In Re: Plagiarism Charges Against Justice Mariano del Castillo (2010)

Intellectual Property Law – Copyright – Plagiarism

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas Organization in the
case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among
others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the
true intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books were:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law (2006);
and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del
Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al
in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.
No Plagiarism
According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s original ideas or
creative expressions as one’s own.”
This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was attribution to
the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is
therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.
But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.
On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA, 313 SCRA 404), the Supreme
Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room
for errors. This would be very disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.
On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately
According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as background facts in establishing the
state on international law at various stages of its development. The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works
can support conflicting theories. The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted,
it is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.
No Misconduct
Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice, fraud or corruption.
No Inexcusable Negligence
The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher is a highly competent one. The
researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her
class and 4th in the bar examinations. Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked
features to apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on her part cannot be
said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the
case to her. Further, assigning cases to researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It
must be emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the researcher and in every
sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.
 G.R. Nos. 174813-15 581 SCRA 320

Hipos
vs
Bay
Facts:
Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners
Darryl Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss
the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.
The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations.

2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10
August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the
same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in an Order of even date.

Issue:
Can the Supreme Court compel respondent judge bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus.

Held:
The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and
control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do
with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a
reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed
to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of
the People to due process of law.

Commission on Elections vs Tomas Noynay

292 SCRA 264 – Legal Ethics – Duty of Lawyers To Properly Quote The Supreme Court
Judicial Ethics – Duty of the Judge to be Studious of the Principles of Law
In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain individuals for violations of the Omnibus Election Code.
The cases were filed with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided over by Judge Tomas Noynay. Judge Noynay however
dismissed the said cases as he ruled that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said cases because said criminal offenses were
punishable with less than six years imprisonment. He said that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELEC’s legal department, filed a motion for reconsideration. He cited a case entitled: “Alberto
Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286)”. According to Atty. Balbuena, in the
said case he cited, the Supreme Court has already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling by the
Supreme Court in his motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the same was contrary to Section 32 of B.P.
129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts except
certain cases (which were not the cases filed by COMELEC in this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a special law which
provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judge’s duty to be studious of the principles of law, to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases. The Supreme Court said that the passage
cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the actual decision of the Supreme Court in the said case cited but rather the memorandum
of the court administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of “Naldeza vs Lavilles, Jr.” was wrong. Not only
did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling was NALDOZA), he also cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA
286 and not 245 SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.