Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Facts:
a. June 1990: The Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for
certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of
Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (or the Federation) with two (2) rank and file
unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the
Philippines (PEUP).
ii. July 1990: PEPSI filed a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter of
PCEU-UOEF on the grounds that (a) members of the Union were managers, and (b)
a supervisors’ union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the
a. February 1991: Court grants temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. Issue
is whether or not a supervisors’ union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2)
rank and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code
iii. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
b. On April 8, 1991, the Secretary of Labor and Employment sent in a Comment, alleging that:
1) until and unless there is a final order cancelling its certificate of registration or charter
exercised all the rights and duties accorded to it by the Labor Code including the right to be
certified as a bargaining representative; 2) Public respondent cannot be deemed to have
committed grave abuse of discretion with respect to an issue that was never presented before it
for resolution
i. Art. 245 of the New Labor Code does not preclude the supervisor's union and the
ii. A federation of local union is not the labor organization referred to in Article 245 but
only becomes entitled to all the rights enjoyed by the labor organization (at the
company level). In other words, the affiliation of the supervisory employee's union
with the same federation with which the rank and file employees union is affiliated
did not make the supervisory employees members of the rank and file employee's
c. PEPSI replies that Petition to Set-Aside, Cancel, Revoke Charter Union Affiliation should
first be disposed of before granting the Petition for the Conduct of Certification Election. To
allow the conduct of the certification election to proceed would make any decision arrived at
by the Bureau of Labor Relations useless inasmuch as the same would necessarily be rendered
i. PEPSI also stressed that officials of both PCLU and PEUP are top ranking officials
of UOEF.
ii. The respondent supervisory union could do indirectly what it could not do directly as
the simple expedient of affiliating with UOEF would negate the manifest intent and
letter of the law that supervisory employees can only "join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own" and cannot "be eligible for membership in a labor
iii. However, there is absolutely nothing in the Labor Code that prohibits a federation
from representing or exercising influence over its affiliates. On the contrary, this is
precisely the reason why federations are formed and are allowed by law to exist. On
December 9, 1991, the Court resolved to DISMISS the case for "failure to
sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion." In a Resolution dated March 2, 1992, the Second Division of the Court
resolved to grant the motion for reconsideration interposed on January 28, 1992.
d. Assailed in this case is Med-Arbiter Order dated May 23, 1991 and the Decision and Order of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, dated October 4, 1991 and December 12, 1991,
respectively.
ii. Ordering the conduct of a Certification Election to be participated by and among the
Inc. at its plant at Tin-ao, Cagayan de Oro City, including all the satellite warehouse
within the territorial coverage and control of the Cagayan de Oro Pepsi-Cola Plant.
iii. On June 6, 1991, PEPSI appealed the said Order to the Secretary of Labor and
Secretary modified the appealed decision, referring MED ARB ROX Case No.
Director which has jurisdiction over these cases. On October 19, 1991, PEPSI
presented a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order but the same was
e.
2. Issues:
3. Holding:
i. Issue in first case has become moot and academic in view of the Union’s withdrawal
from the Federation. The Court holds it unnecessary to discuss a case already moot
and academic unless it concerns a governing principle other cases having similar
situations.
ii. Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a
certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of
the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the
time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to
iii. As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the labor
union of the rank and file: “While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial
employee as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor organization, under the
This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
iv. In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the
managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interest are well protected. The employer is
not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. .
Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement.
supervisors while Credit & Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are
manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd
situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a
member of a union.
b. WHEREFORE, the petitions under consideration are DISMISSED but subject Decision,
dated October 4, 1991, of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is MODIFIED in that
Credit and Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees
NATU v Republic
G. R. No. 93468, December 29, 1994
Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the exclusive bargaining agent of
its supervisory employees. The bank (Private respondent) moved to dismiss the petition alleging that
the supervisory employees are actually managerial employees hence prohibited from joining
unions. The Med Arbiter granted the petition but the decision was modified by the Sec. of Labor on the
ground that the ff employees are deemed as managerial and/or confidential employees and are
therefore ineligible to join or form labor unions (Dept. Managers, Asst. Managers, branch Cashiers and
Controllers).
ISSUE : W/N the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential employees hence ineligible to join or
assist the union of petitioner.
RULING:
The subject employees are supervisory and not managerial. As provided under 212 of the Philippine
Labor Code, a Managerial employee is;
a) One vested with power to lay down and execute management policies, or to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, and
Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do not possess the power to lay
down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty among others to "recommend proposals to
improve and streamline operations.
On one hand, a confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, or with the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.
Therefore only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent bank who are
deemed as confidential employees are ineligible to join or assist petitioner NATU-Republic Planters Bank
Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form any other labor organization
ALU v nlrc
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 250
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year
expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular
workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims
that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is
necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider
them as regular employees. Petitioners’ contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the
Labor Code.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees.
HELD:
No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were
considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the
fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they
are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project
employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that “project” is done, their
services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2 of
Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not
qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be construed
with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to other sections thereof.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6, 33
Case No. 20
G.R. No. L-34024 (April 5, 1978)
Chapter V, Page 240, Footnote No. 251
FACTS:
RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual
salary of P18,000. Arenas was receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of which
was from the national government and the remaining P650 comes from the city
government. Petitioner had repeatedly requested the city to enact the said RA but
the Respondent City refused.
ISSUE:
W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12,000
to P18,000.
HELD:
Looking at the Senate deliberations, the intention in enacting the RA was that
the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor.
Moreover, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed;
they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. In case there is
repugnancy between the proviso and the main provision, the latter provision,
whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the latest expression of the
intent of the legislation, but more so because provisos are negatively written and
gives off a more mandatory tone.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 33, 43,48, b2
Ocampo v. Buenaventura
Case No. 88
G.R. No. L-32293 (January 24, 1974)
FACTS:
On September 11, 1966 the Cebu Police Department arrested and detained
Edgardo Ocampo and other minors for an alleged violation of Ordinance No. 228
which fixed curfew hours. The minors were then convicted for violation of said
ordinance. On appeal, the minors were acquitted since the reason they violated the
ordinance was to attend a birthday, which is considered as a wholesome
assemblage, and therefore falls under the exception to the curfew rule. Roberto
Ocampo filed a complaint against the Respondents for serious misconduct, grave
abuse of authority, and commission of a felony. The Mayor issued an ordinance
exonerating the policemen. On March 17, 1969 a complaint was lodged with the
Police Commission for the same grounds.
ISSUE:
W/N the Mayor can decide or investigate on administrative cases involving
police service and personnel.
HELD:
The Respondents’ argument is devoid of merit. The power of local officials to
investigate and decide administrative cases involving police service and personnel
has been transferred to the POLCOM under RA 4864. According to Commission v.
Hon. Bello, Sec. 26 of the Police Act is a mere saving clause and refers only to
administrative cases involving police personnel and service pending at the time of
the effectivity of the Act (September 8, 1969). Sec. 26 may not be interpreted to
mean that the Board of Investigators and Police Commission could not legally
function to carry into effect the purpose of the Act until after the lapse of the 100
days.
LATIN MAXIM:
1, 6c, 6d