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ALIH v.

CASTRO
151 SCRA 279

FACTS:
The respondents raided the compound occupied by the petitioners in Zamboanga City in search
of loose firearms, ammunitions and other explosives. Petitioners pray to recover the articles
seized from them and respondents be enjoind from using the same against them since they did
not have a warrant to search the compound when they seized said articles, thus constituting an
illegal search.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill of Rights and thus the
evidence obtained therein inadmissible in court

HELD:
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the
non-observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At
the time of the “zona” the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had
not been in fact investigated. Every person is entitled due process. The respondents defied the
precept that “civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military” so clearly proclaimed
in the Constitution. The respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to
determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioners’ premises. It
follows that as the search of the petitioners’ premises was violative of the Constitution, all the
firearms and the ammunitions taken form the raided compound are inadmissible as evidence in
any of the proceedings against the petitioners.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261

December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants
issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the
warrant were real properties.

Issue:

Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.
Stonehill v. Diokno

20 SCRA 283 (1967)

Concepcion, CJ

Facts:

1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties
due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue
Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were
conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated
the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with
the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized
effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The
court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in
both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in
the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said
corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been
impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be
exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of
documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).
Castro vs. Pabalan (70 SCRA 477)

Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application
of Lumang or the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his
witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to answer.
Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that
Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil,
Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete description
of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma.
Cristina and not in Padasil.

Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.

Held: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the Rules of Court
because the two basic requirements are not complied with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, (b) the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a
general warrant. However, things seized cannot be returned and shall be destroyed, except the
liquors, playing cards, distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989]

Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of
the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary
Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized
and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt
along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and
members of various student organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and
co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of
the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating
plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that
the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines,
pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary
restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the
seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.

Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society
from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said
than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but
rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged
as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall."
Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency.
Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of
the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the
community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they
were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The
court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a
judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene
and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State
interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to
be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion

PLACER VS. JUDGE VILLANUEVA [126 SCRA 463; G.R. NOS. L-60349-62; 29 DEC 1983]

Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary
Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been
found. Upon receipt of said informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal
cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent
issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses
and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his
power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned
for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended
that the fiscal’s certification in the informations of the existence of probable cause constitutes
sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.

Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest,
compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to
come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls
for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before
issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.

Petition dismissed.
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)

CASE DIGEST

Facts: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a
complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie
evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge
Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent
the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed,
he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground
that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be
required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless,
Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view
of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.

HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE


ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the 1985
ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the investigating
judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by
searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there
must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to
issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal should,
instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused.
Ponce Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990)

Student: G-one T. Paisones

Professor: Atty. Cisco Franz S. Maclang

Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan
Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI on
the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City Branch
103, in Criminal Case No. 90-10941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio
C. Trampe, and companions, charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda PanIilio,
and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 990.

Issue:

WON the court must abandon Hernandez doctrine (Rebellion can absorb other
crimes).

Held:

NO

Ratio:

11 Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. The


ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent
challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
complete reversal. The President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding
doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition,
absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.

MORANO VS. VIVO [20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967]

Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on
November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first
marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.
Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first
marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines
under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000
pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen.
Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the
Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension
expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before
September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their
arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.

Held: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-
immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified
and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore,
first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the
appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the
officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility
in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases
has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his
or her status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of
Section 9 of the Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah
has, since her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not
particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her
deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity.
Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in
Fukien, China.Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle
which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of
a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his
country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot
insulate her from the State's power of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien
woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but
actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our
immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a
pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such
a flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule that
an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR 1990]

Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner
with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent petitioner a telegram
directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day,
after knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public
respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to
petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or
intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that
petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are
committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of
the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied
by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioner’s residence. They served the
order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes.
Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because
she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also
alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against
her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation.

Issue: Whether or Not the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor
Code

Held: Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”. Mayors and prosecuting
officers cannot issue warrants of seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on
Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of
Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities
must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect… The power of the President to order
the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests)
cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the
sole domain of the courts.” Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a
general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specifically the things to be seized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)

FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its]
control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense,
or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any
agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding
several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search
warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound
and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the
search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a “Motion
to SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which
denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested
Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

HELD:

The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case,
the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the
hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.
Alvarez vs. CFI

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

64 Phil. 33 (1937)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him
as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the
task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the
search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the
judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of
contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was
illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody
of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order
of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only
through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders
58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but
that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it
that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It
is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon
the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is
nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because
it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano Case Digest

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)


FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest
took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were
searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roque’s leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents
seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscal’s office
merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque
asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the
search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:

NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.
PEOPLE VS. DORIA

FACTS:

A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police which caught accused Doria red-handed of
selling prohibited drugs and during the operation the police officers searched for the marked
bills that they used in buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of Gaddao,
according to Doria. When they reached her house, the police officers came upon a box. He saw
that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The
plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by
"Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the
box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to
be dried marijuana leaves.

Both accused were convicted of the crime chared. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the
admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid.

HELD:

We hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a),
a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of committing an
offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a
warrant.
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule
is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained there from may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; 2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She
was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion
at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside
a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article
is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The marijuana
was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the
law and the Constitution. 135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
and never considered by the trial court.
CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA [77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977]

Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Two complaints for grave oral defamation were filed against Faustina Callanta. The City
Judge of Dagupan City, Felipe Villanueva, denied the motions to quash the complaints. Thus,
petitioner Callanta brought the suits for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Petitioner questions
the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal
should have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there
was jurisdictional infirmity. After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at
P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in
this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with the complaints filed.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail
and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the
preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case
at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the issuance of the warrant of
arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only the City
Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation. According to the Charter of the City of Dagupan,
“the City Court of Dagupan City may also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense,
without regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind over any
person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before the proper court”. Petition
for certiorari is denied. Restraining order issued by the Court is lifted and set aside.
Bagcal v Villaraza; G.R. No. L-61770; 31 Jan 1983; 120 SCRA 525

Claudine | 26 September 2017 | Comments (0)

FACTS:
Petitioner was arrested without a warrant on February 28, 1982 by the Philippine Constabulary
and has been detained at Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City since then. City Fiscal of Cagayan
de Oro filed an information for murder against petitioner with the Municipal Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro. The information was accompanied by affidavits not subscribed before
respondent Judge, who failed to ask affiants to ratify their oaths nor asked searching questions.
City Fiscal did not conduct preliminary investigation before respondent Judge issued the
warrant of arrest.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner may assail the validity of his warrant of arrest.

RULING:
NO. Although the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued, any infirmity attached to it was cured
when petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by applying for bail,
submitting a memorandum in support thereof, and filing a motion for reconsideration when his
application was denied.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT [198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]

Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged
before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of
seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at
the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region.

The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of
the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when
accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking
objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from
the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping
out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag.
Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did
not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy
bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from
the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ACCUSED’S DEFENSE

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by
him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa
Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be
reversed.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is
made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest
without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true
that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and
attempted to flee.

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
accused-appellant.

The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA
211)

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints
for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the
very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]

Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office,
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January
1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna
however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In
view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
121 SCRA 472

FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14
detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a conference in
the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14 detainees were under
surveillance as they were then identified as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They were arrested and later transferred to a
facility only the PCs know, hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of
habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid

HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial,
question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period. PD 1836 and LOI
1211 have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the power of preventive arrest
incident to the suspension of the privilege of the writ. In addition, however, it should be noted
that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA) pursuant to PD 1877. As
provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain
persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period of one year, with the cause or
causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or the by the Review Committee
created for the purpose.

Curiously, in Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, [145 SCRA 112 (1986)], a case which
dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, the Supreme Court held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without
authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those “device(s) or arrangement(s)” enumerated therein, following the principle that
“penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.”
Camilo Sabio vs Richard Gordon

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455
“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on
May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him
to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman
Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by
Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence
and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to
cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that
“the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”.
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to
enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right
information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of
government policies and their effective implementation.

Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners


personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search
the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to
search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit
and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of
Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the
respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other
records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as
evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same
on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things
to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from
the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different
from that of the corporation.
Alvarez vs. CFI

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

64 Phil. 33 (1937)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him
as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the
task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the
search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized
different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit
receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the
judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of
contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was
illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody
of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order
of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only
through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders
58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but
that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of
attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully
and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it
that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent
seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It
is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon
the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the
depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is
nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause.
Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is
sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because
it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts
BURGOS, SR. V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP [133 SCRA 800; G.R. NO. 64261; 26 DEC 1984]

Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes


Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by
respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search
and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Respondents contend that petitioners
should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them before
impugning the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on
ground of laches (Failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it). Respondents
further state that since petitioner had already used as evidence some of the documents seized
in a prior criminal case, he is stopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.

Petitioners submit the following reasons to nullify the questioned warrants:


1. Respondent Judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as well
as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementioned address.

3. Articles belonging to his co-petitioners were also seized although the warrants were only
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr.

4. Real properties were seized.


5. The application along with a joint affidavit, upon which the warrants were issued, from the
Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may be validly issued in accordance with
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

Respondents justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they
have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in subversive activities against
the government in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense.

Issue: Whether or Not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.

Held: In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the
lower court, this Court takes cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency
of the constitutional Issue raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search of
the "We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all
metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its
inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention pertaining to laches, the petitioners
gave an explanation evidencing that they have exhausted other extra-judicial efforts to remedy
the situation, negating the presumption that they have abandoned their right to the possession
of the seized property.

On the enumerated reasons:


1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves
conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been
conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants
were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two
warrants intended for one and the same place.

3. Section 2, Rule 126, of the Rules of Court, does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not
be owned by him.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another
factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be
seized under the search warrants in question are too general.

With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any implementing rules
and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, President
Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to sequester the property seized from
petitioners. The closure of the premises subjected to search and seizure is contrary to the
freedom of the press as guaranteed in our fundamental law. The search warrants are declared
null and void.
People vs. Burgos

The State (P) vs. Suspect NPA Rebel (D)

GR L-68955, September 4, 1986 (144 SCRA 1) [T]

Summary: An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive group who


forcibly recruited him and based on this information, the police went to arrest the suspect. At
the time of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his field.

Rule of Law: In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.

Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that he
was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him
with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP
members went to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him plowing his field when they arrived.
One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos
(D) denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house
where a gun was buried in the ground.

After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers
recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was
issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief
of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok.
The location of the firearm was given by the wife of Burgos (D).

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is
an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were
still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject
firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest
lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that
happened or is discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is
necessarily also tainted.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984.
The petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant
was discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt
Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of
the charge against the petitioner.

Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for
a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their
respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was
not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents
thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he
subscribed and swore to the same before him.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing
the Search Warrant.

HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that
the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's
deposition taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by the
undersigned.

In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence.
ALIH v. CASTRO
151 SCRA 279

FACTS:
The respondents raided the compound occupied by the petitioners in Zamboanga City in search
of loose firearms, ammunitions and other explosives. Petitioners pray to recover the articles
seized from them and respondents be enjoind from using the same against them since they did
not have a warrant to search the compound when they seized said articles, thus constituting an
illegal search.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts done by the respondents are violative of the Bill of Rights and thus the
evidence obtained therein inadmissible in court

HELD:
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga at the time in question did not excuse the
non-observance of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. At
the time of the “zona” the petitioners were merely suspected of the mayor’s slaying and had
not been in fact investigated. Every person is entitled due process. The respondents defied the
precept that “civilian authority is at all times supreme over the military” so clearly proclaimed
in the Constitution. The respondents simply by-passed civil courts which had the authority to
determine whether or not there was probable cause to search the petitioners’ premises. It
follows that as the search of the petitioners’ premises was violative of the Constitution, all the
firearms and the ammunitions taken form the raided compound are inadmissible as evidence in
any of the proceedings against the petitioners.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

Facts:

Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose
of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s passport and
other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring
out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and
when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he
alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag.
It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his
passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained
also hashish.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable


search and seizure

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made
upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law,
which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City
was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA
211)

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order,
and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of
the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the
Union of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of
checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative,
they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints
for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the
respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrant or court
order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures?
III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these
do not constitute unreasonable search.

The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government,
in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention
the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such
urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by
deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the
very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonablyconducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform,
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay
for an orderly society and a peaceful community.
UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office,
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January
1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie
Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna
however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In
view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and
are in the nature of continuing crimes.

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