THIRD DIVISION

filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the
Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING G.R. Nos.
DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO 174813-15
REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and
On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum
ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING
ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Present: to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that
Petitioners,
YNARES- there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.
SANTIAGO, J
- versus - .,
Chairperson, On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued
CARPIO,*
HONORABLE RTC JUDGETEODORO A. B CHICO- a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed
AY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of NAZARIO, against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-
Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, NACHURA,
Respondent. and 123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor
PERALTA, JJ.
Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

Promulgated: On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C.

de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an
March 17, appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution
2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On
- -x the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations before Judge Bay.
DECISION

On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.

This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules

Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed
of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October 2006 of
Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus, bringing
respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial
forth this lone issue for our consideration:
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT
COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO
DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF
The facts of the case are as follows. MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING
NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE
On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A
rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?[2]

filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel

and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-
123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by
Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.
[1]
On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA and BBB
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[3]

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only
to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a
public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,
because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.[4]
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we
compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors
Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect,
petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters
involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ
of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those
matters, when refused.[5] However, mandamus is never available to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or
the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise
of either.[6] In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to
Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the
same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or
deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on
the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by
denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If
petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion
in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a
Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been
argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court,
which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition
for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt
from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou[7]:
The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion
on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at
bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion.
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or
modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the
President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order
the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor
does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but
as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an
unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that will
justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the
executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for
such exception is a petition
for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.[8] (Emphases
supplied.)
Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of
its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio
Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court,
challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein denying
his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six
other persons for alleged rape and homicide.One of the
arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination
against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in
the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not
find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that
case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for
Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two
other persons.
In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is
directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court,
seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to
Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The
prosecution has already filed a case against
[9]
petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr., we reiterated the
doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v.
Mogul,[10] that once a criminal complaint or an information is
filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or
acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the
jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus,
we held:
In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a
criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of
the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence,
and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and
sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be
addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule
 applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss
the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The
only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair
the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or
the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial
court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the
case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the
Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of
Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of
subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a
Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have deferred to the
Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the
case.[11] Petitioners cite the following portion of our Decision
in People v. Montesa, Jr.[12]:
In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the
motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the
reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have
deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the
Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material
evidence and determine whether the information it had filed
should stand.[13]
Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took
specific statements from our Decision, carefully cutting off the portions
which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The
Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who,
after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused,
proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the
judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the
case. The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the
disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Resolution by the
Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite
the fact that the reinvestigation the latter ordered was still ongoing, since
the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet
attained finality. We held that the judge should have waited for the
conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting
on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable
cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the
continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa,
Jr. reads:
Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge
to wait for a final resolution of the incident.
In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled:
A
ccordingly, we rule that the
trial court in a criminal case
which takes cognizance of
an accused's motion for
review of the resolution of
the investigating prosecutor
or for reinvestigation and
defers the arraignment until
resolution of the said
motion must act on the
resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor's
finding or on a motion to
dismiss based thereon only
upon proof that such
resolution is already final in
that no appeal was taken
thereon to the Department
of Justice.
The
resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case
never became final, for it was not approved by the
Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter
disapproved it. As a consequence, the final
resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is
that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no
complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the
prior written authority or approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as
amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911.[14]
As can be clearly seen, the
statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to
establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination
by the prosecutor of whether or not there is probable cause. On the
contrary, Montesa, Jr. states:
The rule is
settled that once a criminal complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition
thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court. While the prosecutor
retains the discretion and control of the
prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his
opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a
motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor
before or after the arraignment, or after a
reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records
upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the
discretion of the court. The action of the court
must not, however, impair the substantial rights of
the accused or the right of the People to due
process of law.[15]

In a seemingly desperate attempt on
the part of petitioners counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge is
allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the
prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the
Motion to Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners counsel states in
the Memorandum:
6.10. Further
more, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of
the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9 pages
which was attached to the URGENT PETITION
did not point out any iota of grave abuse of
discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De
Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons
of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by
RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent
ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5,
1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states
that:
I
n the absence of a finding
of grave abuse of
discretion, the courts bare
denial of a motion to
withdraw information
pursuant to the Secretarys
resolution is
void.(Underscoring ours).
6.11. It is
therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon.
Supreme Court disregard the argument of the
OSG because of its falsity.[16]
This statement of petitioners counsel
is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision
in Ledesma.[17] The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a
resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
In the light of
recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and
considering that the issue of the correctness of the
justice secretary's resolution has been amply
threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information,
the resolution of the secretary of justice, the
motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive
discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all
of which were submitted to the court - the trial
judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the motion to withdraw the
information, based solely on his bare and
ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial
court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive
calls for an independent and competent
assessment of the issue(s) presented in the
motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to
evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding
the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner
criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He
merely ruled to proceed with the trial without
stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's
recommendation.[18] (Emphasis supplied.)
It very much appears that the
counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Rule 10.02 A
lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text
of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as
law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.
Counsels use of block quotation and
quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that the
passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the
words Underscoring ours after the text implies that, except for the
underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the
original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to
show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar.
To clarify, we never stated
in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw
Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such
withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the
Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a
trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to
Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment
of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph
of Ledesma states:
When
confronted with a motion to withdraw an
information on the ground of lack of probable
cause based on a resolution of the secretary of
justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of the merits
of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over
the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it before
proceeding further with the trial. While the
 secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding 90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The
on courts. A trial court, however, commits Supreme Court ruled as follows:
reversible error or even grave abuse of
discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such R
recommendation and simply insists on ape victims, especially child
proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of victims, should not be
having already acquired jurisdiction over the expected to act the way
criminal action.[19] (Emphases supplied.) mature individuals would
when placed in such a
situation. It is not proper to
judge the actions of
Petitioners also try to capitalize on children who have
the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order apparently undergone traumatic
experience by the norms of
states that there was no probable cause against petitioners: behavior expected from
adults under similar
circumstances. The range of
WHEREFOR
emotions shown by rape
E, finding no probable cause against the herein
victim is yet to be captured
accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of
even by calculus. It is, thus,
lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw
unrealistic to expect
informations is DENIED.
uniform reactions from rape
victims (People v. Malones,
Let the case
G.R. Nos. 124388-
be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24,
90, March 11, 2004).
2006 at 8:30 oclock in the
morning.[20] (Underscoring ours.)
The Court
finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged
actuations of the complainants after the alleged
Thus, petitioners claim that since rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged
actuations are evidentiary in nature and should be
even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause against evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This
them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City is necessary to avoid a suspicion of prejudgment
against the accused.[22]
Prosecutor should be granted.[21]

As can be seen, the body of the

Even a cursory reading of the
assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable cause
assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word no
against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of
in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed
the reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there
Order states in full:
is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of
After a the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable
careful study of the sworn statements of the
complainants and the resolution dated March 3, conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there
2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will
de Vera, the Court finds that there was
probable cause against the herein accused. The prevail.[23]
actuations of the complainants after the alleged
rapes and acts of lasciviousness cannot be the
basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to
cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance
did not make voluntary the complainants compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is
submission to the criminal acts of the accused improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters
(People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The
complainants affidavits indicate that the accused involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to
helped one another in committing the acts
complained of. Considering that the attackers direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
were not strangers but their trusted classmates retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
who enticed them to go to the house where they
were molested, the complainants cannot be either.[24] The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an
expected to react forcefully or violently in
Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the
protecting themselves from the unexpected turn of
events. Considering also that both complainants resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to
were fifteen (15) years of age and considered
children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a
Court in People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388- requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar. [25]
 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition
Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded
seeking a review of the finding of probable cause by the trial court, we to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the
nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After going proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the
through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court case with dispatch.
that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW
hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for his
merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that disquieting conduct as herein discussed.
might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only
SO ORDERED.
intended to focus on the finding of probable cause.
EN BANC
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the

Court, a designated member plagiarized the works of certain authors and

twisted their meanings to support the decision.

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

The Background Facts
OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C.

DEL CASTILLO. Present: Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all

CORONA, C.J., members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, filed with the Court in G.R.

No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with application for

CARPIO,
preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the
CARPIO MORALES,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of
VELASCO, JR.,
the Solicitor General.
NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION, Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during

World War II, the Japanese army systematically raped them and a
PERALTA,
number of other women, seizing them and holding them in houses or
BERSAMIN,
cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.
DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR., Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the

PEREZ, Executive Department, represented by the respondent public officials,

requesting assistance in filing claims against the Japanese military

MENDOZA, and
officers who established the comfort women stations. But that
SERENO, JJ.
Department declined, saying that petitioners individual claims had
Promulgated:
already been fully satisfied under the Peace Treaty between the

Philippines and Japan.

October 12, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling

the Executive Department to espouse their claims for official apology and
DECISION
other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court

of Justice and other international tribunals.

PER CURIAM:
 c. Enforcing Erga Omnes
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge
action. Justice Mariano C. del Castillo wrote the decision for the University Press (2005).

Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision: it cannot

grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the

exclusive prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine

whether to espouse petitioners claim against Japan; and, second, the Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations

Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse in the case has been put into question by Justice Del Castillos fraud. The

their claims. Court should thus address and disclose to the public the truth about the

manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[3] that resulted in gross

prejudice to the petitioners.

On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for

reconsideration of the Courts decision. More than a month later on July

18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr., Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for

announced in his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental reconsideration generated, Justice Del Castillo circulated a letter to his

petition detailing plagiarism committed by the court under colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the

the second reason it gave for dismissing the petition and that these decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in

stolen passages were also twisted to support the courts erroneous it. He said in the pertinent part:

conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no

further legal remedies. The media gave publicity to Atty. Roques

It must be emphasized that there was
announcement. every intention to attribute all sources, whenever
due. At no point was there ever any malicious
intent to appropriate anothers work as our own.
We recall that this ponencia was thrice included
in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion deliberated upon during the Baguio session on
April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on
for reconsideration that Atty. Roque announced. It accused Justice Del
April 27, 2010. Each time, suggestions were made
Castillo of manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism[1] when he which necessitated major revisions in the draft.
Sources were re-studied, discussions modified,
wrote the decision for the Court and of twisting the true intents of the passages added or deleted. The resulting decision
plagiarized sources to suit the arguments of the assailed comprises 34 pages with 78 footnotes.

Judgment.[2] They charged Justice Del Castillo of copying without

acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles: xxxx

a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by

As regards the claim of the petitioners
Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale
that the concepts as contained in the above
Journal of International Law (2009);
foreign materials were twisted, the same remains
their opinion which we do not necessarily share.[4]
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an
International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
 On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges work, and that the Courts decision amounted to an act of intellectual

against Justice Del Castillo to its Committee on Ethics and Ethical fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.[5]

Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and

recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C.

Vitug to serve as consultant of the Committee. He graciously accepted. On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C.

Corona that, although relevant sentences in the Courts decision were

taken from his work, he was given generic reference only in the footnote

On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma)

comment on Justice Del Castillos verified letter. When this was done, it rather than with respect to the passages taken from his work. He

set the matter for hearing. thought that the form of referencing was inappropriate. Mr. Tams was

also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an

approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual States

In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his to the community of nations) that is not consistent with what he

blog that he and his co-author Evan Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as advocated.

Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their work but

Criddles concern, after reading the supplemental motion for

reconsideration, was the Courts conclusion that prohibitions against On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties submissions in the

sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally binding norms that summary manner of administrative investigations. Counsels from both

treaties cannot diminish. sides were given ample time to address the Committee and submit their

evidence. The Committee queried them on these.

On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing

concern that in mentioning his work, the Court may have misread the Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with

argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross the other parties not in attendance so they could make submissions that

purposes. Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the drafting

appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes. process that went into the making of the Courts decision in

the Vinuya case. Petitioners counsels vigorously objected and the

Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice Del Castillo,

On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the his counsels requested the Committee to hear the Justices court

Committee for investigation, the Dean of the University of the researcher, whose name need not be mentioned here, explain the

Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, research work that went into the making of the decision in

claiming that the Vinuya decision was an extraordinary act of injustice the Vinuya case. The Committee granted the request.

and a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation

by the Highest Court of the land. The statement said that Justice Del

Castillo had a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors

 The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case,

how the attribution of the lifted passages to the writings of Criddle- the Court like its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards will

Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her report to Justice purposely avoid touching the merits of the Courts decision in that case or

Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in

remorse at her grievous mistake and grief for having caused an the same. The Court will deal, not with the essential merit or

enormous amount of suffering for Justice Del Castillo and his family.[6] persuasiveness of the foreign authors works, but how the decision that

Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works

and for what purpose the decision employed the same.

On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to

the researchers explanation, counsel for petitioners insisted that lack of

intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for a At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another

writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is commonly

taken from anothers work. Counsel invoked the Courts ruling understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from

in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and (another) and pass them off as ones own.[8] The passing off of the work

Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,[7] arguing that standards on of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

plagiarism in the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.

The Passages from Tams

After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to

file their respective memoranda. They filed their memoranda in due

course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages
unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court. from Tams book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law

(2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author thought was
The Issues
a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed

This case presents two issues: that the footnoting in this case was not an appropriate form of

referencing,[9] he and petitioners cannot deny that the decision did

1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in
attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did
the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo plagiarized the published works of
not pass off Tams work as his own.The Justice primarily attributed the
authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
ideas embodied in the passages to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself

2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from Simma, Tams

to make it appear that such works supported the Courts position in article as another source of those ideas.

the Vinuya decision.

The Courts Rulings

The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is

sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the footnoting standards of counsel


for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in
International Law (2005) in the Vinuya decision is an attribution no
matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit than he
deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del
Castillo passed off the challenged passages as his own.
That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used
the introductory phrase cited in rather than the phrase See would make a
case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of manifest
intellectual theft and outright plagiarism. If the Justices citations were
imprecise, it would just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of
theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would be target of abuse for
every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form.
The Passages from Ellis
and Criddle-Descent
Petitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using
as footnotes, without attribution to the author, passages from the
published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page
27 of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery,
torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible
as well as legally prohibited under contemporary
international law. 65 xxx
Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the
lengthy passages in that footnote came almost verbatim from Ellis
article,[10] such passages ought to have been introduced by an
acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could
very well have read:
65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an
International Crime, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis
said: The concept of rape as an international crime
is relatively new. This is not to say that rape has
never been historically prohibited, particularly in
war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of
rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the
Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not
mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not
mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the
United States provides that in time of war all
women and children shall not be molested in their
persons. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce,
Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and the
United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785,
U.S.-Pruss., 8 TREATIES & OTHER INT'L
AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S. 78, 85. The 1863
Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of
troop discipline. (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape
in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of
Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. INTL. L. 219, 224). It specified rape as a
capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at
236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected
women by requiring the protection of their honour.
(Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and
private property, as well as religious convictions
and practice, must be respected. Convention (IV)
Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land,
art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907.General Assembly resolution
95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, Affirmation
of the Principles of International Law recognized
by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal; General
Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of
1946; SeeAgreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of the Charter
established crimes against humanity as the
following:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely,
murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any
reference to rape and rape was not
prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, The International Criminal
Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena,7 ILSA J. INTL. COMP. L.
667, 676.) However, International Military
Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape
crimes, even though its Statute did not
explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East
 Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui,
Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign
Minister Hirota criminally responsible for a
series of crimes, including rape, committed
by persons under their authority. (THE
TOKYO JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR
THE FAR EAST 445-54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific
crime came in December 1945 when Control
Council Law No. 10 included the term rape in
the definition of crimes against humanity.
Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying
powers in Germany, was devised to establish
a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals
in German courts. (Control Council for
Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace
and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3
Official Gazette Control Council for Germany
50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the
first modern-day international instrument to
establish protections against rape for women.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention].Furthermore, the
ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have
significantly advanced the crime of rape by
enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a
war crime, and a crime against humanity.
But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar
introduction was missing from Footnote 65.
Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight
sentences and their accompanying footnotes appear in text on pages 30-
32 of the Vinuya decision:
xxx In international law, the term jus
cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms
that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in the
sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority.71
Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since
the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms began to attract
greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred
von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden
Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus
cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s
with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a
consensus that certain international norms had attained
the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a
consensus on the proper criteria for identifying
peremptory norms.
After an extended debate over these and other
theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully
in 1963 that there is not as yet any generally
accepted criterion by which to identify a general
rule of international law as having the character
of jus cogens.76 In a commentary accompanying
the draft convention, the ILC indicated that the
prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full
content of this rule to be worked out in State
practice and in the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.77 Thus, while the existence of jus
cogens in international law is undisputed, no
consensus exists on its substance,77 beyond a tiny
core of principles and rules.78
Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including
their footnotes, from Criddle-Descents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens.[11] Criddle-Descents footnotes were carried into
the Vinuya decisions own footnotes but no attributions were made to
the two authors in those footnotes.
The Explanation
Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of
Ellis and Criddle-Descent could be construed as plagiarism. But one of
Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed attorney, explained
how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the
beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became
the working draft of the decision. She said that, for most parts, she did
her research electronically. For international materials, she sourced
these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and law-
related materials to which the Court subscribes.
 In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday

would have assigned a case for study and report, the researcher would in their work.

source his materials mostly from available law books and published

articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the

one side of the issue or for the other, he would place a strip of paper early drafts of her report in the Vinuya case and these included the

marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and place the book passages lifted from the separate articles of Criddle-Descent and of Ellis

on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He would with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the course

later paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted

books as he typed his manuscript on a manual typewriter. This occasion the attributions.

would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials used to their

authors or sources. First Finding

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers

Castillos researcher also explained, most legal references, including the explanation regarding the accidental removal of proper attributions to the

collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or in three authors is credible. Given the operational properties of the Microsoft

internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as program in use by the Court, the accidental decapitation of attributions to

the researcher found items that were relevant to her assignment, she sources of research materials is not remote.

downloaded or copied them into her main manuscript, a smorgasbord

plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researchers For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer

technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a literate, a familiar example similar to the circumstances of the present

carpenter. The carpenter first gets the pieces of lumber he would need, case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident

choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has in mind, say a happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in the

table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them inalienable character of juridical personality in connection with an

out of the pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo M. Tolentino,

would get rid of the scraps. happens to have been published in a website, researcher X would

probably show interest in the following passage from that book:

Here, Justice Del Castillos researcher did just that. She

xxx Both juridical capacity and
electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of
persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or
Westlaw website and pasted these to a main manuscript in her computer renounced.15
xxx
that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the _____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program.[12] Later, after she decided

on the general shape that her report would take, she began pruning from
Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to
that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions in
other sources, it is evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is
the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it from Von Tuhr and
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with
Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.
Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is
 To understand this, in Tolentinos example, the equivalent

When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote would be researcher Xs removal during cleanup of the tag, The

into a manuscript-in-the-making in his computer, the footnote number inalienable character of juridical personality.23,by a simple delete

would, given the computer program in use, automatically change and operation, and the unintended removal as well of the accompanying

adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if the footnote (#23). The erasure of the footnote eliminates the link between the

preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino lifted passage and its source, Tolentinos book. Only the following would

was pasted on it is 23, Tolentinos footnote would automatically change remain in the manuscript:

from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24. xxx Both juridical capacity and
capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of
persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or
renounced.43
But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, _____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
researcher X would have to tag the Tolentino passage with a short

description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject description

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a
would be: The inalienable character of juridical personality.23 The
function that raises an alarm when original materials are cut up or
footnote mark, 23 From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the
pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the
subject tag, serves as reminder to him to attribute the passage in its final
manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that
form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now
what should stick together had just been severed.
appear like this:

The inalienable character of juridical

personality.23 This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and

xxx Both juridical capacity and Criddle-Descent. The researcher deleted the subject tags and, accidentally,
capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of
persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources of the
renounced.24
xxx lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of
_____________________________
23 From Tolentino. them was not easily detectable.
24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos

The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It
verified letter of July 22, 2010 is inconsistent with his researchers claim
serves but a marker to help researcher X maneuver the passage into the
that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite the fact
right spot in his final manuscript.
that the Justice did not disclose his researchers error in that letter
The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the
despite the latters confession regarding her mistake even before the
Justice had decided what texts, passages, and citations were to be retained
Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By denying plagiarism in his
including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and when she was
letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to
already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she
whitewash the case.[13]
unintentionally deleted the footnotes that went with such tagswith

disastrous effect.

But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false

testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely explained that there was every
intention to attribute all sources whenever due and that there was never But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is

any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own, which as essentially a form of fraud where intent to deceive is inherent. Their

it turns out is a true statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position

upon the case more than once, prompting major revisions in the draft of considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field

the decision. In the process, (s)ources were re-studied, discussions of discipline that is free of any mistake. The theory places an automatic

modified, passages added or deleted.Nothing in the letter suggests a universal curse even on errors that, as in this case, have reasonable and

cover-up. Indeed, it did not preclude a researchers inadvertent error. logical explanations.

Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines

plagiarism as the deliberate and knowing presentation of another person's

And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not
original ideas or creative expressions as one's own.[16] Thus, plagiarism
initially disclose his researchers error. He wrote the decision for the
presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers
Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising
work and pass it off as ones own.
from its preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular

decision for the Court is confidential, which explained his initial request
Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that
to be heard on the matter without the attendance of the other parties.
would indicate that an intent to pass off anothers work as ones own is

Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the academic

motive or reason for omitting attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle- freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a student

Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly respected professors of obtained based on evidence that she misappropriated the work of

international law. The law journals that published their works have others, passing them off as her own. This is not the case here since, as

exceptional reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed

attribution to these authors when the decision cites an abundance of other passages to others.

sources. Citing these authors as the sources of the lifted passages would
Second Finding
enhance rather than diminish their informative value. Both Justice Del

Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the
The Court also adopts the Committees finding that the
failure to mention the works of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was
omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis did not bring about
unquestionably due to inadvertence or pure oversight.
an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages that

he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in
from others remains self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact
committing plagiarism since all that a writer has to do, to avoid the
is that he still imputed the passages to the sources from which Criddle-
charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and
Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.
acknowledge the sources from which these were taken.[14] Petitioners

point out that the Court should apply to this case the ruling in University
This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the
of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy
deletion of the subject tag and, accidentally, its footnote which connects
William Margaret Celine.[15] They argue that standards on plagiarism in
to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:
the academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.
 xxx Both juridical capacity and
capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of Third Finding
persons; hence, they cannot be alienated or
renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291. Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from

Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The Court adopts the Committees

Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or

Tolentino, the passage remains to be attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means to

the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and its footnote distort or pervert the meaning of.[19] For example, if one lifts the lyrics of

reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that Jose Palma

researcher X. It is the same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and who wrote it did not love his country, then there is twisting or

Ellis. Because such passages remained attributed by the footnotes to the misrepresentation of what the anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in

authors original sources, the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the lifted passages,

and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion

Justice Del Castillo. This wholly negates the idea that he was passing that the Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to

them off as his own thoughts. espouse Vinuya et al.s claims.

True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in

The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent
the Vinuya decision without placing them in quotation marks. But such
and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it is impossible for any person
passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost,[17] The
reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors
woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles
as to conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo twisted
to go before I sleep, and miles to go before I sleep. The passages here
their intended messages. And, second, the lifted passages provided mere
consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged history of certain
background facts that established the state of international law at
principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the
various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could
world of legal literature, already belong to the public realm.
support conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has

the power today to order the Executive Department to sue another

country or whether the duty to prosecute violators of international

To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,[18] while the academic
crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
publishing model is based on the originality of the writers thesis, the

judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which

encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to

studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original have twisted the meaning of the passages he lifted from the works of

scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of twisting or

soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more

opinions it draws from. accurate, however, the charge is reckless and obtuse.
No Misconduct
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the
wrong sources, failed to use quotation marks, inadvertently omitted
necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in
every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with
fraud, corruption, or malice are subject of disciplinary action.[20] This is
not the case here. Justice Del Castillos acts or omissions were not shown
to have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives.[21] If the rule
were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or
dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an
unblemished record.[22]
No Inexcusable Negligence
Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede
that the omission was the result of plain error, Justice Del Castillo is
nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that
he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not
have surrendered the writing of the decision to the latter.[23]
But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the
writing of the Vinuya decision to his researcher, which is contrary to the
evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher testified, the
Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by
discussing the issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues,
and reviewing and commenting on the study that she was putting
together until he was completely satisfied with it.[24] In every sense,
Justice Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the
Court, which report eventually became the basis for the decision, and
determined its final outcome.
Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney,
the equivalent of a law clerk in the United States Supreme Court, is
standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated by
necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court
each month, it would be truly senseless for him to do all the studies and
research, going to the library, searching the internet, checking footnotes,
and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would
have to allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has
been submitted for decision. The wheels of justice in the Supreme Court
will grind to a halt under such a proposition.
What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo
retained control over the writing of the decision in the Vinuya case
without, however, having to look over his researchers shoulder as she
cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer
keys. The Justices researcher was after all competent in the field of
assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law school,
graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law
Journal, and placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She
earned a masters degree in International Law and Human Rights from a
prestigious university in the United States under the Global-Hauser
program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top
post graduate programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del
Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in assigning the research work in
the Vinuya case to her.
Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until
computers cease to be operated by human beings who are vulnerable to
human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts should be
as error-free as they themselves are.
Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners
exhibits, the Committee noted that petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing
statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the allegations of
plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the
statement was reproduced but the signatures portion below merely
listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid rows, with the letters
Sgd or signed printed beside the names without exception. These
included the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys

a U.P. professor. involved in legal research and reporting with copies of this decision and

to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in the Vinuya case

Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of
while using the existing computer program especially when the volume
Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy within three
of citations and footnoting is substantial; and
days of the August 26 hearing.[25] He complied. As it turned out, the

original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members 4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary

on the list. The set of signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the software for use by the Court that can prevent future lapses in citations

dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original. Since only 37 out and attributions.

of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a

Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and
statement of the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired
Ethical Standards to turn over to the en banc the dummy as well as the
Justice V. V. Mendoza did not sign the statement, contrary to what the
signed copy of petitioners Exhibit J, entitled Restoring Integrity, a
dummy represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean submitted
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of
Law for the en bancs consideration in relation to the separate pending
copying machines.
matter concerning that supposed Faculty statement.

Since the above circumstances appear to be related to

SO ORDERED.
separate en banc matter concerning the supposed Faculty statement,

there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the

same to the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:

1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et

al.s charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect

against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;

2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this

decision to Professors Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark

Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their known addresses;

[G.R. No. 144412. November 18, 2003] h) October, 1989 to Sept. 1992
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
i) October 1992 to Sept. 1994
Jakosalem Regional Branch,
Cebu City (Rollo, p. 47)
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and POTENCIANO L.
GALANIDA, respondents. Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase,
petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant
managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed
DECISION in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal
to be transferred to Bacolod City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as
CARPIO, J.: reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that would result if
he is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter for constructive dismissal.

The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the
Decision[2] of 27 April 2000 and the Resolution of 8 August 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451. The Court of
Appeals upheld the Decision[3] of 18 September 1998 and the
Resolution of 24 December 1998 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98. The NLRC
modified the Decision dated 23 December 1997 of Labor Arbiter
Dominador A. Almirante (Labor Arbiter) in NLRC Case No. RAB
VII-05-0545-94 holding that Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank) illegally dismissed Potenciano L. Galanida (Galanida). The
NLRC awarded Galanida separation pay, backwages, moral and
exemplary damages, and other amounts totaling P1,264,933.33.
Antecedent Facts
Subsequently, petitioner bank informed private respondent (Rollo, p. 86)
that he was to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch effective 23 May
1994. Private respondent refused. In a letter dated 13 June 1994,
petitioner warned and required of private respondent as follows:
There is no discrimination in your transfer. In fact, among the officers
mentioned, only you have refused the new assignment citing difficulty of
working away from your family as if the other officers concerned do not
suffer the same predicament. To exempt you from the officer transfer
would result in favoritism in your favor and discrimination as against the
other officers concerned.
In furtherance of maintaining a smooth and uninterrupted service to the
public, and in accordance with the Banks order of priority of rotating its
accountants places of assignments, you are well aware that Roberto Isla,
AM/Accountant, assigned in Cebu for more than ten (10) years, was, on
February 14, 1994, reassigned to Iligan City Branch and then to Cagayan
de Oro City Branch on June 8, 1994. Hence, your objection on the ground
of your length of service is without merit.

For a background of this case, we quote in part from the xxx

Decision of the Court of Appeals:

As discussed, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer

Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied
Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-
book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was covered
by a Notice of Personnel Action which provides as one of the conditions
of employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees:
REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves
the right to transfer or assign you to other departments or branches of the
bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and
uninterrupted service to the public.
Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to
several branches as follows:
and reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is penalized
under Article XII of the Banks Employee Discipline Policy and Procedure
[which] provides:
XII Transfer and Reassignment
Refusal to follow instruction concerning transfers and reassignments.
First and subsequent offenses
The penalty may range from suspension to dismissal as determined by
management. The employee shall be required to comply with the order of
transfer and reassignment, if the penalty is not termination of
employment.

In view of the foregoing, please explain in writing within three (3) days
a) January, 1978 to March, 1982 from receipt hereof why no disciplinary action should be meted against
Tagbilaran City Branch you for your having refused to follow instructions concerning the
b) April, 1982 to May, 1984 foregoing transfer and reassignment. xxx[4]
Lapulapu City Branch
c) June, 1984
Mandaue City Branch On 16 June 1994, Galanida replied that (w)hether the banks
d) July, 1984 to April, 1986 penalty for my refusal be Suspension or Dismissal xxx it will all the
Tagbilaran City Branch more establish and fortify my complaint now pending at NLRC,
e) May, 1986 to May, 1987 RAB 7.[5] In the same letter, he charged Allied Bank with
Dumaguete City Branch discrimination and favoritism in ordering his transfer, thus:
f) June, 1987 to August, 1987
Carbon Branch, Cebu City
xxx What I cannot decipher now under the headship of Mr. Olveda is
g) September, 1987 to Sept. 1989
managements discriminatory act of transferring only the long staying
Lapulapu City Branch, Cebu
accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management
prerogative when in truth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to
accommodate some new officers who happen to enjoy favorable
connection with management. How can the bank ever justify the transfer
of Melinda T. Co, a new officer who had experienced being assigned
outside of Cebu for more than a year only to Tabunok Branch? If the
purpose is for check and balance, is management implying that Melinda
Co can better carry out such function over Mr. Larry Sabelino, who is a
seasoned and experienced accountant or any of the Metro Cebu
accountants for that matter? Isnt this act of management an obvious
display of favoritism? xxx[6]
On 5 October 1994, Galanida received an inter-office
communication[7] (Memo) dated 8 September 1994 from Allied
Banks Vice-President for Personnel, Mr. Leonso C. Pe. The Memo
informed Galanida that Allied Bank had terminated his services
effective 1 September 1994. The reasons given for the dismissal
were: (1) Galanidas continued refusal to be transferred from the
Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for work
despite the denial of his application for additional vacation
leave. The salient portion of the Memo reads:
Therefore, your refusal to follow instruction concerning your transfer and
reassignment to Bacolod City and to Tagbilaran City is without any
justifiable reason and constituted violations of Article XII of the Banks
EDPP xxx
In view of the foregoing, please be informed that the Bank has
terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and considered
whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled as forfeited in accordance
with 04, V Administrative Penalties, page 6 of the Banks EDPP which
provides as follows:
04. Dismissal.
Dismissal is a permanent separation for cause
xxx
Notice of termination shall be issued by the Investigation Committee
subject to the confirmation of the President or his authorized
representative as officer/employee who is terminated for cause shall not
be eligible to receive any benefit arising from her/his employment with
the Bank or to termination pay.
It is understood that the termination of your service shall be without
prejudice to whatever legal remedies which the Bank may have already
undertaken and/or will undertake against you.
Please be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)[8]
The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
After several hearings, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied
Bank had abused its management prerogative in ordering the
transfer of Galanida to its Bacolod and Tagbilaran branches. In
ruling that Galanidas refusal to transfer did not amount to
insubordination, the Labor Arbiter misquoted this Courts decision
in Dosch v. NLRC,[9] thus:
As a general rule, the right to transfer or reassign an employee is
recognized as an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of
management (Abbott Laboratories vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]).
The exercise of this right, is not however, absolute. It has certain
limitations. Thus, in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et al. 123 SCRA 296
(1983), the Supreme Court, ruled:
While it may be true that the right to transfer or reassign an employee is
an employers exclusive right and the prerogative of management, such
right is not absolute. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge
his employee is limited by the paramount police power xxx for the
relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual but
impressed with public interest. xxx And neither capital nor labor shall act
oppressively against each other.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination
where employee cited reason for said refusal, such (sic) as that of being
away from the family.[10] (Underscoring supplied by the Labor Arbiter)
The Labor Arbiter reasoned that Galanidas transfer was
inconvenient and prejudicial because Galanida would have to incur
additional expenses for board, lodging and travel. On the other
hand, the Labor Arbiter held that Allied Bank failed to show any
business urgency that would justify the transfer.
The Labor Arbiter also gave credence to Galanidas claim
that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special treatment. The Labor Arbiter
stated that Allied Bank deliberately left out Ms. Cos name from the
list of accountants transferred to Cebu as contained in Allied Banks
letter dated 13 June 1994. However, Mr. Regidor Olveda, Allied
Banks Vice President for Operations Accounting, testified that the
bank transferred Ms. Co to the Tabunok, Cebu branch within the
first half of 1994.
Still, the Labor Arbiter declined to award Galanida back
wages because he was not entirely free from blame. Since another
bank had already employed Galanida, the Labor Arbiter granted
Galanida separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The dispositive
portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision of 23 December
1997 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering respondent Allied Banking Corporation to pay complainant the
aggregate total amount of Three Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Pesos
(P324,000.00) representing the following awards:
a) Separation pay for P272,000.00;
b) Quarter bonus for 1994 P16,000.00;
c) 13th month pay for 1994 P16,000.00;
d) Refund of contribution to Provident Fund - P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC likewise ruled that Allied Bank
terminated Galanida without just cause. The NLRC agreed that the
transfer order was unreasonable and unjustified, considering the
family considerations mentioned by Galanida. The NLRC
characterized the transfer as a demotion since the Bacolod and
Tagbilaran branches were smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a
regional office, and because the bank wanted Galanida, an
assistant manager, to replace an assistant accountant in the
Tagbilaran branch. The NLRC found unlawful discrimination since
Allied Bank did not transfer several junior accountants
in Cebu. The NLRC also held that Allied Bank gave Ms. Co special
treatment by assigning her to Cebu even though she had worked The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC in its
for the bank for less than two years. Decision of 27 April 2000, thus:

The NLRC ruled that Galanidas termination was illegal for

lack of due process. The NLRC stated that Allied Bank did not
conduct any hearing. The NLRC declared that Allied Bank failed to
send a termination notice, as required by law for a valid
termination. The Memo merely stated that Allied Bank would issue
a notice of termination, but the bank did not issue any notice.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed Decision of public respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. [15]

The NLRC concluded that Allied Bank dismissed Galanida in
bad faith, tantamount to an unfair labor practice as the dismissal
undermined Galanidas right to security of tenure and equal
protection of the laws. On these grounds, the NLRC promulgated
its Decision of 18 September 1998, the relevant portion of which
states:
In this particular case, We view as impractical, unrealistic and no longer
advantageous to both parties to order reinstatement of the
complainant. xxx For lack of sufficient basis, We deny the claim for 1994
quarter bonus. Likewise, no attorneys fees is awarded as counsels for
complainant-appellee are from the City Prosecutors Office of Cebu.
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the
appellate court denied in its Resolution of 8 August 2000.[16]
On 26 April 2001, Allied Bank appealed the appellate courts
decision and resolution to the Supreme Court. Allied Bank prayed
that the Supreme Court: (1) issue a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction ex parte to restrain the implementation
or execution of the questioned Decision and Resolution; (2) declare
Galanidas termination as valid and legal; (3) set aside the Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution; (4) make permanent the
restraining order or preliminary injunction; (5) order Galanida to pay
the costs; and (6) order other equitable reliefs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter

dated December 23, 1997 is hereby MODIFIED by increasing the award The Issues
of separation pay and granting in addition thereto backwages, moral and
exemplary damages. The respondent-appellant, ALLIED BANKING
CORPORATION, is thus ordered to pay to herein complainant-appellee, Allied Bank raises the following issues:
POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, the following amounts:
1. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED
THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONERS
a) P336,000.00, representing separation pay
EXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT
b) P833,600.00, representing backwages
PREROGATIVE.
c) P 5,333.23 representing proportional 1994 13th month pay
d) P 20,000.00 representing refund of Provident Fund 2. WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
Contribution VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULES
e) P 50,000.00 representing moral damages CONSTITUTE A GROUND TO WARRANT THE
f) P 20,000.00 representing exemplary damages PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.
===========
P1,264,933.33 TOTAL AWARD 3. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED,
THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT
ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis. The other respondents are
RESPONDENT THE REQUIRED DUE
dropped for lack of sufficient basis that they acted in excess of their
PROCESS.
corporate powers.
4. WHETHER UNDER THE FACTS, THERE IS
SO ORDERED.[12] LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CANNOT RECOVER ANY
MONETARY AWARD.[17]
Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration which the
NLRC denied in its Resolution of 24 December 1998.[13] In sum, Allied Bank argues that the transfer of Galanida was
a valid exercise of its management prerogative. Allied Bank
Dissatisfied, Allied Bank filed a petition for review contends that Galanidas continued refusal to obey the transfer
questioning the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC before the orders constituted willful disobedience or insubordination, which is
Court of Appeals. a just cause for termination under the Labor Code.

On the other hand, Galanida defended his right to refuse the

transfer order. The memorandum for Galanida filed with this Court,
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals prepared by Atty. Loreto M. Durano, again misquotedthe Courts
ruling in Dosch v. NLRC, thus:

Citing Dosch v. NLRC,[14] the Court of Appeals held that xxx His [Galanidas] refusal to transfer falls well within the ruling of the
Galanidas refusal to comply with the transfer orders did not warrant Supreme Court in Helmut Dosch vs. NLRC, et. al., 123 SCRA 296 (1983)
his dismissal. The appellate court ruled that the transfer from a quoted as follows:
regional office to the smaller Bacolod or Tagbilaran branches was
effectively a demotion. The appellate court agreed that Allied Bank
did not afford Galanida procedural due process because there was xxx
no hearing and no notice of termination. The Memo merely stated
that the bank would issue a notice of termination but there was no
such notice.
Refusal to obey a transfer order cannot be considered insubordination
where employee cited reason for said refusal, such as that of being away
from the family.[18]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Preliminary Matter: Misquoting Decisions of the Supreme
Court
The memorandum prepared by Atty. Durano and, worse, the
assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter, both misquoted the
Supreme Courts ruling in Dosch v. NLRC. The Court held
in Dosch:
We cannot agree to Northwests submission that petitioner was guilty of
disobedience and insubordination which respondent Commission
sustained. The only piece of evidence on which Northwest bases the
charge of contumacious refusal is petitioners letter dated August 28, 1975
to R.C. Jenkins wherein petitioner acknowledged receipt of the formers
memorandum dated August 18, 1975, appreciated his promotion to
Director of International Sales but at the same time regretted that at this
time for personal reasons and reasons of my family, I am unable to accept
the transfer from the Philippines and thereafter expressed his preference
to remain in his position, saying: I would, therefore, prefer to remain in
my position of Manager-Philippines until such time that my services in
that capacity are no longer required by Northwest Airlines. From this
evidence, We cannot discern even the slightest hint of defiance, much less
imply insubordination on the part of petitioner.[19]
The phrase [r]efusal to obey a transfer order cannot be
considered insubordination where employee cited reason for said
refusal, such as that of being away from the family does not appear
anywhere in the Dosch decision. Galanidas counsel lifted the
erroneous phrase from one of the italicized lines in
the syllabus of Dosch found in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA).
The syllabus of cases in official or unofficial reports of
Supreme Court decisions or resolutions is not the work of the
Court, nor does it state this Courts decision. The syllabus is simply
the work of the reporter who gives his understanding of the
decision. The reporter writes the syllabus for the convenience of
lawyers in reading the reports. A syllabus is not a part of the courts
decision.[20] A counsel should not cite a syllabus in place of the
carefully considered text in the decision of the Court.
In the present case, Labor Arbiter Almirante and Atty.
Durano began by quoting from Dosch, but substituted a portion of
the decision with a headnote from the SCRA syllabus, which they
even underscored. In short, they deliberately made the quote from
the SCRA syllabus appear as the words of the Supreme Court. We
admonish them for what is at the least patent carelessness, if not
an outright attempt to mislead the parties and the courts taking
cognizance of this case. Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall not
knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority. It is the duty of all officers of the court to cite the rulings
and decisions of the Supreme Court accurately.[21]
Whether Galanida was dismissed for just cause
We accord great weight and even finality to the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, particularly when they affirm the
findings of the NLRC or the lower courts. However, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule. These exceptions are: (1) when
the findings are grounded on speculation, surmise and conjecture;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) when the factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts are conflicting; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, has gone beyond the issues of the case and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the judgment of the appellate court is premised
on a misapprehension of facts or when it has failed to consider
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and
(8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence
on record.[22] After a scrutiny of the records, we find that some of
these exceptions obtain in the present case.
The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarily lies
within the ambit of the employers prerogatives.[23] The employer
exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee for valid reasons
and according to the requirement of its business, provided the
transfer does not result in demotion in rank or diminution of the
employees salary, benefits and other privileges.[24] In illegal
dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of showing that the
transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient and prejudicial to the
displaced employee.[25]
The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with
accounting responsibilities from one branch to another is a
standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred
branches throughout the country.[26] Allied Bank does this primarily
for internal control. It also enables bank employees to gain the
necessary experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, in its Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other
Financial Intermediaries,[27] requires the rotation of these
personnel. The Manual directs that the duties of personnel
handling cash, securities and bookkeeping records should be
rotated and that such rotation should be irregular, unannounced
and long enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or
manipulations.[28]
Galanida was well aware of Allied Banks policy of
periodically transferring personnel to different branches. As the
Court of Appeals found, assignment to the different branches of
Allied Bank was a condition of Galanidas employment. Galanida
consented to this condition when he signed the Notice of Personnel
Action.[29]
The evidence on record contradicts the charge that Allied
Bank discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith when it
ordered his transfer. Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994[30]showed
that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from various
branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other
branches. Allied Bank did not single out Galanida. The same letter
explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment
outside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven years
already. The person first in line, Assistant Manager Roberto Isla,
who had been in Cebu for more than ten years, had already
transferred to a branch in Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none
of the other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or
corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and
favoritism.
 As regards Ms. Co, Galanidas letter of 16 June 1994 itself
showed that her assignment to Cebu was not in any way related to
Galanidas transfer. Ms. Co was supposed to replace a certain
Larry Sabelino in the Tabunok branch. The employer has the
prerogative, based on its assessment of the employees
qualifications and competence, to rotate them in the various areas
of its business operations to ascertain where they will function with
maximum benefit to the company.[31]
Neither was Galanidas transfer in the nature of a
demotion. Galanida did not present evidence showing that the
transfer would diminish his salary, benefits or other
privileges. Instead, Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994 assured
Galanida that he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade,
and that the transfer would involve the same rank, duties and
obligations. Mr. Olveda explained this further in the affidavit he
submitted to the Labor Arbiter, thus:
19. There is no demotion in position/rank or diminution of complainants
salary, benefits and other privileges as the transfer/assignment of branch
officers is premised on the role/functions that they will assume in the
management and operations of the branch, as shown below:
(a) The Branch Accountant, as controller of the branch is responsible for
the proper discharge of the functions of the accounting section of the
branch, review of documentation/proper accounting and control of
transaction. As such, the accounting functions in the branch can be
assumed by any of the following officers with the rank of: Senior
Manager/Acctg.; Manager/ Acctg.; Senior Asst. Manager/Acctg.; Asst.
Manager/Acctg.; Accountant or Asst. Accountant.
xxx
20. The transfer/assignment of branch officer from one branch, to another
branch/office is lateral in nature and carries with it the same position/rank,
salary, benefits and other privileges. The assignment/transfer is for the
officer to assume the functions relative to his job and NOT the
position/rank of the officer to be replaced.
There is also no basis for the finding that Allied Bank was
guilty of unfair labor practice in dismissing Galanida. Unfair labor
practices relate only to violations of the constitutional right of
workers and employees to self-organization[32] and are limited to
the acts enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, none of
which applies to the present case. There is no evidence that
Galanida took part in forming a union, or even that a union existed
in Allied Bank.
This leaves the issue of whether Galanida could validly
refuse the transfer orders on the ground of parental obligations,
additional expenses, and the anguish he would suffer if assigned
away from his family.
The Court has ruled on this issue before. In the case
of Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v.
NLRC,[33] we held:
The acceptability of the proposition that transfer made by an employer for
an illicit or underhanded purpose i.e., to defeat an employees right to self-
organization, to rid himself of an undesirable worker, or to penalize an
employee for union activities cannot be upheld is self-evident and cannot
be gainsaid. The difficulty lies in the situation where no such illicit,
improper or underhanded purpose can be ascribed to the employer, the
objection to the transfer being grounded solely upon the personal
inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason
of the transfer. What then?
This was the very same situation we faced in Phil. Telegraph and
Telephone Corp. v. Laplana. In that case, the employee, Alicia Laplana,
was a cashier at the Baguio City Branch of PT&T who was directed to
transfer to the companys branch office at Laoag City. In refusing the
transfer, the employee averred that she had established Baguio City as her
permanent residence and that such transfer will involve additional
expenses on her part, plus the fact that an assignment to a far place will be
a big sacrifice for her as she will be kept away from her family which
might adversely affect her efficiency. In ruling for the employer, the
Court upheld the transfer from one city to another within the country as
valid as long as there is no bad faith on the part of the employer. We held
then:
Certainly the Court cannot accept the proposition that when an employee
opposes his employers decision to transfer him to another work place,
there being no bad faith or underhanded motives on the part of either
party, it is the employees wishes that should be made to prevail.
Galanida, through counsel, invokes the Courts ruling
in Dosch v. NLRC.[34] Dosch, however, is not applicable to the
present case. Helmut Dosch refused a transfer consequential to a
promotion. We upheld the refusal because no law compels an
employee to accept a promotion, and because the position Dosch
was supposed to be promoted to did not even exist at that
time.[35] This left as the only basis for the charge of insubordination
a letter from Dosch in which the Court found not even the slightest
hint of defiance, much less xxx insubordination.[36]
Moreover, the transfer of an employee to an overseas post,
as in the Dosch case, cannot be likened to a transfer from one city
to another within the country,[37] which is the situation in the present
case. The distance from Cebu City to Bacolod City or
from Cebu City to Tagbilaran City does not exceed the distance
from Baguio City to Laoag City or from Baguio City to Manila,
which the Court considered a reasonable distance in PT&T v.
Laplana.[38]
The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constitutes willful
disobedience of a lawful order of an employer.[39] Employees may
object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers for rules
or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However, until and
unless these rules or orders are declared illegal or improper by
competent authority, the employees ignore or disobey them at their
peril.[40] For Galanidas continued refusal to obey Allied Banks
transfer orders, we hold that the bank dismissed Galanida for just
cause in accordance with Article 282 (a) of the Labor
Code.[41] Galanida is thus not entitled to reinstatement or to
separation pay.
Whether Galanidas dismissal violated the
requirement of notice and hearing
To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section 2 (d),
Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code (Omnibus Rules), which provides:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article
282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying
the ground or grounds of termination, and giving
said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.
 (ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he
so desires is given opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence, or rebut the
evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee indicating that upon due consideration
of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination.
The first written notice was embodied in Allied Banks letter
of 13 June 1994. The first notice required Galanida to explain why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him for his refusal to
comply with the transfer orders.
On the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. [42] An
actual hearing is not necessary. The exchange of several letters, in
which Galanidas wife, a lawyer with the City Prosecutors Office,
assisted him, gave Galanida an opportunity to respond to the
charges against him.
The remaining issue is whether the Memo dated 8
September 1994 sent to Galanida constitutes the written notice of
termination required by the Omnibus Rules. In finding that it did
not, the Court of Appeals and the NLRC cited Allied Banks rule on
dismissals, quoted in the Memo, that, Notice of termination shall be
issued by the Investigation Committee subject to the confirmation
of the President or his authorized representative.[43] The appellate
court and NLRC held that Allied Bank did not send any notice of
termination to Galanida. The Memo, with the heading Transfer and
Reassignment, was not the termination notice required by law.
We do not agree.
Even a cursory reading of the Memo will show that it
unequivocally informed Galanida of Allied Banks decision to
dismiss him. The statement, please be informed that the Bank has
terminated your services effective September 1, 1994 and
considered whatever benefit, if any, that you are entitled [to] as
forfeited xxx[44] is plainly worded and needs no interpretation.The
Memo also discussed the findings of the Investigation Committee
that served as grounds for Galanidas dismissal. The Memo
referred to Galanidas open defiance and refusal to transfer first to
the Bacolod City branch and then to
the Tagbilaran City branch. The Memo also mentioned his
continued refusal to report for work despite the denial of his
application for additional vacation leave.[45] The Memo also refuted
Galanidas charges of discrimination and demotion, and concluded
that he had violated Article XII of the banks Employee Discipline
Policy and Procedure.
The Memo, although captioned Transfer and Reassignment,
did not preclude it from being a notice of termination. The Court
has held that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by
the title given to it but by its body and contents.[46] Moreover, it
appears that Galanida himself regarded the Memo as a notice of
termination. We quote from the Memorandum for Private
Respondent-Appellee, as follows:
The proceedings may be capsulized as follows:
1. On March 13, 1994[47] Private Respondent-Appellee filed before the
Region VII Arbitration Branch a Complaint for Constructive Dismissal. A
copy of the Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex H;
xxx
5. On September 8, 1994, Petitioner-Appellant issued him a Letter of
Termination. A copy of said letter is attached to the Petition as Annex N;
6. Private Respondent-Appellee filed an Amended/ Supplemental
Complaint wherein he alleged illegal dismissal. A copy of the
Amended/Supplemental Complaint is attached to the Petition as Annex O;
xxx [48] (Emphasis supplied)
The Memorandum for Private Respondent-Appellee refers to
the Memo as a Letter of Termination. Further, Galanida amended
his complaint for constructive dismissal[49] to one for illegal
dismissal[50] after he received the Memo. Clearly, Galanida had
understood the Memo to mean that Allied Bank had terminated his
services.
The Memo complied with Allied Banks internal rules which
required the banks President or his authorized representative to
confirm the notice of termination. The banks Vice-President for
Personnel, as the head of the department that handles the
movement of personnel within Allied Bank, can certainly represent
the bank president in cases involving the dismissal of employees.
Nevertheless, we agree that the Memo suffered from certain
errors. Although the Memo stated that Allied Bank terminated
Galanidas services as of 1 September 1994, the Memo bore the
date 8 September 1994. More importantly, Galanida only received
a copy of the Memo on 5 October 1994, or more than a month after
the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice
of termination must be served on the employee.[51] Allied Bank
could not terminate Galanida on 1 September 1994 because he
had not received as of that date the notice of Allied Banks decision
to dismiss him. Galanidas dismissal could only take effect on 5
October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. For this reason,
Galanida is entitled to backwages for the period from 1 September
1994 to 4 October 1994.
Under the circumstances, we also find an award of P10,000
in nominal damages proper. Courts award nominal damages to
recognize or vindicate the right of a person that another has
violated.[52] The law entitles Galanida to receive timely notice of
Allied Banks decision to dismiss him. Allied Bank should have
exercised more care in issuing the notice of termination.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 27 April 2000 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51451 upholding the Decision of 18
September 1998 of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. V-000180-98
is AFFIRMED, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) The awards of separation pay, moral damages and
exemplary damages are hereby deleted for lack of
basis;
2) Reducing the award of backwages to cover only the
period from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994;
and
3) Awarding nominal damages to private respondent
for P10,000.
This case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the
computation, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision, of
the backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, due to
Potenciano L. Galanida for the time his dismissal was ineffectual
from 1 September 1994 until 4 October 1994.
Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M.
Durano are ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the future.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS B.
NOYNAY, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and
DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN
MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action
for certiorari with mandamus is whether R.A. No. 7691[1] has
divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over election offenses,
which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6)
years.
The antecedents are not disputed.
In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an
information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school
principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public
school teachers, for having engaged in partisan political
activities. The COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in
Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of
the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional
Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar, and docketed therein as
follows:
a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against
private respondents Diosdada Amor, Esbel Chua,
and Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private
respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against
private respondent Esbel Chua only;
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against
private respondent Diosdada Amor only.
In an Order[2] issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge
Tomas B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu
proprio ordered the records of the cases to be withdrawn and
directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the
appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,[3] the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the cases since the
maximum imposable penalty in each of the cases does not exceed
six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order read as
follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged
for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code,
which under Sec. 264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not
less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years of
imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus disqualification to
hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg.
129 as Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction)
states: Sec. 32. Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Criminal Cases
Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of
city or municipal ordinance committed within
their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses
punishable with an imprisonment of not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount or fine and regardless of other
imposable accessory and other penalties
including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
time [sic], nature, value and amount thereof,
Provided, However, that in offenses including
damages to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction
over the cases filed considering that the maximum penalty
imposable did not exceed six (6) years.
The two motions[4] for reconsideration separately filed by the
COMELEC Regional Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC
itself through its Legal Department having been denied by the
public respondent in the Order of 17 October 1997, [5] the petitioner
filed this special civil action. It contends that public respondent has
erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in
arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide election offenses because pursuant to
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code and this Courts ruling
in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional Trial Courts
have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.
On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the
Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the
Solicitor General informs us that it is adopting the instant petition
on the ground that the challenged orders of public respondent are
clearly not in accordance with existing laws and jurisprudence.
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent
avers that it is the duty of counsel for private respondents
interested in sustaining the challenged orders to appear for and
defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No.
7691 has divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over
offenses where the imposable penalty is not more than 6 years of
imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides that all
laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are
deemed repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that
since the election offense in question is punishable with
imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is cognizable by
Municipal Trial Courts.
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional
Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Code except
those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to
vote.[6] It reads as follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any
criminal action or proceedings for violation of this Code, except
those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote
which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will
lie as in other criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are
those enumerated in Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly
committed by private respondents is covered by paragraph (i) of
said Section, thus:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or
employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices;
any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces ofthe
Philippines, or any police forces, special forces, home defense
forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units
that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or
indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any
partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order,
if he is a peace officer.
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election
offense under the Code, except that of failure to register or failure
to vote, is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more
than six years and the offender shall not be subject to probation
and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation
of the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7691, provides as follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or
municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial
jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value
or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals[7] that
by virtue of the exception provided for in the opening sentence of
Section 32, the exclusive original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provisions of
law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty
prescribed therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted
cases are punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding six (6)
years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto mayor, or arresto menor),
jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial Courts or the
Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the
exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32 are
cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129; (2) Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on Intellectual
Property;[8] and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,[9] as
amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, election offenses also fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the
Constitution or by Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution, Congress has the
plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain
class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one
court. Such law would be a special law and must be construed as
an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts, namely,
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be
considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an
amendatory law intended to amend specific sections of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does
not have the effect of repealing laws vesting upon Regional Trial
Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never
intended that R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions
is indubitably evident from the fact that it did not touch at all the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 providing for the
exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the
opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is
thus an opportune time, as any, to remind him, as well as other
judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles of law, [10] to
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself,[11] to be faithful to the law, and to maintain
professional competence.[12]
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of
petitioners Law Department, must also be admonished for his utter
carelessness in his reference to the case against Judge Juan
Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for Reconsideration[13] he filed with the
court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled
issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,
A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court
succinctly held:
A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant
to Sec. 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC, has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Code
and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the
same. The Metropolitan, or MTC, by way of exception exercises
jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to
vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the
provisions that any election offense under the code shall be
punishable with imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and
shall not be subject to probation (Sec. 263, Omnibus Election
Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the Code to vest SO ORDERED.
upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of
exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
cases found under B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez,
MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
expanded jurisdiction. (Underscoring ours)

Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:

16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vs-

Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue
of jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on
election offenses, has ruled, thus:

With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent

Provision of Law would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267
of the Omnibus Election Code the Comelec has the exclusive
power to conduct preliminary investigations all election offenses
punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall have
the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan
Trial Court, by way of exception exercise jurisdiction only on
offenses relating to failure to register or to vote. Noting that these
provisions stands together with the provision that any election
offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for
one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation
(Section 264, Omnibus Election Code). We submit that it is the
special intention of the code to vest upon the Regional Trial Court
jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to the
provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P.
Reg. 129, as amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P.
Reg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7691 does not vest upon the MTC
jurisdiction over criminal election offenses despite its expanded
jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that

the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is
neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for
reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but
ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in
volume 245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as
falsely represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in
volume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the

petition, Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted
portions were our findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our
own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the
memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility[14] mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The challenged orders of public respondent Judge
Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in
Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said
cases with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to
faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful

in the discharge of his duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.