, covered by Condominium Certificates of Title No. 14335 (1st floor) and No. 17730 (2nd
floor). Due to his failure to pay assessment dues in the amount of P530,554.00, petitioner association filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Manila, a complaint for sum of money against him, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-74919.

During the course of the proceedings, or on September 13, 1996, petitioner and Marual filed with the RTC a
Compromise Agreement,3 declaring that they have amicably settled their controversy under some of terms and
conditions.

On October 9, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision4 approving the Compromise Agreement and enjoining the
parties to strictly comply with its terms. However, Marual failed to comply with his obligation, prompting
petitioner to file with the RTC a motion for the execution of the compromise judgment.

On July 30, 1999, upon petitioner's filing of the required bond, a writ of possession13 was issued.

Aggrieved, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53216.
Respondent alleged mainly that the RTC Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the Order dated June 8, 1999 and the writ of possession which are in variance with the
compromise judgment and the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 95-74919.

Issue: Whether or not issuance of the writ is correct

Held: No.

There is nothing in the provisions which authorizes the RTC, Branch 4, Manila to issue a writ of possession over the
two condominium units in favor of petitioner. As we held in Abinujar v. Court of Appeals.
A judgment is the foundation of a writ of execution which draws its vitality therefrom. An officer issuing a writ of
execution is required to look to the judgment for his immediate authority.

An execution must conform to and be warranted by the judgment on which it was issued (Francisco, The Revised
Rules of Court, 641 [1966]; Kramer v. Montgomery, 206 Okla. 190 242 P. 2d 414 [1952]). There should not be a
substantial variance between the judgment and the writ of execution (Avery v. Lewis, 10 Vt. 332). Thus, an
execution is fatally defective if the judgment was for sum of money and the writ of execution was for the sale of
the mortgaged property (Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Green, 48 Phil. 284 [1925]).

As petitioners' obligation under the compromise agreement as approved by the court was monetary in nature,
private respondents can avail only of the writ of execution provided in Section 15 (now Section 9), Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, and not that provided in Section 13 (now Section 10 [c] 18 ).

In sum, we find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision. We DENY the instant
petition.

294. PNB v Sanao Marketing Corporation

facts: In July 1997, Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado A. Sanao and Soledad F. Sanao and the
spouses William (Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao (all respondents herein), as joint and solidary debtors, obtained
a loan in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00) from PNB secured by a real estate
mortgage of several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Pili, Tigaon and Camaligan, all of Camarines
Sur, and Naga City. The contract expressly provided that the mortgage shall be governed by the provisions of Act
No. 3135, as amended.

Respondents then filed a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC of Pili in the issuance of the two
assailed orders. The Petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order which the Court of
Appeals granted on 15 February 2001, enjoining the RTC of Pili and PNB from implementing the challenged orders.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of herein respondents.[27] The Court of Appeals rendered a litany of lapses
that the notary public committed in the conduct of the foreclosure proceedings which in its estimation had
effectively undermined the soundness of the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the
Provisional Certificate of Sale, upon which the issuance of the writ of possession was based, is fatally infirm, and
that consequently, the writ of possession was not validly issued as the procedural requirements for its issuance
were not satisfied

Aggrieved by the Decision, PNB filed the instant petition, arguing in the main that in nullifying the orders of the
RTC of Pili, the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as the
issuance of writs of possession is purely ministerial on the part of the trial court.

Issue: Whether Issuance of writ of possession is justified

Held: Yes.

PNB has sufficiently established its right to the writ of possession. It presented as documentary exhibits the
contract of real estate mortgage[53] and the Provisional Certificate of Sale[54] on the face of which appears proof
of its registration with the Registry of Deeds in Camarines Sur on 3 May 1999. There is also no dispute that the
lands were not redeemed within one year from the registration of the Provisional Certificate of Sale. It should
follow, therefore, that PNB has acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession.

Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB Board amply demonstrates Mrs. Domitila A. Amons authority
to sign and verify the instant petition. PNB likewise was not obligated to disclose the alluded case pending before
the Court of Appeals as it was not initiated by the bank and, more importantly, the subject matter and the
properties involved therein are altogether different.[64] It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure
are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.[65]
In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice.[66] And the
power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be
questioned.[67]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11 June 2002 in CA-G.R.
S.P. No. 63162 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 24 November 2000 and 24 January 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 in Spec. Pro. No. P-1182 directing the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of PNB are AFFIRMED.

295.

CENONA OLEGO, Petitioner, v. HON. ALFREDO REBUENO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
Branch IV and ATTY. PEDRO SERVANO, Respondents.

facts:

Pedro D. Servano sued Cenona Olego, for a declaration as to the legality of his title to a residential lot, alleging
that he acquired by purchase the said lot, which he had possessed en concepto de dueño, but his possession was
disturbed by Cenona who claimed to be the owner of the lot. Olego, on the other hand, claimed that she was the
"absolute owner and lawful possessor of the land." After several postponements, the parties submitted a
compromise whereby Olego admitted Servano’s ownership of the lot and "that judgment be rendered declaring"
him the owner thereof. The decision approving the compromise agreement did not order Olego to vacate the lot,
although it followed the usual pattern of judgments in such cases: ordering the parties to comply with the terms of
the compromise. No further proceedings was had in the case for more than ten years after the alleged
compromise settlement was concluded, until Servano sued Olego for contempt on the ground that the latter
prevented the former from having the peaceful use and enjoyment of the land, and that she branded the decision
as "fake" and "not worthy of respect."cralaw virtua1aw library

Olego moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the grounds (a) that the amicable settlement was obtained
through fraud and misrepresentation, (b) that the execution of the judgment was barred by statute of limitations,
and (c) that the Court had lost jurisdiction over the case. The trial court denied the motion and set the contempt
charge for hearing. Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, Cenona filed the instant special civil action
of certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Olego’s failure to vacate cannot be the basis of a contempt charge against her

Held: An order or judgment which declares the rights of parties without any express command or prohibition is
not one which may be the basis of a contempt proceeding. A violation of the rights of ownership does not
constitute contempt of court, even though they have been ascertained and declared by judgment, unless it
consists in doing something that was prohibited, or in failing to do something that was required, by terms of the
judgment.

Where there is no decree or order commanding accused or anyone else to do or refrain from doing
something or anything, disobedience of it is impossible, and therefore one cannot be held guilty of contempt for
disobedience thereunder.

296. Mallari vs Banco Fil Savings

facts:

Petitioner obtained a loan from Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (respondent) and as security therefor,
he executed a Deed of Mortgage over a parcel of land located in Pampanga. Due to his failure to pay the loan,
respondent extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property. Respondent was the highest bidder at the public
auction sale, and the Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was annotated on the title of the subject property on
May 20, 1999. Petitioner failed to redeem said property within the redemption period which expired on May 20,
2000. Respondent then consolidated its title to the foreclosed property. Petitioner's certificate of title to the
property was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of respondent on August 30, 2000.

Thereafter, on January 18, 2001, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) an Ex-Parte Petition for the
Issuance of Writ of Possession Under Act No. 3135. On March 22, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss/Opposition to Petition, alleging that there was still a pending action between the parties for declaration of
nullity of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings which was filed as early as May 16, 2000. Nevertheless, on May
18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting respondent's petition for issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On March 14, 2003, the CA promulgated the herein
assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit, ruling that under the law, the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale should be placed in possession of the property without delay, and that it was the ministerial duty
of the courts to uphold the mortgagee's right to possession even during the redemption period.2 The CA added
that an appeal, which was available to petitioner, was the appropriate remedy, and therefore, he could not avail
himself of the writ of certiorari.

issue:

Whether or not petition fails for lack of merit

held:

Yes. The CA committed no error.

First to be resolved is the issue of whether the remedy of certiorari may be availed of by petitioner in assailing the
RTC Orders granting the issuance of a writ of possession. The well-trenched rule provided for in Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court and elucidated in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity
Commission,4 is that:

Certiorari as a special civil action is available only if the following essential requisites concur: (1) it must be directed
against the tribunal, board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.

297. BPI vs SPS Tarampi

FACTS: Spouses Homobono and Lusdeldia Tarampi (Spouses Tarampi) obtained loans from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI), which were secured by real estate mortgages over a parcel of land. Spouses Tarampi failed
to comply with their obligation, prompting BPI to institute extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. During the
auction, BPI was the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its name. The same was registered and
annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the said parcel of land.

Since the one-year redemption period expired without Spouses Tarampi redeeming the mortgage, BPI
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. A new TCT was issued in favor of BPI. In the meantime, Spouses Tarampi
filed an action for annulment of the real estate mortgages. BPI, on the other hand, filed a Petition for Writ of
Possession over the property including all improvements thereon which was granted by the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. A Notice of Appeal was filed by Spouses Tarampi alleging therein that a writ cannot be issued on the
ground that there is a pending action concerning the validity of the mortgages. The RTC ordered the suspension of
issuance of writ of possession.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, held that since BPI is now the registered owner of the property, it is entitled to a
writ of possession as a matter of right; and that any question regarding the validity of the mortgages or their
foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession after the consolidation of title
in the buyer‘s name, following the debtor-mortgagor‘s failure to redeem the mortgages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of possession should be implemented during the pendency of the case for
annulment of mortgages

HELD: In the case at bar, Spouses Tarampi failed to redeem the mortgages within the reglementary period, hence,
ownership of the property covered thereby was consolidated in the name of BPI who had in fact been issued a new
TCT. Issuance of a writ of possession thus became a ministerial duty of the court.

It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of
the property and can demand it any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of
a new transfer certificate of title.
The rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay,
such possession being founded on the right of ownership. To underscore this mandate, the law further provides
that the debtor-mortgagor may petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled in the
proceedings in which possession was requested; and the court‘s decision thereon may be appealed by either party,
but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.

To stress the ministerial character of the writ of possession, the Court has disallowed injunction to prohibit its
issuance, just as it has held that its issuance may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or
the foreclosure itself.

Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction,
the issuance of a writ of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court. The same is true with its
implementation; otherwise, the writ will be a useless paper judgment - a result inimical to the mandate of Act No.
3135 to vest possession in the purchaser immediately.

298. Sueno v Landbank of the Phil

Facts:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Sally Sueno (Sueno) seeking to reverse
and set aside the Decision1 dated 13 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79566, which affirmed
the Decision2 dated 24 January 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 192, inLRC Case No.
R-2002-551-MK; and the Resolution3 dated 20 September 2006 of the appellate court which denied Sueno's
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC, in its Decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, issued the Writ of
Possession authorizing respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to take physical possession of the two
disputed parcels of land pursuant to its Consolidation of Ownership dated 2 April 2001.

Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES TO LBP IS VALID.

Held:
We are not persuaded. Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the
obligation by a subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal
conditions, or by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the
creditor. In order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites are indispensable:
There must be a previous valid obligation;

There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract;

There must be the extinguishment of the old contract; and

There must be the validity of the new contract.14

The elements of novation clearly do not exist in the instant case. While it is true that there is a previous valid
obligation (i.e., the obligation of LBP to honor Sueno's right to redeem the subject property within a period of one
year), such obligation expired at the same time as the redemption period on 6 March 2001. There is, however, no
clear agreement between the parties to a new contract, again imposing upon LBP the obligation of honoring
Sueno's right to redeem the subject properties within an extended period of six months. Without a new contract,
the old contract cannot be considered extinguished.
299. Roxas v Buan

facts:

On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential
house and lot in favor of private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure the loan of P78,328.08 granted by the latter
to the former.

Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan applied for an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage which was duly published and advertised for public auction by Olongapo City Sheriff Ramon Y. Pardo on
September 29, 1977. Private respondent was the winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a
Certificate of Sale duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds on October 26, 1977. Valentin had a
period of one (1) year from the date of registration within which to redeem the mortgaged properties. The period
for the redemption of the property in question having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a
Final Bill of Sale was thereafter issued by the City Sheriff on November 3, 1978.

After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed before the Court of First Instance of
Zambales a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession."

Issue: whether or not there respondent trial court exercised grave abuse of discretion

Held:

As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as would warrant the issuance of the writ of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for, tainted the issuance of the assailed order, the petition must jail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May
19, 1980 is LIFTED.
300.
SILANGAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. DEMETRIA
March 12, 2007
518 SCRA 160

FACTS:Luzon Spinning Mills, Incorporated (LSMI) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lipa City, a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money against Silangan Textile Manufacturing
Corporation (STMC). In its Complaint, LSMI alleged that Anita, Jimmy and Benito, all surnamed
Silangan, in their capacity as stockholders and officers of STMC ordered 111,161.60 kilograms of
yarn, valued in the total amount of P9,999,845.00. The yarns were delivered at the office of
STMC as evidenced by delivery receipts.

When presented for payment, the foregoing postdated checks were dishonored for the
reason, Drawn Against Insufficient Fund (DAIF). LSMI demanded from STMC the immediate
payment of the obligation. STMC failed and refused to heed the demand of LSMI; hence, the
latter filed the Complaint before the RTC. In accordance with the prayer of LSMI, and finding
the same to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against STMCs properties. In this connection, a notice of attachment on the
properties in the name of STMC covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. 202686 and No.
202685 was issued.

Apparently, LSMI had already previously instituted before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Lipa City, Branch 1, criminal cases against the Silangans for violation of
BatasPambansa Blg. 22. Thus, STMC was prompted to file a Motion, praying to dismiss the civil
Complaint before the RTC, to cite STMCs lawyer for contempt for forum shopping, and to
discharge the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court. After LSMI filed its
Comment/Opposition to the motion of STMC, the RTC resolved the said motion by denying it
for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conclusion of the
public respondent Judge Demetria when it issued the writ of preliminary attachment in favor of
the private respondent.

HELD:

SECTION 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the action or
at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of
the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than moral
and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasi-contract, delict or quasi-
delict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his
creditors.

x xxx

SEC. 2. Issuance and contents of order. An order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or
upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so
much of the property in the Philippines of the party against whom it is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicants demand, unless such party makes
deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicants demand or the value of the
property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs. Several writs may be
issued at the same time to the sheriffs of the courts of different judicial regions.

SEC. 3. Affidavit and bond required. An order of attachment shall be granted only when it
appears by the affidavit of the applicant, or of some other person who personally knows the
facts, that a sufficient cause of action exists, that the case is one of those mentioned in Section
1 hereof, that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
action, and that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of
which he is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all
legal counterclaims. The affidavit, and the bond required by the next succeeding section, must
be duly filed with the court before the order issues.

Attachment is an ancillary remedy. It is not sought for its own sake but rather to enable the
attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal
action. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the pendency of the action
which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights and interests
therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the
case. They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures availed of during
the pendency of the action and they are ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main action.
A writ of preliminary attachment is a species of provisional remedy. As such, it is a collateral
proceeding, permitted only in connection with a regular action, and as one of its incidents; one
of which is provided for present need, or for the occasion; that is, one adapted to meet a
particular exigency. On the basis of the preceding discussion and the fact that we find the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-00420 to be in order, the writ of preliminary attachment issued by
the trial court in the said case must perforce be lifted.

301.
COOTAUCO v. COURT OF APPEALS
June 16, 1988
162 SCRA 122

This is a contest which began in 1980 between two rival cockpit operators for the right to
operate in the one-cockpit town of Labo, Camarines Norte, whose population does not exceed
100,000 residents. The temporary restraining order (later replaced by a writ of preliminary
injunction) which the trial court issued, and which the Court of Appeals declined to set aside, is
before us for determination.

The petitioner, Ricardo L. Cootauco is a duly licensed operator of a cockpit, known as

"GalleraLapu-Lapu" in Labo, Camarines Norte. In 1979 he built another cockpit in the new
recreational zone in Bo. Bocal where he planned to transfer the GalleraLapu-Lapu.

The private respondent Felix L. Luzarraga, is the owner and operator of a rival cockpit,
known as "GalleraPlaridel" whose license was revoked by the Municipal Mayor of Labo on
September 14, 1977, on recommendation of the PC Provincial Commander because it was inside
the residential district and near public buildings and the church, in violation of Section 5 (c) of
P.D. 449 (Cockfighting Law of 1974).

In 1979, Raul Luzarraga, brother of Felix, filed an application with the PC Regional
Commander for a Renewal Permit to operate the "Plaridel Cockpit." The application was denied
on the ground that the Plaridelhad been phased out or ceased to operate in 1977, hence, "the
application for renewal is out of place." Luzarraga filed against Ricardo Cootauco, Sergio
Cootauco and Mayor Mario Villafuerte of Labo in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte for Specific Performance, Annulment of Ordinance, Damages with a Prayer for
Preliminary injunction. The complaint prayed for annulment of the permit which Mayor
Villafuerte had issued to the GalleraLapu-Lapu and also asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to stop the operation of the Lapu-Lapu and the construction of a new
cockpit by the Cootaucos in Barangay Bocal, Labo. The defendants filed separate answers to the
complaint.

On June 2,1980, the Court of First Instance issued a temporary restraining order,
enjoining Cootauco and his agents from proceeding with the construction of their new cockpit in
Barangay Bocal and from conducting cockfights therein. On June 4, 1980, Cootauco filed an
urgent motion to lift the temporary restraining order. The court set it for hearing together with
Luzarraga's application for a writ of preliminary injunction. On June 9, 1980, the trial court
issued an order of injunction.
 However, on January 12, 1981, it denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the
temporary restraining order which it had issued. It held that the error, if any, of the respondent
Judge in issuing the Order of June 2, 1980, was "an error of judgment correctable by appeal in
due time, but definitely not one made in grave abuse of discretion ..."

Cootauco appealed to the Supreme Court, praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
The petition alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for certiorari and in
not holding that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in enjoining the operation of the petitioner's new cockpit.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Supreme Court should issue a writ of preliminary injunction.

HELD:The appeal is meritorious.

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy to which parties litigant may resort for
the preservation or protection of their rights or interests, and for no other purpose, during the
pendency of the principal action Thus, Section 3, Rule 58 enumerates only three (3) grounds for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and they are:

(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period
or perpetually;

(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the
litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the
plaintiff; or

(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or

suffering to be done, some act, probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

The issuance of the injunction order by the trial court, at the instance of Luzarraga, to stop the
petitioner Cootauco from operating his cockpit at its new site in Barrio Bocal was improper for
several reasons: First, because the plaintiff Luzarraga had no right that needed to be protected or
preserved by a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case. The operation of
petitioner's cockpit did not, and would not, violate any right of Luzarraga who was not operating,
and had no license to operate, a cockpit.

Secondly, the status quo at the commencement of Civil Case No. 4753 and 1980 was that
Cootauco was duly licensed to operate, and was operating, the "GalleraLapu-Lapu," had been
authorized to transfer its location to the new recreational zone in Barrio Bocal, and had
constructed a new cockpit arena there which was almost completed and was operational. On the
other hand, the plaintiff Luzarraga was not operating the "GalleraPlaridel" because his license
had been cancelled in 1977, three (3) years before the filing of the case. The issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction for the purpose of closing the new "GalleraLapu-Lapu" during the
pendency of the case, disturbed that status quo instead of preserving it.

Thirdly, the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction would irreparably damage the
petitioner because it would, for no lawful cause, deprive him of the use of his license to operate
his cockpit. On the other hand, Luzarraga would not be prejudiced by the lifting of the writ for
the simple reason that he does not—for want of a license—operate a cockpit with which
Cootauco's cockpit would compete.

The appealed decision of the CA and the writ of preliminary injunction which were issued by the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Camarines Norte in are set aside. The case
is dismissed.

302.
BUYCO v. BARAQUIA
December 21, 2009
608 SCRA 699

FACTS:NelsonBuyco filed a case for the establishment of a permanent right of way,

injunction and damages with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
against the Buycos to enjoin them from closing off a private road which the respondent had
been using to go to and from the public highway. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary
injunction. After trial, the RTC, however, dismissed the complaint. Thus, respondent filed a
notice of appeal of the decision to the CA. Later, respondent filed a motion to cite
PurisimoBaraquia in contempt of court, alleging that he violated the writ of preliminary
injunction. The RTC, noting that the decision had not yet become final and executory, cited
the petitioner in contempt. On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, however, the
RTC granted the same, holding that the brothers cannot be held in contempt by mere
motion, but thru a petition. On the issue of whether or not the writ of preliminary
injunction subsisted while the case is on appeal, the RTC held that it is its “illumined
opinion that the matter of whether a writ of preliminary injunction remains valid until the
decision annulling the same attains finality is not firmly entrenched in jurisprudence,
contrary to the position of the defendants.

Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court on pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lifting of a writ of preliminary injunction due to the dismissal of the
complaint is immediately executory, even if the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts.⁠ It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the
latter’s outcome.⁠ It is not a cause of action in itself.⁠ Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate
effects, of a final judgment in the case.

The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the
pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action.⁠
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually
granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be
had on the merits of the case.⁠

Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court
upon respondent’s showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of
the subject road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to
the easement of right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such
entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted.
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served,
the appeal therefrom notwithstanding.

303
CRUZ v. MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY CO.
1953
92 Phil 699

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 31 1951, which
reverses a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal according to petitioner an
indemnity in the amount of P2,750.

This case stems from an action for forcible entry instituted by Concepcion and Andrea Enciong
and Filemon Leonardo in the Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque, Rizal, against Gregorio
Cruz, docketed as civil case No. 12 wherein they obtained the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon filing a bond in the amount of P3,000. After the issuance of the writ, the
plaintiffs took possession of the property in litigation and harvested the palay standing thereon.
Later, the writ was lifted when the defendant put up a counter bond in the amount of P6,000.
The land was returned but after the palay had been harvested.
In the meantime, Gregorio Cruz, the defendant, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
action for certiorari assailing the proceedings had in the forcible entry case then pending in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Parañaque, Rizal, which resulted adversely to the plaintiffs therein
in that the court declared all the proceedings null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Five months thereafter, Gregorio Cruz initiated in the same Court of First Instance of Rizal an
action for damages against the same persons who succeeded in dispossessing him of the
property in the forcible entry case wherein for the first time he averred having incurred losses
in the total sum of P2,950 not only because of his dispossession of the property in litigation but
also because of the consequential damages he has suffered as a result of the institution of the
forcible entry case against him. In this case the bonding company was made a party defendant.

On October 28, 1947, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss contending, among other
grounds, that this action for damages has no legal basis because the same was not included in
the judgment rendered in the certiorari case as required by the Rules of Court (Rule 60, section
9; Rule 59, section 20). This motion having been denied, the defendants filed their answer
wherein they reiterated the same special defense. And on November 25, 1947, the court
rendered decision ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,750 as damages
and to pay the costs. But when the case was taken to the Court of Appeals, this decision was
reversed and the defendants were absolved from the complaint. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.

RULING OF THE CA: Petitioner-appellant has no cause of action against respondent-appellees

to recover the damages which he has allegedly sustained as a result of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction by the justice of the peace court Parañaque, Rizal.

One of the grounds on which the Court of Appeals has predicated its ruling that petitioner-
appellant has no cause of action against respondent-appellees to recover the damages which
he has allegedly sustained as a result of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction by the
justice of the peace court Parañaque, Rizal, is the failure of said petitioner-appellant to press his
claim for damages in the forcible entry case wherein the writ was issued as expressly required
by section 9, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, in connection with section 20, Rule 59. Because of
such failure, the Court of Appeals says, the petitioner-appellant is now barred from instituting
the present action. This ruling is now assigned as error. We find this ruling of the Court of
Appeals correct. This is in line not only with the Rules of Court (section 20, Rule 59 and section
9, Rule 60), but also with well-known jurisprudence on the mater. Thus, it has been held that "A
claim for damages suffered by reason of the issuance of a preliminary injunction must be
presented in the principal action, and judgment therefor must be included in the final judgment
of the case. The remedy is exclusive and by failing to file a motion for the determination of the
damages on time and while the judgment is still under the control of the court, the claimant
loses his right to such damages.”
The procedure for the recovery of damages on account of the issuance of writ of attachment,
injunction, receivership, and replevin proceedings, as interpreted in the cases adverted to,
requires that the claim for damages should be presented in the same action which gave rise to
the special proceeding in order that it may be included in the final judgment of the case, and it
cannot be the subject of a separate action. The philosophy of the ruling seems to be that the
court that had acted on the special proceeding which occasioned the damages has the exclusive
jurisdiction to assess them because of its control of the case. This ruling is sound and tends to
avoid multiplicity of action.

We believe however, that the action of petitioner-appellant is not entirely lost it appearing
from the record that the forcible entry case pending in the case pending in the justice of the
peace court of Parañaque, Rizal, is still open and has not been dismissed by the court in
the certiorari case. The only import of the decision in the latter case is to declare the
proceedings of the justice of the peace court in connection with the issuance of preliminary
injunction null and void for having been issued in excess of its jurisdiction by it did not throw
the case out of court. Petitioner herein may still press his claim for damages before that court.

We notice that the Court of Appeals has likewise ruled that petitioner herein has no right to
claim for damages for the loss of the palay standing on the land in dispute on the sole premise
that he is not the lawful owner of the land, as shown by the records, wherein the ownership
well says, the ownership of the land is one thing, and the ownership of the improvements is
another. The record does not seem to justify any finding relative to the improvements because
the evidence presented seems to have been limited to the ownership of the land. Petitioner
may have made the improvements in good faith although he may not be the lawful owner of
the land. The claim of petitioner that seem to be without reason or justification. We are,
therefore, constrained to hold that the finding to the effect that petitioner has no right to claim
from damages has no basis in the evidence.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in so far as it hold that petitioner has
no right to institute the present action for damages, but is reversed in all other respects,
without prejudice on the part of petitioner to presenting his claim for damages in the forcible
entry case pending in the justice of the peace court of Parañaque, Rizal, and without
pronouncement as to costs.

304
SANTOS v CA
1954
95 Phil 360

FACTS:
On May 20, 1950, Ofrecino T. Santos (hereinafter to be referred to as petitioner) filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato an action for the recovery of the sum of P1,628 against
Teodulo M. Cruz and Valentin C. Garcia (Civil Case No. 241). The petitioner secured a writ of
preliminary attachment which was levied upon a tractor which, though believed by the petitioner
to belong to the defendants in Civil Case No. 241, in fact was owned by the Philippine
Reconstruction Corporation Inc. (hereinafter to be referred to as respondent), which in due time
filed a third party claim. The petitioner filed an amended complaint including the respondent as a
defendant, but upon motion filed by Teodulo M. Cruz and Valentin C. Garcia, Civil Case No.
241 was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato for lack of jurisdiction, the amount
involved being less than P2,000. The petitioner filed a similar action in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Buayan, Cotabato, against the respondent as sole defendant, wherein the petitioner was
awarded the sum of P1,638.10, with interest and costs, but this decision is still the subject matter
of a pending certiorari proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato instituted by the
respondent.

On May 9, 1951, the respondent filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila Civil Case No.
13778 against the petitioner, for damages resulting from the levy of its tractor under the writ of
attachment issued in Civil Case No. 241. Paragraphs III and VII of the respondent's complaint in
Civil Case No. 13778 read as follows:

III

That on or about the month of September, 1950 and in connection with the execution
of a preliminary writ of attachment secured by the herein defendant Ofrecino T. Santos
in Civil Case No. 241 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato entitled Ofrecino T.
Santos, plaintiff vs. Teodulo M. Cruz and Valentin C. Garcia, defendants, the above-
named defendants conspiring, confabulating and conniving with one another procured
and caused to be attached a certain Caterpillar D-8 tractor of herein plaintiff who was
not a party in said case and that defendants herein fully knowing that the said tractor
does not belong to any of the defendants Teodulo M. Cruz and Valentin C. Garcia in said
Civil Case No. 241 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato;

VII

That due to the said wrongful and malicious attachment levied by the herein defendants
on plaintiffs' tractor and their subsequent refusal to release the same from attachment
as above stated plaintiff was consequently forced to violate its contractual undertaking
with a certain Mr. Tomas Gonzales as stated in the sworn third party claim so that it was
compelled to pay a liquidated damages in the sum of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000)
aside from having lost a sure income from rent on said tractor in the sum of One
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500);

The other necessary details are recited as follows in the decision of the Court of
Appealspromulgated on October 30, 1952 in CA-G.R. No 9925-R, Ofrecino T. Santos, petitioner,
vs. Philippine Reconstruction Corporation, Inc., and the Honorable Demetrio B. Encarnacion,
Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents:
 On June 10, 1951, petitioner (defendant in Civil Case No. 13778 of Manila) was duly
summoned to answer the complaint filed in said Civil Case. A motion to dismiss, filed by
defendant's counsel, was received on June 23, 1951, in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. On the other hand, counsel for plaintiff Philippine Reconstruction Corporation
(now respondent) filed on July 12, 1951, an ex-parte motion, praying that defendant
Ofrecino T. Santos was declared in default on the ground that his motion to dismiss does
not contain a notice for hearing as provided in Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, and
therefore not a valid one. Copy of said order was received by defendant's counsel on
August 2, 1951. On August 26th, plaintiffs counsel moved that the aforesaid Civil Case
No. 13778 be set for hearing. In his turn, counsel for defendant Ofrecino T. Santos filed
on September 1st a petition praying that the order of default dated July 23rd be set
aside; that his motion to dismiss be given due course, either by sustaining or denying
the same; and that if denied, defendant be allowed to file his answer.

By virtue of an order dated February 12, 1952, the case was set for hearing on February
28th, and on the following day decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering the later to pay the sum of P4,500 with legal rate of
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and to further pay the sum of
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of the suit. Consequently, on April 5, 1952,
defendant Ofrecino T. Santos, thru his counsel, moved for the reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision, to which motion counsel for the plaintiff filed his opposition on April
20, 1952.
The said motion for reconsideration was denied.

Ofrecino T. Santos now comes before us as petitioner, alleging that the respondent
court committed a grave abuse of discretion when, as defendant in the aforesaid Civil
Case No. 13778, he was arbitrarily declared in default; and when it declared his motion
to dismiss not a valid one. Petitioner further claims that the respondent court again
committed a grave abuse of discretion when, instead of acting upon his petition for
relief from the order of default, it set the case for hearing a proceeded to hear plaintiff's
evidence and rendered a decision. It is also alleged by petitioner that the Court of First
Instance of Manila acted without jurisdiction, the cause of action in Civil Case No. 13778
having arisen from a supposed wrongful attachment ordered by the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato in Civil Case No. 241, and for that reason, that the latter court has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether its legal processes are wrongful or not; and
even granting that the Court of First Instance of Manila had proper jurisdiction, the
particular cause of action in said Civil Case No. 13778 is banned by the decision of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Buayan, Cotabato.

From the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for certiorari, the petitioner
has interposed the present appeal by way of certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in holding Ofrecino T. Santos under estoppel to raise the “issue
of jurisdiction.”
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining a decision that was null and
void, emanating as it did from a court which had no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 13778.

HELD:
Without deciding whether the petitioner's motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 13778 was a
mere scrap of paper for lack of notice of hearing, it is clear that he could and should have
appealed from the decision on the merits rendered therein by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, of which he was duly notified, raising in said appeal the propriety of the ruling of
default against him, the failure of the trial court to expressly dispose of his petition for relief,
and the principal question of jurisdiction. It is elementary that certiorari will not lie where the
remedy of appeal is available.

On the issue of jurisdiction, it is to be recalled that, when respondent's tractor was levied upon,
it was not a party in Civil Case No. 241, and although an amended complaint was filed, no new
writ of attachment was issued so as to cover respondent's properties. It is also significant that
Civil Case No. 241 was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Cotabato for lack of
jurisdiction. We have no hesitancy in declaring that the Court of First Instance of Manila
correctly took cognizance of Civil Case No. 13778, because the respondent sought damages, not
on the allegation that the writ of attachment was illegally or wrongfully issued by the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato in Civil Case No. 241, but on theory that said writ was caused by the
petitioner to be levied upon the tractor of the respondent which was not a party defendant.
The filing of the amended complaint did not cure the defect, since the seizure continued to be
in virtue of the original writ, none having been issued under the amended complaint.

The petitioner is invoking the following pronouncement in our decision in Cruz vs. Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc., et al., 49 Off. Gaz. (3) 964; 92 Phil. 699:

The procedure for recovery of damages on account of the issuance of a writ of

attachment, injunction, receivership, and replevin proceedings, as interpreted in the
cases adverted to, requires that the claim for damages should be presented in the same
action which gave rise to the special proceeding in order that it may be included in the
final judgment of the case, and it cannot be the subject of a separate action. The
philosophy of the ruling seems to be that the court that had acted on the special
proceeding which occasioned the damages has the exclusive jurisdiction to assess them
because of its control of the case. This ruling is sound and tends to avoid multiplicity of
action.

The citation is not controlling, for the reason that, apart from the circumstance that, as already
stated, the respondent has never claimed that the writ of attachment was wrongfully issued in
Civil Case No. 241, it appears that the latter case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and no
claim for damages could therefore properly have been presented in said case, because the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato, thus lacking jurisdiction, was in fact prevented from
rendering any final judgment therein which could include such damages. Avoidance of
multiplicity of suite presupposes the competence of the court in the first or earlier case.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs against the
petitioner.

305.
MANGILA v COURT OF APPEALS
August 12, 2002
387 SCRA 162

FACTS:
Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against herein petitioner. On
August 1, 1988, the sheriff filed his Sheriff’s Return showing that summons was not served on
petitioner. A woman found at petitioner’s house informed the sheriff that petitioner transferred
her residence to Sto. Niño, Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner had
left the Philippines for Guam.

Thus, on September 13, 1988, construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done
with intent to defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary
Attachment. On September 26, 1988, the trial court issued an Order of Preliminary Attachment6
against petitioner. The following day, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

The trial court granted the request of its sheriff for assistance from their counterparts in RTC,
Pampanga. Thus, on October 28, 1988, Sheriff Alfredo San Miguel of RTC Pampanga served on
petitioner’s household help in San Fernando, Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order,
Affidavit and Bond.
Petitioner filed a motion to discharge attachment claiming that the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over her person.
The trial court granted the Motion to Discharge Attachment on January 13, 1989 upon filing of
petitioner’s counter-bond. The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction
and on the validity of the writ of preliminary attachment.

Thereafter private respondent applied for an alias summons which was granted by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ was validly implemented.

HELD:
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the
order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary
that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any
manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.23
In the instant case, the Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued on September 27, 1988 and
implemented on October 28, 1988. However, the alias summons was served only on January 26,
1989 or almost three months after the implementation of the writ of attachment.

The trial court had the authority to issue the Writ of Attachment on September 27 since a motion
for its issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action.” However, on the day the writ
was implemented, the trial court should have, previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ, acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner. Yet, as was shown in the
records of the case, the summons was actually served on petitioner several months after the writ
had been implemented.

Private respondent never showed that she affected substituted service on petitioner after her
personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private respondent could not ascertain the
whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she had some other recourse under the
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed
to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a
coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person.

The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of
summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as
warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer
a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for
retroactivity of a belated service.

306
TORRES v. SATSATIN
November 25, 2009
605 SCRA 453

FACTS:
Siblings Torres (petitioners) each owned adjacent 20,000 square meters track of land in
Dasmariñas, Cavite. NicanorSatsatin, through petitioners’ mother AgripinaAledia, was able to
convince the siblings to sell their property and authorize him via SPA, to negotiate for its sale.
Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, to which Solar allegedly agreed to buy
the three parcels of land plus the property of one RusticaAledia for P35, 000,000. Petitioners
claimed that Solar has already paid the entire purchase price, however Nicanor only remitted P9,
000,000 out of the P28, 000,000 sum they are entitled to and that Nicanor had acquired a house
and lot and a car (which he registered in the names of his children). Despite the repeated verbal
and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit the balance prompting the petitioners to file a
complaint for sum of money against the family Satsatin.
 Petitioners filed an Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging
among other things, that respondent was about to depart the country and that they are willing to
post a bond fixed by court. After filing a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff, which the RTC
granted, it issued a Writ of Attachment (WOA) on November 15. On November 19, after serving
a copy of the WOA upon the Satsatins, the sheriff levied their real and personal properties. On
November 21, the summons and copy of complaint was served upon the respondents.
Respondents filed their answer and a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment, claiming, among
others, that: the bond was issued before the issuance of WOA, the WOA was issued before the
summons was received. Respondents posted a counter-bond for the lifting of WOA, which was
denied along with MR. Aggrieved, they filed with CA a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and TRO under Rule 65. CA ruled in favor of
respondents and denied petitioners’ MR hence the petition for review on certiorari with the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not erred in finding that RTC was guilty of GADALEJ in the issuance and
implementation of the Writ of Attachment.

HELD:

No. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon

order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the
defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the
defendant.

In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the
bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were
complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval
are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the

distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost
importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine
when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in order to validly
implement the writ of attachment upon his person.

In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy
of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application;
second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no
power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the
Court will not bind the defendant.
 At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can
validly to do so since the motion for its issuance can be filed “at the commencement of the action
or at any time before entry of judgment.” However, at the time the writ was implemented, the
trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent since no summons was
yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in
order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding
effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or
irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the respondents.

Moreover, again assuming arguendo that the writ of attachment was validly issued, although the
trial court later acquired jurisdiction over the respondents by service of the summons upon them,
such belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process
on respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ
of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the
defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted
by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a
retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction

307.
CUARTERO v. COURT OF APPEALS
August 5, 1992
212 SCRA 260

FACTS:

On August 20, 1990, Cuartero filed a complaint before the RTC of QC against the
spousesEvangelista for a sum of money plus damages with a prayer for theissuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment.The RTC issued an order granting ex-parte Cuartero’s prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.The writ of preliminary attachment was issued
pursuant to the trial court’s order dated August 24, 1990. On the same day, the summons for
the spousesEvangelista were likewise prepared. A copy of the writ of preliminary attachment,
the summons and the complaint were all simultaneously served upon the spousesEvangelista at
their residence. Immediately thereafter, Deputy Sheriff Sila levied, attachedand pulled out the
properties in compliance with the court's directive. Subsequently, thespouses filed motion to
set aside the order dated August 24, 1990 and discharge the writ ofpreliminary attachment for
having been irregularly and improperly issued.

RTC denied the motion for lack of merit. Spouses Evangelista then filed aspecial civil action for
certiorari with the CA questioning the orders of the lower court
with a prayer for a restraining order or writ ofpreliminary injunction to enjoin the judge from
taking further proceedings below.CA granted the petition for certiorari. It nullified the orders
of the RTC and cancelled the writ of preliminary attachmentissued on September 19, 1990.

CA grounded its decision on its finding that the RTC did not acquire any jurisdiction
over theperson of the private respondents: “It is not disputed that neither service of summons
with acopy of the complaint nor voluntary appearance of petitioners was had in this case
beforethe trial court issued the assailed order dated August 24, 1990, as well as the writ
ofpreliminary attachment dated September 19, 1990.”

Cuarterio filed a motion for reconsideration however, itwas denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition forreview on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the CA

ISSUES:
Whether or not issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment is valid. YES
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. YES

HELD:

A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order o

fthe court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of
thedefendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the
satisfaction ofwhatever judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor
against thedefendant.
Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance of the writ
are the affidavit and bond of the applicant.
As has been expressly ruled in BF Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, citing MindanaoSavings and
Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, no notice to the adverse party orhearing of the
application is required inasmuch as the time which the hearing will take could beenough to
enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ ofattachment issues.
The writ of preliminary attachment can be applied for and granted at the commencementof the
action or at any time thereafter (Section 1, Rule 57, Rules of Court). "At thecommencement of
the action" is interpreted as referring to the date of the filing of the complaintwhich is a time
before summons is served on the defendant or even
before. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued even before summons is served upon
the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the
defendantuntil jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that
when theproper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service
of summons should be simultaneously made. In the case at bar, when the writ of attachment
was served on thespouses Evangelista, the summons and copy of the complaint were also
simultaneously served.

The petition is granted. CA decision is reversed. Order and writ of attachmentissued by the RTC
Judge are reinstated.

308.
SPOUSES SALGADO v. CA
March 26, 1984
128 SCRA 395

FACTS:

This is a petition for review filed by the spouses Jose Salgado and Julieta Salgado to set
aside the resolution of the then Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-09407-R, dated September
18, 1980, which authorized the issuance of a writ of attachment against the property of said
petitioners.

On May 8, 1978, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, hereinafter referred to as the
Bank, filed an action against petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to recover on a
promissory note in the amount of P1,510,905.96, inclusive of interest and other bank charges.
In its verified complaint, the Bank further prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment. As
grounds therefor it alleged that petitioners had fraudulently misappropriated and/or converted
to their own personal use and benefit the sugar proceeds given as security for the payment of
the indebtedness; that petitioners are guilty of fraud in contracting their obligation and have
concealed, removed or disposed of the properties mortgaged or assigned to the plaintiff, or are
concealing, removing or disposing or about to do so, with intent to defraud their creditor; that
the obligation sought to be enforced is genuine and, therefore, a sufficient cause of action
exists; and that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action.
Attached to the complaint was the affidavit of Mrs. Helen Osias, Senior Branch Credit Division
Manager of the Bank, wherein she stated, among others, "that there is no sufficient security for
the claim sought to be enforced by this action."

On May 9, 1978, the trial court issued an order granting the Bank’s prayer for preliminary
attachment. Upon the filing of said bond, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff levied upon several
parcels of land of petitioners situated in the province of Negros Occidental.
On September 15, 1978, petitioners Salgado moved to quash the writ of attachment on the
ground that respondent Bank made fraudulent misrepresentation in securing the writ by
deleting the words "R E M" or "Real Estate Mortgage" from the xerox copy of the promissory
note attached to the complaint, thereby "making it appear that the note was unsecured when
in truth and in fact it was fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate mortgages
duly registered and annotated in the titles of the affected real properties in favor of the plaintiff
Bank." In the same motion, petitioners stressed the lack of factual basis of the Bank’s claim as
to their alleged fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of the sugar proceeds given as
security for their obligation.

After due hearing, the trial court issued an order dated January 31, 1979 granting petitioners’
motion and lifting the writ of attachment previously issued.

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration the Bank went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari to annul the order of the trial court lifting the writ of attachment.On
November 29, 1979, the respondent Court of Appeals, finding that the order of the trial court
was not arbitrarily issued, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

However, on motion of the Bank, the respondent Court reconsidered its decision of November
29, 1979 and issued the questioned resolution dated September 18, 1980, which authorized the
issuance of a writ of attachment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment is valid.

HELD:We find the petition impressed with merit, The chief purpose of the remedy of
attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant’s property until plaintiff can, by
appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction,
or to make some provision for unsecured debts in cases where the means of satisfaction
thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or
concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.

The grounds upon which attachment may issue are set forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court. But quite apart from the grounds stated therein, it is further provided in Section 3 of
Rule 57 that "an order of attachment shall be granted only when it is made to appear by the
affidavit of the applicant or some other person who personally knows the facts, that . . . there is
no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action."

The reason for the rule prohibiting attachment where indebtedness was already secured is to
prevent the secured creditors from attaching additional property and thus tying up more of the
debtor’s property than was necessary to secure the indebtedness. 2 Thus, to sustain an order of
attachment, "it is incumbent upon plaintiff to establish either of these two facts, to wit: (a) that
the obligation had not been secured originally, or (b) that, if secured at its beginning, the
security later became valueless."
In the instant case, the allegation in the affidavit of the Bank’s Credit Division Manager, Mrs.
Helen Osias, to the effect that "there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be
enforced by this action" has been shown to be false. It is undisputed that the note sued upon
"is fully secured by a series of valid and existing real estate mortgages duly registered and
annotated in the titles of the affected real property in favor of the plaintiff Bank."

Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court authorizes the discharge of an attachment where the
same had been improperly or irregularly issued. In National Coconut Corporation v. Hon.
PotencianoPecson, this Court ruled that when the facts or some of them, stated in the
plaintiff’s affidavit, are shown by the defendant to be untrue, the writ of attachment may be
considered as improperly or irregularly issued.

Since attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy which exposes the debtor to humiliation and
annoyance, the rule authorizing its issuance must be strictly construed in favor of the
defendant. It should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is the duty of the court
before issuing the writ to ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with.

Accordingly, the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate
Appellate Court, dated September 18, 1980, is hereby set aside.

309
QUASHA ASPERILLA ANCHETA VALMONTE PENA v JUAN
November 19, 1982
118 SCRA 505

FACTS:In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks
the annulment of the order of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 105048 dated August 25, 1978 which approved the sale of the subject cargo and prays
instead that the writ of preliminary attachment over the same property issued by Hon. Gregorio
Pineda of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 28710 be allowed to remain in
force.

On October 22, 1976, respondent Filipinas Carriers (Filcar), filed a complaint for sum of money,
enforcement of lien and damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila, which was
presided by respondent Judge, against AB Charles Thorburn& Co., through its receiver Sjoegren
and Winstrand; Estero Shipping and Trading; Bank of Melli of Iran, Jeddah Branch; Perstorp AB;
Skogshgarnas Industries; Ekman and Company AB; and Abdullah Baroom. In the complaint
Filcar alleged that it is the despondent owner of a vessel, MV San Vicente, which was duly
registered with the Republic of the Philippines; that on April 2, 1976, defendant
CarlesThorburn& Co. chartered said vessel by time charter for two or three months for a
voyage from Sweden to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia at three thousand two hundred US dollars (US
$3,200.00) a day, that Abdullah Baroom was impleaded as defendant for being the agent of
Charles Thorburn& Co. at Jeddah and Sjoegren and Winstrand of Sweden for being the receiver
of Charles Thorburn& Co.; that the vessel left Sweden with construction materials as cargoes
belonging to the following shippers and consignees, namely, defendants Bank of Melli of Iran,
Jeddah Branch; the National Commercial Bank, Jeddah Branch; Perstorp AB of Perstorp,
Sweden; Skogshgarnas Industries of Sweden; Ekman and Company of Sweden; that after the
second month, Charles Thorburn failed to pay the daily hire, that the vessel has been in Jeddah
since May 19, 1976 and is now in international waters; that in view of Thorburn's failure to pay
the charter hire, it had struck a lien through the vessel's captain; that the charter party has
expired but the vessel has not yet discharged the cargoes due to inadequate port facilities and
failure of the shippers, consignees and charterer to pay the charter hire; that Filcar demanded
from Charles Thorburn the payment of the charter hire but Thorburn failed to pay and instead
declared bankruptcy and is now under receivership in Sweden; that on demand, Baroom, the
agent of Thorburn in Jeddah, and the consignees and shippers refused to pay; that
consequently, Filcar was forced to exercise its lien on the cargoes, notice of which was sent to
defendants. The plaintiff thus prayed, among others, that the defendants pay the daily charter
hire from the time they were in arrears until payment is made and that the Court allows the
sale of the cargoes to satisfy its claims.

On November 25, 1976, Sierra Madre Wood Industries, Inc. (Sierra Madre) the alleged owner,
end-user and operator of MV San Vicente filed a motion to intervene in the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the purpose of enforcing its lien over the cargo, claiming that it had
chartered the vessel to Filcar for six months renewable every six months at agreed charter hire
fee.Respondent Judge allowed the intervention of Sierra Madre as plaintiff-intervenor.

On December 2, 1976, Filcar filed an extra-parte motion to sell the goods subject of lien,
alleging among others, that the MV San Vicente had arrived in the Philippines, and was due for
dry-docking and needed urgent repairs; and that the goods subject of its lien were in danger of
deteriorating and losing their market value and if the goods were not sold immediately, the
plaintiff would have to pay a staggering amount for warehousing so that the value of the goods

On August 15, 1977, petitioner law firm filed with respondent Judge a special appearance for
defendant Ahmed Baroom contesting the Court's jurisdiction over Baroom's person and
property and a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Court had not acquired jurisdiction
over Baroom's 'person or property aboard the MV San Vicente. Respondent Judge issued an
Order directing petitioner law firm to show on or before September 20, 1977 a written
authorization signed by its client, Baroom, "since the latter is a foreigner".
On November 15, 1977, petitioner, as Baroom's counsel, filed an answer with compulsory
counterclaim, claiming that defendant Baroom is not an agent of Charles Thorburn since the
cargoes belong to him, and denying the validity of plaintiff's lien over the cargo. Petitioner
reiterates the defense that plaintiff's action being in personam involving defendant who is not a
resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, and there is no showing in the records
that the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 in relation to Section 1, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court
have been complied with to convert the action in rem, the Court had no jurisdiction over the
case. Baroom, through petitioner, prayed that plaintiff be directed to deliver the cargoes to
Jeddah, pay damages corresponding to the full value of the goods and to the lost income and
profits he could have realized had plaintiff delivered the cargo to him. Baroom, likewise, filed a
cross-claim against Sierra Madre, plaintiff-intervenor.

On January 23, 1978, petitioner filed with respondent Judge a manifestation and motion that it
be "allowed to withdraw from this case and charging lien be recorded against the properties of
Mr. Baroom now aboard MV San Vicente for unpaid professional fees and reimbursement
expenses. "

Thereafter, on February 17, 1978, petitioner filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
complaint with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment for the recovery of professional
fees and reimbursement of expenses against Baroom whom it alleged to have represented in
Civil Case No. 105048, CFI, Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 28710 and the same
was assigned to Branch XXI presided over by Judge Gregorio C. Pineda.

By virtue of the order dated February 28, 1978 issued by Judge Pineda in the new case,
petitioner obtained a writ of preliminary attachment against Baroom's alleged cargoes which is
the subject matter in Civil Case No. 105048.

Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 105048, on August 2, 1978, respondent Judge gave Attys. Quasha
and Valmonte ten (10) days from receipt of order within which to explain why they should not
be held in contempt of court for filing a case entitled "QuashaAsperillaAnchetaValmonte Peña
and Marcos vs. AlSayed Abdullah Mohammed Baroom" docketed as Civil Case No. 28710 in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, where they obtained a writ of preliminary
attachment over the cargoes, which they knew to be subject matter of Civil Case No. 105048
pending before his sala." A compliance with said order was filed on August 24, 1978, with
petitioner alleging that their cause of action against Baroom was for payment of professional
fees and reimbursement of expenses while Case No. 105048 before Judge Juan was for alleged
unpaid charter hire fees.
On August 25, 1978, respondent Judge issued an order approving the sale of the cargo in
question to Apollo Kokin Trading Co., Ltd. In accordance with the earlier order of April 28, 1977,
respondent Judge directed the deposit of the sale proceeds with a banking institution to be
approved by the Court and its disposition only on orders of the Court.

On September 8, 1978, Filcar filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal an urgent omnibus
motion to be allowed to appear and to dismiss the case and to lift the writ of preliminary
attachment and set aside the order to auction the cargo, attaching thereto the order of
respondent Judge dated August 25, 1978, approving the sale in favor of Apollo Kokin Trading
Co., Ltd. of the subject cargo, the proceeds of which after deducting all expenses shall be
deposited with the court.

Thus, petitioner, on October 23, 1978, filed before this Court the instant petition. Petitioner
assails the order of August 25, 1978, not the earlier order of April 28, 1977 approving the sale in
favor of Apollo Kokin Trading Co., Ltd. of the questioned cargo for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion considering that subject cargo was allegedly earlier attached by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal.

Without giving due course to the petition and pending the filing of comments by respondents,
this Court issued on October 24, 1978 a temporary restraining order,enjoining respondents to
immediately cease and desist from taking, unloading, transferring, conveying, transporting or
disposing of the cargoes or any part thereof aboard the MC San Vicente and Dong Myung.

On October 30, 1978, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion informing this Court that
notwithstanding the restraining order, the MV Don Myung, with the cargo aboard left
surreptitiously at midnight of October 24, 1978 without the assistance of any pilot in violation
of Harbor rules. The goods were then allegedly sold for US.

In the meanwhile, a compromise agreement dated October 16, 1978 and filed on November 2,
1978 wherein Filcar assigned its interests and rights in the proceeds of the sale of the subject
cargoes to Sierra Madre which the latter accepted was approved by the respondent court in its
decision of November 3, 1978. An amended petition was thus filed in this Court impleading
Sierra Madre as partly respondent in his case with prayer that a writ of garnishment be issued
on the proceeds of the sale of the cargoes which are in the possession of Sierra Madre, and an
order be issued directing Sierra Madre and all those to whom such proceeds may subsequently
be reassigned to deliver to petitioner such portion of the proceeds of the sale as would satisfy
the attorney's lien in the interest of justice.
Coming back to the omnibus motion of Filcar for the lifting of the preliminary attachment
issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the said court on December 7, 1978 dismissed
petitioner's case and lifted the preliminary attachment issued therein. Upon motion for
reconsideration dated April 7, 1979, the said preliminary attachment was reinstated by the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in its order dated July 5, 1979.

After several pleading were filed in this Court, we gave due course to the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the defendants, Baroom
and over the cause of action.

HELD:
Petitioner contends that respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction neither over any of the
defendants as they have not voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of respondent
court, nor over the res, since there had been no seizure of the property under a legal process,
as by a writ of attachment or other process of similar effect. The instant case is allegedly
neither a proceeding in rem as would place the property under its potential power citing the
leading case of BancoEspañol v. Palanca which held:

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of litigation may result either
from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the
actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the
property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never
be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by
actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized
at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress and held
to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term
potential jurisdiction over the res is found in the proceeding to register the title
of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court, without
taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some
person claiming to be the owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the
property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the
world.

Claiming that it was the Court of First Instance of Pasig that first acquired jurisdiction over the
res to the exclusion of respondent court, petitioner insists that the latter court's act is undue
interference which cannot be countenanced.
There is no pretense that respondent court has jurisdiction over the cause of action. It is much
too obvious to merit a fuller discussion. Suffice it to say that an action based upon an oral
contract of transportation of goods by water is an action in admiralty which comes under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance irrespective of the value of the
cargo.

As to the person of Baroom, it is to be conceded that at the initial stage of the proceeding in the
Court of First Instance of Manila prior to the issuance of the order of April 28, 1977 directing
the sale of the property and petitioner's firing of various pleadings, said court did not have
jurisdiction over Baroom. Baroom was a non-resident alien and he was beyond the reach of the
court's legal processes. But since the action is brought principally for the enforcement of
maritime lien against the property of defendants who failed to pay the charter hire fee, and
therefore the same is in the nature and character of a proceeding quasi in rem, jurisdiction over
defendant Baroom is not essential. An action quasi in rem has been defined as "an action
between parties where the direct object is to reach and dispose of property owned by them or
of some interest therein." As such the properties allegedly owned by him are primarily made
liable. In elucidating the characteristic of a proceeding where a non-resident defendant fails to
appear, this Court in the aforecited leading case of BancoEspañol Filipino v. Palanca said:

If however, the defendant is a non-resident and, remaining beyond the range of

the personal process of the court, refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never
acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the property itself is in fact the
sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject
of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in
such case is based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it possesses
over the property; and any discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant is entirely apart from the case.

At any rate, defendant Baroom filed later, aside from a motion to dismiss, an answer with
counterclaim praying that plaintiff be directed to deliver the cargoes of defendant Baroom to
Jeddah and to pay damages, etc. and a cross-claim against Sierra Madre, thereby abandoning
any question on jurisdiction over the person and submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the
court.

In the aforecited case, the Court explains that the rule is such because "it cannot look with
favor upon a party adopting not merely inconsistent, but actually contradictory; positions in
one and the same suit, claiming that a court has no jurisdiction to render judgment against it,
but has such jurisdiction to give a decision its favor. 14
It may be noted that if the defendant voluntarily appears, the action becomes as to him a
personal action and is conducted as such. Even then, the court does not lose its jurisdiction
over the res, assuming that it has indeed jurisdiction over the res. The res still remains under its
control and disposition.

As regards jurisdiction over the res, we hold that respondent acquires jurisdiction over it.
Where a property is burdened by a lien, a writ of attachment is no longer necessary in order
that jurisdiction over the property may be obtained by the court. In the same cited case by
petitioner, in the BancoEspañol case, it was clarified:

In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served,

the preliminary seizure is to be considered necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the lien on the property is acquired by
seizure; and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject the property to that lien.
If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the
preliminary seizure is not necessary, and the court proceeds to enforce such lien
in the manner provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized
upon attachment.

The reason for the rule is obvious. An attachment proceeding is for the purpose of creating a
lien on the property to serve as security for the payment of the creditors' claim. Hence, where a
lien already exists, as in this case a maritime lien, the same is already equivalent to an
attachment. Moreover, since the property subject of the action for the enforcement of the
maritime liens was already in the possession of private respondent, there is no need for seizure
for the court to obtain jurisdiction over the rest.

Where a party in actual possession of the res subject to the lien is before the
court, the res is within the jurisdiction of the court for the enforcement of the
lien a suit may be maintained to foreclose a lien on property within the
jurisdiction of the court, although some interest or claim therein is held by a
non-resident.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed.

310.
MERCEDES GRUENBERG and ALBERT GRUENBERG, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE LINO L. AÑOVER and ELDA R. FLORES, respondents.
September 10, 1985
 138 SCRA 471

FACTS: This is a petition to review the decision of CA (now IAC) which affirmed the order for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment & other related orders of the trial.

Flores, the respondent, filed for annulment of sale, recovery of ownership and possession of the
house and lot situated in Diliman, QC, as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the late
William Gruenberg. Flores alleged that:

 the house & lot (sold to defendant Albert Gruenberg) form part of the conjugal partnership of the
Gruenberg spouses, which must answer for the obligations that deceased William Gruenberg
might have incurred during his lifetime as manager & administrator of the conjugal partnership;
 the sale was before the death of William Gruenberg, when two creditors had already filed suits
against him for collection of unpaid obligations, and the latter had unpaid obligation to Flores in
the amount of P13k, exclusive of interest and collection charges, patently and clearly can no
longer be paid or liquidated.

Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. Flores filed a 'Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Attachment' against the properties of petitioners that the latter are indebted to her in
the principal amount of P13k which she seeks to recover. Petitioners opposed the motion for the
issuance of writ of preliminary attachment alleging that this is an action for annulment of sale
and recovery of the house and lot & not for recovery of sum of money; that a writ of preliminary
attachment is not the proper remedy for the protection of the rights of the estate. Trial court
issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of the petitioners and served by the
sherrif. Allegedly the order of respondent Judge was not received by petitioners’ new counsel but
upon being informed of the writ of preliminary attachment and notice of garnishment,
petitioners' new counsel promptly went to the trial court & then and there he discovered that Ps'
opposition to the motion was not attached to the record, because the same was forwarded to
Branch XVIII to which this case was originally assigned. Petitioners filed a motion for
Reconsideration and motion to recall the writ of preliminary attachment and notice of
garnishment, on the ground that it is not true that petitioners did not oppose the motion of
Flores, and that there is no valid basis to grant the motion. Respondent Judge denied the motions
of the petitioners and he required petitioners to appear before his court to explain why they
should not be punished for contempt for denying/disobeying the lawful processes of the court
("show cause" order).

This prompted the petitioners to file a petition for certiorari in the CA but was dismissed. Hence,
the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of attachment and garnishment against the petitioners’
properties issued by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court proper.

HELD: IT WAS NOT PROPERLY ISSUED.

Flores stated that her case "... is one of the situations covered by Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court whereby a writ of preliminary attachment may issue."

Section 1 (d), Rule 57 provides: Grounds upon which attachment may issue.—A plaintiff or any
proper party may, at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property
of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be
recovered in the following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring
the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for
the taking, detention or conversion of which the action is brought.
xxxxxxxxx

While the respondent filed the motion as administratrix of the Gruenberg estate, the motion for
a writ of attachment & its supporting affidavit show that the attachment was intended to secure
only her 13k claim against the estate. Obviously, this cannot be done. A writ of attachment is a
remedy ancillary to the principal proceeding.

Flores' remedy to recover the outstanding debt of the deceased is to follow the procedure in Rule
86 on claims against an estate. Section 8 of Rule 86 calls for the appointment of a special
administrator to defend the estate against such claim. Allowing Flores in the annulment case to
attach the petitioners' properties for the benefit of her 13k claim against the estate would give her
an undue advantage over other creditors against the estate. Moreover, 13k claim of Flores cannot
be settled in the case for annulment of the deed of sale, wherein the writ of attachment is sought.
What she seeks to be secured is not the judgment in the main case but a mere claim against the
estate which is still to be considered and adjudicated by the court.

The rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must be construed strictly in favor of the
defendant. The remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature. If all the
requisites for the issuance of the writ are not present, the court which issues it acts in excess of
its jurisdiction. Following the principle of strict compliance with all requisites, Court ruled that
"when the facts, or some of them, stated in the plaintiff's affidavit are shown by the defendant to
be untrue, the writ may be considered as improperly or irregularly issued." (National Coconut
Corporation V. Pecson, et al., 90 Phil. 809).

The motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment & the affidavit of preliminary
attachment are misleading. Flores states that the "defendants are indebted to plaintiff in the
amount of P13,000.00" exclusive of interests and collection charges. Then, she avers that the
"defendants are guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation due plaintiff ".

The facts in the motion and the affidavit are deceptively framed. The obligation which the
respondent seeks to secure by an attachment was between her and the late William Gruenberg,
Sr. What she seeks to establish as fraudulent was the sale between the late Mr. Gruenberg and his
son. These are two entirely distinct transactions.
 One of the reasons for granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment was the court's finding that the petitioners failed to file an opposition thereto.
Petitioners filed a timely opposition to the motion but in another branch where this case had
earlier been assigned. Despite this timely opposition, the MR of the order for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment was summarily denied for lack of merit.

So the Court found the writ of preliminary attachment to have been improvidently issued. The
petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the former Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The
writ of preliminary attachment and the notice of garnishment are DISSOLVED. The other related
orders issued in connection with the writ of attachment are SET ASIDE.

311.
DY v. ENAGE
March 17, 1976
70 SCRA 96

312.G.R. No. 119723 February 23, 2001

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS TEXTILE MILLS, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner, on April 8, 1991, file a Complaint against private respondent Bernardino Villanueva,
private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills and one Sochi Villanueva (deceased) before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. In the said Complaint, petitioner sought the payment of P2,244,926.30 representing the
proceeds or value of various textile goods, the purchase of which was covered by irrevocable letters of
credit and trust receipts executed by petitioner with private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills as obligor;
which, in turn, were covered by surety agreements executed by private respondent Bernardino
Villanueva and Sochi Villanueva. In their Answer, private respondents admitted the existence of the
surety agreements and trust receipts but countered that they had already made payments on the
amount demanded and that the interest and other charges imposed by petitioner were onerous.
On May 31, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Attachment, contending that violation of the
trust receipts law constitutes estafa, thus providing ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.

Issue:
 Whether Or Not there was a sufficient basis for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment.

Held:
NO. The Motion for Attachment filed by petitioner and its supporting affidavit did not
sufficiently establish the grounds relied upon in applying for the writ of preliminary attachment. While
the Motion refers to the transaction complained of as involving trust receipts, the violation of the terms
of which is qualified by law as constituting estafa, it does not follow that a writ of attachment can and
should automatically issue. Private respondents claimed that substantial payments were made on the
proceeds of the trust receipts sued upon. They also refuted the allegations of fraud, embezzlement and
misappropriation by averring that private respondent Filipinas Textile Mills could not have done these as
it had ceased its operations starting in June of 1984 due to workers' strike.

Note: case no. 313.Philippine bank vs CA and Bernardo is same with

case no. 312

314.Sievert v. Court of Appeals

Facts
Alberto Sievert ("Sievert") received by mail a Petition for Issuance of a Preliminary Attachment,
despite not having previously received any summons or any copy of a complaint. Sievert's counsel
appeared before the court to question its jurisdiction over Sievert's person. The trial court denied
Sievert's objections and proceeded to hear the application.

Issue
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sievert.
Held
No.
Ratio Decidendi
A preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy. Hence, the court's lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in the principal action would necessarily mean that it likewise lacks such
jurisdiction in the ancillary proceeding. In this case, jurisdiction has not been acquired over Sievert in the
principal action as no summons has been served upon him. Hence, it was an error for the trial court to
proceed with the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary attachment.

315. G.R. No. 55381. March 26, 1984

SPOUSES JULIETA SALGADO and JOSE SALGADO, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, Respondents.
FACTS:
 Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, filed action to recover on a promissory note with
prayerwrit of attachment. Court of First Instance Rizal lifted the writ of attachment it previously issued
after petitioners moved to quash it. Bank posted bond. The Court of Appeals reconsidered and
authorized the issuance of the writ of attachment.

ISSUE:
WHETHER or NOT, the remedy ofattachment is valid even if the debt is already secured by other
means.

HELD:
Petition is impressed with merit.
We find the petition impressed with merit. The chief purpose of the remedy of attachment is to
secure a contingent lien on defendant’s property until plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a
judgment and have such property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured
debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction,
or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors.
Sec 1 Rule 57 states the grounds on which attachment may issue.
Sec 3, Rule 57. An order of attachment shall be granted only when it appers by the affidavit of
the applicant , or some other person who personally knows the facts that XXXX there is no other
sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action.
The reason for the rule prohibiting attachment where the indebtedness was already secured is
to prevent the secured creditors from attaching additional property and thus tying up more of the
debtor’s property tan was necessary to secure the indebtedness.
To sustain an order of attachment, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish either of these
2 facts:
a) That the obligation had not been secured originally
b) That, if secured at its beginning, the security later became valueless.

Sec 13, Rule 57 authorizes the discharge of an attachment where the same had been improperly
or irregularly issued.

316. Salas vsAdil

G.R. No. L-46009 May 14, 1979
RICARDO T. SALAS and MARIA SALAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, as Judge of Branch II, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, ROSITA BEDRO and
BENITA YU, respondents.

FACTS:
Respondents Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu filed a civil action against petitioners to annul the deed
of sale of Lot No. 5 executed by administrators of the Hodges Estate in favor of the Spouses Ricardo T.
Salas and Maria Salas and for damages. The annulment was upon the averment that Lot No. 5, being a
subdivision road, is intended for public use and cannot be sold or disposed of by the Hodges Estate. The
claim for damages was based on the assertion that after defendant spouses purchased Lots Nos. 2 and
3, they also purchased Lot No. 5 and thereafter "erected wooden posts thereby preventing Rosita Bedro
and Benita Yu from using the road on the afore-mentioned lot, Lot No. 5, and that as a result of such
obstruction, private respondents Rosita Bedro and Benita Yu sustained actual damages, plus and
damages due to the stoppage in the construction of their commercial buildings on Lot No. 3.
In their answer to the complaint, the Salas spouses denied the allegations in the complaint.
In a motion dated May 12, 1977, private respondents filed a Motion for Attachment, alleging,
among others, that the case was "for annulment of a deed of sale and recovery of damages" and that
the defendants have removed or disposed of their properties or are about to do so with intent to
defraud their creditors especially the plaintiffs in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the motion for attachment is proper.

HELD:
It appears that petitioners have adequate remedy under the law. They could have filed an
application with the court a quo for the discharge of the attachment for improper or irregular issuance
under section 13, Rule 57, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides the following
SEC. 13. Discharge of attachment for improper or irregular issuance. - The party whose property
has been attached may also, at any time either before or after the release of the attached property, or
before any attachment shall have been actually levied, upon reasonable notice to the attaching creditor,
apply to the judge who Salas vs. Adil granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which the action
is pending, for an order to discharge the attachment on the ground that the same was improperly or
irregularly issued. If the motion be made on affidavits on the part of the party whose property has been
attached, but not otherwise, the attaching creditor may oppose the same by counter-affidavits or other
evidence in addition to that on which the attachment was made. After hearing, the judge shall order the
discharge of the attachment if it appears that it was improperly or irregularly issued and the defect is
not cured forthwith.
Considering that petitioners have not availed of this remedy, the instant petition is premature.It is
necessary, however, for the guidance of respondent Court and of the parties, to stress herein the nature
of attachment as an extraordinary provisional remedy.
A preliminary attachment is a rigorous remedy, which exposes the debtor to humiliation and
annoyance, such it should not be abused as to cause unnecessary prejudice. It is, therefore, the duty of
the court, before issuing the writ, to ensure that all the requisites of the law have been complied with;
otherwise the judge acts in excess of his jurisdiction and the so issued shall be null and void .

317.PERKIN ELMER SINGAPORE PTE LTD.,

Petitioner,
- versus -
DAKILA TRADING CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 172242
Facts: Perkin Elmer Asia entered into a distribution agreement with Dakila, a domestic corp. Under the
agreement,Dakila was appointed its sole distributor in the Phils and thus, shall receive commissions for
its sales from Perkin Asia.Dakila was supposed to order the products either from Perkin Asia or from
Perkin Elmer Instruments Philippines (PEIP),an affiliate of Perkin Asia, 99% of the shares of which is
owned by Perkin Asia.However, Perkin Asia unilaterally terminated the agreement with Dakila. So Dakila
sued both Perkin Asia and PEIP –Dakila filed a Complaint for Collection of Money (an In Personam suit)
with a prayer for a Writ of Attachment (for theproperties of PEIP since 99% is owned by Perkin Asia
anyway). The Alias Summons was, however, served uponPerkinelmer Asia, a Singapore based sole
proprietorship owned by Perkin Asia but was allegedly, a separate and distinctentity from it.So in
response to Dakila’s collection suit, PEIP filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action.
Perkinelmer Asiainformed the court of the wrongful service of summons upon it. Dakila then filed an
amended complaint saying thatPerkin Asia is now Perkinelmer, it became a sole proprietorship and
changed its name but it’s the same people/interestso they should still be accountable for their
obligations. Perkin Asia, herein petitioner and the proper party, on the otherhand, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over its person.
RTC denied petitioner’sMotion to Dismiss stating thatsince the action is one for damages, it relates to
Perkin Asia’sproperty and since Dakila alleged in its complaint that Perkin Asia owns shares in PEIP, the
extraterritorial service of summons was sufficient to acquire jurisdiction ( RTC relied on Sec. 15 of Rule
14 - (2) when the action relates to, or thesubject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which
the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual orcontingent).

Issue: Whether of not the service was summons was defective.

Whether or not jurisdiction was validly acquired.

Held: No.Extraterritorial service of summons applies only in in rem and quasi in rem cases, where only
jurisdiction over the res isrequired and such extraterritorial service of summons is done not for the
purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over theperson of the defendant, but to inform the defendant that
there is a suit involving his property (due process). On theother hand, when the defendant or
respondent does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the actioninvolved isin personam,
Philippine courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction
over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court.The present case is an action in personam –
because it deals with Perkin Asia’s personal liability to Dakila because of itsunilateral termination of the
distribution agreement. Hence, there should have been personal service of summons.
Dakila’s allegation that Perkin Asia had properties in the Philippines did not convert the case into an
action quasi in remas to make the extraterritorial service valid.

318. K.O. Glass Construction Co. v. Valenzuela and Pinzon

G.R. No. L‐48756, September 11, 1982
FACTS
Pinzon instituted an action against Kenneth O. Glass for the recovery of P37K alleged to be the agreed
rentals ofhis truck as well as the value of spare parts, which have not been returned to him upon
termination of the lease.He asked for an attachment of the property of K.O Glass consisting of
collectibles and payables with the PhilippineGeothermal Inc on the grounds that the K.O. Glass is a
foreigner, that he has sufficient cause of action, and thatthere is no sufficient security for his claim
against K.O. Glass in the event a judgment is rendered in his favor.

ISSUE
Whether the issue of the writ of preliminary attachment is proper.

RULING
1. There was no ground for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
Sec. 1.Grounds upon which attachment may issue. —A plaintiff or any proper party may, at
thecommencement of the action or at any time thereafter, have the property of the adverse party
attached
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of action arising from contract, express
or implied, against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his
creditor;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or converted to his own use
by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation, or an attorney, factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the
course of his employment as such, or by any other person in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation
of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly detained, when the property, or
any part thereof, has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by
theapplicant or an officer;

(d) In an action against the party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, or in concealing or disposing of the property for the taking,
detention or conversion of which the action is brought;

(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about to do so, with
intent to defraud his creditors;
(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on whom summons may be served
bypublication.

Also, The affidavit submitted by Pinzon does NOT comply with the Rules.Under the Rules (Sec. 3), an
affidavit for attachment must state that—
(a) Sufficient cause of action exists
(b) Case is one of those mentioned in Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 57
(c) There is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action
(d) The amount due to the applicant for attachment or the value of the property the possession of which
heis entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal
counterclaims. The affidavit of Pinzon lacked (b), (c) and (d). Failure to allege in the affidavit the
requisites prescribed for theissuance of a writ of preliminary attachment renders the writ issued against
the property fatally defective, and thejudge issuing it is deemed to have acted in excess of his
jurisdiction.

319. Metro Inc. vs Lara’s Gifts

GR no 171741, Nov. 27, 2009
FACTS:
Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc. (LGD) and Metro, Inc. are engaged in the business of manufacturing,
producing, sellingand exporting handicrafts. Luis Villafuerte, Jr.and Lara Maria R. Villafuerte
are the president and vice-president of LGDrespectively. Frederick Juan and Liza Juan are the
principal officers of Metro, Inc. Metro Inc. and LGD agreedthat LGD would endorse to Metro Inc.
purchase orders received by LGD from their buyers in the US in exchange for a 15%commission, to be
shared equally by LGD and James R. Paddon (JRP), LGD’s agentAnd agreement were embodied in an e-
mail labeled as the "2001 Agreement."
LGD filed with the RTCa complaint against Metro Inc. for sum of money and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminaryattachment. Subsequently, respondents filed an
amended complaintalleging that Metro Inc. defrauded them.Respondents also prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment. The trial court granted LGD’s prayer and issued the writ of
attachment against the properties and assets of petitioners. Petitioners filed a motion to discharge the
writ of attachment. Metro Inc. argued that the writ of attachment should bedischarged on the ground
that respondents failed to substantiate their allegations of fraud with specific acts or deeds showing
howpetitioners defrauded them.
ISSUE:
Whether the writ of attachment issued by the trial court and element of fraud is properly
established.

HELD: Yes. Metro inc,Frederick juan are guilty of fraud. Through employment of machinations
and schemes, Metro Inc. successfully enticed LGD to enter into the2001 Agreement. To secure LGD’s full
trust in them and lure LGD to endorse more Purchase Orders and increase thevolume of the orders,
Metro Inc during the early part, remitted to LGD’s shares under the Agreement and justwhen the orders
increased and the amount involved likewise increased, Metro Inc. suddenly, without any justifiable
reasons and inpure bad faith and fraud, abandoned their contractual obligations to remit to plaintiffs
their shares. Also Metro Inc. transacteddirectly with LGD’s foreign buyer to the latter’s exclusion and
damage. Metro Inc.are likewiseguilty of fraud by violating the trust and confidence reposed upon them
by LGD. Metro Inc. received the proceeds of LGD’s LCs withthe clear obligation of remitting 15% thereof
to LGD. Their refusal and failure to remit the said amount despite demand constitutes abreach of trust
amounting to malice and fraud. LGD’s allegation that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only
throughJRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted directly with respondents’
foreign buyer is sufficient allegationof fraud to support their application for a writ of preliminary
attachment.
320. G.R. No. 104405 May 13, 1993
LIBERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. NAPOLEON K. FLOJO, Presiding Judge of Branch II, RTC
Manila; ATILLA ARKIN, the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI, METRO MANILA, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint for damages with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against private respondents.the Trial Court thru the Hon.
Rosario A. de Leon, issued an order allowing the issuance of the writ, due to fraud committed by the
defendants in promising to give as security or collateral to their Indemnity Agreement, which caused the
plaintiff to release the security bond, when as it turned out that the TCT of a parcel of land turned out to
be fake, as the true land title number was issued over a different parcel of land issued in the name of a
person other than defendants, while defendant AtillaArkin delivered an official receipt in the name of a
third party but which vehicle was allegedly sold to him free from lien and encumbrance, when it turned
out that the car was heavily mortgaged to a third party.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment in question was properly or regularly issued.
HELD:
In an action against a party who has been guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the
obligation upon which the action is brought, Section 1 (d) of Rule 57 authorizes the plaintiff or any
proper party to have the property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered therein.
But to sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to the
execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party into giving
consent which he would not have otherwise given.

321. y v. CA

Facts:
Petitioners William Uy and RodelRoxas are agents authorized to sell 8 parcels of land.
Petitioners offered to sell the land to NHA for a housing project. On February 14, 1989, NHA passed a
resolution approving the acquisition of said lands, and pursuant to this the parties executed Deeds of
Absolute Sale. However, only 5 out of 8 lands were paid for by NHA because of a report from DENR that
the remaining area is located at an active landslide area and are therefore not conducive for housing. On
November 22, 1991, NHA issued a resolution canceling the sale of the remaining lands and offered
P1.225 million to the landowners as dañosperjuicios. On March 9, 1992, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against NHA and its general manager Robert Balao. The RTC declared the cancellation to be
justified, but awarded the amount offered by NHA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but
deleted the award.
Issues:

(1) Whether the petitioners are real parties in interest

Held:

(1) Petitioners are not parties to the contract of sale between their principals and NHA. They are
mere agents of the owners of the land subject of the sale. As agents, they only render some
service or do something in representation or on behalf of their principals. The rendering of such
service did not make them parties to the contracts of sale executed in behalf of the latter. Since
a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-
interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon that contract must, generally, either
be parties to said contract. Petitioners have not shown that they are assignees of their principals
to the subject contracts. While they alleged that they made advances and that they suffered loss
of commissions, they have not established any agreement granting them "the right to receive
payment and out of the proceeds to reimburse [themselves] for advances and commissions
before turning the balance over to the principal[s]."

322. G.R. No. L-45720 December 29, 1937

VENTURA GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO CATOLICO and SIMEON RAMOS, Judge of First Instance of Isabela, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Alfredo Catolico brought an action against the petitioner in the for the recovery of
the amount of his fees for services rendered by him as attorney, praying, at the same time, for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against all of the properties adjudicated to said petitioner.
He alleged that the defendant is trying to sell and dispose of the properties adjudicated to him, with
intention to defraud the herein plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites prescribed by law for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment have been complied with.
HELD:
Section 426 of the Code of the Civil Procedure provides that "A judge or justice of the peace
shall grant an order of attachment when it is made to appear to the judge or justice of the peace by the
affidavit of the plaintiff, or of some other person who knows the facts, that a sufficient cause of action
exists, and that the case is one of those mentioned in section 424, and that there is no other sufficient
security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to the plaintiff
above all legal set-offs or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is granted."
 For the foregoing consideration, this court is of the opinion and so holds that failure to allege in
a complaint or in the affidavit solemnizing it, or in a separate one, the requisites prescribed by section
426 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment that there is no
other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action, and that the amount due to
the plaintiff above all legal set-offs or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is sought,
renders a writ of preliminary attachments issued against the property of a defendant fatally defective,
and the judge issuing it acts in excess of his jurisdiction.

323 .R. No. 55272 April 10, 1989

JARDINE-MANILA FINANCE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IMPACT CORPORATION, RICARDO DE LEON and EDUARDO DE LEON,
respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Jardine-Manila Finance, Inc. (JARDINE) filed a complaint against private respondents
Impact Corporation (IMPACT), Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon, to collect various sums of money
allegedly due from therein defendant IMPACT under a credit accomodation by way of a discounting line
agreement. Private respondents Ricardo de Leon and Eduardo de Leon were included as defendants by
virtue of their undertaking covered by a Surety Agreement under which they bound themselves jointly
and severally with defendant IMPACT to pay herein petitioner all of IMPACT's obligations under the
aforesaid agreement.
It was alleged that IMPACT assigned its receivables to JARDINE on the condition that IMPACT
was to collect them on their due dates from their issuers and remit the collected amounts to JARDINE
and/or repurchase the assigned receivables; but despite the fact that IMPACT had collected the
amounts due on said receivables, it failed or refused to turn over the amounts so collected to JARDINE.

Likewise contained in said complaint is petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary attachment
against private respondents.
Defendants filed a motion to set aside the writ of preliminary attachment. They also submitted to the
court a quo a memorandum in support of their motion to dissolve the attachment contending that the
grounds alleged by the plaintiff in its application for a writ of attachment are not among the grounds
specified under Section 1 of Rule 57; that the defendants have other sufficient security; that there was
no affidavit of merit to support the application for attachment as required by Section 3 of Rule 57 and
that the verification of the complaint was defective as it did not state that the amount due to the
plaintiff above all legal set-ups or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the order is sought. 9

ISSUE:
Whether or not non-compliance with the formal requirements invalidate the writ of attachment.

Held:
Failure to allege in the affidavit the requisites prescribed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, renders the writ of preliminary attachment issued against the property of the defendant
fatally defective, and the judge issuing it is deemed to have acted in excess of his jurisdiction. In fact, in
such cases, the defect cannot even be cured by amendment.

The general rule is that the affidavit is the foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed
which wholly fails to set out some facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and
the proceedings are null and void. Thus, while not unmindful of the fact that the property seized under
the writ and brought into court is what the court finally exercises jurisdiction over, the court cannot
subscribe to the proposition that the steps pointed out by statutes to obtain such writ are
inconsequential, and in no sense jurisdictional.

Considering that petitioner's application for the subject writ of preliminary attachment did not fully
comply with the requisites prescribed by law, said writ is, as it is hereby declared null and void and of no
effect whatsoever.

324. DAVAO LIGHT & POWER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts

The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection suit against
Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex
parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued
an Order of Attachment, and the corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12
May 1989, the summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served
upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the
attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of Attachment
were issued, the trial court has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over
the persons of the defendants.

Issue

Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.

Held

Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
Ratio Decidendi
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an appreciable period of time
between the commencement of the action (takes place upon the filing of an initiatory
pleading) and the service of summons to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a
number of actions which the plaintiff or the court may validly take, including the application
for and grant of the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the
law which prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court allows
the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction at the commencement of the suit. In the
cases of Toledo v. Burgos and Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice
and hearing are not prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
Further, in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was
ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose of the remedy by
affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his properties before the writ can be
issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as obtaining it. In any
case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is matched by
the ease with which it can be remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a
showing of its improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a preliminary
attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a ground which is
at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even though validly issued, is not
binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction over his person is first acquired.

325. SOLIDUM VS COURT OF APPEALS missing

326. PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS VS RAMOLETE

Facts:
On June 1976, a Cimarron PUJ owned by Nelia Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, was
travelling from Cebu City to Danao City. While passing through Liloan, Cebu, the Cimarron
PUJ collided with a private jeep owned by the late Calixto Palmes (husband of private
respondent Primitiva Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep. The impact of the
collision was such that the private jeep was flung away to a distance of about thirty (30)
feet and then fell on its right side pinning down Calixto Palmes. He died as a result of
cardio-respiratory arrest due to a crushed chest. The accident also caused physical injuries
on the part of 2-year-old Adeudatus Borbon.

Private respondents Primitiva and Honorato Borbon, Sr. (father of Adeudatus) filed a
complaint against Cosme and Nelia before the then Cebu CFI claiming actual, moral,
nominal and exemplary damages as a result of the accident. The claim of Borbon, Sr. was
excluded from the complaint due to jurisdiction.

The CFI ruled in favor of Primitiva, ordering common carrier Nelia to pay her damages and
attorney’s fees. The judgment of the trial court became final and executory and a writ of
execution was issued, which however, returned unsatisfied, prompting the court to
summon and examine Nelia. She declared that the Cimarron PUJ was covered by a third-
party liability insurance policy issued by petitioner Perla.

Palmes then filed a motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued
against the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the judgment debtor.
Respondent Judge then issued an Order directing the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to
garnish the third-party liability insurance policy. Petitioner filed for MR and quashal of the
writ of garnishment on the ground that Perla was not a party to the case and that
jurisdiction over its person had never been acquired by the trial court by service of
summons or by any process. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion.An Order for issuance
of an alias writ of garnishment was subsequently issued.
More than two (2) years later, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed
with this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete
in ordering garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract issued by petitioner
Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia Enriquez. The Petition should have been
dismissed forthwith for having been filed way out of time but, for reasons which do not
appear on the record, was nonetheless entertained.

Issue:
W/N there is GADALEJ on the part of the respondent judge

W/N there insurance policy may be subject to garnishment

Held:
1. No. The SC found no grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or without jurisdiction
on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in ordering the garnishment of the judgment
debtor’s third-party liability insurance.
2. Yes. Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for reaching any property
or credits pertaining or payable to a judgment debtor. In legal contemplation, it is a forced
novation by the substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor, who is the original creditor
of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of garnishment, substituted by the judgment
creditor who thereby becomes creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been
described as a warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of the
judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property to the latter, but rather to
appear and answer the plaintiff’s suit.
In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind the person of
the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The
garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for
the trial court lawfully to bind the person of the garnishee or any person who has
in his possession credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of
the writ of garnishment.
Rule 39, Section 15 and Rule 57, Section 7(e) of the ROC themselves do not require that
the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him
liable.
In the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court actually acquired
jurisdiction over petitioner Perla when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the
third-party liability insurance policy it had issued in favor of judgment debtor Nelia Enriquez.
Perla cannot successfully evade liability thereon by such a contention.

In a third-party liability insurance contract, the insurer assumes the obligation of paying the
injured third party to whom the insured is liable. The insurer becomes liable as soon as the
liability of the insured to the injured third person attaches. Prior payment by the insured to
the injured third person is not necessary in order that the obligation of the insurer may
arise. From the moment that the insured became liable to the third person, the insured
acquired an interest in the insurance contract, which interest may be garnished like any
other credit.

A separate action is not necessary to establish petitioner’s liability.

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time
and for lack of merit. Judgment AFFIRMED.

327. BIACO VS PHILIPPINE COUNTRY SIDE RURAL BANK

Facts:

Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired several loans from Philippine Countryside
Rural Bank (PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure the loans, he mortgaged certain property
in favor of the bank. He was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he defaulted in loans
obtained in 1998 which amounted to more than a million pesos.
Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure against the spouses Biaco. Summons
were issued by the trial judge. The Sherriff served the summons to Ernesto at the latter’s
office. No summons was served to Teresa.
Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did Teresa because she was not aware sans
the summons being served her). The case was heard ex-parte and the spouses were
ordered to satisfy the debt and failure to do so will authorize the Sheriff to auction the
mortgaged the property.
Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned for P150k which is not sufficient to cover
the P1 M+ debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was issued against the personal
properties of Teresa to satisfy the deficiency.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the previous ex parte proceedings. She then
sought to have the judgment annulled as she now claims that she was deprived of due
process when she did not receive summons; that it was only her husband who received the
summons; that there was extrinsic fraud because her husband deliberately hid the fact of
the foreclosure proceeding.
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem, hence Teresa’s
participation is not required so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res which is
what happened in the case at bar; that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic fraud because such
situation cannot occur in her case because she is a co-defendant of Ernesto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court should be annulled.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a quasi in rem proceeding and that the
presence of Teresa is not required because the trial court was able to acquire jurisdiction
over the res (mortgaged property). HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is
superior over the procedural matters mentioned. Her right to due process was violated
when she did not receive summons. Teresa, as a resident defendant, who does not
voluntary appear in court must be personally served with summons as provided under
Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Even if the action is quasi in rem, personal service
of summons is essential in order to afford her due process. The substituted service made by
the sheriff at her husband’s office cannot be deemed proper service absent any explanation
that efforts had been made to personally serve summons upon her but that such efforts
failed. Further, the order of the trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt using her
personal property is a judgment in personam which the court cannot do because it only
acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over the person of Teresa.
On the issue of extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals, agreeing with PCRB, is correct that
there is none in the case at bar. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act
committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic fraud is present where the unsuccessful
party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise;
or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the
acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side. The above is not applicable in the
case of Teresa. It was not PCRB which made any fraud. It should be noted that spouses
Biaco were co-defendants in the case and shared the same interest.

328. BANCO ESPANOL-FILIPINO VS PALANCA

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in

Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he
died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then
instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to
give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the
summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown
whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a
newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was
rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made
by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the
applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and the judgment, and to
vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was that the
order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have
reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to
administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the
parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions
which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and
his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process
exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of
the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of
the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction
acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is seized
at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide
the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the
res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the
registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property
assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in
rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the
world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a

proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking
an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression
"action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings
in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant,
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien
burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is
made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such.
This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the
action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles
governing actions in rem.

329. ADLAWAN VS TORRES

FACTS
Respondent Aboitiz and Company sought to collect from petitioners a sum of money for unp
aid loan amortizations, technical and managerial services rendered and unpaid installments
of the equipment provided by Aboitiz. Acting on an ex parte application for attachment, the
Executive Judge issued an order directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachmen
t against the property of petitioners upon the filing by respondent Aboitiz of an attachment
bond.

Petitioners, however, moved for a bill of particulars and to set aside the ex parte writ of atta
chment. Finding merit on the motion, the court ordered the lifting of the writ and consequen
tly the discharge of the levied property.

Respondent Aboitiz filed a notice of dismissal of its complaint, which was confirmed by the c
ourt, emphasizing that all orders of the court issued prior to the filing of the notice of
dismissal had been rendered functus oficio and all pending incidents moot and aca
demic.

Adlawan filed a motion for implementation and enforcement of the order. However, this was
denied by the court on account of the filing by respondent Aboitiz before another court of a
n action for delivery of personal property (replevin) and the filing by Adlawan before the sa
me court of an action for damages in connection with the seizure of his property under the
writ of attachment.

In the replevin suit, the court ordered the seizure and delivery of the property. All
eging that while his office was in Cebu City, Adlawan was a resident of Minglanilla

and hence, Lapu Lapu City court should not entertain the action for replevin for lac
k of jurisdiction. Adlawan filed an omnibus motion praying for reconsideration and dissoluti
on of the writ of seizure, the retrieval of his seized property and dismissal of the complaint
—DENIED. MR also denied.

The 3rd Division of the SC ruled that since the attachment is an ancillary remedy, the withdr
awal of the complaint left it with no leg to stand on. Respondent Aboitiz filed MR—
denied with finality. Second MR—
SC ruled that the properties to be returned are only those held by Aboitiz by virtue of writ of
attachment that has been declared non‐existent.

Again, Aboitiz filed against petitioners 2 complaints for collection of sum of money
with prayers for the issuance of writs of attachment due to money and equipment loan
ed by Aboitiz to petitioners. Complaint 1: Judge Torres ordered the issuance of a writ of atta
chment upon filing of P5M bond. Complaint 2: Judge Jacinto ordered issuance of writ of atta
chmet upon filing of P2.5M bond. A writ was issued by sheriff for complaint 1, but not for co
mplaint 2.

ISSUE
Whether it was proper for the Judge to order the issuance of the writs of attachment in the
consolidated cases for collection of sums of money—NO.

RULING
The affidavit submitted by Aboitiz in support of its prayer for the writ of attachment does N
OT meet the requirements of Rule 57 of RoC regarding the allegations on impending fraudu
lent removal, concealment and disposition of defendant’s property.

To justify a preliminary attachment, the removal or disposal must have been made wit
h intent to defraud defendant’s creditors. Proof of fraud is mandated by paragraphs (d)
and (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 on the grounds upon which attachment may issue. Thus, the
factual basis on defendant’s intent to defraud must be clearly alleged in the affidavit in
 support of the prayer for the writ of attachment if not so specifically alleged in the veri
fied complaint.

It is evident from said affidavit that the prayer for attachment rests on the mortgage by
petitioners of 11 parcels of land in Cebu, which encumbrance respondent Aboitiz considered
as fraudulent concealment of property to its prejudice. We find, however, that there is no f
actual allegation, which may constitute as a valid basis for the contention that the mortgage
was in fraud of respondent Aboitiz. As this Court said in Jardine‐
Manila Finance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 636 (1989), "[T]he general rule is that
the affidavit is the foundation of the writ, and if none be filed or one be filed which wholly
fails to set out some facts required by law to be stated therein, there is no jurisdiction and t
he proceedings are null and void."

Bare allegation that an encumbrance of a property is in fraud of the creditor does not suffice
. Factual bases for such conclusion must be clearly averred.

The execution of a mortgage in favor of another creditor is not conceived by the Rules as on
e of the means of fraudulently disposing of one's property. By mortgaging a piece of proper
ty, a debtor merely subjects it to a lien but ownership thereof is not parted with.

Furthermore, the inability to pay one's creditors is not necessarily synonymous with fraudul
ent intent not to honor an obligation.

Consequently, when petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order directing t
he issuance of the writ of attachment, respondent Judge should have considered it as a mot
ion for the discharge of the attachment and should have conducted a hearing or required su
bmission of counter‐
affidavits from the petitioners, if only to gather facts in support of the allegation of fraud (Jo
pillo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 247 [1988]). This is what Section 13 of Rule 57 ma
ndates.

This procedure should be followed because, as the Court has time and again said, attachme
nt is a harsh, extraordinary and summary remedy and the rules governing its issuance mus
t be construed strictly against the applicant. Verily, a writ of attachment can only be grante
d on concrete and specific grounds and not on general averments quoting perfunctorily the
words of the Rules (D.P. Lub Oil Marketing Center, Inc. v. Nicolas, 191 SCRA 423 [1990]).
The judge before whom the application is made exercises full discretion in considering
the supporting evidence proffered by the applicant. One overriding consideration is that
a writ of attachment is substantially a writ of execution except that it emanates at the begi
nning, instead of at the termination of the suit.

330. CONSOLIDATED BANK VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

331. BINAN STEEL CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS

332. ABOITZ AND CO. VS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF

333. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS PABALAN

Facts:

On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter
by a notice of garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA)
in the sum of P12,724.66 deposited with the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La
Union filed an administrative complaint against Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion,
alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned funds are of public character
and therefore may not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB La Union
Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may be sued.
HELD: Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from
garnishment. PVTA is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome
is attributed. The government has entered with them into a commercial business hence it
has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped down to the level of a corporation.
Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect can be sued.
Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.

334. MIRASOL VS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS

FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the
use of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for
failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the
highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate
motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
considerations.

ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is

unconstitutional.

HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an
exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed
regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures
designed to ensure public safety.

335. URBANES. JR. VS COURT OF APPEALS

336. TRANSFIELD PHILIPPINES, INC VS LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION

Facts:

Transfield Philippines (Transfield) entered into a turn-key contract with Luzon Hydro Corp.
(LHC). Under the contract, Transfield were to construct hydo-electric plants in Benguet and
Ilocos. Transfield was given the sole responsibility for the design, construction,
commissioning, testing and completion of the Project. The contract provides for which the
project is to be completed and also allows for the extension of the period provided that
extension is based on justifiable grounds such as fortuitous events. In order to guarantee
performance by Transfield, two stand-by letters of credit were required to be opened.
During the construction of the plant, Transfield requested for extension of time citing
typhoon and various disputes delaying the construction. LHC did not give due course to the
extension of the period prayed for but referred the matter to arbitration committee. Because
of the delay in the contraction of the plant, LHC called on the stand-by letters of credit of
default. However, the demand was objected by Transfield on the ground that there is still
pending arbitration of their request of extension of time.

Issue:
Whether or not LHC can collect from the letters of credit despite the pending arbitration
case.

Held:

Transfield’s argument that any dispute must first be resolved by the parties, whether
through negotiations or arbitration, before the beneficiary is entitled to call on the letter of
credit essence would convert the letters of credit into mere guarantee.

The independent nature of the letters of credit may be: (a) independence in toto where the
credit is independent from the justification aspect and is a separate obligation from the
underlying agreement like for instance a typical standby; or (b) independence may be only
as to the justification aspect like in a commercial letter of credit ot repayment standby,
which is identical with the same obligation under the underlying agreement. In both cases
the payment may be enjoined if in the light of the purpose of credit the payment of the
credit would constitute fraudulent avuse of the credit.

337 Bengzon vs. Court of Appeals

May 31, 1988
161 SCRA 745

Facts:

The Philippine corporation Boie-Takeda manufactures, distributes, and sells drugs, one of
which is “Danzen”, a tablet containing OPE (anti-inflammatory proteolytic enzyme) serrapeptase
which it has been licensed to manufacture and sell since 1970 in the country. Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFAD) Director Catalina C. Sanchez issued BFAD Regulation No. 1 on 1 April 1987
with approval of Sec. of Health Alfredo Bengzon, which ordered that preparations containing
anti-inflammatory proteolytic enzymes should no longer be marketed in the country, based on
the US Food and Drug Commissioner ’s decision dated 30 May 1985 (affirmed by US Court of
Appeals in 1 April 1986) which determined that these drugs have not been shown to be effective
for use in controlling edema and inflammation associated with medical procedures (surgical,
dental, obstetrical), allergies and infections. DOH and BFAD issued after a week BFAD
Regulation No. 1-A dated 10 April 1987, which included Boie-Takeda’s Danzen 5 mg. tablet
containing 10,000 units of serratiopeptidase in its list of banned pharmaceutical preparations.
Boie-Takeda appealed that withdrawal order to the Secretary of Health, who in turn, referred its
appeal to the National Drug Committee (NDC). On 1 February 1988, Sec. Bengzon informed
Boie-Takeda that the recall and cancellation of registration of the Danzen tablets was confirmed
by the said committee and that it was directed to discontinue marketing that product. Boie-
Takeda appealed the cancellation of registration of Danzen via petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, where it prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to restrain the Health Secretary Alfredo Bengzon to enforce BFAD Regulation No. 1-A
pending the case’s determination.

The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order and set the hearing for
application of preliminary injunction on 22 February 1988. On 3 March 1988, the Court of
Appeals granted via its resolution the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by Boie-Takeda.

Issue/s:

W/N the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing writ of preliminary
injunction?

Held by the Supreme Court:

The petition for certiorari and prohibition by the petitioner Sec. of Health Alfredo
Bengzon and National Drug Committee Director Catalina C. Sanchez is DENIED, and the Court
ruled that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain them from implementing withdrawal order (BFAD)
Regulation 1-A. A writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preservative remedy may
only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests, and
for no other purpose, during the pendency of the principal action. Here, the writ was issued to
protect and preserve the rights or license of the private respondent Boie-Takeda to market its
product “Danzen” in the Philippines, which it has been doing for the past 17 years (since 1970).
Hence, the object of the writ is to preserve the status quo, or the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. In the present case, the status quo
before the withdrawal order (that caused the controversy) is that Boie-Takeda’s Danzen was
registered and being sold in the country under proper license from the Bureau of Food and Drugs
(now Food and Drug Administration or FDA).

338. COOTAUCO VS COURT OF APPEALS

339. HERNANDEZ VS NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION

Facts
Sometime in 1996, Respondent National Power Corporation began the construction of 29
steel poles in connection with its 230 kilo-volt Sucat-AranetaBalintawak Power Transmission
Project. These poles, each of which was 53.4 meters high, were to support overhead tension
cables that would pass through Dasmariñas Village, Makati City, where petitioners’ homes
were located.

Trouble ensued when petitioners discovered some scientific studies, finding that
electromagnetic fields created by high-voltage power lines could cause a range of illnesses
from cancer to leukemia. In a privileged speech, Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero
denounced the cavalier manner in which Napocor had ignored safety and consultation
requirements. An explanation was demanded by Representative Arnulfo Fuentebella,
chairperson of the House Committee on Energy. Respondent admitted that it was still
negotiating with petitioners, and that it had come up with four options to address the
problem: transfer the line, maintain a 12-meter distance from the village, construct an
underground line, or reroute along C-5 and South Luzon Expressway. These negotiations
resulted in an impasse.

On March 9, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Napocor.
Judge Francisco B. Ibay issued an Order temporarily restraining it from energizing and
transmitting high-voltage electric current through the project. This Order was extended
from 2 days to 18

days.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for TRO
and Preliminary Injunction and sought the dismissal of the Complaint, on the ground that
the trial court had no jurisdiction. It cited Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818, which
states:

Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or
controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural
resource development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the
government, including among other public utilities for transport of the goods or
commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity
or government official from proceeding with or continuing the execution or implementation
of any such project, or the operation of such public utility or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
While the Petition was pending before the CA, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to stop Napocor from installing highvoltage cables and from
energizing and transmitting high-voltage electric current through those cables.

On May 3, 2000, the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground that Section 1 of
Presidential Decree 1818 clearly proscribed injunctions against infrastructure projects. It
further cited Supreme Court Circulars 2-91 and 13-93 dated March 15, 1991, and March 5,
1993, respectively.

Petitioners filed the instant Petition, contending that the proscription in PD 1818 should not
be applied to cases of extreme urgency, such as when the right to health and safety was
hanging on the balance.

Issue

The issue was whether the trial court may temporarily restrain or preliminarily enjoin
Napocor from constructing and operating the 29 steel poles or towers, notwithstanding
Presidential Decree 1818

Court’s Ruling

In a unanimous Decision penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the Court granted the
Petition. It held that the prohibition contained in Presidential Decree 1818 extended only to
the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts, in controversies
involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. It did not cover controversies
involving questions of law, as those involved in the instant case.

What Presidential Decree 1818 aimed to avert was the untimely frustration of government
infrastructure projects, particularly by provisional remedies. Otherwise, the greater good
would suffer from the disruption of the pursuit of essential government projects or the
frustration of the economic development effort of the nation. PD No. 1818, however, was
not meant to be a blanket prohibition that would disregard the fundamental right to the
health, safety and well-being of a community, guaranteed by the Constitution.

Indeed, the prohibition was not absolute. It only prohibited the courts from issuing
injunctions against administrative acts involving facts or the exercise of discretion in
technical cases. Outside this dimension, the Supreme Court declared that courts could not
be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts in cases
involving questions of law.

The instant controversy involved questions of law. Petitioners raised the issues of whether
there was a violation of their constitutionally protected right to health, and whether
respondent had indeed violated the Local Government Code provision[10] on prior
consultation with affected communities. These questions of law removed the case from the
protective mantle of Presidential Decree 1818.

Moreover, the issuance by the trial court of a preliminary injunction found legal support in
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,[12] which merely required a probable violation of
the applicant’s rights and a tendency to render the judgment ineffectual. In the case at bar,
there was adequate evidence on record to justify the conclusion that the Napocor project
would probably imperil the health and safety of petitioners.

First, petitioners presented copies of studies linking the incidence of illnesses, such as
cancer and leukemia, to exposure to electromagnetic fields.

Second, the Napocor brochure on its Quezon power project had a provision that power lines
should be located within safe distances from residences because of the danger concomitant
with high-voltage power.

Third, documents on record showed that respondent had made representations that it was
looking into the possibility of relocating the project, and that it had even undertaken a
series of negotiations and meetings with petitioners. These documents and negotiations
suggested that their health concerns were far from imaginary. If there was indeed no cause
for concern, it would not have come up with options to address their woes. Neither would
Representative Escudero have fired away strong words of censure in his privileged speech.

While it was true that the issue of whether the transmission lines were safe was essentially
evidentiary in nature and pertained to the very merits of the action below, the Court found
that the possibility of health risks from exposure to electromagnetic radiation was within the
realm of a scientific scale of probability. It held that there was sufficient basis on record
engendering a cloud of doubt over the danger posed by the project upon the lives of
petitioners. Indeed, probability was enough for injunction to issue as a provisional remedy.
In contrast, injunction as a main action was resorted to when one needed to establish
absolute certainty as basis for a final and permanent injunction. Pending the final
determination of the trial court on the main case, it was prudent to preserve the status quo.

The Supreme Court held that its circulars on the observance of PD 1818 did not suggest an
unbridled prohibition on the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining orders. What these circulars prohibited was the indiscriminate issuance of court
injunctions.[15] They simply enjoined judges to observe utmost caution, prudence and
judiciousness in issuing temporary restraining orders and in granting writs of preliminary
injunction, so as to avoid any suspicion that these measures were for considerations other
than the strict merits of the case.[16] Thus, there was nothing in the circulars that would tie
the hands of the courts from issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.

This Decision did not seek to undermine the purpose of the Napocor project, which was
aimed at the common good of the people. But the Court recognized, too, that the primordial
concern should be the far-reaching irreversible effects to human safety, rather than the
economic benefits presumed by respondent. Of what use would modernization be if it
proved to be a scourge to an individual’s fundamental right, not just to health and safety,
but to the preservation of life itself in all of its desired quality?

340.UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, VICE CHANCELLOR ROLANDO P.

DAYCO, VICE CHANCELLOR MARTIN GREGORIO, PROF. ARTURO BALBASTRO, PROF. CECILIA
FLORENCIO, and PROF. LETICIA PENAO-HO vs. HON. ELPIDIO M. CATUNGAL, JR. (deceased); HON.
OSCAR C. HERRERA, JR., in his capacity as former acting Presiding Judge of Branch 85 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. PEDRO M. AREOLA, in his capacity as Present Presiding Judge of
Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and SALVADOR CARLOS
G.R. No. 121863, May 5, 1997
FACTS:
On 5 October 1994, the RTC of Quezon Cityissued an Order granting the application filed by the Quezon
City Central Police District Command for the issuance of a search warrant against Carlos. With the
cooperation of the UP Diliman police. Carlos was arrested and detained at the Quezon City jail for illegal
possession of firearm.On 6 October 1994, petitioner Dayco ordered a preliminary investigation of the
matter and designated Atty. Marichu C. Lambino of the UP Diliman Legal Office to conduct the
investigation. Atty. Lambino submitted her Preliminary Investigation Report wherein she confirmed that
a prima facie case existed against Carlos and recommended that Carlos be charged with grave
misconduct and placed under preventive suspension for ninety days.
The Office of the Chancellor, UP Diliman, through petitioner Dayco as officer-in-charge, filed a Formal
Charge for grave misconduct against Carlos. That same day, petitioner Dayco issued an Order of
Preventive Suspension against Carlos. The pleadings disclose that Carlos thrice sought the
postponement of the hearings, and the Tribunal granted all his requests.
Unknown to the Tribunal and the UP prosecutor, Carlos filed on 8 December 1994 a complaint for
injunction before the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed and assigned to Branch 85 thereof. In
the complaint Carlos prayed for (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the petitioners,
(2) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for the Tribunal to cease and desist from proceeding
with the administrative case during the pendency of the case, and (3) his reinstatement and payment of
his withheld salary and Christmas bonus. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order against the
petitioners in its order of 12 December 1994. The following day, the Tribunal issued an order granting
the request of Carlos for the resetting of the presentation of his evidence, subject to the outcome of the
hearing on the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. Q-94-22364.Pending the hearing for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioners moved to dismiss the said civil action.
On 6 January 1995, after the lapse of the effectivity of the restraining order, the Tribunal issued
another order setting the administrative case for the presentation of Carlos' evidence. Carlos was
warned that failure on his part to present his evidence would constitute a waiver and the case would be
submitted for resolution. On 1 February 1995, the trial court issued the assailed order which granted a
writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioners were directed to refrain from proceeding with the
administrative case against Carlos. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the order. This was
followed by a motion to resolve the motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss.
In the order of 24 April 1995, the trial court denied for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration and
the motion to dismiss. Two subsequent orders were issued setting the case for pre-trial on 31 August
1995 and resetting it on 5 October 1995.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the court shall grant the petition for preliminary injunction?
2. Whether or not there is prior exhaustion of administrative remedies?
RULING:
1. No.Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the following as grounds for the grant of a
preliminary injunction:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in
the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or
the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the
subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who must apply for it must come with equity or with
clean hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) he who seeks equity must do equity,
and (2) he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. It signifies that a litigant may be denied
relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. We are convinced that Carlos did not come to
court for equitable relief with equity or with clean hands. It is patently clear from the above summary of
the facts and from that made by the trial court in its order of 1 February 1995 that the conduct of Carlos
and his counsel before the Tribunal can by no means be characterized as nobly fair, just, and reasonable.
The various strategies adopted by them could lead rational minds to only one conclusion: they were
intended to unduly delay the investigation, if not to gain time to prevent the witnesses from testifying.
2. Carlos did not exhaust administrative remedies, which were available, as he admitted in paragraph 25
of his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-94-22364. His claim that the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply to his case is nothing more than a self-serving conclusion and is speculative.
Indisputably then, Carlos' immediate recourse to the court was effectively barred by his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to
pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the
principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and speedier solutions to
disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a
system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts -- for reasons of law, comity, and
convenience -- will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted
to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors
committed in the administrative forum.

341. LEVI STRAUSS & CO. VS CLINTON APPAREL

FACTS:

The Complaint alleged that LS & Co., a foreign corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Delaware, USA and engaged in the apparel business, is the
owner by prior adoption and use since 1986 of the internationally famous “Dockers and
Design” trademark. This ownership is evidenced by its valid and existing registrations in
various member countries if Paris Convention. In the Philippines, it has a Certificate of
Registration No.46619 in the Principal Register for use of said trademark on pants, shirts,
blouses, skirts, shorts, sweatshirts and jackets under Class 25. The “Dockers and Design”
trademark was first used in the Philippines in or about May 1988, by LSPI, domestic
corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of various products bearing
trademarks owned by LS & Co. To date, LSPI continues to manufacture and sell Dockers
Pants with the “Dockers and Design” Trademark. LS & Co and LSPI alleged that they
discovered the presence in the local market of jeans under the brand name “Paddocks”using
a device which is substantially, if not exactly, similar to the “Dockers and Design” trademark
owned and registered in their name, without their consent. Based on their belied, they
added Clinton Apparelle manufactured and continues to manufacture such “Paddocks” jeans
and other apparel. However, since LS & Co. and LSPI are unsure if both or just one of
impleaded defendants is behind the manufacture and sale of the “Paddocks” jeans
complained of, they brought this suit under Sec. 13 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The evidence considered by the trial court in granting injunctive relief were as follows: (1) a
certified true copy of the certificate of trademark registration for “Dockers and Design” (2) a
pair of DOCKERS pants bearing the trademark (3) a pair of “Paddocks” pants bearing the
respondents assailed logo; (4) the trends MBL Survey Report purportedly proving that there
was confusing similarity between two marks; (5) the affidavit of one Bernabe Alajar which
recounted petitioners’ prior adoption, use and registration of the “Dockers and Design”
Trademark and (6) the affidavit of

Mercedes Abad of Trends MBL Inc which detailed the methodology and procedure used in
their survey and results thereof.

The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which prompted Clinton Apparelle to
file a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. Whereby
the Appellate Court granted the petition of Clinton Apparelle’s petition; holding that the trial
court did not follow the procedure required by law. Thus, holding the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction is questionable after petitioner’s failure to sufficiently establish its
material and substantial right to have the writ issued. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
strongly believes that the implementation of the questions writ would effectively shut down
respondent’s shut down. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” confers on the
owner the right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof.

HELD:

Given the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” and considering that
respondent only uses the assailed device but a different word mark, the right to prevent the
latter from using the challenged “Paddocks”device is far from clear. Stated otherwise, it is
not evident whether the single registration of the trademark “Dockers and Design” confers
on the owner the right to prevent the use of a fraction thereof in the course of trade. It is
also unclear whether the use without the owner’s consent of a portion of a trademark
registered in its entirety constitutes material or substantial invasion of the owner’s right.

It is likewise not settled whether the wing-shaped logo, as opposed to the word mark, is the
dominant or central feature of petitioners’ trademark—the feature that prevails or is
retained in the minds of the public—an imitation of which creates the likelihood of deceiving
the public and constitutes trademark infringement. In sum, there are vital matters which
have yet and may only be established through a full-blown trial.

342. UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Some nursing students were not admitted for the second semester fpr organizing a student
body council which was not allower by the school which was allegedly a ciolation of the
school regulations. The school argued that under the ALCUAZ DOCTRINE, schools habe the
discretion to admit students for the second semester, the contract was for the semester
only. However a mew doctrine was later on promulgated which abandonend the Alcuaz
doctrine which is now the NON doctrine.

Issue:

Whether or not the new Non doctrine be applied retroactively to the case

Held:

No. the new doctrine shall be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted on faith thereof.

343. YUJUIVO VS QUIAMBAO

Facts:

On July 27, 1998, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved the amendment
of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation’s (STRADEC) Articles of Incorporation
authorizing the change of its principal office from Pasig City to Pangasinan.

On March 1, 2004, STRADEC held its annuak stackholders meeting in Pasig City its office as
indicated in the notices sent to the stockholders. Herein petitioners and respondents were
elected members of the Board of Directors.
Five months thereafter, respondents filed with the RTC in Pangasinan a complaint against
STRADEC. The complaint seeks for the nullification of the election on the ground of improper
venue, pursuant to Section 51 of the Corporation Code, next is the nullification of all
subsequest transactions conducted by the elected directors and lastly that a special
stockholder’s meeting be held once again. The RTC under pairing Judge Emuslan issued an
Order for granting respondents application for preliminary injuction ordering (1) the holding
of a special stockholders meeting of STRADEC on December 10, 2004 in the principal office
of the corporation in Bayambang, Pangasinan; and (2) the turn-over by petitioner Bonifacio
Sumbilla to the court of the duplicate key of the safety deposit box in Export Industry Bank,
Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City where the original Stock and Transfer Book of STRADEC was
deposited. The plaintiff filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari. CA
dismissed such petition and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the RTC has the power to call a special stockholder’s meeting involving an intra-
corporate controversy?

Ruling:

Yes. Upon the enectment of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation
Code which took effect on August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over the intra-
corporate controversies and other cases enumerated in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A has
been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction, or the appropriate RTC. Section5.2 of
R.A. No. 8799 provides: 5.2 The Commissions jurisdicrtion over all cases enumerated in
Section 5 if the Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court, Provided that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority mat designate the RTC branches that shall exercise kurisdiction
over these cases. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending cases involving
intra-corporate disputes submitted for final resolution which should be resolved within one
(1) year from the enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over
pending suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until finally
disposed.

The RTC has the power to hear and decide the intra-corporate controversy of the parties
herein. Concomitant to said power is the authority to issue orders necessary or incidental to
the carrying out of the powers expressly granted to it. Thus, the RTC may, in appropriate
cases, order the holding of a special meeting of stockholders or members of a corporation
involving and intra-corporate dispute under its supervision.

344. SEARTH COMMODOTIES CORP VS COURT OF APPEALS

345 .FIRST GLOBAL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. CHRISTOPHER

SAN AGUSTIN
 G.R. No. 144499, February 19, 2002
FACTS:

The subject matter of the instant controversy is a parcel of land, including the house built thereon, located
at Makati City. The subject property was sold to spouses Enrique and Angelina Camacho (spouses
Camacho) in 1994 for the amount of P2.5 million pesos. The records show that spouses Camacho
convinced petitioner to accept a partial payment of P100, 000.00 pesos upon the execution of a deed of
absolute sale in their favor over the subject property.Thereafter, [respondent] executed a deed of sale in
favor of spouses Camacho, who in turn paid respondent] the amount of P100, 000.00 pesos. It appeared
that First Global Realty Development Corporation (FGRDC), [herein petitioner], granted spouses
Camachos loan application with the subject property as collateral, in the amount of P1.190 million.
However, spouses Camacho did not pay the remaining balance of the subject property. FGRDC filed a
special civil action for the foreclosure of the subject property inasmuch as spouses Camacho defaulted in
the payment of their loan obligation. On June 28, 1996, Branch 143 rendered a decision ordering the
foreclosure of the subject property and the subsequent sale thereof at public auction.FGRDC filed a
motion for execution which was granted on February 7, 1997. Spouses Camacho executed in favor of
FGRDC.Accordingly, on September 8, 1997, FGRDC demanded rentals but when FGRDCs demand was
unheeded by [respondent], it filed a motion for issuance of a writ of possession.Apparently, on November
20, 1997, [respondent] filed a motion for interventionwherein he asked for the rescission of the deed of
absolute sale/mortgage, dacionenpago and cancellation of FGRDCs title over the subject property.

However, finding the motion for intervention to be a futile undertaking, [respondent] filed a
separate complaint the court a quo issued an order denying [respondents] prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction complaint for rescission of the deed of absolute sale, annulment of
the dacionenpago and cancellation of title and issuance of a new title with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or a writ of injunction against FGRDC, seeking to enjoin the latter from
taking possession of the subject property. The case was raffled to Branch 141 (court a quo), where public
respondent is the presiding judge, and docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2673.tion. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but [it] was denied in an order dated June 26, 1998 for lack of merit.the RTC denied
the application of respondent for a preliminary injunction to prevent petitioner from evicting him from the
subject property. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and granted the injunctive relief prayed for by
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction should be granted?

RULING:

NO. Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates various grounds for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, as follows:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when
it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. It is issued to preserve the status quo
ante -- the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that preceded the actual controversy.[10] In Saulog
v. CA, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to final judgment, requiring a
person to refrain from a particular act. It may be granted at any time after the commencement of the
action and before final judgment, when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; that the
commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the non-performance
thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

A preliminary injunction, as the term itself suggests, is merely temporary, subject to the final disposition
of the principal action and its purpose is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action
and/or the relation between the parties, in order to protect the right of the plaintiff respecting the subject
of the action during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise or if no preliminary injunction were issued, the
defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the
court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards granting the relief
sought by the plaintiff. Its issuance rests entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of
the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.

The purpose of a preliminary injunction, then, is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable

injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully.Thus, it will be issued only upon a
showing of a clear and unmistakable right that is violated. Moreover, an urgent and permanent necessity
for its issuance must be shown by the applicant.

In the present case, the status quo that is sought to be preserved is the possession of the property by
respondent and his right to use it as his dwelling, pending determination of whether or not he had indeed
sold it to the Camachos and, consequently, whether the latters transfer of its ownership to petitioner
via dacionenpago should be upheld.
346. MARQUEZ VS SANCHEZ

347.ALEJANDRO RODULFA, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO ALFONSO, Judge of First Instance of

Pangasinan, and PABLO DEL MORAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-14 ,February 28, 1946

FACTS: The petitioner Alejandro Rodulfa allegesin this court of First Instance of Pangasinan, instituted by
him against the respondent Pablo Del Moral, on September 19, 1945, he has demanded the return and
reconveyance of fifteen parcels of land, with an aggregate area of about thirty-one hectares. And on October
26, 1945, Pablo del Moralfiled a motion praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
againstAlejandro Rodulfato desist and refrain from molesting, retarding, or otherwise disturbing the
possession of respondent Pablo del Moral of said fifteen parcels of land, until further orders from the
Supreme Court. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order, praying that it be
set aside and that another be issued denying the motion of respondent Pablofor the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction because the petitioner alleged, under oath, that for many years previous to the filing of
the complaintand up to the present time, he has always been in the material possession of the parcels of land
in question. But on November 14, 1945, said motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent Judge.
And herein petitioner further alleges that said order dated November 7, 1945, authorizing the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction said order of November 14, 1945 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, are both illegal and have been issued without or in excess of the respondent Judge's
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and are probably not in accord with law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the respondent Judge is in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion.

HELD: NO. Injunction, as a rule, will not be granted to take property out of the possession or control of one
party and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law. (Devesa vs. Arbes,
13 Phil., 273; Evangelista vs. Pedreños, 27 Phil., 648: Asombra vs. Dorado and Gesmundo, 36 Phil., 883;
Kabankalan Sugar Co. vs. Rubin, 54 Phil., 645.)

The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard.
The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.
(Fredericks vs. Huber, 180 Pa., 572; 37 Atl., 90.)

The plaintiff's offer to file a counterbond was properly denied by the lower court, in the exercise of sound
judicial discretion, for the preservation of the status quo; as the plaintiff's right and interest, if any, in the
property in question are amply protected by the bond executed for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction.

The fact that no copy of said bond was given to the plaintiff in said civil case No. 8930, now petitioner herein,
before it was submitted to the court for approval, cannot and will not invalidate said bond, as the failure to
send copy of the bond to enable said plaintiff to object to the sufficiency was a mere formal defect, which
might be waived, either expressly or impliedly, as by the filing in said civil case No. 8930 of a petition for
permission to file a counterbond.

In cases involving the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by
the lower court will not generally be interfered with; and the refusal of the trial court to permit the plaintiff in
this case to file a counterbond cannot be considered as an abuse of sound judicial discretion.
348 ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. BORROMEO and ANTONIO LUA doing business under the name CEBU
HOME & INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY, respondentsG.R. No. L-26461 November 27, 1968

FACTS:

Prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining contract between Associated Labor Union (ALU) and
Superior Gas and Equipment Company of Cebu, Inc
( SUGECO), negotiations had started for the renewal of said contract and that during said negotiations, tw
elve (12) SUGECO employees resigned from ALU, owing according to charges preferred by ALU and confi
rmed by a complaint filed by a CIR prosecutor to unfair labor practices allegedly committed by SUGECO
and its supervisors who, it was also claimed, had induced and coerced said employees to quit the ALU, wh
ich they did. Thereupon, SUGECO stopped negotiating with ALU alleging that, with the resignation of sai
d twelve (12) members, ALU no longer represented a majority of the SUGECO employees. Consequently,
ALU declared a strike and picketed the SUGECO plant in Mandaue.

Then, SUGECO filed a case in the CFI of Cebu, which forthwith issued a writ of preliminary injunction AL
U maintains that the lower Court has no jurisdiction over the because it had grown out of a labor dispute, i
s intimately connected with an unfair labor practice case pending before the CIR. Upon the other hand, re
spondents argue that the issue in the lower court does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CIR, there bei
ng no employer-
employee relationship and “no labor dispute” between the ALU members and Cebu Home, also owned by
the owners of SUGECO.

ISSUE: Whether or not CIR has the jurisdiction over a case wherein there is no employer-
employee relationship between the parties.

HELD:

Yes, CIR has the jurisdiction over the case even if there is the absence of employer-
employee relationship. To begin with, Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 875 vests in the Court of Industrial
Relations exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of any unfair labor practice. Moreover, for an issue “c
oncerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employ
ment” to partake of the nature of a “labor dispute”, it is not necessary that “the disputants stand in the pro
ximate relation of employer and employee.”

Then, again, in order to apply the provisions of Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 875, governing the conditions u
nder which “any restraining order” or “temporary or permanent injunction” may issue in any “case involvi
ng or growing out of a labor dispute,” it is not indispensable that the persons involved in the case be “empl
oyees of the same employer,” although this is the usual case. Sec. 9, likewise, governs cases involving pers
ons: 1) “who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation”; or 2) “who . have direct or indi
rect interests therein;” or 3) “who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or e
mployees”; or 4) “when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a `labor dispute’ (as her
einbefore defined) or `persons participating or interested’ therein (as hereinafter defined).” Furthermore,
“a person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief i
s sought against him or it” and “he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in whic
h such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any a
ssociation composed in whole or in part of employees or employers engaged in such industry, trade, craft,
or occupation.”

349 GREGORIO SARASOLA

vs.
WENCESLAO TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine
Islands

G.R. No. L-14595 October 11, 1919

Facts:

A complaint for injunction was filed by the petitioner before CFI Manila to restrain
the Collector of Internal Revenue from the alleged illegal collection of taxes in the
amount of 11,739 pesos. CIR interposed a demurrer to the complaint on the
following grounds: a. Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter because of
the provisions of the Sec. 1578 of the Administrative Code , facts stated in the
complaint did not entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded

Judge of CFI sustained the demurrer holding that "In the opinion of the court, the
case is still controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Churchill
and Tait vs. Rafferty (32 Phil., 580).

Issue

Whether or not the Court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter because of the
provisions of the Sec. 1578 of the Administrative Code

Ruling

No,The last remaining point touches upon the possibility that section 1579 of
the Administrative Code, in conjunction with the following section, has served to
diminish the jurisdiction of the courts and, in pursuance of well-known principles, is
thus invalid. Section 9 of the Philippine Bill and section 26 of the Jones Law, the
first the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the second the Act of Congress of
August 29, 1916, have provided

"That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands
shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional
jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law. . . ." The Supreme Court of the
Philippines, in interpreting these provisions, has reached the conclusion that they
had the effect of taking one or more Acts of the Philippine Commission and
Legislature out of the field of ordinary legislation and making of them in effect basic
laws. In other words, it was held that the Legislature could add to but could not
diminish the jurisdiction of the courts. (Barrameda vs .Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44.)
But any argument predicated upon such a proposition must necessarily assume that
the Philippine courts have had the power to restrain by injunction the collection of
taxes.

And since, with or without a law, the Philippine courts would not have presumed to
issue an injunction to restrain the collection of a tax, the prohibition expressed in
the law has had no other effect than to confirm a universal principle. This was
expressly decided in the case of Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, supra, and has since
then not been open to discussion.

350 SATURNINO DAVID, in his capacity as Collector of Internal Revenue,

Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SIMEON RAMOS, in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and MARIA B. CASTRO,

[G.R. No. L-4300. October 31, 1951.]

Facts

The respondent Maria B. Castro filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint
dated October 18, 1950, against David, petitioner herein, in his capacity as Collector of
Internal Revenue, alleging among other things, that she had been acquitted in a criminal
case for non-payment of the war profits tax for insufficiency of evidence; that
notwithstanding said acquittal, the Collector of Internal Revenue announced that her
properties would be sold at public auction to satisfy the war profits tax assessed against
her; that this sale is an abuse of authority on the part of the Collector and would cause
irreparable injury to her; that Republic Act No. 55, known as the War Profits Tax Law is
unconstitutional. She prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the Collector
of Internal Revenue from proceeding with the sale and that afterward the injunction be
made permanent.

The Collector of Internal Revenue filed his answer in the Court of First Instance of Manila
specifically admitting some of the allegations in the complaint and denying others, and
alleged as special defenses that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to entertain
the complaint nor to issue a temporary or permanent writ of injunction to restrain the
collection of the war profits tax;

The lower court ordered , declaring that the court had authority to proceed with the case,
but denied the petition of Maria B. Castro for a preliminary injunction.

Issue

Whether or not the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of
taxes, the remedy being to pay and sue for recovery

Ruling
 Yes, No suit to enjoin collection of a tax, disputed or undisputed, can be brought,
the remedy being to pay the tax first, formerly under protest and now without need of
protest file the claim with the Collector, and if he denies it bring an action for recovery
against him. All the allegations of the taxpayer to the effect that the dismissal of a criminal
case brought against him is res judicata or a bar to the collection by distraint and levy; and
that Republic Act No. 55, known as the War Profits Tax Law, is unconstitutional, should be
set forth as part of the cause of action in the complaint that may be filed against the
Collector of Internal Revenue for recovery of the tax after its payment, but not in an action
for prohibition or injunction

351 FILIPINAS MABLE CORPORATION vs. IAC et al

G.R. No. L-68010 , May 30, 1986

FACTS:

Filipinas Marble Corporation (FMC) applied for a loan in the amount of $5 million with
respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in its desire to develop the full
potentials of its mining claims and deposits.

Petitioners alleges that the respondents and their directors/officers mismanaged and
misspent the loan and instead of helping petitioner get back on its feet, DBP completely
abandoned the petitioner’s project and proceeded to foreclose the properties mortgaged to
it by petitioner without previous demand or notice.

Petitioner in its complaint seeks the annulment of the deeds of mortgage and deed of
assignment which it executed in favor of DBP in order to secure the loan.

Respondent DBP opposed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction stating that under
Presidential Decree No. 385, DBP’s right to foreclose is mandatory as FMC’s arrearages had
already reached at least twenty percent of its total obligations; that under the same decree,
no court can issue any restraining order or injunction against it to stop the foreclosure.

The trial court decided in favor of respondents and against FMC. The appellate court
affirmed said decision. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE

Whether or not the $5 million proceeds of the loan were not received and did not
benefit the petitioner per finding of the lower court which should not be disturbed unless
there is grave abuse of discretion, it must follow that PD 385 does not and cannot apply

Ruling

PD No. 385 was issued primarily to see to it that government financial institutions
are not denied substantial cash inflows, which are necessary to finance development
projects all over the country, by large borrowers who, when they become delinquent, resort
to court actions in order to prevent or delay the government’s collection of their debts and
loans.

The government, however, is bound by basic principles of fairness and decency under the
due process clause of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of
government lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation,
lead that corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its
funds, and who, after ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the
consequences of their misdeeds.

The designated officers of the government financing institution cannot simply walk away
and then state that since the loans were obtained in the corporation’s name, then P.D. 385
must be peremptorily applied and that there is no way the borrower corporation can prevent
the automatic foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties once the arrearages reach
twenty percent (20%) of the total obligation no matter who was responsible.But cannot, at
this point, conclude that respondent DBP together with the Bancom people actually
misappropriated and misspent the $5 million loan in whole or in part although the trial court
found that there is “persuasive” evidence that such acts were committed by the respondent.
This matter should rightfully be litigated below in the main action. Only after trial on the
merits of the main case can the true amount of the loan which was applied wisely or not, for
the benefit of the petitioner be determined. Consequently, the extent of the loan where
there was no failure of consideration and which may be properly satisfied by foreclosure
proceedings under P.D. 385 will have to await the presentation of evidence in a trial on the
merits.

352 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and RENE KNECHT.

G.R. No. L-42278 January 20, 1989

Facts

Mariano R. Dulay Enterprises (DULAY) obtained on various occassions, real estate

loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). These loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage of a certain parcel.

As of September 10, 1974, DULAY had incurred arrearages in the payment of its
loans, the GSIS instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property, the said property was sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Pasay City to
the GSIS as the highest bidder for P13,426,382.00.

GSIS filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) , an "Ex-
Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession" in the original registration
proceedings.

private respondent Rene C. Knecht , filed with the aforesaid court, an "Urgent
Motion for Intervention" claiming that DULAY had sold the property to him. The
GSIS opposed the motion alleging that "intervention will not lie when there is no
pending litigation; when it impairs substantial rights of the adverse party; when the
intervenor is guilty of laches; and that the intervenor has no legal interest in the
property subject of a writ of possession"

Court of First Instance of Rizal denied Knecht's motion for intervention and ,
directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the GSIS .

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision upholding Knecht's right to

intervene in the proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession, as a
successor-in-interest of the Dulays, and standing "on better footing than a
necessary or an indispensable party" (p. 89, Rollo). Respondent Court of Appeals
likewise set aside, "as having been issued in

grave abuse of discretion," the Orders of the CFI of Rizal and making permanent

the injunction it had earlier issued.

Petitioner GSIS seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals. Hene,this petition.

Issue

1. Whether or not the decision of the court of appeals is correct in setting

aside the decision

of the lower court as to the issuance of injunction

2. Whether or not Is Knecht a proper intervenor

Ruling

No, the order for the issuance of the writ was clearly within the power,
competence and jurisdiction of the court a quo to issue. As to the wisdom or
soundness of the challenged order granting such writ of possession, it is a matter of
judgment in connection with which the remedy is ordinary appeal. (Toribia
Lamagan vs. Hon. Rafael de la Cruz and Cosme O. Follosco, G.R. No. L-27950, July
29, 1971; 40 SCRA 101; Salvador E. Bimeda vs. Arcadio Perez and Hon. Jose T.
Surtida, 93 Phil. 636). There being no showing that the court a quo acted
whimsically or capriciously as to amount to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the questioned orders, but acted precisely in compliance with the mandatory
provisions of Sec. 7, Act 3135 and PD 385, the respondent Court of Appeals erred
in acting on the petition for certiorari, which is intended to correct defects of
jurisdiction solely and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the court
a quo's findings or conclusions (Ilacad vs. Court of Appeals, 79 SCRA 301).

No, In the absence of such registration and GSIS consent, Knecht was not
validly substituted as debtor (Mc Collough and Co., Inc. vs. Velasco, 46 Phil. 1), on
the basis of which he could assail and/or intervene in the proceedings for the
issuance of the writ of possession. The sale therefore did not in any manner bind
GSIS which is obliged to recognize only the Dulays as mortgagor. (Thus, the GSIS
notice of arrearages was directed solely to the Dulays. Neither is there any GSIS
board resolution officially recognizing Knecht as substitute debtor). To rule
otherwise would be to defeat the statutory remedy of foreclosure. A wily mortgagor
could easily avoid and/or delay the transfer of possession of the foreclosed property
to the purchaser by secretly conveying the same to third persons, who would then
assert ownership rights/pecuniary interests thereon to the prejudice of the
legitimate purchaser.

Foregoing considered, Knecht therefore acquired no legal right over the mortgaged
property as against the GSIS, and consequently is not a proper intervenor.

it is clear that intervention contemplates a suit, and is therefore exercisable during

a trial and, as pointed out by petitioner is one which envisions the introduction of
evidence by the parties, leading to the rendition of the decision in the case (p.
363, Rollo). Very clearly, this concept is not that contemplated by Sec. 7 of Act No.
3135, whereby, under settled jurisprudence, the Judge has to order the immediate
issuance of a writ of possession 1) upon the filing of the proper motion and 2) the
approval of the corresponding bond. The rationale for the mandate is to allow the
purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such
possession being founded on his right of ownership. A trial which entails delay is
obviously out of the question.

Knecht's remedy, as correctly pointed out by petitioner GSIS, is a separate,

distinct, and independent suit, provided for in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.

353 SEARTH COMMODITIES CORPORATION, ARACELI CAMACHO, PROSPERO

CASTRO and MANUEL TARROJA,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 64220 March 31, 1992

Facts

May 17, 1972, petitioner. Searth borrowed from respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) the amount of Three Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P370,000) to
finance the former's hybrid tomato plantation in Tubao, La Union as security for the loan,
Searth gave a collateral, but petitioners allege that in June 1972, a series of floods and
typhoons hit Luzon and destroyed the plantation. Then, on October 21, 1972, the President
of the Philippines issued a Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 proclaiming the entire country
as a land reform area as a result of said proclamation the farmers took possession of the
60-hectare agriculture lot and staked ownership in said land, paralyzing Searth's operations,
due to Searth's failure to pay its agricultural loan, DBP foreclosed the real estate and chattel
mortgages executed by Searth. None of the petitioners redeemed the properties. Title to the
foreclosed properties were thereafter consolidated in the name of DBP.
 Petitioners filed Civil Case No. 39128 before Branch II, Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Rizal for annulment of real estate mortgages and foreclosure sale.
The petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
the sale of the residential properties. The appellate court, ruled in favor of the respondent
bank. Hence, this petition.

Issue

Whether or not respondent bank erred in denying the equitable relief of

injunction

Ruling

No, the petitioners failed to show that they have an existing right to be protected.
The petitioners cannot cite nor assert equity since by their own inaction they have forfeited
the right to invoke such remedy.

The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which
would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. (Rivas v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 190 SCRA 295 [1990]; Government Service and Insurance System v.
Florendo, 178 SCRA 76 [1989]; and Ortigas v. Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, 162
SCRA 165 [1988]) In the case at bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the
sale of the properties premised on the aforementioned justification of the petitioners, the
issuance of a writ would be a virtual acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale is
null and void. (See Ortigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, supra). There
would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden
of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to
prove. (Id.)

Moreover, the object of the writ is to preserve the status quo, which is the last actual
peaceable uncontested status that preceded the pending controversy. (Rivas v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, supra; Bengzon v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 745 [1988];
Rodulfa v. Alonso, 76 Phil. 225 [1946]) The last actual peaceable uncontested status that
preceded the controversy is that DBP is the owner of the properties in dispute, the
petitioners having failed to redeem them and DBP having consolidated its title thereto. As
owner of, these properties, DBP has every right to dispose of them. The issuance of the writ
would no doubt upset, not preserve, the status quo.

We agree with the pronouncement of respondent Court of Appeals that the petitioners have
an adequate remedy for the protection of whatever interest they may still have over the
disputed properties. Instead of securing an injunctive writ, they can register a notice of lis
pendens over DBP's titles to the properties which notice will bind any prospective buyer to
the outcome of the civil case pending before the trial court. The buyer purchases the lots
with peril that he may be deprived of what he purchased should the main case be decided in
favor of the petitioners.

354 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 103412. February 3, 2000

Facts
On January 18, 1985, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. N-4614 to nullify Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
(555) RT-2957 and its derivative titles, and to revert the lands covered by these titles to the
public domain. The complaint alleged that said TCT was a falsely reconstituted title, issued
by an unauthorized recorder at the Office of the Register of Deeds. It further alleged that
the lot covered by said title was foreshore land and cannot be privately appropriated.

Private respondent A. Sison & Sons, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint, which the RTC
granted on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Trial court ruled that, since petitioners objective was reversion of the lots to the public
domain, a reopening of the land registration case would be necessary, and it had no
jurisdiction to do so.

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to res judicata.

Issue

Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is Correct

Ruling

Yes, For purposes of res judicata, only substantial identity is required and not
absolute identity. Parties in both cases need not be physically identical provided that there
is privity between the parties or their successors-in-interest subsequent to the
commencement of the previous cause of action, litigating for the same thing, title, or
capacity. The Court of Appeals correctly found in our view, that since all the aforecited cases
were ultimately in the interest of these "small fishermen," there is privity of interest in all
the cases.

On identity of subject matter, the issue of whether or not the disputed property forming
part of Cavite Seabreeze Subdivision is a portion of the foreshore area and hence incapable
of private appropriation has been settled, in the aforecited cases. Where material facts or
questions, which were in issue in a former action, were judicially determined such facts
are res judicata.

As to identity of causes of action, the allegations in the complaint and the relief
sought, determine the nature of an action as well as which court will have jurisdiction. Civil
Case No. N-4614 and Civil Case No. 2498 were both instituted for the benefit of alleged
"small fishermen." Civil Case No. 4614 was for the annulment of an allegedly invalid
reconstituted title. Civil Case No. 2498 sought the cancellation of a free patent and title for
having been fraudulently acquired. The primary reliefs sought in both cases were similar,
the reversion of land to the State. If the disputed properties were declared "foreshore
lands," they could be used by the alleged "small fishermen." There is, thus, substantial
identity in the causes of action.

355 MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS VS CA

G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989
FACTS:

MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview
Plaza Hotel, where it would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time
that the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50
and was consequently transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition. The
DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim lease agreement to effect the
disposition of the property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension of
30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to APT.

However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property
for more than 1 year the agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired
preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that MSI has a legal lien on the
property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to
P12 Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took
place but MSI did not participate. Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco
Corporation were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85 Million. MSI filed a
complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders.
Trial court granted, but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of
Proclamation No. 50: "No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order
or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of
assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser
of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets
purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held
that it continues to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of
Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been deprived of its property rights since
those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged reimbursable
advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may not be
justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI does not have a legally demandable
and enforceable right of retention over the said property.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec.
31 of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the
TC

RULING

No, Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the
Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts to settle actual controversies
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define,
prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature,
except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated
in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction,
the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the
acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative

agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of
discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.

356 CESAR A. CERENO vs. HON. LUIS D. DICTADO,

G.R. No. L-81550. April 15, 1988.]

Facts
Petitioner Cesar A. Cereno and private respondent Ramon B. Asis were mayoralty
candidates for the municipality of Vinzons, Camarines Norte in the local election of January
18, 1988, who were voted for the said office. Petitioner was proclaimed by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers as the duly elected mayor of said town.

Respondent Asis filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, presided by Hon.
Judge Sancho Dames, II docketed as Civil Case No. 5549 but the same was ordered
dismissed on the same day on the ground that the claim that 84 votes cast for Santiago
Cereno, another mayoralty candidate, were credited to petitioner, was not substantiated,
and that petitioner had already been proclaimed.

Another election protest was filed by respondent Asis before the same court but was
assigned to Branch 39
thereof presided by respondent Hon. Judge Luis D. Dictado, docketed as Civil Case No.
5551,seeking a judicial recount of the votes cast in two precints. On January 28, 1988,
respondent judge issued an order that petitioner desist or refrain from taking his oath of
office on February 2, 1988 or any date thereafter until further orders of the court.

As petitioner took steps to assume the office he was served a copy of the supplemental
order of the respondent judge of February 2, 1988 ordering him to refrain from assuming
office or if he has already assumed office to stop, desist and refrain from continuing to act
as Mayor of Vinzons, Camarines Norte until further orders from the court. Petitioner filed his
ex-parte urgent motion to set aside the supplemental order but the respondent judge has
not acted on the same date. Hence this petition.

Issue

Whether or not the decision of the respondent judge is with merit

Ruling

No, the claim of respondent Asis to the contested office is a contingent right which could
ripen only into an actual right favorable to him when a judgment is rendered to this effect.
The respondent judge is not justified in protecting private respondent Asis alleged right to
the contested office when it has not yet been clearly established against petitioner whose
right is actual and existing. An injunction "is not to protect contingent or future rights nor is
it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.

By the same token, the Officer-In-Charge, respondent Job de Vela, has no lawful right to
continue discharging the duties of Municipal Mayor of said town as the petitioner appears to
have been duly elected to said office and has qualified thereto.

357 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,

vs.
Hon. MIDPANTAO ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI Iloilo, Branch
II, and the HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO MELLIZA Composed of ANGELINA
LOBATON VDA. DE MELLIZA, etc., ROSEMARIE CHANG, RAYMUNDO TEODORO
MELLIZA, JR., MARILYN MELLIZA, JOSE TEODORO MELLIZA, et al.,

G.R. No. L-52823 November 2, 1982

Facts

August 2, 1974, respondent Angelina Lobaton Melliza, for herself and as judicial
administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Uy Melliza, obtained a loan from petitioner in the
amount of P80, 000.00 which was secured by a mortgage over two parcels of land covered
by TCT Nos. 8266 and T-8267, for failure of said respondent to pay the loan on maturity,
the mortgage was foreclosed extra judicially on February 16, 1976 at which foreclosure sale,
petitioner purchased the properties for P97, 923.73.

Petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession before the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, respondent judge, acting on private respondents' prayer for
injunction, issued an order restraining petitioner from disturbing the status quo, and on July
5, 1979, respondent judge issued an order granting the writ of preliminary injunction.

In the proceeding for the writ of possession, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order granting the writ of possession, while petitioner filed a motion to declare private
respondents in contempt for refusal to vacate the premises, which motions were ordered by
respondent judge held in abeyance pending the resolution of the prejudicial question raised by
private respondents in Civil Case No. 12894. Hence, this petition.

Issue

whether or not respondent judge grave abused his discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the orders

Ruling

Yes, in the case at bar, the writ of possession was issued but its enforcement was
suspended by the grace period given by the Sheriff who has no authority to do so, and later
by the order of the judge on a very dubious ground as "humanitarian reason." If the
applicable laws clearly allow the purchaser to have possession of the property foreclosed
and mandate the court to give effect to such right, it would be a gross error for the judge to
suspend the implementation of the writ of possession, which, as shown, should issue as a
matter of course. We are of the opinion that once the writ of possession has been issued,
the Court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without delay, especially as in this case,
no motion for the suspension of the enforcement was filed.

The right of the petitioner to the possession of the property is clearly unassailable. It is
founded on its right of ownership. As the purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale,
and to which the respective titles thereto have already been issued, petitioner's right o-,,er
the property has become absolute, vesting upon him the right of possession over an
enjoyment of the property which the Court must aid in effecting its delivery. After such
delivery, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property. As We said , in Tan
Soo Huat vs. Ongwico, 3the deed of conveyance entitled the purchaser to have and to hold
the purchased property, this means, that the purchaser is entitled to go immediately upon
the real property, and that it is the Sheriff's inescapable duty to place him in such
possession.

Respondents cannot claim that the writ of possession was suspended under the authority
set forth in Rule 1135 of the Rules of Court. To invoke the power granted therein, the court
must act within the law and with justice. When the reason given by the judge in issuing the
order of suspension was not specified in the order, but stated only in general term, as
"humanitarian reasons," the Court did not act within the bounds of the law. The order was,
furthermore, issued motu proprio and without the petitioner being afforded the right to
present its side. We cannot give Our approval to the actuation of respondent judge, for an
order suspending the implementation of an earlier order is like an injunction which must be
issued always with circumspection, and upon proper motion of the party concerned.

As it is, the suspension order has a far-reaching effect. It enabled private respondents to
withhold the possession from petitioner and file the complaint where an injunction was
sought. Had not respondent judge issued such order, petitioner could have already taken
possession of the property, thereby acquiring an absolute ownership over the property, and
injunction could no longer have been issued. A prohibitory injunction cannot be issued when
the act sought to be enjoined has already been committed. 4 Neither can a mandatory
injunction issue, for it is a well-settled rule that injunction will not lie to take the property
out of control of the party in possession. 5

358 G.R. No. L-48603 September 29, 1989

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

vs.
Hon. ALFREDO C. FLORENDO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVI of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and FELIPE T. ANG,

Facts

August, 1965, private respondent Felipe T. Ang's total indebtedness to petitioner

Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS) has amounted to
P7,175,000.00. To secure its payment, Ang executed real estate mortgage contracts in
favor of GSIS covering, among other properties, the lot and the building known as the
House International Building, including all the improvements thereon.
Despite many repeated demands upon Ang to liquidate his then increasing obligation to
GSIS, he failed to make any payments, although he made several promises to do so.GSIS
finally initiated foreclosure proceedings against Ang and the period for redemption having
expired, the titles to all the properties in Manila were registered in the name of GSIS.

Ang filed a complaint against GSIS before the Court of First Instance of Manila by reason of
GSIS' alleged unlawful take-over of the House International Building and appropriation of
personal properties thereon which were not included in the real estate mortgage, praying
for the

respondent Judge Alfredo C. Florendo directed the issuance of a temporary restraining

order,

the Sheriff broke the door leading to the centralized air-conditioning unit, cut-off its
electrical connections, and subsequently prevented its use by GSIS. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction
when he issued the challenged orders directing the issuance of a temporary restraining
order authorizing the use of reasonable force to implement the writ of injunction.

Ruling

Yes, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in the present case, as in any
other case, is

addressed to the sound discretion of the court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and
positive right of the movant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory
remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3 of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.** (Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of
Isabela, et al., G.R. No. L-49529, March 31, 1989). In the issuance thereof, the courts are
given sufficient discretion to determine the necessity for the grant of the relief prayed for as
it affects the respective rights of the parties, with the caveat that extreme caution be
observed in the exercise of such discretion (Bataclan, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 78148, July 31, 1989). It is also a settled rule that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a party in
a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case,
the only limitation being that this discretion should be exercised based upon the grounds
and in the manner provided by law. The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower
court in injunctive matters should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse
(Detective and Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Cloribel, G.R. No. L-23428, Nov. 29, 1968, 26
SCRA 255).

With these principles in mind, and after a careful consideration of the undisputed facts and
the arguments of the parties, the Court finds that the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in having issued the order dated June 16, 1978. The respondent judge
also committed a grave abuse of discretion when he issued the order dated June 30, 1978,
notwithstanding the fact that the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the June 16, 1978
order filed by GSIS was still unresolved.
359 ORTIGAS & COMPANY Limited Partnership,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS DALTON B. KING and CECILIA F. KING,

G.R. No. 79128 June 16, 1988

Facts

On May 10, 1984, Wellington Syquiatco, with the approval of Ortigas, subleased the subject
unit to herein respondent spouses (King who occupied the premises ) . Later, Wellington
Syquiatco, for valuable consideration sold to King spouses his leasehold rights and
obligations over the subject Gondola/unit. This transfer of rights was approved by Ortigas .

Ortigas' new manager, Jose Lim III, met with the Gondola lessees and proposed to correct
the inequities in the lease agreements. Individual electric meters were to be installed in the
respective units.

A new contract for the Gondola units was submitted to the lessees, which provided among
others that "electric and other utility costs' were for the lessees" account. The Kings did not
sign the new lease agreement.

The electricity bin for May and June, 1986, amounted to P3,480.02 (including cost of meter
installation) and P2,456.53, respectively, which Ortigas tried to collect from the King
spouses but the latter protested the bill, citing paragraph No. 6 of the letter contract of
October 28, 1983 which provided that electric and water bills were for the account of
Ortigas.

Trial court denied plaintiff application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Respondent Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for by the Kings upon the filing of a bond of P15, 000.00.

Issue

Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying plaintiffs'
application for a preliminary mandatory injunction

Ruling

No, the writ of preliminary injunction, in general, cannot be sought as a matter of

right, but its grant or refusal rests in the sound discretion of the court under the
circumstances and the facts of the particular case. The writ is the "strong arm of equity"
and therefore should not be used to sanction inequity.

The defendant in the case, the petitioner herein, was able to show that the electricity
consumed per month by the King spouses was way above the amount of the monthly
rentals which they were paying to the petitioner, thereby in effect making the latter
subsidize the business of the former in the leased premises. Such an obviously inequitable
situation by which private respondents enriched themselves at the expense of petitioner
cannot be ignored, as private respondents wanted the trial court to do, by insisting on a
strict adherence to the letter of the contract, which petitioner questioned, alleging inter
alia obvious mistake and collusion, and non-approval of the contract by the principal of the
signatory for the lessor defenses which must eventually be considered by the court a quo in
deciding the merits of the case. It is thus not a simple case of a contracting party having
made a bad bargain and who must be made to abide by it. The trial court, considering the
equities of the case, refused to issue the preliminary mandatory injunction. We hold that in
refusing to do so the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion.

In general, courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which in effect
disposes of the main case without trial. This is precisely the effect of the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the respondent appellate court. Having granted through a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the main prayer of the complaint, there is
practically nothing left for the trial court to try except the plaintiffs' claim for damages.

360 MAGDALENO MENESES, PETRONILA MENESES and PASCUALA BIGTING, petitioners, vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, L. PASICOLAN, Sheriff of Manila,
FELICIDAD PATIO, and BRIGIDO VALENCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-2088 September 9, 1948

FACTS: Respondents Felicidad Patio and Brigido Valencia were leasing part of Condesa Street,
Binondo and built a building thereto. Which building was destroyed during the aerial bombing of
the city in 1944. After the liberation of the city, said respondents constructed on the same spot a
make-shift structure or barong-barong using in its construction part of the materials. They lived in
said house, and resumed paying rent to the city for the use of the lot at the rate of P7 a month, since
September 1, 1945.

Then thereafter, respondents, as plaintiffs, brought an action in the municipal court for detainer
against the petitioners, as defendants. The municipal judge in this case conducted an ocular
inspection of the lot and the structure on it and evidently found that the said barong-barong
belonged to the plaintiffs-respondents, for he rendered a judgment ordering the defendants-
petitioners to vacate the said structure on lot No. 11 Condesa Street and to pay plaintiffs P17 a
month for the use and occupation of the barong-barong and lot, from July 1947 up to the time they
vacate it completely. But because of the refusal of the petitioners to leave said barong-barong,
plaintiffs had to resort to the courts through an action in detainer.

On January 27, 1948, Judge Dinglasan issued an order for execution of the judgement. Thereafter
several motions of the petitioners for the stay of execution were filed, but they were denied,
although on February 7, 1948, Judge Dinglasan, by order granted the defendants a stay of execution
until March 15, but the execution was not carried out until March 22, because of an extension
granted by the sheriff himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Dinglasan acted in excess and abuse of his discretion in granting
execution of the judgment

RULING: NO. There is a long line of decisions of this Court holding that the provisions of Rule 72,
section 8, regarding the immediate execution of a judgment in forcible entry or detainer cases are,
unless pending appeal payment is made regularly on or before the 10th day of each month for rent
corresponding to the preceding month, mandatory. Jurisprudence even held that the lower court
lacks authority to extend the period within which the rents should be paid from time to time in
order to stay execution. If the lower court, where hearing of an appeal in a case of ejectment is
pending, may not extend the period within which to make the payment required by law in order to
stay execution, then it is clear that said provisions of the Rules of Court are mandatory, and that the
respondent judge in the present case may not and cannot stay execution of the decision of the
municipal court, after the petitioners had failed to pay the rents as required by law.

In view of the foregoing, the high court hold that the action and order of Judge Dinglasan in giving
due course to the execution of the judgement appealed from were both legal and authorized by law.
As to the petition for a writ of injunction, it is obvious that it is unwarranted. There is no longer
anything that may be restrained. The respondent judge has already ordered execution of the
judgment and the sheriff of Manila has already carried out the order and demolished the barong-
barong. The petition for the writ of certiorari is dismissed and the petition for the writ of injunction
is denied.

361 SALVADOR AMBROSIO, DIONISIO REYES, RODOLFO ALMEROL, FEDERICO DIÑO, ROGELIO DIEGO,
DOMICIANO DINDIN, JESUS ABARRONDO, CAMILO AMBROSIO, ROBERTO PARIZAL, AGUSTIN
EDRADAN, DEMETRIO BUENAVISTA, EVARISTO CANTARA, SULPICIO ISMAEL, BALTAZAR TORILLA,
CANDELARIO GUTIERREZ, PABLITO MAGALLANES, FRANK CALUB, DELFIN MANZO, JR., ERNESTO
MANUEL, ALFONSO V. PORTIS, ARSENIO BALAMBAO, SEVERINO VALENZONA, PABLO SUNGA, AMADO
MIRANDILLA, MODESTO NICOLAS, FRANCISCO PADRIGANO, FELICIANO CAMPOSANO, ALBERTO
MARCO, RAFAEL MADERO, HENRY CURTIVO, ANGELO GATCHALIAN, MANOLITO TALABIRO, PEDRO
CONCEPCION, POLICARPIO ESCOBIDO, GERARDO SOLOMON, EPIFANIO REANDINO and SANTIAGO
BALANCIO, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, LIM PA, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and LABOR ARBITER FRANCISCO DE LOS REYES, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-47651. December 11, 1978.]

FACTS: Thirty-nine (39) taxi-drivers filed a complaint with the NLRC against "Extraco Taxi wherein the Lim
Pa is the proprietor of the said taxi company. In their complaint, the plaintiffs prayed that certain exactions or
wage deductions made by Extraco Taxi be declared void and returned to them and that the defendant be
required to remit to the Social Security System (SSS) their contributions. The case was submitted for
arbitration to an NLRC hearing officer. The arbitrator in a decision ordered Extraco Taxi to reimburse the
complainants the sum of P96, 677 as illegal wage deductions plus interest and a fine of P2, 000. To satisfy the
judgment, the sheriff of the NLRC levied upon three lots, with a total area of 1,982.5 square meters and
registered in the name of Lim Pa.

Lim Pa filed in the NLRC a motion to quash the writ of execution on the grounds that he was not a party in the
case and that he was never sued in the NLRC. In denying the motion by the Labor Arbiter and instead of
exhausting his remedies in the NLRC, Lim Pa filed an injunction complaint with the CFI at Caloocan City
against the thirty-nine claimants, the NLRC, its sheriff, and the register of deeds of Caloocan City.

Acting on that complaint, an order restraining the register of deeds from recording the sale of the lots. In its
order, the lower court directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the register of
deeds from registering the sale at public auction of Lim Pa’s lots by virtue of the judgment in the NLRC case.
The lower court reasoned out that the judgment was not binding on Lim Pa because, not having been
impleaded, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue an injunction.

RULING: NO. The Court of First Instance has no authority to issue injunction against a semi-judicial body,
such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Social Security Commission, the defunct Public Service
Commission, and the Patent Office, which, in exercising their quasi-judicial functions, rank with the Court of
First Instance. This holding obviates confuse and obstruction in the administration of justice.

Section 2, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that a judge of the Court of First Instance may issue
a writ of preliminary injunction "in any action pending in an inferior court within its district." And section 4,
Rule XVI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, in dogmatic terms provides that "no
temporary injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be
issued by any court or other entity.”

Hence, for lack of jurisdiction, respondent Judge should dismiss the injunction case filed by Lim Pa against the
thirty-seven respondents, the NLRC, its sheriff and the register of deeds.

362 .EMERITO M. RAMOSet. al VS. COURT OF APPEALS, THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, COMMERCIAL BANK OF MANILA, THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON and EDGARDO L.
TORDESILLAS
173 SCRA 550 May 24, 1989

FACTS: On June 15, 1987, the petitioners filed before the RTC in Makati a Complaint for specific performance,
rescission of contract and damages against the private respondents (GSIS), the (COMBANK) and the Atrium
Capital Corporation.

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
GSIS and COMBANK from pushing through with a reported plan to sell COMBANK to the private respondent
FNBB and a group of Filipino investors represented by the private respondent Edgardo L. Tordesillas. The
petitioners alleged that the GSIS has no legal right to sell COMBANK inasmuch as both the GSIS and COMBANK
failed to comply with their obligations to the petitioners as embodied in an Agreement of May 9, 1980
executed by the petitioners and the IUCP investors group where petitioners sold to the latter 187,649 shares
in the Overseas Bank of Manila under the terms and conditions provided therein. In sum, the petitioners
maintained that they have considerable proprietary interest in COMBANK and, accordingly, their consent
must be obtained before COMBANK can be legally sold to interested purchasers.

On July 24, 1987, the trial court issued the restraining order and on September 7, 1987, the FNBB and
Tordesillas sought a reconsideration of the action taken by the trial court.On the same day, September 25,
1987, the GSIS and COMBANK filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus , with the Court of
Appeals and on September 30, 1987, the Seventh Division of the appellate court resolved to give due course
to the Petition. Lastly, on December 7, 1987, the Eleventh Division resolved to convert the restraining order
issued by the Seventh Division into a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: In issuing the resolution dated December 7 1987 converting the restraining order of September 30
1987 into an injumction, responded court overstepped its jurisdictional bounds or committed graved abuse
of discretion by making findings and conclusions without factual or legal basis but based merely on
speculations and conjectures.

RULING: NO. This Court finds that the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction.
The court reproduces with approval the disquisition of the respondent court in its resolution of December 7,
1987 —

The principal relief sought by private respondents as plaintiffs in the court below is one for specific
performance. Rescission is invoked merely as an alternative remedy should specific performance be
impossible of compliance. This is as it should be because 'the action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be
instituted except when the party suffering damages has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the
same.' (Art 1383, Civil Code; Vinco v. Fuentebella, 12 C.A. Rep. 645; Guash v.

363. RIVERA VS FLORENDO

Oct. 8,1986

Facts:

Rivera, a registered stockholder of Fujuyama Hotel and Restaurant, Inc., is allegedly just a front of a
Japanese investor named Akasako. The latter sold the shares registered under Rivera to the
respondents. Initially, everybody agreed to affect the sale including Rivera.

However upon the consummation of such, Rivera refused to make the indorsement unless he is also
paid. Respondents attempted several times to have shares registered but were refused compliance by
the corporation. The trial court granted to the respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction the right
to manage the company upon filing of a bond.

Issues:

Whether of not Rivera had the right to refuse the indorsement of the shares of stock in question.

Whether or not the Corporation had the right to refuse the registration of the respondent’s shares.

Whether of not ht SEC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

The Supreme Court denied the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and remanded the case to the
lower court for a trial on the merits. As found in Sec. 63 of the Corporation Code, shares stock may be
transferred by delivery of the certificate after indorsement by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other
person legally authorized to make the transfer. By this provision it is evident that Rivera’s indorsement
must be obtained before any transfer of the questioned shares is effected. On the matter of jurisdiction,
the SEX does not have jurisdiction of the case since the dispute is not an intra-corporate controversy.
What is simply involves is a conflict on the ownership of a group of shares between the registered owner
and an outside party. Hence, because of this conflict in ownership rights, a mandatory injuction can not
lie.

364. ROMULA VS YNIGUEZ

FACTS

Petitioners representing more than 1/5 of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling
for the impeachment of President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment. Said
resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government (CJHRGG). The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance
to warrant its further consideration and disapproved the Resolution and dismissed all the charges
contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan
and sent to the Archives. The next day, Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from
the archives of RN 644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the
Batasan. The present petition was then filed with the Court praying that pertinent provisions of the
Batasan Rules granting power to the Batasan to determine whether an impeachment complaint is
sufficient and its power to approve of deny such complaint be declared unconstitutional. They also pray
that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN 644 and the impeachment complaint attached thereto
be declared null and void. It is the petitioner’s contention that said provisions of the Batasan Rules are
unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Art XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with
the amendatory process provided in the Constitution. Further, the said provisions vest with the CJHRGG
the power to decide whether to impeach or not, which should be decided by the Batasan as a collegiate
body and not by a small body of the Batasan. They also content that the Batasan Rules impose an
unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment
can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan
for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose at least
1/5 of all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.

ISSUEs

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the Archives and report out the
resolution and complaint for impeachment?

2. Can the Court, assuming that the resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled from
the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges of the complaint?

3. Are the assailed provisions unconstitutional?

HELD

No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for the recall from the Archives of
RN 644 and the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing
said complaint and resolution. The Constitution provides that no official shall be convicted without
the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of
the Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG makes mathematically impossible the required vote for
conviction of at least 2/3 of all the members. It would serve no purpose to proceed any further when it
is obvious that the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained. Dismissal of the impeachment
proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and
complaint for impeachment – as in the dismissal of Mitra’s motion in the case – makes irrelevant under
what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of
the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of the powers vested
upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review. The court cannot compel the
Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the CJHRGG to recall
from the Archives the complaint and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the Batasan
to proceed with the impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are
constitutional. The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt
necessary rules of procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in
impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an impeachment complaint which is not sufficient in
form and substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has
not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of a
resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of the
1973 Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules
(aside from the fact that the question involved is a political one), because the acts of the committee
sought to be restrained had already been consummated. They are fait accompli.

365 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK and THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners vs. NATIONAL MINES & ALLIED WORKERS UNION (NAMAWU MIF),
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (REGIONAL BRANCH NO. IV) ATLAS CONSOLIDATED
MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. L-50402 August 19, 1982

FACTS: 1. That the judgment obtained by the respondent Union from the NLRC on December 22, 1975 was
the result of an unfair labor practice case filed by said Union against PIM because of its failure to comply with
the condition imposed upon it by the Minister of Labor when it was granted clearance to shut down its
operation and lay off all its personnel due to its bankruptcy to the effect that said clearance was "subject to
such rights and benefits accruing to the workers and employees of your company under (the) existing
collective bargaining agreement and relevant provisions of the Labor Code."

2. That PIM was a mortgage debtor separately of the Development Bank of the Philippines and of herein
petitioners,

3. On account of the failure of PIM to pay its obligations just referred to, PCIB and Manila Bank foreclosed all
mortgages in their favor on December 20, 1975 and as they were the only bidders at the auction sale, they
eventually secured final conveyances in their favor of said properties.

4. To be sure, respondent Union had already been able to levy on certain properties of PIM which allegedly
were not covered by the mortgages to petitioners, and so there are now in the lower courts suits wherein
petitioners and the Union are contesting as to who of them have the superior right over said properties.
Additionally, there is a proceeding for contempt pending in the NLRC because petitioners' men would not
allow the Sheriff to enforce execution of some of said properties.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is valid.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court seems that the case is now moot and academic, the prohibitory injunction
prayed for being already impossible of enforcement, the acts sought to be enjoined having been already
consummated. But it is obvious from the allegations of the petition that the main and real remedy aimed at by
petitioners is for them to be considered as in no way liable for the money paid to the laborers of respondent
Philippine Iron Mines by virtue of the writ of execution and garnishment in question and that the obedience
or compliance thereto by respondent Atlas was uncalled for, hence Atlas should be held still liable to them for
the amount aforementioned it had delivered to the Sheriff in order to complete the P30 M purchase price of
the PIM properties sold by them to Atlas.

Thus, Article 110 of the New Labor Code, as amended, as well as Section 10, Rule VIII, Book II, of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the New Labor Code provide: 1äwphï1.ñët

Art. 110. Worker Preference in case of bankcruptcy. — In the event of bankcruptcy or liquidation of an
employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards wages due them for services
rendered during the period prior to the bankcruptcy or liquidation, any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding. Unpaid wages shall be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to share in
the assets of the employer. (New Labor Code)

Section 10. Payment of wages in case of bankcruptcy. — Unpaid wages earned by the employees before the
declaration of bankcruptcy or judicial liquidation of the employer's business shall be given first preference
and shall be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to a share in the assets of the
employees. (Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, Book III, Rule VIII)

366. ROLDAN, JR. VS ARCA

FACTS:

Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony
Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries Commissioner
through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company took
Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to
apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and
Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5or 6,
1965, the two fishing boats were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.

ISSUE:

WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was valid.

HELD:

YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the
customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a
search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the search warrant must besought before such warrant could be secured; hence it
is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be
constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels
breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful motors that enable
them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard. Under our Rules of
Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person(a)
who has committed, is actually committing or is about to commit an offense in his
presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been
actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while
serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency of his case or
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the members
of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and
dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.

367 HON. CARLOS ABIERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and the
SPOUSES MIGUEL DE LA CRUZ AND JOVITA DE LA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ANGELINA E. PUENTEVELLA, as Judicial Administratrix of the Intestate Estate
of Luis B. Puentevella, respondents.

G.R. No. L-26294 May 31, 1972

FACTS: In Civil Case No. 7435 the herein petitioner as administratrix of the estate of Luis obtained a
decision from Branch 11, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental rescinding a contract of sale
entered into by Luis as vendor and Raul as vendee. The court ordered the defendants to vacate the lots
and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiff. The decision having become final, a writ of execution was
issued and the Sheriff of Occidental Negros placed the plaintiff in possession of the land. On December
20, 1965 a certain Mr. Aniceto Lacson filed a third-party claim with the Sheriff alleging that he was the
owner of the building and school equipment for having allegedly purchased them from Mr. and Mrs. Jose
Lopez. On December 28, 1965 another third-party claim was filed over the same subject property. In this
second third-party claim, the claimant is Jovita De la Cruz, who alleges that she acquired the same
properties from Mr. and Mrs. Jose Lopez also by purchase.

Respondent Puentevella filed a petition for certiorari or mandamus with the C.A with a prayer "that an
ex-parte writ of preliminary injunction be issued, enjoining the Hon. Carlos Abiera from enforcing the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by him in Civil Case No. 293 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 293.

ISSUE: Whether or not Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acted with authority
in enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from proceeding with the execution sale of properties levied upon by
him pursuant to a final judgment rendered by Branch II.
RULING: NO. Jurisprudence states that “no court has power to interfere by injunction, with the
judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the
relief sought by injunction ..."

The doctrine as thus formulated is well settled, and has been adhered to consistently whenever justified
by the facts in order to avoid conflict of power between different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to
bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their proceedings. For the doctrine to apply,
however, the injunction issued by one court must interfere with the judgment or decree issued by
another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction, and the relief sought by such injunction must be one
which could be granted by the court which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.

368.PHILIPPINE PACIFIC FISHING CO., INC.,petitioners, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA,

Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. L-59070 March 15, 1982

FACTS: The Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. through it’s of. Officers, Yoshio Yamamoto
anterior Marilyn Javier, private respondents herein, mortgaged to the Philippine Banking
Corporation the fishing vessels, PACIFIC I and PACIFIC II, to secure payment of a debt. Upon
default of the Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. to pay its debt, the Philippine Banking
Corporation instituted foreclosure proceedings and filed an action for replevin.Upon failure
of Philippine Pacific to pay the debt, Cheng Yong foreclosed the mortgage. Yamamoto and
Javier then went to the Securities and Exchange Commission and filed a complaint, alleging
that the controversy between Cheng Yong and Philippine Pacific was intra-corporate.

On October 22, 1979 private respondentsfiled with the respondent court a complaint for
declaration of rescission and injunction, with ex-parte preliminary injunctionentitled
'Yoshio Yamamoto and Marilyn A. Javier, plaintiffs, versus, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Jose Maria Hilado, Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. Cheng Yong, Lilia Gaw
and Cheng Guat. Thereafter, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the
defendants, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission, from enforcing and
implementing the orders complained of and from disturbing or interfering in the exercise
by private respondent Yoshio Yamamoto of his rights to the ownership and possession of
the two fishing vessels, PACIFIC I and PACIFIC II.

ISSUE:Whether or not there’s excess of jurisdiction and or an abuse to discretion the order
of respondent judge.

RULING: NO. The organic act creating the Commission, Presidential Decree 902-A, provides
the appropriate remedy, first within the Commission itself, and ultimately in the high court.
Nowhere does the law empower Court of First Instance to interfere with the orders of the
Commission. Not even on grounds of due process or jurisdiction. The Commission is,
conceding arguendo a possible claim of respondents, at the very least, a co-equal body with
the Courts of First Instance. Even as such co-equal, one would have no power to control the
other. But the truth of the matter is that only the Supreme Court can enjoy and correct any
actuation of the Commission.

Moreover, it is obvious that since the Commission has its offices outside of Manila, under
settled jurisprudence, a Manila court's writ of preliminary injunction much less a
restraining order, can have no binding effect outside the Manila area.

369 .MAXIMO NOCNOC, petitioner, vs. HON. ISIDORO A. VERA District Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte
G.R. No. L-37737 February 27, 1979

FACTS: Norberto Nocnoc died in an accident on June 9, 1970, while employed as a bus conductor in the
transportation business of private respondent, Ernest Manarang. And on September 19, 1972, petitioner-
claimant filed a claim for compensation under Act 3842. And on August 7, 1973 respondent Judge ordered
defendants, WCU Chief Referee and the Provincial Sheriff to "cease and desist from further orders.And on
September 18, 1973 respondent Judge enjoined the execution of the order of the Workmen's Compensation
Unit (WCU) Regional District No. 6, dated March 14, 1973, directing inter alia private respondent to pay
petitioner-claimant the sum of P3, 910.00 for the death of his son, as well as the order of the same Court dated
October 10, 1973 which denied the motion for reconsideration of above order of September 18, 1973. In the
resolution of November 5, 1973, petitioner-claimant's motion to litigate as pauper was granted, respondent
was required to file an answer to the petition — not to move to dismiss the same — and a temporary
restraining order was issued enjoining respondent Judge from further proceedings effective immediately and
until further orders from the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to entertain a Workmen's Compensation
case or impugning the validity of an award/decision of the WCU.

RULING: NO. The decisions, orders and awards entered by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are
appealable to the Supreme Court. The Court of First Instance is not empowered or clothed with jurisdiction to
review or modify, much less, annul an award or order of execution issued by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission.

The law and jurisprudence are thus clear, unequivocal. No further interpretation is necessary. The proper
forum to thresh out the validity of the WCU's award — which is allegedly null and void because it was
rendered without giving the private respondent his constitutional right to due process, as well as the validity
of the ensuing writ of execution to enforce the same — is the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and, on
appeal, this court and not any other, much less respondent's court.

370.G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A.

LANZANAS, TWO THOUSAND (2000) TRANSPORT CORPORATION, NISSAN CAR
LEASE PHILIPPINES, INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY AND
GUILLERMO G. CUNANAN
G.R. No. 120287, May 28, 2002
FACTS:

Petitioner G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), with the name and style Avis Rent-A-Car, was
the exclusive operator of taxi services at (NAIA) under a five (5)-year contract of concession with
respondent Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).The concession contract expired on 31
January 1994 but was renewed by the parties on a monthly basis until such time when a new
concessionaire (shall have been) chosen. Under the arrangement, G & S was able to operate the coupon
taxi service uninterruptedly beyond the period of five (5) years originally awarded by MIAA.On 12 July
1994 MIAA initiated proceedings for public bidding to choose two (2) concessionaires of the coupon taxi
services at the NAIA. Five (5) firms pre-qualified to join the bidding including petitioner G & S and
respondents Two Thousand (2000) Transport Corporation (2000 TRANSPORT) and Nissan Car Lease
Philippines, Inc. (NISSAN), after complying with the terms of reference, the instructions to bidders and
the invitation to bid. Consequently, on 5 December 1994 MIAA selected 2000 TRANSPORT and
NISSAN as the winning bidders and issued in their favor the respective notice of awards of the coupon
taxi service concession. On 10 January 1995 petitioner G & S filed a complaint for injunction and
mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against MIAA and its General
Manager Guillermo G. Cunanan, 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSANAs prayed for in the complaint, the
trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining MIAA from awarding to 2000 TRANSPORT
and NISSAN the new concessions to operate the NAIA coupon taxi service and from removing G & S as
such concessionaire, and thereafter scheduled for hearing the application for preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN each moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action and for improper venue and to lift the temporary restraining
order. Respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN assailed before the Court of Appeals the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction through their respective petitions for certiorari with prayer for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.On 6
February 1995 the appellate court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the enforcement of the
writ of preliminary injunction. On 16 May 1995 the Court of Appeals granted the petitions for certiorari
of 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN, set aside the 30 January 1995 Order of the trial court issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction .G & S argues in its petition for review that irregularities attending the
bidding for the coupon taxi service at the NAIA warranted the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction and that PD 1818 was not applicable to divest the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the
complaint. G & S asserts in its petition under Rule 65 that allegations in the complaint that 2000
TRANSPORT falsified its Articles of Incorporation and income tax returns, and was a dummy
corporation for two (2) Korean nationals, and that irregularities rigged the bidding stated fully a cause of
action against 2000 TRANSPORT and NISSAN which would have justified the disqualification of
respondent 2000 TRANSPORT from the bidding and the continuation of the month-to-month renewal of
the concession contract in favor of G & S. Petitioner also justifies resorting to Rule 65 in lieu of an
ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals to question the Order of dismissal of the trial court on
grounds of expediency and necessity for a speedier remedy than appeal and further explains that joining
the petitions for review and for certiorari in just one (1) pleading was essential to avoid conflicting rulings
in case the petitions were brought separately in different fora.

ISSUE:

. Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court which would justify the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65?

RULING:
1. NO. The high court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint in
Civil Case No. 95-72586 for failure to state a cause of action against respondents 2000 TRANSPORT and
NISSAN.As admitted by petitioner G & S itself, the trial court used the correct guidelines by which the
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action as a ground in a motion to dismiss must be
considered.Concededly therefore the only errors involved in this petition are mere errors of judgment, if
any, and not errors of jurisdiction for which the instant petition would be the inappropriate mode for
seeking a reversal. The allegations of errors of judgment are in fact fairly obvious on the face of the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

We nonetheless examine the Order of the trial court in the interest of justice. The elementary test for
failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the
relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged
therein? Only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts which in the first place should
not have been alleged in the complaint are considered for purposes of applying the test. Furthermore,
actions which are prematurely commenced would fall under the objection

371.EMERITO M. RAMOSet. al VS. COURT OF APPEALS, THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE

SYSTEM, COMMERCIAL BANK OF MANILA, THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON and EDGARDO L.
TORDESILLAS
173 SCRA 550 May 24, 1989

FACTS: On June 15, 1987, the petitioners filed before the RTC in Makati a Complaint for specific performance,
rescission of contract and damages against the private respondents (GSIS), the (COMBANK) and the Atrium
Capital Corporation.

The petitioners prayed for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
GSIS and COMBANK from pushing through with a reported plan to sell COMBANK to the private respondent
FNBB and a group of Filipino investors represented by the private respondent Edgardo L. Tordesillas. The
petitioners alleged that the GSIS has no legal right to sell COMBANK inasmuch as both the GSIS and COMBANK
failed to comply with their obligations to the petitioners as embodied in an Agreement of May 9, 1980
executed by the petitioners and the IUCP investors group where petitioners sold to the latter 187,649 shares
in the Overseas Bank of Manila under the terms and conditions provided therein. In sum, the petitioners
maintained that they have considerable proprietary interest in COMBANK and, accordingly, their consent
must be obtained before COMBANK can be legally sold to interested purchasers.

On July 24, 1987, the trial court issued the restraining order and on September 7, 1987, the FNBB and
Tordesillas sought a reconsideration of the action taken by the trial court.On the same day, September 25,
1987, the GSIS and COMBANK filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus , with the Court of
Appeals and on September 30, 1987, the Seventh Division of the appellate court resolved to give due course
to the Petition. Lastly, on December 7, 1987, the Eleventh Division resolved to convert the restraining order
issued by the Seventh Division into a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: In issuing the resolution dated December 7 1987 converting the restraining order of September 30
1987 into an injumction, responded court overstepped its jurisdictional bounds or committed graved abuse
of discretion by making findings and conclusions without factual or legal basis but based merely on
speculations and conjectures.

RULING: NO. This Court finds that the Eleventh Division of the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction.
The court reproduces with approval the disquisition of the respondent court in its resolution of December 7,
1987 —

The principal relief sought by private respondents as plaintiffs in the court below is one for specific
performance. Rescission is invoked merely as an alternative remedy should specific performance be
impossible of compliance. This is as it should be because 'the action for rescission is subsidiary; it cannot be
instituted except when the party suffering damages has no other legal means to obtain reparation for the
same.' (Art 1383, Civil Code; Vinco v. Fuentebella, 12 C.A. Rep. 645; Guash v.

372 The Chief of Staff, AFP vs Guadiz-101 SCRA 827

Facts: Diosamer Development Corporation filed a complaint against the Chief of staff, AFP for stopping,
preventing, molesting, driving or threatening to stop, prevent, molest from passing through the bignay
and sumandig- Alulag roads for its logging operations. Hon Guadiz acted on the motion of diosamer
Development Corporation for the clarification of restraining order where they shall be allowed to cut
and remove logs and seeking for a right of way inside or outside the military camp. The Chief of staff,
AFP, filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue: whether or not Juadge Guadiz acted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
favoring the corporation on the clarification of restraining order.

Ruling:

Yes, Judge Guadiz acted grave abuse of discretion denying the motion to set aside the restraining order
allowing the company to pass through the areas of Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation.

373 Romero vs Chief of Staff, AFP Brig. Gen Casaclang February 20, 1989- 170 SCRA 408

Facts: Petitioners were among the military personnel charged for a suit to the unsuccessful coup d' etat
of 28 August 1987.Petitioners seek reliefs and filed a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents from continuing with the court martial proceeding. The solicitor
General opposed the issuance of Temporary restraining order.

Issue: Whether or not the application for a restraining order granting to restrain a criminal prosecution
against the petitioner.

Ruling: NO, Injunction shall not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution. The trial shall proceed
before the General Court Martial No. 9 without any further delay and let full and speedy justice be
accorded.

374 192 SCRA 182 December 10, 1990 - LINO BROCKA vs. JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Facts: Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO) a
demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently dispersed a petitioners arrested by
Northern Police District Officers for illegal assembly. All petitioners released on bail – P3,000 each
EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and RodolfoS a n t o s ( B r o c k a , e t a l . ) , w h o
were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail
w a s recommended. Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC. QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago
ordered Brocka, et al’s provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each but despite service of
release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a respondents-police officers invoked Preventive
Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against Brocka. On Feb 11 ’85 – Brocka, et al charged with
Inciting to Sedition. Panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver of
their rights under RPC125 as condition for the grant of the counsel’s request that they be
given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients a no such requirement required
under the rules. Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 ’85 on orders of then Pres.
Marcos a release narrated in Court’s resolution in petition for habeas corpus file.In Return of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had already been released a four on Feb15’85 and
one on Feb.8 ’85. Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become moot and
academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of
inciting to sedition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined

RULING:The Supreme Court rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal
prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition.

GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final

375 Justiniani vs CastilloJune 21, 1988- 162 SCRA 378

Facts: Justiniani and alacapa filed a petition with preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin respondent
Jose Castillo (Provincial Fiscal of Pasig) from conducting a preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint for libel filed by Brig. General Montoya against the Petitioners.
A complaint for libel alleged that it caused damages which intended to cause dishonor, discredit,
public contempt and ridicule to his personal worth integrity, honor and position.

Issue: Whether or not the provincial fiscal may be perpetually enjoined from conducting preliminary
investigation on a complaint for libel instituted on the basis of statements embodied in a separate
complaint.

Ruling: Yes, Justice would be sub served by enjoining respondents from further proceeding with the
questioned preliminary investigation. Indeed, it would be futile endeavor to conduct an investigation
where no crime was committed.

376 Ang vs Castro – May 15, 1985- 136 SCRA 453

Facts: Amando Ang filed an administrative complaint against Judge Castro for ignorance of law and gross
inexcusable negligence. Judge Castro ordered petitioner to appear before him and to show cause why
he should not be punished for contempt of court for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and
contemptuous attitude towards court and towards him. The said Judge sentenced Ang for 5 days
imprisonment. Ang filed for notice of appeal which was denied by the Judge.

Issue: Whether or not Ang may be held liable for contempt in basis of the language he used in his letters
and complaint to the office of the president and the Supreme Court.

Ruling: No, because it was not uttered in the presence of the Judge as to obstruct or interrupt
proceedings rather it was contained in the pleadings filed by petitioner.

377Case Digest: Primicias vs Municipality of Urdaneta

Facts:

On February 8, 1965, Primicia was driving his car within the jurisdiction of Urdaneta when he was found
violating Municipal Order 3, Series of 1964 for overtaking a truck. The Courts of First Instance decided
that from the action initiated by Primicias, the Municipal Order was null and void and had been repealed
by Republic Act 4136, the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

Issues: Whether or not Municipal Order 3 of Urdaneta is null and void

Ruling: Municipal Order 3 is null and void as there is an explicit repeal in RA 4136 and as per general
rule, the later law prevails over an earlier law and any conflict between a municipal order and a national
law must be ruled in favor of the statute.

378 Pelejo vs Court of Appeals- October 18, 1982- 117 SCRA 666
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of Deed of Sale, title, conveyance and damages alleging
that the Deed of Sale petitioners executed in favor of respondents is merely simulated to accommodate
the latter in obtaining a loan from the bank. The complaint was dismissed on the motion of private
respondent pointing out that the complaint states no cause of action. No appeal was taken by
petitioners and instead another complaint but with the same cause of action was filed on the ground of
resjudicata.
The complaint was dismissed and such dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals meanwhile
respondents filed Accion Reinvendicatoria or publiciana, the dismissal was appealed to the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction was mandatory.

Ruling: Yes, to justify the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction the following
must be shown: (1) that the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) that his right has been
violated and the invasion is material and substantial; and (3) that there is an urgent and
permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.

379 TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.
FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees. After the
holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via
appeal to the DOLE Secretary. Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said
appeal. The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and
2. Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal
strikes.

HELD:

1. Yes. The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the
Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes. Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not
strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any
filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from
work just to attend DOLE hearings.

380 Gordillo vs Del Rosario

Facts:

An Action was instituted against Gutierrez, Gordillo and Salgado y Martinez who are engaged in general
merchandise business and conducting the establishments, on the Escolta, known as the "New York-
Paris-Manila" and "St. Louis Dry Goods Store.it was alleged that the defendants, in the abuse of their
authority as managers, had unlawfully diverted large sums of money from the legitimate uses of the firm
and had appropriated the same to their own use in violation of law and the articles of partnership.
The Honorable Judge issued an exparte injunction upon execution of bond without preliminary notice to
the defendants. Defendants moved to dissolve the injunction however it was denied. They applied
petition for certiorari and asked the Supreme Court to supersede, quash and dissolve the injunction in
the ground of irregularity and grave abuse of discretion by the Judge.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the Court of the first Instance in granting the injunction in question
was irregular and in excess of its jurisdiction.

Ruling: The petition is without merit. The granting of preliminary injunction is proper and sufficient itis in
the conformity of the articles on partnership and it does not ask that the firm be liquidated under
judicial supervision.

381 AlVARO VS ZAPATA. November 25, 1982-118 SCRA 582

Facts: On February 13, 1979, a complaint for forcible entry and damages with prayer for restraining
order was filed by private respondents against petitioners before the Municipal Court of Lubao,
Pampanga. After an ex- parte hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injection,
the trial judge on February 28, 1979 issued the writ upon private respondents’ filing of an injunction
bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of said order granting the writ and filed a manifestation
that the insurance company that posted the bond for respondents has no authority to issue judicial
bonds. After conducting a hearing on the motion to lift the injunction, respondent judge, on April 30,
1979, issued an order denying said motion, thus the present recourse.

Issue:
Whether or not the preliminary mandatory injunction is proper

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that it is improper to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
prior to the final hearing except in cases of extreme urgency; that private respondents’ legal right over
the property is very doubtful since the supporting papers attached to their comment refer to other
parcels of land and not to the lands involved in this case; that the leasehold contracts submitted by
petitioners prima facie show that they are entitled to remain in possession of the land; that respondent
judge in issuing the writ and in refusing to dissolve the same, in effect, decided the merits of the case
without a hearing, in complete disregard of the documentary evidence presented by petitioners; that
when petitioners moved for the lifting of the writ, with supporting papers, it is incumbent upon the
judge to dissolve the writ, after all, the issuance or recall thereof is an interlocutory matter that remains
at all times within the control of the court and it becomes more imperative for the judge to recall the
writ when his attention was called to the fact that the bond posted by the First Integrated Bonding and
Insurance Co., Inc. has not been authorized to issue judicial bonds.

382 Ramos v. CA

FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy).
They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC
Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go
into a coma and suffer brain damage.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages.
The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the
anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Diagnostic tests prior to
surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

HELD:
Whether or not the respondents were negligent and solidarily liable for damages.

Ruling: Yes, they are solidarily liable for negligence and liable for damages. Res ipsa loquitor, the thing
speaks for itself.

383 CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOC. V. CA

FACTS:
Land in question is a public land. Bureau of Lands granted authority to COCLAI to survey the land for
purposes of subdivision into residential lots. NHA, on the other hand, filed an expropriation proceeding
to acquire the same lot. The President of the Philippines issued a proclamation granting NHA to develop,
administer and dispose said land. So, NHA demolished the structures built by COCLAI. MTCC granted
forcible entry decision against NHA & RTC affirmed. While case was pending, the President of the
Philippines issued a Special Patent covering the land in question, thereby granting title to NHA. COCLAI
moved for the execution of forcible entry while NHA wants to quiet the title and an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Who has the better right?

HELD:

NHA has a better right.

An injunction may only be restored by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights. CA was
justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to writ of injunction since it has a title on the lot and the
proclamation granted the authority to dispose the land. On the other hand, petitioner’s only basis is
lawful entry and possession. Petitioners became squatters with no legal right over the land they are
occupying.

384.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.

vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks the nullification of the injunctive writ dated April 3,1995 issued by the NLRC and
the Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the said
Orders were issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed
from the service for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in
Hong Kong. Private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction.
On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining
petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its Memorandum of dismissal.

ISSUE:
 Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a complaint
for illegal dismissal filed before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and
issue such writ.

RULING:

The NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting
private respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private
respondents.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality
an action for illegal dismissal. The power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ
originates from "any labor dispute" upon application by a party thereof, which
application if not granted "may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or
render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party."
It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the
contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present case, there is no
labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet been no
complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents
against the petitioner.

385.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

vs.
Hon. MIDPANTAO ADIL

G.R. No. L-52823 November 2, 1982

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to annul the several
injunctive orders issued by respondent judge, and praying that, instead, the writ of
possession issued in favor of petitioner, as purchaser in the foreclosure sale, be
immediately enforced.

Respondent Angelina Lobaton Melliza obtained a loan from petitioner secured by

a mortgage over two parcels of land. She failed to pay the loan on maturity and was
foreclosed extra judicially and during the foreclosure sale, petitioner purchased the
properties. The properties were not redeemed within the period, hence the title over the
same were consolidated in the name of petitioner.

Petitioner filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession. Upon

issuance of the writ private respondents requested for a grace period of seven (7) days
to vacate the premises in question. Private respondents did not complied with the writ of
possession and immediately ordered for ejectment. Before the ejectment was
completed, respondent judge issued motu proprio an order suspending the
implementation of the writ of possession for a period of fifteen (15) days. Before the
expiration of the period, private respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure, writ of possession and consolidation of ownership.

In the proceeding for the writ of possession, private respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order granting the writ of possession, while petitioner filed a
motion to declare private respondents in contempt for refusal to vacate the premises.
The respondent judge, issued an order restraining petitioner from disturbing the status
quo, and later respondent judge issued an order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting to

lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders of which, in effect, enjoined the enforcement of
the writ of possession.

RULING:

Yes. The Court did not act within the bounds of the law. Pursuant to Section 4 of
P.D. No. 385, it is mandatory for the court to place the government financial institution,
which petitioner is, in the possession and control of the property. As stated, the said
decree was enacted "in order to effect the early collection of delinquent loans from
government financial institutions and enable them to continue effectively financing the
development needs of the country" without being hampered by actions brought to the
courts by borrowers.

386.

APOLINARIO BATACLAN et al.,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 78148 July 31, 1989

FACTS:

Petitioners Apolinario, Eleazar, Napoleon and Herminia, all surnamed Bataclan,

together with several others, are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land. Private
respondents are the occupants and cultivators of said land.
 On December 12, 1978, Pedro Caragao and his wife against the Bataclans in the
RTC of Tagaytay for the conveyance or cancellation of title over the aforesaid parcel of
land. A judgment by default was rendered by the trial court and a writ of execution
pending appeal was issued. By virtue of said writ, the Caragao spouses were placed in
possession of the land.

Petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for certiorari with injunction to
annul the aforesaid judgment by default and the writ of execution issued pending
appeal, respondent court issued a restraining order. On January 9, 1981, respondent
court rendered a decision declaring null and void the judgment by default rendered and
the writ of execution issued pending appeal.

Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court, issued a writ of execution to restore
possession of the land to them. On March 14, 1984, Cagarao filed a certiorari case, with
respondent Court, assailing the said writ of execution. Upon the denial of said petition,
another writ of execution was issued to enforce the aforestated decision of respondent
court, by reason of which possession of the land eventually reverted to herein
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is proper .

RULING:

A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be

resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action. In the issuance thereof, the courts
are given sufficient discretion to determine the necessity for the grant of the relief
prayed for as it affects the respective rights of the parties, with the caveat that extreme
caution be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It is with an equal degree of care
and caution that courts ought to proceed in the denial of the writ. It should not just
summarily issue an order of denial without an adequate hearing and judicious
evaluation of the merits of the application. A perfunctory and improvident action in this
regard would be a denial of procedural due process and could result in irreparable
prejudice to a party.

387. VALLEY TRADING CO., INC.

vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ISABELA et al.,
 The petitioner Valley Trading Co., Inc. filed a complaint in the court a quo
seeking a declaration of the supposed nullity of Section 2B.02, Sub-paragraph 1,Letter
(A), Paragraph 2 of Ordinance No. T-1, Revenue Code of Cauayan, Isabela, which
imposed a graduated tax on retailers, independent wholesalers and distributors; and for
the refund of P23,202.12, plus interest of 14 % per annum thereon, which petitioner had
paid pursuant to said ordinance. Petitioner likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the collection of said tax.

Petitioner takes the position that said ordinance imposes a "graduated fixed tax
based on Sales" that "in effect imposes a sales tax in contravention of Local Tax Code
which prohibits a municipality from imposing a percentage tax on sales.

Respondents claim in their answer that the tax is an annual fixed business tax,
not a percentage tax on sales, imposable by a municipality under Section 19(A-1) of the
Local Tax Code. The Acting Secretary of Finance, in his letter of April 14, 1977,
upholding the validity of said tax on the ground that the same is an annual graduated
fixed tax imposed on the privilege to engage in business, and not a percentage tax
on sales which consists of a fixed percentage of the proceeds realized out of every sale
transaction of taxable items sold by the taxpayer. The trial court denied the prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that "the collection of taxes cannot be
enjoined".Issues1.

ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction be issued.

RULING:

According to the Supreme Court, Taxes are lifeblood of the government. The
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction will delay the functions of the government.
Furthermore, such action will run counter to the well settled rule that laws are presumed
to be valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal
terms. A court should issue a writ of preliminary injunction only when the petitioner
assailing a statute has made out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough
to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, aside from a
showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The case at bar, however, presents
no features sufficient to overcome such presumption. There mere fact that a statute is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement
enjoined.
388. GOVERNOR PABLO P. GARCIA,

vs. HON. JOSE P. BURGOS

G.R. No. 124130. June 29, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioners, through Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assail the validity of three Orders of Judge Jose P.
Burgos of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The first assailed Order, dated February 22, 1996, denied
herein Petitioner Tomas R. Osmeas Omnibus Motion with Opposition to the Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, which prayed that said application be cancelled or its hearing deferred, and that
the temporary restraining order already issued in favor of herein private respondent be lifted.

During the summary hearing, defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the court to issue the same,
citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1818. It was also pointed out to herein respondent judge that
the Supreme Court, in Administrative Circular 13-93, pursuant to P.D. 1818, and in implementation of
the policy behind the law, prohibited all judges of all courts from issuing TROs and/or writs of
preliminary injunction against the implementation of government infrastructure projects.

ISSUE:

Whether or not issuance of preliminary Injunction is void and improper.

RULING:

Section 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute,
or controversy involving an infrastructure project of the government, to prohibit any person or persons,
entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of
any such project, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.

The issuance of said writ of preliminary injunction evidently constitutes a blatant violation of PD 1818.
The assailed Order is therefore void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion and without
jurisdiction
389.

HON. SALVADOR M. MISON

vs.
HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 82586. September 11, 1992

FACTS:

Butch Martinez informed the Commissioner of Customs through a letter of the

existence of both "assembled and disassembled" knocked-down vehicles, owned by a
certain Mr. Castro and located at St. Jude Avenue, St. Jude Village, San Fernando,
Pampanga. Martinez requested for an immediate investigation thereon and prosecution
for the violation of customs laws.

Gen. Benjamin C. Cruz, Acting Director of the National Customs Police, formed a
team issuing the same a Mission Order on February 11,1988. The team proceeded to
San Fernando, Pampanga on the same day. Upon arrival at the place ,the team found a
fenced area containing twenty (20) units of fully and partly assembled Toyota Lite Ace
vans. It immediately took possession and control of the motor vehicles by cordoning off
the enclosure. Thereafter, two members of the team were designated to secure a
warrant of seizure and detention from the Collector of Customs herein petitioner Carlos
L. Razo. The latter instituted seizure proceedings against the abovementioned vehicles
for the violation of "Section 2530 (f) and (1)-1 & 5" of the Tariff and Customs Code, in
relation to Central Bank regulations. At about 8:00 a.m. on 12 February 1988, he issued
a Warrant of Seizure and Detention.

When the team was about to haul the motor vehicles away, two (2) RT C sheriffs
arrived with a temporary restraining order issued on that date by the respondent Judge.
The order was issued in connection with Civil Case No. 8109, entitled "Sonny Carlos,
plaintiff, versus Bureau of Customs and/or Customs Police from seizing or confiscating
the vehicles until further ordered, and directed the defendants to attend the raffle of the
case and show cause why a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued against
them. By virtue of the restraining order, the physical transfer of the vehicles was
deferred.

The lawyers of the Bureau of Customs filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging therein
(a) the lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject vehicles in view of
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs over seizure and forfeiture cases,
and (b) the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in issuing the temporary
restraining order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
c
RULING:

The respondent Judge, acted arbitrarily and despotically in issuing the

temporary restraining order, granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying the
motion to dismiss, thereby removing the res from the control of the Collector of Customs
and depriving him of his exclusive original jurisdiction over the controversy. Respondent
Judge exercised a power he never had and encroached upon the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs. By express provision of law, amply supported
by well-settled jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over
seizure and forfeiture proceedings and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise
thereof or stifle or put it to naught.

390.

COMMODITIES STORAGE & ICE PLANT CORPORATION

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

In 1990, petitioner spouses Trinidad obtained a loan from respondent Far East Bank & Trust
Company to finance the purchase of the Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The loan
was secured by a mortgage over the ice plant and the land on which the ice plant stands. Petitioners failed to
pay their loan. The bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the ice plant was sold by public bidding.
Respondent bank was the highest bidder. It registered the certificate of sale on and later took possession of the
property.

On November 22, 1993, petitioner spouses filed Civil Case against respondent bank before the RTC,
of Malolos, Bulacan for reformation of the loan agreement, annulment of the foreclosure sale and damages. The
trial court dismissed the complaint for petitioners' failure to pay the docket fees. The dismissal was without
prejudice to refiling of the complaint.

On October 28, 1994, petitioners filed another Civil Case against respondent bank before the RTC,
Branch 9, Manila for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period. As a provisional remedy, petitioners
filed on November 16, 1994 an "Urgent Petition for Receivership." Petitioners thus prayed for the appointment of
a receiver to save the ice plant, conduct its affairs and safeguard its records during the pendency of the case.

Instead of an answer, respondent bank filed a "Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Plaintiff's Petition
for Receivership." It alleged that the complaint states no cause of action and that venue had been improperly
laid. It also alleged that petitioners failed to pay the proper docket fees and violated the rule on forum-shopping.
The trial court granted the petition for receivership and appointed petitioners' nominee, Ricardo Pesquera, as
receiver.

Respondent bank assailed this order before the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. The CA
annulled the order for receivership and dismissed petitioners' complaint for improper venue and lack of cause of
action. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court is correct in granting the petition for receivership.

RULING:

The trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order for receivership. A petition for receivership
under Section 1 (b) of Rule 59 requires that the property or fund which is the subject of the action must be in
danger of loss, removal or material injury which necessitates protection or preservation. The guiding principle is
the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If an action by its nature, does not require such protection or
reservation, said remedy cannot be applied for and granted.

In the instant case, we do not find the necessity for the appointment of a receiver. Petitioners have not
sufficiently shown that the Sta. Maria Ice Plant is in danger of disappearing or being wasted and reduced to a
"scrap heap." Neither have they proven that the property has been materially injured which necessitates its
protection and preservation. In fact, at the hearing on respondent bank's motion to dismiss, respondent bank,
through counsel, manifested in open court that the leak in the ice plant had already been remedied and that no
other leakages had been reported since.

391.

PACIFIC MERCHANDISING CORPORATION

vs.
CONSOLACION INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC.,
G.R. No. L-30204 October 29, 1976

FACTS:

In Civil Case No. 117811, which was an action instituted by Pacific Merchandising Corporation to collect
the sum of P2,562.88 from Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., who in turn filed a third-party complaint
against Gregorio V. Pajarillo ,the City Court of Manila rendered judgment on April 6, 1964 in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant, ordering the latter to pay the former the sum of P2,562.88 with interest thereon at the
rate of 12% per annum from May 30, 1963 until fully paid, P100.00 as for attorney's fees, plus the costs of suit;
condemning third defendant to pay third-party plaintiff for whatever sums or amounts the latter paid the plaintiff
on account of this judgment.

Third-party defendant Pajarillo appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of First
Instance rendered judgment on August 8, 1964, which judgment was amended on August 25, 1964, affirming the
appealed decision of the City Court .

ISSUE:

Whether or not third party defendant-appellant Gregorio V. Pajarillo is liable to plaintiff for the unpaid
amount claimed

RULING:

When Atty. Pajarillo assumed the obligation of Leo Enterprises, Inc., as a Receiver, there was a
subrogation of the party liable. Under Section 7 of Rule 61 of the former Rules of Court, one of the powers of a
receiver is to pay outstanding debts. The procedure outlined in Section 8 of the Rule, namely, that whenever the
court "shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer exists, it shall, after due notice to all interested
parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the delivery of the funds and other property in his
hands to the persons adjudged entitled to receive them, and order the discharge of the receiver from further duty
as such. In Perez v. Pomar, the Court ruled that where one has rendered services to another, and these services
are accepted by the latter, in the absence of proof that the service ",as rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he
should pay a reasonable remuneration therefore because "it is a well-known principle of law, that no one should
be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of another.
392.

JESUS LIM ARRANZA

vs.
B.F. HOMES, INC. AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 131683 June 19, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation engaged in developing subdivisions and selling
residential lots. One of the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision,
which now sprawls across not only a portion of the City of Parañaque but also those of the adjoining cities of Las
Piñas and Muntinlupa.

Respondent filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a state of suspension of
payments when the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino. The SEC placed respondent under a
management committee. Upon that committee's dissolution, the SEC appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as a
Receiver, and approved a Revised Rehabilitation Plan.

On November 7,1994, Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his duties as a Receiver, and a new Board of
Receivers was appointed for the implementation of Phases II and III of respondent's rehabilitation. The Chairman
of the new board Albert C. Aguirre, revoked the authority given by Orendain.

Petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit against respondent to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF
Homes Parañaque. In its answer, respondent claimed that (a) it had complied with its contractual obligations
relative to the subdivision's development; (b) respondent could not be compelled to abide by agreements
resulting from Orendain's ultra vires acts; and (c) petitioners were precluded from instituting the instant action on
account of Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A providing for the suspension of all actions for claims against a
corporation under receivership. Respondent interposed counterclaims and grayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.

Petitioners thereafter filed an urgent motion for a cease-and-desist/status quo order. Acting on this motion,
HLURB Arbiter Charito M. Bunagan issued a 20-day temporary restraining order to avoid rendering nugatory and
ineffectual any judgment that could be issued in the case; and subsequently, an Order granting petitioners' prayer
for preliminary injunction was issued.

ISSUE:

Whether it is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) that has jurisdiction over a complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision
developer that is under receivership .

RULING:
 The HLURB, not the SEC, is equipped with the expertise to deal over the complaint for specific performance to
enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards to rights of way, water, open spaces, road and
perimeter wall repairs, and security. The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of
that jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case. It is
conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the averments
of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer. Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over
petitioners' complaint because it pertains to matters within the HLURB's competence and expertise

393.

CONRADO ALCANTARA
vs.
HON. MACAPANTON ABBAS
G.R. No. L-14890 September 30, 1963

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to annul the order of the respondent judge removing him as receiver, and appointing
Martin T. Bacaron in his place.

In March, 1957, Alcantara sued Bacaron partly to foreclose the chattel mortgage executed by the latter on
a caterpillar tractor with its accessories. Pursuant to a clause in the mortgage contract, the Davao court
designated Alcantara as receiver of the tractor; and he duly qualified as such. Thereafter, with the court's
approval, he leased the machine to Serapio Sablada. Upon the expiration of the lease, and after Sablada's failure
to return the machine, said court at the instance of Alcantara, declared Sablada to be in contempt of court and
fined him in the amount of P100.00 on October 6, 1958.

Meanwhile, on October 2, 1958, alleging that Alcantara had neglected his duties as receiver, because he
did not get the tractor, Bacaron petitioned the court to relieve such receiver, and to appoint him as the receiver
instead. Alcantara opposed the petition. Respondent judge issued an order dated December 10, 1958, relieving
Alcantara and appointing Bacaron as receiver of the tractor, without bond, with authority to receive the sum of
P2,000.00 in Alcantara's hands as rentals of the tractor, and to the end the same for repairs if necessary.

His motion to reconsider having been denied, Alcantara filed with this Court the instant special civil action.
And his request a preliminary injunction was issued to restrain enforcement of his relief as receiver.
ISSUE:

(a) Whether or not Alcantara's removal is proper.

(b) Whether or not Bacaron's appointment is legal

RULING:

If it was error to remove Alcantara, a clearer error occurred when Bacaron the defendant was
appointed, as receiver without bond, over the objection of Alcantara the plaintiff. The general rule is that neither
to a litigation should be appointed receiver without the other's consent because "a receiver ought to be an
indifferent person between the parties" and "should be impartial and disinterested". Under the Rules of Court, the
receiver must file a bond; and yet Bacaron was exempted from such obligation. The effect of the whole
proceeding was to discharge the receiver ship at the request of the defendant, without so much a bond contrary
to sec. 4, Rule 61, of the Rules of Court. Such mistakes causing prejudice to petitioner, call for interference with
that discretion which usually vests in trial courts in the matter of receivership .The order relieving Alcantara as
receiver and appointing Bacaron in his behalf is annulled.

394.

ENRIQUE ABRIGO
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE UNION C. KAYANAN

G.R. No. L-28601 March 18, 1983

The plaintiffs sought the partition of seven parcels of land under a claim of co-ownership with the defendants.
The plaintiffs claimed that except for one-half of the fifth parcel, two of the defendants, Leon and Enrique Abrigo,
were in possession of the lands. The defendants put up the defense of ownership; they claimed ownership by
hereditary title by virtue of an alleged duly approved Amended Project of Partition in the Testate Estate of
Nazario Abrigo.

On October 21, 1967, the plaintiffs filed an Urgent Motion for the appointment of a receiver to administer parcel
on the ground that numerous squatters had invaded the property to the plaintiffs' great damage and prejudice.
During the hearing for the motion defendants' counsel is absent and pursuant thereto then Judge Union C.
Kayanan issued an Order on the same day appointing as Atty. Pedro S. Nantes receiver. Later, on November 8,
1967, the respondent judge, motu propio, issued an Order appointing Mr. Benjamin M. Santiago as Assistant to
the Receiver.

One of the defendants who is the petitioner herein, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order claiming that
there was no legal basis for the appointment of a receiver under the facts of the case; and alternatively, he
offered to post a bond so that the receiver be discharged. The motion however was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in connection with the
appointment of a receiver.

RULING:

The respondent judge has acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the order for the appointment
of a receiver. The order, in effect, made the clerk of court a sort of a receiver charged with the duty of receiving
the proceeds of sale and the harvest of every year during the pendency of the case with the disadvantage that
the clerk of court has not filed any bond to guarantee the faithful discharge of his duties as depositary; and
considering that in actions involving title to real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained
because its effect would be to take the property out of the possession of the defendant, except in extreme cases
when there is clear proof of its necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss or damage, it is
evident that the action of the respondent judge is unwarranted and unfair to the defendants.
395.

ARTURO Q. SALIENTES
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 66211 July 14, 1995

FACTS:

In September 1980, Arturo Q. Salientes filed a complaint in Civil Case No. C-8682 for annulment
of the titles of private respondents in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City. Salientes
instituted the action in his capacity as the receiver in Civil Case No. C-424 of the same court "to
administer, preserve and protect" all the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 982-985 and 994. The
complaint alleged, that said trial court in a decision dated December 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. C-424,
declared the lands covered by OCT Nos. 982-985 and 994 and known as the Maysilo Estate in Caloocan
City , to be the common property of Isabel Gil de Sola and several co-owners; that no portion of the
Maysilo Estate had been alienated to anybody, much less to private respondents; and that Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 26136, 26137, 26138, 26139, 26140, 56626, 57358, 55525, 57498,
56640, 57427 and 57048 of Register of Deeds of Caloocan City issued in the names of private
respondents covered lots within the Maysilo Estate. The complaint also sought to enjoin private
respondents from proceeding with the ejectment cases they filed against the occupants of the lots
covered by the titles of private respondents.

Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of
action, res judicata and lis pendens. They alleged that Salientes, not claiming to be the owner of the
property subject of the complaint, had no legal interest to protect and that the titles over the lots in
question had been adjudicated in their favor .Said judgments had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Salientes has authority to file the complaint for the recovery of the lots in question
under Section 7, Rule 59 of the Revised Rules of Court.

RULING:

Yes, Salientes has the authority to file the complaint for recovery of the lots in question. In Cahilo
v. Judge De Guzman and La Fuente, 106 Phil. 520 (1959), interpreting Section 7, Rule 61 of the Rules of
Court, which is the progenitor of Section 7, Rule 59 of the Revised Rules of Court, The SC held that a
receiver of a land may be sued by the tenant of said land in that capacity under said Rule, which allowed
the receiver to bring and defend actions in such capacity in his own name. A receiver sued in such a
capacity cannot claim that the plaintiff must first obtain the permission to do so from the Court having
jurisdiction over the receivership proceedings. Under Section 7, Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, "a receiver
shall have the power to bring and defend, as such actions in his own name subject to the control of the
court in which the action is pending”.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a receiver is proper only during the pendency of the case
.It overlooked that even after judgment, a receiver may still be appointed, or if previously appointed,
retains certain powers to implement the execution of said judgment.

396. RAMON RAÑON v. HON. LIWAG,246 SCRA150, July 14, 1995

FACTS:

Judgment was rendered ordering the ejectment of the petitioners. Upon the finality of the
judgments, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition for the removal of the
structures of the petitioners. A similar order was issued in the other caseson March 16,
1984.

The demolition order was not enforced as the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari,
claiming that there was a pending action in another branch of the trial court, in which the
ownership of the lots in question was in issue. The petition was filed with the Court
whichdismissed the petition as nothing but a ‘last-ditch effort to stave off the execution of
the judgments in the eight civil cases. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, but their petition was dismissed. Following the dismissal of the Supreme
Court case, the trial court, on motion of the private respondents, issued another demolition
order.

ISSUE:Whether or not the respondent court cannot grant a motion for execution if the
decision sought to be executed is more than five (5) years from the time it became final and
executory

HELD:

Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judgment may be executed on
motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations,
a judgment may be enforced by action.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case at bench, however, the judgment was never executed since petitioners filed
different actions to stave off the execution of said judgment. Petitioners were at fault and
consequently caused the delay in the execution of judgment for almost ten years.
In ejectment cases, the rule is explicit in that the judgments must be executed immediately
when it is in favor of the plaintiff. This is to prevent further damage to him arising from the
loss of possession. The sense of urgency is more pronounced in the instant case where the
ejectment in favor of plaintiffs (private respondents herein) was decided in 1983 but the
judgments therein were subsequently appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.

397. CIRILO D. DOLAR v. CARLOS L. SUNDIAM, 38 SCRA 616. April 30, 1971.

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside an order of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo dated December 1, 1966, in Special Proceeding 472, granting the
petition of the herein respondent RemigioLumampao for the appointment of a receiver over
two (2) parcels of land subject of a motion, filed by the said respondent Lumampao, to set
aside the sale thereof made by the herein petitioner Luis Tupas, in his capacity as judicial
administrator of the testate estate of one GenerosoTupas, Sr., in favor of his herein co-
petitioner Cirilo Dolar.

FACTS:

GenerosoTupas, Jr. filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
allowance of his father's will and the appointment of an administrator for the deceased's
estate. After the probate of the will and the appointment of the deceased's widow later
replaced by Luis Tupasas judicial administrator of the testate estate, GenerosoTupas, Jr.,
sold to the herein Lumampao, two (2) parcels of land bequeathed to him by his father.
Lumampao, by virtue of this purchase, asked the surrogate court to be allowed to intervene
in the proceedings which the court granted.

Luis Tupas sold to his herein co-petitioner CiriloDolar for the four (4) parcels of land
specified in the motion, inclusive of the 92 hectares previously sold to Lumampao
byGenerosoTupas, Jr. It will be noted that at this time, the validity of the sale to Lumampao
was still pending adjudication in the Court of Appeals.

Lumampao, in his capacity as intervenor in the settlement proceedings, filed with the
surrogate court an amended motion to set aside the order of the said court insofar as it
authorized the sale of the two (2) parcels of land conveyed to him by GenerosoTupas, Jr.
Lumampao filed with the probate court a petition for the appointment of a receiver over the
two parcels of land conveyed and adjudicated to him.The probate court granted
Lumampao's petition. Tupas and Dolar filed petition to set aside the receivership order.

ISSUE:Whether or notthe respondent court has no jurisdiction to grant receivership over

the said parcels of land in dispute

HELD:

A piece of property which originally is a part of the estate of a deceased person is sold by an
heir of the deceased having a valid claim thereto, and said piece of property is, by mistake,
subsequently inventoried or considered part of the deceased’s estate subject to settlement,
and, thereafter, with the authority and approval of the probate court, is sold once more to
another person, a receiver of the property so sold may, during the pendency of a motion to
set aside the second sale, be appointed by the court when in its sound judgment the grant
of such temporary relief is reasonably necessary to secure and protest the rights of its real
owner against any danger of loss or material injury to him arising from the use and
enjoyment thereof by another who manifestly cannot acquire any right of dominion thereon
because the approving surrogate court had already lost jurisdiction to authorize the further
sale of such property to another person.

Ordinarily, a receiver cannot be put on property which is already in custody of the law under
process from another court of competent jurisdiction; and there cannot be more than one
receiver over the same property. In appreciating the foregoing principles, it must be borne
in mind that, thus far, we have proceeded upon the assumption that the estate upon which
receivership is prayed for is under the custody of law. Apparently, the two parcels of land in
dispute cannot be said to be within this category, judged from the records of this case. The
said two parcels of real estate were, by virtue of a final and executory judgment,
adjudicated in favor of Lumampao Consequently, they can no longer be said to form part of
the testate estate of the late GenerosoTupas, Sr. over which the probate court can validly
exercise jurisdiction in connection with the distribution and liquidation of the said estate.

398. DOMINADOR BASAYA, JR v. MILITANTE, 156 SCRA 299. December 11, 1987

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners challenge the assumption of jurisdiction
by Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch XII, over a complaint
for Replevin filed by private respondent, Philippine Tuna Ventures, Inc. against petitioners,
upon the allegation that it is intertwined with a labor dispute so that exclusive jurisdiction
belongs to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Tuna Ventures, Inc. (TUNA), is the charterer of the fishing vessel, the
F/B Caribbean (Vessel). TUNA, Inc. Sometime in 1985, TUNA, Inc. transferred the operation
of the Vessel to a sister corporation, the Eastship Fishing Corporation (Eastship).
Petitioners, twenty-four (24) in all, constitute the crew of the Vessel, with petitioner
DominadorBasaya, Jr., as its Captain.

TUNA, Inc. sought the remedy of Replevin against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
praying that petitioners be ordered to deliver to it the possession of its Vessel, which
petitioners were allegedly possessing in violation of its rights.

In their defense petitioners maintained that they were in possession of the Vessel as its
crew; that their possession is "an extension of the possession of the plaintiff over the
Vessel" and that to deprive them of its possession by a Writ of Replevin would amount to an
illegal termination of their employment.

The Writ of Replevin was ordered issued upon TUNA, Inc.’s filing of a bond in the amount of
P2M. The Sheriff served the Writ on petitioners and they disembarked from the Vessel.
However, after about an hour, they re-embarked and re-took possession.Judgment was
rendered in the Replevin Case declaring TUNA, Inc. to have a better right to the possession
of the Vessel and ordering petitioners to immediately deliver possession thereof.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the Replevin Case

HELD:

Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff.
The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained
by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or
possession of personal property.

The Trial Court, therefore, rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the Replevin Case and aptly
held that, as charterer of the Vessel, TUNA, Inc. has the better right of possession and that
petitioners’ alleged right to possess the Vessel as the crew thereof is not in any way
superior to the right of TUNA, Inc. as such charterer or lessee.

The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The
respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently of the other. In fact,
on 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ
enjoining petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering
petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled
under the Labor Code.

399. BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS 258 SCRA 102,July 5,

1996

FACTS:

The spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Manahan executed a promissory note binding
themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc.. To secure payment, the Manahan spouses executed a
deed of chattel mortgage over a motor vehicle. Carmasters later assigned the promissory
note and the chattel mortgage to petitioner BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of
the Manahans. When the latter failed to pay the due installments, petitioner sent demand
letters. The demands not having been heeded, filed a complaint for replevin with damages
against the spouses, as well as against a John Doe, praying for the recovery of the vehicle
with an alternative prayer for the payment of a sum of money should the vehicle not be
returned. Upon petitioner's motion and the filing of a bond in the amount of P169,161.00
the lower court issued a writ of replevin.

ISSUE:Whether or not a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any
possessor of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a party to the
mortgage

HELD:
A chattel mortgagee, unlike a pledgee, need not be in, nor entitled to the possession of the
property unless and until the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee thereupon seeks to
foreclose thereon. Since the mortgagee's right of possession is conditioned upon the actual
fact of default which itself may be controverted, the inclusion of other parties like the debtor
or the mortgagor himself, may be required in order to allow a full and conclusive
determination of the case. When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the
eventual foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the
mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can properly uphold
the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a valid justification for that action
lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor, who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be
deprived of his possession, let alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage
contract, simply because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

400. THOMAS YANG vs. VALDEZ, 177 SCRA 141, August 31, 1989

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Ricardo and Milagros Morante brought an action in the Regional Trial
Court against petitioner Thomas Yang and Manuel Yaphockun, to recover possession of two
(2) Isuzu-cargo trucks. In their complaint, the Morante spouses alleged that they had actual
use and possession of the two (2) cargo trucks, having acquired them. The trucks were,
however, registered in the name of petitioner Thomas Yang who was the Treasurer in the
Morante spouses' business. TheMorante spouses alleged that they were deprived of
possession of the vehicles when petitioner Yang had the vehicles taken from where they
were parked to the warehouse of Manuel Yaphockun and there they were thereafter held.

To obtain immediate possession of the Isuzu trucks, respondent spouses applied for a writ
of replevin and put up a replevin bond of P560,000.00lThe respondent judge issued an
order of seizure directing the Provincial Sheriff of to take immediate possession and
custody of the vehicles involved. The Sheriff carried out the order. law library

Petitioner Yang moved, on 21 January 1985, for an extension of fifteen (15) days within
which to file an answer to the complaint for replevin. Four days later, on 25 January 1985,
petitioner put up a counter-bond in the amount of P560,000.00 which counter-bond was,
however, rejected by the respondent judge for having been filed out of time.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the spouses are entitled to the writ of replevin

2. Whether or not the defendant’s right to counteredbond has prescribed

HELD:

1. The provisional remedy of replevin is in the nature of a possessory action and the
applicant who seeks immediate possession of the property involved need not be
holder of the legal title to the property. It suffices, if at the time he applies for a writ
of replevin, he is, in the words of Section 2, Rule 60, "entitled to the possession
thereof."chanrobles virtual law library
law library
2. Under Section 5, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to
the plaintiff" require the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within
 five (5) days after the taking of the property by the officer." Both these periods are
mandatory in character. Thus, a lower court which approves a counter-bond
filed beyond the statutory periods, acts in excess of its jurisdiction. In the instant
case, the cargo trucks were taken into custody by the Sheriff on 7 January 1985.
Petitioner Yang's counter-replevin bond was filed on 25 January 1985. The conclusion
of respondent judge that petitioner's right to file a counterbond had already
prescribed is correct.

401. PAGKALINAWANv. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ 21SCRA 1275, Dec. 18, 1967

FACTS:

This decision deals with the specific question of. In brief, this petition presents this
situation: Respondent Judge, the Hon. Amador E. Gomez, acting on a complaint for replevin
filed by the other respondent Norberto L. Dayrit directed petitioner, Nicanor B.
Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the National Bureau of Investigation to turn over to
the Sheriff of Cebu City an automobile which was seized under a search warrant issued by
the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon. Guillermo Santos presiding, as a subject of
the offense of theft or as stolen property.

ISSUE:Whether a court of first instance of one district in a replevin proceeding may ignore
a search warrant issued by another court of first instance

HELD:

Once a court of first instance has been informed that a search warrant has been issued by
another court of first instance, it cannot require a sheriff or any proper officer of the court to
take the property subject of the replevin action, if theretofore it came into custody of
another public officer by virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that
issued such a search may order its release. A contrary ruling would be subversive of a
doctrine steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and
consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts
of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other’s lawful orders.

402. BAGALIHOG v. HON. JUDGE GIL P. FERNANDEZ 198 SCRA614 June 27, 1991

FACTS:
Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a
motorcycle. The petitioner’s house, which was near the airport, was searched with his
consent to see If the killers had sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless.chaTwo
days later, Capt. JulitoRoxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the
petitioner’s motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search
warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles
used by the killers.

The petitioner and several others were charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder
for the killing of Espinosa and three of his bodyguards and the wounding of another person.

The petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas for the recovery of the motorcycle with
an application for a writ of replevin, plus damages in the total amount of P55,000.00
ISSUE:Whether Replevin is proper to recover the possession of said motorcycle

HELD:

It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule
applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule
against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of
litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis.A thing is in custodialegis when it is
shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer
in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.

The circumstance that Judge Fernandez ordered the motorcycle to be deposited with the
clerk of court on motion of the petitioner did not place the vehicle in custodia legis. The
respondent judge had no authority over it because it had not been lawfully seized nor had it
been voluntarily surrendered to the court by the petitioner. The private respondent
observed in his comment that "it is only when the exhibits are offered in evidence and
admitted by the court that they are submitted to the custody of the Court, and, before that,
"they are usually in the possession of the prosecution." Even he agrees therefore that the
motorcycle is not in custodia legis.

Our finding is that the action to recover the motorcycle in the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate will not constitute interference with the processes of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and that, consequently, the complaint should not have been dismissed by the
respondent judge.

403. CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS 222SCRA 85, May 17, 1993

FACTS:

Judge Lauro V. Francisco of after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other
witnesses, issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Canoy seized the vehicle and took
custody thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

A civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu
dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch VIII, presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares.The
petitioneralleging among other things that lawful ownership and possession of the subject
vehicle; that he has not sold the subject vehicle to anyone; that he has not stolen nor
carnapped it.

Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond. The
writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized on by
Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes.cCanoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint
and for the quashal of the writ of replevin.

ISSUE:Whether or not the vehicle can be a subject of replevin

HELD:
It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A
thing is in custodialegis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official
custody of a judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The
reason posited for this principle is that if it was otherwise, there would be interference with
the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under
which the property was taken.virtual law library

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of
possession of the property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin.
It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the
carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a
conflict in jurisdiction could still arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one
court cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of the same court
because they are co-equal and independent bodies acting coordinately, must always be
adhered to.chan

404. LA TONDEÑA DISTILLERS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, 209 SCRA 553, June 8,
1992

FACTS:
The appellate proceedings at bar originated from an action of "replevin with damages"
instituted in the Regional Trial Court of Manila by La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. against a
person named "Te Tien Ho," described in the complaint as a "junk dealer" or owner of a
"second hand store".

La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. (La Tondeña) manufactures and sells a gin popularly known as
‘Ginebra San Miguel,’ which is contained in 350 c.c. white flint bottles with the marks of
ownership ‘LA TONDEÑA, INC.’ and ‘GINEBRA SAN MIGUEL’ stamped or blown-in to the
bottles which specially ordered from the bottle manufacturers for its exclusive use. The
defendant "Te Tien Ho" has in his possession a quantity of the registered bottles worth
P20,000.00.

Judge Santillan issued the writ of delivery prayed for upon La Tondeña’s posting of a bond
in the amount of P40,000. Tee Chin Ho" in his answer prayed for the issuance of "a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

ISSUE:Whether or not the defendant may be allowed to file a motion to dissolve the writ of
seizure

HELD:

The law does not allow the defendant to file a motion to dissolve or discharge the writ of
seizure (or delivery) — on the ground of insufficiency of the complaint or of the ground
relied upon therefor, as in proceedings on preliminary attachment or injunction, and thereby
put at issue the matter of the title or right of possession over the specific chattel being
replevied, the policy apparently being that said matter should be ventilated and determined
only at the trial on the merits.

Thus if a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property taken by the sheriff
restored to him, he should within five days from such taking, (1) post a counter-bond in
double the value of said property, 30 and (2) serve plaintiff with a copy thereof, both
requirements — as well as compliance therewith within the five-day period mentioned —
being mandatory. Alternatively, "the defendant may object to the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon;" but if he does so, "he cannot require
the return of the property" by posting a counter-bond pursuant to Sections 5 and 6.

405. ONG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 201 SCRA 543, Sep. 13,1991

FACTS:

To secure the fulfillment of the obligations of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. to the Solidbank,
and credit accommodations which the former may from time to time obtain from the latter
both parties executed a document denominated as "Pledge Agreement".Under the said
Pledge Agreement, Madrigal Shipping, Co., Inc. gave additional securities or collaterals in
the form of a pledge in favor of the bank, its barge and tugboat particularly described.

Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. failed to pay its obligation to the Solidbank. The creditor bank
had to sell the pledged properties. Nevertheless, when the pledgee bank was to sell the
pledged properties, it found out that the tugboat and the barge had surreptitiously been
taken without the knowledge and consent of the Solidbank. Honesto Ong bought one (1)
MSC Barge No. 601 the same barge which was subject of the pledge from Santiago S.
Ocampo, a successful bidder in a public auction by virtue of a writ of execution issued by
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) .

Solidbankfiled a complaint against Honesto Ong, et al. for Replevin with Damages . The
respondentcourt issued an order for the seizure of the above described personal property
upon posting of a bond in the sum of P1,000,000.00.Honesto Ong filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Seizure, claiming great and irreparable damage would be suffered by him if the
Court would not recall the above stated order. In the same motion, he maintained that he
purchased in good faith MSC Barge No. 601 and even offered to post acounterbond.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is a necessity for the Ongs to post a counterbond

HELD:

This Court has explained that a defendant in a replevin suit, (petitioners Ong in this case)
may demand the return of possession of the property replevined by filing a redelivery bond
executed to the plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff s
affidavit, within the periods specified in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section D, petitioner may "at any time before the delivery of the property to the
plaintiff' require the return of the property; in Section 6, he may do so, "within five (5) days
after the taking of the property by the officer. The intent of the law requiring the posting of
the bond by the applicant is clear and manifest, which is to cover and insulate the
defendant's interest from undue damage. In short, whoever holds the property must post
the bond to stand as security to the non-holder pending the final determination of the case.

Verily, respondent Appellate Court aptly observed that the questioned orders reveal that the
Court a quo exercised prudence in the highest degree. Solidbank was required and has
already posted a bond in favor of the Ongs should the suit for replevin be declared
improper. Conversely, petitioner Ong must post a bond if he seeks the continued possession
of the property, in favor of Solidbank should the suit for replevin prosper.
406. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. v. BAUTISTA 505 SCRA 748, Oct. 27, 2006

FACTS:

Noel Tabuelog, et al, imported 72 secondhand right-hand drive buses from Japan. When
the shipment arrived the District Collector of Customs impounded the vehicles and ordered
them stored at the warehouse of the Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI), a customs-bonded
warehouse. Conformably with Section 2607 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the District
Collector of Customs issued Warrants of Distraint against the shipment and set the sale at
public auction.

The Secretary of Justice rendered an opinion stating that shipments of right hand wheel
vehicles loaded and exported at the port of origin before February 22, 1998 were not
covered by RA No. 8506 unless the same were loaded and imported after said date.

The importers filed a complaint with the RTC of Parañaque City, against the Secretary of
Finance, Customs Commissioner, and the Chief Executive of the SocieteGenerale de
Surillee, for replevin with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory
injunction and damages.The RTC granted the application for a writ of replevin on a bond.

ISSUE:Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
replevin by respondents

HELD:

Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for replevin by
respondents herein, issue the writ of replevin and order its enforcement. The Collector of
Customs had already seized the vehicles and set the sale thereof at public auction. The RTC
should have dismissed the petition for replevin at the outset. By granting the plea of
respondents (plaintiffs below) for the seizure of the vehicles and the transfer of custody to
the court, the RTC acted without jurisdiction over the action and the vehicles subject matter
thereof. It bears stressing that the forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs is a
proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is in the nature of a proceeding
in rem, i.e., directed against the res or imported articles and entails a determination of the
legality of their importation. In this proceeding, it is, in legal contemplation, the property
itself which commits the violation and is treated as the offender, without reference
whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner.36

In fine, the initial orders of the RTC granting the issuance of the writ of replevin and its
implementation are void.

407. SAN JUAN v. VALENZUELA, 177 SCRA 926, October 23, 1982.]

FACTS:

The marriage between Mejia and petitioner San Juan was declared null and void on the
ground of a prior and subsisting marriage between petitioner and one Isabel Bandin. Mejia
instituted the instance action against San Juan seeking support for herself and her two
minor children. Mejia entered the challenged order granting support pendente lite.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.Hence this petition. However, during
pendency of said petition, petitioner filed with the trial court a manifestation proposing a
scheme of payment for the amount of support which had accrued, and seeking to reduce
the amount of support pendente lite to P1,000.00 on the ground that the sum previously
fixed by respondent judge is now beyond his means to pay.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay support pendent lite

HELD:

Unquestionably, the petitioner’s willingness to pay the amount of support pendente lite in
the manner indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent
Judge have rendered this petition moot and academic. The trial court’s order fixing the
amount of support pendente lite is not final in character in the sense that is can be the
subject of modification, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the
obligor to pay the amount fixed for support. Hence, in the instant certiorari petition, the
factual issue of whether the amount of P2,500.00 previously fixed by respondent judge is
now beyond the means of petitioner, should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of
the evidence to be presented at the proper hearing.

408-419 MISSING
420 Mesina vs IAC

145 scra 497 Nov 13, 1986

Facts

Respondent Jose Go purchased from Associated Bank Cashier's checkfor 800,000.00

Unfortunately, Jose left said check on the top of the desk of the bank manager when he left the bank.
The bank manager entrusted the check for safekeeping to a bank official, a certain Albert Uy, who had
then a visitor in the person of Alexander Lim. Uy had to answer a phone call on a nearby telephone after
which he proceeded to the men's room. When returned to his desk, his visitor Lim was already gone.
When Jose Go inquired for his cashier's check from Uy, the check was not in his folder and was nowhere
to be found. The latter advised Jose Go to go to the bank to accomplish a STOP PAYMENT order, which
suggeston Jose immediately followed. Albert went to the police to report the loss of the check, pointing
to the person of Alexander Lim as the on who could shed light on it.

The records of the police show that Associated Bank received the lost check for clearing, coming from
Prudential Bank, Escolta branch. The check was immediately dishonored by Associated Bank by sending
it back to Prudential bank with the words "Payment Stopped" stamped on it. However, the same was
again refunds to Associated Bank on and for the second time it was dishonored. Several days later
respondent Associated Bank received a letter from a certain Atty. Lorenzo Navarro demanding
payment on the cashier's check in question, which was being held by his client.

On Feb. 2, 1984, Associated Bank filed for an action for interpleader naming as respondent Jose Go and
one John Doe, Atty. Navarro's then unnamed client.

On even date respondent bank received summons and copy of the complainant for damages of a certain
Marcelo Mesina. When Marcelo was asked his he came to possess the check, he said it was paid to
home by Alexander Lim in a certain transaction.

Albert Uy filed a motion of intervention and answer one the interpleader. Petitioner instead of filing his
answer to the interpleader filed for a motion to dismiss alleging lCk of jurisdiction in view of the absence
of an order to litigate, failure to state a cause of action and lack of personality to sue.

The trial court in the interpleader case issued an order denying the motion to dismiss of petitioner
Mesina and ruling that respondent Bank's complaint sufficiently pleaded a cause of action for
interpleader.

Issue

Whether or not the orders of respondent Judge of RTC may be annulled by giving due course to the
interpleader suit and declaring petitioner in default.

Ruling

No, petitioner stubbornly insists that there is no showing of conflicting claims and interpleader is out of
question. There is enough evidence to establish the contrary. Respondent bank merely took necessary
precaution not to make a mistake as to whom to pay and therefore interpleader was it's proper remedy.

421 Vda. de Camilo v. arcamo

3 scra 146 Sept. 29, 1969

facts

Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo was the owner of a lot and apartments where Ong Peng Kee was a lessee
since June 1, 1957.

Severino Estrada, Felisa, Susana and Antonio all surnamed Francisco were the owner of the lot and
buolding adjacent to the land of De Camilo.
On Aug. 1,1957, Arthur Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against De Camilo and Ong Peng Kee.
Due to Bannister's failure to appear he was declared in default. Bannister filed for a motion for
reconsideration which was denied.

On Sept. 1, 1957 the 2 commercial buildings of de Camilo, Estrada and the Franciscos were burned
down. Two weeks thereafter Spouses Ong constructed a building encroaching a portion of the land
previosly occupied by de Camilo, and Francisco.

On Dec. 3, 1957, de Camilo filed a case dor forcible entry against Spouses Ong for thw portion belonging
to her wherein the building of Ong was erected.

On Aug. 8, 1958, Estrada and Francisco filed a similar case. In answer to the complaints the Ongs claimed
that the land where they erected their building was leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas.
Pending trial of the two cases, Spouses Ong filed a complaint for interpleader against de Camilo, Estrada,
Francisco, Arthur Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of Malangas. Alleging that the filing of the 3 cases
of forcible entry indicated that the defendants had conflicting interest, since they all claimed to be
entitled to the possession of the lot in question and they cannot determine without hazard to
themselves who was entitled to possession. Interpleader plaintiffs further alleged that they had no
interest in the property other than as mere lessees. De Camilo and Francisco were ordered to
interplead. The cases for forcible entry were dismissed.

De Camilo, and Francisco instituted the present proceedings for certiorari and mandamus. The CFI
decided in favor of De Camilo and Francisco stating that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction.

issue

wheter or not the Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the interpleader case.

ruling

No the JP had no jurisdiction. Sec. 1, rule 14 of the rules of court provides- Interpleader when proper.-
Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a lerson, who
claims no interest whatever in the subject-matter matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting clamimants compel them to
interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.

the petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. their respective claim was
separate and distinct from the other. De Camilo, Estrada and the Francisco only wanted the spouses Ong
to vacate that portion of their property that was encroached upon by tjem when they erected their
building. Furthermore it is not true that spouses Ong did not have an interest in the subject matter.
Their interest was the prolongatiob of their occupancy ir possession of the portions encroached upon by
them. It is, therfore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of interpleader does not exist.
422 Jose Beltran v People's Homesite

29 scra 145 Aug 28, 1969

In 1953 the plaintiffs first occupied their respective housing units in Project 4 under the lease for
People's Homesite & Housing Corp (PHHC) and paying monthly rentals, they were assured that after 5
years of continuous occupancy, they would be entitled to purchase said units.

On Feb. 21, 1961 PHHC announced that its administration and ownership was being transferred to GSIS
as it's payment for it's debts. PHHC later announced that payments made after March 31, 1961 would be
considered as installment payments. However when PHHC transferred it administration to GSIS the new
Chairman-Generel Manager refused to recognize all of its previous undertakings enterd into with GSIS,
while GSIS insisted on its legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contentkion
by both the Government Corporate Counsel and the Sec of Justice. Plaintiffs thus then claimed that
these conflicting claims between the defendant- corporation caused them inconvenience and
incalculable damages as they do not know to whom they should pay.

Aug. 21, 1962 Jose Beltran in tgeir own behalf and in behalf of all the residents of Project 4 Quezon City,
praying that the two defendant government corporation be compelled to litigate and interplead
between themselves their conflicting claims involving project 4.

On Aug. 29, 1962, the defendants filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action.

issue

whether or not the trial court was wrong in dismissing the complaint for interpleader.

ruling

we find no error in the trial court's order of dismissal of the complaint for interpleader, the record
shows clearly that there were no conflicting claims by defendant corporations as agains plaintiff-
tenants, which may properly be compelled in an interpleader suit to interplead and litigate among
themselves. as held in an early case, interpleader is aremedy wherebu a person who has property in his
possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially without claiming any right in both, comes to
court and asks that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation ve required to litigate
among themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation.

423 Almeda v bathala marketing industries

542 scra 470 Jan 28, 2008

facts

sometime in May 1997, Bathala Marketing Industries Inc., as lessee, renewed its Contract of lease with
Ponciano Almeda husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under said
contract Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo St.,
Makati Cityfor a monthly rental of 1,107,348.69 for a term of 4 years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner
terminated as provided in the contract.

During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died.

On Dec. 29, 1997 the Almedas informed Bathala that tgey shall assess and collect VAT on its monthly
rentals. In response, Bathala contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the
contract od lease were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering taht yheir contract was
executed when VAT law had long been on effect.

on Jan. 26, 1998, Bathala received another letter informing them that their monthly remtal should be
increased by 73% pursuant to condition no. 7 of their contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code.
Respondent opposed petitioners demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to
warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted renyals as demanded by the Almedas but continued to
pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract.

On Feb. 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the
correct interpretation of conditions Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice.

On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed for an action for ejectment, rescission and damages for
respondents failure to vacate the premises after demand made by the former. The RTC ruled in favor of
the Bathala stating theat they were not liable for payment of VAT of 10% and any rental adjustment,
there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation. The matter was elevated to the CA. The court
dismissed the appeal with modification in that the order for return of the balance of the rental deposits
and the amounts representing the VAT and rental adjustment is deleted.

Issue

whether or not declaratory relief is proper since plaintiff was in breach when the petition for declaratory
relief was filed before the trial court.

ruling
declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract, or other
written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity
araisinf from instryment, executive order or regulation, or statute and for declaration of his rights and
duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or
validity of provisions in an instriment or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be
justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances.

decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief as follows: 1) the subject
matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract, or written instrument statute executive order
or regulation or ordinance. 2) the terms of said documents and the validity tjereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question. 4) there
must be an actual jsutifiable controversy or the ripening seeds of one between persons whose interest
are adverse. 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination and 6) adequate relief is not available
through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.

It is cavil that that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case. Given all these circumstances,
the court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it,
notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/ rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of
the present petition would write finis to the parties dispute, as it would settle once and for all the
question odf the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.

424 Brother Mariano “Mike” Velarde v. Social Justice Society

G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004

Facts:

2003, Respondent political party filed a petition against Petitioner, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions,specifically on the separation of church and state, wanted relief on the
constitutionality of the acts of religiousleaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or
requiring members of their flock to vote for aspecified candidate. The religious leaders (Cardinal Sin,
Eddie Villanueva, Eli Soriano, Mike Velarde, EranoManalo) said there was no cause of action against
them and no justiciable controversy.

The court a quo opined thatthe endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is
a clear violation of the separation clause.The decision contained no statement of facts, much less an
assessment, or of the court’s findings as to probablefacts, beginning with a statement of the nature of
the action and then the question, and then a brief explanation of theprovisions involved, and then to a
full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church andstate. Without stating
the final conclusion or specifying the relief granted, the decision ended with “So ordered.”
Issue:

Whether or not the endorsement is violative of the constitution.

Ruling

There is no justiciable controversy since the petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of
Petitioner wasviolated by Respondent, did not state what acts were in breach of rights or the
constitution. Respondent did not state ultimate facts. Rmerely speculated without facts that, as religious
leaders, Petitoner had endorsed or threatened to endorse candidates forelective office, and that it
posed a clear and present danger of serious erosion of people’s faith in the electorlaprocess, reinforcing
the belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of the elections, violative ofseparation
clause. No. Furthermore, Respondent did not ask for a declaration of rights, nor stoppage of and
threatened violation; it merely asked for an advisory opinion. Respondent did not state any certainty
that loss for them will occur or thatasserted rights will be invaded. Not even transcendental importance.
The initiatory pleading of SJS immediatelyrevealed gross inadequacy, contained no element of ultimate
facts upon petitioner relied for its claim. It did notspecify the relief sought, merely asked for answer to a
hypothetical question. “Endorsement of specific candidates inan election to any public office is a clear
violation of the separation clause,” found on page10 of the decision is notsufficient.But whether or not
endorsements by religious leaders is unconstitutional is of paramount interest, for it concerns the
governance of the country and its people. Respondent's counsel utterly failed to convince the court that
there are enoughfactual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. OSG sided with Petitioner
insofar as there were no facts to supportthe petition. Even respondentclaimed there were no factual
allegations.

425 PDIC vs CA

GR NO: 126911 April 30, 2003

facts

Respondents had 71 Golden Time Deposits in Manila Banking Corporation. However, Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas issued a memorandum prohibiting MBC to do business in the Philippines and placed it's assets
under receivership. On the next banking day, respondent Jose Abad pre-terminated his 71 GTDs and
redeposit the fund into 28 GTDDs in larger denominations. Thereafter, respondent filed claims for
payment kg the insured GTDs.

Petitioner PDIC argued that the insured GTDs should not be recognized since they were mere derivatives
of respondents previous account balances pre-terminated at the time the MBC was already in serious
financial distress. Under its charter, they contended that they are only liable for deposits received in
the usual course of business.

Consequently, periphery files a petition for declaratory relief against respondents for a judicial deter of
the insurability of respondent. In turn Jose Abad set up a counter-claim against PDIC whereby they
asked for payment of the insured deposits.

Issue

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the payment of the deposit insurance since a petition
for declaratory relief does not essentially entail an executor process. The only relief being granted is a
declaration of the rights and duties.

Ruling

No, the RTC's Acton was proper. Without a doubt, a petition for declaratory relief does not essentially
entail an executory process. However, the4 is nothing in its nature that prohibits a counter-claim from
being set up in the same action.

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent due to petitioner's failure to overcome the
presumption that it was issued in the ordinary course of business.

426 Department of Budget and Management v Manila's Finest Retirees Association Inc.,

520 scra 90 May 9,2007

Facts

On Feb. 25, 1998 R. A. No. 6975 was amends by R. A. No. 8551. The amendatory law re-engineered the
retirement scheme in the police organization. Relevantly, PNP personnel, under the new law, stood to
collect more retirement benefits than what INP members of equivalent rank, who had retired under the
INP Law, received.

On June 3, 2002, in the RTC of Manila all INP retirees headed by Manila's Finest Retirees Association Inc.,
or MFRAI filed for declaratory relief, thereunder impleading, as respondents, the Department of Budget
as Management, the PNP, the NAPOLCOM, CSC, GSIS. The petition in gist alleged that INP retirees were
equally situated as the PNP retirees but whose retirement benefits prior to the enactment of R. A. No.
6975, as amends by R. A. No. 8551, we're unconscionably and arbitrarily excepted from huger rates and
adjusted benefits accorded to the PNP retirees. The GSIS moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and cause of action. On the other hand CSC, DBM, NAPOLCOM and PNP asserted that
the petitioners cannot claim for higher retirement benefits under R. A. No. 6975 because at no time did
they become PNP members., having retired prior to the enactment of said law. The RTC decided in favor
of the INP retirees stating that they are entitled to the same or identical retirement benefits bestowed
upon PNP retirees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law affirming the decision of the trial
court notwithstanding that it is contrary to law and established jurisprudence.

Ruling

We deny. Pursuant tibR. A. No. 6975, the PNP initially consisted of members of the police forces who
integrated into the INP. The INP was never abolished or terminated out of existence by R. A. No. 6975.
Instead, what the law provides is for the absorption, transfer, and/or merger of the INP with the PNP.
The members of the INP whuch include herein petitioners are therefor not excluded from availing
themselves of the retirement benefits accorded to PNP retirees.

Note : No. 427 the same as PCID v CA.

Note : 428 -429 araneta vs gatmaitan and Soriano v araneta tackled as one case

Gr nos. L-8895 and L-9191 April 30, 1957

Facts

The president issued eo 22-prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and eo 66 and 80 as
amendments to eo 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the
coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion of the
effects of trawl dishing

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint injection and/or
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the CFI of Manila, praying that a writer of preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture sand Natural Resources and the director of
Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to declare the same. Null and void, and for such other
relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Issue

Whether or not the constitutionality of an executive order can be ventilated in a declaratory relief
proceeding.

Ruling

For this court taking cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the lower court in the case of Hidalgo
vs. Dela Costa, which involves constitutionality of another executive order presented in an action for
declaratory relief, in effect accepted the propriety of such action.

430 Jumamil vs Cafe

Gr no. 144570 Sept. 21, 2005

Facts

In 1989, petitioner Jumamil filed before the RTC a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for prelim
injunction and wait of restraining order against public respondent Mayor Jose Cafe and the members of
the Sangguniang Bryan of Panahon, Davao Del Norte. He questioned the constitutionality of Municipal
resolution no. 7, series of 1989 which enacted Appropriation Ordinance no. 111, provided for an initial
appropriation of 765,000 for the construction of stalls around a proposed terminal fronting the Panahon
Public Market which was destroyed by fire.

Prior to the passage of these resolutions, mayor Cafe had already entered into contracts with those who
deposited 40,000 each. Some were close friends and/or relatives of the mayor. The construction of the
stalls which the petitioner's sought to stop through preliminary injunction was nevertheless finished
rendering their prayer to be moot and academic. The RTC dismissed Jumamil's petition for declaratory
relief. On appeal the CA affirmed the decision if the trial court.

Issue

Where or not Jumamil has legal standing to bring a petition for declaratory relief.

Ruling

A special civil action for declaratory relief can be files in relation to a contract by persons who are
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instruments may bring an action to determine
any question of the contract, or validly arising under the instrument for a declaratration of his rights or
duties thereunder.

Legal standing or locus standi is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.

Jumamil has legal standing. He brought the petition in his capacity as taxpayer of the Municipality of
Panahon, Davao Del Norte and not in his personal capacity. He was questioning the official acts of the
public respondents in passing the ordinary and entering into the lease contacts with private
respondents. A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge it's validity.

431 Santos v Aquino

Gr no. L-5101 Nov 28, 1953

Facts

Santos was a manager of a theater known as Cine Conception. He avers that ordinance no. 61 imposed
a license tax of 1000 per annul in addition to a license tax on all tickets sold in the theater. The action
purports to obtain a declaratory relief but the prayer seeks to have the ordinances be declared null and
void.

The court ruled that the ordinances are valid and constitutional.

Issue

Whether or not the action is a petition for declaratory relief

Ruling

This is not a petition for declaratory relief, because the terms of the ordinances assailed are not
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning which require a construction thereof by the court. Angels Santos
does not aber not does testify that he is the owner of cine-conception. He alleges hr is only the
manager, for that reason he is not an interested party. The rule that actions must be brought on the
name of the real party in interest applies to actions brought under Rule 66 for declaratory relief. The
fact that he is the manager of the theater does not make him a party in interest.

432. G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO
as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners, vs.VIRON
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority,petitioners, vs. MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM,
INC., respondent.

FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued E.O. 179 "Providing for the Establishment of Greater
Manila Mass Transport System." Under the EO, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila
has been the numerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport
modes;5 and the MMDA had "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals
now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the
mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal
facilities" which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the Greater Manila Mass Transport System Project
(the Project).
On February 24, 2003, Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation,9 filed a petition for declaratory
relief10 before the RTC11 of Manila.
Viron alleged in its petition docketed as Civil Case No. 03-105850 that the MMDA was "poised
to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals
along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation."Viron alleged that
the MMDA’s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their
existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property.
Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a
similar petition for declaratory relief14 against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA
Chairman Fernando. Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their
respective terminals. Mencorp prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the impending closure of its bus terminals which it was leasing at the
corner of EDSA and New York Street in Cubao and at the intersection of Blumentritt, Laon Laan and
Halcon Streets in Quezon City. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-106224.
Mencorp’s petition was consolidated with Viron’s petition which was raffled to Branch 26 of the
RTC, Manila.
By Decision, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. which
empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila’s basic services including those of transport and
traffic management. The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State
as it satisfied the two tests of lawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Viron’s and Mencorp’s
property rights must yield to police power.
On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order
reversed its Decision holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power” that the
authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the
closure of Viron’s and Mencorp’s existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Public Service Act.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court is in fault for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory
relief are not present, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224;
and (2) the President has the authority to undertake or cause the implementation of the Project?
RULING: It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated
petitions to meet the requirement of justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the
Pre-Trial Order.
In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the
essential requisites for their respective petitions for declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners’ contention
that a justiciable controversy was lacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised
and discussed by the parties before the trial court.
The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked
must be ripe for judicial determination.25
The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual
controversy or the ripening seeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before
the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable
when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.27
It is readily apparent from the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, then
possessed of and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning,
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and
regulate networks of transportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the
power to establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and
communications. Such authority springs from the President’s power of control over all executive
departments as well as the obligation for the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17
of the Constitution. Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate,
the President may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.
The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is
generally considered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents,
hence, the investments they have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites.
Eliminating the terminals would thus run counter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID for
being ultra vires.
#433. G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. After, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen and had obtained a divorce decree then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment
or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation.
The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination
Respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry; he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. In this petition, the
OSG raises a pure question of law:

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF

THE FAMILY CODE?
RULING: At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
“Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.”
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried
while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts
its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of
his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and
puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Article 26 thereof states: “All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.”
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case
at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
 The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the
aforecited evidence in his favor.
The petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur are hereby SET ASIDE.

# 434. G.R. No. 175527. December 8, 2008

HON. GABRIEL LUIS QUISUMBING, HON. ESTRELLA P. YAPHA, HON. VICTORIA G.
COROMINAS, HON. RAUL D. BACALTOS (Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cebu), Petitioners, - versus - HON. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA VELASCO, JR., (In her
capacity as Governor of the NACHURA,Province of Cebu), HON. DELFIN REYES, P.
AGUILAR, Cluster IV Visayas Local Government Sector, HON. HELEN S. HILAYO and HON.
ROY L. URSAL,Respondents.

FACTS: The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted a financial audit on the Province of Cebu for the
period ending December 2004. Its audit team rendered a report, Part II of which states: Several
contracts in the total amount of P102,092,841.47 were not
supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into
a contract, as required under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160. The audit team then recommended that the
local chief executive must secure a sanggunian resolution authorizing the provincial governor to enter
into a contract as provided under Section 22 of R.A. No. 7160.
Gov. Garcia, in her capacity as the Provincial Governor of Cebu, sought the reconsideration of
the findings and recommendation of the COA. However, without waiting for the resolution of the
reconsideration sought, she instituted an action for Declaratory Relief before the RTC of Cebu City
alleging that the infrastructure contracts[4] subject of the audit report complied with the bidding
procedures provided under R.A. No. 9184 and were entered into pursuant to the general and/or
supplemental appropriation ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Gov. Garcia alleged
that a separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer necessary.
The trial court rendered a Decision declaring Gov. Garcia need not secure prior authorization
from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu before entering into the questioned contracts. The trial
court declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by
R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue and be sued. The trial court accordingly dismissed the case against
respondent members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On the question of the remedy of declaratory relief being improper because a breach had already
been committed, the trial court held that the case would ripen into and be treated as an ordinary civil
action. The trial court further ruled that it is only when the contract (entered into by the local chief
executive) involves obligations which are not backed by prior ordinances that the prior authority of
the sanggunian concerned is required. In this case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cebu had already
given its prior authorization when it passed the appropriation ordinances which authorized the
expenditures in the questioned contracts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of declaratory relief filed by Gov.Garcia is proper?
RULING: NO. In view of the foregoing, the instant case should be treated as an ordinary civil action
requiring for its complete adjudication the confluence of all relevant facts.
Note should be taken of the fact that Gov. Garcia, both in her petition for declaratory relief and in
her Comment on the instant petition, has failed to point out the specific provisions in the general and
supplemental appropriation ordinances copiously mentioned in her pleadings which supposedly
authorized her to enter into the questioned contracts.
Parenthetically, Gov. Garcias petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed because it
was instituted after the COA had already found her in violation of Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160.
One of the important requirements for a petition for declaratory relief under Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court is that it be filed before breach or violation of a deed, will, contract, other written
instrument, statute, executive order, regulation, ordinance or any other governmental regulation.
In Martelino v. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation,[24] we held that the purpose of
the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute,
deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising
from its alleged breach. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed,
contract, etc. to which it refers. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing
of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. Under such
circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there
is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify, short of a judgment or final order.
Thus, the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the action despite the fact that the subject
thereof had already been breached by Gov. Garcia prior to the filing of the action. Nonetheless, the
conversion of the petition into an ordinary civil action is warranted under Sec. 6, Rule 63 [25] of the Rules
of Court.

#435. G.R. No. 172457. December 24, 2008

CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, and DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS EDWARD
O. BALTAZAR, Respondents.

FACTS: Proclamation No. 420 (the Proclamation) was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos to create
a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in a portion of Camp John Hay in Baguio City. Section 3 of the
Proclamation granted to the newly created SEZ the same incentives then already enjoyed by
the Subic SEZ. Among these incentives are the exemptions from the payment of taxes, both local and
national, for businesses located inside the SEZ, and the operation of the SEZ as a special customs territory
providing for tax and duty free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.[5] In line with the
Proclamation, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Revenue Regulations No. 12-97[6] while the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) issued Customs Administrative Order No. 2-98 which provides the rules and
regulations to be implemented within the Camp John Hay SEZ. However, Section 3 of the Proclamation
was declared unconstitutional in part by the Court en banc in John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v.
Lim. Proclamation No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and effective. [9] Five months
later, the BOC followed suit and demanded of CJH the payment of P71,983,753.00 representing the
duties and taxes due on all the importations made by CJH from 1998 to 2004. For its part, the BIR sent a
letter to CJH wherein it treated CJH as an ordinary corporation subject to the regular corporate income tax
as well as to the Value Added Tax of 1997.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion to dismiss. The OSG claimed that the
remedy of declaratory relief is inapplicable because an assessment is not a proper subject of such petition.
The RTC rendered its assailed order.[17] It held that the decision in G.R. No. 119775 applies
retroactively because the tax exemption granted by Proclamation No. 420 is null and void from the
beginning. The RTC also ruled that the petition for declaratory relief is not the appropriate remedy. A
judgment of the court cannot be the proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief; the enumeration in
Rule 64 is exclusive. Moreover, the RTC held that Commonwealth Act No. 55 (CA No. 55) which
proscribes the use of declaratory relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his tax liability is still in force
and effect. CJH filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied it.[18] Hence this petition.

ISSUES: Whether or not the remedy of declaratory relief proper in this case?
RULING: NO.
The requisites for a petition for declaratory relief to prosper are: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved
must be ripe for judicial determination.[19]
Moreover, the proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a deed, will, contract, or other
written instrument, or the construction or validity of statute or ordinance.[23] CJH hinges its petition on the
demand letter or assessment sent to it by the BOC. However, it is really not the demand letter which is the
subject matter of the petition. A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its
subject matter.
There are other remedies available to a party who is not agreeable to a decision whether it be a
question of law or fact. If it involves a decision of an appellate court, the party may file a motion for
reconsideration or new trial in order that the defect may be corrected.[26] In case of ambiguity of the
decision, a party may file a motion for a clarificatory judgment.[27] One of the requisites of a declaratory
relief is that the issue must be ripe for judicial determination. This means that litigation is inevitable [28] or
there is no adequate relief available in any other form or proceeding.[29]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

#436 G.R. No. L-11357 May 31, 1962

FELIPE B. OLLADA, etc., petitioner-appellant, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.

FACTS: Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant whose name was placed in the rolls of certified
public accountants authorized and accredited to practice accountancy in the office of the Central Bank of
the Philippines. Ollada's previous accreditation was nullified.
Pursuant to the new requirement, the Import-Export Department of the Central Bank issued
APPLICATION FOR ACCREDITATION OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED Form
No. 5) and ACCREDITATION CARD FOR CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS (CB-IED, Form
No. 6) for CPAs to accomplish under oath. Assailing said accreditation requirement on the ground that it
was (a) an unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (b) in excess of the powers
of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional in that it unlawfully restrained the legitimate pursuit of one's
trade, Ollada filed a petition for Declaratory Relief in the Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify said
accreditation requirement.
The Central Bank filed a motion to dismiss the petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of cause of
action. Its main contention was that the Central Bank has the responsibility of administering the Monetary
Banking System of the Republic and is authorized to prepare and issue rules and regulations to make
effective the discharge of such responsibility. That the accreditation requirement alleged in the petition
was issued in the exercise of such power and authority.

ISSUE: whether or not upon the facts alleged in the petition for Declaratory Relief and others elicited
from the parties and made of record by them prior to the issuance of the order appealed from, this case
was properly dismissed?

RULING: the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed.

It appears, therefore, that after respondent had eliminated said objectionable features, the petition for
declaratory relief has become groundless and should be dismissed.

Without deciding the question of whether the petition under consideration has, in reality "become
groundless", we believe that, upon the facts appearing of record, said petition was correctly dismissed.

Petitioner commenced this action as, and clearly intended it to be one for Declaratory Relief under the
provisions of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. On the question of when a special civil action of this nature
would prosper, we have already held that the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after
a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation
arising from the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner
himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury — all these giving
him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil action or proceeding. The
dismissal of the action was, therefore, proper in the light of our ruling in De Borja vs. Villadolid, 47 O.G.
(5) p. 2315, and Samson vs. Andal, G.R. No. L-3439, July 31, 1951, where we held that an action for
declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract, statutes or right, and that it
is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach — which would constitute actionable
violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available
through the means of other existing forms of action or proceeding (1 C.J.S. 1027-1028).

#437 G.R. No. L-29535. February 27, 1971.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FELISA LIM (Alias Lam Bit Sha) FOR
REPATRIATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63. FELISA LIM (Alias Lam Bit
Sha), Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

FACTS: petitioner Felisa Lim filed with court of First Instance of Zamboanga City a petition alleging
that she was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. That she lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of
marriage to a Chinese in Canton, China. That she has the intention to reacquire her Philippine citizenship
and to renounce all allegiance and fidelity to China. That she has all the qualifications to be repatriated
and that she and her minor children are holders of immigration papers and were admitted into the
Philippines as permanent residents. Premised upon these allegations, Felisa Lim prayed that she "be
permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and thus repatriated." Despite the opposition
thereto of the Government, the lower court rendered a decision declaring that Felisa Lim was a citizen of
the Philippines before her marriage and that she may be repatriated as such citizen. Hence, this appeal by
the Solicitor General who maintains that the lower court erred "in declaring petitioner ‘repatriated’ as a
citizen of the Philippines," upon the ground that she had not duly established either the nationality of her
alleged father, Lorenzo, or her alleged relation with him, and that Under our laws, there can be no action
or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual, only as an incident of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy may the Court pass upon and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was a citizen of the Philippines before she contracted marriage to a
Chinese national?
RULING: Thru her petition herein, she hopes to establish that she was a citizen of the Philippines before
she contracted marriage. As a consequence, her petition is, in effect, one for a declaratory relief, which
this Court has repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natural persons.
In Feliseta Tan v. Republic, the judgment was set aside by the Supreme Court upon the ground that:
"Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when ‘any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute
or ordinance,’ demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above
circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that there is no
proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.library
virtua1aw library
Of particular relevance to the case at bar is the following pronouncement made in Delumen v.
Republic of the Philippines:
". . . there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleged status of the appellees as
Filipino citizens had in any instance been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority.
Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered themselves and were considered by their
friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were
registered voters for the elections of 1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions their
citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say, as appellees do, that an actual controversy arose
after the filing by the Solicitor General of an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of
action must be made out by the allegations or the complaint or petition, without the aid of the answer. As
a matter of fact, the answer herein alleges that the petition states no cause of action. In essence, the
appellees merely wanted to remove all doubts in their minds as to their citizenship, but an action for
declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstract
or theoretical question, or to decide claims which are uncertain or hypothetical. (1 C. J. S., p. 1024.) And
the fact that appellee’s desires are thwarted by their ‘own doubts, or by fears of others . . . does not confer
a cause of action.’ (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. II, p. 148, citing Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Assn., 277 U.S., 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct., 507, 509.)."cralaw virtua1aw library
#438 G.R. No. L-22313 March 31, 1966
BARTOLOME DY POCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,
and THE IMMIGRATION OFFICER OF CEBU, defendants-appellees.

FACTS: The petition for declaratory judgment was based on the allegations that petitioner-appellant is a
Filipino, having been born in Cebu City of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father Dy Poco. That
petitioner secured alien certificates of registration in 1947 and 1951. That petitioner-appellant petitioned
the Commissioner of Immigration for cancellation of his name from the list of aliens, which petition was
denied. The Secretary of Justice, to whom the matter was referred, rendered an opinion (Op. No. 72, s-
1965) sustaining the stand of the Commissioner, for the reason that the nationality of the mother and the
illegitimate status of petitioner had not been satisfactorily established. Upon being required by the
immigration authorities to secure an immigrant certificate of residence, petitioner instituted the present
declaratory relief proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The court dismissed the petition, on
the ground that the declaration of citizenship is not a proper subject of a proceeding for declaratory
judgment. Petitioner has appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's citizenship cannot properly be passed upon in a declaratory relief
proceeding?

RULING: It may be pointed out, however, that notwithstanding the manner in which the petition was
worded, it is clear from all the allegations thereof that the relief being sought therein is a declaration of
petitioner's alleged Philippine citizenship. As consistently ruled by this Court, the proceeding for
declaratory relief is the proper and available remedy to secure such declaration of citizenship.
But, even assuming for the sake of argument, that the issue raised in this case can properly be the
subject of a declaratory judgment, the dismissal of the petition must still be sustained.
Appellant's claim to Philippine citizenship, or "exemption from compliance with the requirements
of the Alien Registration law", as he wants to put it, is based on his alleged illegitimacy or that, even if his
parents were legally married, he followed the citizenship of his Filipino mother when the latter became a
Filipino again upon the death of her Chinese husband in 1915. However, both the Secretary of Justice and
the lower court found these allegations not substantiated by evidence. In other words, these material facts
upon which the cause of action was based, were and still are subject to dispute or controversy.
Consequently, no declaration based on such questioned facts can be made.1äwphï1.ñët
The prevailing rule is that "where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be
determinative of issues rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations,
commonly expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment." And, here, the
material issues are the citizenship of the mother and the illegitimacy of the petitioner, and the rights and
status of the latter which are sought to be declared are dependent upon those disputed issues.
It may be observed further that our Rules contain no similar provision. Taking into consideration
the nature of a proceeding for declaratory judgment, wherein relief may be sought only to declare rights,
and not to determine or try issues, there is more valid reason for us to adhere to the rule that a declaratory
relief proceeding is unavailable where the judgment would have to be made only after a judicial
investigation of disputed facts.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
#439 G.R. No. L-21855 January 30, 1968
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF ANDRES SINGSON TO BE ADMITTED OR TO BE
DECLARED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. ANDRES SINGSON, petitioner-appellant, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS: Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization with an alternative prayer that he be permitted to
present evidence of his Philippine citizenship and declared a Filipino citizen. There being no opposition
from either the office of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Fiscal, the lower court received the
evidence for the petitioner. It rendered its decision holding that inasmuch as petitioner was already a
Filipino citizen, there was no need to give due course to his petition for naturalization since it would serve
no useful purpose for him. Accordingly, the lower court granted petitioner's alternative prayer and
declared him a citizen of the Philippines.
However, after the lapse of more than two years, the Solicitor General filed a petition to set aside
the decision and to declare the same null and void. The lower court issued an order declaring the first
decision rendered on August 9, 1960 finding petitioner to be a Filipino citizen, void and of no force and
effect. This order is based on an affidavit allegedly executed by petitioner. In the affidavit petitioner
appears to have expressly renounced all his rights and privileges as a Filipino citizen in the event that he
should be considered as such by virtue of his having been born out of wedlock of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother.
Appellant contends that inasmuch as the original decision did not confer Philippine citizenship
upon him but merely confirmed such citizenship, the doctrine of res judicata and laches prevents the
Government from attacking collaterally the questioned decision more than two (2) years after its
rendition. On the other hand, appellee argues that although the petition for naturalization granted
petitioners alternative prayer that he be declared a citizen, that fact alone did not operate to convert the
case into a petition for declaratory relief nor did the judgment place appellant beyond the reach of legal
remedies available under the Naturalization Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines?

RULING: We find no error on the part of the lower court in allowing (petitioner) to present proof
regarding his Philippine citizenship in (naturalization) proceedings when, in his opinion, the evidence in
his possession proves that he has already that status as would make it unnecessary to press further his
petition for naturalization. There is nothing in the law which would prohibit this alternative procedure. In
fact, this course has been followed in a number of cases wherein the very evidence presented to
substantiate the petition for naturalization rendered the latter unnecessary and the court proceeded to
dismiss the case after pronouncement that petitioner is already a Philippine citizen. Such a
pronouncement is inevitable if we have to sanction the petition for dismissal and it is unfair and unjust to
quash the proceedings if the claim for Philippine citizenship is not substantiated.

At the time the lower court rendered its decision declaring petitioner a citizen of the Philippines, the
ruling in the Sy Quiamsuan and Sen cases was no longer controlling. The lower court thus premised that
decision on jurisprudence which had already been modified, particularly by the case of Suy Chan vs.
Republic (G. R. No. 14159, April 18, 1960

It would seem therefore that the decision of August 9 was the result of an erroneous appreciation of the
applicable jurisprudence at the time. Even so, however, the error did not necessarily render the decision
void, and the same would acquire force and effect unless reversed on appeal or set aside on other
recognized grounds, such as fraud in its procurement.

The stipulation of facts, upon which the parties agreed to submit the case for resolution, does not show
any admission by appellee of the genuineness and due execution of the affidavit in question. All that was
stipulated on in this respect is that when the Solicitor General filed his petition to set aside the decision of
August 9, the affidavit was attached thereto as an annex. When the court a quo set aside its original
decision without affording appellee a chance to present evidence to rebut the Republic's allegation of
fraudulent representation by him, it virtually deprived him of his day in court.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case remanded to the court below for further
proceedings in connection with the motion of Solicitor General to set aside and annul the decision
declaring petitioner a Filipino citizen.

#440 G.R. No. L-5204 March 27, 1953

In re: The petition for declaratory relief of Hospicio Obiles and for cancellation of erroneous
registration as alien. HOSPICIO OBILES, petitioner-appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.

FACTS: In his petition for declaratory relief, petitioner alleges that he is a Filipino citizen by birth and
parentage, residing in Bacacay, Albay. That because "of erroneous belief and fear of criminal
prosecution," petitioner registered himself with the municipal treasurer of Bacacay as Chinese alien, but
that notwithstanding said registration he never intended to give up his Filipino citizenship, and that he
continued to hold himself out as a Filipino citizen.

Against this petition the Solicitor General filed an opposition, alleging that the petition contains no cause
of action and that no actual controversy has arisen against anyone, and that if the petitioner desires to
establish his Filipino citizenship, he should do so in another separate proceeding. The court holds that
there was no actual controversy involved in petitioner's petition because petitioner is merely in doubt as to
his right and no one disputes his claim. That any declaration the court render in the premises will not
terminate the controversy. Therefore, dismiss the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitoner’s petition is for declaratory relief be dismiss?

RULING: An actual controversy has arisen which is concrete and real, which justifies every specific
relief in the form of a pronouncement by the court as to whether the petitioner is a Filipino citizen or not.

The deed or written instrument, which petitioner claims and believes to have given rise to his
cause of action, is his supposed registration as an alien filed in the office of the municipal treasurer of
Bacacay in the year 1941. This instrument is not a contract in which another party or person is involved.
It is a unilateral act of the petitioner himself not affecting nor binding anyone else but himself, not
creating any right or obligation on the part of any other party or on that of the state, and, therefore, no one
has interest therein except himself. By such registration petitioner has not become a Chinese alien. By
such declaration alone no rights and obligations are created, no status fixed or determined. The
registration, however, may be used as evidence against the petitioner himself. There is no allegation in the
petition, however, that by reason of such registration any official of the Government has taken steps, or is
intending to take steps or threatening to take steps, to hold the petitioner to any obligation, responsibility,
or liability. As the petitioner himself candidly admits in his complaint, he is only afraid lest this
registration might involve the loss of his Filipino citizenship. This supposed fear in the mind of the
petitioner is not what the law considers as an actual controversy, or a justiciable controversy, which
requires the intervention of the courts of justice in order that the rights, obligations, or liabilities arising
therefrom may be predetermined. In effect, petitioner's allegations of fact in his petition are entitled to no
more than an advisory opinion, because a ruling on the effect of the registration by petitioner involves no
actual, genuine, live controversy affecting a definite legal relation. (Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, pp.
29, 30.)

Besides, upon closer analysis, especially the prayer of the petition and the allegation to the effect that he
is a Filipino citizen and is ready and willing to submit evidence to sustain this allegation, what the
petitioner desires is to be declared a Filipino citizen in spite of his registration as a Chinese citizen. As
contended by the Solicitor General, petitioner's remedy is clearly not by an action for declaratory relief.

For the reason, therefore, that petitioner's action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy, because
his desire is to be declared a Filipino citizen, and because the facts alleged in his petition constitute no
cause for a declaratory judgment, the judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, affirmed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant.

#441 G.R. No. L-29535. February 27, 1971.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FELISA LIM (Alias Lam Bit Sha) FOR
REPATRIATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63. FELISA LIM (Alias Lam Bit
Sha), Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

FACTS: petitioner Felisa Lim filed with court of First Instance of Zamboanga City a petition alleging
that she was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. That she lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of
marriage to a Chinese in Canton, China. That she has the intention to reacquire her Philippine citizenship
and to renounce all allegiance and fidelity to China. That she has all the qualifications to be repatriated
and that she and her minor children are holders of immigration papers and were admitted into the
Philippines as permanent residents. Premised upon these allegations, Felisa Lim prayed that she "be
permitted to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and thus repatriated." Despite the opposition
thereto of the Government, the lower court rendered a decision declaring that Felisa Lim was a citizen of
the Philippines before her marriage and that she may be repatriated as such citizen. Hence, this appeal by
the Solicitor General who maintains that the lower court erred "in declaring petitioner ‘repatriated’ as a
citizen of the Philippines," upon the ground that she had not duly established either the nationality of her
alleged father, Lorenzo, or her alleged relation with him, and that Under our laws, there can be no action
or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual, only as an incident of the
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy may the Court pass upon and make a
pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such pronouncement is beyond judicial power.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was a citizen of the Philippines before she contracted marriage to a
Chinese national?
RULING: Thru her petition herein, she hopes to establish that she was a citizen of the Philippines before
she contracted marriage. As a consequence, her petition is, in effect, one for a declaratory relief, which
this Court has repeatedly held to be inapplicable to the political status of natural persons.
In Feliseta Tan v. Republic, the judgment was set aside by the Supreme Court upon the ground that:
"Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil action which may lie only when ‘any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute
or ordinance,’ demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder. None of the above
circumstances exists in the case under consideration. And this Court has already held that there is no
proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to be a citizen may get a
declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to his citizenship.library
virtua1aw library
Of particular relevance to the case at bar is the following pronouncement made in Delumen v.
Republic of the Philippines:
". . . there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleged status of the appellees as
Filipino citizens had in any instance been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority.
Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered themselves and were considered by their
friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted in the general elections of 1946 and 1947, and were
registered voters for the elections of 1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions their
citizenship was controverted. It is not accurate to say, as appellees do, that an actual controversy arose
after the filing by the Solicitor General of an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of
action must be made out by the allegations or the complaint or petition, without the aid of the answer. As
a matter of fact, the answer herein alleges that the petition states no cause of action. In essence, the
appellees merely wanted to remove all doubts in their minds as to their citizenship, but an action for
declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or try issues or to determine a moot, abstract
or theoretical question, or to decide claims which are uncertain or hypothetical. (1 C. J. S., p. 1024.) And
the fact that appellee’s desires are thwarted by their ‘own doubts, or by fears of others . . . does not confer
a cause of action.’ (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. II, p. 148, citing Willing v.
Chicago Auditorium Assn., 277 U.S., 274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct., 507, 509.)."cvirtua1aw library
#442 G.R. No. L-47245 December 9, 1977
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE BUDGET
COMMISSIONER, respondents.

FACTS: Considering the allegations, issues presented, and arguments adduced (a) in what the petitioner
has denominated as a "Petition for Prohibition or Declaratory Relief," (b) in the Solicitor General's
Comment on the petition, and (c) at the hearing on November 24, 1977, the Court Resolved NOT to give
due course to the petition and to DISMISS the same, for the reasons hereunder set forth.
(1) The question to be submitted to the people in the December 17, 1977 referendum which reads,
"Do you vote that President Ferdinand E. Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be Prime
Minister after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for in Amendment No. 3 of
the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution?," is in neither the nature nor the form of an amendment.
Presidential Decree No. 1229 which calls for the December 17, 1977 referendum cannot therefore be said
to suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
(2) The matter of whether or not the holding of the December 17, 1977 referendum is
unnecessary because the people had already expressed their assent to the incumbent President's
continuance in office and their approval of his programs of government is a political and non-justiciable
question.
(3) The call for the referendum is explicitly authorized by Amendment No. 7 of the Constitution
which in part provides that "Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the supervision of the
Commission on Elections may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the
will of the people regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest."

RULING: It is clear from the above that the petition does not pose any question of sufficient importance
or significance to warrant the further intention of the Court. The dismissal of the instant petition is
immediately executory.
#443 G.R. Nos. L-9322-23. January 30, 1956.]
TEODORO TANDA, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. NARCISO N. ALDAYA, Defendant-Appellee.

FACTS: Appellant TANDA instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cavite an action for the annulment
of a certain contract of sale with pacto de retro (Civil Case No. 4606). The trial court rendered a decision
declaring the contract valid and absolving Appellee Aldaya of the complaint. After a motion to set aside
judgment and a motion for new trial filed by Appellant were denied by the trial court, Appellant brought
the case on appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from
particularly with regard to the validity of the contract which is disputed by Appellant. After the two
motions for reconsideration filed by Appellant were denied, the decision became final and executory and
the record was returned to the court of origin but Appellant initiated the present case for declaratory relief.
Considering that this action is purposeless because, while outwardly its aim is to seek a declaratory relief
on certain matters but in effect its purpose is to nullify the judgment rendered in the previous case (Civil
Case No. 4606) which was affirmed by the Supreme Court (G. R. No. L-3278). Appellee filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the case states no cause of action. The trial court, acting on the two motions,
entered an order on June 12, 1953 granting the motion to dismiss and allowing the withdrawal of the
original title as already adverted to in the early part of this decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Appellant can seek a petition for declaratory relief?
RULING: The purpose of the case which gave rise to the present appeal is avowedly for declaratory
relief instituted under Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which provides that “Any person
interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute
or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.” And, it is claimed, this case
comes under its purview because its purpose is to obtain a clarification of the decision of this Court in G.
R. No. L-3278 which in the opinion of Appellant, is vague and susceptible of double
interpretation. Appellant contends that the words “other written instrument” should be interpreted as
including a court decision regardless of whether it is final in character or otherwise.
Evidently, a court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words
“other written instrument”, as contended by Appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court
already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified
without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66. Thus, if a party is not agreeable to a
decision either on questions of law or of fact, he may file with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
or a new trial in order that the defect may be corrected (Section 1, Rule 37). The same remedy may be
pursued by a party with regard to a decision of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court (section 1,
Rule 54, section 1, Rule 55, in connection with section 1, Rule 58). A party may even seek relief from a
judgment or order of an inferior court on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence if
he avails of that remedy within the terms prescribed by section 1, Rule 38. Apparently, Appellant has
already availed of some of these legal remedies but that he was denied relief because his claim was found
unmeritorious.
But the fundamental reason why the decision of this Court in the original case (G. R. No. L-3278)
cannot be the subject of declaratory relief is predicated upon the principle of res judicata which stamps
the mark of finality on a case which has been fully and definitely litigated in court. This principle is
sound. It avoids multiplicity of actions.
Finding no merit in this appeal, we hereby affirm the order appealed from, with costs against Appellant.
444. Ollada vs. Central Bank G.R. No. L-11357 May 31, 1962

Facts:

Ollada, a CPA authorized to practice accounting at Central Bank filed in the CFI a petition
for declaratoy relief after his petition for a writ of prelim injunction had been dismissed in
the CFI assailing the enforcement of the Bank with two requirements for CPAs, re: that the
applicant CPA should sign a statement under oath and that, upon accreditation, a CPA
would be governed by the rules and regulations of the Central Bank and not by those of the
Philippine Institute of Accountants. He alleges that because of these requirements he had
suffered serious injury, and that such enforcement has resulted in the unlawful restraint in
the practice of CPAs in the Office of the Central Bank. The CFI dismissed the petition.

Issue: WON a declaratory relief is proper.

Held: No.

The complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a contract, statute or right
has been breached or violated. In the present case such is precisely the situation arising from
the facts alleged in the petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner
himself, respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury — all
these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate ordinary civil
action or proceeding.

An action for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a breach —
which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action for Declaratory Relief
is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the means of other existing forms of
action or proceeding.

445. Kawasaki Port Service Corp. v. Amores

Doctrine: An action purely for injunction is a personal action as well as an action in personam. As a
personal action, personal or substituted service of summons upon the defendant, not extra territorial
service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the Court over the defendant

Facts:

 C.F Sharp Kabushiki (Kabushiki) incurred several obligations from several creditors,
including petitioners herein
 C.F. Sharp & Co (CF Sharp) anticipated that the creditors of Kabushiki will run after it
 Hence, C.F. Sharp prayed for injunctive relief against the petitioners' demand for the
payment of C.F. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha's liabilities
 C.F. Sharp alleged that it is separate and distinct from Kabushiki. That the former is organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines while the latter is under the laws of Japan.
o That it had no participation whatsoever or liability in connection with the
transactions between the latter and the defendants.
 CF Sharp also prayed for declaratory relief that it is separate and independent
corporation, it is not liable for the obligations and liabilities of Kabushiki. (Note: not
available according to the court as no action in court has yet been filed by the creditors)
 As the creditor-defendants are non-residents, without business addresses in the
Philippines but in Japan, CF Sharp asked the court to effect extraterritorial service of
summons.
 Judge Amores authorized the extraterritorial service of summons on creditors
 Naturally, the creditors opposed and filed "Special Appearance to Question Jurisdiction
of This Honorable Court Over Persons of Defendants"
o Alleged that lower court does not and cannot acquire jurisdiction over the persons
of defendants on the grounds that private respondent's action does not refer to its
personal status
o The action does not have for subject matter property contemplated in Section 17
of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, that the action does not pray that defendants be
excluded from any interest or property in the Philippines;
o And that no property of the defendants has been attached
o Action is in personam; and that the action does not fall within any of the four
cases mentioned in Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
 Defense: affects status of CF Sharp and liability for Kabushiki’s indebtedness

ISSUE: WON an extraterritorial service of summons is allowed in this case and therefore the Court
obtained jurisdiction? NO

HELD:
Extraterritorial service of summons is proper only in four (4) instances:
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs:
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent;
(3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and
(4) when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines
 Injunction was asked to enjoin petitioners from demanding from private respondent the
payment of the obligations of Kabushiki. It was not prayed that petitioners be excluded from
any property located in the Philippines, nor was it alleged, much less shown, that the
properties of the defendants, if any, have been attached
 Complaint does not involve the personal status of CF Sharp, nor any property in the
Philippines in which creditors have or claim an interest, or which was attached, but purely an
action for injunction, it is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an action in
rem or quasi in rem
 As a personal action, personal or substituted service of summons on the defendants, not
extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court.
 In an action for injunction, extra-territorial service of summons and complaint upon the non-
resident defendants cannot subject them to the processes of the regional trial courts which are
powerless to reach them outside the region over which they exercise their authority.
446 UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch 89),
National Capital Region, Quezon City, Metro Manila, MANUEL ELIZALDE, BALAYEM, MAHAYAG, DUL and
LOBO,
G.R. No. 97827 February 9, 1993

Facts:

In July 1988, UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the 12th
International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen
reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in
several dailies.

With these acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar as well as newspaper reports and commentaries
on the matter as bases, on October 27, 1988, Elizalde and Tasaday representatives Balayem,
Mahayag, Dul and Lobo, filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against Salazar and
Bailen before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court.

UP filed a motion to intervene with supporting memorandum asserting that, having authorized the
activities of Bailen and Salazar, it had a duty to protect them as faculty members for acts and utterances
made in the exercise of academic freedom. Moreover, it claimed that it was itself entitled to the right of
institutional academic freedom.

Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that: the complaint failed to
state a cause of action; the cause of action, if any, had already prescribed; they are protected by the
guarantees of free speech and academic freedom; the court had no jurisdiction to grant declaratory
relief in a civil action and no justiciable controversy exists.

Said motion to dismiss was denied by the lower court. The same court order held that there was no
necessity to appoint a guardian ad litem for the Tasaday plaintiffs, granted UP's motion for leave to
intervene and admitted UP's answer in intervention dated December 8, 1988.

UP filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but it was stricken off the record and a subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining order it
had earlier issued. It held that the motion to dismiss may not be granted on the ground of insufficiency
of cause of action predicated on matters not raised in the complaint. It ruled that the lower court had
jurisdiction over the complaint for damages as the action was aimed at recovering relief arising from
alleged wrongful acts of the defendants.

Issues:

1)Whether the acts of the defendants are within the protective mantle of academic freedom guaranteed
by the Constitution for which they cannot be made liable for damages.

2)Whether the Tasaday ethnic group is a hoax as the defendants had claimed in a public discussion.

3)Whether Bailen and Salazar infringed on plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they maliciously and
falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax
or fraud upon the public with and under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde.

Held:

Unique Set-up on procedural problem

We are confronted here with a situation wherein an intervenor who made common cause with the
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint after filing an answer in intervention and after the original
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint had been denied. What is more striking is the fact that the
same intervenor sought the dismissal of a complaint where its interest is not apparent. Moreover, the
intervenor founded its motion to dismiss on an extraneous matter which is not even obliquely alluded to
in the complaint.

With this unique set-up, we cannot subscribe to private respondents' contention that the resolution of
this petition is foreclosed by the principle of res judicata.

While it is true that the instant petition and that in G.R. No. 87248 revolve around the issue of whether
or not the lower court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-88-1028,
there is an aspect of the case which takes it out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata.

The said principle applies when there is, among others, identity of parties and subject matter in two
cases. Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner herein while Salazar and Bailen were the
petitioners in G.R. No. 87248 is not a hindrance to the application of res judicata because the situation
is akin to the adding of other parties to a case which had been finally resolved in a previous one. UP
was not an original party-defendant in Civil Case No. Q-88-1028, but it intervened and made common
cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate
academic freedom, both individual and institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial identity of
parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand, represent the same
interests in the two petitions.

Following the provisions of Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which states that any of the grounds
for dismissal provided for in Section I of the same Rule "except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense," UP filed a motion for a preliminary hearing on the special defenses, specifically
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action which it pleaded in its
answer in intervention. As Section 5 provides, the result would be the same — "as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed." It was the lower court's Order of May 15, 1989 ascribing no merit to UP's special
defenses, which was first presented to this Court for nullification on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, through the petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 88664. The petition
having been referred to the Court of Appeals, the propriety of the same Order of May 15, 1989 was
resolved against UP by said appellate court on March 12, 1991.

Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to herein facts would be stretching to its limits the requirement of
identity of subject matter. Moreover, the fact that the resolution of Civil Case No. Q-88-1028 would
inevitably create an impact, not only on the academic community but also on the cultural minorities, we
need to scrutinize more closely the validity of the Order denying the motion to dismiss. It bears stressing
that res judicata may not be held applicable where justice may have to be sacrificed for the rigid rules of
technicality.

Academic freedom vs legal procedures

As its first ground for the allowance of the petition, UP contends that the allegations in the complaint
regarding the acts and statements of Bailen and Salazar are "protected by the mantle of the institutional
academic freedom of UP and are therefore privileged communications which cannot give rise to any
cause of action for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code in favor of the herein private
respondents."

Actually, this ground is a restatement of the two affirmative defenses cited by the petitioner in its answer
in intervention. The lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted these defenses as falling
within the purview of Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which considers as a ground for a
motion to dismiss failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.

On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and Salazar can be made out from the complaint:
their acts and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown
therein to have staged a fraud. The fact that the "hoax" was played up in the media allegedly
aggravated the situation.

This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was improper. In fact, it eventually proned to be
necessary. Coming to the defense of its faculty members, it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts
and utterances of Bailen and Salazar were circumscribed by the constitutionally-protected principle of
academic freedom. However, it should have championed the cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course
of the trial of the case.
 This procedural lapse, notwithstanding, no irremediable injury has been inflicted on the petitioner as,
during the trial, it may still invoke and prove the special defense of institutional academic freedom as
defined in Tangonan v. Paño and in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology.

Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby forfeited their right to notice of subsequent
proceedings and to participate in the trial, petitioner's answer in intervention shall be the gauge in
determining whether issues have been joined. The fact that the defenses raised in said answer were
denied grounds for a motion to dismiss does not affect their value as affirmative defenses in an answer
to a complaint within the purview of Section 5(b), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court. The Order of May 15,
1989 merely "denied" petitioner's affirmative defenses as grounds for a motion to dismiss. Moreover,
under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, the failure of some defendants to answer cannot prevent
the court from trying the case noon the answer filed and thereafter rendering judgment on the basis of
the evidence presented.

Scientific breakthrough vs legal procedures

With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct
ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court is
cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may
not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. 26 As private respondents themselves declare in their
comment, "(t)he complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiffs' dignity and honor, and to protect them
from further vexation.

More explicitly in their comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 18074 before the Court of Appeals, they declared:

Plaintiffs below do not ask the court to rule on so-called scientific or anthropological issues, nor to
interpret scientific or anthropological findings pertaining to the Tasaday. They merely ask the court to
find from the evidence to be presented below — Whether or not Bailen and Salazar infringed on
plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to present
plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with and
under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde.

Indeed, it is not the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and
expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may find congruence in what is
justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper
role and function is the determination of legal issues.

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order of the lower court and the Decision of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED. The lower court is directed to PROCEED with the hearing of the case with
DISPATCH even as it observes caution in the resolution of Civil Case No. Q-88-1028. No-costs.

SO ORDERED.

447. Tadeo v. Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan

G.R. No. L-16474 January 31, 1962

TOMAS B. TADEO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF PANGASINAN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF
MANGALDAN,
EMILIA ACOSTA and LEONCIO MAICONG, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:
1. In the Civil case 10759, spouses Emilia Acosta and LeoncioMaicong sued Tadeo for damages
allegedly for preparing a deed of sale of their parcel of land conveying it to Francisco
Bongatoand fraudulently inducing them to sign the deed of sale which they did sign under the
belief that itwas a partition of their conjugal partnership property they had asked the appellant, a
lawyer andnotary public, to prepare and ratify.

2. The spouses filed again a complaint for estafa (criminal case no. 129).

3. The CFI dismissed the civil case on the ground that upon motion of the counsel of
the spousesdespite the objection of Tadeo.

4. Tadeo filed a complaint for declaratory relief (Civil Case D-413) in the CFI against the
spousesand co-defendant Vicente Torralba praying that the deed of quitclaim executed by them
in favor of Francisco Bongato be declare "the genuine document representing the true intention"
of thespouses and that he (the appellant) relieved from civil and criminal liability arising from
the part hehad taken as lawyer and notary public in the drafting and execution thereof.

5. The criminal case was subsequently dismissed on the ground that the dismissal of the civil
casewhich was prejudicial precluded the continuation of the criminal case which arose from the
sametransaction alleged in the civil case.

6. Spouses again filed a criminal case No. 263 for estafa.

7. The respondents conducted preliminary investigation.

8. Tadeo filed a complaint against the spouses for declaratory judgment alleging that
the dismissalof the civil and criminal cases constitutes a bar to further criminal prosecution of the
appellant for estafa; that all these notwithstanding the appellee Provincial Fiscal and Special
Counsel and theappellee Justice of the Peace Court were conducting the preliminary
investigation of criminalcase No. 263 against the appellant; that the act of the aforesaid
appelleesin conducting thepreliminary investigation in the said criminal case constitutes a grave
abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction; and that there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the appellant. The
appellant prayedthat the appellees be enjoined from conducting the preliminary investigation in
criminal case No.263 for estafa against him.

ISSUE:Whether appellant is entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment.

HELD:No. The pendency of civil case No. D-413 for declaratory judgment, commenced by the
appellantagainst the appellees spouses in the Court of First Instance, was one of the reasons
given by the Justiceof the Peace Court to dismiss criminal case No. 129. However, the appellant
not being one of thecontracting parties to the deed of sale executed by the appellees spouses but
took part only as notarypublic before whom they acknowledged the execution thereof is not
entitled to file an action for declaratory judgment. None of his rights or duties thereunder need be
declared. Another valid and good reason relied upon by the Court in denying the writ prayed
for is that theappellant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
the appropriate caseand at the opportune time, he may set up all defenses available to him and
may appeal from an adverse judgment.

448 MISSING
449. Chua v. Hon. Manuel Lim

G.R. No. L-19639 February 26, 1965

CHUA U, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.
HON. MANUEL LIM, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants

Facts:

Petitioners were and are still owners and operators of the Bijon Factories before the passage of
RA 3018

In The manufacTure of Bijon, petitioners are using rice and/or corn as The principal ingredient.
The congress passed a bill regulating The Trade of palay,rice, and corn (RA 3018). The
federaton of Chinese Chamber of Commerce sent a letter To The government
requestnginformaton as To wheTher The manufacTurers of Bijon are wiThin The scope of The
RA

5.RespondenTs ruled ThaT They are included

6.Pettoners, in a declaraToryjudgmenT, prayed To annul Resoluton No. 10 which declared

ThaTBijonindusTry is included in RA 3018

7.Petitioners and respondenTssubmiT for deTerminatonwheTher RA 3018 is applicable To

TheBijon industry

8.LowercourT found for The petitioners, RA 3018 did noT include “bijonmanufacTures” because
The latter did noT deal in rice or corn or any of iTsby-producTs

9.OSG appealed direcTly To The SC

ISSUE:WheTher or noTdeclaraTory relief should be granTed.

Ruling: We agree with the Solicitor General that this case for declaratory judgment should have
been dismissed for several reasons. In the first place, from the time the Rice and Corn Board
issued a ruling that the petitioners-appellees were covered by the terms of Republic Act No.
3018, the way was open for said petitioners to appeal the Board's ruling to its administrative
superiors, and thereafter institute an ordinary judicial action to contest the Board's ruling and
prohibit it from enforcing the ruling. This Court has repeatedly ruled that the remedy of
declaratory judgment is proper only if adequate relief is not available through other existing
forms of action or proceeding (Ollada vs. Central Bank, L-11357, May 31, 1962; Hoskyns vs.
National City Bank of New York, 85 Phil. 201, cit. 1 C.J.S., 1027). As ruled in Elliot vs.
American Manufacturing, Co., 138 Fed. 2d, 678, courts are loath to interfere prematurely with
administrative proceedings, and will not assume jurisdiction of declaratory judgment
proceedings until administrative remedies have been exhausted.1

A second reason for denying relief is that the declaratory judgment herein sought would
necessarily affect also other manufacturers and processors of rice and corn derivative products
(such as gaw-gaw, face powder, etc.), which were not represented in these proceedings.

In the third place, it is also the rule in this jurisdiction that action for declaratory judgment must
be brought before any breach of the statute or ordinance sought to be tested (Rule 66, sec. 2;
Santos vs. Aquino, 94 Phil. 65).

But even if the declaratory judgment were proper, we believe that the facts stipulated are
insufficient to warrant a verdict in this case. As observed in the appealed decision itself (Rec.
App. p. 26), the avowed purpose of Republic Act No. 3018, as shown in the explanatory note to
the original bill, was to do away with the possibility and practice of aliens creating artificial
shortages of rice and corn by hoarding these commodities, or cornering the market therefor, so as
to enable them to dictate prices thereof. It is thus a necessary point of inquiry whether or not the
producers of derivatives, in which rice or corn is the main ingredient, could singly, or in
combination with others, create an artificial scarcity of the cereals at any given time; and for that
purpose complete data of the consumption capacity of these producers are material. Such
particulars are not available in the record before us.1

450 MISSING
451. Tolentino v. The Board of Accountancy
G.R. No. L-3062 September 28, 1951

Facts: Commonwealth Act No. 3105 was enacted. Section 16-A thereof, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342, authorized accountants to practice their profession under a trade
name. Assailing the constitutionality of the aforementioned provision, plaintiff, an accountant,
filed an action for declaratory relief in the CFI of Manila on the ground advanced that the
assailed provision is a class legislation since by its terms it excludes persons engaged in other
callings or professions from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the
practice of such callings or professions. Included as defendants are Robert Orr Ferguson, and
Hans Hausamann, foreign accountants practicing their profession in the Philippines under the
trade name “Fleming and Williamson.”
Issue: Whether plaintiff has sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 342?

Held: No, plaintiff has no sufficient cause of action. Plaintiff’s main objection centers on the
exclusive character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged in the profession
of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit,
or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are adversely affected,
but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to other professions or callings, who are not
parties to this case. He does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his
rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the defendants. His
complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of said trade name by the
defendants because it is misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore, has no
actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants which may give him the right to
secure relief by asserting the unconstitutionality of the law in question. In order that an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or
conditions: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
These requisite facts are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient
cause of action.

451-455 MISSING
456. NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
G.R. NO. 165001
January 31, 2007

Austria-Martinez, J.:

Facts:

 NEW FRONTIER Sugar Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business

of raw sugar milling.
 August 2002 – New Frontier filed a Petition for the Declaration of State of Suspension of
Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan under the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
 August 20, 2002 – RTC found the petition sufficient and issued a Stay Order dated,
appointing Manuel B. Clemente as rehabilitation receiver, ordering the latter to put up a
bond, and setting the initial hearing on the petition.
 One of New Frontier’s creditors, the Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB), filed a
Comment/Opposition with Motion to Exclude Property, alleging that:
 o New Frontier is not qualified for corporate rehabilitation, as it can no longer
operate because it has no assets left.
o New Frontier’s financial statements, schedule of debts and liabilities, inventory of
assets, affidavit of general financial condition, and rehabilitation plan are
misleading and inaccurate since its properties have already been foreclosed and
transferred to EPCIB before the petition for rehabilitation was filed
o New Frontier, in fact, still owes EPCIB deficiency liability.
 January 13, 2003 - RTC issued an Omnibus Order terminating the proceedings and
dismissing the case. New Frontier sought reconsideration but the RTC denied its
Omnibus Motion.
 New Frontier then filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari
 July 19, 2004 – CA DECISION
o Dismissed New Frontier’s petition
o HELD: Findings of the RTC must be sustained. Since New Frontier no longer
has sufficient assets and properties to continue with its operations and answer its
corresponding liabilities, it is no longer eligible for rehabilitation.
o Even if the RTC erred in dismissing the petition, the same could not be corrected
anymore because what New Frontier filed before the CA was a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of an ordinary appeal.
Issue:
(1) W/N CA erred in dismissing the petition for suspension of payments?
(2) W/N CA erred in holding that certiorari was an improper remedy?

Ruling:

1) REHABILITATION NOT PROPER FOR THERE ARE NO ASSETS TO BE

CONSERVED
 Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to
restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and
solvency (Ruby Ind’l. v. CA).
 Under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation, the RTC must issue a Stay Order
within 5 days from the filing of the petition for rehabilitation and after finding that the
petition is sufficient in form and substance.
o The Stay Order includes the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. It will also
suspend the enforcement of all claims, prohibit transfer or encumbrance of the
debtor’s properties, prohibit payment of outstanding debts; and the withholding of
supply of goods and services from the debtor.
o Any transfer or other disposition made in violation of the Stay Order or the
Interim Rules may be declared void upon motion or motu proprio by the court.
o The stay order is effective against both secured and unsecured creditors. The
relation among creditors of a corporation undergoing rehabilitation is described
by the phrase equality is equity.
o Alemar’s Sibal & Sons v. Elbinias: “During rehabilitation receivership, the assets
are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors to preclude one from
obtaining an advantage or preference over another by the expediency of an
attachment, execution or otherwise. For what would prevent an alert creditor,
 upon learning of the receivership, from rushing posthaste to the courts to secure
judgments for the satisfaction of its claims to the prejudice of the less alert
creditors.
As between creditors, the key phrase is "equality is equity." When a corporation
threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the creditors should
stand on an equal footing. Not anyone of them should be given any preference by
paying one or some of them ahead of the others. This is precisely the reason for
the suspension of all pending claims against the corporation under receivership.
Instead of creditors vexing the courts with suits against the distressed firm, they
are directed to file their claims with the receiver who is a duly appointed officer
of the SEC.”
 However, the suspension of enforcement of all claims commences only from the time the
rehabilitation receiver is appointed.
 Thus in RCBC v. IAC, the foreclosure of the debtor’s properties was upheld because the
Management Committee was constituted only after the foreclosure sale.
 CAB: The foreclosure by EPCIB was made on May 14, 2002 while the rehabilitation
receiver was appointed only on August 20, 2002. EPCIB thus acted within its rights to
foreclose the property and have title transferred to it since the foreclosure was made prior
to the appointment of the rehabilitation receiver.
o The fact that there is a pending case for the annulment of the foreclosure is of no
moment, because New Frontier remains without title to the properties until the
court annuls the foreclosure sale (Yulienco v. CA). In such case, the court has a
ministerial duty to grant a possessory writ over the properties.
o CA, therefore, did not err in ruling that the title to New Frontier’s properties had
already passed to EPCIB; and that New Frontier has no more assets to speak of.
New Frontier does not dispute the fact that the foreclosed properties constituted
the bulk (if not the entirety) of its assets.
 Rehabilitation is of a commercial nature, thus the Interim Rules provide for a summary
and non-adversarial proceeding, which is aimed at expeditious resolution for the benefit
of all parties concerned and the economy in general.
 BASIC PROCEDURE FOR REHABILITATION UNDER THE INTERIM RULES
1) The petition is filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court
2) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
shall issue a Stay Order, which shall provide, among others, for the appointment
of a Rehabilitation Receiver; the fixing of the initial hearing on the petition; a
directive to the petitioner to publish the Order in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks; and a
directive to all creditors and all interested parties (including the Securities and
Exchange Commission) to file and serve on the debtor a verified comment on or
opposition to the petition, with supporting affidavits and documents.
3) Publication of the Stay Order
4) Initial hearing on any matter relating to the petition or on any comment and/or
opposition filed in connection therewith. If the trial court is satisfied that there is
merit in the petition, it shall give due course to the petition
5) Referral for evaluation of the rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation receiver
who shall submit his recommendations to the court
 6) Modifications or revisions of the rehabilitation plan as necessary
7) Submission of final rehabilitation plan to the trial court for approval
8) Approval/disapproval of rehabilitation plan by the trial court
 CAB: The rehabilitation petition was dismissed after due consideration of the pleadings
filed. RTC cannot be faulted for summarily dismissing the petition. This amounts to a
finding that it is unmeritorious. Under Rule 4§9 of the Interim Rules, the court has
authority to give due course to the petition; and it would be wasteful for the RTC to give
due course to the petition even if New Frontier has no assets.
2) APPEAL, NOT CERTIORARI WAS THE PROPER REMEDY; NEW REMEDY PROVIDED
FOR UNDER INTERIM RULES
 Certiorari is a remedy for correcting errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It is an
original and independent action. Being a remedy against jurisdictional errors, it can be
directed against an interlocutory order prior to an appeal, or when there is no appeal
available.
 CAB: The Omnibus Order denying New Frontier’s petition was a final order since it
terminated the proceedings and dismissed the case. It left nothing more to be done. The
proper remedy from such order is an appeal.
 In this regard, A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC promulgated on September 4, 2001 provides that a
petition for rehabilitation is considered a special proceeding given that it seeks to
establish the status of a party or a particular fact.
 Accordingly, the period of appeal provided in paragraph 19 (b) of the Interim Rules
Relative to the Implementation of BP 129 for special proceedings shall apply. Under said
paragraph 19 (b), the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being
required.
 However, it should be noted that the Court issued A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on September
14, 2004, clarifying the proper mode of appeal in cases involving corporate rehabilitation
and intracorporate controversies. It is provided therein that all decisions and final orders
in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799
shall be appealed to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the
RTC.

Petition denied.
457. JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 137914.
December 4, 2002

CORONA, J.

Facts:

Petitioners Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno were charged by Neugene Marketing,
Inc. (NMI, for brevity), through its designated trustee, Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, with the crime of
estafa with abuse of confidence before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bacolod City. On
December 14, 1988, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution absolving the petitioners from
criminal liability due to lack of malice on the part of the petitioners in retaining the money of
NMI. The appeal by NMI to the Department of Justice (DOJ, for brevity) was denied on the
ground that the petitioners did not misappropriate corporate funds.
NMI then filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On January 4, 1991, the
DOJ, through then Undersecretary Silvestre Bello III, ordered the reinvestigation of the
case. Upon recommendation of City Prosecutor Augusto C. Rallos on March 9, 1991 to charge
the petitioners with estafa, Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 were filed.
The petitioners, on May 4 and 21 of 1992, filed at the DOJ petitions for reinvestigation of
the cases but the same were denied on the ground that the trial courts permission should first be
secured before reinvestigation can be conducted in accordance with this Courts ruling in Crespo
vs. Mogul.[4] Petitioners then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings before the trial court on
the ground that there was a need for reinvestigation and there was a prejudicial question in a
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) case pending before this Court docketed as
G. R. No. 112941. The SEC case questions the validity of the dissolution of NMI and the
designation of Atty. Reyes as trustee.
Initially, the trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the DOJ to conduct a
reinvestigation. But, on motion for reconsideration by the prosecutor, the trial court reversed
itself, set aside the previous order and scheduled the arraignment of the petitioners. On January
19, 1996, the petitioners filed another motion to suspend the proceedings, based on the same
ground that the prejudicial question in the SEC case would determine the petitioners guilt in the
criminal cases, thereby necessitating the suspension of the same.
On June 27, 1996, the trial court rendered the first assailed order denying petitioners motion
to suspend the proceedings. Arraignment was scheduled on June 28, 1996. But on the day of the
arraignment, petitioner Lee failed to appear. The trial court then issued the second assailed order,
directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest and fixing an additional bond in the amount
of P30,000 by petitioner Lee.
The petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, questioning the said orders of the trial court. On August 24, 1998, the
appellate court rendered a decision denying the Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals is correct in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
under rule 65 filed by the petitioners?
Ruling:
Yes. We have consistently ruled that certiorari lies only where it is clearly shown that
there is a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked
or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order
may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns
upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the
administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts.
We find that the allegations of the petitioners are not sufficient grounds to qualify as abuse
of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The petitioners present factual
contentions to absolve them from the criminal charge of estafa. The criminal cases concern
corporate funds petitioners allegedly received as payment for plastic bought by Victorias Milling
Corporation from NMI. They refused to turn over the money to the trustee after NMIs
dissolution on the ground that they were keeping the money for the protection of the corporation
itself. Thus, the elements of misappropriation and damage are absent. They argue that there is no
proof that, as officers of the corporation, they converted the said amount for their own personal
benefit. They likewise claim that they already turned the money over to the majority stockholder
of the defunct corporation.
Clearly, the said allegations are defenses that must be presented as evidence in the hearing
of the criminal cases. They are inappropriate for consideration in a petition for certiorari before
the appellate court inasmuch as they do not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court hearing the
said criminal cases but instead are defenses that might absolve them from criminal liability. A
petition for certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent
court acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by it in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which can be reviewed or corrected on appeal
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ordered to conduct the arraignment
with no further delay. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
458.MICROSOFT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BEST DEAL COMPUTER CENTER
CORPORATION, PERFECT DEAL CORPORATION, MARCOS C. YUEN doing
business as PERFECT BYTE COMPUTER CENTER and HON.
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 255, Las
Pias City, respondents.

G.R. No. 148029.

September 24, 2002
Bellosilio , J.:
Facts:
MICROSOFT CORPORATION assails the Order of Judge Florentino M.
Alumbres, RTC-Br. 255, Las Pias City, dated 26 December 2001 in its Civil Case No.
00-0237 denying its application for an ex parte order for the seizure and impounding of
relevant and infringing evidence and the Order dated 1 March 2001 denying
reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner is a US-based corporation. It is not doing business in the Philippines but
has sued in the court below solely to protect its intellectual property rights.
On 4 December 2000 petitioner filed a complaint for Injunction and Damages with
Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and the Provisional Measure of
Preservation of Evidence against Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, Perfect Deal
Corporation and Marcos C. Yuen doing business as Perfect Byte Computer Center. It
alleged that defendants without authority or license copied, reproduced, distributed,
installed and/or loaded software programs owned by Microsoft into computer units sold
by them to their customers in violation of its intellectual property rights. It prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain and enjoin defendants from
illegally reproducing, selling and distributing unlicensed software programs. It also
applied for the issuance of an ex parte order for the seizure and impounding of relevant
evidence that can be or may be found at defendants' business premises.
On 26 December 2000 the Las Pias trial court set petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order for hearing but at the same time denied its application for
an ex parte order ratiocinating that the Intellectual Property Code does not expressly
allow its issuance and that, in any case, the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) AGREEMENT cannot prevail over it. The court a quo also
opined that petitioner's application partook of a search and seizure order available only
in criminal cases. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied on 9
January 2001.
Issue:
Whether or not the court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of
seizure and impounding of infringing evidence?
Ruling:
No. The quest for speedy justice should not be used as a devise to trample upon other
equally laudable policies of this Court. Petitioner's direct resort to this Court in the guise of
speedy justice was in utter disregard of the hierarchy of courts. We find no exceptional or
compelling reason not to observe the hierarchy of courts. Our pronouncement in People v.
Cuaresma is most instructive -

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared
by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra - resulting from the deletion of
the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" - was evidently intended precisely to
relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary
writs which, but for the expansion of the Appellate Court's corresponding jurisdiction, would
have had to be filed with it.

The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of
litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and
sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the
highest tribunal of the land.

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and
guidance of all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require
a more strict observance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed order dated 26 December
2001 of the RTC-Br. 255, Las Pias City, which denied petitioner's application for anex
parte order for the seizure and impounding of relevant and infringing evidence as well as its
order dated 1 March 2001 denying reconsideration thereof is SUSTAINED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
459. MANUEL CAMACHO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS, JR., Graft
Investigation Officer I and/or OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN - MINDANAO, SIXTO
O. DALEON, AIDA AGULO, DESIDERIO ALABA, NORMA TECSON, and the BOARD
OF REGENTS of the UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES;
SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY RENO CAPINPIN of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA,
and NEDA REGIONAL DIRECTOR SANTIAGO ENGINCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 134372

August 22, 2002

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate

School of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba,
are faculty members of said university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317,
which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995. At the
end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5,
respectively.[3] They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr.
Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial
meetings, quizzes, and term papers.
Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the
first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were ghost students in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr.
Daleon. According to them, these ghost students, namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given
passing grades despite their failure to attend classes.
On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner requested the
latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term papers, and record of attendance of the
students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the request.
On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed
that the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the
complaint.
In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to
petitioners letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special
arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioners approval.
Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be
required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course
requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations. However, on December
1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades given by
Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed its
Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.
 Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and
violation of R.A. 6770 was docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132.
On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to
Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws against Dr. Daleon,
Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP Board of Regents, including Dr. Prantilla. On
July 24, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent
members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No. 96-
602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of said
criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative
complaint.
On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints
against respondents. Approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
Issue:
Whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, committed
grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the impugned BOR resolution as it is contrary
to the University Code, violates due process and is based on self-serving hearsays?
Ruling:
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an
extraordinary remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Courts power of
judicial review under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be
subjected to our review under Rule 65.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent
Office had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3,
1997. We note that the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily
verifiable from the records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided
such findings are supported by substantial evidence, as in this case. Graft Investigation Officer I
Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of said Office gave weight to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon as
corroborated by the affidavit of Prof. Concesa P. Lagare, Professor 2 of the College of
Education, USP. These affidavits averred that during the graduate school orientation program
sometime in July 1995, the universitys Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Luz D.
Ancheta, declared that special arrangements between a professor and a graduate student may be
allowed on a case-to-case basis. Dr. Ancheta made this statement in reply to Dr. Daleons query
on the policy of USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether Dr. Daleon could
give grades to students who do not attend classes. In her reply to Dr. Daleons query, the VPAA
even cited her experience when she pursued her doctoral course at UP Los Baos. According to
Dr. Ancheta, she was given a special arrangement by one of her professors. She added that she,
too, had allowed the same special arrangement for her students at the USP Graduate School.
Public respondent also anchored his decision on Article 140 of the University Code, which
provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classessubject to the
modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses.[16] It is undisputed
that at the time that Dr. Daleon handled the graduate class in Ed.D. 317, he had already been
duly designated Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and
was even entitled to the emoluments inherent to the Office of the Dean of the Graduate
School.[17] Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Graduate School,
Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permission of
petitioner.
Further, Dr. Daleons teaching style had the support of the members of the Board of Regents,
the body with the authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on
attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing Resolution No. 2432, S. 1995,[18] not
only did they validate the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo, but they also gave an imprimatur
on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleons instructional approach. In said
resolution, the BOR cited Article 155 and Article 3 of the University Code, thus:
In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of the
University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest partiality in the
performance of their official duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents
below from both administrative and criminal charges. The resolution of that Office is in order for
it accords with the facts and the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated
June 3, 1997, of the Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

460. ROBERT DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORMA
EBERSOLE DEL MAR, respondents.

G.R. No. 139008

March 13, 2002

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts:

The parcels of land covered by the land titles that are sought to be nullified are all owned
by [private] respondent NORMA EBERSOLE DEL MAR by way of inheritance from her lawful
[ascendants]. The original titles were all issued in her name and favor.
 In the early 1970s [private] respondent together with her two children, GERALD and
FLORENCE went to the United States with the intent of obtaining domicile there[i]n and leaving
behind the other son petitioner, and entrusting [to] his [administration] their properties.

In 1974, [private respondent] came back to the Philippines and stayed up until 1978 and
thereafter went back to the US. During her stay, the properties were intact.

Sometime in 1996, [private respondent] discovered that the properties were already in the name
of [petitioner]. [Private respondent] protested because she never had done any act of transfer of
the properties in favor of [petitioner], because her intent was to have these properties to be
eventually divided into THREE (3) equal parts for her THREE (3) children The transfer was
[without] the knowledge of [private respondent]. It was fraudulent and unlawful

Private respondent also claims that petitioner had been duly served summons, but neither he
nor his counsel appeared for pretrial. Hence, petitioner was declared in default. While he did
receive the Order of Default, he never bothered to have it lifted. So, trial proceeded and
evidence ex parte for private respondent was received by the trial court.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On January 7, 1998, Noel T. Tomas, legal researcher and
officer in charge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City (Branch 35), forwarded to
the CA the records of Civil Case No. 35-2373. Buenaventura B. Miguel, chief of the Judicial
Records Division of the appellate court, thereafter wrote a letter dated August 13, 1998,
addressed to Atty. Federico Abuan Jr., counsel for petitioner, stating the following:

Pursuant to the resolution en banc of the Supreme Court, dated February 23, 1984, you are
hereby required to file with this court SEVEN (7) printed copies of the brief, or SEVEN (7)
eleven inches in leng[th] by eight and a half inches in width - commonly known letter size[,]
written double space, copies of said brief together with the proof of service of TWO (2) printed
typewritten or mimeographed copies hereof upon the appellee. The decision of Trial Court shall
be appended to the brief.

On December 8, 1998, Atty. Amado C. Vallejo Jr., counsel for private respondent, moved to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner had failed to file the required brief within the
reglementary period.
As already stated, the CA granted the Motion to Dismiss via the first assailed Resolution.

Issues:

Whether or not CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal for his
mere failure to file his Brief within the reglementary period? And that

Ruling:

No. Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Revised Rules of Court, expressly authorizes the CA to
dismiss an appeal for, inter alia, failure of appellant to serve and file the required number of
copies of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules.
 Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of when the following requisites concur:
(a) a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction; and
(b) there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
annulling or modifying the proceeding.
It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Exceptions to this rule arise
when (1) such negligence is so gross, palpable, reckless and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of the due process of law; and (2) the application of such due process results in the
outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality.
The negligence of Atty. Abuan does not fall under these exceptions. His negligence in this
case was his inexcusable failure to file the required appellants Brief, thus causing the dismissal
of the appeal of petitioner. But the latter was not without fault. He was aware of Atty. Abuans
failure to appear at the pretrial conference, a failure that had placed him in default. Because
petitioner was in default, private respondents evidence was received ex parte by the RTC. No
wonder, the trial court decided against him. Yet, he retained Atty. Abuans services for the
appeal. One is bound by the decisions of ones counsel regarding the conduct of the case,
especially where the former does not complain against the manner in which the latter handled the
case.
Petitioner cannot be said to have been denied due process, because he was afforded the
opportunity to be heard. In fact, he filed an Answer to private respondents Complaint. That he
did not present evidence in his favor was the effect of his being in default and his continued
failure to move that such status be lifted. His claim that he was abroad is unavailing.
We cannot attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Court of Appeals which merely
followed Rule 50 in dismissing the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

461. PCGG vs. Silangan Investors and Managers Inc.

G.R. Nos. 167055-56

March 25, 2010

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

Facts:

On 27 July 1987, PCGG filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaintfor reconveyance,

accounting and damages against Jose, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. (Nieto, Jr.), Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Benedicto, Juan Ponce Enrile,
and Potenciano Ilusorio. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0009.
 On 15 June 1988, PCGG issued writs of sequestration against Aerocom Investors and
Managers, Inc. (Aerocom) and Polygon, stating, By virtue of the authority vested in the
Commission, the above-named [companies are] hereby placed under sequestration, together with
all of the shares of stock, office premises, records, documents, assets and other properties
thereof.
On 3 November 1990, Benedicto and PCGG entered into a compromise agreement.
On 29 July 1991, PCGG filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint for injunction and
damages against Victor, Jose, Nieto, Jr., and Juan De Ocampo.
On 1 August 1991, Jose, Nieto, Jr., Andres L. Africa, Aerocom, Polygon, Belgor Investment,
Inc., and Silangan filed before the Sandiganbayan a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against PCGG. For this purpose, Silangan engaged the services of
M.M. Lazaro & Associates and agreed to pay 15% of the total amount it may recover as
contingent fee. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0127. The Sandiganbayan jointly heard
Civil Case Nos. 0126 and 0127.
In its 7 March 1994 Order, the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of execution of the 3
November 1990 compromise agreement.
In its 25 April 1994 Decision, the Sandiganbayan held that (1) the 15 June 1988 writs of
sequestration were void because the PCGG failed to commence judicial action within the
required six-month period; (2) the 11 April 1986 writ of sequestration was void because it was
signed by only one commissioner; and (3) the acts of PCGG in managing Oceanic were void.
PCGG filed a motio for reconsideration, dated 7 July 2004.
In its 23 December 2004 Joint Resolution, the Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs 7 July 2004
motion for reconsideration and granted Silangans 6 February 2004 omnibus motion.

Issues:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered
the release of the cash dividends, with interest, to Silangan and Polygon because (1) the cash
dividends were under custodia legis, and (2) the acts of PCGG in managing Oceanic including the
declaration of cash dividends were void?

Ruling:
In petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must show that
respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion. In Angara v. Fedman Development
Corporation, the Court held that:

Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in

character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a
limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within
its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one
 where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[43]

In Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court defined grave abuse of discretion:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility

PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion. The Sandiganbayan correctly held that Silanganand Polygon were entitled to their
Oceanic cash dividends, with interest, because the declaration of cash dividends was
valid. PCGG declared the cash dividends before the Sandiganbayans 25 April 1994 Decision
came out. At that time, the 11 April 1986 and 15 June 1988 writs of sequestration were presumed
valid.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Court AFFIRMS the 21 June 2004
Resolution and 23 December 2004 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in
Civil Case Nos. 0126 and 0127, and the 7 July 2005 and 25 October 2005 Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Civil Case No. 0127. SO ORDERED.

462. Julies Franchise Corporation vs Ruiz

G.R. No. 180988

August 28, 2009

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

On 28 July 1999, respondent Dancel, as franchisee, entered into two franchise

agreements with petitioner corporation, as franchiser, over the two bakeshop outlets located in
Rizal Avenue, Dipolog City and Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte. On 8 March 2000,
respondent Dancel entered into a third franchise agreement with petitioner corporation over the
bakeshop located on Balintawak Street, Dipolog City. In 2003, respondent Dancel decided to
renew the franchise agreements for the three Julies bakeshops. Three months before the
expiration of the franchise agreements, petitioner corporation evaluated the performance of the
three Julies bakeshops and the results were favorable. In 2004, respondent Dancel paid the
renewal fees for the next five years of the franchise agreements covering the three Julies
bakeshops. However, when respondent Dancel and his business partner Jose Rodion Uy
dissolved their business partnership, petitioner corporation informed respondent Dancel that it
was terminating the three franchise agreements and that the extended term of the franchises
would expire on 30 June 2005. Uy is the son-in-law of Rodrigo M. Gandionco, Sr., who was the
original owner of the trade name and business style Julies Bakeshop.[1]

On 22 June 2005, respondent Dancel filed against petitioner corporation a complaint for
Specific Performance with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order before the trial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 6108. The trial
court denied respondent Dancels application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
or Temporary Restraining Order for lack of jurisdiction. When the trial court denied his motion
for reconsideration, respondent Dancel filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00740. In January 2006, the Court of Appeals resolved
to grant the Temporary Restraining Order, effective for 60 days from notice, restraining or
enjoining petitioner corporation from terminating the franchise agreements. On 14 August 2006,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition.

Petitioner corporation filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals
denied. Petitioner corporation then filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In a
Resolution dated 12 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for late filing since the petition
was filed beyond the reglementary period of 15 days.[5] Petitioner corporation twice moved for
reconsideration, which this Court denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assiled writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin acts
committed or about to commit outside the trial courts territorial boundaries?

Ruling:
The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of
discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[13]
We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, which merely issued the questioned Writ
of Preliminary Injunction in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals
which has already attained finality. The propriety of the issuance of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was already ruled upon by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated 14 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00740. Such decision has
become final and executory after petitioner corporations appeal to this Court was
denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period.

Except to correct clerical errors, a judgment which has acquired finality can
no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct a
perceived erroneous conclusion of fact or law. There would be no end to litigation
if parties are allowed to relitigate issues which were already resolved with finality.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

463. Vergara vs Ombudsman

G.R. No. 174567

March 12, 2009

CARPIO, J.:

Facts:

The City Council of Calamba (City Council), where petitioner was a member, issued Resolution
No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners within the vicinity
of Barangays Real, Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the public hearing, the choice for the
new city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana and a lot in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba.

The City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001, authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase
several lots owned by Pamana with a total area of 55,190 square meters for the price of P129,017,600.
Mayor Lajara was also authorized to execute, sign and deliver the required documents.
 The City Government of Calamba (Calamba City), through Mayor Lajara, entered into the
following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of Assignment of
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA).

The above documents were subsequently endorsed to the City Council. Petitioner, however,
alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the City Council, a fact duly noted by the
Commission on Audit.

The respondents justified the absence of ratification by the City Council of the MOA, Deed of
Sale, Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment. They cited Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA
7160) which spoke of prior authority and not ratification. Respondents pointed out that petitioner did not
deny the fact that Mayor Lajara was given prior authority to negotiate and sign the subject contracts. In
fact, it was petitioner who made the motion to enact Resolution No. 280.

The Ombudsman explained that ratification by the City Council was not a condition sine qua non
for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior
authorization from the City Council and in this case, Resolution Nos. 115 and 280 were the City
Council’s stamps of approval and authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Aggrieved by the Ombudman’s findings, petitioner elevated the case before this Court. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether all the documents pertaining to the purchase of the lots should bear the ratification by
the City Council of Calamba?

Ruling:

Petitioner contends that all the documents, like the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Sale,
Deed of Mortgage, and Deed of Assignment, do not bear the ratification by the City Council.

In the assailed Order, the Ombudsman held that the various actions performed by Mayor Lajara in
connection with the purchase of the lots were all authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod as
manifested in numerous resolutions. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of
the properties as one that gave unwarranted benefits.

In its Memorandum submitted before this Court, the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, pointed out that the ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for
the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the city. The law requires prior authorization
from the City Council and in this case, Resolution No. 280 is the City Councils stamp of approval and
authority for Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

Section 22(c), Title I of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
provides:

Section 22. Corporate Powers. - x x x

 (c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by
the local chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be
posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay
hall. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Section 455, Title III of RA 7160 enumerates the powers, duties, and compensation of the Chief
Executive. Specifically, it states that :

Section 455. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Compensation. - xxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
city mayor shall:

xxx

(vi) Represent the city in all its business transactions and sign in
its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents
upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or
ordinance; (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)

Clearly, when the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization
or authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod and not ratification. It cannot be denied that the City
Council issued Resolution No. 280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots.

As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not a
condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts. With the resolution issued by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, it cannot be said that there was evident bad faith in purchasing the
subject lots. The lack of ratification alone does not characterize the purchase of the properties as
one that gave unwarranted benefits to Pamana or Prudential Bank or one that caused undue
injury to Calamba City.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution and Order of

the Ombudsman in OMB-L-C-02-1205-L dated 17 March 2004 and 22 August 2005,
respectively. SO ORDERED.
464. Vda De Daffon vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129017.

August 20, 2002

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Concepcion Villamor was married to the late Amado Daffon, with whom she
begot one son, Joselito Daffon. Joselito married Lourdes Osmea, and they bore six children,
namely, Aileen, Joselito Jr., Ana Vanesa, Leila, Julius and Suzette.
Amado passed away on January 21, 1982. His son, Joselito, died on October 25, 1990.
On January 21, 1994, respondents Lourdes Osmea Vda. De Daffon, together with her six
minor children, instituted an action for partition against petitioner Concepcion Villamor Vda. de
Daffon, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. DNA-281 of the Regional Trial Court of
Danao City, Branch 25. Respondents alleged that Amado left several real and personal properties
which formed part of his conjugal partnership with petitioner. Joselito being a forced heir of
Amado was entitled to at least one half of Amados estate, consisting of his share in the said
conjugal properties. However, the said properties were never partitioned between petitioner and
Joselito. After Joselitos death, petitioners behavior towards respondents, her daughter-in-law and
grandchildren, changed. She claimed absolute ownership over all the properties and deprived
them of the fruits thereof. Thus, respondents prayed that the conjugal properties of Amado
Daffon and petitioner be partitioned and that the one-half share of Amado be further partitioned
between petitioner, on one hand, and the respondents as heirs of Joselito Daffon, on the other
hand.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case; (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; and (3) waiver,
abandonment and extinguishment of the obligation. She argued that the trial court cannot take
cognizance of the action for partition considering her claim of absolute ownership over the
properties; and that respondents themselves admitted that petitioner has repudiated the co-
ownership. Anent the third ground, petitioner alleged that Joselito Daffon filed a complaint
against Milagros Marin, who was likewise married to Amado Daffon, for recovery of a parcel of
land in MandaluyongIn said complaint, respondent Lourdes Osmea Vda. de Daffon allegedly
admitted that the land sought was the only property of the late Amado Daffon.
In an Order dated July 22, 1994, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration which was also denied on September 23, 1994.
On October 25, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35536. On November 14, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed decision denying due course and dismissing the petition for certiorari. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated April 21, 1997.
Issue:
Whether or not admitting the facts alleged to the court can render a valid judgment upon the
same in accordance with the prayer thereof?

Ruling:

It should be stressed that in the determination of whether a complaint fails to state a cause
of action, only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered Moreover, a
defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged the court
can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer thereof. The
hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint
and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants

In the case at bar, the complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant (i.e., petitioner herein)
was married to Amado Quiros Daffon and that they begot an only son in Joselito DaffonThe
complaint further alleged that Joselito Daffon later got married to herein plaintiff Lourdes Osmea
and before the former died on October 25, 1990 he sired the six (6) children who are now
plaintiffs with their mother. This, to our mind, was sufficient allegation that Joselito Daffon was
a legitimate son of the spouses Amado and Concepcion Daffon; and that plaintiffs (i.e.,
respondents herein) were likewise legitimate heirs of Joselito Daffon. Admitting the truth of
these averments, there was, therefore, no need to inquire whether respondent minor children
were duly acknowledged by the deceased Amado Daffon. To be sure, the illegitimacy of the said
children and the lack of acknowledgment are matters which petitioner may raise as a defense in
her answer and threshed out by the court during a full-blown trial.

In the same vein, there is no need for the complaint to specifically allege respondents
claim of co-ownership of the properties. The complaint needs only to allege the ultimate facts on
which the plaintiffs rely for their claim

The rules of procedure require that the complaint must make a concise statement of the
ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is essential if
it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A
complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements, namely: (1)
a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35536 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

465. Gabriel L. Duero vs. CA and Bernardo A. Eradel

G.R. No. 131282
January 4, 2002

QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts :

 1988 – According to petitioner, private respondent occupied petitioner’s land in Baras, San
Miguel, Surigao del Sur, with an assessed value of P5,240. Despite repeated demands,
respondent refused to vacate the land.
 June 16, 1995 – Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership against private respondent and Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena.
 Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas entered into a compromise agreement whereby the
latter bound themselves to recognize and respect petitioner’s ownership. Respondent was not
a party thereto.
 January 12, 1996 – Partial judgment was rendered by RTC on the basis of the compromise
agreement. Respondent was declared in default for failure to file his answer.
 February 13, 1996 – Petitioner presented his evidence ex-parte.
 May 8, 1996 – Judgment was rendered in favor of the petitioner, copy of which was received
by respondent on May 25, 1996.
 June 10, 1996 – Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been
occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., and that he turned over the summons
to Laurente in the honest belief that the latter had a better right to the land and was
responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. RTC denied the motion.
 Meanwhile, an administrative case between petitioner and the Laurentes remained pending
before the DENR regional office.
 July 24, 1996 – Respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
reiterating the same allegation in his motion. He also averred that he cannot be made to
vacate the land pending determination of who owned the land, and that the judgment is void
because the indispensable heirs of Laurente were not impleaded.
 September 24, 1996 – The grandchildren on Laurente filed a Motion for Intervention, but the
same was denied by RTC.
 October 8, 1996 – RTC denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment.
 In a Motion for Reconsideration, respondent alleged that RTC had no jurisdiction since the
value of the land was only P5,240. RTC denied the Motion.
 January 22, 1997 – Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted on January
28.
 February 27, 1997 – Writ of Execution was issued by RTC.
 March 12, 1997 – Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
 CA declared the judgment of RTC null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion when it held that the MTC had
jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not stopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
RTC after he had filed several motions before it

Ruling:

Respondent is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. While participation
in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction,
estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful
invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. For estoppel to apply, the
action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel
may become a tool of injustice.

Under the circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and
in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be
waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express
consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of
the proceedings and even on appeal. Even if private respondent actively participated in the
proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against
him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the
action.

Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a
miscarriage of justice. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized
when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before
the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within
the jurisdiction of the MTC. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order
were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case
No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an
injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-
lessee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1075 entitled Gabriel L.
Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to
petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

466. ELADIO DILLENA petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA

CARREON, respondents.
G.R. No. 77660
July 28, 1988

BIDIN, J.:

Facts:

Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on March 7, 1974 and August 21,
1974, in Quezon City and Manila, respectively, leaving an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon,
private respondent herein. On October 21, 1974, Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the deceased
Rufino Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
the Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores Sebastian — Petition for Letters of
Administration" before the then CFI, Branch XXXI, Quezon City. On November 7, 1974, the
said court appointed Fausta Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the purpose of
receiving and collecting all sums of money due and payable to the estate, in addition to the
powers and duties provided for under Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

On October 3, 1975, private respondent executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the

Estate of the deceased spouses, adjudicating to herself all the real properties of the said spouses.

Meanwhile, on November 8, 1978, private respondent, while being the administratrix of

the estate, executed an extrajudicial adjudication of the three (3) fishpond properties of the
deceased spouses in Hagonoy, Bulacan. By virtue of said extrajudicial adjudication, Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 140243, 140244 and 140245 in the names of the deceased spouses were
cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of private
respondent.

On November 13, 1978, private respondent sold in favor of petitioner the three fishponds
in question without the knowledge and approval of the probate court.

The aforesaid vendees were duly furnished with copies of the order dated September 22,
1981. Only Starlight Industries, Co., Inc. appeared on October 23, 1981. Again, the vendees were
required to submit their respective explanations and the hearing on the incident was re-set to
November 11, 1981. Petitioner was again duly served with a copy of said order.

At the scheduled hearing, Starlight Industries Co., Inc. submitted an explanation, thus, the
sale in its favor was approved and confirmed by the probate court. However, vendees Luisa S.
Rodriguez and petitioner Eladio Dillena neither appeared at the scheduled hearing nor submitted
their explanations as to why the sales in their favor should not be cancelled for having been
executed without court approval.
 On August 10, 1984, acting on the claim of Atty. Eugenio Balatbat for attorney's fees on
account of his legal services rendered to private respondent and to the estate, the probate court
approved the payment of said fees to be paid out of the properties of the estate. The same was
ordered annotated as a lien on the transfer certificates of title of the real properties of the estate,
including those properties transferred by private respondent without court approval.

On September 13, 1984, the lower court, on motion of Atty. Balatbat for a definitive
ruling as to the validity of the sale made by administratrix-private respondent to Luisa S.
Rodriguez and petitioner, declared that the transfers in favor of the aforesaid vendees are null
and void and without force and effect for having been made without court authority and
approval. Petitioner was served with a copy of the said order on December 13, 1984.

On July 25, 1985, or after seven (7) months from the time the order of September 13,
1984 was received by petitioner, the latter filed a petition before the probate court in the same
Sp. Proc No. Q-19378 by way of special appearance alleging that said court, in view of its
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, has no power to annul the sale of the fishponds in
question; that the orders annulling the sale are void because he is not a party to Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19378; that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the res, which are located in Bulacan
province.

After hearing the petition and the opposition therein, the lower court, on October 28,
1985, denied the petition and ordered petitioner to return physical possession of the fishponds to
private respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforesaid order which was denied.

On February 20, 1986, a petition for certiorari was instituted by petitioner before the
respondent Court of Appeals and as earlier mentioned, the said court, on November 14, 1986,
dismissed the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on March 2,
1987; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate court, in view of its limited jurisdiction, cannot declare as null
and void, the sale of the questioned properties?

Ruling:

This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. de Gil vs. Agustin
Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. Consequently, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate
action.

It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court before
it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void.
As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a
sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the probate court
is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.

There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition
of the property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected
without authority from the said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize
and/or approve the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can
declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To
uphold petitioner's contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would
render meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. Sales of properties under
administration which do not comply with the requisites under sections 4 and 7 of Rule 89 are
null and void (Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

467. REMEDIOS VELASCO VDA. DE CALDITO, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALIO C.

SEGUNDO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-58187
September 30, 1982

Facts:

The complaint was filed on April 10, 1980. The private respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. In an
Order dated September 29, 1980, the respondent Judge sustained the said contention and ordered
the dismissal of the case. It was reasoned out that the action, being based on quasi delict, the
same prescribed in four (4) years in accordance with Article 1146 of the Civil Code; and the
action having been instituted after more than seven (7) years from the date of the incident, the
same is already barred by the statute of limitations.

Although the order of dismissal was issued since April 11, 1980, it was not until December 17,
1981 that the petitioner instituted this proceeding before the Supreme Court in order to secure a
declaration of its nullity. No explanation was given for the undue delay in seeking the
nullification of the order of dismissal complained of. The petition alleges that the said order of
dismissal is null and void for being contrary to law inasmuch as the proper period of prescription
is ten (10) years and not four (4) years, the acting being based on a contract of carriage and not
quasi-delict. Mention is also made that the respondent judge showed his partiality by
commenting in open court that he considered this case as one of pure harassment, and by
manifesting a "too friendly alliance with defendant's counsel."

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is correct in filing a petition for certiorari as substitute
for appeal?
Ruling:

The questioned order of dismissal is appealable and the proper remedy should have been
to appeal the same. No circumstance had been shown to explain why such procedure was not
observed, nor to justify a deviation from the same as to make available a petition for certiorari in
lieu of taking an appropriate appeal. As may be noted, the petition was filed almost one (1) year
after the issuance of the order of dismissal complained of. Even in situations wherein certiorari is
allowed as a remedy in lieu of appeal, said period may not be considered as a reasonable time
within which to avail of such a remedy. Moreover, the imputed error to the challenged order is
not jurisdictional but merely one of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED, without costs.

SO ORDERED.

468-479 MISSING

480. Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano vs

Hon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, Judge of the Regional Trial Court
G.R. No. 143951,
October 25, 2005

Facts:
On May 10, 1999, private respondent Serquina, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Mangaliag and Solano, before the RTC. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and
his co-passengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their
tricycle with the petitioners’ dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence
of the petitioners in driving the dump truck. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount
of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction. The respondent RTC Judge Pastoral ruled in favor of
relying upon the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 09-94, paragraph 2 which provides that
in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action. the amount of such claim shall
be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. Also, the petitioners’ defense of lack
of jurisdiction has already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively
taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be
unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction.
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or
reliefs sought therein.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that, in the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered
by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the
pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present
controversy. that happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to the CA.
Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this case, there is
no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are note stopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This
Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts,
and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
In the present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent
seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical
suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the
vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the
purview of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-
delict causing physical injuries.
481. Spouses Conrado and Ma. Corona Romero vs
Court of Appeals and Saturnino S. Orden
G.R. No. 142406,
May 16, 2005

Facts:
On April 23, 1996, petitioner Ma. Corona and her siblings executed a letter-contract to
sell with private respondent Orden. In said contract, private respondent proposed to purchase
from Romero a property located Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 145269, for the total amount
of P17M. The parties stipulated in their contract that private respondent shall pay petitioner the
amount of P7M upon the execution of the deed of absolute sale, the balance of P10M not later
than December 19, 1996 and shoulder the expenses to evict the squatters on the property. The
private respondent failed to pay the down payment then rescinded the contract to sell. The
respondent then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages, alleging that he has
complied with his obligation to evict the squatters on the property and is entitled to demand from
petitioners the performance of their obligation under the contract. Simultaneous with the filing of
the complaint, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT No.
145269. The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was denied by the RTC. The
private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the
resolutions of the RTC and asked for the re-annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the TCT.
The CA granted the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the re-annotation
of the lis pendens.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that, the Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit,
refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a
suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy
and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the
court until the litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property
is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does
so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.

482. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs.

Hon. Achilles Melicor
G.R. No. 140954
April 12, 2005

Facts:
On May 21, 1991, Private respondents Balane owned a 1,399 sq. Mt. Parcel of land in
Bohol, a part of which was allowed to be occupied by Hinog, predecessor of petitioners. After
the expiration of their 10-year agreement, the Balanes demanded the return of the occupied
portion but Hinog refused, showing a Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondents filed for Recovery of
Ownership. As a result, the counsel for Hinog withdrew his services and a new lawyer, Atty.
Petalcorin entered his appearance as new counsel and filed a to expunge the respondents’
complaint and nullify all court proceedings because the respondents failed to specify the amount
of damages claimed in their complaint so as to pay the correct docket fees. Respondents averred
that the motion was filed more than 7 years after the institution of the case and that according to
Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rule of Court, the death of the original defendant requires a
substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a litigant. His
motion to expunge did not mention any party whom he represented. The Trial Court ruled that a
specified amount should be stated in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction. It noted that there
was no formal substitution of petitioners as mandated by the Rule of Court to which Atty.
Petalcorin complied. The respondents then paid the deficiency and filed a motion to reinstate the
case which the Trial Court granted. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
directly before the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be
reinstated since the complaint failed to state the specific amount of damages resulting in
insufficient payment of docket fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are allowed to directly file the petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Supreme Court.

Held:
No. The concurrence of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not give petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of correct forum. It would be an imposition upon the precious time of the Court, it would
cause an inevitable and resultant delay in the adjudication of cases. The Supreme Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts
and only under exceptional and compelling circumstances. In this case, no special and important
reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioners to justify
their direct appeal to the Supreme Court. The present petition should have been filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Besides, the writ of
certiorari and prohibition does not avail since they never sought reconsideration of the Trial
Court’s order to expunge and only opposed the reinstatement of the case averring lack of
jurisdiction after their supplemental pleading was denied.
483. Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol & Tibayan, Danilo M. Tungol and Abelardo M.
Tibayan vs.
The Court of Appeals and Erlando A. Abrenica
G.R. No. 143706
April 5, 2002

Facts:
Petitioners and respondent are the registered partners in the Law Firm of Abrenica,
Tungol and Tibayan, a professional law partnership duly organized under Philippine laws. On
May 6, 1998, petitioners Tungol and Tibayan filed before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) a complaint for accounting, return and transfer of partnership funds with
damages and application for issuance of preliminary attachment against their partner, respondent
Abrenica, and claim that a real estate transaction entered into by the herein respondent Abrenica,
defendant therein, was a law partnership transaction. After several hearings SEC Hearing Officer
Roberto O. Sencio, Jr. issued an Order which granted the preliminary attachment of respondent
Abrenicas assets but the respondent Abrenica filed an Omnibus Motion for the inhibition of
Hearing Officer Sencio and the reconsideration of the Order. The motion was denied. The
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the SEC en banc contending that Hearing Officer
Sencio and the Hearing Panel acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction in granting the petitioners application for issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. The CA denied the motion. The petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the SEC en banc, exercising purely appellate jurisdiction, has jurisdiction
and can take cognizance of the issue of excessive attachment which was raised for the first time
on certiorari and not raised before or brought to the attention of, and acted or ruled upon by, the
SEC Hearing Officer/Panel.

Issue:
Whether or not CA exercising its appellate jurisdiction.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court has ruled that the foregoing citations specifically referred to
appellate courts but are equally applicable to appellate administrative agencies, such as the SEC,
where rules of procedure are liberally construed. However, the foregoing rule and the exceptions
thereto are not applicable to the circumstances of the case at bar.
 The SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals overlooked the nature of respondent. The
SEC en banc was not acting on an ordinary appeal which opens the entire case for review. It was
not exercising its appellate jurisdiction; which process is merely a continuation of the original
suit. The petition was brought under the SEC en bancs original jurisdiction via the
commencement of a new action, that is, a special civil action for certiorari.
A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercised its jurisdiction and an error was
committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error was committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. An error of judgment that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original
special civil action of certiorari. The SEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it addressed a non-jurisdictional issue in a
special civil action for certiorari. It sought to correct an error in the enforcement of the writ of
attachment, an error of judgment which is clearly a factual issue involving appraisal and
evaluation of evidence. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the SEC Hearing
Officer/Panel simply because of the alleged mis appreciation of facts and evidence. Erroneous
factual findings amount to no more than errors in the exercise of jurisdiction which are beyond
the ambit of the sole office of a writ of certiorari, namely, the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
484. Fortune Guarantee and Insurance Corporation vs.
Honorable Court of Appeals, Honorable Judge Henedino P. Eduarte
G.R. No. 110701
March 12, 2002

Facts:
On November 11, 1988, Isabela 1 Electric Cooperative, Inc. secured Fire Insurance
Policy from petitioner for Two Million Pesos and was later on expanded coverage to include
typhoons and floods of one year. During the subsistence of the insurance policy, the insured
properties of ISELCO-I were destroyed by two typhoons. ISELCO-I filed successive claims with
petitioner but the later refused to pay the claims.The ISELCO-I filed a complaint against
petitioner for a sum of money with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of ISELCO-I. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and ISELCO-I filed its Opposition to the said Motion for Reconsideration. Trial court denied the
said motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge abused his discretion in issuing a writ of execution
pending appeal despite the fact that its appeal is clearly not dilatory.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that, as a general rule, the execution of a judgment should
not be had until and unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e., the period of
appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal
has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which
event, execution "shall issue as a matter of right." Execution pending appeal in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 3926 of the Rules of Court is, therefore, the exception.
 The requisites for the grant of a motion for execution pending appeal are:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.

Being an exception to the general rule, the requisites of execution pending appeal must,
therefore, be strictly construed. Thus, anent the requisite that there must be good reason
justifying the execution of the judgment pending appeal, we have consistently held that such
good reason must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the
injury or damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Beyond the guideline
set by jurisprudence, however, statute does not determine, enumerate, or give examples of what
may be considered good reasons to justify execution pending appeal.

485. Metro Transit Organization, inc. and Jovencio P. Bantang, Jr. vs.
The Court of Appeals, National Labor Relations Commission and Ruperto Evangelista
G.R. No. 142133
November 19, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Metro Transit Organization, Inc. is a government-owned and controlled
corporation operating a light rail transit, while petitioner Bantang, Jr. is an officer of MTO.
Respondent Evangelista worked as a cash assistant in the Treasury Division of MTO. On
December 29, 1989, after completion of an inventory count of tokens, petitioners discovered that
2,000 pieces of tokens were missing. Petitioners conducted an investigation which resulted in
implicating Evangelista as one of the alleged perpetrators responsible for the loss of the tokens
and filed a criminal case for qualified theft against Evangelista before the prosecutor’s office but
the investigating prosecutor dismissed the case. Evangelista filed a case for illegal dismissal
against petitioners. On September 5, 1991, Labor Arbiter Oswald B. Lorenzo rendered a decision
declaring that petitioners illegally dismissed Evangelista. The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners
to reinstate Evangelista to his former position, with payment of full back wages. Petitioners did
not file any motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioners directly filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
special civil action of certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Issue:
 Whether or not CA erred in holding that the petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the
rules of court is not the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to petitioners.

Ruling
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is
indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal
the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The rule is well-settled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari,
subject to certain exceptions.
Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its
imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

An examination of the records reveals that petitioners did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision. As petitioners alleged in their petition before the Court of
Appeals, a motion for reconsideration is not necessary as the questions raised before the court are
the very same issues which the NLRC already considered.4 Except for this bare allegation,
petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior
motion for reconsideration. Petitioners failed to state any justification that their case falls within
any of the exceptions.
486. Government of the United States of America vs.
Hon. Guillermo Purganan
G.R. No. 148571
September 24, 2002

Facts:
Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice V. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was
ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the
Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Government of the USA
filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which
the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower
court.

ISSUES:
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069.

HELD:
YES. By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to it,
the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The
prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which
neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended. Even Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants,
the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants
and the witnesses they may produce.

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve the Ends of Justice in Extradition Cases. Upon
receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of
the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to
the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.

487. Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation vs.

Hon. Court of Appeals and Diamond Machinery Co., Inc.
G.R. No. L-45473
April 28, 1980

Facts:
The private respondent praying the court that, pending trial, an order be issued directing
the sheriff to take into his custody and to dispose of in accordance with the Rules of Court the
following personal properties which petitioner allegedly bought from defendant Diamond
Machinery Co., Inc., now the private respondent herein, on installment basis, but defaulted in the
installment payments due thereon. On April 1, 1976, private respondent Diamond Machinery
Co., Inc. filed a verified complaint for replevin against petitioner. The first of these cases is Civil
for Damages filed with the Court of First Instance was dismissed. The second case is Civil Case
for Injunction with preliminary injunction and annulment of contract was dismissed due to
improper venue.

Issue:
Whether or not the disputed order issued by the trial Judge without, or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Held:
No. The rule is well-settled that errors of judgment or of procedure not relating to the
court's jurisdiction or amounting to grave abuse of discretion, are not reviewable by certiorari.
The order complained of by petitioner is merely interlocutory or peremptory in character which
is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. This Court has, likewise, held that where the
issue or question involved affects the wisdom or soundness of the decision, not the jurisdiction of
the court to render said decision or its validity, the same is beyond the province of the special
civil action for certiorari. The Rules of Court clearly specify the case in which they may be
properly granted The provisional remedy prayed for in the case at bar is for delivery of personal
property under Rule 60, Rules of Court. Hence, this rule alone must apply to the operative facts,
to the exclusion of the other rules; more so, that there was compliance with the provisions of
Rule 60 by the party invoking it, the plaintiff herein. Application for relief by the party adversely
affected should be had pursuant to the procedure decreed under this rule; otherwise it would be a
departure from the pronouncement that to each kind of action or actions, a proper provisional
remedy is provided for by law. Specifically, under Section 5, Rule 60, defendant has the remedy
to maintain and continue its possession on the personal property in question by putting up a
counter bond if he had not objected to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond. The record does not
show that he has availed of the provisions of this section; hence, he cannot defeat the application
of the plaintiff for replevin made in compliance with the requisites provided by law, by resort to
a restraining order. Indeed, if defendant suffers damages by reason of plaintiff's application for
replevin, plaintiff's bond in double the value of the property stands to answer for it thru judgment
of the Court, under Section 9, Rule 60.

488. Philippine Consumers Foundation, inc., vs.

National Telecommunications Commission and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.,
G.R. No. L-63318
August 18, 1984

FACTS:
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a revised
schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an ex-parte order
provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was set aside by this Court on
August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that "there was necessity of a hearing by the
Commission before it should have acted on the application of the PLDT”. On November 22,
1982, the NTC rendered the questioned decision permanently approving PLDT's new and
increased SIP rates. It is the submission of petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the
PLDT is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet
promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 217.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the
Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of specific rules
and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217.

HELD:
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to
promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is said that
the case involves a simple problem of statutory construction - that of Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 217. The decision sustained the petitioner's contention that it is the duty of NTC to
first promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does not subscribe to the view that the
NTC should or must promulgate rules and regulations because the decree must be given its
ordinary meaning; the word used is the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall." The
non-unanimous resolution thus relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the
indication of intent) and a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there
should be no departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory
construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we have the
following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words ought to be more
subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an elementary rule in statutory
construction that the word "may" in a statute is permissive while the word "shall" is mandatory.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not
prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words
are sufficiently flexible to admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention.
In the case at bar compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed
as mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of the
revised schedule of PLDT's SIP.
489. Esteban Yau vs.
The Manila Banking Corporation
G.R. No. 126731
July 11, 2002

Facts:
A two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seek to set aside the
Decisions of the Court of Appeals. To satisfy the judgment the only asset of Silverio was subject
to auction of sales. The petitioner was the highest and only bidder of said Silverio share at P2
Million and the corresponding Certificate of Sale issued in his name. At the time of the execution
sale on December 29, 1992, the Silverio share was already subject to a prior levy pursuant to
separate writs of preliminary attachment dated March 27, 19905 and October 17, 19906 obtained
by the Manila Banking Corporation (Manilabank). Yau filed separate motions, the one was
denied on the ground that the motion was filed after the parties have rested their respective cases
and the same will only unduly delay the disposition of the case. On the other hand, granted Yau’s
motion to intervene. Manilabank sought reconsideration but denied the same. Manilabank
interposed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Yau formally requested Manila
Golf, through its transfer agent, Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), to cancel the
certificate in the name of Silverio and issue a new certificate in his name by virtue of the
Certificate of Sale dated December 29, 1992 issued in his favor. Thereupon, Yau filed in Civil
Case before the RTC a motion for order directing Manila Golf to issue a certificate in his name.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Manilabank filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA. The appellate court found and declared that when the RTC Cebu City ordered the
cancellation of the Silverio share which was in custodia legis of RTC, it interfered with or
invaded the jurisdiction of the latter coordinate and co-equal court, hence, said order is null and
void.

Issue:
Whether or not there was an interfered with or invaded the jurisdiction of the latter
coordinate and co-equal court.

Held:
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of
a co-equal court, as an accepted axiom in adjective law, serves as an insurmountable barrier to
the competencia of the RTC Cebu City to entertain a motion, much less issue an order, relative to
the Silverio share which is under the custodia legis of RTC Makati City, Branch 64, by virtue of
a prior writ of attachment. Indeed, the policy of peaceful co-existence among courts of the same
judicial plane, so to speak, was aptly described in Parco v. Court of Appeals,31 thus: Jurisdiction
is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various
branches of the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts
one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings
and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various branches
of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal
authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments.
It cannot be gainsaid that adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on
the orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss
as to where to appear and plead their cause.
The garnishment of property operates as an attachment and fastens upon the property a
lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. It is
brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such court. A court which has control of
such property, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the same, retains all incidents relative to the
conduct of such property. No court, except one having supervisory control or superior
jurisdiction in the premises, has a right to interfere with and change that possession.

490. Roman P. Aquino vs.

The National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 98108
September 3, 1993

Facts:
 The petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal against
private respondent. He alleged that he was removed from the payroll in January 1987 and was
not paid his salary. Private respondent answered that petitioner had abandoned his work after he
was held accountable for advances amounting to P48,921.94. On May 30, 1990, the Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision, ordering to reinstate Aquino. The counsel for private respondent
filed an appeal but petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and for the issuance of a writ of
execution and alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of NLRC, filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The NLRC, aside from justifying its reversal of the February 18 Resolution, questioned
the propriety of the filing of the petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari can be availed of: (1) to review an
interlocutory order; (2) without first filing a motion for reconsideration in the NLRC; and (3)
when there exists a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that of filing an answer to the
memorandum on appeal.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court hold that where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such order may be
questioned before this Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. To delay the review of the order until the appeal from the decision of the main case,
would not afford the party adversely affected by the said order a speedy, plain and adequate
remedy. Regarding the failure of petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC,
such failure may be excused where the order sought to be reviewed is a patent nullity.

491. Bache & Co. (PHIL.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerma vs

Hon. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
G.R. No. L-32409
February 27, 1971

Facts:
Respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed
to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of
Section 46 of National Internal Revenue Code and authorizing Revenue examiner Rodolfo de
Leon, to make and file the application for Search Warrant which was attached to the letter. At
that time Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note he instructed the Deputy Clerk
of Court to take the depositions of respondents de Leon and Logronio. The stenographer, upon
request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent
Judge asked responded Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz conducted a personal examination.

HELD:
No. The petition for Certiorari, prohibition and Mandamus are granted. Search Warrant
No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void. Personal examination by the
Judge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence
or non-existence of a probable cause, the determination of whether or not a probable cause exists
calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to
be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of
the complainant and his witnesses. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings
which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the
stenographer’s readings of her notes to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be
considered a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his
witness, it was one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. The Judge or Justice of the peace
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the complaint and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attached them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.

492. G.R. No. L-32490 December 29, 1983

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION, represented by its Administrator RIZALINO

LOPEZ (Now PEDRO G. DUMOL), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special 8th Division), HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge of the CFI of
Pangasinan (Lingayen Branch), THE RURAL POWER CORPORATION, the Spouses EUSEBIO
FERRER and LOURDES FERRER, and EDUARDO FERRER, respondents.

FACTS:

On June 14, 1965, respondents Rural Power Corporation executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Petitioner NAtional
Electrification Administration (NEA) in the sum of P985,00.00 for the purpose of improving the foremer's services to the public. Rural power
was required to execute two other real estate mortgages to secure two other loans for the amunt of P98.000.00 and P81,000.00, but said
amounts were never released. Of th three deeds of mortgages, only the first in the amount of P985,000.00 has been the object of
implementation.
 The mortgage deed provided fpr a program of world divided into Phases A, B and C and pursuant thereto P68,000.00 was
released on July 8, 1965, P247,000.00 on Spetember 19, 1965, and P125,000.00 on January 16,1966. Among the conditions of the mortgage
were that the amount to be released to Rural POwer would be utilized for the purposes therein specified subject to availability of funds, and
that the respondents shall adhere strictyly with the progra, of work and specificiations attached to the deed. DDue to aleeged violations of
the above-stated concditions, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings pursuant to the deed of real esttate mortgage for
the amount of P985,000.00, Sheriff of Pangasinan set the sale of the properties involved for public auction.

Rural Power iniciated Civil case No. 14742 with CFI PAngasinan for Injunction, release of sum of money, cancellation of mortgages,
and damages. Respondent TRial Judge issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction stopping the auction sale and subsequently decided in favor of
Rural Power after trial on the mertits.

Petitioner filed its Record on Appeal. However, this was disapproved by respondent Judge in an order issued on January 14,1970
for alleged non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and directed petitioner to comply therewith and file an Amended
Record on Appeal.

On February 13, 1970, petitioner filed an amended Record on Appeal supplying the deficiencies with the prayer that all oral and
documentary evidence presented in the instant case be elevated together with all the records to the Court of Appeals. Again, respondent
Judge disapproved the Amended Record on Appeal for alleged non-compliance with Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court.

On May 27, 1970, petitioner instituted a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction before respondent
Court of Appeals, denied for failure to MR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Appellate Court gravely abused its discretion in holding that petitioner's
omission to move for reconsideration before the Trial Court prior to filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus
was fatal to the petition.
Whether or not respondent Trial Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving petitioner's
Record on Appeal and the subsequent Amended Record on Appeal.
HELD:
The respondent’s Trial Judge's Order of January 14, 1970 as well as that of March 4, 1970 disapproving
petitioner's original and amended Record on Appeal, respectively, for alleged non- compliance with Section 6 of
Rule 41 were both vague because they did not specify the requirements not complied with nor the errors or
additions that had to be corrected or added. As the Appellate Court had observed "it is possible that the
respondent (Judge) was referring to deficiencies other than that specified in the order of January 14, 1970". Hence,
petitioner cannot be faulted if its Amended Record on Appeal did not meet the standards set by the Trial Judge as
there weren't any.
Also, whatever defects the original Record on Appeal may have contained had been cured in the
Amended Record on Appeal by petitioner's prayer that all the documentary and oral evidence be elevated to the
Appellate Court as expressly provided for by Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore,
respondent Judge's disputed Order was arbitrary and constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
That petitioner is a government corporation performing governmental functions pursuant to Republic Act,
No. 2717, as amended. Public interest being involved, a Motion for Read consideration need not be availed of and
a Motion for Reconsideration is no longer a prerequisite where there is urgent necessity and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government.
The Decision of respondent Appellate Court (former Special 8th Division), dated August 17, 1970, is
annulled and the Regional Trial Court corresponding to the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Lingayen
Branch)was directed to transmit the entire original record of the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

493 G.R. No. L-25596 April 28, 1983

CLARA E. VDA. DE SAYMAN, ANACORITA S. DE MACAYRA, OSIAS E. SAYMAN,
Heirs of the Late IGNACIO SAYMAN, FAUSTINA VDA. DE SAYMAN, As
Guardian Ad Litim of the Minor Illegitimate Children of the Late DEMOCRITO
SAYMAN, Namely, IMELDA, CORAZON RUBEN, and DEMOCRITO JR., All
Surnamed, SAYMAN, ADELE CRISOLOGO, CONSEJO VDA. DE MANGOB, Mother
of the Late POTENCIANO VDA. DE ODO, PRESCILLA ODO DE MASINADING,
ANITA, JACINTO, ENRIQUITO and CONCEPCION, All Surnamed
CASTRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS A. GO THONG & CO.,
INC., respondents.
FACTS:
This case is intimately related with two other cases which involve the same parties filed in the trial court
between the same parties herein wherein the decision of the Court of Appeals is the subject of the petition for
certiorari
The subject-matter is the writ of execution issued by the trial court to enforce its judgment after the same
became final and executory, but during the pendency of a petition for relief from the same. The said order of
execution was brought to the respondent Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. In a decision of said court
promulgated on December 14, 1965, the writ of execution issued by the trial court was annulled and set aside.
The petitioners assail the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals on three principal grounds. Also, it
is true that as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should precede recourse to certiorari in order to give
the trial court an opportunity to correct the error that it may have committed. The said requirements is not
absolute and may be dispensed with in instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no
useful purpose, such as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion or
where the error is patent for the order is void, or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases where execution
had already been ordered; or where the issue raised is one purely of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a writ of execution may be issued under the circumstances obtaining is purely one of law, and the
need for urgent relief therefrom is patent from the fact that the trial court had already issued a writ for the
execution of the judgment complained of in the petition for relief.
HELD:
It is the rule that when a petition for relief is filed, the court may issue preliminary injunction as may be
necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending the proceeding under Section 5, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court. The CA pointed out that the respondents entirely overlook the fact that the order denying the
petition for relief is appealable to the Court and the judgment on the merits may be assailed in the appeal on the
ground that it is not supported by the evidence and/or is contrary to law under Sec. 2, 2nd paragraph of Rule 41. If
so appealable, its supervisory power may be exercised for the purpose of preventing the premature and unjust
execution of a judgment.
It is to be further noted that the right of the private respondent to seek a review of the decision of the
trial court in connection with its appeal from the denial of the petition for relief was sustained. The possibility
which the respondent Court of Appeals seeks to guard against still exists in greater likelihood. The judgment of the
trial court the enforcement of which is sought to be restrained has not yet attained the status of being beyond
modification or reversal. Hence, the enforcement of the same at this stage of the proceeding is premature. In the
least, to stop its execution as was ordered by the respondent Court of Appeals may not be categorized as a grave
abuse of discretion. Therefore, the petition for certiorari was denied by the court.
494 G.R. No. 92813 July 31, 1991

PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, EASTMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., EDMUNDO O. MAPUA and ROSE
U. MAPUA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE, ISLANDS, respondents.

FACTS:

A petition for review on certiorari on the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, promulgated on September 4,
1989, granting the petition for certiorari filed by private respondent, and its resolution on March 29, 1990 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On December 6, 1982, herein private respondent Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) sued herein petitioners Peroxide Philippines Corporation (Peroxide), Eastman Chemical Industries, Inc.
(Eastman), and the spouses Edmund O. Mapua and Rose U. Mapua (Mapuas) of the then Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Metro Manila for the collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound
themselves to be solidarily liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings.

HELD:

No, respondent court has not departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. It is
correct in holding that, on the above-stated premises, the attachment of the properties of Eastman and the
Mapuas remained valid from its issuance since the judgment had not been satisfied, nor has the writ been validly
discharged either by the filing of a counterbond or for improper or irregular issuance. The ex parte discharge or
suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly administration of justice and nullifies the underlying
role and purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the parties pendente lite as an ancillary
remedy.

The court sustains the position of BPI that the Court of Appeals, in its judgment presently under challenge,
did not err in upholding the continuing and uninterrupted validity and enforceability of the writ of preliminary
attachment issued in Civil Case No. 48849 created the operational lacuna in its effectivity as claimed by petitioners.
Further, the cancellation of the annotations regarding the levy on attachment of petitioners' properties, procured
by the sheriff pursuant to the aforesaid invalid orders, is likewise a nullity and another levy thereon is not required.
We observe, however, that the records do not disclose the lifting of the levy on the Bataan shares of Eastman and
the Mapuas and on their real properties in Caloocan City.

Also, this Court denied the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the clarification sought
involves questions of fact. At any rate, whether said petitioners are guarantors or sureties, there exists a valid
cause of action against them and their properties were properly attached on the basis of that indubitable
circumstance.

Neither does the court subscribe to petitioners' charge that respondent court injudiciously gave due
course to the aforesaid petition for certiorari without requiring the prior filing and resolution of a motion for the
reconsideration of the questioned orders of the trial court. There are, admittedly, settled exceptions to that
requisite and which obtain in the present case. A motion for reconsideration was correctly dispensed with by
respondent court since the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding had been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court. Also, under the circumstances therein, a motion for reconsideration would serve no practical
purpose since the trial judge had already had the opportunity to consider and pass upon the questions elevated
on certiorari to respondent court.

Therefore, the petition at bar is denied and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is affirmed

495 THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL and BANCO FILIPINO, Savings and Mortgage Bank,

G.R. No. L-26971 April 11, 1972.

FACTS:

The Central Bank of the Philippines seeks a writ of certiorari and prohibition to annul an order of Hon.
GaudencioCloribel as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila authorizing the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the Petitioner and the Monetary Board, as well as its officials and agents, from enforcing
Central Bank Circulars Nos. 185 and 222, and Monetary Board Resolutions Nos. 805 and 1566, respectively, insofar
as they restrict the payment by Banco Filipino of "monthly" interest on savings deposits and "advance" interests on
time deposits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the authority of the Monetary Board to fix the maximum rates of interest which banks
may pay on deposits and on any other obligations includes the power to determine and fix the manner in which
said interests may be compounded and paid.

HELD:

It is significant that the law does not merely authorize the Board to fix the maximum rates of interest
which banks may pay on deposits and on any other obligations. It, also, expressly empowers the Board in order to
avoid possible evasion of maximum interest rates set to fix also the maximum rates that banks may pay to or
collect from their customers in the form of payments of any sort. Indeed, the authority to establish maximum rates
of interest carries with it, necessarily, the power to determine the maximum rates payable as interest for given
periods of time. In other words, it connotes the right to specify the length of time for which the rates thus fixed
shall be computed. Consequently, it cannot but include the prerogative to regulate the manner of computing said
rates and the manner or time of payment of interest, insofar as these factors affect theamount of interest to be
paid. In fact, the record shows that, since, at least, May 25, 1956, when Central Bank Circular No. 67 was issued,
the Monetary Board has consistently regulated the time or manner of payment of interest on bank deposits. What
is more, it would seem that the validity of such regulation had never before been contested.

496 JOVENAL OUANO, petitioner,

vs.
PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION and HON. JUDGE RAMON G. CODILLA,
JR.,respondents.

G.R. No. 134230 July 17, 2002

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing the Orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998 as having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On December 11, 1997, PGTT filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City, a verified
complaint against JovenalOuano, for Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real Property and Damages. In its
complaint, PGTT alleged that it is the owner of Lot Nos. 1-10, Block 2 of the Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision
located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu City. Sometime in October of 1996, PGTT found that Ouano uprooted the
concrete monuments of the said lots, plowed them and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTT’s demand that he
vacate the lots and restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused, claiming he is the owner and lawful
possessor of the 380 square meters he occupied. Due to Ouano’s wrongful act, PGTT was deprived of the use of its
property and suffered damages in the amount of P100,000.00 a year. Likewise, PGTT was constrained to file the
subject action and hired the services of his counsel for P100,000.00.

PGTT contends that the RTC has jurisdiction since the market value of the lots is P49,760.00.5 Besides, the
complaint is not only an action for recovery of ownership and possession of real property, but also for damages
exceeding P100,000.00, over which claim the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction under Section 19 (paragraph 8)
of the same law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the civil case.

HELD:

It is undisputed that the assessed value of the property involved, as shown by the corresponding tax
declaration, is only P2,910.00. As such, the complaint is well within the MTC’s P20,000.00 jurisdictional limit.

The provisions stated does not apply to the instant case. It is applicable only to all other cases other than
an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in
determining the court’s jurisdiction. Besides, the same provision explicitly excludes from the determination of the
jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses,
and costs.

The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under
Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages
are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered
in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

The court finds that in issuing the assailed orders denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, thus taking
cognizance of the case, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, the petition is granted. The
assailed Orders issued by respondent RTC on March 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998 is set aside and the complaint is
ordered dismissed

497. MISSING

498 G.R. No. 111544 July 6, 2004

VICENTE T. UY, petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), PIEDRAS PETROLEUM
COMPANY, INC. (PIEDRAS), RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION (RCBC), TRADERS ROYAL BANK (TRB),
ORIENTAL PETROLEUM & MINERALS CORP. (OPMC) and ATTY. JOSE C. LAURETA, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
promulgated on August 23, 1993 which dismissed petitioner Vicente Uy's original Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction filed against respondents Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), Piedras Petroleum
Company, Inc. (PIEDRAS), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), Traders Royal Bank (TRB), Oriental
Petroleum & Minerals Corporation (OPMC) and Atty. Jose C. Laureta. Petitioner Uy filed this petition in his capacity
as a practicing lawyer, landowner, taxpayer and stockholder of OPMC.

Respondent PIEDRAS is a sequestered corporation voluntarily surrendered by Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto to the
PCGG under a Compromise Agreement. As PIEDRAS did not have sufficient funds, it negotiated for RCBC and TRB
to advance the needed amount for the additional stocks subscription to be availed by PIEDRAS. The agreements
with the respective banks were confirmed and authorized by the PCGG and was then executed.

On June 20, 1993, petitioner filed with public respondent Sandiganbayan a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction
with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order assailing the actions of the PCGG in negotiating with respondent
banks for the advance of the funds needed by PIEDRAS to pay for its additional subscription. Petitioner likewise
sought to enjoin OPMC and Atty. Jose C. Laureta, OPMC's Corporate Secretary, from recognizing and giving effect
to the MOA and SSA. However, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter which involved the alleged disturbance of petitioner's rights as a stockholder and the violation
by PIEDRAS of the exclusivity of the pre-emptive offering by OPMC. This, the Sandiganbayan said, was a purely
intra-corporate matter which is outside of its jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan added that assuming it did have
jurisdiction over the case, the petition failed to show abuse of discretion on the part of PIEDRAS or the PCGG.
Moreover, petitioner, while a landowner and a taxpayer, does not have the capacity to sue as his case does not
meet the requisites for a taxpayer's suit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue raised by petitioner is one which the Sandiganbayan is empowered to resolve.

HELD:

The Sandiganbayan correctly denied jurisdiction over the proposed complaint-in-intervention. The original and
exclusive jurisdiction given to the Sandiganbayan over PCGG cases pertains to cases filed by the PCGG, pursuant to
the exercise of its power under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended by the Office of the President, and
Article XVIII, Section 26 of the Constitution, where the principal cause of action is the recovery of ill-gotten wealth,
as well as all incidents arising from, incidental to or related to such cases cases filed by those who wish to question
or challenge the commission's acts or orders in such cases. In the case at bar, there is no longer any pending
sequestration.

Therefore, the court does not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in this case.

499 G.R. No. 178259 March 13, 2009

ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR and JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

The present petition, the Court gathers from its allegations, is one forCertiorari, Prohibition
and Injunction.

During the May 14, 2007 elections, Arturo F. Pacificador and Jovito C. Plameras,
Jr.(petitioners), and Salvacion Z. Perez (private respondent), then the incumbentGovernor of Antique,
ran as candidates for the position of Governor.

Alleging violation of Section 261, paragraphs O, V and W of the Omnibus ElectionCode,

petitioners filed on April 23, 2007 with the Office of the Provincial ElectionSupervisor a case for
disqualification (disqualification case) against respondent andother members of the Nationalist People’s Coalition-
Antique ticket

After the elections or on May 18, 2007, petitioners filed a petition for suspension
of t h e c a n v a s s i n g o f v o t e s f o r t h e p o s i t i o n o f G o v e r n o r a n d / o r s u s p e n s i o n o f t h e proclama
tion of private respondent before the COMELEC which docketed it as EM07-041 (suspension case). They alleged
that the canvassing of votes on May 15, 2007by the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) composed of
Atty. Gil Barcenal asChairman, Prosecutor Napoleon Abiera as Vice-Chairman, and Corazon Brown
asMember-Secretary (Barcenal PBOC) was attended by fraud because the electionreturns were prepared
under duress and bore fraudulent entries.

By Resolution of May 21, 2007, the Barcenal PBOC ruled against petitio
n e r Pacificador due to insufficiency of evidence, hence, he appealed to the COMELEC,which appeal was
denominated as REF No. 07-066 (PBOC appeal).

Meanwhile, the COMELEC’s Second Division, by Resolution of May 28, 2007,

ruleda g a i n s t p e t i t i o n e r s o n t h e s u s p e n s i o n c a s e , f i n d i n g " n o o v e r w h e l m i n g n e e d t o suspe
nd the canvassing of votes as well as the proclamation of the candidate whogarners the most number
of votes for the election for Governor of the province of Antique.

In the meantime, the COMELEC First Division, by Resolution dated June 7, 2007,dismissed
petitioners’ PBOC appeal and created a new PBOC to be composed of Atty. Renato A. Mabutay as
Chairman, Atty. Tomas Valera as Vice-Chairman, andA t t y . E l i z a b e t h D o r o n i l a a s M e m b e r -
S e c r e t a r y ( M a b u t a y P B O C ) . I t n o t e d t h a t petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal on May 21, 2007, but
that no appeal was filedwithin five days as required under Sec. 20 (f) of Republic Act No. 7166 and Sec. 9 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Petitioners contend that the Majarucon PBOC is illegal, being violative of Sec. 2 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7859 promulgated on April 17, 2007 which provides thatt h e r e l i e f o f t h e B o a r d o f C a n v a s s e r s
(BOC) must be for cause, and Sec. 21
of Republic Act. No. 6646 (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the ElectoralSyste
m and for other Purposes) which
states that the substitute BOC must becomposed of the therein named officials in thei
r order of appearance, viz, theProvincial Auditor, the Register of Deeds, the Clerk of C
o u r t n o m i n a t e d b y t h e Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, and any other available
appointiveprovincial official

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners are correct in questioning the creation of the new PBOC and proclaiming the new officials
of the province.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.In issuing the June 22, 2007 Resolution relieving the Mabutay PBOC
and creating theMarajucon PBOC, the COMELEC First Division was merely exercising its mandate under
Sec. 227 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:Sec. 227. Supervision and control over board of canvassers. - The
Commission shallhave direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers.Any member of the board
of canvassers may, at any time, be relieved for cause andsubstituted motuproprio by the Commission.

Petitioners’ contention that the COMELEC’s choice of officials to substitute themembers of

the BOC is limited only to those enumerated under Sec. 21 of RepublicAct. No. 6646 is untenable.
 Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the enumeration above is not exclusive. Membersof BOCs can be filled
up by the COMELEC not only from those expressly mentionedi n t h e a b o v e -
q u o t e d p r o v i s i o n , b u t f r o m o t h e r s o u t s i d e i f t h e f o r m e r a r e n o t available

It bears noting that pursuant to Rule 18 of the Omnibus Election Code, decisionsand
resolutions of any division of the COMELEC in special cases become final andexecutory after the lapse
of five days, unless a timely motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc

500 G.R. No. 135547 January 23, 2002

GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A. RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR., JORGE P.
DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI ALDEA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as Chairman of the PAL Inter-Agency Task Force created under
Administrative Order No. 16; HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary of Labor and
Employment; PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO, MANOLO E.
AQUINO, JAIME J. BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O. BARRIENTOS, Respondents.

Facts:
PAL was suffering from a difficult financial situation in 1998. It was faced with bankruptcy and was forced
to adopt a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than 1/3. PALEA (PAL Employees Association)
went on a four-day strike to protest retrenchment measures in July 1998. PAL ceased operations on Sep 23, 1998.
PALEA board again wrote the President on Sep 28, 1998. Among others, it proposed the suspension of the PAL-
PALEA CBA for a period of ten years, subject to certain conditions. PALEA members accepted such terms through a
referendum on Oct 2, 1998. PAL resumed domestic operations on Oct 7, 1998.
Seven officers and members of PALEA filed instant petition to annul the Sep 27, 1998 agreement entered into
between PAL and PALEA.

Issue:

Whether or not negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.

Held:
YES. CBA negotiations may be suspended for 10 years.
The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the
light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely
promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latter’s closure.
There is no conflict between said agreement and Article 253-A of the Labor Code. CBA under Article 253-A of the
Labor Code has a two-fold purpose. One is to promote industrial stability and predictability. Inasmuch as the
agreement sought to promote industrial peace, at the PAL during its rehabilitation, said agreement satisfied the
first purpose of said article. The other purpose is to assign specific timetable, wherein negotiations become a
matter of right and requirement. Nothing in Article 253-A prohibits the parties from waiving or suspending the
mandatory timetable and agreeing on the remedies to enforce the same.
501 G.R. No. 143797 May 4, 2006

CARLITO L. MONTES, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Sixth Division, Office of the Ombudsman, Department of Science and
Technology,Respondents.

FACTS:
This is Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Carlito L. Montes seeks to prohibit the Honorable Secretary of the Department
of Science and Technology (DOST) from implementing the suspension order dated 28 June 2000. The suspension
order was issued in relation to the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman directing wherein he was found guilty
of violation of RA 4200 (THE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW) amounting to GROSS MISCONDUCT are is SUSPENDED
FROM THE SERVICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY EFFECTIVE JULY 16, 200 from the Complainants Imelda D.
Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla. The complainants filed an administrative complaint against Carlito L. Montes,
Chief of the Legal Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service for
producing a tape recording of a private conversation without their knowledge and consent.
The Ombudsman denied Montes’ motion for reconsideration and affirmed the Decision. Hence, Montes
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with prayer for temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals.The Court of Appeals dismissed outright Montes’ petition in a
Resolution for being procedurally infirm.
On motion for reconsideration, however, the appellate court issued a Resolution requiring the
Ombudsman to file his comment. Notably, the appellate court considered Montes’ motion for reconsideration
abandoned in a Resolution in view of the commencement of the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Montes is entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the DOST Secretary
from enforcing the suspension order.
HELD:
No, Montes is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining the DOST Secretary from
enforcing the suspension order because the act sought to be enjoined has taken place already so there is nothing
more to restrain. Thus, the instant petition has been unmade as a mere subject matter of purely theoretical
interest. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. Therefore, in view of the
foregoing, the instant Petition for Prohibition has been dismissed.

502 GONZALES VS. NARVASA

G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform
(PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43
(E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of
the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a
law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
43

HELD:

The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any
“injury” in this case since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s
powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the
PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his
rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR’s activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish
his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.

Furthermore, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. It is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending
power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amendedby E.O. No. 70.
Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is “appropriated” for its operational expenses
“to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President.” Being that case, petitioner must show that
he is a real party in interest - that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will
be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to make such a
representation.

503 TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the
Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and
San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and
Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners
opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete
accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km.,
which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that
— “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.

Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of
the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing
boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent
province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity
would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province
of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the
dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the
municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the
boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue
the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

504-515 MISSING
516
Cristobel v. Melchor
78 SCRA 175, July 29, 1977
FACTS:
The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private
Office, Malacanang, Manila, having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with
a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. He is a third grade civil service eligible. Secretary
Amelito R. Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed the plaintiff that
his services as private secretary in the President's Private Office were "terminated
effective today." Sometime in May 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles,
etals. was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The dismissed
employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the
President, plaintiff was one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be
reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications. He waited for Secretary Mutuc
to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the service, until Secretary
Mutuc was replaced by other executive secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of
assistance to be reemployed at "the opportune time."

ISSUE:
Is the principle of laches or non-compliance with the "Statute of Limitations" applicable
against appellant?

HELD:
No. Laches not applicable to Appellant. - Laches is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. - There are certain exceptional
circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule enunciated above and lead
us to grant relief to appellant. 1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of
Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his right to reinstatement in
office.Cristobal, with the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter
dated January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Executive Secretary
AmelitoMutuc that he (Cristobal) was a civil eligible employee with eight years of service
in the government and consequently entitled to security of tenure under the
Constitution. This was followed by another letter of January 26, 1962.Cristobal was not
one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not fatal to his
cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to press his
request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint
and was in fact promised reinstatement. The essence of laches is not merely lapse of
time. It is essential that there be also acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of
diligence in seeking a remedy. 2. It was an act of the government through its
responsible officials more particularly then Executive Secretary AmelitoMutuc and his
successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of Cristobal's present
complaint for reinstatement.
517
Fortuno v. Palma
156 SCRA 691, Dec. 18, 1987
Facts:
Fortuno and Abante were candidates for the position of director of Camarines Sur II
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CASURECO II). Alleging that Fortuno failed to comply with
the residence requirement, Abante filed a petition to disqualify him before the National
Electrification Administration (NEA). The petition was later endorsed to the District
Election Committee (DEC) which found that Fortuno was qualified. DEC then
proclaimed Fortuno as director after the election. Thus, Abante filed a quo warranto
petition before the RTC. The RTC granted the petition and enjoined Fortuno from
continuing as director. Fortuno now questions the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Fortuno argues that the power to determine and decide the residence qualification is
vested in, and falls within the peculiar function and competence of the NEA, acting
through its duly created District Election Committee and that since the decision
rendered by the latter had already become final, said resolution may no longer be
questioned elsewhere.

Issue:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving the
qualification for membership of the Board of Directors of an electric cooperative?

Held:
A quo warranto proceeding maybe instituted to determine the right to the use or
exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is
not well- founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the dispute
is on the eligibility to perform the duties by the person sought to be ousted or
disqualified a quo warranto is the proper action.

The Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings with the
Regional Trial Court in the province in which the defendant or one of the defendants
reside, or when defendant is a corporation, in the province in which it is domiciled or has
a place of business; but when the Solicitor General of the Philippines commences the
action, it may be brought in a Court of First Instance in the City of Manila or the
Supreme Court.
 518
Gaerlan, Jr. v. Catubig
17 SCRA 376, June 1, 1966
Facts:
GaerlanJr and Catubig were registered candidates for councilors in 8-seat City Council
of Dagupan in the 1963 elections. Catubig was proclaimed one of the eight elected
councilors while Gaerlan lost his bid.
However, Gaerlan went to Court to challenge Catubig's eligibility for the office on the
averment of non-age. Catubig was below 25 years of ages as of the date of the filing of
his certificate of candidacy or date of election or date of assumption of office. Catubig
claims that the question of age-eligibility should be governed by RA 170
which provides that the elective members of the Municipal Board shall be qualified
electors of the city residents therein for at least one year and not less than 23 years of
age and not RA 2259 which provides that no person shall be a city mayor,
vice mayor or councilor unless he is at least 25 years of age, resident of the city for one
year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 170 (23 years of age) should give way to Section 6 of
RA 2259 (25 years of age).

Held:
No. Section 6 of RA 2259 (25 years of age) should prevail. RA 484 amending Section
12 of the Dagupan City Charter (RA 170), took effect on June 10, 1950 whereas RA
2259 became law on June 10, 1959.
The question whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or
more subsequent general laws is dependedt mainly upon the intent of Congress in
enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its
members intended to amend or repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259,except those which are expressly excluded
from the operation thereof. All cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said
act are subjct thereto. Hence, the age-limit provision in RA 2259 is continuing, because
Dagupan City was not excluded. Therefore, its charger provision on the age limit is
thereby repealed. This is because the last statute si so broad in terms and so clear and
explicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject and
therefore to displace the prior staute.
 519
Castro v. Del Rosario
19 SCRA 196, Jan. 31, 1967
FACTS:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and mandamus originally filed in the
Court ofFirst Instance of Manila.The controverted position is that of Assistant Regional
RevenueDirector II, Manila, which became vacanton August 24,1959, upon the
promotion of itsoccupant, Alfredo Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was
appointed in his place, and it isthis appointment that is being questioned by petitioner
Teodoro M. Castro in this proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors waived their rights to the
positionby their failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.

RULING:
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The silence of the eight other
AssistantRevenue Regional Directorsdoes not amount to a waiver on their part.
Waiver must bepredicated on more concrete grounds. The evidence must be
sufficient and clear to warrant afinding that the intent to waive is unmistakable.
Castro himself, when he testified, could not categorically state that the eight others were
notinterested in the position. Not having shown either seniority in rank among the nine
AssistantRevenue Regional Directors outside the Manila District or waiver on the part of
those who weresenior to him Castro has failed to establish a clear right to the office
which would entitle him tooust respondent Toledo
 520
Palma-Fernandez v. De La Paz
160 SCRA 751, April 15, 1988
FACTS
In 1985, Nenita Palma-Fernandez was extended a permanent appointment to the
position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ngBagongLipunan (East Avenue Medical
Center) by the Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Center, Jesus Azurin. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center entitled
the position of the Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services.
Hospital Order No. 30 was issued designating Palma-Fernandez as Asst. Director of
Professional Services.

In 1987, EO 119 (Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health) was promulgated.

Hospital Order No. 22 was issued relieving Palma-Fernandez as Chief of Clinics and
transferring her to the Research Office. Dr. Aguila was designated to her former
position.

Palma-Fernandez, thereafter, filed a letter-protest with the Secretary of Health. Failure

to secure any action on her protest, she filed an instant Petition for Quo Warranto with
Preliminary Injunction against Dr. de la Paz (Medical Center Chief), Dr. Aguila and the
Secretary of Health.

ISSUE
Whether or not the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies precludes the
filing of this petition

HELD
NO. The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not preclude petitioner
from seeking judicial relief. This rule is not a hard and fast one but admits of exceptions
among which are that (1) the question in dispute is "purely a legal one" and (2) the
controverted act is 'patently illegal." The questions involved here are purely legal. The
subject Hospital Orders violated petitioner's constitutional right to security of tenure and
were, therefore, "patently illegal." Judicial intervention was called for to enjoin the
implementation of the controverted acts.

There was substantial compliance by petitioner with the requirement of exhaustion of

administrative remedies since she had filed a letter-protest With the respondent
Secretary of Health, with copies furnished the Commissioner of Civil Service, and the
Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission, but the same remained
unacted upon and proved an inadequate remedy. Besides, an action for quo warranto
must be filed within one year after the cause of action accrues (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules
of Court), and the pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the
running of the one-year period.
 521
Galano vs. Roxas
GR.NO. L-31241, September 12, 1975

Facts:
Respondent, Nemesio Roxas, was elected mayor of the Municipality of San Mateo,
Rizal. Shortly after assuming office, there were filed 24 resignations signed by petitioners
Chief of Police Jesus Galano and his 23 co-petitioners, all members of the police
department of said town. Roxas accepted the resignations and thereafter appointed
replacements to the positions vacated by petitioners.
However petitioners addressed separate letters to the Police Commission and the
Civil Service Commission claiming that they were threatened by the respondent into filing
their courtesy resignation and pray that the same be declared null and void and that their
respective replacement be accordingly disapprove. The Polcom and CSC after investigation
declared that the resignation of the petitioners are null and void and they be reinstated to
their former positions with corresponding payment of back salaries. Respondent is now
ordered to comply with the indorsement of the CSC. Petitioners filed a petition for the
fulfillment by the respondent of the order of the CSC. Respondents posits that neither the
Polcom nor the CSC has the authority to order the reinstatement in question, since only
courts can do so.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were right to addressed their complaint to the CSC and
POLCOM, rather than to the court.

Held:
Petitioners are beyond the help of the court, their time to resort thereto having lapsed.
While it is desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or
bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite to nor bar the institution of
quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who claims the right to hold public office
allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts, should file the
proper judicial action within the reglementary period.

522
Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna
402 SCRA 440, April 30, 2003
Facts:
Two lots measuring 144 squaremeters was to be expropriated byBargy.Masili for the
purpose ofconstructing a barangay hall.However, the barangay and the lotowners could
not agree with thepurchase price of Php 200,000.The first complaint was filed
beforethe MTC. Whereas, the secondcomplaint was filed before the RTC.The MTC
dismissed the complaintfor lack of interest of the petitioner lotowners.The RTC stated
that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. It also ruledin favor of BrgyMasili.

Issue:
Whether or not the MTC has jurisdictionover the case of expropriation.

Ruling:
The SC held that the expropriationproceedings is within the jurisdictionof the RTC
because it is incapable ofpecuniary estimation. As discussed:
“xx An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum
ofmoney. Rather, it deals with theexercise by the government of itsauthority and right to
take property for public use.
As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial
courts. xx”
 523
Masikip v. The City of Pasig
479 SCRA 391, Jan. 23, 2006
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of
Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and
recreational activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January
1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the
alleged purpose that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to
provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on
the ground that there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was
elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property

HELD:
Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to
the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on
condition of providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It is the power of the State
or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from
sovereignty and inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power
thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to
constitutional limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may
exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
 524
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila
40 Phil. 349, 31 October 1919
FACTS:
Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for
the purpose of constructing a public improvementnamely, the extension of Rizal
Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.Herein defendants,
on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, whichhad been used as such for many years,
and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be
converted into a street forpublic purposes.The lower court ruled that there was
no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.Petitioner
therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the onlyfunction of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor
the owners of the land can inquire intothe advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask
any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers
of the landinvolved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is
fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of thedefendant
for its value.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of
the expropriation?

HELD:
Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposesdesignated by the law. When
the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply with the conditionsaccompanying such authority. The necessity for conferring
the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is,
without question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under theconditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire
into.
 525
J.M. Tuazon and Co vs. Land Tenure Administration
33 SCRA 882, June 30, 1970

FACTS:
On September 7, 1954, petitioner J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. entered a contract to sell with
respondent Ligaya Javier a parcel of land known as Lot No. 28, Block No. 356, PSD
30328, of the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision for the sum of Php3,691.20 with 10%
interest per annum; Php396.12 will be payable upon execution of the contract, and an
installment of Php43.92 monthly for a period of ten (10) years. It was further stipulated
in the contract, particularly the sixth paragraph, that upon failure of respondent to pay
the monthly installment, she is given a one month grace period to pay such installment
together with the monthly installment falling on the said grace period. Furthermore,
failure to pay both monthly installments, respondent will pay an additional 10% interest.
And after 90 days from the end of the grace period, petitioner can rescind the contract,
the payments made by respondent will be considered as rentals. Upon the execution of
the contract, respondent religiously paid the monthly installment until January 5, 1962.
Respondent, however, was unable to the pay the monthly installments within the grace
period which petitioner, subsequently, sent a letter to respondent on May 22, 1964 that
the contract has been rescinded and asked the respondent to vacate the said land. So,
upon failure of respondent to vacate the said land, petitioner filed an action to the Court
of First Instance of Rizal for the rescission of the contract. The CFI rendered a decision
in favor of respondent in applying Article 1592 of the New Civil Code. Hence, petitioner
made an appeal to the Supreme Court alleging that since Article 1592 of the New
Civil applies only to contracts of sale and not in contracts to sell.

ISSUE:
Did the CFI erroneously apply Article 1592 of the New Civil Code?

RULING:
Yes. Regardless, however, of the propriety of applying Article 1592, petitioner has not
been denied substantial justice under Article 1234 of the New Civil Code. In this
connection, respondent religiously satisfied the monthly installments for almost eight (8)
years or up to January 5, 1962. It has been shown that respondent had already paid
Php4,134.08 as of January 5, 1962 which is beyond the stipulated amount of
Php3,691.20. Also, respondent has offered to pay all installments overdue including the
stipulated interest, attorney’s fees and the costs which the CFI accordingly sentenced
respondent to pay such installment, interest, fees and costs. Thus, petitioner will be able
recover everything that was due
thereto. Under these circumstances, the SC feel that, in the interest of justice and
equity, the decision appealed from may be upheld upon the authority of Article 1234 of
the New Civil Code.
 526
Municipality of Binan v. Garcia
180 SCRA 576 Dec. 22, 1989
Facts:
The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Biñan,
Laguna filed in the RTC. The land sought to be expropriated was intended for use as
the new site of a modern public market and the acquisitionwas authorized by a
resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. One of the defendants, Francisco filed a MTD.
Her motion was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67. Her "motion to dismiss" was thus
actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not
an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the
contemplation of Rule 16. Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the
plaintiff Municipality.

Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as against defendant FRANCISCO," and
amending the Writ of Possessions as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and
effects said defendant and her property ..."

The Municipality filed a MR. Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or
Finality of Order," contending that the Order had become "final and executory for failure
of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the
reglementary period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order ..
appealed from.

The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in actions of
eminent domain, and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15) days;the
special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69.

Issue:
whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 is a case "wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, as regards which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty [30]
days, instead of fifteen (15) days

Held: In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2)
appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is
thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15)
days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of
BP129 to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109
of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period
of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.

The municipality's MR was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period
laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise
and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and
executory.
 527
National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Guivelondo
404 SCRA 389, June 19, 2003
Facts:
NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent
domain against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.
The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the
land which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.
Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and
19 as well as the amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration of the trial courts partial judgment . but the trial court issued an
omnibus order to deny the motion of respondent granting the petitioner’s motion and of
just compensation.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. Thereafter, heirs filed a
motion for execution since the trial court move for the entry of the partial judgment as
modified by the omnibus order.
The Court of Appeals rendered dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the ground of
partial judgment and omnibus order became a final and executory when petitioner failed
to appeal. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but then it was denied by the
court. The courts of appeals serve on petitioner for a notice of levy pursuant to writ of
Execution and a Notice of third garnishment from the Land bank of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be compelled and coerced by the courts to continue with
its inherent power of eminent domain.

Ruling:
The state as represented by the NHA for housing project can continue its inherent
power of eminent domain provided that the just compensation for the property sought is
taken. After the rendition of such order the plaintiff shouldn’t be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue such proceedings except on such terms of the court be equitable.The order
was final after the non-appealing of the petitioner as the lawful right to expropriate the
properties of respondent heirs of Guivelondo. Petitioner NHA are not exempt from
garnishment or execution, although it is public in character since it is arbitrary and
capricious for a government entity to initiate expropriation proceedings that seize a
private owner’s property.
Petition was DENIED and the trial court’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss expropriation proceeding was AFFIRMED. Its injunctive relief against the levy
and garnishment of its funds and personal properties was also DENIED. The temporary
Restraining Order was LIFTED.

528 CITY OF ILO-ILO VS BESANA

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against private respondent elpidio
t.javellana and southern development bank, the latter as a mortgagee. The complaint soughtto
expropriate two parcels of land registered in javellanas name to be used as a school site for
Lapaz High School.
ISSUE: what is the reckoning point for the determination of just compensation.
HELD: When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings or takes place subsequent to the filing for
eminent domain, just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint.
Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 rules of procedure , under which the complaint for
expropriation was filed , just compensation is to be determined as of the date of filing of the
complaint.

592 APO FRUITS CORPORATION VS CA

FACTS: Apo Fruits Corporation (afc) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (hpi) filed a separate complaints
for determination of just compensation with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board(DARAB). Despite the lapse of more three years from the filing of the complaints DARAB
failed and refused to render decision on the valuation of the land. Hence two complaints for
determination of just compensation were filed by the AFC and HPI before branch 2 of the
regional trial court of Tagum city( acting as a special agrarian court), which were subsequently
consolidated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a just compensation on the land.
HELD: The plaintiffs have presented evidence to established the value of their properties. It may
be admitted that plaintiffs properties are agricultural, however it is simply beyond dispute that in
going about the task of appraising real properties as in the instant case, all the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings its improvements and capabilities, may be shown
and considered in estimating its value.
It is undeniable that plaintiffs agricultural landas borne out from the records hereof and
remaining lots shows that all weather roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing
house and among numerous other improvements are permanently in place and not just a measly
but substantial amounts investment have been infused.

530 MANILA RAIL ROAD VS VELASQUEZ

FACTS: The property involved is situated in the municipality of San Pablo of Laguna. It
contains 6208.7 square meters. Apparently it first belonged to three owners latter transferred
their rights to the Tayabas Land Company. The contest has finally resolve itself into one between
the Manila Railroad Company and the Tayabas Land Company.
ISSUE: whether or not the trial court is correct in determining the fair market value of the
subject land.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agree with the trial court that both 8.50 and 5 per square meter,
as determined by two commission, was grossly excessive, but cannot agree with the Railroad
Company that .51 per square meter is just compensation.
The decision of the trial court fixing the value of the property at 5772 with interest at 6
percent per annum from December 1, 1909, until the date of the last payment is affirmed.
531 BPI VS CA
FACTS: Banks of the Philippine Island filed for review on certiorari of the decision of the court
of appeals in affirming on toto that of the Regional Trial court, which dismissed the complaint
filed by the petitioner BPI against private respondent Benjamin C. Napiza for the collection of
sum of money.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Napiza is liable under his warranties as a general indoser.
HELD: While it is true that private respondents having signed a blank withdrawal slip set in
motion the events that resulted in the withdrawal and encashment of the counterfeit check, the
negligence of the petitioner personnel was the proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent , is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause producing the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.

532-533 Missing
534 REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON,
FACTS: NAIA 3, a project between the Government and the Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO) was nullified.
Planning to put NAIA 3 facilities into immediate operation, the Government, through
expropriation filed a petition to be entitled of a writ of possession contending that a mere deposit
of the assessed value of the property with an authorized government depository is enough for the
entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court).
However, respondents avers that before an entitlement of the writ of possession is issued, direct
payment of just compensation must be made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No. 8974
and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).
ISSUE: WON expropriation can be conducted by mere deposit of the assessed value of the
property.
HELD: No, in expropriation proceedings, entitlement of writ of possession is issued only after
direct payment of just compensation is given to property owner on the basis of fairness. The
same principle applied in the 2004 Jurisprudence Resolution and the latest expropriation law
(RA No. 8974).

535 National Power Corporation v Judge Jocson 206 SCRA 520 (1992)

Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by
respondent judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The
petitioner filed 7 eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels
of land in relation to the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good
with the offer of corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation
process. However, both parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby
prompting petitioner to bring the eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing
paramount public interest for the expropriation and thereby issued an order determining the
provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax declaration of the properties. The
petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited corresponding amount of
the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the Philippine National
Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the assessed value
is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00. Immediately
the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the motion
for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours from
receipt of order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to
said order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered
petitioner to pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed
such order to be in violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not
the petitioner was deprived of due process of law.

Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent
domain proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take
possession of the real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be
held by the bank subject to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed
to observe this procedure by failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its
effort to deposit the amount in compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent
judge erred in increasing the provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both
parties. The instant petition was granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order
and directing respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing his orders.

536 BIGLANG AWA VS BACALLA

FACTS: The petitioner are the registered owners of a certain parcels of land situated in Talipapa
Novaliches Quezon city. The government needed to expropriate part of the aforementioned
property of the petitioner for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue.
Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic to submit documents to
determine just compensation of the property and failed to do so would give rise to an
expropriation proceeding for the said property. Petitioner failed to submit the said documents and
thus the Republic through the Department of Public Works and Highways filed with the RTC an
expropriation suit for said properties.
Respondent deposited the amount for compensation of the properties of the petitioners
thus the RTC issued a writ of possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the petitioners was violated by respondent
Republic.
HELD: No. expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property pursuant to Section 2 of sais Rule ,
without need of a hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited.
537 Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620)

Facts:

In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement
over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation
proceedings for the land in question.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation
should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property that year .

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to
be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

538 DIDIPIO v GOZUN

FACTS: This petition for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s.
1996 (DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered
into on 20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC),
a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals.

Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining Limited to form a single company that
now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining Corporation (CAMC), the controlling
99% of stockholders of which are Australian nationals.

on 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000
hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is
Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.

The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract
Area, the full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same. It also bestows
CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or
occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.

Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and

indigenous peoples organized under Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected
by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other residents of areas affected by the mining
activities of CAMC.

ISSUES & RULINGS:

WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942 AND THE CAMC FTAA ARE VOID
BECAUSE THEY ALLOW THE UNJUST AND UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION , IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 9,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION.

NO.

The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-
owned contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface
areas within the FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure. The government
then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through a voluntary
transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA. Eminent
domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface
rights can be acquired other than expropriation. The FTAA provision under attack merely
facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and shields it from violating the
Anti-Dummy Law.

There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and
regulations do not provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76
of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just
compensation.

539 . MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS PINEDA

Facts:

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic corporation duly

organized and existing under the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G.
Pineda is impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private
respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are
owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.

On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed by petitioner
MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila. The complaint alleges that for the
purpose of constructing a 230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at
Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private respondents consisting of an
aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and
attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to reach an agreement.

The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent court's act of determining and
ordering the payment of just compensation to private respondents without formal presentation of
evidence by the parties on the reasonable value of the property constitutes a flagrant violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to due process. It stressed that respondent court ignored the
procedure laid down by the law in determining just compensation because it formulated an
opinion of its own as to the value of the land in question without allowing the Board of
Commissioners to hold hearings for the reception of evidence.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.

Ruling:

Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square
meter on a property declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a
"Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and
private respondents on June 1, 1972. This agreement was merely attached to the motion to
withdraw from petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just compensation
on its own, without the proper reception of evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private
respondents as landowners have not proved by competent evidence the value of their respective
properties at a proper hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity to rebut
any evidence that would have been presented by private respondents. In an expropriation case
such as this one where the principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial before
the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. Contrary to the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least
three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may substitute its own estimate of
the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied
illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
excessive (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial with the aid of the
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no
reason at all. Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the commissioners may be
disregarded, the trial court may make its own estimate of value from competent evidence that
may be gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement relied upon by the
respondent judge, in the absence of any other proof of valuation of said properties, is
incompetent to determine just compensation.

540. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga

( 33 SCRA 527 , June 30, 1970 )

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in an
expropriation case (Civil Case No. 1130), declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of ownership of one of the condemned lots, in the same proceeding.

The controversy here is an incident in the case filed by the Republic of the Philippines in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, for the expropriation of the so called Henson Estates
belonging to the heirs of the deceased Jose P. Henson, who are all named defendants in the
complaint. The records show that when the complaint was filed , the estate had already been
subdivided and partitioned among the above-named heirs. One of the lots assigned to
defendant Francisca Henson-Roque was Lot No. 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017.

After a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of all the defendants, one Antonio
Feliciano, representing himself to be the owner of the lot identified as Lot No. 6, Block 6, plan
Psd-2017, filed a motion in intervention praying for the dismissal of the case . The motion was
opposed by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, pointing out that the sale of the land by
Francisca Henson-Roque to movant-intervenor was made a year after the filing of the
expropriation case, in violation of Section 20 of the Land Reform Act of 1955 (Republic Act
1400). The court, in its order declared as null and void the sale of the lot to Antonio Feliciano;
reconsidered the order allowing the intervention of Feliciano and treated Francisca Henson as
the defendant in the case; and directed the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel the
certificate of title issued in the name of Feliciano.

It appears, however, before the above order was issued, Feliciano sold the same lot to
the spouses Juan Punzalan and EufrocinaWingco, as a result of which TCT No. 17235-R in the
name of Feliciano was cancelled and another one (TCT No. 19484-R) was issued in favor of the
Punzalan spouses. Required later to show cause why the sale of the lot to them should not be
declared invalid and their title cancelled, the Punzalans contested the jurisdiction of the lower
court, submitting that not being a land registration court, it is without authority to pass upon
the validity of the sale and of the certificate of title. Besides, it was claimed that the sale of the
lot to them was in good faith and for value. On 30 January 1959, the lower court promulgated
an order stating that since the issue in that incident revolves around the validity of the sale of
the lot (after the expropriated case had started), which issue would call for the determination of
the interests of third parties in the property, the proper procedure would be to have the said
question ventilated and threshed out in a separate action.
 Plaintiff and Defendants manifested in court that they had come to an amicable
settlement of their controversy, the defendants agreeing to the sale of their land and to the
government’s immediate taking of possession thereof upon payment of the provisional value to
be fixed by the court. Taking cognizance of such agreement between the parties, the court
entered an order of condemnation against the defendants’ properties of the condemned land.

The defendants prayed for the modification of the condemnation-order, to exclude therefrom
eight lots . One such lot was the parcel of land, Lot 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017. Then, another motion was
also filed by defendants, increasing to sixteen the number of lots sought to be excluded from the
condemnation-order. The lower court granted the defendants’ motion and directed the exclusion of the
enumerated 16 lots from the order of condemnation. The court changed its stand and ordered the re-
inclusion of Lot 6, Block 6 in the list of expropriable properties, declaring further that the issues of the
validity of the two sales and the propriety of the cancellation of the titles issued to the vendees should
be determined at the instance of the affected party or parties.

Punzalans once more applied to the court for the exclusion of the lot , and for the cancellation
of the lispendens notice at the back of their certificate of title. This motion was denied by the court ,
reasoning that to grant movants’ prayer at that point would amount to prejudging the matter of the
validity of their (movants) title to the land. The court issued another order giving the government 30
days within which to initiate the necessary action to settle the question of the Punzalan’s title over the
property. When the given period elapsed without the government’s making any move on the premises,
the Punzalans filed another motion in the expropriation case reiterating their prayer for the exclusion of
the lot from the condemnation order and for cancellation of the lispendens annotation on their title.
The court denied movants’ motion; ordered the lifting of its previous order , and declared itself
possessed of authority to pass upon the issue raised in that incident, in accordance with Section 10, Rule
69 3 of the Rules of Court. There was a lull in the proceeding in the lower court , when the judge to
whom the case was reassigned 4 issued an order disavowing jurisdiction over the question of the validity
of the subsequent sales of the lot, and directing its exclusion from the order of condemnation . When its
motion for reconsideration of this latest order was denied, the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines came
to this Court by way of the present certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court that hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in
the sale proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned.

RULING:
 Must be resolved in the affirmative. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting
claims of ownership of the condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful
owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule 69, which
provides:

"SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership. Conflicting claims. — If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain,
or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the clerk of court for the benefit of the persons adjudged in
the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or
sums awarded to either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made."

In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming
ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action
nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality,
that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true
ownership of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.

Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation of Lot 6, Block 6,
Psd-2017, the court taking cognizance of the expropriation must necessarily determine if the sale to the
Punzalan spouses by Antonio Feliciano is valid or not. For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be
paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to someone else.

541. MWV v. De los Angeles

( 55 Phil. 776, 1927 )
------- to follow--- can not locate..
542. Republic of the Philippines v. Baylosis

( 109 Phil. 580, 1960 )

FACTS:

This case is an offshoot of the decision in G.R. No. L-6191, Republic of the Philippines vs.
CiriloBaylosis, et al., promulgated January 31, 1955, sustaining the motions to dismiss of appellants and
ordering the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings filed by the Republic of the Philippines in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas to expropriate seven lots formerly constituting part of the Lian Estate
(Hacienda Lian) .

It appears that after the records were returned by the Supreme Court ( SC ) to the Court a quo,
the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to withdraw its preliminary deposit of P27,105.22
made pursuant to section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, and by virtue of which it was placed in the
possession of parcels in question, on the ground that whatever claims for damages the finality of the
decision in G.R. No. L-6191, which made no pronouncement on nor contained a reservation of
defendants' right to claim damages. Defendants opposed the motion, claiming that their losses and
damages resulting from the transfer of the possession of their lands to plaintiff and which they alleged
in their motions to dismiss had not yet been determined by the trial court. Notwithstanding the
opposition, the court below, ordered the result of the deposit to plaintiff, for the reason that "the
defendants have not taken any step towards the recovery of such damages," nor "is there any assurance
that they would do so in the immediate future, on the assumption that their right to pursue such claim
for damages is not barred by laches". Defendants accordingly moved for the reconsideration of such
order, and before their motion for reconsideration was resolved, also moved that their counterclaims
for the damages be set for hearing. Both motions were denied by the court; whereupon, defendants
interposed the present appeal to this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellants can still prove and recover their damages in this same action.

RULING:

Yes.

In view of the antecedents, it can not be said that appellants are now barred from proving their
alleged in this case simply because their right to do so had not been reserved in our decision in G.R. No.
L-6191. The reservation had already been made in the court below and duly approved therein; the
reservation was not questioned by the Government, and it did not appeal therefrom. As there was
already that reservation, it was needless for appellants, to raise such matter on appeal or ask for a
reservation of their right to prove damages in our decision in G.R. No. L-6191. In a similar case wherein
agreed to the appointment of commissioners and presented evidence before them, upon the
understanding that said hearing was without prejudice to discussing later the question relative to the
right to plaintiff to expropriate, we held that the reservation was "very expressive in the sense that in
the mind of the court, defendants never had the intention of waiving that defense as otherwise it would
not stated in its order such reservation. Such reservation negatives the idea of waiver." (Republic vs.
G.R. No. L-6161, May 28, 1954.) The reservation made by appellants and approved by the court in this
case can not be any less effective than the reservation in the Gabriel case.
 543. Soriano v. Enriquez

( 24 Phil. 584, 1913 )

FACTS:

The appellant herein is by the defendants from the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The
action was commenced to recover a balance of interest alleged to be due upon a mortgage
indebtedness. The judgment awards to plaintiff a portion of the interest claimed, holding that the
remainder has become barred by the statute of limitations. From this judgment only the defendants
have appealed.

Antonio Enriquez executed a mortgage for P5,000 in favor of ObrasPias upon certain real estate
. Said mortgage, by express stipulation, bore interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. It is admitted
that the interest was paid by the mortgagor. Antonio Enriquez sold said real estate to defendant,
Carmen de la Cavada, for P8,000, of which P3,000 was paid in cash and, as to the remainder, the
purchaser expressly assumed the mortgage debt and agreed to pay the same. ObrasPias commenced an
action to foreclose this mortgage. Neither the mortgagor nor Carmen de la Cavada was made a party.
The action was against the persons then owning the mortgaged premises or having some interest
therein. By a decision rendered , the foreclosure of the mortgage was decreed against the property to
satisfy the principal amount and interest for two years at 6 per cent, but without personal liability on
the part of the defendant to pay any deficiency judgment. Before the sale under the foreclosure,
ObrasPias sold and transferred to the plaintiff all of its right, title, and interest in and to said mortgage
and in and to said mortgage and in and to the judgment of foreclosure already referred to. The property
was sold, pursuant to such judgment of foreclosure, and brought a sum sufficient to pay the mortgage
debt and the two years' interest, after deducting all costs and expenses. The plaintiff, standing in the
shoes of ObrasPias, commenced this action against Carmen de la Cavada and her husband to collect the
deficiency between the amount due upon the mortgage and the amount realized by the foreclosure
sale.

So far as appears from the record the amount received from the property on foreclosure sale,
less costs and expenses of foreclosure, was the same sum which was found due to the plaintiff in the
foreclosure action, namely, P5,600, P5,000 being of principal and P600 being of interest. It was found
upon the action of foreclosure when the case was appealed to this court that the defendants, being
third persons within the mortgage law, were not responsible for interest upon the principal except for
the two years immediately prior to the time the action was commenced. This, then, is an action to
recover interest only, being the interest on the mortgage debt from 1881 down to the beginning of the
two years for which interest was allowed in the foreclosure action.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the action to recover mortgage debt has prescribed.

RULING:

The conclusions having been reached that article 1964 of the Civil Code is applicable to the
present case and that the period of prescription had not been interrupted except upon the date on
which the ObrasPias presented its complaint, it is undeniable that the action in the present case has
prescribed, particularly the annual interest corresponding to the years from the 30th of May, 1881, to
the 23rd of December, 1890, these years being prior to the fifteen-year period which began on the 23rd
of December, 1890, and continued until the 23rd of December, 1905, on which date the complaint was
presented. The defendants, Carmen de la Cavada and Francisco Enriquez, are therefore obliged to pay to
the plaintiffs in this action the interest on said sum from the 23rd day of December, 1890, until the 30th
day of January, 1909, inasmuch as the land was sold by the sheriff on the 31st day of January, 1911, and
only so much of the interest was paid as was included in the last two years prior to such sale, or from
the 31st day of January, 1909, to the 31st day of January, 1911.

544. De Villa v. Fabricante

( 105 Phil. 672, 1959 )

FACTS:

Plaintiff filed this action before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur to foreclose the
mortgage executed by defendants covering two parcels of land situated in the same province.
Defendants, after having been duly served with summons, filed a motion to dismiss, which was
sustained, but, on appeal, this Court set aside the sustaining order and remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in a foreclosure mortgage , the mortgage debtor and the person to whom it is
sold must be both made defendants in the suit.

RULING:

Yes. In a foreclosure of mortgage if the encumbered property is sold to another person, the
mortgage debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be made defendants in the suit.
 We agree with the trial court that said purchasers are necessary parties to this action. This is
clear from Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court which provides that "All persons having or claiming
an interest in the premises subordinate in right to that of the holder of the mortgage . . . shall be made
defendants in the action." And this Court has held that if the mortgaged property is sold to another
person, the mortgage debtor, as well as the person to whom it is sold, must both be made defendants.

545. De La Riva v. Reynoso

( 61 Phil. 734, 1935 )

FACTS:

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant Marceliano Reynoso to foreclose the
second real estate mortgage which the latter executed in his favor. In the complaint La Urbana was
joined as defendant because it has a first mortgage on the same real property executed by the said
Reynoso.

After trial, judgment was rendered ordering Reynoso to pay La Urbana, and to pay De la Riva.
Reynoso appealed.

But in his appeal he contends that his demurrer, based on the misjoinder of La Urbana as
defendant because the plaintiff was without right to join it as defendant being a first mortgages, should
have been sustained; that he neither applied for the loan from the La Urbana nor executed the
mortgage deed with full knowledge of the facts and of the deed which he executed, and that his cross
complaint against the said party should have been granted. Reynoso died during the trial of the case;
and at the instance of his judicial administrator, the appeal against the plaintiff was dismissed, leaving
only the pending appeal against La Urbana.

The administrator-appellant argues that La Urbana cannot be joined in plaintiff's complaint

because it was the first mortgagee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not La Urbana cannot be joined in plaintiff’s complaint.

RULING:

No. It is true that section 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure only requires the inclusion in the
complaint for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage of the second mortgagee or of any other person
claiming a right or interest subordinate to the mortgage sought to be foreclosed; but it will be noted
that there is no provision in said Code prohibiting the joinder of a first mortgagee in a complaint filed by
the second mortgagee for the same purpose. And the prohibition is even less justified where, as in the
present case, the joinder of the first mortgagee was with the latter's consent and conformity. We see no
good reason to hold that in a suit to foreclose a real estate mortgage, the second mortgagee cannot join
the first mortgagee as defendant, with the latter's consent and when the principal obligation or the
terms of the mortgage had become due and payable.

546. Top Rate International Services v. IAC

( 142 SCRA 467, July 07, 1986 )

FACTS:

These are two consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court ( SC ) seeking to annul the
decisions of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 67496 dated January 6, 1984 and in G.R. No.
68257 dated June 6, 1984, respectively. The two decisions both upheld the validity of the levy made on
two properties whose ownership is claimed by petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that the value of said
properties are far in excess of the amount of the liens thereon. The decisions are based on the ground
that what was attached and levied upon are not the properties themselves but only the vendor's equity
of redemption. The petitioner also asks that the resolutions of the appellate court denying its motions
for reconsideration be set aside.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
ruled that "because the private respondent through the sheriff could not have levied on the properties
but only on the right of redemption or equity of redemption thereon, there could not have been an
over-levy sufficient to justify a quashal of the notice of levy on attachment on the properties claimed by
the petitioner."

RULING:

We, therefore, hold that the appellate court did not commit any error in ruling that there was
no over-levy on the disputed properties. What was actually attached by respondents was Consolidated
Mines' right or equity of redemption, an incorporeal and intangible right, the value of which can neither
be quantified nor equated with the actual value of the properties upon which it may be exercised.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 67496 and G.R. No. 68257 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The decisions of the respondent court are AFFIRMED.

547. Huerta Alba Resort v. Court of Appeals

( 339 SCRA 534, September 01,2000 )

FACTS:

Private respondent instituted a civil case as mortgagee-assignee of a loan amounting to P8.5

million obtained by petitionerfrom Intercon. In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage private
respondent sought the foreclosure of (4) parcelsof land mortgaged by petitioner to Intercon Fund
Resource, Inc. (“Intercon”), which was granted by the CA. On September 6, 1994, private respondent
was declared the highest bidder during the auction sale and the Certificate of Sale issued in itsfavor was
registered on October 21, 1994. In opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession,
petitioner filed aMotion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept Redemption on May 2, 1995 ,invoking
for the very first time its alleged rightto redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No. 337
(General Banking Act).

Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 provides that “in case of a foreclosure of amortgage in favor of a
bank, banking or creditinstitution, whether judicially or extrajudicially, the mortgagor shall have the
right, within one year after the sale of the realestate as a result of the foreclosure of the respective
mortgage, to redeem the property.”

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner had the right of redemption or equity of redemption over subject
properties.

RULING:

From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo , petitioner has been adjudged to have
was only the equityof redemption over subject properties. The right of redemption in relation to a
mortgage - understood in the sense of aprerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration
of the foreclosure sale - exists only in the case of theextrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. No such
right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only where themortgagee is the Philippine National
Bank or a bank or banking institution. Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to
the mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of the sheriff’s
certificate of foreclosure sale.In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner to
invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A.No. 337. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to
the beneficial provisions of the said law -since private respondent’s predecessor-in-interest is a credit
institution - is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which should have been averred in
petitioner’s answer to the complaint for judicial foreclosure.There then existed only what is known as
the equity of redemption, which is simply the right of the petitioner to extinguishthe mortgage and
retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the
judgmentbecame final. There being an explicit finding on the part of the CA - that the petitioner failed to
exercise its equity of redemption within the prescribed period, redemption can no longer be effected.

548. Limpin v. Intermediate Appellate Court

( 166 SCRA 87, September 29, 1988 )

FACTS:

Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and MarcelinaAquino to Guillermo Ponce and his
wife Adela (sincedeceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. Themortgages were registered. Two
of the lots, those covered byTCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were afterwards sold by theAquinos to the
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation, whichcaused an adverse claim to be annotated on the
certificatesof title.Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment againstButuan Bay Wood Export
Corporation in Court of FirstInstance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the lots coveredby TCTs Nos.
92836 and 92837 were levied upon on and soldat public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder for the
sumof P517,485.41.On order of the trial court, the covering titles were cancelled and issued to Limpin.
Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M.Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs Nos. 285450 and285451
were cancelled on November 4, 1983, and TCT’S werereplaced in Sarmiento's name.Ponce filed suit
against the Aquino spouses for judicialforeclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots.Judgment
was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgmentbecame final, the Trial Court, directed the sale at
publicauction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment.The 4 lots, including those formerly
covered by TCTs Nos.92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself whose bid wasthe highest and
exactly correspond to the judgment debt. Onthe same day, the sheriff's certificate of sale was
registered.Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and theissuance of a writ of possession in
his favor covering the fourlots. But the Trial Court confirmed only the sale of the lotscovered by TCTs
Nos. 02839 and 92840, refusing to confirmthe sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the
lotscovered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground thatthose titles had already been cancelled
and new ones issuedto Gregorio F. Limpin.Limpin refused to participate in the hearings contending
thatthe Court had no jurisdiction over his person; but he didcomment that the mortgage over the lots
covered by TCTsNos. 92836 and 92837 had been released by Ponce by virtueof a "Partial Release of Real
Estate Mortgage". The Trial Courtdenied Ponce's motion for reconsideration, whereupon hesought
corrective relief by filing a special civil action forcertiorari and mandamus in the Intermediate
AppellateCourt, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, as privaterespondents.IAC set aside the judgment of
the Trial Court and issue a writof possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject toSarmiento's equity
of redemption.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IAC erred in according superiority to themortgage rights of Ponce over the levy
and sale in favor of Limpin and the subsequent sale to Sarmiento.

RULING:

NO. The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of asubsequent judgment creditor is now
expressly provided inRule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, whichstates with regard to the
effect of levy on execution that itshall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over theright title and
interest of the judgment debtor in suchproperty at the time of the levy, subject to the liens
orencumbrances then existing.Using jurisprudence in Santiago v Dionisio, the Court in that case held
that: ... [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both
is to render the foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor
the "unforeclosed equity of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit.
(Ibid; 2 Moran's Rules of Court, 3rd ed., p. 239)

549. De Castro v. Intermediate Appellate Court

( 165 SCRA 654, September 26, 1988 )

FACTS:

The spouses Patricio and Angelina Reyes were the registered owners of a residential house and lot . The
spouses Reyes sold said mortgaged property to herein petitioners who all assumed the mortgage with
the knowledge and consent of the mortgagee bank, pursuant to a "deed of sale with assumption of
mortgage." However, said deed was not annotated at the back of the title of the mortgaged property
nor registered with the Registry of Deeds.

Petitioners failed to fully pay the loan as it fell due, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed by the mortgagee bank, and the property was sold at public auction to Alfredo Garcia.

Petitioners offered to redeem the property. The City Sheriff and the Pasay City Development
Bank refused to issue in favor of petitioners a certificate of redemption and deed of conveyance over
the property. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus. The court a quo denied the petition. The IAC
affirmed the decision of the trial court; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are redemptions or successors-in-interest in contemplation of

Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135 and related rules under the Rules of Court.

RULING:

The sale of a mortgaged property at public auction by reason of an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
is governed by Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. Under the cited law, a right of redemption is
granted to the debtor, his successor-in-interest or any judicial creditor of said debtor or any person
having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, within a period of one (1) year from the date of the sale: and such redemption is governed by
Sections 29, 30 and 31. Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The matter of redemption is wholly statutory. Only such persons can redeem from an execution sale as
are authorized to do so by statute.

In determining whether a person is included within the terms of a redemption statute, the principle is
stated to be that, if one is in privity in title with the mortgagor, and he has such an interest that he
would be a loser by the foreclosure, he may redeem. Redemption is proper where made by debtors,
grantee, or assignee for the benefit of creditors, or assignee or trustee in insolvency proceedings. In
Gorospe vs. Santos , the Court, citing Magno vs. Viola and Sotto, said: We held in Magno v. Viola that
the successor-in-interest includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of
redemption; or one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
redemption; or one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by operation of law; or one or more joint
debtors who were joint owners of the property sold; or the wife as regards her husband's homestead by
reason of the fact that some portion of her husband's title passes to her.

In the instant case, the petitioners, as the assignees or transferees of all the rights of the original
debtors, i.e., spouses Patricio and Angelina Reyes, over the subject property by virtue of a "deed of sale
with assumption of mortgage" may validly exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-interest" of
said debtors.

550. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Coconut Planters Bank

( 604 SCRA 343, October 23, 2009 )

FACTS:

This is an action involving a disputed assessment for deficiencies in the payment of creditable
withholding tax and documentary stamps tax due from a foreclosure sale.

Respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) granted loans to George C. Co, Go Tong Electrical
Supply Co., Inc., and Tesco Realty Co. . When the latter later failed to pay their loans, UCPB filed a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties.

UCPB presented the certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds of Manila for annotation on the transfer
certificates of title of the foreclosed properties. The bank paid creditable withholding taxes (CWT) and
documentary stamp taxes (DST) in relation to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), however, charged UCPB with late payment of the
corresponding DST and CWT. These taxes accrued upon the lapse of the redemption period of the
mortgaged properties. The CIR pointed out that the mortgagor, a juridical person, had three months
after foreclosure within which to redeem the properties.

The CIR theorized that the three-month redemption period was to be counted from the date of the
foreclosure sale. Here, he said, the redemption period lapsed three months. Thus, UCPB was in default
for having paid the CWT and DST

UCPB protested the assessment issued by the CIR. It claimed that the redemption period lapsed on June
1, 2002 or three months after the executive judge of Manila approved the issuance of the certificate of
sale. Foreclosure under Section 47 of the General Banking Law, said UCPB, referred to the date of
approval by the executive judge, and not the date of the auction sale. But the CIR denied UCPBs protest,
prompting UCPB to file a petition for review with the CTA .

The CTA Second Division set aside the decision of the CIR .Hence, UCPBs payments of
CWT and DST in early July were well within the prescribed period. On appeal to the CTA En Banc in CTA
EB 234, the latter affirmed the decision of the Second Division. With the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner has taken recourse to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the three-month redemption period for juridical persons should be reckoned
from the date of the auction sale.

RULING:

No.
 On August 15, 2008, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Revenue Memorandum Circular
58-2008 which clarified among others, the time within which to reckon the redemption period of real
estate mortgages. It reads:

For purposes of reckoning the one-year redemption period in the case of individual mortgagors, or the
three-month redemption period for juridical persons/mortgagors, the same shall be reckoned from the
date of the confirmation of the auction sale which is the date when the certificate of sale is issued.

The CIR must have in the meantime conceded the unreasonableness of the previous position it had
taken on this matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

551. Barrameda v. Gontang

( 19 SCRA 387, February 18, 1967 )

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by LeoncioBarrameda
against the respondents.

LeoncioBarrameda was the registered owner of three parcels of land which he mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Because of his failure to pay the indebtedness when it
became due, the DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. In the auction sale, the DBP was the
highest bidder. Barrameda failed to redeem the land. Soon thereafter the DBP sold the property to
Carmen Gontang and Rodolfo General.

In the meanwhile, Gontang and General, requested the DBP to deliver to them the possession of the
land. Pursuant to this request, the DBP filed an ex parte petition in the Court of First Instance. A writ of
possession was issued to install the DBP in possession of the property and to eject therefrom all adverse
occupants, including LeoncioBarrameda and FidelaTerrero. The writ was not served for failure of the
DBP to pay the sheriff's fee. An alias writ was subsequently issued and by virtue of this alias writ, the
DBP, represented by its successors-in-interest, Gontang and General, took possession of the land. But
because of the repeated attempts of LeoncioBarrameda, through his armed men, to re-enter the land
and get the landowner's share of the harvest, Gontang and General asked for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction to enjoin Barrameda and his men from disturbing them in their possession of the
land. After due hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction against Barrameda. The latter's motion
for reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not preliminary injunction is proper.

RULING:

Yes.

The petition below for preliminary injunction filed by Gontang and General (Civil Case 5700
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur) alleges that despite their possession, the petitioner
herein has repeatedly attempted to intrude into the premises; that through the aid of armed men he
forcibly took the owner's share of the harvest; that he threatened to re-enter the property and get the
landowner's share of the coming harvest; and that the continuance of such illegal acts would work grave
and irreparable damage and prejudice to the rights of the landowner. The trial court found these
allegations well-founded, and, upon the filing of a written obligation by Gontang and General, issued the
preliminary injunction in question. This action of the court is perfectly proper. In Rustia vs. Franco, 41
Phil. 280, this Court declared:

In the American system of procedure, from which provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, relative to
injunction are taken, the injunction is recognized as a perfectly legitimate remedy to protect the owner
of the land, being in possession, from illegitimate acts of repeated intrusion by a stranger, as where a
person who has no right to enter from time to time, cut wood, or carry other products. The intermittent
nature of such acts, and the probability, not to say certainty, of repetition in the future, makes the legal
remedy by an independent action to try title inadequate and justifies the granting of the equitable
remedy. (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 3d ed. Vol. 4, sec. 135).

554,556,557,558,561 MISSING
552 RAMOS VS MANALAC
89 phil 270, June 16, 1951
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners
question the validity of the CFI ruling that they will be held in contempt for
refusing to vacate the land. The said property, being collateral for a loan to a
Mr. Rivera, was foreclosed due to non-payment of loan amount and its interest
within the prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera later sold the property to Ms. Lopez,
who later filed petition that she be placed in possession of the land. The
petitioners question the ruling of the court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:

(1) The decision of the lower court (CFI) is valid;

(2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid;
and,

(3) (Possible Legal Ethics Issue) the term “appearance” would include only
presence in courts.

RULING:
1. YES. Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be
sustained for the reason that it is in a nature of collateral attack to judgment
which on its face is valid and regular for a long time. It is a well known rule that a
judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in
separate action brought principally for the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47
Phil. 717).

2. YES. It was not also taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of
possession in foreclosure proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the
purview of Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is merely ministerial and
complementary duty of the court.

3. NO. The word or term “appearance” includes not only arguing a case before
any such body but also filing a pleading in behalf of a client as “by simply filing
a formal motion, plea or answer”.

553 Alpha Insurance and surety Co. vs Reyes

106 SCRA 274, July 31, 1981

FACTS:
Spouses Esperanza and Arturo Reyes executed in favor of Alpha Insurance a
second mortgage over their parcels of land and the buildings thereon, in
consideration of Alpha Insurance’s undertaking to act as surety of the said
spouses in certain loans to be obtained from Banks or financial institutions.

Due to the default of Esperanza C. Reyes, Alpha Insurance, as solidary debtor,

had to pay the two loans. As the spouses did not make any reimbursement to
Alpha Insurance, the latter filed a foreclosure action against the spouses and
the DBP with the court of First Instance of Manila.

The Reyes spouses did not file an answer and were declared in default. Judge
Moya simply ordered the spouses to pay Alpha and ignored the foreclosure of
Alpha Insurance’s second mortgage.

Alpha Insurance filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by Judge
Moya. Alpha Insurance appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the foreclosure of the second mortgage is proper

RULING:

Yes. However, the proceeds of the sale should first be paid to DBP’s (first
mortgage) credit.

Even if the DBP were just an ordinary first mortgagee without any preferential lien
under RA no. 85 or commonwealth act 459, the statutes mentioned in the
Associated Insurance case relied upon by the trial court. It would be
unquestionable that nothing may be done to favor plaintiff-appellant, a mere
second mortgagee, until after the obligations of the debtors-appellees with the
first mortgage have been fully satisfied and settled. In law, strictly speaking, what
was mortgaged by Reyes to Alpha was more than their equity of redemption.

555 Jose Ponce De Leon vs Rehabilitation Finance Corporation et al

36 SCRA 289, December 18, 1970

FACTS:
On October 8, 1951, Jose Ponce De Leon and Francisco Soriano took out a loan
from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation or RFC (now Development Bank of
the Philippines) for P495, 000.00. The loan was secured by a parcel of land
owned by Soriano. A deed of mortgage was then executed in view of the loan.
Soriano and Ponce de Leon also executed a promissory note in the amount of
P495k, payable in monthly installments of P28,831.64.
Part of the P495k was used to pay off the previous encumbrances amounting to
P135k on the property of Soriano. The rest were released to Ponce de Leon in
various amounts from December 1951 to July 1952, still pursuant to the deed of
mortgage.
The loan went unpaid and so RFC initiated a foreclosure proceeding on the
mortgaged property. According to RFC, the monthly payments were supposed
to be due in October 1952.
In his defense, Ponce de Leon insists that the amortizations never became due
because allegedly, RFC did not complete the disbursement of the loan to him
(allegedly, P19k was withheld). He also invokes that on the face of the
promissory note it was written that the installments have “no fixed or determined
dates of payment”. Hence, the monthly payments were never due therefore the
foreclosure is void. He insists that the court should first determine the date of
maturity of the loan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ponce de Leon is right
RULING:
No. During trial and based on the records, Ponce de Leon’s lawyer admitted
that all the remainder of the loan was released to Ponce de Leon so he cannot
invoke that not all of the P495k was released by RFC.
Anent the issue of the loan’s maturity date, under Section 13 and 14 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, when a promissory note expresses “no time for
payment,” it is deemed “payable on demand.” Therefore, when RFC
demanded payment on October 24, 1952, the installments become due.

559 Russel vs. Vestil

304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and
deed of confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting the
land executed by and among the respondents whereby respondents divided
the property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who are entitled
thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated “DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION” against defendants with the RTC claiming that the document was
false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that
no oral partition of the property whatsoever had been made between the
heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and
an order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs.

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of

lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to dismiss saying that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case
RULING:
Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void
the document in question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of
nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective
of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

560 MAGLUCOT-AW vs MAGLUKOT

329 SCRA 78, March 28, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages alleging
that they are owners of lot no 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639
which was covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis,
Pascual Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot.
Subsequently, Tomas and respondent’s predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to
subdivide the lot into six (6) portions and were granted.

Then in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-D paying rentals therefore.
They likewise built houses on their corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992,
they stopped paying rentals, claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners
maintained that there was a valid partition and that the respondents are
stopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of their
agreement in 1946 and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied
upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are stopped from questioning the title to
partition?

RULING:

YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition and
who took possession of the partition allotted to them are stopped from
questioning the title to partition allotted to another party. Here, respondents
already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This occupation
continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the
possession and ownership of other co-owners who took exclusive possession of
lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan. As well as the payment of
the rentals reveals that respondent’s possession of the land is that of a holder
and not as owner thereof. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership. Hence, petitioners
were in possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to
the time the present action was commenced. Petition was granted.

562 DE MESA vs CA

231 SCRA 773, April 25, 1994

FACTS:

The case stemmed in an action for petition filed by private respondents against
petitioner. Private respondents prayed for the partition of certain properties left
by their parents.

Petitioner, in his owner, admitted that their parents left properties, but claimed
that the subject funeral parlor in his own.

ISSUE:

Whether or not judgment on partition is final and appealable

Ruling:

Yes. The rule is that a judgment ordering partition with damages is final and duly
appealable notwithstanding the fact which petitioner seeks to capitalize that
further proceedings will still have to take in place in the trial court.

In the instant case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of
accounting had already become final and executor. The execution thereof,
thus, became a matter of right on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private
respondents and it is mandatory and ministerial duty on the part of the court.

563 MANUEL T. GUIA VS. CA AND JOSE B. ABEJO

413 SCRA 114, October 8, 2003

FACTS:

Two parcels of land covering a fishpond equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and
Lorenza Araniego. The one half undivided portion owned by Araniego was later
purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo, the only heir of the original
owner (husband of Araniego). Prior to this sale, the whole fishpond was leased
by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A.
Abejo in favor of De Guia. De Guia continues to possess the entire fishpond and
derived income therein despite the expiration of the lease contract and several
demands to vacate by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest; Jose
Abejo.Abejo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages against
De Guia. However, Abejo failed to present evidence of the judicial or
extrajudicial partition of the fishpond.
ISSUE:

Whether a co-owner can file ejectment case against a co-owner?Whether

Abejo was entitled to rent?

RULING:

Under Article 484, “there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an

undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion
which is truly abstract. Article 487 also provides that ‘anyone of the co-owners
may bring an action for ejectment”. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not
only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. However,
the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The
plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as a
co-owner he has a right of possession.

If one co-owner alone occupies the property without opposition from the other
co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot
demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the
house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the
house.

The Lejano Heirs and TeofiloAbejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE
GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent.

564.DELIMA V. CA

201 SCRA 641

FACTS:Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar

Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino
Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister
namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima.
After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August
3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented
by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents,
executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this
affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on
February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the
other heirs.

Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.

On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and
Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional
Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the
annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima
and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the
petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the
statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect
his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of
petitioners from their shares in the disputed property.

HELD:
When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the
strength thereof, obtained a cancellation of the title in the name of their
predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as owner, the statute
of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the
latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and
their rights thereafter. The issuance of a new title constituted a clear act of
repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.

565.ARRIOLA V. ARRIOLA
Facts:

Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola
(respondent) ,his son with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife
and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners).

On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without
prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.

However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above mentioned
property and so the respondent proposed to sell it though public auction. The
petitioners initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for
lack of merit.

When a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the respondent
elevated the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari and prayed that he be
allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land including the
house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction
sale of the subject lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion. Hence this petition for
review on Certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying the motion for contempt of court.

Ruling: Filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for
the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect
contempt are : a) it shall be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it
should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions. In Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616 (2007) it was held that: As explained
by Justice Florenz Regalado , the filing of a verified petition that has complied
with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory.

566.VALMONTE V. CA DIGEST

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners

Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222
 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his
profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his
residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at
S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of
petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband.
She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a
resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the
defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be
served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St.,
Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant
Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be
found.He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the
Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to her
husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her
should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner
Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his
summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not
authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process
server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her
Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in
default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in
behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. RTC
denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default.
Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with
summons.

Ruling:NO.

There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.

1. The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific
property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of
 summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be
effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service;
(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address
of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.

2. In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.

Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode of
service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant
resides. The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not
made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly
was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to
consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.

3. Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided
in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by
affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the
grounds for the application.

4. Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such
leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.

567.DEL VAL VS. DEL VAL

Facts: Plaintiffs and defendant are brothers and sisters and only heirs to
Gregorio Nacianceno del Val who died August 4, 1910. During his lifetime he
took out insurance on his life for P40,000 payable to defendant as sole
beneficiary. Defendant collected face of the policy and used P18,365.20 to
redeem certain real estate through his attorney in the name of plaintiff and
defendant. Defendant declares redemption under name of plaintiff was without
his knowledge or consent. Plaintiffs contend that the amount of the insurance
policy belonged to the estate and not to defendant personally therefore they are
entitled to partition thereof.
Issue: Did the trial court err in declaring that the proceeds of policy belong
exclusively to defendant?

Held: No. The proceeds of an insurance policy belong exclusively to the

beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and that
such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary, and
not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured.

Since the repurchase has been made n the names of all the heirs instead of the
defendant alone, petitioners claim that the property belongs to the heirs in
common and not to the defendant alone. The SC held that if it is established
by evidence that that was his intention and that the real estate was delivered to
the plaintiffs with that understanding, then it is probable that their contention
is correct and that they are entitled to share equally with the
defendant. HOWEVER, it appears from the evidence that the conveyances were
taken in the name of the plaintiffs without the knowledge and consent of
Andres, or that it was not his intention to make a gift to them of real estate,
when it belongs to him.

568.LAVARROV. LAVITORIA

FACTS: In 1916 a tract of coconut land was registered in favour of S and the
defendants in the present action. Subsequently, in the same year, the herein
defendants brought an action for the partition of the land with its
improvements. The action was finally terminated in 1927 and S was awarded
68,877 square meters of land and 850 coconut palms as her share. Shortly
afterwards, the present action was brought by S and her two daughters to
recover compensation for improvements consisting of coconut palms and
alleged to have been planted by S and her first husband.
Issue: Whether or not a party may institute more than one suit for a single
cause of action.

Held:

It was held that a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action
and make it a basis for several suits , and the plaintiff in the former action
cannot subsequently avail himself of the residue by way of an offset in an
action against him by the opposite party.

569.NOCEDA V. CA

FACTS:

Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo,

the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo
extrajudicially settled a parcel of land located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan,
Zambales, which was said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff
Directo’s share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294
square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria
Arbizo. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant
Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister,
Carolina. However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was
executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths
of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant
Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as
well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121 in the name of the late
Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area of only
29,845 square meters.

Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land

donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted
to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and
constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed the
fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and
fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo
demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.

Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the
recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation,
against defendant Noceda before the lower court.

Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the
donation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cecilia Obispo who has tax declarations in her name
over Lot 1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof make them
indispensable parties in the present case.

Held : The fact that Cecilia Obispo has tax declarations in her name over Lot
1121 and several persons occupied a portion thereof did not make them
indispensable parties in the present case. A party is not indispensable to the
suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible
from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily prejudiced by a
judgment, which does complete justice to the parties in court.

571. DEBORJA V. JUGO

FACTS:

Jose De Borja , the petitioner is the son of the respondent Francisco de Borja.
On May 11, 1928, Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja,
by instituting land registration case No. 528 of the Province of Rizal, were
declared, owners of the real property known as Hacienda de Jalajala. Two
years later, or in 1930, Quintin de Borja, as administrator of the Intestate
estate of Marcelo de Borja, instituted civil case No. 4565, for the partition of the
property of which said deceased, Francisco de Borja and Bernardo de Borja
were undivided owners.

On October 29, 1931, the court which tried the case decided it, adjudicating
one-third of the property under partition to the respondent Francisco de Borja.
However, in view of the fact that the order of partition failed to specify the areas
and boundaries of the portions allotted to each of the three co-owners, the
court ordered the survey thereof by some surveyors commissioned for that
purpose.

The petitioner, Jose de Borja alleged that there was a deed of sale purporting to
have been signed by Francisco de Borja and the petitioner which was
categorically denied by the respondent, characterizing it as spurious.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene.

HELD:

In this jurisdiction the right to intervene in an action is not absolute. It

depends upon the sound discretion of the court and when there is no evidence
that the person who desires to intervene as such has an interest in the subject
matter of the litigation, his right thereto should not be recognized
(Joaquin vs. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705). The fact that the petitioner has brought an
action for the recovery of possession against the respondent Francisco de Borja
and others and that he has in his possession a document which was
categorically denied by the respondent, characterizing it as spurious, is
insufficient to show that his interest to intervene in civil case No. 4565 is legal,
clear and positive.

On the other hand, intervening may be permitted only in cases where the
intervening party desires to join the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the
claimant, or to unite with the defendant in resisting the claims of the plaintiff,
or to demand anything adverse to both the plaintiff and defendant, and in the
case under consideration the petitioner joined neither of said parties.
Furthermore, such step may be taken only during the trial or hearing of the
case and never after judgment had been rendered (Felismino vs. Gloria, 47
Phil., 967). When the petitioner filed his motion to intervene (August 19, 1936),
more than five years had already elapsed from the time judgment had been
rendered in the case for partition, and the only thing then lacking was some
incidental proceedings precisely to give effect to said judgment. For all these
considerations, the conclusion that must be arrived at is that the petition filed
is without merit. This is so because in order that a person may be compelled,
by mandamus, to perform a particular act, it is imperative that the right had
for that purpose be clear, not doubtful. In view of the present status of said
action for the recovery of possession (civil case No. 6598), it is still to be
determined whether or not the alleged contract of sale between father and son
existed, which proves that the alleged right of the petitioner is not clear but
doubtful.
 572.SEPULVEDA vs. PELAEZ

DOCTRINE: The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua

non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable
party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the
plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that
the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.

FACTS: On December 6, 1972, private respondent Atty. Pacifico Pelaez filed a

complaint against his granduncle, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr., for the recovery of
possession and ownership of his 1/2 undivided share of several parcels of land;
his undivided 1/3 share in several other lots; and for the partition thereof
among the co-owners. The 11 lots were among the 25 parcels of land, which
Dulce (private respondent's mother) and her uncles Pedro and Santiago co-
owned, each with an undivided 1/3 share thereof. In his complaint, the private
respondent claims that his grandmother Carlota repeatedly demanded the
delivery of her mother’s share in the 11 parcels of land, but Pedro Sepulveda,
Sr. who by then was the Municipal Mayor of Tudela, refused to do so. Dulce,
likewise, later demanded the delivery of her share in the eleven parcels of land,
but Pedro still refused. The private respondent alleged that he himself
demanded the delivery of his mother’s share in the subject properties on so
many occasions, the last of which was in 1972, to no avail. The private
respondent further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit stating
that he was the sole heir of Dionisia when she died intestate in 1921, when, in
fact, the latter was survived by her three sons, Santiago, Pedro and Vicente.
Pedro also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property covered by T.D.
No. 19804 in favor of the City of Danao, and received P7,492 without his
(private respondent’s) knowledge. The private respondent prayed that he be
declared the absolute owner of his portions of the parcels of land, that said
parcels of land be partitioned and segregated, and that he be given his share of
P7,492 representing the purchase price of the parcel of land sold to the City of
Danao. In his answer to the complaint, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. admitted having
executed a deed of sale over the parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 19804 in
favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed to pay the purchase price
thereof; besides, the private respondent had no right to share in the proceeds
of the said sale. He likewise denied having received any demand for the delivery
of Dulce’s share of the subject properties from the latter’s mother Carlota, or
from the private respondent. During the trial, Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. died
intestate. A petition for the settlement of his estate was filed with the RTC of
Cebu. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas, was appointed
administratrix of his estate and substituted the deceased in this case.
According to the petitioner, Dulce and Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. had a verbal
agreement wherein the eleven parcels of land covered by the complaint would
serve as the latter’s compensation for his services as administrator of Dionisia’s
estate. Thus, upon the termination of Special Proceeding No. 778-0, and
subsequent to the distribution of the shares of Dionisia’s heirs, Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. then became the sole owner of Dulce’s shares. The petitioner
likewise adduced evidence that Santiago Sepulveda died intestate and was
survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda and their then minor children. It was
pointed out that the private respondent failed to implead Paz Sepulveda and
her minor children as parties-defendants in the complaint. It was further
claimed that Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. declared the property covered by T.D. No.
18199 under his name for taxation purposes since the beginning of 1948. It
was likewise alleged that the 11 parcels of land deeded to Dulce under the
Project of Partition had been declared for taxation purposes under the name of
Pedro Sepulveda since 1974, and that he and his heirs paid the realty taxes
thereon. TC in favor of the private respondent: The private respondent’s action
for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the
complaint was filed; that he was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale
of the property to Danao City; and that the partition of the subject property
among the adjudicatees thereof was in order. Petitioner appealed the decision
to the CA. CA affirmed the appealed decision with modification. The petitioner
now comes to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON private respondent's action will prosper, despite having failed to
implead all the indispensable parties in his complaint.

Held: NO. It appears that when the private respondent filed the complaint, his
father, Rodolfo Pelaez, was still alive. Thus, when his mother Dulce Pelaez died
intestate on March 2, 1944, she was survived by her husband Rodolfo and
their son, the private respondent. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
provides that in an action for partition, all persons interested in the property
shall be joined as defendants. Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of
real estate.- A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which
partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons
interested in the property. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an
interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for
partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

In the present action, the private respondent failed to implead the following
indispensable parties: his father, Rodolfo Pelaez; the heirs of Santiago
Sepulveda, namely, Paz Sepulveda and their children; and the City of Danao
which purchased the property from Pedro Sepulveda, Sr. and maintained that
it had failed to pay for the purchase price of the property. Rodolfo Pelaez is an
indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct, equal to the share
of the respondent in the subject properties. There is no showing that Rodolfo
Pelaez had waived his right to usufruct.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine
qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable
party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the
plaintiff is mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that
the absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision
of the court, otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process. Without
the presence of all the other heirs as plaintiffs, the trial court could not validly
render judgment and grant relief in favor of the private respondent. The failure
of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-plaintiffs
constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s exercise
of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or judgments
rendered therein a nullity. To reiterate, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority
to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Hence,
the trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint. Petition is
GRANTED. RTC and CA decisions are set aside. RTC is ordered to dismiss the
complaint without prejudice.

573. HEIRS OF INFANTE V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Plaintiffs Teofilo Infante, Inocencia Infante, Emiliana Infante, Rufo

Infante, Francisca Infante, Iluminada Infante, Gliceria Infante, Nemesia
Infante, Antonio Infante and Melodita Infante filed on May 31, 1973 with the
then Court of Instance of Negros Oriental a Complaint "For: Reconveyance and
Damages" against Bartolome Infante and Juliana Infante. Thereafter, the
defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that plaintiffs had no cause of
action against defendants and even if they had, the same is barred by the
statute of limitations. The then Court of First Instance, instead of resolving the
motion to dismiss, held the same in abeyance after the "complete hearing on
the merits."

ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the private respondents in the
court is one for partition even though the Complaint is for "Reconveyance and
Damages."

HELD: On this score, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
action instituted by private respondents in the court below may be considered
as one for partition even though the Complaint is for "Reconveyance and
Damages."
Contrary to petitioners' contention, allegations sufficient to support an action
for partition may be found in private respondents' Complaint:

There is therefore substantial compliance with the procedural requirements for

a complaint for partition provided in Section 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Sec. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having a right
to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed,
setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded, and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property.

Further, the course of action taken by the Court of Appeals is sanctioned by

the Revised Rules of Court, which mandates that all pleadings shall be liberally
construed so as to do substantial justice [Rule 6, Sec. 15.]

574. HEIRS OF JARDIN V. HEIRS OF HALLASGO

FACTS :The spouses Braulio Jardin and Maura Hallasgo were survived by their
two children named Catalino and Galo and by Sixto Hallasgo, apparently
Maura's child by her first husband.

In 1920, Catalino, Galo and Sixto partitioned in a private document the

following properties inherited from the Jardin spouses:

(1) A residential lot in the poblacion of Jasaan, now Lower Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental, with an assessed value of P1,000. Catalino and Galo each received as
their share 495 square meters and seven coconut trees. The remainder of the
lot and seven coconut trees were allotted to Sixto.
(2) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Camposanto planted to 2-1/2 gantas
with an assessed value of P500. An area planted to five gantas was given to
Sixto while the remainder was adjudicated to Galo and Catalino.
(3) A parcel of land located at Barrio Cabagtucan planted to 21/2 gantas with
an assessed value of P200 was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(4) A parcel of cornland located at Barrio Canajawan planted to fourteen gantas
was assigned to Sixto.
(5) A parcel of land also located at Barrio Canajawan planted to thirteen gantas
with an assessed value of P500 was assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(6) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Sagpolon planted to ten gantas was
assigned to Galo and Catalino.
(7) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Mandagisiao planted to five gantas
was assigned to Sixto.
(8) A parcel of riceland located at Barrio Calabugon planted to six gantas was
divided equally among the three heirs.
(9) A parcel of land located at Barrio Mingomon, Claveria, Bukidnon, plus one
cow, was assigned to Sixto in exchange for a house of strong materials located
at the poblacion.

Galo later ceded to Catalino his share of 495 square meters in the lot at the
poblacion of Jasaan in exchange for Catalino's one-half share of the riceland in
Barrio Sagpolon (No. 6). Catalino became the owner of 990 square meters of the
poblacion lot. Galo became the sole owner of the riceland at Sagpolon.

It was only in the early part of 1973 that the children of Galo and Catalino
came to know of the 1920 deed of partition which was shown to them by
Corazon Hallasgo during a confrontation in the provincial commander's office
at Camp Alagar when they sought to recover the said portion of 350 square
meters from the Hallasgos.

On that occasion, the children of Galo and Catalino came to know that the
shares of Galo and Catalino in that partition allegedly had been in the
possession of Sixto and his children "for a long time". In spite of earnest efforts,
Sixto's heirs refused to settle the case amicably with the heirs of Galo and
Catalino.

The heirs of Galo and Catalino prayed in their 1973 complaint that Sixto's
heirs be ordered to reconvey to them the lands allocated to their parents in the
1920 partition and the portion of 350 square meters in the poblacion lot
appropriated by Sixto. The plaintiffs also prayed for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land
or are they barred by prescription.

HELD: Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten years was the
maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive prescription — In the instant
case, as the partition was made in 1920 and the plaintiffs did not specify when
Sixto Hallasgo repudiated the co-ownership of the lands in Camposanto and
Calabugon, the trial court assumed that prescription started to run even before
the Civil Code took effect. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, a period of ten
years was the maximum period for acquisitive and extinctive prescription.
Hence, the trial court concluded that the 1973 action was barred by
prescription.
 575.Encarnacion V. Amigo

Facts: On April 11, 1995, petitioner became the owner of a parcel of land by
virtue of a waiver of rights executed by his mother-in-law, which he thereafter
subdivided into two lots.

Sometime in 1985, respondent allegedly entered the premise and took

possession of a portion of the property without the permission of the
predecessor-in-interest of the said property.

On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer)

with the MTC after his February 1, 2001 letter to the respondent demanding
that the latter vacate the premises remained unheeded. The letter was received
by the respondent on February 12, 2001.

Respondent alleged that he has been in actual possession and occupation of a

portion of the subject land since 1968.

The MTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, but the RTC dismissed the
case on appeal, on the ground that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Hence the latter acquired no appellate jurisdiction over thereof.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which
remanded the case to the RTC for the proper action.

Issue: WON the proper action in this case is unlawful detainer.

Held: No.

The three kinds of actions for recovery of real property are:

1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding which may be either

forcible or unlawful detainer, which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more
than one year, and should be brought with the MTC.
 2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of
possession, which should be brought in the RTC when the dispossession
has lasted for more than one year.

3. Accion reinvindicatoria, which is an action for the recovery of ownership

which must be brought in the RTC.

The remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are granted to a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person. If the dispossession has not lasted for
more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the proper MTC
acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more
than one year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which
should be brought to the proper RTC.

Petitioner became the owner of the subject lot in 1995 and has been since that
time deprived possession of a portion thereof. From the date of the petitioner’s
dispossession in 1995 up to his filing of his complaint for ejectment in 2001,
almost 6 years have elapsed. The length of time that the petitioner was
dispossessed of his property made his cause of action beyond the ambit of
an accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via
an accion publiciana which is a suit for recovery of the right to possess.

Note: The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on
the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without
prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in
the interest of justice

576 GOLDEN GATE REALTY, CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. ANTONIO DESCALLAR, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Iloilo Branch XXIV; Spouses EMILIO YOUNG and ALBERTA YOUNG, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts:

On November 26, 1980, petitioner filed three (3) separate complaints for ejectment against private-
respondent Emilio Young and two other defendants before the City Court of Iloilo, docketed as Civil
Cases Nos. 13436, 13439, and 13462. These cases were jointly tried. It may be stressed here that so far
as relevant to this petition, Civil Case No. 13439 refers to the ejectment case filed against respondent
Young.

On November 4, 1981, a motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering
that the complaint failed to allege prior demand to vacate the premises. An opposition thereto was filed
by the petitioner claiming that only a demand to pay rentals due is a prerequisite to an action for
unlawful detainer citing as its authority Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

A petition for review on certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court relative to Civil Case No. 14191 and
docketed as G.R. No. 60402. The petition was dismissed for having been filed out of time per minute
resolution of the Supreme Court dated July 28, 1982. The motion for reconsideration filed was denied
on October 4, 1982.

On February 29, 1984, a writ of execution was issued in Civil Case No. 13439 where the City Sheriff
ejected the respondent spouses Emilio and Alberta Young and scheduled for auction sale the properties
levied upon.

On May 4, 1984, respondent Young filed Civil Case No. 15712 which seeks to nullify 13439. On even
date, respondent-Court (Regional Trial Court of Iloilo) issued ex-parte a temporary restraining order,
enjoining the petitioner herein and the City Sheriff of Iloilo from conducting the sale at public auction
and set the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to May 11, 1984 which was
reset to May 21, 1984.

Issue:

Whether or not Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 13439.
Whether or not the court has acquired jurisdiction over the ejectment case which was filed by the
petitioner.

Held:

The Regional Trial Court declaring as void all proceedings conducted before the City Court of Iloilo on
the ground that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the ejectment case filed by the petitioner, the latter
having failed to allege that a demand to vacate was made to the private respondents.

On June 4, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued the questioned order nullifying the decision
in Civil Case No. 13439 of the City Court of Iloilo for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
According to the respondent trial court, for the said city court to have acquired jurisdiction over the
ejectment case which was filed by the petitioner, the demand to vacate by the latter should have been
couched in definite and not conditional words. Thus, the principle of res judicata cannot be applied to
the ejectment case

577 LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASCADE COMMERCIAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Facts:

On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc. leased a building and lot in Quezon
City to private respondent Cascade Commercial Corporation for a period of 4 years beginning March 1,
1982. 1

On January 22, 1986, cascade received a demand letter.

On February 19, 1986, La Campana filed against Cascade a complaint for ejectment with preliminary
attachment in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint alleged non-payment of
rentals since August 1985 despite repeated demands by the plaintiffs on the defendant. It prayed that a
writ of preliminary attachment be issued for the amount of P73,820.60 to answer for the unpaid rentals.

On April 4, 1986, Cascade filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Discharge of Attachment. 4 The
motions alleged that, in view of the circumstances surrounding the case, the complaint should be
considered an action for a sum of money and not ejectment. Since the amount claimed was over
P20,000, the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction. Cascade also alleged that it vacated the leased
premises on March 3, 1986, and that when copies of summons and complaint were tendered upon it on
March 26, 1986, the court no longer acquire jurisdiction over it and the subject of the action.
On July 25, 1986, Cascade filed its answer with the counterclaim in the Metropolitan Trial Court praying
for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment to its of actual expenses, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the suit.

On July 28, 1986, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Cascade, holding that it was actually a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition that should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:

Whether or not private respondent had questioned the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was not for ejectment but for the collection of a sum of
money.

Held:

It is settled that where a party voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on
the merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction after all. The party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication but because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.

In Sibonghanoy, we held that the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered the
questioned ruling was barred by estoppel or laches, which we defined as "failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

578 Salandanan v. Spouses Mendez

G.R. No. 160280 March 13, 2009

(Salandanan – intervenor; Mendez – TCT owner, Fernandez – family to be ejected)

The case stemmed from a complaint for ejectment instituted by Spouses Bayani and Isabel Mendez
against Spouses Fernandez before the MeTC. They alleged that they are the owners of the property as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title. That Spouses Fernandez and their families were occupying the
subject property for free through the generosity of respondent Isabel’s father; and That respondents
brought the matter to the Barangay Lupon for possible settlement but the same failed.
Spouses Fernandez denied such and averred that Spouses Pablo and Sofia Salandanan are the registered
owners of the property and that they have continuously occupied the said property with the permission
of Spouses Salandanan; Spouses Fernandez claimed that Mendez’s were able to transfer the subject
property to their name through fraud; that they went to the house of Spouses Salandanan and asked
them to sign n SPA that was in fact a deed of donation.

RTC affirmed the Metc, the RTC also issued an Order authorizing the sheriff to employ the necessary
force to enable him to enter the property and get possession of such, since when he tried to do it the
first time around it was pad-locked and the only person therein was a old woman who he took pity on.
Spouses Fernandez filed before the CA a petition for review which they rendered its Decision
affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.

Sofia Salandanan filed a Motion for Clarification and Intervention and attached a Motion for
Reconsideration. She alleged that she and her deceased spouse are the real owners of the subject
property; that she was not a party to the case for ejectment and did not receive any notice therefrom;
and that by virtue of the said decision, she was about to be evicted from her property without having
participated in the entire process of the ejectment proceeding. CA DENIED MOTION for lack of merit, (as
to the intervention) since she filed a different suit for the annulment of said title with the RTC.

Salandanan asserts that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, according to her, she was
constrained to file a motion for clarification and intervention because the CA included her in its decision
in spite of the fact that she was not impleaded as a party to the unlawful detainer case,

ISSUE: can the petitioner intervene?

Held: NO under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provide:

Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Section 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.

As a rule, intervention is allowed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. After the
lapse of this period, it will not be warranted anymore because intervention is not an independent action
but is ancillary and supplemental to an existing litigation. The permissive tenor of the provision on
intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in
permitting or disallowing the same, but under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the courts are
nevertheless mandated to consider several factors in determining whether or not to allow
intervention. The factors that should be reckoned are whether intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether the intervenors rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Moreover, Sofia Salandanan’s intervention in the ejectment case would not result in a complete
adjudication of her rights. The issue raised is mainly that of ownership, claiming that the property in
dispute was registered and titled in the name of the Spouses Mendez through the use of fraud. Such
issue cannot even be properly threshed out in an action for ejectment, as Section 18, Rule 70 provides
that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to
the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.

579 G.R. No. 108817 May 10, 1994

ESPERANZA P. SUMULONG, represented by MARIO P. SUMULONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts:

The MTC sustained the theory of plaintiff Esperanza P. Sumulong (hereinafter Sumulong) that the
defendant (hereinafter INLAND) entered the premises "by stealth and strategy, since it has no sublease
when it entered the premises and remained because it misrepresented itself as owned by Jopson and
also because it asked to negotiate for a new lease." The MTC disregarded the defense of INLAND that
the proper action should have been for unlawful detainer.
On appeal to the RTC by INLAND (Civil Case No. 91-58122), the MTC decision was reversed. The RTC held
that the MTC's ruling "betrays a misapplication and/or misinterpretation of the law and jurisprudence
on Forcible Entry," and that although Sumulong had constructive possession of the subject premises,
she was, nevertheless, not in prior physical and actual possession thereof. The latter kind of possession
is an essential element in forcible entry; accordingly, her action for forcible entry should fail. It
concluded:

Under the facts as established and the evidence adduced before the Court a quo, in relation to the
applicable law and jurisprudence, the complaint for Forcible Entry as instituted cannot be sustained.
Plaintiff's assertion of its right to the possession of the subject properties may nevertheless be
ventilated by way of another action, not for Forcible Entry.

In its challenged Decision of 28 January 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision on the
ground that Sumulong failed to specifically aver in her complaint facts which would clearly show that her
cause of action is for forcible entry. It held:

Those pertinent allegations in the complaint as well as Mario Sumulong's testimony are facts, intimate
and intertwined, proving that private respondent's entry, possession and occupation of the premises
were upon the broad knowledge and acquiescence, if not express upon the implied permission of
petitioner. And thus, the private respondent, is admittedly in the actual possession of the premises in
question. All doubts should be resolved in his [sic] favor, it being the rule of law that the present
possessor is to be preferred should a question arise regarding the fact of possession (Art. 539, NCC). We,
therefore, find and so hold that petitioner failed to specifically aver in her complaint facts which would
clearly show that her cause of action should be for forcible entry, well supporting the findings of the RTC
that the petitioner has not shown that she has been deprived of the possession of the premises by force,
intimidation, stealth, threat or strategy. On this basis, the complaint for forcible entry cannot be
sustained on the ground of lack of cause of action and which should be dismissed on that ground (sec. 1-
[g], Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court). To use the words in [S]arona vs. Villegas [22 SCRA 1257] the failure
of a plaintiff to specifically aver in the complaint facts which would definitely show that plaintiff's action
is for forcible entry — that defendant's entry into the land is illegal — "is not to be lightly treated." The
reason and philosophy behind this rule, apart from the fact that there is distinct difference between the
cause of action for forcible entry, on the one hand, and unlawful detainer, on the other hand, is that
whatever may be the character of one's prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has
the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right to such possession.

On 23 March 1993, Sumulong avers that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that she has no
cause of action for forcible entry against INLAND and asserts that she was the prior physical possessor of
the premises in question and that INLAND's intrusion, occupation, and possession of the subject
premises were effected through stealth and strategy. She argues that the prior possession for purposes
of the action for forcible entry is not to be reckoned from June 1989 when INLAND first entered the
premises, as held by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, but from November 1989, when she
"successfully regained actual physical possession of the subject premises" from INLAND which "failed to
resist the physical take-over and
re-entry."

Issue:

(1) whether the complaint in Civil Case No. 132844-CV before the MTC fails to state a cause of action for
forcible entry; and

(2) assuming that it does not, whether it, in fact, contains sufficient allegations for unlawful detainer for
which judgment may be rendered accordingly.

Held:

Accordingly, we rule that the allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 132844-CV adequately and
sufficiently establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer and that the prayer therein is equally
appropriate for an action for unlawful detainer.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the complaint should not have been dismissed merely for its failure to
state a cause of action for forcible entry, for although Sumulong has designated or denominated it in the
caption as one for forcible entry, her allegations in the body thereof sufficiently establish a cause of
action for unlawful detainer. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as
well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means
of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is
the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's
cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

580 G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991

IGNACIO WONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and
MANUEL MERCADO, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:p

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as it involves
purely question of law, seeking the annulment of the September 29, 1978 decision of the then Court of
First Instance ** of Davao del Sur, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 1258 which reversed the February 20, 1978
decision of the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, *** Davao del Sur in an action for Forcible Entry (Civil Case
No. 13) ordering the dismissal of the complaint as well as the counterclaim.

The undisputed facts of this case, as found by both the trial court and the then Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur, are as follows:

On the basis of the admission of parties in their respective pleadings, the oral testimonies of all
witnesses for both plaintiff and defendants and the documentary evidence offered and admitted this
Court finds that plaintiff Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation, particularly
lot 3 (LRC) Pcs-295, (situated at Colonga, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) and which is particularly described
and embraced in Transfer Certificate of title No. (T-4244) T-972 from William Giger by virtue of a deed of
sale with right to repurchase which was executed in 1972 for a consideration of P3,500.00 (testimony of
plaintiff, T.S.N., p. 3, hearing of January 7, 1977). Then, in 1973, William Giger again asked an additional
amount of P2,500.00 from plaintiff and so he required William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de
Retro Sale (Exhibit "A") on November 5,1973 at Davao City before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller
(T.S.N., p. 5, hearing of January 7, 1977). In 1972, plaintiff began harvesting only the coconut fruits and
he paid the taxes on the land (Exhibits B to E) for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make
copra but he never placed any person on the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the
land as he is a businessman and storekeeper by occupation and resides at Lower Sta. Maria, Davao del
Sur while the land in litigation is at Colongan, Sta. Maria. Neither did he put any sign or hut to show that
he is in actual possession (p. 8, T.S.N., p. 7, hearing of January 14, 1978). He knew defendants' laborers
were in the land in suit as early as August, 1976 and that they have a hut there but he did not do
anything to stop them. Instead plaintiff was happy that there were people and a hut on the land in suit
(p. 14, T.S.N., hearing of January 14, 1978).

Before July, 1976, defendant Ignacio Wong went to the land in litigation to find out if there were other
people residing there or claiming it besides the owner and he found none. So, in July, 1976, defendant
Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela
(Exhibit 5). After the execution of Exhibit 5, defendant Ignacio Wong asked for the delivery of the title to
him and so he has in his possession TCT No. (T-4244) T-974 (Exhibit 6) in the name of William Giger. Mr.
Wong declared the land in suit for taxation purposes in his name (Exhibit 7). He tried to register
the pacto de retro sale with the Register of Deeds by paying the registration fee (Exhibit 8) but due to
some technicalities, the pacto de retro sale could not be registered. The defendant Wong placed
laborers on the land in suit, built a small farm house after making some clearings and fenced the
boundaries. He also placed signboards (T.S.N., pp. 14-15, hearing of September 15, 1977). On September
27, 1976, plaintiff Manuel Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras. That was the time the
matter was brought to the attention of the police of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur and the incident entered
in the police blotter (Exhibit 11). Then on November 18, 1976, defendant Wong ordered the hooking of
the coconuts from the land in litigation and nobody disturbed him. But on November 29, 1976,
defendant received a copy of plaintiff's complaint for forcible entry with summons to answer which is
the case now before the Court. During the pendency of this instant complaint for forcible entry, spouses
William Giger and Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First
Instance of Digos, Davao del Sur against plaintiff Mercado (Exhibit 4). The case pertains to Exhibit "A" of
plaintiff. (pp. 1-3, CA Decision, pp. 82-84, Rollo).

On the basis of the aforestated undisputed facts, the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur in its
February 20, 1978 Decision found that herein petitioner (defendant Ignacio Wong) had prior, actual and
continuous physical possession of the disputed property and dismissed both the complaint and the
counter-claim.

Issue:

A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER IS AN INTRUDER IS WITHOUT

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF A FORCIBLE ENTRY.

Held:

The petition is without merit. Petitioner, in claiming that the private respondent has not established
prior possession, argues that private respondent's periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may have
been consented to and allowed or tolerated by the owner thereof for the purposes of paying an
obligation that may be due to the person gathering said nuts and that a person who enters a property to
gather coconut fruits and convert the same to copras may only be a hired laborer who enters the
premises every harvest season to comply with the contract of labor with the true owner of the property.

It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of
a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
for acquiring such right." (Art. 531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]);
and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing,
unless there is stipulation to the contrary.

581 MANUEL DRILON, petitioner,

vs.

LUIS GAURANA and Honorable VALERIO ROVIRA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch IV, respondents.
Facts:

On September 14, 1970, respondent filed another civil case, MC Civil Case No. 126, before the Municipal
Court of NuevaValencia, Sub-Province of Guimaras, Iloilo, also against herein petitioner, this time for
"Forcible Entry" involving the same parcel of land as in CFI-Civil Case No. 8323, alleging that herein
petitioner Manuel Drilon, "by means of stealth, force and strategy," took possession of the South-East
portion of said land on July 14, 1970 and since then has retained pos sion of the premises
notwithstanding demands upon him to vacate the same.

Petitioner Manuel Drilon, on December 7, 1970, filed his Motion to Dismiss the complaint in said
Forcible Entry case, MC-Civil Case No. 126, based on two grounds: (a) lack of jurisdiction, since the cause
of action of respondent Luis Gaumna was one for recovery of ownership and possession of real property
and not merely one of "forcible entry;" and (b) pendency of another action for the same cause, CFI-Civil
Case No. 8323 filed on September 4, 1970, which filing is subsequent to the alleged "forcible entry"
committed on July 14, 1970, now the subject-matter of the said MC-Civil Case No. 126 (Ibid., pp. 1517).

On January 7, 197 1, the Municipal Court of Nueva Valencia denied the motion to dismiss stating that
"plaintiff did not split his cause of action and the alleged act of dispossession occurred subsequent to
the filing of the complaint in Civil Case No. 8323, Court of First Instance of Iloilo and therefore the only
issue before him was the question of de facto possession."

On May 19, 1971, petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a "Petition for Certiorari"
which was therein docketed as Civil Case No. 8629 praying among other things, that Judge Arturo Alinio
be declared without jurisdiction to try MC-Civil Case No. 126 (Forcible Entry) and that said judge be
enjoined from proceeding any further with said MC-Civil Case No. 126.

Issue/s:

I The respondent judge, the honorable Valerio V. Rovira erred in holding that there was no splitting of a
single cause of action.

II The respondent judge, the honorable Valerio V. Rovira erred in holding that the Municipal Court of
Nueva Valencia did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

III The respondent judge erred in holding that the Municipal Court of Nueva Valencia had jurisdiction to
try Civil Case No. 126 for forcible entry.

Held:

I It is true that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action (Rule 2, Sec. 3,
Revised Rules of Court) and if two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a single cause of
action, the firing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other (Rule 2, Sec. 4. Revised Rules of
Court). However, a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that
of an action for reconveyance of titic What is involved in a forcible entry case is rarely the issue of
material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance, ownership is the
issue.

II With respect to the second assignment of error, one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules of Court is the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause.

In order that a ground may be availed of there must be, between the action under consideration and the
other action,

(1) Identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;

(2) Identity of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

(3) the Identity in both cases is such that the judgment which may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case (Arceo v. Oliveros,
134 SCRA 308).

III The Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the forcible entry case because herein respondent sets
up a claim of ownership over the property. Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be
divested of their jurisdiction over ejectment cases simply because the defendant sets up a claim of
ownership over the litigated property (De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 520; Alilaya v. Espanola,
107 SCRA 564; Dehesa v. Macalalag, 81 SCRA 543).

582 JAVIER V. VERIDIANO

237 SCRA 565

FACTS:
Javier filed a miscellaneous sales application over a parcel of land. Thereafter, she instituted an action for
forcible entry against Ben Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of the parcel of land. Her
complaint was dismissing, followed the finding of the Bureau of Lands that the disputed portion of land is
outside the lot owned by Javier. Later, the sales application has been granted. Babol had already sold the
land to somebody else. Petitioner demanded the return of the land to her and after 4 years since the
dismissal of her earlier complaint, she files an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession
against Babol and Rosete. The latter moved for the dismissal of the case based on res judicata.

ISSUE: Whether the prior complaint for ejectment can bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition
to quiet title

HELD:

NO. Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession,
regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. Thus, "[t]he only issue in an action for
forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not
possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of
the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong hand,
violence or terror." And, a judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on
the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting of Title
and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926,
which is an accion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0,
plaintifftherein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be
ejected fromthe disputed land and that she be declared the owner and given possession thereof.
Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria.

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area
without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly
alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the rightful owner and given possession of
the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful
(possessor) and in actual, prior physical possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil
CaseNo. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel of land
"covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0
definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of
exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such
ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no
other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. Consequently,
there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the
prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery,or petition to quiet title

583 VICTORINO QUINAGORAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ August
24, 2007

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Facts:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of
the CA dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 28, 2002, which denied Quinagoran's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The heirs of Juan dela Cruz, represented by Senen, filed on October 27, 1994 a Complaint for Recovery of Portion
of Registered Land with Compensation and Damages against Victorino Quinagoran before the RTC of Tuao,
Cagayan. The heirs alleged that they are the co-owners of a a parcel of land containing 13,100 sq m located at
Centro, Piat, Cagayan, which they inherited from the late Juan dela Cruz; that in the mid-70s, Quinagoran started
occupying a house on the north-west portion of the property, covering 400 sq m, by tolerance of the heirs; that in
1993, they asked Quinagoran to remove the house as they planned to construct a commercial building on the
property; that Quinagoran refused, claiming ownership over the lot; and that they suffered damages for their
failure to use the same. The heirs prayed for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed 400 sq m, more or
less, and to be paid the amount of P5,000.00 monthly until the property is vacated, attorney's fees in the amount
of P20,000.00, costs of suit and other reliefs and remedies just and equitable.
Quinagoran filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case under RA 7691, which
expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC to include all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein which does not exceed P20,000.00. He argued that since the
346 sq m lot which he owns adjacent to the contested property has an assessed value of P1,730.00, the assessed
value of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount. The RTC denied Quinagoran's Motion
to Dismiss in an Order dated November 11, 1999, because present action on the basis of the allegation of the
complaint partakes of the nature of action publiciana and jurisdiction over said action lies with the Regional Trial
Court, regardless of the value of the property. This is so because in paragraph 8 of the complaint, it is alleged that
the plaintiff demanded from the defendant the removal of the house occupied by the defendant and the
possession of which is only due to Tolerance of the said heirs. Quinagoran's Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied by the RTC. Quinagoran then went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking the
annulment of the Orders of the RTC. On May 27, 2002, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision dismissing
Quinagoran's action and affirming in toto the RTC. CA stated that, it is settled that when the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reinvindicatoria in
the proper regional trial court. Quinagoran's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on August 28, 2002 for lack of
merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA Decision and Resolution be annulled and set aside and that the complaint of the heirs of
Juan de la Cruz before the trial court be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because 1) under R.A. No. 7691 the MTC
has jurisdiction over the case and 2) that it is an indispensable requirement that the complaint should allege the
assessed value of the property involved.

Held:

Yes. The Court of Appeals's Decision dated May 27, 2002 and its Resolution dated August 28, 2002, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Courts Orders dated November 11, 1999 and May 11, 2000, and all proceedings
therein are declared NULL and VOID. The complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of Quinagoran's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA -- that
all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of
the property -- no longer holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties
the assessed value of which is below P20,000, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within. Republic Act No.
7691 which amended Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and which was already in effect when respondents filed their
complaint with the RTC on October 27, 1994. The Court has also declared that all cases involving title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, falls under the
original jurisdiction of the MTC. In Atuel v. Valdez the Court likewise expressly stated that:

Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. Specifically, the RTC exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve x xx possession of real property. However, if the
assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and P20,000.00 outside
of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. This is because the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and
the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein. Nowhere in said complaint was the assessed value of the subject property ever
mentioned. There is therefore no showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over
the action of the respondents.

584 G.R. No. 52740 November 12, 1991

SPOUSES EUSEBIO ABRIN and JULIANA ABRIN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. VICENTE R. CAMPOS, and SPOUSES GONZALO GUEVARRA and CLARA LONTOK-
GUEVARRA, respondents.

Facts:

On April 24,1978, spouses Eusebio Abrin and Juliana Agni (Abrin, for brevity) filed an action for
reconveyance with damages against the spouses Gonzalo Guevarra, Sr. and Clara Lontok (Guevarra, for
short). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2547 assigned to Branch III of the then CFI of Nueva
Vizcaya, Bayombong.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged, among others, that they are the owners of the land subject
matter of the controversy; that in connection with CAR Case No. 205-NV 66 entitled "Eusebio Abrin v.
Telesforo Ellorenco", they hired the services of defendant Guevarras' son, who is a lawyer, to recover
the aforesaid land from Telesforo Ellorenco and Angel Opinia; that in connection with the said case, they
needed the sum of P10,000.00 and incurred expenses totalling P21,200.00 which amount was advanced
by the Guevarra spouses.

On July 11, 1978, the Guevarra spouses filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as
the issue allegedly raised in the complaint is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Despite the opposition filed by the Abrin spouses, the trial court in its order dated January 23, 1979,
dismissed the case without prejudice. The motion for reconsideration of the Abrin spouses was likewise
denied in the trial court's order dated February 22, 1979, Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of
the complaint in petitioner's complaint for Reconveyance on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Held:

There was no grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint. To resolve the
issue of jurisdiction, the Court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction vis-a-vis the averments of
the complaint (Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation v. Judge Mendoza, 154 SCRA 548 [1987]). The
defenses asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss are not to be considered in resolving the issue of
jurisdiction, otherwise the question of jurisdiction could depend entirely upon the defendant (Magay v.
Estandian, 69 SCRA 456 [1976]).

The defense of tenancy could be properly considered only if the trial court conducted a preliminary
hearing on the issue of jurisdiction raised in the answer and reiterated in the motion to dismiss or after
the trial on the merits

585 FLORENTINO GO, JR., MA. LUZVIMINDA GO, LEONIDA GO, FELIPE GO, MARIETTA GO, ROBERTO
GO, ESTRELITA GO, ANTONIO GO, ALBERTO GO, BABY LUCILA GO and MANUEL GO, petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA I. PEREZ, respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES,J.:

Facts:

Plaintiffs are the children and the only surviving heirs of the late spouses Florentino, Sr. and Lucila Go
who both died intestate on June 10, 1973 and January 22, 1988, respectively, and in whose name a
parcel of land situated in Caloocan City is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-32110.

Through mere tolerance of plaintiffs as well as their late mother, defendant was allowed to occupy the
said parcel of land temporarily on condition that she would vacate the same once she is asked.

In December, 1994, plaintiffs, feeling the need to establish another residence to accommodate a
growing family finally asked defendant to vacate the premises. This demand to vacate was repeated
several times more but the same went unheeded even up to this time thus prompting plaintiffs to seek
the help of the local Barangay office.

Several conciliation meetings were held but no settlement was reached and as a result of which a
Certification to File Action was issued as shown by the attached copy of the same marked as Annex "B"
and made as an integral part of the complaint.

Issue:

whether or not the action for ejectment was commenced within the jurisdictional one year period
provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.;

Held:

Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting
actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved, that is why it is a special civil
action with a special procedure.5 The only issue to be resolved in ejectment cases is the question as to
who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto.6

The summary actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are distinguished from each other as
follows:

"Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry
centers on who has the prior possessionde facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the issue of
rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff's
cause of action is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession."

586 ANICETO G. MEDEL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
TIBURCIO MILITANTE, defendant-appellee.

STREET, J.:

Facts:

This action of unlawful detainer was originally instituted by Aniceto G. Medel in the court of the justice
of the pace of the municipality of Libon, Albay, to recover the possession of a parcel of property located
in said municipality. Judgment having been entered in favor of the plaintiff in the court of the justice of
the peace, the cause was taken by appeal to the Court of First Instance. In the original complaint two
person were named as defendants, to wit, Tiburcio Militante and Bernardo Cortes, but the latter died
while the cause was pending in the Court of First Instance.

At the hearing evidence was submitted in behalf of the plaintiff which establishes clearly enough that
the plaintiff is the owner of the parcel in question and that for several years prior to June, 1915, Tiburcio
Militante, and Bernardo Cortes had enjoyed the peaceful occupation of the same s croppers on the
shares under the plaintiff. In addition to being croppers on the shares, they were also charged with the
care of certain carabaos which had been committed to their keeping by the plaintiff.

In the month of June aforesaid, the plaintiff appointed another person, named Lorenzo Resera, as his
agent with respect to the parcel of land in question and directed him to procure materials and cause a
granary to be erected thereon. To this end Resera purchased a house in the vicinity for the sum of P50,
intending to have the granary constructed from the materials thus obtained. However, upon attempting
to occupy the parcel of ground where the granary was to be erected Resera encountered obstruction
from the defendants, and was given to understand that the granary could not be put there. As a result
materials, to the value of about P60, which had been brought to the spot for building purposes were left
on the ground, and no further attempt was made to proceed with the construction.

Issue:

Whether or not the court of a justice of the peace has jurisdiction to entertain an action of this character
must be determined from the form in which the complaint is drawn — not from the allegations of the
answer.

Held:

The judgment rendered in the lower court was a mere dismissal of the action; but the cause was really
heard on the merits, and there is no reason why we should not, upon reversal of the case in this court,
render judgment absolute, as will accordingly be done.

His Honor, the trial judge, we apparently of the opinion that the action could not be maintained except
upon proof showing that the defendants had originally acquired possession by force. In this he was, as
we have already shown, manifestly in error; and in this connection it may not be amiss to call attention
to the circumstance that two entirely distinct causes of action are coupled together in section 80 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The first is based on entry effected by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. The second is based on unlawful detention by a person who has acquired possession rightfully,
but who detains the property after the right to keep possession is end. The action can be maintained if a
case is made out to conform with either of these distinct causes of action; and where the real cause of
action is unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired lawful possession, the allegations of
seizure by force may be ignored.

587 MATEO MADDAMMU, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, Fifth Judical District, NICASIO SANCHEZ, and the SHERIFF
OF MANILA, respondents

MORAN, J.:

Facts:

On January 8, 1943, plaintiff Nicasio Sanchez, now one of the respondents, filed with the Municipal
Court of Manila a complaint against defendant Mateo Maddammu, now petitioner, alleging, among
others, "that on or before December 5, 1942, plaintiff bought from Alejandro Calipayan and Maura
Manalo a house"; that "before plaintiff could take possession of and occupy said house, defendant
surreptitiously and maliciously occupied same without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff.”
The respondent Court rendered judgment declaring that "by virtue of the sales contract, between
Alejandro Calipayan and Nicasio Sanchez the latter became the owner of the house formerly belonging
to Alejandro Calipayan"; and that "by virtue of his ownership"; Nicasio Sanchez has the right to the
possession of said house at the time the sale was consummated." The Court accordingly ordered the
defendant to vacate the house; to give plaintiff freedom to remove it from defendant's lot; and to pay
plaintiff the consequential damage of P12 per month from December 5, 1942. Plaintiff sued a writ of
immediate execution of this judgment which defendant opposed and upon the allowance of the writ,
defendant instituted with this Court the present certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the vendors have ever had such prior physical possession, and this made it impossible
for the respondent Court of acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Held:

The respondent Court purports to be one for forcible entry, but the facts alleged therein fail to show
that such is the nature of the action. In forcible entry cases, the only issue is physical possession or
possession de facto of a real property. To confer jurisdiction upon the respondent Court the complaint
should have alleged prior physical possession of the house by plaintiff or by his vendors and deprivation
of such possession by defendant through any of the means specified by the Rule. (Rule 72, sec. 1).

Had plaintiff alleged that defendant unlawfully turned him out of possession of the property in litigation,
the allegation would have been sufficient, because plaintiff's prior physical possession may then be
implied therefrom. But no such allegation has been made. On the contrary, the allegation made is that
"before plaintiff could take possession of and occupy said house, defendant surreptitiously and
maliciously occupied same without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff which indicates conclusively
that he has no prior physical possession of the property.

588.
GABRIEL ELANE, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and INOCENCIO V. CHUA, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 80638. April 26, 1989.]

FACTS:
Private respondent Inocencio V. Chua filed an action for forcible for the eviction of petitioner Gabriel
Elane from a portion of a parcel of land, which was the subject of a permit to occupy issued to private
respondent by the Bureau of Forestry. Private respondent alleges that, while visiting the property, he
discovered that petitioner was constructing a semi-concrete building on a portion thereof, without his
knowledge and consent. The order made by private respondent upon petitioner to desist therefrom was
ignored by the latter. Petitioner Elane claims that he was granted a permit by the Bureau of Forest
Development over a parcel of land; that he has been in possession and occupation of that parcel of land
continuously and uninterruptedly since 1970, having originally erected a hut thereon which was later
replaced by a bungalow; and that the land has been declared for taxation in his name and the real
property taxes thereon paid by him for the years 1970 to 1979. Both the Municipal Trial Court and the
Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner claims that a copy of the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City was sent by registered mail to the counsel of private respondent at his given
address. However, the envelope was supposedly returned to the court when counsel for private
respondent allegedly failed to claim the same after a second notice. Petitioner then contends that the
decision of the regional trial court became final, private respondent not having seasonably filed either a
motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal. Private respondent then elevated the case on a petition
for review which reversed the decisions of the two courts a quo and rendered judgment ordering therein
respondent Elane to remove or demolish the residential house or building that he constructed on that part
of the land in question, to vacate and return possession of said parcel of land to therein petitioner Chua.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not there is a completeness of service as to the delivery of notice to respondent.

HELD: No. It is incumbent upon a party who relies upon constructive service under Section 5 of Rule 13
of the Rules to prove that the first notice of the registered letter was sent and delivered to the addressee,
as the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed does not apply to such a situation.
Here, the assertions in the petition of the facts stated in the next preceding paragraph are
unsubstantiated. In the absence of such proof in the record, the disputable presumption of completeness
of service does not arise.

Furthermore, not only has petitioner failed in such requisite proof, but, as earlier stated, the records do
not show that such issue was raised or proved by him in the respondent court when the petition for review
was filed with and was pending therein. The principle of estoppel by laches, which is in the interest of a
sound administration of the laws, consequently bars this objection from being raised by petitioner for the
first time and at this late stage. The respondent court gravely erred in adjudicating the case on the basis
of priority of physical possession instead of legal possession.

589.
MARGARITO SARONA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELIPE VILLEGAS and RAMONA
CARILLO, defendants-appellees.

[G.R. No. L-22984 March 27, 1968]

FACTS: Plaintiffs lodged with the Municipal Court of Padada, Davao, against defendants as complaint,
styled "Unlawful Detainer." They aver that they are the absolute owners and in possession of a parcel of
land. Defendants entered upon said land and constructed their residential house thereon and up to date
remain in possession thereof, unlawfully withholding the possession of the same from the plaintiffs. The
reasonable rental for said Lot is P20.00 per month. Plaintiffs demanded defendants to vacate the
premises and to pay the rentals in arrears but then defendants failed to do so, hence defendants'
possession thus became clearly unlawful after said demand.

Defendants met the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
municipal court. They say that the case is one of forcible entry, and the reglementary one-year period had
elapsed before suit was started.

ISSUE(S): Whether the complaint is a case of forcible entry or one of unlawful detainer.

HELD: Failure to specifically aver in the complaint facts which definitely show that plaintiffs' action is for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer depends upon factual averments. The jurisdictional facts must appear
on the face of the complaint.
Clearly, plaintiffs' case fits in the jurisprudential precept of forcible entry. Because the entry is forcible.
Long had it been made evident that in forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. In order to
constitute the use of "force," as contemplated in this provision, the trespasser does not have to institute a
state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he should use violence against the person of the party in
possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. Under the statute entering
upon the premises by strategy or stealth is equally an obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation of
the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered without
right. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition
under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession, therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of the
person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the latter, and there plants
himself and excludes such prior possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as is
necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.

590.
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., Petitioners, v. HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, and ALBERTO MAGDATO,
Respondents.

[G.R. No. 118691. July 5, 1996]

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Alejandro Bayog
and private respondent Alberto Magdato entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot with
BAYOG as the LANDOWNER-LESSOR and MAGDATO as TENANT-LESSEE. A Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold was issued to MAGDATO, declaring that the latter had complied with all the
requirements to become the agricultural lessee of the land cultivated by him and owned by BAYOG.

BAYOG, in consideration of P250,000.00, executed a Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of

redemption within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. In a letter dated 19 October 1992, BAYOG
asked MAGDATO to remove his (MAGDATO's) house from BAYOG's land. BAYOG explained that the
house was an obstacle to the cultivation of the land by Jorge Pesayco, Jr., the brother and civil law lessee
of Santiago Pesayco. As MAGDATO did not comply, BAYOG and Jorge Pesayco, Jr. filed a complaint, for
"Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for Demolition." The MCTC declared that the case
fell under the Rule on Summary Procedure and directed the issuance of summons which, together with
complaint, was served on MAGDATO. MAGDATO filed his answer outside the reglementary period. He
admitted BAYOG's ownership of the lot, but asserted that he was in actual possession thereof as
BAYOG's agricultural lessee as evidenced by the Agricultural Leasehold Contract and that the court had
no jurisdiction over the case, it being an agrarian dispute; and that he had not been able to cultivate the
land because plaintiff Jorge Pesayco, Jr. threatened to shoot anyone who would work on it.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading;

Whether or not the MCTC has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: It must be noted that despite the effectivity of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure on 15
November 1991, the MCTC Judge still applied the previous Rule on Summary Procedure in his 15
December 1992 order. While it may be true that this did not affect the outcome of the case, judges are
expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and circulars adopted by this Court which
affect the conduct of cases before them.

Moreover, while it may be said that the MCTC correctly applied the Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil
Case No. 262 since BAYOG's complaint for ejectment therein suppressed the fact of an agrarian
relationship between him and MAGDATO, it should not have refrained from taking cognizance of
MAGDATO's Answer. Although filed late, the Answer asserted that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over the
case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between BAYOG and MAGDATO, which is clearly
evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in
MAGDATO's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per se, did not automatically divest the
MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in view of MAGDATO's defense, the
MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise purpose of determining whether or
not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing, if tenancy was shown to be at issue,
the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed MAGDATO were an
agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not provide that an answer filed
after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no
provision for an entry of default if a defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that
MAGDATO's defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an
exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

591.

RTHUR BARANDA, et al., petitioners, vs. NORBERTO PADIOS, et al., respondents.

[G.R. No. L-61371 October 21, 1987]

FACTS: A complaint for ejectment, with prayer for temporary restraining order, was filed by private
respondents Roberto Padios, et al., as plaintiffs, and petitioners Rogelio Sorioso et al., as defendants,
before the municipal court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs were among nine
(9) tenants of a 33-hectare parcel of land belonging to the Philippine National Bank situated in Barrio
Vista Alegre, Anilao, Iloilo, each of whom occupying and cultivating portions of the land ranging from 4.5
hectares to 3/4 hectares in area, aggregating a total of 20 hectares, more or less, devoted to rice and
corn; that their possession of the area claimed by them were recognized and sanctioned by an order of
the Court of Agrarian Relations of Iloilo. The defendants by means of force and intimidation forcibly
dispossessed plaintiffs of the areas cultivated by them. The municipal court issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order, enjoining the defendants from interfering and disturbing the peaceful possession of their
respective areas. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the case involved
agricultural tenancy and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the municipal court, and that a case was
pending before the Court of Agrarian Relations involving the same subject matter, the same parties and
issues, the very case cited by plaintiffs in their complaint; defendants further prayed for the dissolution of
the temporary restraining order. The municipal court ordered the complaint temporarily dismissed and
lifted the temporary restraining order, but on motion of the plaintiffs the court reconsidered said order and
reinstated the competent together with the temporary restraining order. Hence, the defendants filed the
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and injunction with prayer for temporary restraining
order.

ISSUE: Whether the municipal court has jurisdiction over a forcible entry and detainer case involving
agricultural tenants.

HELD:The Court of Agrarian Relations has exclusive and original jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to
try the case. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
explicitly provides that said rule shall not apply to cases covered by the Agricultural Tenancy Act.

592.

FRANCISCO LU, complainant, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO ANA F. SIAPNO, et al., respondents
[A.M. MTJ-99-1199. July 6, 2000]

FACTS: In his administrative complaint, Francisco Lu alleges that he filed an Answer with Counterclaim
to the Amended Complaint for ejectment which was later amended. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to
Dismiss the ejectment case on the ground that plaintiffs therein were no longer the owners of the land in
question, the same having been sold to the Shahanis and later transferred in the names of the latter
under TCT No. 202393. Respondent Judge Siapno rendered judgment against Lu which decision was
allegedly received by Lu's counsel.

While on appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan issued a preliminary mandatory
injunction and declared the writ of execution earlier issued by the MTC-Urdaneta, Pangasinan to be null
and void.RTC rendered judgment modifying the MTC-judgment by deleting the paragraph "(I)n
accordance with the Rules, let a Writ of Execution be issued." Hence, Lu filed a petition for review with
the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion for Execution with MTC which was
granted by respondent Judge Siapno granted allegedly without notice and hearing. Plaintiff filed an Ex-
parte Motion to Withdraw deposit praying that the amount deposited in the municipal treasurer be
withdrawn in order to satisfy the judgmentfiled a Motion for Special Demolition. Said motions were
granted by Respondent Judge without notice and hearing. Hence, this complaint for gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law, abdication of official function and gross misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge is correct in issuing a writ of execution without notice and
hearing.

HELD:Respondent Judge Siapno is guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he rendered judgment
providing, in the dispositive portion, for its immediate execution. It should be noted that the Regional Trial
Court, while affirming the judgment of the respondent Judge, nevertheless deleted that portion of the
decision providing for immediate execution. Basic is the rule that a judge may not order execution of
judgment in the decision itself. Section 21 of the Rules on Summary Procedure likewise provides that the
decision of the regional trial court is immediately executory. Even if immediately executory, there must
first be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for that purpose. In an ejectment case, the adverse
party is entitled to notice before execution can be ordered. In disregarding the rules and settled
jurisprudence, respondent Judge showed gross ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive.
The lack of malicious intent, however, cannot completely free respondent Judge from liability. When the
law is elementary, so elementary not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

593.
ANDRES DY and GLORIA DY, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.
[G.R. No. 93756 March 22, 1991]
FACTS: PrivaterespondentRAMON V. ROXAS filed a complaint for ejectment of petitioners from his
property in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. Summons was issued requiring
petitioners to answer within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Petitioners filed their answer thereto to which private respondent filed a reply. Judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs to
pay the monthly rentals. An appeal therefrom was interposed by petitioners to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and the RTC affirmed the decision appealed.

An ex-parte motion for immediate execution of judgment was filed by the private respondent in the inferior
court. It was granted on the same day and on the following day, respondent sheriff, assisted by several
policemen and other persons, ejected petitioners from the premises by throwing out all their belongings
into the street and turning over possession of the premises to private respondent.

ISSUE(S): May such a judgment or order of the regional trial court be immediately executed even before
a copy thereof was served on the losing party?

HELD: No.Given a judgment or order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding, if no appeal
therefrom had been interposed within the reglementary period, execution shall issue as a matter of right.
There should be proof of service of a copy of said judgment or order on the parties to determine if the
period of appeal had lapsed, before a motion of execution thereof may be granted and implemented.

It is clear that a judgment or order of a Regional Trial Court which disposes of the action or proceeding
must be served on the losing party before the same may be considered immediately executory. While an
ex-parte motion for issuance of a writ of execution thereof may be filed in the proper court, such motion
must be supported by a proof of service of the judgment or order on the losing party. This will enable the
losing party to take any appropriate steps to protect his interests when warranted. The losing party is
entitled to such notice as an essential requirement of due process; otherwise, the entire proceedings
leading to the execution of the judgment may be nullified and set aside.

594.
AliciaT. Kaw vs. Judge Casiano P. Anunciacion, Jr., et al.

[A.M. No. MTJ-93-811 March 1, 1995]

FACTS: Alicia T. Kaw,filed a complaint charging the respondents with grave misconduct, incompetence,
and partiality.The charges stemmed from an ejectment case filed by the Italy Marketing Corporation (IMC)
against complainant's husband, George L. Kaw. It appears that for more than twenty (20) years, George
Kaw had leased from Margarita Manalo a unit of a building located at 648-650 Padre Rada Street, Tondo,
Manila where he conducted his business under the name "PocketSaver's Mart and Bakeshop."

On May 20, 1989, IMC sent a letter to Kaw, informing him of its acquisition of the building and demanding
that Kaw vacate the premises. Several demands followed, the latest of which was made on February 15,
1990. As Kaw refused to leave, IMC filed an ejectment suit. The summons, with a copy of the complaint,
was served on Kaw ordering him to file his answer.Kaw nonetheless filed a motion for extension of 15
days and another motion for extension of ten (10) days to file his answer.
Respondent judge did not act on the two motions and rendered a decision ordering Kaw to vacate the
premises. Alicia Kaw alleges that she and her husband received the respondent judge's decision and that
immediately, the following day, they were served a copy of the writ of execution by respondent sheriff and
evicted from the premises. Their personal properties, consisting of tools and equipment used in business
were levied upon and later sold at an auction sale. Complainant contends that the issuance of the writ of
execution was improper.

ISSUE(S):

1) Whether or not a motion for extension is allowed under the Rule on Summary Procedure;
2) Whether or not the issuance of the writ of execution without prior notice to complainant is proper.

HELD:

No. Complainant cannot dispute the fact that the summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was
duly served on her husband, George Kaw, with a warning that he should file his Answer within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice under the Rule on Summary Procedure. A motion for
extension is in fact a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

On the issuance of the writ of execution, the respondent judge is liable for issuing an order of execution
when no prior notice of the motion for execution had been given to complainant's husband. The record
shows that IMC filed an "Ex Parte Motion for Execution" and that the same day respondent judge granted
it. The following day complainant and her family were ejected. The writ of execution may only be issued
by the court in ejectment cases after notice to the adverse party and if the rents have not been paid or
deposited by him. Indeed, that the MeTC's decision in ejectment cases is immediately executory does not
mean that notice of the motion for execution to the adverse party is unnecessary.

595.
BIENVENIDO ONCE, petitioner, vs. Judge CARLOS Y. GONZALES, et al, respondents.

[G.R. No. L-44806 March 31, 1977]

FACTS: The city court of Iloilo ordered Bienvenido Once to vacate an apartment in a building owned by
Juanita Peña and to pay a monthly rental. Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He alleged
that he had been occupying the apartment since 1966; that he was the only one singled out for ejectment;
that the commissioner's report on the alleged dilapidated condition of the building was not set for hearing,
that he occupied the apartment as residence and for use as a carinderiawhich allegedly was his sole
means of livelihood, and that he should be given a preference to reoccupy the apartment after the
completion of the repairs. The city court denied the motion.Juanito Peña, the owner of the apartment, filed
a motion for immediate execution of the city court's judgment. He invoked, as grounds, Once's alleged
failure to file a supersedeas bond and the supposed untenantable condition of the apartment.
Bienvenido Once filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that the execution was improper
because he had deposited in court the current rentals. The lower court denied the motion and issued a
writ of execution.

ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in ordering execution of the city court's judgment pending appeal.

HELD: Yes, the lower court committed a patent error in ordering execution of the city court's judgment on
the ground that Bienvenido Once did not file a supersedeas bond. No such bond was necessary because
no back rentals were adjudged in the city court's judgment. The attorney's fees need not be covered by a
supersede as bond. Once's timely deposit of the rentals for April, May, June, July and August, 1976
stayed the execution of the judgment pending appeal. In such a situation, no supersedeas bond was
required to stay execution of the city court's judgment. Consequently, the order of execution was
groundless. Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rule of Court requires a supersedeas bond only if there are
accrued rentals in arrears. It dispenses with that bond if the defeated tenant deposits in court the rentals
due from time to time. The execution proceeding already mentioned is void.

596.
JESUS C. JAKIHACA, petitioner, vs. SPS. LILIA AQUINO and APOLONIO AQUINO, JOSE
TORALDE, and HON. EMMA CENIDOZA-ONA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 83982 January 12, 1990]

FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against respondents-spouses Lilia Aquino and
Apolonio Aquino, and Jose Toralde before the Municipal Trial Court on account of the latter's refusal to
remove their houses which they have allegedly illegally constructed without the knowledge and consent
and against the will of the former on a residential land despite verbal demand.

Initially, the matter was referred to the Barangay for conciliation processes pursuant to the requirements
of P.D. No. 1508. But due to repeated refusal of respondents to appear before the Barangay Lupon, the
Lupon Chairman and Secretary thereafter issued a "certification to file action."

The defendants contend that there was a verbal contract of tenancy between the defendants and the
former owner of the land in question which they planted to fruit bearing trees and devoted the same
primarily to rice and corn products, and so therefore, they cannot be ejected under the Land Reform Law
more particularly P.D. No. 1 from this land which they had occupied and cultivated for more than ten (10)
years with the consent of the former owner Gloria Gener. In addition, they said that there is no showing
that the case was first brought to the attention of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for certification that this
case is proper for trial before said Court.

ISSUE(S): Whether the Municipal Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Yes.It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty. We
frown upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer
and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by cross-
examining respondent Planas. Upon that premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt
an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129. Summary
procedures have no application to cases before the Regional Trial Courts. Hence, when the respondents
appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the applicable rules are
those of the latter court.

597.
Sps. MAMERTO REFUGIA and FELIZA PAYAD-REFUGIA, et al, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and Sps. ARTURO REFUGIA and AURORA TIMBANG-REFUGIA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 118284. July 5, 1996]

FACTS: Sps.Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are the registered owners of a parcel of land
and a duplex apartment building constructed thereon located at as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title. Said title was issued pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on in favor of respondent Arturo
Refugia, but the purchase price was reportedly advanced by his father, herein petitioner MamertoRefugia.
Thereafter, respondent Arturo Refugia obtained a housing loan from the Social Security System, using
the land as collateral to secure payment thereof. After the construction of the duplex apartment building,
herein petitioners immediately began to occupy one door while respondents stayed in the other unit.

Petitioners were told by private respondents to vacate the unit that they were occupying because,
according to private respondents, the family of one of their children who is married needed a place of their
own. Petitioners refused to leave, claiming that they own the unit they are occupying by reason of the fact
that it was actually MamertoRefugia who bought the lot on which the duplex apartment stood. Because of
this, the matter was brought before the barangay court of conciliation. No amicable settlement having
been reached between the parties, private respondents instituted an action for ejectment with the MTC.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower
court by declaring herein petitioners and private respondents co-owners of the lot and the two-door
apartment. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondents duly filed a petition
for review before respondent Court of Appeals. Said respondent court declared that the Regional Trial
Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the
issue of ownership and to declare herein petitioners as co-owners because its power is limited only to a
determination of the issue of possession; that petitioners bare allegation of ownership cannot prevail over
the transfer certificate of title and deed of sale in favor of private respondents; and that petitioners have
been occupying the subject premises by mere tolerance.

ISSUE:Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer.

HELD: Yes. The Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in an action for unlawful detainer
where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership.

With the enactment of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, the inferior courts now retain jurisdiction over an
ejectment case even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of
ownership, with the express qualification that such issue of ownership shall be resolved only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession. In other words, the fact that the issues of ownership and
possession de facto are intricately interwoven will not cause the dismissal of the case for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer on jurisdictional grounds.

598.
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION, et al, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.,
respondents.

[G.R. No. 97637 April 10, 1992]

RAMON QUE, SOUTHERN SALES CORP. and HENRY TAN, petitioners, vs. Judge RICARDO M.
ILARDE, et al., respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 98700-01 April 10, 1992]

FACTS:Wilmon was the lessee of a commercial building and bodegas standing on a registered land
owned in common by the Lacsons, Solinap, and Jarantilla. The leases were embodied in deeds wherein
one of the clauses provided for a reservation of rights—the seller has the right to encumber or sell the
property provided that the transferee would respect the lease of Wilmon. On a relevant date, after the
expiration of the lease period, the premises were sold to Star Group Resources and Development. The
latter instituted an action for unlawful detainer against Wilmon. Wilmon impugned Star’s right to eject
them. It alleges that its right of preemption has been violated, as well as their leasehold rights, and that it
was denied the option to extend the lease. These same propositions were also raised in the case it filed
with the RTC. In the unlawful detainer cases, it was decided by the MTC that the case should proceed
against some of the lessees but not with the others. The lessees filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied. They filed a petition for certiorari and the RTC held in the end that the pendency of the case
in the RTC didn't warrant suspension of the unlawful detainer case with the MTC.

ISSUE(S): Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee should be
abated or suspended by an action filed in the RTC by the defendant lessee on the claim that he is entitled
to a right of pre-emption.

HELD:An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed with the RTC based on a tenant’s claim
of his right of preemption was violated. The actions in the RTC didn't involve physical possession and on
not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment
proceeding. In forcible entry and lawful detainer cases, "the defendant raises the question of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding that issue of
ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and Municipal Trial Courts nevertheless
have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership only to determine the issue of
possession."

599.
FELIPE NACORDA and LUZ NACORDA, petitioners, vs. Judge NICASIO YATCO, et al.,
respondents.
[G.R. No. L-19520 August 12, 1966]

FACTS:J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc., sued Fernando Castro to recover possession of a parcel of land with an
area of about 100 square meters, included within a larger parcel covered by a transfer certificate of title in
the plaintiff's name. The complaint alleged that the defendant entered into such possession unlawfully
and without the plaintiff's consent, and prayed that Castro be ejected. Judge NicasioYatcopresiding,
rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The said judgment became final, and a writ of execution was issued,
followed by an order for the demolition of the house situated on the land.

Sps. Felipe Nacorda and Luz Nacorda, alleging that they had just learned of the proceedings
abovementioned, filed a petition praying that the writ of execution and demolition be lifted on the ground
that they were the owners of the land and the house, having acquired said land by virtue of a series of
transfers from the original owner, a certain Agustin de Torres, and that Fernando Castro, defendant in the
case, was merely a tenant of theirs. The petition was denied by Judge Yatco. After the denial of their
petition, the spouses Nacorda filed a separate action against J.M. Tuason& Co., Inc. in the branch
presided by Judge HermogenesCaluag, asking that they be declared the owners of the same properties
and that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the execution of the judgment in the previous
case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for injunction is proper to prevent enforcement of a judgement that
has already become final and executory.

HELD: It is not proper. Injunction is an ancillary writ and cannot be resorted to for the purpose of
preventing the enforcement of a judgment that has already become final, except possibly in a proper
action to annul such judgment. The validity of the judgment insofar as the parties therein are concerned,
is not and has never been questioned: what petitioners seek is to prevent its execution on the ground that
they are the owners of the property involved therein. This question of ownership is not litigated before Us
in the instant petition; and the bare claim of petitioners on this point is certainly no reason to obstruct the
judgment duly rendered in a case against another party, especially considering that the question in that
case was merely one of possession. Indeed, petitioners have filed the proper reivindicatory action, and
they should pursue their remedy there to its logical conclusion.

600. [G.R. No. L-45640 : July 30, 1981.]

FELOMINO RAMIREZ and RUSTICO VALDEZ, Petitioners, vs. HON. ILDEFONSO
BLEZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, HON. ZACARIAS
V. GARCIA, Municipal Judge of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, PABLO QUIJOL,
ABEDIANO GAANAN, and DR. CONSTANCIO BONDAL, Respondents.

Facts:
On September 3, 1973, private respondents Pablo Quijol, Abediano Gaanan, and
Constancio Bondal, filed an action for forcible entry against Felomino Ramirez and
Rustico Valdez with the Municipal Court of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, to recover
possession of a portion of Lot 654 of the Bongabong Cadastre, situated in Barrio Anilao,
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The defendants, petitioners herein, filed an answer
,asserting that Felomino Ramirez is the owner of the land occupied by them while the
defendant Rustico Valdez is his tenant.Wherefore, they prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to vacate that portion of Lot 654 unlawfully occupied and possessed by them
and to pay the defendants reasonable damages.On September 15, 1973, the
defendants filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
which the court granted upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00.
On September 16, 1975, the court rendered judgment in favor of FELOMINO
RAMIREZ and RUSTICO VALDEZ.
 The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal without, however, submitting the
corresponding appeal bond, so that on November 10, 1975, the respondent municipal
judge ordered them to submit the bond. The plaintiffs failed to comply with the said
order.
On March 18, 1976, the defendants filed a motion with the Municipal Court
praying that the judgment be entered and that a writ of execution be issued. The said
court denied the motion.Consequently, the defendants filed a petition for mandamus
with the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro to compel the respondent municipal
judge to issue the writ of execution prayed for. But the court denied the petition for lack
of merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the respondent judge of first instance to hold the
execution of the judgment was issued without jurisdiction?

Held:
Yes. The Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro had not acquired appellate
jurisdiction because the appellants therein (now private respondents) failed to perfect
their appeal within the reglementary period. Well settled is rule that if a party does not
perfect his appeal within the time prescribed by law, the appellate court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Hence, the order of the respondent judge of first instance, dated February
23, 1976, directing the respondent Municipal Judge of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro to
hold the execution of the judgment rendered to await the outcome of Civil Case No. R-
436, was issued without jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders, dated February 23,
October 7, and March 24, 1976, all issued in Civil Case No. R-184 of the Municipal
Court of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, are hereby annulled and set aside.

601. G.R. No. 78223 December 19, 1988

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO GUBALLA, SR. and GUBALLA MARKETING
CORPORATION, petitioners
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RUFINO B. RISMA and TECLA
GOTICO-RISMA respondents.

Facts:
The late Francisco Guballa, Sr. was the registered owner of a parcel of land,
located at Hidalgo St., Quiapo, Manila under TCT No. 15638 of the Register of Deeds of
Manila, together with improvements existing thereon, consisting of a building known as
the Bulaklak Building. Guballa Sr. used to own and operate Bulaklak Publications
housed in the ground and mezzanine floors of said building. After cessation of Guballa
Sr.'s business operations BUSCOPE LABOR UNION, instituted a complaint for non-
payment of separation pay against BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS and/or Francisco
Guballa, Sr. After hearing, judgment was rendered in favor of BUSCOPE and against
BULAKLAK PUBLICATIONS.The NLRC issued a writ of execution and levied upon
Gubalia's property and subsequently sold the same at public auction in favor of
BUSCOPE as highest bidder.
 On July 7, 1976, and within the period of redemption, a motion for the annulment
of the certificate of sale issued in favor of BUSCOPE was filed in NLRC and, a Notice of
Lis Pendens was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. 15638. However, despite the
pendency of said motion, a Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of BUSCOPE over
subject property.
On March 10, 1978, BUSCOPE's President Amado Pagsanjan sold the said
property to Atty. Rufino Risma but without annotating his acquired rights thereon, in
TCT No. 15638.
On June 26, 1979, an action for the issuance of a writ of possession of property
covered by TCT No. 15638 was filed by the Risma spouses against Guballa Sr. at the
CFI of Manila, Branch XXXIV.In his answer Guballa Sr. prayed for the dismissal of the
case. The prayer for dismissal was denied in the Order of the lower court. On June 19,
1982, subject property was sold by Guballa Sr. to Guballa Marketing.
On July 26, 1982, a decision was rendered granting the issuance of a writ of
possession over the subject property in favor of the private respondents spouses
Risma.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, all motions were all denied and instead party-
appellant Guballa Sr., et al. was ordered to be substituted by the present owner.
Petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. did not comply with the aforesaid resolutions.
A motion for reconsideration of the latter resolution was filed by private
respondents Risma and on December 9, 1986, the appeal was dismissed for failure of
appellant to comply with the resolution dated November 12, 1985.
From said dismissal, petitioners Guballa Sr., et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration dated January 2, 1987 which was however denied.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of party-appellant to be substituted by a transferee

pendente lite is not a proper ground for the dismissal of the appeal?

Held: Yes.
It has been held that a transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment because the action or suit
may be continued for or against the original party or the transferor and still be binding
on the transferee (Association de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc., 88 SCRA 462 [1979]). More specifically, this Court has ruled that a
transferee pendente lite is a proper party in the case but it is not an indispensable party
Fetalino vs. Sanz, 44 Phil, 691 [1923]; Jose vs. Blue, 42 SCRA 361 [1971]; Tanchoco
vs. Quino, 154 SCRA 18 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED.

602. G.R. No. L-31822 July 31, 1972

JOSE SALCEDO QUIMPO, petitioner,
vs.
CATALINO DELA VICTORIA and FRANCISCA O. DELA VICTORIA, respondents.

Facts:
 On 2 May 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed a complaint against defendant-
petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I for quieting of title and
recovery of possession with damages.
On 28 June 1968, plaintiffs-respondents filed another case against defendant-
petitioner with the City Court of Davao City for forcible entry over the same parcel of
land.Plaintiffs-respondents prayed in the later case for the court to order defendant-
petitioner to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the former.
In a motion to dismiss dated 13 July 1968, defendant-petitioner sought the
dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry but the City Court denied the said motion.
On 12 December 1968, defendant-petitioner was declared in default for failure to
file his answer to the forcible entry case and the City Court set the reception of plaintiffs-
respondents' evidence for the following day. On 16 January 1969 the same court
rendered its decision the defendant to vacate the premises in question and deliver
possession thereof to the plaintiffs
Defendant-petitioner then moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order of
29 November 1968 denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for forcible entry, and
also the decision of 16 January 1969. However, his motion was denied in the City Court
order of 4 March 1969.
Defendant-petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. In the meantime,
plaintiffs-respondents moved for the issuance of an order for the immediate execution of
the City Court decision of 16 January 1969. On 29 July 1969, the court a quo denied the
motion to dismiss of 5 July 1969 for lack of merit, and at the same time granted the
immediate execution of the City Court judgment. His motion for reconsideration having
been denied, and his appeal dismissed, defendant filed the herein petition, claiming that
the lower court —

Issue: Whether or not the lower acquired jurisdiction over the action for forcible entry,
the verification of the corresponding complaint being void?

Held:
Yes. Catalino dela Victoria, one of the plaintiffs (now respondents) clearly
referred to the allegations in the complaint as having been read by him. However, while
he stated that "they are true and correct," he omitted to state that said conclusion was
reached of his own knowledge. The latter detail, however, is logically inferable since
affiant was a party and it does not appear that he was verifying upon information and
belief. If petitioner entertained doubt about the true character of the verification, he
should have asked that it be made more definite.
Moreover, even if we should find the verification insufficient, that insufficiency
would not render the complaint for forcible entry, or the whole proceedings in the court
below, void. This Court already held in several decisions that the requirement regarding
verification is not jurisdictional, but merely formal.
While it is true that Section 1, Rule 70, of the Revised Rules of Court requires the
verification of the complaint for forcible entry, the insufficiency of the same, or its being
defective, is not fatal to the jurisdiction of the City Court or that of the court a quo to
which the case was later appealed.
 WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the orders appealed from, the same
are hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-petitioner.

603. G.R. No. L-77227 November 29, 1988

COMMANDER REALTY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and RUDY VELAYO, INC., respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Rudy Velayo Inc. (Velayo) was ordered, in the interest of
substantial justice and in avoidance of multiplicity of suits, to pay petitioner, Commander
Realty, Inc. (Commander), reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
leased premises of P15,000. 00 from 4 September 1980 to 4 September 1983;
P20,000.00 from 4 September 1983 to 4 September 1985; and P25,000.00 from 4
September 1985 to 30 November 1987, the date that Velayo vacated the leased
premises.
Velayo now brings to the attention of the Court that the issue of rentals from 4
September 1980 to 4 September 1985 had already been laid to rest by the Court
of when it fixed said rentals at P10,000.00 monthly. Further, Velayo contends that there
is no factual basis for the award of P25,000.00 rental from 4 September 1985 to 30
November 1987 as it had not yet filed its Answer in the case.

Issue:
Whether or not the further damages in the sum of Pl-M be denied it being that its
cause of action is one for unlawful detainer and not for damages.

Held:
Yes.
The dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be reconsidered, therefore, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, Rudy Velayo Inc. is hereby ordered to pay a monthly rental of
P20,000.00 from 5 September 1985 to 30 November 1987, with interest at the legal rate
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

604. FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-62577 September 21, 1987
ESTELITA, ROBERTO, LEONARD, REYNALDO, ELY, MYRNA, MICHAELANGELO,
ROMEO and LEONOR, all surnamed ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH III, Presided by
the HONORABLE MAGADAPA I. RASUMAN, CITY COURT OF ILIGAN CITY,
Presided by the HONORABLE POMPEYO L. PALARCA AND GREGORIO
ORELLANA, respondents.

Facts:
 The petitioners and the respondent entered into a contract of lease over the
former's property for the expressed period of three years beginning March 1, 1977. On
January 12, 1980, the petitioners advised the private respondent that he would have to
vacate the leased premises on March 1, 1980, not only because of the lapse of the
agreed term but also because he had subleased the property in violation of their
agreement.. The private respondent objected. As no agreement between the parties
appeared in sight, the private respondents beat his adversaries to the draw, so to
speak, by filing on February 21, 1980, with the Court of First Instance of Iligan City an
action for the continued enforcement of the lease contract and for damages. The said
court on February 28, 1980, one day before the expiration of the lease, issued a
restraining order that maintained the status quo between the parties. Ten days later, the
petitioners filed their own complaint, this time for unlawful detainer, with the City Court
of Iligan City.This was followed two days later with a motion to dismiss the private
respondents' complaint before the Court of First Instance on the ground inter alia of the
pendency of the ejectment case, and for the lifting of the temporary restraining
order. For his part, the private respondent moved to dismiss the ejectment suit also on
the ground of lis pendens, his argument being that the case he had filed earlier should
be decided first before the petitioners' complaint could be entertained.
In the Court of First Instance, the petitioners' motion was in effect denied with its Order
dated May 27, 1981, that the "determination of the said motion is hereby deferred until
the trial. " The motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated September 14,
1982. In the City Court, the petitioners fared no better when the ejectment case was on
April 24, 1980, "ordered held in abeyance until the case in the Court of First Instance is
finally resolved." The motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October
4, 1982.

Issue: Whether or not the lessee should be allowed to continue occupying the land as
lessee.

Held:
Yes. It has been settled in a number of cases that the right of a lessee to occupy
the land lease as against the demand of the lessor should be decided under Rule 70
(formerly Rule 72) of the Rules of Court.There is no merit to the contention that the
lessee's supposed right to a renewal of the lease contract can not be decided in the
ejectment suit. In the case of Teodoro vs. Mirasol, supra, this Court held that "if the
plaintiff has any right to the extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and
legitimate issue that could be raised in the unlawful detainer case because it may be
used as a defense to the action." In other words, the matter raised in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite may be threshed out in the ejectment suit, in consonance with the
principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits. And the mere fact that the unlawful detainer-
ejectment case was filed later, would not change the situation to depart from the
application of the foregoing ruling.
It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint
that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is pending action, not a
pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later date is no bar
to the dismissal of the present action (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol, supra.).
 WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and judgment is hereby rendered: a)
SETTING ASIDE the Orders of the respondent Court of First Instance.

605.G.R. Nos. L-28170 and L-28200 February 17, 1968

CARMEN PARDO DE TAVERA Y LOPEZ MANZANO, Petitioner, vs. DEMETRIO B.
ENCARNACION; HON. JOSE B. JIMENEZ as Judge, Court of First Instance of
Cavite, Branch III; HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, as Judge, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and HON. RICARDO TENSUAN, as Judge, Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City, known as Lot
No. 8-A Sub-block No. 13-F, of the Subdivision Plan Psd-1107, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 18304 (18833) of the Register of Deed of Quezon City. On
February 18, 1954, she leased the said lot to herein respondent Demetrio B.
Encarnacion, for a period of twelve (12) years, at a monthly rental of P0.60 per square
meter, or P120.00 monthly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles \
On October 11, 1965, the lessee reiterated in writing his desire to renew the
contract, and mentioning justifications for a reduced rental. By a letter of October 22,
1965, the lessor informed the lessee that if the lease would be renewed, it would be on
an increased rental.
On February 17, 1966, one day before the expiration date of the aforesaid
contract of lease, the lessee filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for
specific performance. The lessor, on March 1, 1966, countered with a "Special
Appearance Attacking Jurisdiction and Venue with Consequent Dismissal of the Case."
On March 10, 1966 the lessor instituted unlawful detainer-ejectment proceedings
against the lessee in the City Court of Quezon City. The lessee moved to dismiss the
complaint but said court declared itself with jurisdiction over the same.
On January 14, 1967, the lessee filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction seeking a declaration that the City
Court of Quezon City has no jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.

Issue: Whether or not there is a valid ground for dismissal on account of the prior
pending action? vir

Held:
No.
It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a
complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending
action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful detainer suit was of a later
date is no bar to the dismissal of the present action (Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol supra).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let the writs issue as prayed for in the petition,
and the preliminary injunction issued at the commencement of these proceedings is
made permanent..

606. G.R. No. L-19173 December 27, 1966

ROSE DESAMITO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
TRINIDAD CASAS-CUYEGKENG, assisted by her husband ALFONSO
CUYEGKENG, defendants-appellees.

Facts:
On February 10, 1959 Trinidad Casas-Cuyegkeng instituted ejectment
proceedings against her tenant, Rose Desamito, in the Municipal Court of Manila to
recover possession of premises at 474 Isaac Peral, Manila, operated by said tenant as
a dress shop named "Fifth Avenue". Plaintiff averred that the defendant had failed to
pay rental for November and December, 1958 and January, 1959 totalling P1,300; that
the plaintiff needed the premises for her own use and that of her family, but the tenant
refused to vacate.
In her answer to the complaint for ejectment, defendant alleges that for a period of 8
years she has been occupying the premises in question. Subsequently, on April 1,
1959, defendant Desamito filed an amended answer reproducing the allegations plus an
additional averment that, having stayed almost 8 years in the premises, defendant was
entitled to ask the court to fix a longer period for the lease, which she prayed to be set
at 5 years from the filing of the complaint.
While the ejectment case was pending, Rose Desamito as plaintiff this time, filed
the present action against Casas and her husband in the court of first, averring three
causes of action on practically the same facts pleaded in Desamito's answers. After the
court had denied a motion to dismiss, defendants Casas-Cuyegkeng answered the
complaint on March 12, 1959 denying having agreed to the transfer of Desamito's lease
to Mr. Gomez.
On May 20, the municipal court decided the ejectment case in favor of the
landlord Casas. The tenant Desamito then appealed to the Court of First Instance, and
on July 1, 1959, there the appellant, Desamito, filed a new answer, and reproduced the
averments she had made in the Municipal Court.
Before this appealed case could be tried, Rose Desamito died and was
substituted by her sister, Soledad Desamito Reyes, as her legal representative. After
trial, on January 5, 1961, the Court of First Instance decided the appealed ejectment
case, affirming the judgment of the Municipal Court and dismissing the counterclaim.
At this juncture, the spouses Casas-Cuyegkeng moved to dismiss the case for
damages. One month later, on July 22, 1961, plaintiff amended the complaint by
suppressing the first cause of action regarding the fixing of the lease term by the court
and retaining the others, amplifying the averment of damages. Casas-Cuyegkeng then
reiterated the motion to dismiss, on the ground of another action pending between the
same parties, on the same facts and issues. After the matter had been extensively
argued, the Court of First Instance ordered the complaint dismissed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance take cognizance of that issue on
appeal from the decision of the court of origin.

Held:
 Yes. The Court of First Instance in the appealed case could, and did, take
cognizance of the issue of damages in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and
resolved it adversely against appellant Desamito. Authority for this action of the court is
found in section 11 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 11. Lack of jurisdiction.—A case tried by an inferior court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be dismissed on appeal by the Court of
First Instance. But instead of dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if the parties
therein file their pleadings and go to the trial without
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs
against petitioner-appellant.

607. G.R. No. L-41162 September 5, 1975

JAMES JUDITH, MANUEL JUDITH AND TERESITA JUDITH LOZADA, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
MELCHOR ABRAGAN AND CONCHITA DE ABRAGAN, defendants-appellees.
Facts:
On October 27, 1964, plaintiffs acquired by virtue of a deed of sale, a building
(house-store) and two lots for the sum of P12,580.00. After buying the property, they in
turn leased it to the defendants; that after sometime the defendants failed to pay the
corresponding monthly rentals; and that despite repeated demands, they refused to
vacate the premises. On August 23, 1965, plaintiffs filed before the City Court of
Cagayan de Oro, a complaint for illegal detainer against the defendants.
In their answer, defendants interposed that plaintiffs' complaint states no cause
of action. On March 7, 1966, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
complaint which was denied. Subsequently, defendants submitted an amended answer
denying under oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents attached to
the plaintiffs' complaint.
On July 6, 1966, defendants filed another motion to dismiss restating the same
grounds they availed of in their first motion, but the same was denied by the City Court
in its order dated July 29, 1966.
After trial, the City Court on October 21, 1966 rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and so defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.
During the pendency of the appeal, defendants filed a motion to suspend the hearing.
The motion was denied and the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case. After
the plaintiffs have rested their case, defendants filed a Demurrer to the Evidence and/or
Motion to Dismiss.
On September 23, 1969, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the
case.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case on
the merits in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction?

Held: Yes.
 The fact that defendants have previously filed a separate action in the same
Court of First Instance for the reformation of the deed of absolute sale into one of pacto
de retro sale or equitable mortgage, "is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary
remedy of ejectment afforded by law to the plaintiff."
Accordingly, the action filed by the plaintiffs with the City Court is one of
possession, and therefore falls within the original jurisdiction of said court in accordance
with Section 88, par. 1, Republic Act No. 296, as amended which was then the law
prevailing when the instant case was filed, unlike at present when under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 5967 which further amended Section 88 of Republic Act No. 296, it is
only city courts that are granted concurrent jurisdiction with the Courts of First Instance
to resolve question of ownership in ejectment cases. Consequently, it was erroneous for
the lower court to dismiss the appeal from the decision of the City Court for it has still
the power to review said decision in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and set aside. Case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
and decision on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs.

608. G.R. No. L-17468 July 31, 1963

PILAR T. DEL ROSARIO, MARIANO V. DEL ROSARIO and SALVADOR V. DEL
ROSARIO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. DAMIAN L. JIMENEZ, as Judge of the Municipal Court of Quezon City,
Branch III,
SANCHO R. JACINTO and DOMINGO BASCARA, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
This case was one of forcible entry under Rule 72, involving two parcels of land
of which the plaintiffs, Sancho R. Jacinto and Domingo C. Bascara, now respondents-
appellees, are the registered owners .These lands had been acquired by them through
purchase from the previous registered owner, J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. In their answer to
the complaint the defendants, now petitioners-appellants, claimed ownership of the
same properties by purchase from one Macaria Fulgencio and her husband Carlos
Javier and alleged that they were and had been in actual physical possession thereof
even before the purchase from J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. by appellees. Appellants, after a
second amended complaint had been filed by appellees, submitted their answer thereto
dated October 2, 1958, including a "third-party complaint" against the plaintiffs
themselves as well as against J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc., from both of whom they prayed
for an award of damages.
In the meantime, after the action of forcible entry was filed, herein appellants
commenced a suit for "reconveyance and/or recovery" of the same properties against
appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal , and then, on November 4, 1958, filed a
motion in the municipal court to suspend proceedings in the summary action before it
until after the termination of the case in the Court of First Instance.
On October 7, 1958 the municipal court denied admission of the third-party
complaint; and on the following November 6 it likewise denied the motion to suspend
proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the third-party complaint was improperly laid against the
appellees?

Held:
Yes. The third-party complaint was improperly brought against appellees Jacinto
and Bascara, since they were themselves the plaintiffs in the forcible entry case, as to
whom a mere counterclaim would suffice. Insofar as J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. was
concerned, the allegation against it is that it had entered into a compromise agreement
with a certain Deudor in four civil cases in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
whereby it agreed to give priority to occupants of lands involved therein (including those
now in dispute) in the matter of their purchase and that the ejectment suit filed by herein
appellees was a violation of that compromise agreement. The court failed to see how
such "agreement to which appellees were strangers, could have anything to do with
their right of action to recover the material possession of the lands in question. The
prayer in the third-party complaint that J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. be sentenced to pay
damages should be the subject, if at all, of a separate action so that matters extraneous
to the issue of possession may not unnecessarily clutter the forcible entry case. The
admission of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the court, and in the present
instance there was no abuse of discretion in the order of denial complained of.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

609. G.R. No. 95818 August 2, 1991

LEOPOLDO SY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,** ROLANDO JAVIER, Deputy Sheriff, Br. XIX, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Manila, and SPOUSES EMETERIO M. CALUGAY and LINA
SAMERA, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:p
Facts:
On November 8, 1988, petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case against private
respondent Emeterio M. Calugay with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XIX. On December 29,1988, herein private respondents filed an Answer with Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that there was
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXVI, an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance involving private respondents' right to repurchase
the subject property which had been acquired by therein defendant bank and ultimately
sold to herein petitioner.
On November 27, 1989, the trial court rendered judgments against therein
defendant. On December 8, 1989, a motion for reconsideration was filed by private
respondents which was, however, denied by the trial court.
On February 19, 1990, private respondents filed a notice of appeal which was
denied due course. Consequently, a writ of "Ejectment Execution" was issued on March
12, 1990 commanding the Sheriff of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch XIX, Manila, to
cause the herein private respondent Emeterio M. Calugay, and all persons claiming
under him, to vacate the premises.
Private respondents filed on April 30,1990 an amended petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI.
In an order dated June 18,1990, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. On August 24, 1990, respondent court issued a resolution
ordering the restoration of the possession over the subject premises.
On September 4, 1990, respondent court issued another resolution ordering
private respondents, among other things, to deposit in escrow with the Philippine
National Bank the back rentals due on the premises in question.

Issue:
Whether or not the decretal portion of said resolution were made with grave
abuse of discretion, or without or in excess of jurisdiction?

Held:
Yes.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the orders or decisions
upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction.
However erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.
It is, therefore, imperative that under the factual ambience of this case and the
events that have apparently supervened therein, respondent court should primarily and
promptly determine whether any of the aforesaid exceptions apply to justify its assuming
jurisdiction over a case the judgment wherein it is postulated to have become final and
executory.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed resolution of October 31, 1990 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, with the directive that respondent court forthwith proceed
with deliberate dispatch in CA-G.R. SP No. 22521 in the manner indicated herein.

610. G.R. No. L-50259 November 29, 1983

FLORENTINO SALINAS and MILAGROS C. SALINAS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIGUEL R. NAVARRO, ARSENIO DE LEON and ESTRELLA A. DE
LEON, respondents.
Facts:
On June 4, 1973, respondents spouses Arsenio De Leon and Estrella De Leon
executed a deed of absolute sale with assumption of mortgage in favor of the petitioners
over a house and lot at 2228 Banaag at Sikat Street, Tondo, Manila.
According to the petitioners, the De Leons pleaded that they be allowed a grace period
of six (6) months from said date or up to December 5, 1973. When the period lapsed,
the De Leons refuse to vacate the premises thus prompting the petitioners Salinas to
file an action for unlawful detainer with the City Court of Manila.
In their answer, the private respondents contended that the real issue in the
litigation was ownership and not mere possession and that, consequently, the city court
had no jurisdiction.
 The private respondents stated that they originally purchased the house and lot
from a certain Manuel Torres under term payments. When the time came to make the
final payment, the De Leons could not raise the necessary amounts so they borrowed
money from the petitioners who were their friends.
On June 27, 1978, the De Leons perfected an appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The respondent court denied the motion in an order dated January
25, 1979 which denied the motion for immediate execution.

Issue:
Whether or not there be an execution of the judgment even when an appeal has
been perfected?

Held:
Yes. Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for an immediate
execution.
The rule is explicit. In ejectment cases, the judgment must be executed
immediately when it is in favor of the plaintiff in order to prevent further damages to him
arising from the loss of possession. However, the defendant may stay execution (a) by
perfecting an appeal and filing a supersede as bond and (b) by paying from time to time
either to the plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the property as may be fixed by the justice of the peace court in its
judgment (Base v. Leviste, 99 SCRA 575). Thus, in an eviction case where the
defendant did not file a supersede as bond and did not make any monthly deposit of the
rentals, we ruled that the lessor is entitled as a matter of right to the immediate
execution of the municipal or city court's judgment for the restoration of possession and
the payment of the accrued rentals, or compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises. In such a case, the duty of the court to order immediate execution is
ministerial and imperative (Philippine Holding Corporation v. Valenzuela, 104 SCRA
401).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent judge is directed to
issue the writ of execution.

611. GEORGE V. BENEDICTO, Petitioner, - versus - HON. COURT OF APPEALS

and ROMEO G. CHUA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157604 October 19, 2005

Facts:
Petitioner George V. Benedicto is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of
736 square meters located in Carlos Hilado Highway, Bacolod City. He entered into a
contract of lease with private respondent Romeo G. Chua on October 15, 2000. Under
the contract, the lease was to start on November 15, 2000. The contract also stipulated
that the rent would be P7,000 monthly.
Chua immediately started constructing a hollow-block fence.On November 13,
2000, Chua paid Benedicto P28,000 representing deposit for one month and advance
rent for three months. Thereafter, Chua failed to pay the rent prompting Benedicto to
send a demand letter after a fruitless amicable settlement at the Office of Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
Chua did not pay. Hence, Benedicto filed a case against Chua for unlawful
detainer and damages with the Municipal Trial Court in Bacolod City, Branch 3. In turn,
Chua filed with the same court a petition for consignation.The MTCC dismissed the
consignation case for lack of jurisdiction as the said case falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC. The MTCC found merit in the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages
which rendered a decision against Chua. Chua appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 43.The RTC modified the MTCC judgment. It dismissed the case
for consignation, for lack of tender of payment and prior notice; ordered Chua to
immediately vacate or peacefully surrender possession to Benedicto.
On November 19, 2002, Chua filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review
with prayer for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on November 22, 2002, the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 43 issued a
Writ of Execution.
On April 4, 2003, Benedicto filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion to Dissolve/Quash Temporary Restraining Order on the
ground that the TRO had already become moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals ruled on the said Manifestation and Motion and decided in
favor of Benedicto.

Issue:
Did the Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction, despite
the immediately executory character of RTC judgments in ejectment cases?

Held:
No.
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Court on Forcible Entry and Unlawful
Detainer presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is
unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a
superior court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without
prejudice to the appeal taking its due course.
Chuas putative right to continued possession of the premises stands to be
violated if the adverse judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. Hence, the
complete execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance, through a writ of
preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

612 CO TIAC v. FELIPE NATIVIDAD, and DOMINGO LAO

[G.R. No. L-1457. January 28, 1948.]

Facts
June 26, 1945, Domingo Lao brought an action in the municipal court for unlawful
detainer of a warehouse (bodega) said to be located at 528 Elcano Street, Manila,
alleging that the property had been leased prior to February, 1945, to a certain Co
Tiac on
a month-to-month basis at a monthly rental of P40 payable in advance.

It was further alleged that Co Tiac, without giving any notice to the plaintiff, left the
premises, and his whereabouts were unknown at the time of the filing of the
complaint; that in the same month, the defendant, without obtaining the prior
permission of the plaintiff, began to live in the said premises, telling the plaintiff
that he was Co Tiac’s relative; that the defendant, notwithstanding repeated
demands, refused to vacate said premises.
The defendant refused to vacate the premises, and the counsel for the plaintiff
moved for the execution of the judgment and execution was issued. Co Tiac, the
present petitioner, through counsel filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash Execution,"

Judge Natividad denied the motion to quash the execution, on the ground that "the
movant, Co Tiac, is not a party in this case, either as plaintiff, or as defendant, or
as intervenor." The court expressed "the opinion that said movant has no
personality to intervene in this case at this stage of the proceedings and to ask for
the quashing of the writ issued for the execution of the judgment rendered therein,
which is now final and executory."cr

Issue

Whether or not Co Tiac has a personality to intervene in the case at bar

Ruling

No, the Supreme Court ruled that "Except as otherwise provided by statute,
an action of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained only against one in
possession at the commencement of the action, and not against one who does not
in fact hold the land." This is in harmony with section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of
Court. This rule does not require that the lessee or the person who committed the
forcible entry should be made a party even though his whereabouts be unknown.

Forcible entry or unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding, intended to provide an

expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
property. Title is not involved. Co Kay disappeared from the scene and Co Tiac
emerged, resurrected from the grave to take up the cudgels. What is more, he
would not start where his partner and kin left off; he would have all the issues
fought over again. Unluckily for the petitioner, law and justice can not be
circumvented and outwitted so easily. A party will not be allowed to take undue
advantage of a situation created by his own fault, especially if it is deliberate, to the
detriment of his opponent.

613 GENARO PRADO v. APOLINARIO CALPO, ET AL

G.R. No. L-19370. April 30, 1964

Facts

May 24, 1957, plaintiff Prado, filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, a forcible entry case against the defendants.

Defendants presented their answer and averred that the Justice of the Peace Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case, because it involved question of title over the property.

Plaintiff opposed, claiming, among others, that the ground on which the same was based
could only be resolved in a trial on the merits, for, whether title is necessarily involved in an
action for forcible entry or not is a question of fact.

Justice of Peace Court denied the Petition for Dismissal and favors the plaintiff. Defendants
perfected their appeal to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and instead of presenting
their Answer; defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, again raising the same issue of
jurisdiction of the inferior court the CFI without any hearing, handed down an Order
granting the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.

Issue

Whether or not the JP Court had jurisdiction to entertain the case and the CFI
could legally take cognizance of the appeal

Ruling

The CFI erred in quashing the case, upon a mere motion to dismiss. The findings of
the JP Court clearly show that the plaintiffs had prior physical possession of the disputed
property and the alleged circumstance that the defendant Cabrera was the registered owner
of the property, did not detract from the fact that plaintiffs had a right of possession thereof
which should be protected.

When possession is the issue, an action for Forcible Entry and Detainer is the proper
remedy.

The CFI should have heard the case on the merits, and find out whether the findings and
conclusions of fact of the JP, regarding the prior possession of the plaintiffs and their
subsequent dispossession by the defendants are correct or not. Insofar as the appeal with
the CFI is concerned, the latter did not have to delve into the issue of ownership, which
could be threshed out in an action, to quiet title. Forcible entry and detainer lies even
against the very owner of property.
 614 FLORENDA ARIEM, vs. HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch IV; PEOPLE'S HOMESITE &
HOUSING CORPORATION and THE CITY SHERIFF,

G.R. No. L-32164 January 31, 1973

Facts

The Court rendered judgment on December 4, 1969, in favor of the plaintiff therein,
respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, and against the defendant therein,
Nicasio Barles, ordering the latter to vacate Lot No. 16, Block 15, Psd-57771 situated in
Project 6, Quezon City, which is the registered property of said respondent.

After the judgment had become final and executory, respondent Judge ordered the issuance
of the writ of execution to carry it into effect.

On May 14, 1970, petitioner Florenda Ariem filed in the same case a petition to lift the writ
of execution, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the People's Homesite
& Housing Corporation, or any other persons acting under its command and/or behalf, from
executing the judgment of eviction. The petition was denied by the respondent Judge in his
order of June 24, 1970, and from this order petitioner has come to this Court praying that it
be nullified and set aside and that respondents and/or any person acting in their behalf be
enjoined from executing the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12775. Basis of the petition is
Florenda Ariem's claim that she is the bona fide occupant of the land involved in said case
and not defendant Nicasio Barles who was merely left as her caretaker when she left for the
provinces. Court required the respondents to answer the petition and issued a restraining
order to prevent the execution of the judgment, including the demolition of the house and
improvements on said land under the order of June 24, 1970, until further orders from this
Court.

Issue

Whether the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petition to lift the order of execution so as to prevent the respondents from carrying into
effect the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12775.

Ruling

No, Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit. Nicasio Barles is the real party-in-interest as
he was actually occupying the lot in question and had constructed his house thereon. The
cases cited by the petitioner to bolster up her claim that she cannot be deprived of the land
involved without prior hearing to determine the extent of her right thereto, are not in point.

They deal with rights of possessors in good faith who were not parties to the action
involving title to the property and, hence, not bound by the judgment. Such possessors
were not relatives or privies of the defendants and did not derive their right from the latter.
Here, petitioner Florenda Ariem is a privy to Nicasio Barles who is her son-in-law. The
respondent Judge in the hearing of the petition to lift the writ of execution gave ample
opportunity to the petitioner to be heard as regards her alleged bona fide possession. But
the Court did not believe her, it being evident that her claim was merely a pretext to
frustrate the execution of the judgment ousting Barles who is a squatter on the land owned
by respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation.

615 PAZ S. BAENS, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CHUA SENG,

G.R. No. L-57091 November 23, 1983

Facts

Chua Seng filed Civil Case for forcible entry with the City Court of Manila against Dra. Baens
alleging that the refusal to remove the padlocks was a breach of the contract of lease
consisting in the deprivation of plaintiff's right to occupy and use the leased premises.

On February 12, 1976, petitioner Baens filed her answer to the complaint for forcible entry
alleging inter alia that Chua Seng right to occupy said premises had long expired and that
the respondent failed to pay the rentals due and had voluntarily vacated the premises. .

The City Court of Manila which conducted a joint trial and rendered a consolidated decision,
in favor of Chua Seng, ordering Dra. Baens to restore him to the possession and enjoyment
of the leased premises at No. 2441 Oroquieta Street, Manila, and to pay him attorney's fees
in the sum of P1, 000.00.Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision affirming the
City Court's deision.

Respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision annulling the order of the Court of First
Instance granting immediate execution and modifying the appealed decision.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals decision is correct

Ruling

Yes,Sec. 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other
person against who, the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of and contract, express
or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of avail such landlord, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper inferior court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution to such possession, together with damages and
costs. The complaint must be verified.

On the last issue of whether temperate damages may be awarded in favor of respondent
landlord, it has been held that while damages may be adjudged in forcible entry and
detainer cases, these "damages" mean "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the premises." ( Mitschiener v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 55. cited in Garcia v.
Pe�a 77 Phil. 1011) or "fair rental value of the property." (Sparrevohn v. Fisher, 2 Phil.
676: Nlitschiener vs.. Barrios, supra; Castueras v. Bayona, 106 Phil. 340). profits which the
plaintiff might have received were it not for the forcible entry or detainer do not represent a
fair rental value, Sparrevhon v. Fisher, 2 Phil, 676; supra; Igama v. Soria, 42 Phil. 11).

616 LAO SENG HIAN, CHENG TO, AND Y.S. WOO,

vs.
NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, and
JOSE M. OCAMPO,

G.R. No. L-1950 May 16, 1949

Facts

The Court of First Instance, on an application for certiorari to the

municipal judge, ruled against the petitioner, defendant in the case for
unlawful detainer and appellant herein. Hence, this petition.

Issue

Whether or not the money claim at the rate of P5,250 a month, made
in the complaint in an action for lawful detainer, removes the case from the
jurisdiction of the municipal court.

Ruling

No, the quantum of the money judgment demanded is immaterial to

the court's jurisdiction. Any amount for rents or in the nature of rents or in
the nature of rents is allowable in an action of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.

This is so because rents or compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises is only incidental or accessory to the main action for the restitution
of possession unlawfully withheld. This rule is too familiar and too well
settled to required citations of authorities.

The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is affirmed with costs
against appellant.
617 MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 116665. March 20, 1996

Facts

Under a one (1) year lease contract commencing on July 1, 1992 and ending on June
30, 1993 but renewable upon agreement, herein petitioner Azcuna, Jr., as lessee, occupied
three (3) units (C, E and F) of the building owned by private respondent Barcelonas family.
Came expiration date of the lease without an agreed renewal thereof and coupled by
petitioners failure to surrender the leased units despite private respondents demands,
private respondent filed before the Municipal Trial Court an ejectment case against
petitioner.
Judgment of that inferior court, affirmed in its entirety by the Regional Trial Court and
herein public respondent Court of Appeals on subsequent appeals taken by petitioner,
favored private respondent.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision that the only damages
that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be
claimed in an ordinary action.

Ruling
No,This Court has often stated that inferior courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
cases of forcible entry and detainer regardless of the value of damages demanded. It has
also ruled that the damages that may be recovered in actions for ejectment are those
equivalent to a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises by
defendant. Nonetheless, this latter legal proposition is not pertinent to the issue raised in
the instant case because here, the damage sought to be recovered had previously been
agreed to by lessee (in the contract of lease) and imposed by lessor by way of
damages. Besides, nobody can affirm that the liquidated amount of damages stipulated in
the lease contract was not due to occupation or loss of possession of the premises and non-
compliance with the contract.
618 JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO v. HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL,
in G.R. No. L-43345. July 29, 1976.

Fats
Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots located at
the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City. The lots were
leased to Ong Cu for fifteen-year period which allegedly expired
on August 31, 1974.In view of Ong Cu’s failure to vacate the lots
and remove his improvements thereon Mrs. Laureano filed
against him an ejectment suit in the city court of Iloilo City.
After trial, the city court rendered a judgment ordering Ong Cu
to vacate the lots, and to pay compensation for the use and
occupation. Ong Cu appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo Instead of filing a supersede as bond based on the findings
of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu asked the city court ex
parte to approve his supersede as bond. The city court granted
that ex parte motion. Thereafter, the record was elevated to
the Court of First Instance.
Mrs. Laureano filed a motion in the lower court praying for a
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore her to the
possession of the said lots. Invoking article 1674 of the Civil
Code and section 9, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, she alleged
that Ong Cu’s appeal was frivolous and dilatory.
Issue
Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in denying Mrs. Laureano’s motions for execution and a
mandatory injunction

Ruling
No, Under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
judgment of the inferior court in plaintiff’s favor in an ejectment
case it immediately executory. Plaintiff in entitled as a matter of
right to the immediate execution of the city court’s judgment
both as to the restoration of possession and the payment of the
accrued rentals or compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises. Thus, where the city court on the day it rendered
the judgment ordered the execution thereof and the defendant
did not perfect his appeal and did not post a supersedeas bond, it
was held that certiorari would not lie to set aside the execution.
Section 8 of Rule 70 is an exception to the general rule as to the
execution of the judgment of an inferior court which is found in
Section 18, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court.

The inferior court’s judgment is immediately executory in order to

prevent further damages to the plaintiff should the defendant
continue to deprive him of the possession of the premises in
litigation.

The defendant may stay execution by (a) perfecting an appeal

and filing a supersede as bond and (b) paying from time to time
either to the plaintiff or of the Court of First Instance during the
pendency of the appeal the rentals or the reasonable value of the
use and occupation of the property as fixed but the inferior court
in its judgment.

619 DOMINADOR STA. ANA v. HON. DELFIN VIR. SUÑGA

G.R. No. L-32642. November 26, 1973

Facts

In an action to quiet title to a residential parcel of land located at Barrio

Bagacay, Tinambac, Camarines Sur containing an area of approximately
1,100 square meters and referred to as Lot B filed by Victor Dasal and Maria
Pecunio as plaintiffs against Pelicula Sabido and Maximo Rances as
defendants said defendants (herein respondents) prevailed in their
contention that Lot B was but a strip of land forming part of their property of
over two hectares which they had entrusted to plaintiff Maria Pecunio as
their encargada but which she later tried to claim as her own.

In their amended answer, however, respondents averred that "if plaintiffs

are referring to that portion of land adjoining the defendants’ property on
the west and belonging formerly to Antonio Amator as their alleged second
parcel of land then defendants allege herein that they have made no
pretense whatsoever of ownership over the same much less have they
occupied the same or taken possession thereof.

Its decision having become final and executory, respondent court issued a
writ for its execution.

Issue

Whether or not the decision of the lower court is correct

Ruling

No, From the maze of voluminous pleadings and factual allegations on

petitioner’s part and counter-allegations on respondents’ part, supported
with numerous documentary evidence and exhibits proferred in respondent
court as well as in this Court, it is patent that petitioner’s claims are far from
being baseless or unmeritorious and entitle him to a hearing and a day in
court, as urged by him from the beginning in respondent court.

It is conceded in the answers of both respondent court and private

respondents that "petitioner has no house inside Lot B" and respondent
court stated that the inclusion of petitioner’s house in his demolition order of
May 5, 1970 "was a palpable mistake caused either by mere inadvertence or
clerical error which the herein respondent would have immediately corrected
had petitioner called his attention to it." Yet petitioner had so called
respondent court’s attention to his wrongful inclusion in the demolition order
in his motion for reconsideration, which was denied peremptorily, as above
stated.

620 ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., , vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Fourth
Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., [G.R. No. 128743. November 29, 1999]

Facts
Private respondent Angel Chaves, Inc. is the owner of a commercial building in Cagayan
de Oro which he leased to several business establishments. On January 15, 1991, private
respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC),Cagayan de Oro City, because of the failure of the lessees to comply with her
demand on increasing the said rental fee.
In his answer to the complaint, defendant Constancio Manzano, through his counsel, Atty.
Cesilo Adaza, allegedThat it is not true that in the said contract the monthly rentals of the
defendants as stated in paragraph 3 of the complaint are to be paid by the
defendants. What was agreed was for the following defendants to pay the following rentals
beginning July 1, 1988 and two years thereafter.
On July 23, 1992, the MTCC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against three
defendants, including petitioner, but ordered the ejectment of the fourth defendant Alfredo
Co.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City,
reversed the MTCC and ordered the four defendants ejected from the premises.
Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which, on
November 27, 1996, rendered a decision declaring the writ of injunction as null and void,
and ordering the trial court to dismiss Sp. Civil Case no. 95-560.Hence, this petition .
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion in declaring null and void the order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction as an interlocutory order issued by the RTC

Ruling

No, The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as

such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review
on certiorari.[8] The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file
a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.[9] In the instant case, the trial
court issued as writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 13040, in spite of the fact that the right of petitioner to
occupy the leased premises has been declared by final judgment to be
inexistent. Having no clear legal right, petitioners plea should not have merited the
favorable action of the trial court. The order granting the writ of preliminary
injunction was thus clearly erroneous and must be set aside.

621 ANACLETO SANTIAGO vs THE SHERIFF OF MANILA AND MELCHOR

Almorò

[GR No. L-907. December 17, 1946.]

Facts

As a basis for his petition, he alleges that he obtained in purchase the

house located at Tambunting Street No. 29, Rizal Extension Avenue,
Manila on May 16, 1946 by Felisa Pascual;
That on August 20, 1946 Hon. Judge Gutierrez David of the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued an order of execution against Felisa
Pascual in civil case No. R-2184, entitled Melchor Almoro v. Felisa
Pascual; That on September 6, 1946, the appellant filed a writ of third
party with the Sheriff of Manila, and he disregarded it, and threatened
to execute the order of execution against him; That it is the ministerial
duty of the sheriff to give course to the third party and to require the
appealed Melchor Almoro to give bail; Which has no remedy of appeal,
or any other fast and expedited remedy.

When the Sheriff of Manila was constituted in House No. 29,

Tambunting Street, Rizal Extension Avenue, Manila to verify the
execution order, according to the defendant Felisa Pascual, Emilia
Escobar and Juan Fernando, who begged and asked To the applicant
Melchor Almoro an extension to vacate said house until 9 of September
of 1946; (Performance Enforcement, Annex I). Melchor Almoro was
satisfied (Annex lA). The appellant states in his memorandum and in his
writ of third party that he was the owner and owner of the house at the
time of execution.

The sheriff did not embargo the house to be sold in publicasta. It was
ordered in civil case No. R-2184, from the decree of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to remove Felisa Pascual from that house and to put
Melchor Almoro in possession, in accordance with Rule 39, Article 13
Before article 444, par.5, Code of Civil Proc.). The order of execution
thus says in part: "NOW, THREFORE, we command you to cause the
defendant (Felisa Pascual) to forthwith vacate the house known as No.
29 Tambunting. Manila, and that plaintiff Melchor Almoro have
restitution of the same . The appellant, who was not a party to the
case, argued that he was the owner and owner of the house and asked
the sheriff not to bother him in the exercise of his rights over said
property.

The judgment rendered in the present case is in personam, and as such

is only binding for the parties and not for strangers. (Rule 44, par. [B],
Rule 39.) If the appellant Anacleto Santiago, who was not a party to the
eviction case, had a good faith belief in the estate in question, the
judgment in that case could not Be validly executed against him. It may
be emphasized, however, in the execution of the sentence if it is proved
that the possessor is simply a successor, or a host, or an agent of the
executed in the fraudulent purpose of frustrating the sentence; In such
case, there must be a procedure in the Court of First Instance that
issued the order of execution for elucidation of the character of the
possession of the alien occupant.

In the case of Omana against Gatulayao (. 73 Phil, 66), we said the

following: virtual chanrob1es 1AW library

Judgment rendered in actions in personam, as in the instant case, are

enforceable only Between the parties and Their successors in interest,
but not Against strangers thereto. (Sec. 306, par.2, of Act No 190, now
Rule 39, § 44 [b], Rules of Court.) There may be cases where the actual
possessor may be claimed to be a privy to any of the parties To the
action, or his bona-fide possession may be disputed, or where it is
alleged, as in the instant case, that such possession has been taken in
connivance with the defeated litigant with a view to frustrating the
judgment. In any of These events, the proper procedure would be to
order a hearing on the matter of Such possession and to deny or access
to the enforcement of a writ of possession as the finding Shall warrant.
" Cralaw virtua1aw library

The resolution of the Court of First Instance in such a proceeding, which

is for the purpose of execution only, is not conclusive in a subsequent
matter that any of the parties may initiate before a court competent for
the final determination of the title on the property. That the stranger is
merely a quasi-master or agent or guest of the executor, then the order
of execution will be followed against him. This is not an objection,
however, so that the occupant can avail himself of any other legal
remedy for definitive determination the title or possession of the
property.

for these reasons, and without prejudice to the parties to follow the
procedure here indicated, the application for mandamus is dismissed,
with costs against the appellant.
622 G.R. No. L-32164 January 31, 1973

FLORENDA ARIEM, petitioner,

vs.
HON. WALFRIDO DE LOS ANGELES, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch IV; PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION and THE CITY
SHERIFF, respondents.

Facts

Petitioner Florenda Ariem filed in the same case a petition to lift the writ of execution, with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, or
any other persons acting under its command and/or behalf, from executing the judgment of eviction.
The petition was denied by the respondent Judge in his order of June 24, 1970, and from this order
petitioner has come to this Court praying that it be nullified and set aside and that respondents and/or
any person acting in their behalf be enjoined from executing the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12775.

Basis of the petition is Florenda Ariem's claim that she is the bona fide occupant of the land involved
in said case and not defendant Nicasio Barles who was merely left as her caretaker when she left for
the provinces.

On July 6, 1970, this Court required the respondents to answer the petition and issued a restraining
order to prevent the execution of the judgment, including the demolition of the house and
improvements on said land under the order of June 24, 1970, until further orders from this Court.

Issue

Whether or not the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petition to lift the order of execution so as to prevent the respondents from carrying into effect the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12775.

Ruling

No, Petitioner's contention is devoid of merit. Nicasio Barles is the real party-in-interest as he was
actually occupying the lot in question and had constructed his house thereon. He was duly summoned
to answer the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-12775 but, instead of answering the complaint, he moved
to dismiss the same on the ground that he has no interest in the premises and the filing of the
complaint against him was erroneous. Accordingly, he prayed that he should not be made liable for
the outcome of the Civil Case No. Q-12775. Having failed to answer the complaint after the denial of
his motion to dismiss, Nicasio Barles was declared in default and respondent People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, judgment was rendered
against Nicasio Barles ordering him to vacate Lot No. 16 and remove his house and other construction
thereon.

Petitioner resorted to the filing of this petition simply to delay the execution of the judgment and to
prolong the possession of the premises by Nicasio Barles, his son-in-law. It is unfortunate that
petitioner willingly allowed herself to be a docile instrument for making a mockery of judicial processes
and for trifling with the rule of law.
The cases cited by the petitioner to bolster up her claim that she cannot be deprived of the land
involved without prior hearing to determine the extent of her right thereto, are not in point. They deal
with rights of possessors in good faith who were not parties to the action involving title to the property
and, hence, not bound by the judgment. Such possessors were not relatives or privies of the
defendants and did not derive their right from the latter. Here, petitioner Florenda Ariem is a privy to
Nicasio Barles who is her son-in-law. The respondent Judge in the hearing of the petition to lift the
writ of execution gave ample opportunity to the petitioner to be heard as regards her alleged bona
fide possession. But the Court did not believe her, it being evident that her claim was merely a pretext
to frustrate the execution of the judgment ousting Barles who is a squatter on the land owned by
respondent People's Homesite & Housing Corporation.

623 LEVI A. LEDESMA and SALUD B. LEDESMA,

vs.
BENJAMIN JAVELLANA,

G.R. No. L-55187 April 28, 1983

Facts

Plaintiffs-appellants are the registered owners of seven parcels of land located in the
municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo. On August 3, 1968, they entered into a contract of
lease with the defendant-appellee over the said parcels of land for the stipulated rental of
P30,000.00 per annum. Defendant-appellee, through counsel, wrote a letter to the
appellants manifesting the appellee's intention to renew the lease contract for another ten
(10) years upon its termination, as expressly provided for in the contract. The appellants
expressed conformity to the renewal of the contract, but refused to accede to the claim of
the appellee that the renewal shall be under the same terms and conditions as the original
contract.

In view of their failure to arrive at an agreement regarding the conditions the appellants
commenced this action in the Court of First Instance praying for a judicial declaration that
paragraph 1 of the contract of lease should be interpreted to mean that the appellee's right
to renew the lease contract for another ten (10) years shall be subject to such new terms
and conditions that the parties thereto may agree upon, particularly with respect to the
amount of the yearly rental and the terms and conditions of the payment thereof.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs
declaring that the exercise by the defendant of his option to extend the contract of lease for
another ten (10) years shall be subject to the same rentals, terms and conditions stipulated
upon in the said contract.

Issue

Whether or not the renewal of the lease contract in question should be under the
same terms and conditions as the original contract

Ruling

In the lease contract under consideration, there is no provision to indicate that the renewal
will be subject to new terms and conditions that the parties may yet agree upon. It is to
renewal provisions of lease contracts of the kind presently considered that the principles
stated above squarely apply. We do not agree with the contention of the appellants that if it
was intended by the parties to renew the contract under the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract of lease, such should have been expressly so stated in the
contract itself.

The same argument could easily be interposed by the appellee who could likewise contend
that if the intention was to renew the contract of lease under such new terms and conditions
that the parties may agree upon, the contract should have so specified. Between the two
assertions, there is more logic in the latter.The settled rule is that in case of uncertainty as
to the meaning of a provision granting extension to a contract of lease, the tenant is the
one favored and not the landlord. (Cruz vs. Alberto, 39 Phil. 99.)As a general rule, in
construing provisions relating to renewals or extensions, where there is any uncertainty, the
tenant is favored, and not the landlord, because the latter, having the power of stipulating
in his own favor, has neglected to do so; and also upon the principle that every man's grant
is to be taken most strongly against himself. (50 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 1162, p. 48; see also 51
C.J.S. 599.)

624 , 625,626,628, 629,630,631,632,633,634 –Missing

627 JAKIHACA V AQUINO

181 SCRA 67PARAS;

January 12, 1990

FACTS:

On September 10, 1986 - Jesus Jakihaca filed an ejectment suit against

respondents Lilia Aquino and Apolonio, Aquino, and Jose Toralde before the San
Mateo RTC on account of the latter's refusal to remove their houses were allegedly
illegally constructed on land owned by Jakihaca in San Mateo which were done
without his knowledge and consent. The matter was initially referred to the
Barangay Captain of Ampid, San Mateo for conciliation processes pursuant to the
requirements of P.D. No.1508. But due to repeated refusal of the Aquinos to appear
before the Barangay Lupon, the Lupon Chairman and Secretary thereafter issued a
"certification to file action."- November 3, 1986. The Aquinos filed an answer with
special and affirmative defenses, arguing that: There was a verbal contract of
tenancy between the Aquinos and Gloria Gener, the former owner of the land in
question. They planted fruit-bearing trees on the said land along with rice and corn
therefore they cannot be ejected under the Land Reform Law more particularly P.D.
No. 1from the land which they had occupied and cultivated for more than ten (10)
years with the consent of the former owner Gener. They said that there is no
showing that the case was first brought to the attention of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform forcertification that this case is proper for tria lbefore the MTC. On
December 22, 1987 , the MTC found that the Aquinos were not tenants of either
Gener nor Jakihaca and that they entered the land 10 or 20 years earlier and built
their house on the land with the tolerance of Gener. The respondents were then
ordered by the Court to remove the houses on the land and surrender possession to
Jakihaca. On appeal to the RTC, the case was dismissed on the ground that the
MTC acted without jurisdiction as the complaint shows nothing when the verbal
demand to remove the houses on the lot of the petitioner was made on the private
respondents. Jakihaca filed a motion for reconsideration with the MTC which was
denied. Jakihaca alleged that the RTC erred in dismissing the case on the ground of
the MTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Aquinos argued that the
petition was filed out of time; that the petition was filed with the wrong court; that
the Municipal Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action;
and that there was no allegation in the complaint of prior physical possession of the
land by the petitioner.

ISSUE

WON the RTC ruling was correct

HELD

NO.

a)With regard to the absence of allegation in the complaint of prior physical

possession of the land by Jakihaca

The records show that the complaint explicitly alleged that "plaintiff verbally asked
the defendants to remove their house son the lot of the former but the latter
refused and still refuse to do so without just and lawful grounds."

Such is sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, in accordance

with the doctrine laid down in the case of Hautea v.Magallon where it was held that:
"An allegation in an original complaint for illegal detainer that in spite of demands
made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to restore the land, is considered
sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of previous demand." b)As
to whether or not the demand was brought within the one year period-As a general
rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case maybe objected to at any stage
of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception.

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape penalty.(Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy )c)As to the issue of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter

Petitioners, in their position paper, attached the report of Mr. Maines of the
Agrarian Office which categorically states that there is no evidence whatsoever to
show that the subject land is devoted to the production of rice and corn; that the
occupants are not sharing with the present landowner, hence, they are classified as
illegal occupants.

That the subject land is not tenanted, not devoted to the production of palsy
and/or corn,hence, not covered by P.D. No. 27or the Operation Land Transfer of the
government)As to the contention that the petition was filed out of time
 They allege that when petitioner received the decision of the RTC on April 20,1988
and the appeal to this Court was filed only on July 12,1988 or only after three
months ,such appeal was definitely outside the 15-day reglementary period within
which to appeal. The SC held that this contention is erroneous. The Rule on
Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court
and Municipal Trial Courts, pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Summary procedures have no application to cases before the Regional TrialCourts.
Hence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the MTC to the RTC, the
applicable rules are those of the latter court.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated April
8, 1988 and the order dated June 25, 1988 both of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
76, San Mateo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 415, are hereby SET ASIDE. The decision of
the Municipal Trial Court of Sap Mateo,Rizal, dated December 22, 1987 in Civil Case
No. 616is hereby REINSTATED.

628 MANUEL CO KENG KIAN, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 75676 August 29, 1990/ 189 SCRA 67

FACTS

A complaint for ejectment against petitioner Manuel Co Keng Kian was filed
by Plaza Arcade, Inc., alleging that petitioner refused to vacate the
premises and to pay the monthly rentals notwithstanding receipt of several
letters of demand which was sent to petitioner by registered mail. During
the pendency of the trial before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
petitioner voluntarily vacated the disputed premises, turning over the key to
the clerk of court but without paying the accrued rent.

The inferior court rendered its judgment dismissing the ejectment case for
lack of jurisdiction. It refused to give probative value to the three letters of
demand to vacate which were all sent to petitioner and which he refused to
receive. The inferior court held that since none of the demand letters was
served (1) personally, or (2) by written notice of such demand upon a
person found on the premises, or (3) by posting such notice on the
premises if no person can be found thereon pursuant to the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there was no valid demand. If
none was made, the case came within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and not the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Plaza Arcade, Inc. appealed to the Regional Trial Court which initially
reversed the decision of the MTC, but on motion for reconsideration by
petitioner, affirmed the dismissal of the ejectment case. 1

A petition for review was filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court overturned the appealed order of the trial court which
had earlier sustained the dismissal of the ejectment case. The decision of
the Appellate Court was elevated to this Court on a petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the notice to vacate required to be served on the lessee under

Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to confer
jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Trial Court in an action for ejectment, may
be served by registered mail.

RULING

The Appellate Court took the lower courts to task for taking a rather
constricted view of Section 2, Rule 70, and declaring that the service of
demand letters to vacate on the lessee is strictly limited to the three (3)
modes. The notice to vacate the leased premises required by the Rules to
be served on the tenant before a forcible entry or unlawful detainer action
can be commenced against him, may be served by registered mail. This is
a substantial compliance with the modes of service enumerated under
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature because they
involve a disturbance of social order which must be abated as promptly as
possible without any undue reliance on technical and procedural rules
which only cause delays. It matters not how the notice to vacate was
conveyed, so long as the lessee or his agent has personally received the
written demand, whether handed to him by the lessor, his attorney, a
messenger or even a postman.

635 SOCO vs. MILITANTE

123 SCRA 160
June 28, 1983

FACTS:
Soco and Francisco entered into a contract of lease on January 17, 1973, whereby Soco
leased her commercial building and lot situated at Manalili Street, Cebu City, to Francisco for a
monthly rental of P 800.00 for a period of 10 years renewable for another 10 years at the option
of the lessee. It can readily be discerned from Exhibit “A” (from SOCO) that paragraphs 10 and
11 appear to have been cancelled while in Exhibit “2” (from FRANCISCO) only paragraph 10
has been cancelled. Claiming that paragraph 11 of the Contract of Lease was in fact not part of
the contract because it was cancelled, Soco filed Civil Case No. R-16261 in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu seeking the annulment and/or reformation of the Contract of Lease.
Sometime before the filing of Civil Case No. R-16261 Francisco noticed that Soco did not
anymore send her collector for the payment of rentals and at times there were payments made but
no receipts were issued. This situation prompted Francisco to write Soco the letter dated
February 7, 1975 which the latter received. After writing this letter, Francisco sent his payment
for rentals by checks issued by the Commercial Bank and Trust Company.

The factual background setting of this case clearly indicates that soon after Soco learned that
Francisco sub-leased a portion of the building to NACIDA, at a monthly rental of more than
P3,000.00 which is definitely very much higher than what Francisco was paying to Soco under
the Contract of Lease, the latter felt that she was on the losing end of the lease agreement so she
tried to look for ways and means to terminate the contract.

In view of this alleged non-payment of rental of the leased premises beginning May, 1977, Soco
through her lawyer sent a letter dated November 23, 1978 to Francisco serving notice to the latter
‘to vacate the premises leased.’ In answer to this letter, Francisco through his lawyer informed
Soco and her lawyer that all payments of rental due her were in fact paid by Commercial Bank
and Trust Company through the Clerk of Court of the City Court of Cebu. Despite this
explanation, Soco filed this instant case of Illegal Detainer.

MTC and RTC have conflicting findings. The former found that the consignation was valid. RTC
reversed and ordered the eviction of the Francisco.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid consignation of payment of the rentals.

HELD:
 In order that consignation may be effective, the debtor must first comply with certain
requirements prescribed by law. The debtor must show (1) that there was a debt due; (2) that the
consignation of the obligation had been made because the creditor to whom tender of payment
was made refused to accept it, or because he was absent or incapacitated, or because several
persons claimed to be entitled to receive the amount due (Art. 1176, Civil Code); (3) that
previous notice of the consignation had been given to the person interested in the performance of
the obligation (Art. 1177, Civil Code); (4) that the amount due was placed at the disposal of the
court (Art. 1178, Civil Code); and (5) that after the consignation had been made the person
interested was notified thereof (Art. 1178, Civil Code). Failure in any of these requirements is
enough ground to render a consignation ineffective. (parang wala naman tong mga to sa 1176,
1177 and 1178?)
We hold that the respondent lessee has utterly failed to prove the following requisites of a valid
consignation: First, tender of payment of the monthly rentals to the lessor. Second, respondent
lessee also failed to prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation,

Evidently, from this arrangement, it was the lessee’s duty to send someone to get the cashier’s
check from the bank and logically, the lessee has the obligation to make and tender the check to
the lessor. This the lessee failed to do, which is fatal to his defense.
Third, respondent lessee likewise failed to prove the second notice that is after consignation has
been made, to the lessor. And the fourth requisite that respondent lessee failed to prove is the
actual deposit or consignation of the monthly rentals except the two cashier’s checks referred to
in Exhibit 12. As indicated earlier, not a single copy of the official receipts issued by the Clerk of
Court was presented at the trial of the case to prove the actual deposit or consignation.

We, therefore, find and rule that the lessee has failed to prove tender of payment except that in
Exh. 10; he has failed to prove the first notice to the lessor prior to consignation except that
given in Exh. 10; he has failed to prove the second notice after consignation except the two made
in Exh. 12; and he has failed to pay the rentals for the months of July and August, 1977 as of the
time the complaint was filed for the eviction of the lessee. We hold that the evidence is clear,
competent and convincing showing that the lessee has violated the terms of the lease contract
and he may, therefore, be judicially ejected.

635-647-Missing
648-660 – Missing