EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME
AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.

G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more
transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.

In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner
and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]

The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin
Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator
Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo
Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in
behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral
authority to govern.[3] Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of
the petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the supreme
self-sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners resignation.[7]However, petitioner strenuously held
on to his office and refused to resign.

The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers,
resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington
Sycip.[8] On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.[9] On November 3, Senate President
Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.[10]

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles
of Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This
caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.Speaker Villar
was unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-
one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.[13]

The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.[14] the battle royale was
fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano
Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios,
Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House
Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course
enjoyed the highest viewing rating.Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point
of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one
foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement
with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001,
more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took
the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose
Velarde. The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President.[18] The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.[19] Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]

January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples
solidarity in demanding petitioners resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their
concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.[21]

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary
Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed
to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary
of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on
behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to
this government.[23] A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their
posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he
was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelop.[26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide had
become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. [27] Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at
Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.

At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. [28] At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the following press statement:[30]

20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along
with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will
not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:[31]

Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise
the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January 20. [32] Another copy was transmitted to Senate President
Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]

On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the
Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the
Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was
treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a proper party.

Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos
government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.[36]

On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.[37] The House then passed
Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the
assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution.[39]

On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.[40] A few days later, she also signed into law the
Political Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act.[41]

On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. [42] the next day, February 7, the
Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. [43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce
Enrile, and John Osmea voted yes with reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives also
approved Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.[46]

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the
grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was
still qualified to run for another elective post.[48]

Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to
38% on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased
to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:

58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very poor class.[50]
 After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc;
(3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al.,
on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It
is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against
him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the
term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for
Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day,
February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the
Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m.
of February 15.

On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They
debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side
but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2)
days to submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that
neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making
any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases
pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.[53]

The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.

The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:

Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II

Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President.

III

Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative
and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV

Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.

We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.

Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question

Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress
that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that
these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the Court cannot enter.

We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its
exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the
principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United
States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case
of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:

x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of political cases.

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer
perimeters of a political question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58] where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, notlegality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.[59] Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.[60]With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision
did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language
to x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.

Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.[61] and related cases[62] to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo,
ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we
held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful
one. No less than the Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government
sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional
loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine
is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has
stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people
power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to
judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898
revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and
included it as among the reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898,
provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing,
through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to
public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were preserved
when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900
issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the
rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the
Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely
ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by
Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is
a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
and necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the
progress of a society can take place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,[71] this function of
free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which
emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this
means talk for all and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly stressed that "... it should be
clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For
in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, [74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . .
. Thus, respondents invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in the dark.

II

Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal
question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as president.

The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:

Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President
to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President until
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

x x x.

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent
took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.[78] The validity of a resignation is
not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace
in the Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the
expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged
misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives
which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or
more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives.Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as
Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected
senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo
when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of
outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their
number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided
in the Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara
Diary reveals that in morning of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they
decided to crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small
office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has
defected.)[80] An hour later or at 2:30, p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency even at that time.At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the
resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to
respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel
to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky was
falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He
gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his
family.[83] Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave
the country.[84] At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in
the palace.[85] This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with
the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan
tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the
guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner.[87]Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this
fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary
shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

xxx

I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:

Oppositions deal

7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon
Bagatsing and Macel.

Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:

1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on
which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons
designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with
the incumbent officials concerned.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national military and police
effective immediately.

4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the president and his family as approved by the
national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the
Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.

Our deal

We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:

The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:

1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the
presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their natural
lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private
sector throughout their natural lifetimes.

This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national
military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).

3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in
the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.

4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition Period), the incoming Cabinet members
shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national
military and police authorities.

Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this
agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.

Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex A heretofore attached to this
agreement.[89]
 The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round
of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures
to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was
then signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the
fateful events, viz:[90]

xxx

11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the
general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.

Agreement

The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which
day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.

xxx

The rest of the agreement follows:

2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the
Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.

3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families
throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority Vice President.

4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities.

5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as
proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.

The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B heretofore attached to this agreement.

xxx

11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United
Opposition.

And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be
sworn in at 12 noon.

Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the agreement)? I asked.

Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).

I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?

And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).

Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.

But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments,
Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel and General
Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provision
on security, at least, should be respected.

I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The president is too stunned for words.

Final meal

12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.

12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.

The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.

By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since
the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.

1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal possessions as they can.

During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacaang.

The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will
not shrik from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!

It was curtain time for the petitioner.

In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt,
he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of
the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern. In
support of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is
cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the
powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

 To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay
even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation.Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during
the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for
him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the
resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to
petitioners letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He
relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate
Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it
now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is
under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire.[92] During the period of amendments, the following provision
was inserted as section 15:

Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during
his incumbency.[93]

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted
that the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13
under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the
reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official
with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the
act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. [94] A public official has
the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing
administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner
resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-
1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be
considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the
petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity
from suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him
from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.

III

Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.

 We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the
presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on
the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.[95] This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose,
the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now the operative facts:

(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;

(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;

(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;[96]

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which states:

RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of
the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the
purpose of national unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of
the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the
House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the
attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal
social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various
segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend
its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the Nations goals under the Constitution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which states:

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from
among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of
Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino
people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various
capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Senator of the Philippines - qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be
it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary General

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following:

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic)
will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our
duties to attain desired changes and overcome the nations challenges.[99]

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:

RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from
among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of
Vice President of the Republic of the Phillippines;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence, and courage; who has served the Filipino
people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities,
among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice. Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of
the Philippines.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated.

Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001
be considered approved.

Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for
proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon
written approval of the Senate President.

Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.

Adopted,

(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.

President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO

Secretary of the Senate

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the
COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and
without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his
inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v.
Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been
delegated to the Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this
Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is
the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

IV

Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited
because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of
executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the
respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him
to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:

The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General;
that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the
guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of
courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no
remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts and the
members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare
an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights
have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General
personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more that it can a member of the Philippine Commission or
the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to
perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the
liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to
act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when
he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority
to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is not
protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not
as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important
matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of
one of the highest officials of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to
the integrity of government itself.[105]

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the
martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.

In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A
Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:

In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we
extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so
that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not
only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be
said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).

The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973
Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after
incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a
return to the anachronism the king can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed.

The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When
the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The
following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108]

Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on
immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence
that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be
spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from
suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add
other things.

Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for
the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation
than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]

xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President
resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the
impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and
academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts.

This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment
process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine
qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case
of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner
Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will
be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US President
Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and
advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which were
committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential
campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he
could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official acts. Recently, the
US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents immunity
from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
 There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the
great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain
honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." [119] It ordained that (p)ublic
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. [121] It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers,
among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. [123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.[124] These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from
suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against
him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file
the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases.[125] The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.[126] The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They
have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and
present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile
criminal cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the
doctrine that:

We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair
trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-
day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our
bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity
lest they lose their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no
procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated
by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that
attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the
case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and
their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that the time this Nations
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias
or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a
community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys criminal process
satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to
observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be
concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v.
United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press,
the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a
public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has
been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to
attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process
right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the
DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can
easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that
they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of
their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting
from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. [131] He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have
already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the
respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed
at him by the mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of
the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the
petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged
prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the
theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit
they are reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they
be compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that
the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

VI.

Epilogue

A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new
stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of
teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to
prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the most fundamental of all
freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient
vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are
rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition
of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from
the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th
President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., no part in view of expression given in the open court and in the extended explanation.
Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.
Kapunan, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., no part per letter of Inhibition dated Feb. 15, 2000 mention in footnote 51 of ponencia.
Pardo, J., in the result; believes that petitioner was constrained to resign and reserve his vote in immunity from suit
Buena, J., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concur in the result and reserve the filing of a separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26979 April 1, 1927

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffs,

vs.
MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO, defendants.

Attorney-General Jaranilla, F. C. Fisher, and Hugh C. Smith for plaintiff.

Jose Abad Santos; Ross, Lawrence and Selph; Paredes, Buencamino and Yulo;
Araneta and Zaragoza; Charles E. Tenney; Camus, Delgado and Recto and Mariano H. de Joya for defendants.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the
National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822.
The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which
provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives."

The material facts are averred in the complaint of the plaintiff and admitted in the demurrer of the defendants.

The National Coal Company is a corporation organized and existing by virtue of Act No. 2705 of the Philippine Legislature as amended by Act
No. 2822, and of the Corporation law. By the terms of the charter of the corporation, the Governor-General was directed to subscribe on behalf
of the Government of the Philippine Islands for at least fifty-one per cent of the capital of the corporation. The government eventually became
the owner of more than ninety-nine per cent of the thirty thousand outstanding shares of stocks of the National Coal Company. Only nineteen
shares stand in the names of private individuals.

On November 9, 1926, the Government-General promulgated Executive Order No. 37. Reference was made therein to opinions of the Judge
Advocate General of the United States Army and of the Acting Attorney-General of the United States wherein it was held that the provisions of
the statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a voting committee or board of control, and enumerating the duties and powers
thereof with respect to certain corporations in which the Philippine Government is the owner of stock, are nullities. Announcement was made
that on account of the invalidity of the portions of the Acts creating the voting committee or board of control, the Governor-General would,
thereafter, exercise exclusivelythe duties and powers theretofore assumed by the voting committee or board of control. Notice of the contents
of this executive order was given to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. (24 Off. Gaz., 2419.)

A special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company was called for December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, for the
purpose of electing directors and the transaction of such other business as migh properly come before the meeting. Prior thereto, on
November 29, 1926, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as members of the voting committee,
requested the Governor-General to convene the committee at 2:30 p. m., on December 6, 1926, to decide upon the manner in which the stock
held by the Government in the National Coal Company should be voted. TheGovernor-General acknowledged receipt of this communication but
declined to participate in the proposed meeting. The president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives did in fact meet
at the time and place specified in their letter to the Governor-General. It was then and there resolved by them that at the special meeting of
the stockholders, the votes represented by the stock of the Government in the National Coal Company, should be cast in favor of five specified
persons for directors of the company.

On December 6, 1926, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the special meeting of the stockholders of the National Coal Company was held in
accordance with the call. The Governor-General, through his representative, asserted the sole power to vote the stock of the Government. The
president of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives attended the meeting and filed with the secretary of the company a
certified copy of the minutes of the meeting of the committee held at the office of the company a half hour before. The Governor-General,
through his representative, thereupon objected to the asserted powers of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the latter likewise objected to the assertion of the Governor-General.

The chair recognized the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in their capacity as majority members of the
voting committee as the persons lawfully entitled to represent and vote the Government stock. To this the representative of the Governor-
General made protest and demanded that it be entered of record in the minutes. The vote cast by the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives was in favor of Alberto Barretto,Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, Anselmo Hilario, and Frank B. Ingersoll.
The Governor-General through his represetative, alleging representation of the Government stock, cast his vote in favor of Alberto Barreto,
Romarico Agcaoili, Frank B. Ingersoll, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo. The chair declared the ballot cast by the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House as electing the names therein indicated, directors of the National Coal Company.

Immediately after the stockholder's meeting, the persons declared by the chairman to have been elected, met and undertook to organized the
board of directors of the National Coal Company by the election of officers. All the directors for whom the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives voted and who were declared elected at the meeting of the stockholders participated in this meeting.
Included among them, were the three defendants, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario.

The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in
statutes enacted under authority of that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it.

The Government of the Philippine Islands is an agency of the Congress, the principal, has seen fit to entrust to the Philippine Government, the
agent, are distributed among three coordinate departments, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. It is true that the Organic Act
contains no general distributing clause. But the principle is clearly deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our
Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by this court.

No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of
the others. Again it is true that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by the division of the Government
into three departments. The effect is the same whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this court that
each of the branches of the Government is in the main independent of the others. The doctrine is too firmly imbedded in Philippine institutions
to be debatable. (Administrative Code sec. 17; Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson [1905], 5 Phil., 87; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7;
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros [1910], 16 Phil., 366; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco vs. Crossfield [1910], 16
Phil., 534; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338; Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599; U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho [1922], 43 Phil., 1;
Abueva vs. Wood [1924], 45 Phil., 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon [1924], 46 Phil., 83.)

It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed
by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform to the Organic Law. The Governor-General must find his powers and duties in the
fundamental law. An act of the Philippine Legislature must comply with the grant from Congress. The jurisdiction of this court and other courts
is derived from the constitutional provisions.

These canons of political science have more than ordinary significance in the Philippines. To the Government of the Philippine Islands has been
delegated a large degree of autonomy, and the chief exponent of that autonomy in domestic affairs is the Philippine Legislature. TheGovernor-
General on the other hand of the Government and symbolizes American sovereignty. That under such a political system, lines of demarcation
between the legislative and the executive departments are difficult to fix, and that attempted encroachments of one on the other may occur,
should not dissuade the Supreme Court, as the guardian of the constitution, from enforcing fundamental principles.

The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands. In addition to specified functions,he is
given "general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of the Philippine Islands as far as is not
inconsistent with the provisions of this act. "He is also made "responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands and of
the United States operative within Philippine Islands."The authority of the Governor-General is made secure by the important proviso "that all
executive functionsof Government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under
thesupervision and control of the Governor-General. "(Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief
Executive of the Islands, is charged with the executive control of the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through the
Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according to law." (Se.58)

The Organic Act grants general legislative power except as otherwise provided therein to the Philippine Legislature. (Organic Act, secs. 8, 12.)
Even before the approval of the existing Organic Act, it was held that the Philippine Legislature has practically the same powersin the Philippine
Islands within the sphere in which it may operate as the Congress of the United States. (Chanco vs. Imperial [1916], 34 Phil., 329.) The rule
judicially stated is now that an Act of the Philippine Legislature which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is valid, unless the
subject-matter has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the Organic Law. The legislative
power of the Philippine Government is granted in general terms subject to specific limitations. (Gaspar vs. Molina [1905], 5 Phil., 197; U.
S. vs. Bull, supra; In re Guarina [1913], 24 Phil., 37; U. S. vs. Limsiongco [1920],41 Phil., 94; Concepcion vs. Paredes, supra.)

An independent judiciary completes the governmental system. Thejudicial power is conferred on the Supreme Couts, Courts of FirstInstance,
and inferior courts. (Organic Act, se. 26)

It is axiomatic that the Philippine Legislature was provided to make the law, the office of the Governor-General to execute the law, and the
judiciary to construe the law. What is legislative, an executive, or a judicial act, as distinguished one from the other, is not alwayseasy to
ascertain. A precise classification is difficult. Negatively speaking, it has been well said that "The legislature has no authority to execute or
construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." (U.
S. vs.And Tang Ho, supra.)

It is legislative power which has been vested in the Philippine Legislature. What is legislative power? Judge Cooley says he understands it "to be
the authority, under the constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." Those matters which the constitution specifically confides to
the executive "the legislature cannot directly or indirectly take from his control." (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., pp. 126-131, 157-
162.) President Wilson in his authoritative work, "The State", page 487, emphasizes by italics that legislatures "are law making bodies acting
within the gifts of charters, and are by these charters in most cases very strictly circumscribed in their action." If this is true, the converse that
legislative power is not executive or judicial or governmental power needs no demonstration. The Legislature essentially executive or judicial.
The Legislature cannot make a law and them take part in its execution or construction. So the Philippine Legislature is not a partaker in either
executive or judicial power, except as thePhilippine Senate participates in the executive power through the Governor-General, and except as
the Philippine Senate participates in the executive power through having the right to confirm or reject nominations made by the Governor-
General, and except as the Legislature participates in the judicial power through being made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of its elective members and through having the right to try its own members for disorderly behavior. The Philippine, Legislature
may nevertheless exercise such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to its indenpdence and to make its express powers effective.
(McGrain vs. Daugherty [1927], 273 U. S., 135; 71 Law. ed., 580.)

When one enters on a study of the abstract question, Where does the power to appoint to public office reside?, one is nearly buried in a mass
of conflicting authority. Yet we have been at pains to review all of the cases cited by counsel and others which have not been cited. Shaking
ourselves loose from the encumbering details of the decisions, we discern through them a few elemental truths which distiguish certain cases
from others and which point the way for us in the Philippines.

The first principle which is noticed is that the particular wording of the constitution involved, and its correct interpretation predetermines the
result. Does the constitutions deny the legislative body the right of exercising the appointing power. The legislature may not do so.
(State vs. Kennon [1857], 7 O. St., 547; Clark vs. Stanley[1872], 66 N. C., 28.) Does the constitution confer upon the government the power to
prescribe the manner of appointment. The authorities are in conflict as to whether the legislature the power to prescribe the manner of
appointment. The authourities are in conflict as to whether the legislature may itself make the appointment. Does the constitution merely
contain the usual clause distributing the powers of government and no clause regulating appointments. The weight of judicial opinion seems to
be that the power of appointing to office is not exclusively an executive function and that the legislature may not only create offices but may
also fill them itself, but with a vigorous opposition in most respectable quarters. (Contrast Pratt vs. Breckinridge [1901], 112 Ky., 1, and
State vs.Washburn [1901], 167 Mo., 680, with People vs. Freeman [1889], 80 Cal., 233, and Richardson vs. Young [1909], 122 Tenn., 471.)

The second thought running through the decisions is that in the state governments, the selection of persons to perform the functions of
government is primarily a prerogative of the people. The general powerto appoint officers is not inherent in any branch of the government. The
people may exercise their political rights directly or by delegation. Should the people grant the exclusive right of appointment to the governor,
he possesses that right; but if they should otherwise dispose of it, it must be performed as the sovereign has indicated. Inasmuch, however, as
the legislative body is the repository of plenary power, except as otherwise restricted, and the chief executive of the State is not, legislative
bodies usually possess wide latitude in the premises. But this situation does not obtain in the Philippines where the people are not sovereign,
and where constitutional rights do not flow from them but are granted by delegation from Congress.

It may finally be inferred from the books that the appointment of public officials is generally looked upon as properly an executive function. The
power of appointment can hardly be considered a legislative power. Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts, but when so
made be taken as an incident to the discharge of functions properly within their respective spheres. (State vs. Brill [1907], 100 Minn., 499;
Stockman vs. Leddy [1912], 55 Colo., 24; Spartanburg County vs. Miller [1924], 132 S. E., 673; Mechem on Public Officers, secs. 103-108;
Mechem, The power of Appoint to Office; Its Location and Limits, 1 Mich. Law Rev. [1903], 531.)

From the viewpoint of one outside looking in, it would seem that the State legislatures have all too often been permitted to emasculate the
powers properly belonging to the executive deparment, and that the governor of the State has been placed with the responsibility of
administering the government without the means of doing so. The operations of the executive department have been fundamentally variedby
the legislative department. The legislature has absorbed strength, the executive has lost it. This tendency has rather been tolerated than
acquiesced in. The executive should be clothed with sufficient power to administer efficiently the affairs of state. He should have complete
control of the instrumentalities through whom his responsibility is discharged. It is still true, as said by Hamilton, that "A feeble executive
implies a geeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed,
whatever it may be intheory, must be in practice a bad government." The mistakes of State governments need not be repeated here..

The history of the power of appointment and the stand taken by the judiciary on the question in the State of Kentucky is of more than ordinary
interest. Kentucky was permitted to become an independent State by Virginia. The clause in the Kentucky constitution separating and guarding
the powers of government came from the pen of the author of the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson. He it was who, in a letter to
Samuel Kercheval, dated July 16, 1816, said: "Nomination to office iss an executive function. To give it to thelegislature, as we do is Virginia, is a
violation of the principle of the separation of powers. It swerves the members from correctness by the temptation to intrigue for office for
themselves, and to a corrupt barter for votes, and destroys responsibility by dividing it among a multitude." Possibly inspired to such action by
the authorship of the portion of the State constitution which was under consideration, in the early days of the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Mr.
Chief Justice Robertson in the case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth ([1830], 3 J. J.Marshall, 4010) announced that "Appointmets to office are
intrinsically executive," but that it might be performed by a judicial officer when the duties of the office pertains strictly to the court. This
opinion was shaken in the case of Sinking Fund Commissioners vs. George ([1898], 104 Ky., 260) only to be afterwards reaffirmed in Pratt vs.
Breckinridge ([1901], 112 Ky., 1), and in Sibert vs. Garrett ([1922], 246 S. W., 455). in the decision in the latter case, one of the most recent on
the subject, the Supreme Court of Kentucky after reviewing the authorities refused to be frightened by the bugaboo that numerically a greater
number of courts take a contrary view. It said: "We are convinced that they by doing so are inviting destruction of the constitutional barriers
separating the departments of government, and that our interpretation is much the sounder one and is essential to the future preservation of
our constitutional form of government as originally intended by the forefathers who conceived it. . . . Such power (of appointment) on the part
of the Legislature, if a full exercise of it should be persisted in, would, enable it to gradually absorb to itself the patronage and control of the
greater part of the functioning agencies of the state and county governments, and, thus endowed, it would be little short of a legislative
oligarhy."

It is of importance, therefore, not to be confused by Statedecisions, and invariably to return to the exact provisions of the Philippine Organic
Law which should be searched out and effectuated.

The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well defined exceptions, by the Government of the United States to the executive
branch of the government which it has set up in the Philippines. Let the Organic Law speak upon this proposition.

The original government inaugurated in the Philippines after American occupation was military in nature, and exercised all the powers of
government, including, of course, the right to select officers. The original civil authority with administrative functions establishedhere was the
second Philippine Commission. President Mckinley, in his Instructions to the Commisions of April 7, 1900, ever since considered as the initial
step taken to introduce a constitutional government, provided that until further action should be taken by congress or otherwise, "The
Commission will also have power . . . . to appoint to office such officers under the judicial, educational, and civil- service systems, and in the
municipal and departmental goernments, as shall be provided for." When the first Civil Governor was appointed on June 21, 1901, the
President again took account of the power of appointment in the following language: The power to appoint civil officers, hererofore Governor,
will be exercised by the Civil Governor with the advice and consent of the commission." The Congress when it came to make legislative
provision for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine
Bill, "approved, ratified and confirmed," the action of the President, and in creating the office of Civil Governor and authorizing said Civil
Governor to exercise powers of government to the extent and in the manner set forth in the exectutive order date June 21, 1901. (Philippine
Bill, sec. 1.) Congress in the same law provided that the Islands "shall continue to be governed as thereby and herein provided." (See opinion of
Attorney-General Araneta on the power of the Governor-General to appoint and remove civil officers, 3 Op. Atty.-Gen., 563.)

Thus stood the right to appoint to office for fourteen years.

The Organic Act of August 29, 1916, included what follows on the subject of appointments. The governor-General "shall, unless otherwise
herein provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-General,or
such as he is authorized by law to appoint." (Organic Act, sec. 21.) The exception to the general grant is that the Philippine Legislature "shall
provide for the appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, sec. 22.) Each
House of the Philippine Legislature may also elect a presiding officer, a clerk, a sergeant at arms, and such other officers and assistants as may
be required. (Organic Act, sec. 18.) The Philippine Legislature is authorized to choose two Residentcommissioners to the United States. (Organic
Act, sec. 20.) The prohibition on the local Legislature, which has been thought of as referring to the Resident Commissioners, is that "No
Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any office the election to which is vested in
the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any office of trust or profit which shall have been created or the emoluments of which shall have been
increased during such term." (Organic Act, sec. 18.)

The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall have such specific
powers and duties as are expressly conferred or imposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers and duties set forth," including th
special powers and duties "(a) To nominate and appointofficials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the Government of the
Philippine Islands. (b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For
disloyalty to the Government of theUnited States, the Governor-General may at any time remove a personfrom any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by the
Governor-General. (Sec. 66.)

It will be noticed that the Governor-General, in addition to being empowered to appoint the officers authorized by the Organic Act and officers
who thereafter he might be authorized to appoint, was to continue to possess the power to appoint such officers as could be appointed him
when the Organic Act wa approved. The careful phraseology of the law and the connection provided by the word "now" with prior Organic laws
is noteworthy. It would not be at all illogical to apply the same rule to the Governor-General in his relations with the Legislature which the
judiciary uniformly applies to the courts in their relations with the Legislature, which is, that the Legislature may add to, byt may not diminish,
the jurisdiction of the courts — The Legislature may add to, but may not diminish, thepower of the Governor-General. (Organic Act, sec. 26;
Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; In re Guarina, supra; U. S. vs.Limsiongco, supra.)

It will also not escape attention that the only reference made to appointments by the Legislature relates to the selection of Secretaries of
Departments, of officers and employees for the Legislature, and of Resident Commissioners, from which it would naturally be inferred that no
other officers and employees may be chosen by it. The exceptions made in favor of the Legislature strengthen rather than weaken the grant to
the executive. The specific mention of the authority of the Legislature to name certainofficers is indicative of a purpose to limit the legislative
authority in the matter of selecting officers. The expression of one things not expressed. Had it been intended to give to the Philippine
Legislature the power to name individuals to fill the offices which it has created, the grant would have been included among the legislative
powers and not among the executive powers. The administrative controlof the Government of the Philippine Islands by the Governor-Generalto
whom is confided the responsibility of executing the laws excludes the idea of legislative control of administration.

Possibly, the situation may better be visualized by approching the question by a process of elimination. Is the power of appointment judicial?
No one so contends. Is the power of appointment legislative? Not so if the intention of the Organic Law be carried out and if the Legislature be
confined to its law-making function. Is the power of appointment executive? It is.

The exact question of where the power of appointment to office is lodged has never heretofore arisen in this jurisdiction. But a decision of this
court and a controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court are in point.

In Concepcion vs. Parades, supra, this court had before it a law which attempted to require a drawing of lots for judicial positionss in derogation
of executive power. The case was exhaustively argued andafter prolonged consideration, the questioned portion of the law was held invalid as
in violation of the provisions of the Organic Act. Following the lead of Kentucky, it was announced that "Appointment to office is intrinsically an
executive act involving the exercise of discretion."

In the case of Myers vs. United States ([1926], 272 U. S., 52; 71 Law. ed., 160), the United States Supreme Court had presented the question
whether, under the Constitution, the President has the exclusive power of removing executive officers of the United States whom he has
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The answer was that he has. The decision is ephocal. The Chief Justice quoted
from Madison the following:

If there is a principle in our Constitution, indeed in any free Constitution more sacred than another, it is that which separates the
legislative, executive and judicial powers. If there is any point inwhich the separation of the legislative and executive powers ought
to be maintained with great caution, it is that which relates to officers and offices.

'The powers relative to offices are partly legislative and partly executive. The legislature creates the office, defines the
powers, limits its duration and annexes a compensation. This done, the legislative power ceases. They ought to have
nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office. That I conceive to be of an executive nature. Although it be
qualified in the Constitution, I would not extend or stain that qualification beyond the limits precisely fixed for it. We
ought always to consider the Constitution with an eye to the principles upon which it was founded. In this point of view,
we shall readily conclude that if the legislature determines the powers, the honors, and emoluments of an office, we
should be insecure if they were to designate the officer also. The nature of things restrains and confines the legislative
and executive authorities in this respect; and hence it is that the Constitution stipulates for the independence of each
branch of the Government.' (1 Annals of Congress, 581, 582. Also see Madison in The Federalist, Nos. 47, 46.).

The distinguished Chief Justice said:

"* * * The Constitution was so framed as to vest in the Congress all legislative powers therein granted, to vest in the President the
executive power, and to vest in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress might establish, the judicial power. From
this division on principle, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be kept separate in all
cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it
affirmatively requires. Madison, 1 Annals of Congress, 497.

xxx xxx xxx

The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the President alone
and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates. This view has since been
repeatedlyaffirmed by this court. . . . As he is charged specifically to take care that they be faithfully executed, the reasonable
implication, even in the absence of express words, was that as part of his execute power he should select those who werre to act for
him under his direction in the execution of the laws. The further implication must be, in the absence of any express limitation
respecting removals, that as his selection of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be his
power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible. (Fisher Ames, 1 Annals of Congress, 474.) It was urged
that the natural meaning of the term "executive power" granted the President included the appointment and removal of executive
subordinates. If such appointments and removals were not an exercise of the executive power, what were they? They cetainly were
not the exercise of legislative or judicial power in government as usually understood.
 It is quite true that in state and colonial governments at the time of the Constitutional Convention, power to make appointments and
removals had sometimes been lodged in the legislatures or in the courts, but such a disposition of it was really vesting part of the
executive power in another branch of the Government.

xxx xxx xxx

We come now to a period in the history of the Government when both Houses of Congress attempted to removes this
constitutionalconstruction and to subject the power of removing executive officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate to the control of the Senate, indeed finally to the assumed power in Congress to place the removal of such officers anywhere
in the Government.

xxx xxx xxx

The extreme provisions of all this legislation were a full justification for the considerations so strongly advanced by Mr. Madison and
his associates in the First Congress, for insisting thatthe power of removal of executive officers by the President alone wasessential
in the division of powers between the executive and the legislative bodies. It exhibited in a clear degree the paralysis to which a
partisan Senate and Congress could subject the executive arm and destroy the principle of executive responsibility, and separation
of the powers sought for by the framers of our Government, if the President fhad no power of removal save by consent of the
Senate. It was an attempt to redistribute the powers and minimized those of the President.

xxx xxx xxx

For the reasons given, we must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876 by which the unrestricted power of removal of
first class postmasters is denied to the President is in violation of the Constitution and invalid.

Membership in the Committee created by Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822 is an office. No attempt will be made to accomplish the impossible, which is
to formulate an exact judicial definitions of term "office." The point is that the positions in question constitute an "office," whether within the
meaning of that word as used in the Code of Civil Procedure under the topic "Usurpation of Office," and in the jurisprudence of Ohio from
which these portions of the Code were taken; whether within the local definitions of "office" found in the Administrative Code and the Penal
Code; or whether within the constitutional definitions approved by the United States Supreme Court. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 197 et seq.,
519; Act No. 136, sec. 17; State vs. Kennon, supra, cited approvingly in Sheboygran co. vs. Parker [1865], 3 Wall., 93; Administrative Code, sec.
2; Penal Code, arts. 264, 401.) Paraphrasing the United States Supreme Court in alate decision, there is not lacking the essential elements of a
public station, permanent in character, created by law, whose incidents and duties were prescribed by law. (Metcalf & Eddy vs. Mitchell [1926],
269 U. S., 514; U. S. vs. Maurice [1823], 2 Brock., 96; U. S. vs.Hartwel [1867], 6 Wall., 385.) The Legislature did more than add incidentalor
occasional duties to existing executive offices for two of the members of the voting committee are representatives of thelegislative branch. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that the Act of the General Assembly giving to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives the power to appoint proxies and directors in all corporations in which the State has an interest, creates a public
office and fills the same by appointment of the Legislature. (Clark vs. Stanley [1872], 66 N. C., 28;Howerton vs. Tate [1873], 68 N. C., 498;
Shoemaker vs. U. S. [1892], 147 U. S., 282; Advisory Opinion to Governor [1905], 49 Fla., 269; Mechem on Public Officers, Ch. I.)

To tell the truth, it is possible that the earnestness of counsel has just led us to decide too much. Not for a moment should there be dismissed
from our minds the unusual and potently effective proviso of section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive functions of the government
must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-
General." At the very least, the performance of duties appurtenant to membership in the voting committee is an executive function on the
Government, which the Organic Act requires must be subject to the unhampered control of the Government-General. The administrative
domination of a governmentally organized and controlled corporation is clearly not a duty germane to the law-making power.

The incorporation of the National Coal Company has not served to disconnect the Company or the stock which the Government owns in it from
the Government and executive control. The Philippine Legislature is empowered to create and control private corporations. (Martinez vs. La
Asociacion de Señoras Damas del Santo Asilo de Ponce [1909], 213 U. S., 20.) The National Coal Company is a private corporation.(National Coal
Company is a private corporation. (National Coal Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue [1924], 46 Phil., 583.) By becoming a stockholder in
the National Coal Company, the Goverment divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the corporation.
(Bank of the U. S. vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia [1824], 9 Wheat., 904.) Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its
consent, and is subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of government. Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall in speaking of the Bank of the United States said, "It was not created for its own sake, or for private purposes. It has never been
supposed that Congress could create such a corporation." (Osborn vs. Bank of the U. S. [1824], 9 Wheat., 738; National Bank vs. Commonwealth
[1869], 9 Wall., 353; Railroad Co. vs. Peniston [1873], 18 Wall., 5; Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. vs. U. S. [1918], 250 U. S., 123.) Of the
National Coal Company, it has been said by Mr. Justice Johnson as the organ of the court in National Coal Company vs. Collector of Interanl
Revenue, supra, that "The Government of the Philippine Islands is made the majority stockholder, evidently in order to insure proper
governmental supervision and control, and thus to place the Government in a position to render all possible encouragement, assistance and
help in the prosecution and furtherance of the company's business.' The analogy is closer in the companion National Bank case, No. 27225.
It further is inconvertible that the Government, like any other stockholder, is justified in intervening in the transactions in the corporation, and
in protecting its property rights in the corporation. Public funds were appropriated to create the National Coal Company. Those funds were
used to purchase stock. The voting of the government stock is the prerogative of the stockholder, not the prerogative of the corporation. It is
transaction in, but not of, the corporation. The stock is property. The Government, the owner of the majority stock in the company, naturally
dominates the management of its property. The Government may enforce its policies and secure relief in and through the corporation and as
stockholder.

The situation will be better understood if it be recalled that, in addition to the National Coal company (Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822), the Philippine
Legislature has created the Philippine National Bank (Acts Nos. 2612, 2747, 2938, and 3174), the National Petroleum Company (Act No. 2814),
the National Development Company (Act No. 2849), the National Cement Company (Act No. 2855), and the NationalIron Company (Act No.
2862). The aggregate authorized capital stock of these companies is P54,500,000. The Legislature has in each of these instances directed that a
majority of the shares of stock shall be purchased for the Government, and has appropriated money for this purpose. There have likewise been
authorized corporations for the promotion of the merchant marine (Act No. 2754). The stock of the Manila Railroad Company has been
purchased for the Government. (Acts Nos. 2574, 2752, and 2923.) All these are conspicuous instances of a paternally inclined government
investing large sums in business enterprises which after acquisition or organization have vitally concerned the Government. In all of the
companies mentioned, the stock is to be voted by a committee or board of control, consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The power of the majority stckholders to vote the government stock in the
corporation carries with it the right, under our Corporation Law, to elect all the directors, to remove any or all of them, and to dissolve the
corporation by voluntary proceedings. (Corporation Law, secs. 31, 34, 62.) In the case of the Philippine National Bank, the law explicitly
enumerates various functions of the bank which may not be performed without the express approval of the Board of Control. (Act No. 2938.)

Very important property rights are involved in the transactions in the governmental directed corporations. Just as surely as the duty of caring
for government property is neither judicial nor legislative in character is it as surely executive. Yet a majority of the voting committee or board
of control is made up of the presiding officers of the two houses of the Legislature and they are in a position to dictate action to the directors
and subordinate personel of these corporations.

Based on all the foregoing considerations, we deduce that the power of appointment in the Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions, to
the executive department; that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or executive function; that the National Coal
Company and similar corporations are instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government agencies and government
property belongs to the executive department; that the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting committee constitutes
an invasion by the Legislative Department of the privileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government of delegated powers,
under which delagation legislative power vests in the Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General, and under
which Governor-General and a specified power of appointment resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly
perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its presiding officers as majority members of a body which has executive
functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory of the division of powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the
Organic Law. That has been the decided trend of persuasive judicial opinion.

The intimation contained in the conclusions just reached does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff will be privileged to substitute the
directors designated by the Governor-General for those designated by the two presiding officers in the Legislature. The burden has heretofore
been on the defendants. From this point, it will be on the plaintiff. It is well established in quo warranto proceedingsthat the failure of the
defendant to prove his title does not established that of plaintiff. (People vs. Thacher [1874], 10 N. Y., 525.)

The answer to the problem comes from two directions. The acting Attorney-General of the United States finds the solutions in the supreme
executive power entrusted to the Governor-General, while counsel for the plaintiff advance the rule of statutory construction pertaining to
partial invalidity. We are frank to say that we experience difficulty in following the lead of the law officer of the Government of the United
States. The Governor-General since the approval of the last Organic Act has had no prerogative powers. His powers are so clearly and distincly
stated that there ought to be no doubt as to what they are. Like the Legislature and the judiciary,like the most inconspicuous employee, the
Governor-General must find warrant for his every act in the law. At this stage of political development in the Philippines, no vague residuum of
power should be left to lurk in any of the provsions of the Organic Law.

Counsel for the plaintiff rely on a decision of this court (U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759) as best expressing the local rule regarding
statutes void in part. Counsel for the defendants cite an earlier case (Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44). As the principle announced in the
last cited case is the more comprehensive and is much fairer to the defendants, we give it preference. It was there announce:

Where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enfored. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it
is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact
the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. The void
provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the Act in a manner contrary to the intention of
the Legislature. The language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and
what remains must express the legislative will independently of the void part since the court has no power to legislate.
Omitting reference to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representative in section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by
section 2 of Act No. 2822, it would then read: "The voting powerof all such stock owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor- General." Would the court be justified in so enforcing the law without itself
intruding on the legislative field?

The Philippine Legislature, as we have seen is authourized to create corporations and offices. The Legislature has lawfully provided for a
National Coal Company, but has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the committee. Would this court be doing violence to the
legislative will if the votig power be continued solely in the hands of the Governor-General until different action is taken by the Legislature? We
conclude that we would not, for the reason that the primordial purpose of the Legislature was "to promote the business of developing coal
deposits . . . and of mining . . . and selling the coal contained in said deposits." (Act No. 2705, sec 2; Act No.2822, sec.1.) The incidental purpose
of the Legislature was to provide a method to vote the stock owned by the Government in the National Coal comapny. In the words of the
United States Supreme Court, "The striking out is not necessarily by erasing words, but it may be by disregarding the unconstitutional provision
and reading the statute as if that provision was not there." (Railroad companies vs. Schutte [1880], 103 U. S. 118; State vs. Westerfield [1897],
23 Nev., 468; State vs. Washburn, supra; State vs. Wright [1913], 251 Mo., 325; State vs. Clausen [1919], 107 Wash.,667; 1 Lewis Sutherland,
Statutory construction, Second ed. Ch. IX.)

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Clayton vs. People ([1890], 132 U. S., 632) is particularly applicable on account of relating to
the validity of an Act passed by a territorial legislature, the question of partial invalidity, and the contention likewise here made, that since the
law in question had been on the statute books for a number of years, it must be considered as having been impliedly ratified by the Congress.
An Act of the Legislature of Utah of 1878 had declared that the auditor and the treasurer shall be elected by the voters of the territory. In a
decision handed down in 1886, the Supreme Court of the territory of Utah held the act void because in conflict with the organic act creating the
territory, which provided that the governor, with the consent of the legislative council, shall appoint such officers. It further held that a
territorial statute invalid when enacted is not validated by the failureof the congress expressly to disapprove it. (People vs. Clayton [1886], 4
Utah, 421.) The United States Supreme Court on appeal affirmed the judgment. It said:

It can hardly be admitted as a general proposition that under the power of Congress reserved in the Organic Acts of the territories to
annul the Acts of their legislature the absence of any action by Congress is to be construed to be a recognition of the power of the
Legislature to pass laws in conflict with the Act of Congress underwhich they were created. . . . We do not think that the
acquiescenceof the people, or of the Legislature of Utah, or of any of its officers, in the mode for appointing the auditor of public
accounts, is sufficient to do away with the clear requirements of the organic Act on that subject. It is also, we think, very clear that
only that part of the Statute of Utah which is contrary to the Organic act, namely, that relating to the mode of appointment of the
officer, is invalid; that so much of it as creates the office of auditor of public accounts and treasurer of the Territory is valid; and that
it can successfully and appropriately be carried into effect by an appointment made by the governor and the Council of the Territory,
as required in the Act of Congress.

On the assumption, however, that the entire provision authorizing the voting committee be considered as wiped out, yet we think it would still
devolve on the Governor-General to protect the public interests and public property. He is made responsible for the execution of the laws, and
he would be unfaithful to that trust if, through inaction, instrumentalities of government should fail to function and government property
should be permitted to be dissipated.

Counsel for the dependants have injected the argument into the discussion that, as the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives are at least de facto officers, their right to act as members of the voting committee cannot be collaterally attacked, and that
the defendants in this suit are the de jure members of the board of directors of National Coal Company. Contentions such as there are out of
harmony with the avowed purpose to avoid technical obstruction, and to secure a definite expression of opinion on the main issue. However, it
remains to be said that this is a direct proceeding to test the right of the defendants to the offices to which they consider themselves entitled.
The inquiry then may go, as is proper in quo warranto proceedings, to the extent of determining the validity of the act authorizing the offices.
The fallacy of the argument relating to the de facto doctrine is that, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office, there cannot be
a de facto officer in a de fact office. There is no such thing as de facto office under an unconstitutional law. (Norton vs. Shelby County [1886],
188 U. S., 425.)

Before terminating, a few general observations may be appropriate.The case has been carefully prepared and elaborately argued. All parties
appear to desire to have the matter at issue definitely determined. We have endeavored to accomodate them. But in such a bitterly fought
contest, the ingenuity of counsel presses collateralpoints upon us which the court need not resolve. We thus find it unnecessary to express any
opinion on the propriety or legality of Executive Order No. 37, on that portion of section 18 of the Organic Act which disqualifies Senators or
Representatives for election or appointment to office and no other subsidiary matters. Need it be added that the court is solely concerned with
arriving at a correct decision on a purely legal question.

Every other consideration to one side, this remains certain—The congress of the United States clearly intended that the Governor- General's
power should be commensurate with his responsibility. The Congress never intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with the
responsibility of administering the government and of executing the laws but shorn of the power to do so. The interests of the Philippines will
be best served by strict adherence to the basic principles of constitutional government.
We have no hesitancy in concluding that so much of section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the
voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, is unconstitutional and void. It results, therefore, in the demurrer being overruled, and as it would be impractible for the
defendants to answer, judgment shall be rendered ousting and excluding them from the offices of directors of the National Coalcompany. So
ordered, without costs.

Street, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., concurring:

Under the admitted facts the writ of quo warranto prayed for should be granted. Milton E. Epringer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario are
unlawfully and illegally holding and exercising the position of members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal Company andshould be
ousted and altogether excluded therefrom; that Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo have been duly and legally elected as
members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal Company, and judgment is rendered that they be inducted into said position to take
charge thereof and to perform the duties incumbent upon them as members of said board of directors.

The principal questions involved in this action are:

(a) May the Legislative Deparment of the Government of the Philippine Islands adopt a law and provide that some of its members
shall take part in its execution?

(b) Was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands authorized, under the law, to promulgate Executive Order No. 37? and,

(c) Were the respondents legally elected as members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal Company?

Inasmuch as these questions involve respective powers of two great departments of the Government, they should be seriously considered by
this court and not to be lightly resolved on.

These questions were presented to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands for solution in an original action, praying for the issuance of the
extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto. In relation with the questions involved, the specific and definite purpose of the action is (a) to inquire
into the right of the respondents, Milton E. Spinger, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario to act as members of the Board of Directors of the
National Coal Company, a private corporationcreated by special charter by an Act of the Philippine Legislature; and (b) to have inducted into
office, in their place and stead, said Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador Lagdameo.

To the petition presented by the Government of the Philippine Islands (ex rel. Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath and Salvador Lagdameo) the
respondents demurred. The facts are therefore admitted. A question of law only is presented for solution.

THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE ACTION IS BASED

The facts upon which the petition is based are few, clear, and well defined. There is no dispute upon the facts. They are briefly: That the
National Coal Company is a private corporation created by Act No. 2705 (vol. 2, Public Laws, p. 216, March 10, 1917) as amended by Act No.
2822 (vol. 14, Public Laws, p. 202, March 5, 1919). Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, constitutes the charter of said company. Said
Acts are not public laws. They are private Acts of the Philippine Legislature. They provide that said company shall be subject to the provisions of
the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of said charter, and shall have the general powers
mentioned in said Act (Act No. 1459) and such other powers as may be necessary to enable it to prosecute the business of developing coal
deposits in the Philippines Islands, and mining, extracting, transporting, and selling the coal contained in said deposits. Said charter provided
that the capital of said company shall be P3,000,000, divided into 30,000 shares of stock with a par value of P100 per share.

Said charter further provided that the Governor-General on behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands, shall subscribe for 51 per
centum of said capital stock, and that the "voting power of all such stock owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested
exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives." At
the time of the adoption of said charter the Philippine Legislature appropriated the sum of P1,530,000 for investment in the stock of said
company to be acquired by the Government of the Philippine Islands.
The National Coal Company was organized in accordance with the provisions of its charter. A Board of Directors was elected from time to time.
Its business was carried on by said Board of Directors. Finally a legal question arose concerning the right of the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to act with the Governor-General in voting the stock of said company. That question was referred to
the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army as well as to the Attorney-General of the United States. Upon full consideration of the
question, the Judge Advocate General and the Attorney-General reached the conclusion that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives were without authority in law to take part in the voting of the stock owned by the Government, for the reason that
the particular provision of the charter granting or creating said power as illegal and void, and that the participation of the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in voting said stock was an illegal encroachment upon the powers of the Executive
Department of the Government. Upon receiving said opinions, the Government-General evidently for the purpose of avoiding criticism that he
was permitting an illegal and void law to be enforced and, if possible, impeachment proceedings for a failure or refusal on his part to comply
with the law of the land, issued an executive order, known as Executive Order No. 37. Executive Order No. 37 provides:

Whereas it is held in an opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army, confirmed by an opinion of the Attorney-
General of the United States, received at the Office of the Executive, November seventh, nineteen hundred and twenty-six, that the
provisions of the statutes passed by the Philippine Legislature creating a 'Board of Control' or 'Committee' and enumerating the
duties and powers thereof, with respect to certain corporations in which the Insular Government is the owner of stock, are nullities;
that the remaining portions of said statutes are valid; that the duties imposed by said statutes upon said Board or Committee are
executive in their nature, and subject to the provisions of the Organic Act relating to the executive functions; that said executive
duties and powers may be performed as in other cases not specifically provided for by law.

Now, therefore, acting under authority of said opinions, the duties and powers heretofore exercised by said 'Board of Control' or
Committee' shall, from and after this date, be exercised solely by the Governor-General pursuant to the executive power vested in
him by the Organic Act."

Notice of said Executive Order was duly and timely given by the Governor-General to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. The Governor-General further notified the President and Speaker that "he would thereafter exercise exclusively the duties
and powers" with respect to the voting of the stock held by the Government of the Philippine Islands in the National Coal Company.

At the time of the issuance of said Executive Order No. 37 or thereabouts the Government of the Philippine Islands was the registered owner of
about 29,975 shares of the total of 30,000 shares of said company. The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives protested against the alleged assumed authority on the part of the Governor-General to vote said government stock and
insisted upon their right to participate in the voting of the same.

Later, and without going into great detail, a meeting of the stockholders was called for the purpose of electing members of the Board of
Directors of said company. In accordance with the preannounced intention, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives attended the meeting of the stockholders of the company and then and there asserted their right, as a majority of the "Voting
Committee," to vote the stock of the Government. Against the objections and protest of the Governor-General they were permitted by the
Chairman of the meeting to vote all of the stock held by the Government of the Philippine Islands. They deposited a ballot purporting to be
signed by them on behalf of the said "Voting Committee" for the election as Directors of Alberto Barretto, Frank B. Ingersoll, Milton E. Springer,
Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario. Notwithstanding the objection and protest of the Governor-General to the acceptance of said ballot, the
Chairman permitted it to be deposited in favor of the persons for whom it was cast. At the same meeting of the stockholders and at the same
time the Governor-General, insisting upon his sole right to vote the stock owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands, cast his ballot
representing all of the stock of the Government, in favor of Alberto Barretto, Frank B. Ingersoll, Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath, and Salvador
Lagdameo, which ballot was rejected by the Chairman and the same was not allowed to be deposited.

Against the ruling of the Chairman, permitting the ballot of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to be
deposited on behalf of the said "Voting Committee" a protest of the Governor-General was duly and timely presented. Notwithstanding said
protest on the part of the Governor-General, that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives had no
authority to vote the stock of the Government nor to participate in the voting of the same, the Chairman declared that Alberto Barretto, Frank
B. Ingersoll, Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario had each received a majority of the votes cast and that said persons had
been duly elected as members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal Company.

It will be noted that both the Governor-General, and the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives voted for the
election of Alberto Barretto, and Frank B. Ingersoll. There is no objection in this record to the right of said persons to act as members of the
Board of Directors. The contention of the Government is, that Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Heath and Salvador Lagdameo had been duly and legally
elected as members of the Board of Directors by the vote of the Governor-General, and that Milton E. Springer, Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo
Hilario had not been duly and legally elected as members of the Board of Directors by the vote of the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and that they should be ousted and altogether excluded from their office.

Considering the foregoing facts we have the question squarely presented, whether the persons elected by the Governor-General in voting the
stock owned by the Government had been duly and legally elected directors of said company, or whether the persons elected by the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives were legally elected as such Directors.
It can scarcely be contended that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, when the Governor-General is
present at a meeting of the stockholders of said company, have a right to vote all of the stock of said company, to the entire exclusion of the
Governor-General. There is nothing in the law which indicates the manner in which the stock owned by the Government of the Philippine
Islands may be voted when a difference of opinion exists among the members of the "Voting Committee" as to how the same shall be voted.

Without discussing the method of voting the stock when there is a difference of opinion in the "Voting Committee" as to how it shall be voted,
we pass to the question, whether or not the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as members of the
Legislative Department of the Government, have any right whatever to participate in the voting of the stock belonging to the Government of
the Philippine Islands.

THE RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO EXECUTE OR TO ASSIST IN THE EXECUTION OF ITS LAWS.

The Legislative Department of the Government adopted the law creating the charter of the National Coal Company. The Legislative Department
of the Government provided a method, in said charter, by which it, through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, should assist in the execution of said law.

It has been stated so frequently by eminent statesmen and jurists, that it scarcely needs the citation of authorities to support the doctrine, that
wherever the American flag flies as an emblem of Government, the powers of that Government are divided into three distinct and separate
departments — Executive, Legislative and Judicial — each acting in its own field, under its own authority and general powers of the
government. While the line of demarcation, by division, is easily discerned, it is at times difficult to follow in actual cases. There is a constant
overlapping of the different departments of the government which cannot be avoided, and yet such overlapping generally results in the greater
stability and permanency of the government. It is also a statement, based upon political science, that scarcely needs repetition, that one
department overreaches its powers whenever it steps across the line of demarcation and attempts to function within the field of another
department of government under the American flag. Under the form of government established in the Philippine Islands, one department of
the government has no power or authority to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the discretion of the other
department. It is the general duty of the legislative branch of the government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually conserve the
peace and good order and protect the lives and the property of the citizens of the state. It is the duty of the governor-General to take such
steps as he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. Every delay and hindrance and obstacle which prevents a strict
enforcement of laws necessarily tends to jeopardize public interest and the safety of the whole people. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5
Phil., 87.)

The different departments of the government are coordinate, coequal and each functions independently, uncontrolled and uncontrollable by
the other. To that statement, however, there exist exceptions. For example, the executive department of the government may annul and set
aside acts of the legislative department of the government under its power of veto. So may the legislative department of the government annul
and set aside actions of the executive department of the government by repealing or amending laws. So likewise the judicial department of the
government may annul and set aside acts of the legislative department of the government when such acts are contrary to the fundamental
laws of the state or beyond the powers of the legislative department. But in every case, where one department, as above indicated, to any
extent attempts to control the effects of acts of the other department or departments, it is acting under its own power and within its own
department.

The Constitution of the United States as well as the Constitution of each of the states of the United provide that the government shall be
divided into three departments: executive, legislative, and judicial. George Washington, who was the President of the Constitutional
Convention which adopted the United States Constitution, in a letter written to his friend Lafayette in 1788, referring to the complete
separation of the powers of the government, said: "These powers are so distributed among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, in
which the powers of the government are arranged that it can never be in danger of denigrating into a monarchy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, or
any other despotic form of government as long as there shall remain any virtue in the body of the people."

Mr. Thomas Jefferson, who has been quoted on questions relating to the meaning, force and application of the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States perhaps more than any other one person, said: "The great principle established by the Constitution of the United States
which was never before fully established, was the separation of the delegated power into the hands of the executive, the legislative
department, and the judiciary. This is our system of check and balances which makes ours a 'government of laws and not of men.'" On another
occasion Mr. Thomas Jefferson said, in discussing the necessity of limiting the power of government: "When it comes to a question of power —
trust no man, bind him down from mischief, by the strong chains of the Constitution."

By the well known distribution of the powers of government among the executive, legislative, and judicial departments by the constitution,
there was provided that marvelous scheme of check and balances which has been the wonder and admiration of the statesmen, diplomats, and
jurists in every part of the civilized world.

The balance of the powers of government provided for in the constitution as well as in the charter of the Philippine Government was not the
result of chance. The various parts did not fall into place merely through the vicissitudes of circumstance. They were devised by careful
foresight; each in a measure dependent upon the others and not possessed of so much independence as to give freedom and courage in the
exercise of their functions. Each was to move within its respective spheres as the bodies of the celestial system march along the pathways of
the heaven. It is a fundamental rule of constitutional law that no department of government has power to perform nor to assist in performing
the functions of another.

The executive department is limited to the execution of valid laws adopted by the legislative department of the government. The legislative
department is limited to the enactment of laws and to the investigation of facts necessary for wise legislation. The judicial department of the
government is limited to the administration of justice and the interpretation of laws. In case of differences between the executive and
legislative departments as to their respective powers, it has long since been conceded that the Supreme Court shall act as an umpire.
(Marbury vs.Madison [1803], 1 Cranch [U.S.] 137; Rice vs. Austin, 19 Minn., 74; Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard [U.S.], 44; Martin vs. Mott, 12
Wheat. [U. S.], 19.)

No government, past or present, has more carefully and watchfully guarded and protected, by law, the individual rights of life and property of
its citizens than the governments under the American flag. Each of the three departments of the government has had separate and distinct
functions to perform in this great labor. The history of the United States, covering nearly a century and a half, discloses the fact that each
department has performed its part well. No one department of the government can or ever has claimed, within its discretionary power, a
greater zeal than the others in its desire to promote the welfare of the individual citizens, entities or corporations. They are all joined together
in their respective spheres, harmoniously working to maintain good government, peace and order, to the end that the rights of each citizen be
equally protected. No one department can claim that it has a monopoly of these benign purposes of the government. Each department has an
exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain legal and discretionary limits. No other department can claim a right to enter
these legal and discretionary limits and assume to act there. No presumption of an abuse of these legal and discretionary powers by one
department will be considered or entertained by another. Generally such conduct on the part of one department, instead of tending to
conserve the highest interest of the government and its citizens and the rights of the people, would directly tend to destroy the confidence of
the people in the government and to undermine the very foundations of the government itself. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87,
115; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534.)

The Government of the Philippine Islands, like the Government of the United States, is based upon the fundamental principle of the separation
of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Subject only to the exceptions especially established by the organic act, neither of the great
department of the government may validly exercise any of the powers conferred upon either of the others. In the case of Abueva vs. Wood (45
Phil., 612) it was said: "The duties of each department are well defined and limited to certain filed of governmental operation." Each
department exercises functions as independent of each other as the Federal or state governments of the Union. It was not intended by the
framers of the theory of our government that the duties which had been assigned to the executive should be performed by the legislative, nor
that the duties which had been assigned to each of them should be performed and directed by the judicial department. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99
U. S., 700, 718; Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U. S., 361; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)

No well organized government or business even can be well managed if one department can enter upon the field of another and attempt to
administer or interfere in the administration of the other. (Abueva vs. Wood, supra; Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87; U. S. vs. Bull,
15 Phil., 7, 27.)

In the case of Kilbourne vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168) it was said: "It is also essential to the successful working of the system, that the persons
entrusted with power in any one of these branches shall not be permitted to encroach upon the powers confided to the others, but that each
shall by the law of its creation be limited to the exercise of the powers appropriate to its own department and no other."

Section 17 of the Administrative Code of 1917 (Act No. 2711) provides: "The executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the Philippine
Government are distributed, respectively, among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, severally exercising the functions and powers
conferred on them by law.

Each department of the government has an exclusive field within which it can perform its part within certain discretionary limits. No other
department can claim a right to enter these discretionary limits and assume to act there. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, supra; U.
S. vs. Bull, supra; Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534; Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil., 338.)

In the case of United States vs. Ang Tang Ho (43 Phil., 1) this court said that the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law. Subject to the constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own
jurisdiction, and it is for the judiciary only to say when an act of the legislature is or is not constitutional. It is beyond the power of any branch of
the Government of the Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws
which conform to the Organic Law. (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 96.)

It is not within the power of the Philippine Legislature to enact laws which either expressly or impliedly diminish the authority conferred by an
Act of Congress on the Chief Executive. (Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil., 599.)

From all of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable, that if any given act of the Philippine Legislature does not, by its nature, pertain to the
law-making function, but is either executive or judicial in character, and does not fall within any of the express exceptions established by the
Organic Act, such an act is ultra vires and therefore null and void. (See, for a discussion of the powers of the executive department of the
Government, the opinion by the late Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano in the case of In re Patterson, 1 Phil., 93.)

POWERS OF THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENTS UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG

Some one has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments of the
same are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as
are expressly given and such other powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which they cannot leap.

Mr. Justice Cooley, one of the greatest expounders of constitutional law, said: "The legislative power, we understand, to be the authority, under
the constitution, to make laws and to alter and repeal them."

Mr. Biddel, an eminent lawyer, said: "The legislature has no other duty nor power than to make laws. After a law has been enacted, that
department has no further power over the subject except to amend or repeal it. It can neither adjudge the law nor execute it. All power of that
department is ended."

Mr. James Wilson, who was a member of the convention which adopted the Constitution of the United States, and later one of the first
members of the Supreme Court of the United States, and one of the very ablest of the members of that great body, in discussing the question
of the powers of the legislative department of the government, said, quoting from an able English statesman: "England can never be ruined but
by a Parliament (legislative department), which demonstrates the danger of allowing to the legislative department any other (power) than
strictly legislative powers."

Even the Justice of the Supreme Court joined in a letter addressed to President Washington upon the general subject of the separation of the
departments of government, and insisted upon a scrupulous and undeviated maintenance of the separation of the departments.

Mr. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, who were among the great expounders of the Constitution, wrote earnestly
upon the question of the separation of the departments of government, and, with many others, united in protesting against tolerating the
claim of the legislative department to exercise any other than purely legislative power.

It has been said in many of the leading cases decided by the highest courts of record that "the power of the legislature is the power to legislate
only and to make such investigations as are necessary for that purpose."

Under a constitutional form of government it is believed that all will agree that the concentration of power in the legislative department of
government or in any one of the other departments will inevitably result in despotism.

Mr. Bryce, who for many years was a close student of the system of government under the American flag, said: "A legislature is a legislature and
nothing more." Mr. Woodrow Wilson, in discussing the powers of the executive and legislative departments of government, said: "The power of
the legislative department is to enact laws, while it is the duty of the President to see that the laws of Congress are failthfully executed."

A careful reading of the debates, in the Constitutional Convention, by the greatest statesmen and diplomats at that time shows clearly that one
of their greatest concerns was the limitation upon the powers of the executive and legislative departments. A reading of the Constitution itself
adopted after a long discussion shows clearly that its members intended to expressly limit the powers of said departments. In the enumeration
of the powers of the three departments the phrase that each "shall" or "shall not" do a particular thing is frequently found. No general
unlimited power is found. Experience had shown that there was need of curbing the legislative body in order to prevent a violation of the
citizens' right of liberty and property. The members of the Constitution Convention made an effort to strike at the very root of the evils which
the people of the state had suffered by the madness of a sovereign legislative body.

James Madison, a member of the Convention, and later President of the United States, said: "Experience had proved a tendency in our
governments (state governments) to throw all power into the legislative vortex. The executives of the states are, in general, little more than
ciphers; the legislature, omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised in restraining the instability and encroachment of the latter, a revolution
of some kind or other would be inevitable."

Gouverneur Morris, one of the great statesmen of his time, said that "he concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater danger from
legislative usurpation than from any other source." (July 21, 1787.)

James Madison, in September, 1787, in speaking of the encroachments of the legislative department, said: "The experience of the states had
demonstrated that their checks are insufficient. The legislative department is everywhere extending the spheres of its activity and draining all
power into its impetuous vortex. I have appealed to experience for the truth of what I advance on this subject."
Mr. James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention and one of the first members of the Supreme Court of the United States, said on
the 16th day of June, 1787: "If the legislative authority be not restrained there can be neither liberty nor stability."

The great statesmen who were among the members of the Constitutional Convention were as solicitous about the limitations of the executive
department of the government, as they were concerning the limitations of the legislative department. They were exceedingly cautious in
defining the powers of each of said departments, and so far as their knowledge and experience aided them their work was complete.

POWERS OF THE PHILIPPINES LEGISLATURE, GRANTED BY THE PHILIPPINE CHARTER

Turning to the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the "Jones Law," for the purpose of ascertaining what power or
authority to legislate was granted to the Philippine Legislature, we find that, while the legislature was given "general legislative power" (secs. 7,
8, 12), "all laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the United States, which reserved the power and
authority to annul the same." Not only must all laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature be reported to Congress for approval but certain
laws, in addition to the requirement that they must be submitted to Congress, must be submitted to the President of the United States for
approval (secs. 9, 10, and 19). In other words, no act of the Philippine Legislature can have the force and effect of a law until it has been either
expressly or tacitly approved either by the Congress of the United Statesor by the President. Neither will it be contended that the express or
tacit approval by the Congress of the United States or by the President, of a law otherwise illegal and void, will render such law valid if, in fact, it
was adopted without power or authority.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO ENACT LAWS IS WHOLLY A DELEGATED AUTHORITY

The only legislative authority possessed by the Philippine Legislature is a delegated authority. The only power or authority to legislate is granted
by the Congress of the United States by the charter (Jones Law; Act of July 2, 1902). To ascertain the power of the Philippine Legislature,
therefore, an examination of its charter must be made.

It is argued that when either the President or the Congress of the United States gives express or tacit approval to an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, that such an act thereby becomes a valid subsisting law. That argument is tenable, except when such act is beyond the powers
granted to the Legislature. The approval by the President or Congress of an act of the Philippine Legislature does not render such an act legal if,
in fact, the same is beyond the powers of the Legislature or contrary to the fundamental law of the land. If the provisions of the act extend
beyond the powers of the Legislature, then certainly it cannot be contended that the same is a valid and legal act even though the same has
been expressly or tacitly approved by the President or Congress, unless the same can be considered an act of the congress of the United States
and then only, when the same is within the power and authority of Congress. Such act of the Philippine Legislature, even with such approval,
can be no more valid and legal than if the Congress of the United States itself had adopted a law which was beyond its power. The legality of
such act, notwithstanding the approval, may be decided in a proper proceeding for the purpose of determining whether its provisions are
beyond the powers of the legislative department of the government.

The general legislative powers granted to the Philippine Legislature and found in sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 of the Act of August 29, 1916, and
those provisions of the Act of July 2, 1902, which have not been repealed. Section 6 provides that the laws now in force in the Philippines shall
continue in force, except as altered, amended or modified herein, until altered, amended or repealed by the legislative authority herein
provided by the Act of Congress.

Section 7 provides that the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment, to
amend, alter, modify or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act, as it may from time to time see fit.

Section 8 provides that general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted to the Philippine Legislature,
authorized by this Act. Section 12, among other things, provides that general legislative power in the Philippines, except as herein otherwise
provided, shall be vested in the Legislature, which shall consist of two houses, one the Senate and the other, the House of Representatives, and
the two houses shall be designated "the Philippine Legislature."

From a reading of said sections 6, 7, 8, and 12 we have some difficulty in determining why it was necessary to repeat practically the same idea
concerning the legislative authority in said sections. The provisions of sections 6, 7, and 12 add nothing to the provisions of section 8 which
granted general legislative power to the Philippine Legislature.

We have read said Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in vain, to find the slightest reference to the power of the Philippine Legislature to
participate in the slightest degree, by legislation or otherwise, in the execution of its laws even after they have been approved expressly or
tacitly by the President or Congress, unless such power is found in that provision of the law, and then only in the Philippine Senate, which gives
that branch of the Legislature the right to participate, with its advice and consent, in the appointment of certain officers the Government. But
even that provision can scarcely be construed to mean that the Senate can participate in the execution of the laws.

THE ONLY SOVEREIGN IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS IS THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES
The people of the Philippine Islands exercise in all matter of government a delegated authority. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial
departments of the government are merely exercising a delegated authority. These departments, unlike the departments of Government in the
United States under the Constitution, have received no authority from the people of the Philippine Islands. In the absence of Congressional
authority, these departments have no authority or power. They are each creatures of the Congress of the United States. Like all agents, they
must act within the authority given. The title of acts of the Philippine Legislature, by which it assumes to enact laws "by its own authority" is an
assumption of authority not possessed in fact nor in law. It acts by authority of the Congress of the United States and in the enactment of laws
that authority should be recognized.

RIGHT OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO APPOINT COMMITTEES TO MAKE INVESTIGATIONS IN ORDER TO ENACT WISE LEGISLATION.

In addition to the power to enact, the Philippine Legislature has the inherent power on its own account, or through committees appointed by it,
to inquire into the general condition of the government, the administration of governmental affairs and the general welfare of the people, to
obtain information to aid it in adopting wise legislation. When such investigation is terminated and laws are adopted, then the authority of the
legislature is ended and the execution of such laws is turned over to the Executive Department of the Government.

THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE EXECUTIVE UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

From a further examination of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in relation with the Act of Congress of July 2, 1902, we find a depository
of power and authority created for the express purpose of executing the laws of the Philippines. (Section 21 of said Act (August 29, 1916)
provides "that the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer whose official title shall be the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands." It occurs to us that when the Congress of the United States used the words "supreme executive power" that the phrase was
used after a careful consideration of its meaning. It was not a haphazard use of the term. The use of that phrase was carefully considered by the
Congress of the United States when the Jones Bill was under consideration. In addition to the enumerated powers conferred upon the
"supreme executive power," we find that he is held responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands." The language of
section 22 is "he shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the Philippine Islands." There is nothing in any of the provisions of
the Jones Law which authorizes or permits the "supreme executive power" to divide its responsibility for the faithful execution of the laws of
the Philippine Islands with any other department, legislative or judicial, or with any of the bureaus of the Government. All executive functions
of the Philippine Government are expressly under the direction and control of the Governor-General.

Outside of the provisions for the internal regulation and control of the affairs of the legislature, its rules and regulations in its relation with the
confirmation of certain appointees by the Governor-General, there is not a syllable, a word, a phrase, a line, nor a paragraph in the Jones Law
which permits the legislature to participate in the execution of its general or special laws.

It is a fundamental maxim of political science, recognized and carried into effect in the Federal Constitution and the constitutions of all the
states of the Union, that good government and the protection of rights require that the legislative, executive, and the judicial powers should
not be confided to the same person or body, but should be apportioned to separate and mutually independent departments of the
government. (Black's Constitutional Law, p. 83.)

The idea of an apportionment of the powers of government, and of their separation into three coordinate departments is not a modern
invention of political science. It was suggested by Aristotle in his treatise on "Politics." and was not unfamiliar to the more advanced of the
medieval jurists. But the importance of this division of powers, with the principle of classification, were never fully apprehended, in theory, until
Montesquieu gave to the world his great work "Spirit of the Laws." Since then his analysis of the various powers of the state has formed part of
the accepted political doctrine of the civilized world.

All American constitutions, state and Federal, provide for the separation of the three great powers of government, and their apportionment to
distinct and independent departments of government.

The principle of the separation of the three departments of the government imposes upon each the limitation that it must not usurp the
powers nor encroach upon the jurisdiction of either of the others.

The people of the United States ordained in their constitution that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States." The people also declared that "the executive power shall be vested in a President" and that "the judicial power of the United
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." It is made
clear therefore that the power to legislate is given to the Congress and that the President and the courts are prohibited from making laws. The
legislature cannot lawfully usurp any of the functions granted by the Constitution to the executive department. The true meaning of the
constitutional division of governmental powers is simply that the whole power of one of the three departments of government shall not be
exercised by the same hand which possesses the whole power of either of the other departments.

Mr. Baker, who was Secretary of War of the United States at the time the Jones Law was adopted, and who perhaps was more familiar with its
meaning and purpose than any other one person, wrote a letter to Governor-General Harrison, in which he said in general terms that "it would
seem to be the part of wisdom for the President and the Governor-General to admit of no encroachment on those powers and placed in their
hands."

Energy and constancy in the executive department of the government is a leading element in the definition of good government. They are
essential to the protection of the people of the state against foreign attack; they are not les essential to the steady administration of the law; to
the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice and
administration of the law; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. A feeble
executive in the administration of his department implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a
bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government. Delay in the
administration of the laws will lead to injustice, dissensions, turmoils, and disorder.

While the legislature has authority to adopt laws and the courts are possessed with power to construe them, yet finally in its largest sense, the
administration of a government and the execution of the laws so adopted and construed is finally left in the hands of the executive department
of the government.

FORMS OF GOVERNMENT WHICH HAVE EXISTED IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SINCE AMERICAN OCCUPATION

Since the 13th day of August, 1898, there have existed in the Philippines several district forms of Government.

First. A Military Government. — From the 13th day of August, 1898, until the 1st day of September, 1900, there existed a Military Government
in the Philippine Islands under the authority of the President of the United States. That Government exercised all of the powers of government,
including executive, legislative, and judicial.

Second. Divided Military and Civil Government. — From the 1st day of September, 1900, to July 4, 1901, the legislative department of the
Government was transferred from the Military Governor to the United States Philippine Commission, to be thereafter exercised by said
Commission in the place and stead of the Military Government, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of War might prescribe, until
the establishment of the Civil Central Government for the Islands, or until Congress should otherwise provide. During that period the executive
authority was vested in the Military Governor while the legislative authority was vested in the Philippine Commission. (See Instructions of the
President of the United States to the United States Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900.) On the 4th day of July, 1901, the executive power
theretofore possessed by the Military Governor was transferred to the President of the United States Philippine Commission.

Third. Civil Government. — From the 4th day of July, 1901, to the 16th day of October, 1907, the executive and legislative powers of the
Philippine Government were possessed by the United States Philippine Commission. The President of the Commission not only possessed and
exercised the executive power of the Government but sat as a member of the United States Philippine Commission as a member of the
legislative department of the Government.

Fourth. Legislative Department of the Government Divided into Two Branches. — On the 16th day of October, 1907, the Legislative Department
of the Government was divided into two branches — the United States Philippine Commission, and the Philippine Assembly — which form
continued up to the 16th day of October, 1916. The Governor-General during that period not only possessed the executive powers of the
Government, but acted as a member of the branch of the legislative department, known as the United States Philippine Commission.

Fifth. Legislative Department of the Government Separated from the Executive Department. — From the 16th day of October, 1916, until the
present time, by virtue of the provisions of the Jones Law, the executive and legislative departments of the Government have been separated,
each constituting a separate and distinct department of government; the first, represented by the Governor-General and the second, by the
Philippine Legislature.

In each of the separate forms of government above mentioned there existed the executive, legislative and judicial powers fully established and
recognized by the only authority for the existence of said Government, — the Government of the United States.

DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEN ADVISED OF ILLEGALITY OF A LAW — HE MAY DISREGARD IT OR FORMULATE A
PROPER ISSUE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE COURT CONCERNING ITS LEGALITY.

It is the sworn duty of the Governor-General of the Philippines to execute the laws. That duty, however, does not require him to execute an
illegal act of the Legislature. When he is advised by his legal department that a certain act, or any part thereof, of the Legislature is illegal and
void, he may do one of two things: (a) He may disregard it and refuse to executive it, or (b) he may formulate an issue upon the alleged illegality
and have that question presented to the courts for solution. He is acting within his powers whichever to these courses he elects to take. To
disregard an illegal and void act of the Legislature is neither tyranny nor a violation of his sworn duty. It would be a violation of his sworn duty
to enforce or permit the enforcement of an illegal act.

RIGHT OF DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS TO CONSTRUE POWERS GRANTED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OR CHARTER
While in many jurisdictions a provisions exists by virtue of which the executive and legislative departments may, in case of doubt as to their
powers, refer the question to the courts for decision, no such provision exists in the Philippines. In the absence of such provision it becomes
necessary therefore in the first instance, when a duty is to be performed, for said departments to pass upon the question of their power to act.
Every department of government invested with constitutional or charter powers must, in many instances, be the judge of their powers, or they
could not act. Such interpretation of their powers is not exclusive. The parties aggrieved may resort to the courts for a judicial interpretation.
(Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 73.)

EXCLUSIVE DUTY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO PROTECT THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT

It is the duty of the Governor-General, as the supreme executive power, to protect the property of the Government. If he, by negligence or
inattention to that responsibility, permits the property of the Government to be wasted, destroyed or lost, he subjects himself to the danger of
impeachment. His responsibility is then one of great seriousness. He should not supinely disregard it. While the legislative department of the
Government may adopt laws for safeguarding and protecting the property, public and private, it cannot intervene in the enforcement of such
law. The legislative department would thereby be taking part, not only in the enactment of laws but in the execution of the same, which is not
permitted under the American Constitution and system of laws.

WHAT HAS BEEN DONE BY LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT FURNISHES NO CRITERION AS TO REAL POWERS

In support of the contention that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the house of Representatives, under Act No. 2705 as amended
by Act No. 2822, have a right to intervene in the execution of said laws, our attention is called to many acts of legislative bodies, where such
bodies have not only enacted laws but have made provisions in the same, by which they have intervened in their execution. The cited cases
support the allegations of the respondents. Our attention is called especially to Acts Nos. 69, 1415, 1841, 1849, 1870, 1981, 2023, 2479, 2510,
2598, 2957 and 3208 as well as to many acts of the legislatures of different states of the Union. It is true that in each of the various acts cited, of
the Philippine Legislature, a provision is made for the appointment of certain persons to assist in their execution.

No question has ever been raised concerning the powers of the Legislature in respect of said acts. The mere fact, however, that the legality of
said acts has never been questioned and their legality has been passed sub silentio, does not create a conclusive presumption that they were in
fact adopted within the powers of the legislative department of the Government. The fact that a statute has been accepted as valid, and
invoked and applied for many years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a court from later passing on its
validity where the question is properly raised and presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, and cases cited.)

LEGALITY OF THAT PROVISION OF ACT NO. 2705, AS AMENDED BY ACT NO. 2822, CREATING THE "VOTING COMMITTEE"

In addition to the contention that the Legislature, by virtue of the provisions of Acts Nos. 2705 and 2822, not only attempted to legislate but to
participate in the execution of its laws, there is still another objection of the legality of that provision of said acts which creates the "Voting
Committee." One of the inhibitions against the powers of the Philippine Legislature is found in one of the subparagraphs of section 3 of the
Jones Law. Said subparagraph provides: "That no bill (public or private) which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." The title of Act No. 2705 reads: "An Act to create the National Coal Company." The
title of Act No. 2822 is: "An Act to amend Certain Sections of Act No. 2705, Entitled 'An Act to create the National Coal Company.'" Act No. 2822
does not amend that provision of Act No. 2705 relating to the "Voting Committee." The inhibition, therefore, of the Jones Law need not be
discussed with reference to the provisions of Act No. 2822.

Many of the states of the Union have adopted similar constitutional provisions. The purpose of this legislative restriction and the evils sought to
be remedied thereby are clearly stated by Mr. Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in his valuable
work on Statutory Construction. In section 111 he says that:

In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have kept steadily in view the correction of the
mischief against which it was aimed. The object is to prevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such
restriction existed, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other, or to the subject specified in
the title, by which measures were often adopted without attracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests,
and were combined in order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. These combinations were
corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the State. Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as
many different subjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, 'and for other purposes.

The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by the legislation often resulted in members
voting ignorantly for measures which they would not knowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the
public also; so that legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session, which, having no merit to
commend them, would have been made odious by popular discussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been reasonably
announced. The constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent such corrupting aggregations of
incongruous measures by confining each act to one subject or object; to prevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject
or object to be expressed in the title.
In the case of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329), the Supreme Court of Alabama stated the proposition as follows — citing and quoting from
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 143:

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision are will known. Legislative
assemblies for the dispatch of business often pass bills by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A specious title
sometimes covered legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent
surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this
provision, the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or contents.

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as were
diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of
several measures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up his review of the authorities
defining the objects of this provision: "It may, therefore, be assumed as settled, that the purpose of this provision was: First, to
prevent hodge-podge, or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by means of provisions in
bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;
and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
they shall so desire.'

"The practice," says the Supreme Court of Missouri, "of comprising in one bill subjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine
in its support members who were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which measures could command the requisite majority on its
own merits, was found to be not only a corrupting influence in the Legislature itself, but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this
was not more detrimental than that other pernicious practice by which, though dexterous and unscrupulous management, designing men
inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles gave no indications, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to
their passage. These things led to fraud, surprise, and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the share of a constitutional
provision." (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 578, 590.)

The authorities are to all intents uniform that this constitutional requirement is mandatory and not directory. Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, section 112, states the rule correctly as follows:

The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has been pointed out, depends on judicial
enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regarded as mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of
legislation. The mischief existed notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected to continue
notwithstanding that obligation is formulated and emphasized in this constitutional injunction, if it be construed as addressed
exclusively to them, and only directory. It would, in a general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the provisions
of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure of the legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question
that such was the intention of the framers of that instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the
fundamental law to say that it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may be followed or disregarded at
pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provision can be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated
by the legislature as if it was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded.

In the case of Walker vs. State, supra, the court said:

It is the settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, that this provision of the constitution is not
a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to the general assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to
declare void any statute not conforming to it.

Justice Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179, 180) states that our courts have held, without exception, that such
constitutional provision is mandatory. (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883.)

Inasmuch as the body of said Act contains a provision to which no reference is made in the title, in view of the well established authorities, we
are forced to the conclusion that, that provision creating the "Voting Committee" is illegal. That illegality, however, is one which may be
separated from the rest of the act without affecting the legality of the other provisions.

THE "VOTING COMMITTEE" AS PUBLIC OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

It is argued most earnestly by the petitioner, and denied with equal earnestness by the respondents, that the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, acting as members of the "Voting Committee" in participating in voting the stock of the National Coal
Company, were acting as public officials of the government and that the legislature is without authority to appoint public officials for that
purpose or to appoint public officials at all for any purpose. It is admitted by both parties that the National Coal Company is a private
corporation. It is admitted that the Government of the Philippine Islands is a stockholder. The law provides that the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives at a stockholders' meeting shall act as a committee for the purpose of
voting said stock. Does that fact make the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives public officials? In the
voting of the stock do they stand in any different relation to the Government and the National Coal Company than any other holders of stock?
Are they not governed by the same laws, and by-laws of the corporation like other stockholders?

Mr. Justice Marshall, in the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia (22 U. S., 904 [Feb. 18, 1824]), in discussing the
question of the relation of the Government to private corporation when it becomes a stockholder in a private corporation, said, among other
things: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns
the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company (or
corporation) its privileges and its (sovereign) prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom its associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted . . . . . As a member of a corporation, a Government
never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other powers in the management of the affairs of the
corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act. The Government of the Union held shares in the old Bank of the United States;
but the privileges of the Government were not imparted by that circumstance to the bank. The State of Georgia, by giving to the bank the
capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives all the
privileges of that character."

The doctrine announced by Chief Justice Marshall in that case has been followed without modification not only by the courts but by all of the
eminent authors who have written upon that particular question. (Thompson on Corporations, vol. 1, sec. 167; Bank of Kentucky vs. Wister, 27
U. S., 318, 322; Briscoe vs. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U. S., 256, 324; Liuisville Railway Co. vs. Letson, 43 U. S., 497, 550; Curran vs. State of Arkansas,
56 U. S., 302; Veazie Bank vs. Fenno, 75 U. S., 533; Railroad Co. vs. Commissioner, 103 U. S., 1, 5; Hopkins vs. Clemson College, 221 U. S., 636,
644; Putnan vs. Ruch, 56 Fed., 416; Wester Union Tel. Co. vs. Herderson, 68 Fed., 591; U. S. vs. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co., 206 Fed., 964;
Encyclopedia of the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 11, p. 225; Encyclopedia of the U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 3, p. 124; Encyclopedia of the
U. S. Supreme Court Rep., vol. 4, p. 643.)

The petitioner as well as the respondents cite many cases in support of their respective contentions. The petitioner cites the following cases:

Pratt vs. Breckinridge (112 Ky., 1); State vs. Brill (100 Minn., 499); State vs. Denny (118 Ind., 382; 4 L. R. A., 79); State vs. Washburn (167 Mo.,
680); State vs. Stanley (66 N. C., 60); Welker vs. Bledsoe (68 N. C., 457); Howerton vs. Tate (68 N. C., 546); Myers vs. United States (272 U. S., 52;
71 Law. ed., 160); Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599).

Cases cited by respondents:

The Smithsonian Institution; Mechem's Public Officers, sec. 1; Olmstead vs. Mayor (42 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 481); United States vs. Germaine (99 U. S.,
508); McArthur vs. Nelson (81 Ky., 67); Congressional Reports, vol. II; State vs. Kennon (7 Ohio State, 562).

See also:

Walker vs. City of Cincinnati (21 Ohio State, 14; 8 Am. Rep., 24); State vs. Hocker (39 Fla., 477; 63 Am. St. rep., 174); Butler vs. Walker (98 Ala.,
358).

After a careful analysis of all of the authorities cited, it is difficult to conclude just what is the weight of authority, in view of the decision of chief
Justice Marshall quoted above. If the Government acts merely as one of the corporators of the National Coal Company and exercises no other
power in the management of the affairs of the corporation than the one expressly given by the Incorporatory Act, it is difficult to understand
how the "Voting Committee" is acting as a public officer. It was not the intention of the Legislature to make the President and Speaker officers
of the Government. The Legislature simply intended to add additional duties to said officers. But after all, in our opinion, the fact that the
Legislature enacted the law and at the same time provided that, through the President and Speaker, it (the Legislature) should assist in the
execution of the same, is sufficient to nullify that provision. It is a matter of no importance in what capacity they acted. The Legislature had no
authority to take part in the execution of the particular law.

THE RIGHT OF THE COURT OF DECIDE THE QUESTION, WHAT ARE THE RESPECTIVE POWERS OF THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF
GOVERNMENT.

It is conceded by all of the eminent authorities upon constitutional law that the courts have authority to finally determine what are the
respective powers of the different departments of government.

The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the Government, and the courts will
resolve every presumption in favor of its validity. Courts are not justified in adjudging a statute invalid in the face of the conclusions
of the legislature, when the question of its validity is at all doubtful. The courts will assume that the validity of a statute was fully
considered by the legislature when adopted. Courts will not presume a statute invalid unless it clearly appears that it falls within
some of the inhibitions of the fundamental laws of the state. The wisdom or advisability of a particular statute is not a question for
 the courts to determine. If a particular statute is within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact, it should be sustained
whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the statute covers subject not authorized by the fundamental
laws of the land, or by the constitution, them the courts are not only authorized but are justified in pronouncing the same illegal and
void, no matter how wise or beneficent such legislation may seem to be. Courts are not justified in measuring their opinions with the
opinion of the legislative department of the Government, as expressed in statutes, upon questions of the wisdom, justice and
advisability of a particular law. In exercising the high authority conferred upon the courts to pronounce valid or invalid a particular
statute, they are only the administrators of the public will, as expressed in the fundamental law of the land. If an act of the
legislature is to be held illegal, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and because the will of the people, as declared in such fundamental law, is paramount
and must be obeyed, even by the legislature. In pronouncing a statute illegal, the courts are simply interpreting the meaning, force,
and application of the fundamental law of the state. (Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250, 251.)

The judicial department of the Government may examine every law enacted by the legislative branch of the Government when the question is
properly presented for the purpose of ascertaining:

(a) Whether or not such law came within the subject-matter upon which the legislative branch of the Government might legislate; and

(b) Whether the provisions of such law were in harmony with the authority given the legislature.

If the judicial branch of the Government finds (a) that the legislative or executive branches of the Government had authority to act upon the
particular subject, and (b) that the particular law contained no provisions in excess of the powers of such department and the acts of the
executive were within his powers, then that investigation, or that conclusion, conclusively terminates the investigation by the judicial
department of the Government.

SOLICITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS FOR THE WELFARE AND
WELL BEING OF THE INHABITANTS.

No Government, past or present, has more carefully and watchfully guarded and protected, by law, the individual rights of life and property of
the citizens of the Philippine Islands than the Government of the United States and its representatives. Each of the three departments of the
Government has had separate and distinct functions to perform in this great labor. The history of the Philippine Islands, covering a period of
more than a quarter of a century, discloses the fact that each department has performed its part well. No one department of the Government
can or ever has claimed, within its discretionary and legal powers, a greater zeal than the others in its desire to promote the welfare of the
individual citizen. They are all joined together in their respective spheres and departments, harmoniously working to maintain good
government, peace, and order to the end that the rights of each citizen in his life and property be equally protected. No one department can
claim that it has a monopoly of these benign purposes of the Government. Each department has an exclusive field, under the law, within which
it can perform its part, within certain discretionary limits. No other department can claim a right to enter these discretionary and legal limits
and assume to act there. No presumption of an abuse of these discretionary powers by one department will be considered, permitted or
entertained by another. Such conduct on the part of one department, instead of tending to conserve good government and the rights of the
people, would directly tend to destroy the confidence of the people in the Government and to undermine the very foundation of the
Government itself.

CONCLUSIONS

For all of the foregoing reasons the petition for the extraordinary legal writ of quo warranto should be granted, and that Milton E. Springer,
Dalmacio Costas, and Anselmo Hilario are each illegally and unlawfully occupying the position of members of the Board of Directors of the
National Coal Company and should be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom; that Romarico Agcaoili, H. L. Health, and Salvador Lagdameo
have been duly and legally elected as members of the Board of Directors of the National Coal Company, and judgment is rendered that they be
immediately inducted into said position, to take charge thereof and to perform the duties incumbent upon them as members of the Board of
Directors. The demurrer is overruled. Considering the petition and demurrer in relation with the stipulated facts, there seems to be no reason
for permitting an answer to be filed. And without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

AVANCEÑA, C.J., VILLAMOR and VILLA-REAL, JJ., dissenting:

Much to our regret we have to dissent from the majority whose opinion has always commanded our respect.

In the case of National Coal Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue (46 Phil., 583), this court said:

THE NATIONAL COAL COMPANY, A PRIVATE CORPORATION; SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 1496 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — The National Coal Company is a private corporation. The fact that
the Government happens to be a stockholder therein does not make it a public corporation. It is subject to all the provisions of the
Corporation Law in so far as they are not inconsistent with Act No. 2705. As a private corporation, it has no greater powers, rights, or
 privileges than any other corporation which might be organized for the same purpose under the Corporation Law. It was not the
intention of the Legislature to give it a preference, or right, or privilege over other legitimate private corporations in the mining of
coal. The law made no provision for its occupation and operation of coal-bearing lands, to the exclusion of other persons or
corporation, under proper permission. The National Coal Company being a private corporation, neither the lessee nor the owner of
the lands upon which it mined coal for the year in question, is subject to the payment of the internal revenue duty provided for in
section 1496 of the Administrative Code.

The National Coal Company, having been created and established by the Philippine Legislature for the purpose of developing the coal industry
in the Philippine Islands, in harmony with the general plan of the Government to encourage the development of the natural resources of the
country, what relation does it bear with said Government? Is it an agency or instrumentality thereof empowered to perform some government
act or function for governmental purposes?

Agency or instrumentality is defined to be a means by which a certain act is done (2 C.J., 420; 32 C.J., 947). So governmental agency or
instrumentality may be defined as a means by which a government acts, or by which a certain governmental act or function is performed. A
governmental act is a term sometimes used to describe an act done in pursuance of some duty imposed by the state on a person, individual or
corporate, which duty is one pertaining to the administration of government and as an absolute obligation on a person who receives no profit
or advantage peculiar to himself for its execution (28 C.J., 753, n. 1). Naturally, when a government acts it does so for purposes of its own. Now,
what is the purpose of government? "A government does not exist in a personal sense, or as an entity in any primary sense, for the purpose of
acquiring, protecting, and enjoying property. It exists primarily for the protection of the people in their individual rights, and it holds property
not primarily for the enjoyment of property accumulations, but as an incident to the purpose for which it exists — that of serving the people
and protecting them in their rights." (Curley vs. U. S., 130 Fed., 1, 8; 28 C.J., 750.) "The term governmental purposes, as used in the constitution
which provides that public property taken for public purposes is exempt from taxation, means, in its most extensive sense, the punishment for
crime, for prevention of a wrong, the enforcement of a private right, or in some manner preventing wrong from being inflicted upon the public
or an individual, or redressing some grievance, or in some way enforcing a legal right, or redressing or preventing a public individual injury. (City
of Owensboro vs. Com., 105 Ky., 344; 28 C.J., 753, n. 8).

In the light of the above definitions, let us inquire what governmental act or function does the National Coal Company perform and for what
governmental purposes.

As was stated by this court in the above cited case, "As a private corporation, it has no greater rights, powers, or privileges than any other
corporation which might be organized for the same purpose under the Corporation Law. It was not the intention of the legislature to give it a
preference, or right, or privilege over other legitimate private corporations in the mining of coal. The law made no provision for its occupation
and operation of coal-bearing lands to the exclusion of other persons or corporations, under proper permission." It is subject to the payment of
internal revenue tax on its coal output. The Philippine Government owns nothing in said corporation except the stock which it has purchased
therein. The National Coal Company cannot perform any governmental act, for it has not been authorized to do so. The fact that it has been
created and established for the purpose of developing the coal industry in the Philippine Islands, in harmony with the general plan of the
Government to encourage the development of the natural resources of the country, and the fact that the Government owns a majority of the
stock thereof, are not alone sufficient to give the National Coal Company the distinction of being an agency or instrumentality of said
Government, just as the investment of government money in any other corporation of the same nature or in a radio corporation to which it has
given a charter for the purpose of encouraging the development of radio communication in the Islands is not by itself sufficient to make of such
a corporation an agency or instrumentality of the Government in the political and administrative sense of the term.

If the National Coal Company is a private corporation, and is not a government agency or instrumentality, what standing has the Government in
said corporation by virtue of its ownership of a majority of its stock.

In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia (6 Law. ed., 244), Chief Justice Marshall said:

It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as
concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating
to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the
character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who have an
interest in banks, are not usable even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The State of
Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects
the transactions of the bank, and waives all the privileges of that character. As a member of a corporation, a government never
exercise its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the
corporation, than are expressly given by the incorporating act. (Bank of the United States vs. Planters' Bank of Georgia [22-25 U.S.], 6
Law. ed., 244.)

In the case of the Bank of Kentucky vs. Wister (7 Law. ed., 323), the court, after citing the above paragraph, added:
 To which it may be added, that if a State did exercise any other power in or over a bank, or impart to it its sovereign attributes, it
would be hardly possible to distinguish the issue of the paper of such banks from a direct issue of bills of credit; which violation of
the Constitution, no doubt the State here intended to avoid.

The Government of the Philippine Islands, as a stockholder, has a right to participate in the election of the Directors of the National Coal
Company by the exercise of its voting power. In so doing it acts merely as a corporator with no other power than are expressly granted by the
Corporation Law, and does not exercise its sovereignty. It cannot impose its sovereign will, but it must act according to the by-laws of the
corporation. The only control it has is what is given to it by the amount of its stock.

The Government, as stockholder, has a right to appoint or designate a proxy to vote its stock in the National Coal Company, and the Philippine
Legislature has done this for it by creating in the same Act a voting committee to be composed exclusively of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Now the question arises whether or not the position of a proxy of
the Government in said corporation is a public office.

An office is defined by good authority as involving a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government,
to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public, by which it is distinguished from employment or contract. (Mechem Pub. Off.
quoted in Barnhill vs. Thompson, 122 N. C., 403, 405; 29 S. E., 720.)

The word "office" mentioned in the constitution means a position having to do with the general government of the State (Walker vs. Cincinnati,
21 Ohio St., 145), and that same meaning must be given to the word "office" mentioned in the Jones Law, which has the character of a
constitution.

Does the committee in voting the stock of the Government perform any sovereign function of government?

The Government participates in the management of the affairs of the National Coal Company every time it exercises by proxy the right of voting
in the election of its directors, and, according to Chief Justice Marshall, in so doing it acts as a corporator merely and does not exercise any
sovereign power. Its proxy, in performing his duty exercises no greater power. And it cannot be otherwise, for we would have the absurd result
of an agent exercising a higher power than that of the principal in the fulfillment of the latter's mandate. If the voting of the stock of the
Government in the election of the directors of the National Coal Company is the act, not of the Government in its sovereign capacity, but of a
corporator merely, the designation of the members of the voting committee by the Government to vote its stock does not involved a
delegation of a sovereign function of government, for the function delegated is of a private and not of a public nature.

The case of State vs. Stanley (66 N. C., 59; 8 Am. Rep., 488), cited in the brief for the plaintiff, wherein it was held that membership in a
committee, composed of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the State of North Carolina, is an
office, is not in point, for said committee was entrusted with the appointment of directors and proxies in all the corporations in which the State
was a stockholder; while the committee under consideration has no other power except to vote the stock of the Government in the National
Coal Company. In that case the committee was an appointer of directors and proxies; in this case the committee is a mere proxy.

Is the public directly benefited by the exercise of the delegated power of voting the stock of the Government by the committee? When the
committee votes the stock of the Government, as a stockholder, the corporation and its stockholder alone are directly benefited by the act, and
the public only indirectly by way of an increased material prosperity. But this is not the kind of benefit that is sought to be obtained by the
creation of a public office. It is the benefit that is deserved from the protection of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.

The voting of the stock of the Government which is delegated to the committee, not being a part of the sovereign functions of the said
Government, and not being exercised for the direct benefit of the public, membership therein is not a public office.

Let us now examine into the question whether or not the designation of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as ex-officio members of said committee, by section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, is constitutional, and
therefore valid.

If the membership in the voting committee is not a public office, the designation by the Philippine Legislature of its own members as members
ex-oficio thereof is not in violation of the principle of separation of powers. It will not be denied that the power of appointment to certain
offices vested in the Governor-General by the Jones Law refers only to public executive office; that his power of supervision and control is
limited to public executive functions, and that the responsibility imposed upon him for the faithful execution of the laws refers only to laws of
public nature. Membership in the voting committee, not being a public office, the Governor-General has no power to appoint its members; the
voting of the stock of the Government not being a public executive function, he has no supervision and control over it; and the law creating the
National Coal Company and designating a voting committee not being a public law, he is not charged with the responsibility of executing it.
Therefore, in creating the voting committee and designating the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-
officio members thereof the Philippine Legislature did not encroach upon any of the powers of the Governor-General.
The contention that the Legislature cannot execute its own laws, is contrary to the congressional interpretation expressed on various occasions,
specially in the case of "The Smithsonian Institution." In incorporating it, the Congress has provided for its management "by a Board of Regents"
named the Regent of the Smithsonian Institution, to be composed of the Vice-President, the Chief Justice of the United States, and three
members of the Senate and three members of the House of Representatives; together with six other persons, other than members of the
Congress, two of whom shall be resident of the City of Washington; and the other four shall be inhabitants of same State, but no two of them in
the same State" (9 Fed. St. An., sec. 588 [a]). The members of the Senate were to be appointed by the President thereof; and the member of
the House, by the Speaker thereof. Granting, for the sake of argument, that membership in the voting committee is a public office, does the
designation of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of the said committee an
encroachment upon the power of appointment to office vested in the Governor-General.

No challenge seems to have been made to the power of the Philippine Legislature to designate the Governor-General or any other executive
officer to serve on said voting committee or any public office, and a challenge of that nature, if made at all, will find no support in the
authorities (12 C.J., 837).

What is vigorously attacked is the power of the Legislature to designate any of its members to serve on said voting committee, the contention
being that the exercise of such power is a violation of the principle of separation of powers and an encroachment upon the power of
appointment to office vested in the Governor-General by the Jones Law.

By some authorities the power of appointment to office is regarded as per se an executive function, which, therefore, may not be
exercised, vested, or controlled by the legislature except in so far as it is a necessary incident to the exercise of the legislative power
or is vested by the constitution in the legislature. By the great weight of authority, however, the power of appointment is held not to
be per se an executive function, and unless the appointment of particular officers is, by the constitution, expressly conferred on the
executive department or forbidden to the legislature the latter may, by statute, vest the power of appointment in its discretion. The
ordinary constitutional distributive clause providing for the complete separation of governmental power has generally been held
insufficient to vest the appointing power solely in the executive. Thus a statute conferring on a circuit judge the power to fill
vacancies in a board of park commissioners is valid. So a board of civil service commissioners may be appointed by the legislature for
the purpose of prescribing qualifications for offices except such as are otherwise provided for in the constitution. (12 C.J., 836, par.
319, n. 1.)

A provision of the constitution precluding the legislature from electing or appointing officers does not invalidate an act creating a
board or commission of which certain state officers shall be ex-officio members, nor prevent the legislature from imposing new
functions on existing officers. (12 C.J., 837, par. 319, n. 5.)

Under the American system of government the chief executive has no prerogative powers, but is confined to the exercise of those
powers conferred upon him by the constitution and statutes. (12 C. J., 898, par. 402; State vs. Bowden, 92 S. C., 393;
Richardson vs. Young, 122 Tenn., 471.)

This must be true of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, when section 21 of the Jones Law says in part:

He shall, unless otherwise herein provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, such officers as may now be
appointed by the Governor-General, or such as he is authorized by this Act to appoint, or whom he may hereafter be authorized by
law to appoint.

The enumeration of the instances in which the Governor-General may make appointments, implies that he has not been empowered to make
all appointments. The expression "whom he may hereafter be authorized by the law to appoint," implies clearly that there may be certain cases
in which he may not be authorized to make appointments.

It is contended that the legislature may make such appointments where the source of power is the people or the constitution made by the
people, as the residuum of power is entrusted in the legislature; but that this may not be done in the Philippine Islands where the source of
power is the Congress of the United States, and the Philippine Legislature only acts by delegation of said body. The Congress of the United
States, after enumerating the powers pertaining to each of the three departments of the Government and declaring which are the functions of
each, has reserved to itself the power and authority annul the laws enacted by the Philippine Legislature, which must be reported to it (Jones
Law, sec. 19). If the Congress of the United States had intended to limit the powers of the Philippine Legislature to those enumerated by it in
the Organic Act and to those of purely legislative character, it would seem that there would have been no necessity for making such
reservation; because all laws passed by the Philippine Legislature which are within its powers will of necessity be valid, and all laws in excess of
its powers will be null and void, and the courts will so declare them. It is only when a residuum of power is left with a legislature which does not
owe its powers to the people or to a constitution made by the people, as the Philippine Legislature, that such reservation becomes necessary;
for it may exercise a power which the Congress had not intended it should exercise, and which the latter may be powerless to correct, giving
room to doubts with no other means of solving them except by judicial decision, which may be precisely the contrary of what the Congress may
have intended. If such reservation of power and authority has any meaning at all, as it must have, it cannot be other than to avoid doubts and
undertainties as to the authority of the legislature to enact certain laws, by permitting those affected by them to determine by the action or
inaction of Congress whether or not such power was one of those constituting the residuum.
Furthermore, nothing could have prevented the Congress of the United States from giving to the Philippine Legislature the power of
appointment to an office which have not previously been vested expressly in the Governor-General, as nothing had prevented if from placing in
the hands of the Philippine Commission not only executive but legislative powers as well. If so, there is nothing that can prevent it from
ratifying any law by which executive officers are created and filled by the legislature with its own members. Ratification may be made either
expressly or impliedly. Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, having been reported to Congress, the failure of the latter to annul it was
equivalent to an implied ratification.

In the case of Fajardo Sugar Co. of Porto rico vs. Holcomb, decided on Noveberm 23, 1926, the Federal Court of the First Circuit said:

If, turning from the section specifically dealing with the powers of the auditor, we look more broadly at the structure of the
Government of Porto Rico provided under the Organic Act, — we are driven to the same conclusion. Under that Act, the Governor-
General, Attorney-General, Commissioner of Education, and Auditor are presidential appointees. The Governor has, in general, the
powers of the Governor of one of our states, and, besides, he is required annually to make official report of the transactions of the
government of Porto Rico to the executive department of the United States, to be designated by the President, and the said annual
report shall be transmitted to the Congress. Moreover, in section 34 (Camp. St., par. 3803 n), it is provided that if, after veto of the
Governor, the Legislature shall by a two-thirds vote pass an Act over the veto, the Governor, if he shall not then approve, shall
transmit the proposed Act to the President of the United States; that "if the President of the United States approve the same he
shall sign it and it shall become a law. If he shall not approve same, he shall return it to the Governor so stating, and it shall not
become a law." It follows that no Act can become a law without the approval of the Porto Rican Governor, a presidential appointee,
or the President of the United States. There is also a provision in section 34 that:

'All laws enacted by the legislature of Porto Rico shall be reported to the Congress of the United States . . . which hereby
reserves the power and authority to annul same.'

If not thus annulled, within reasonable time, there is a presumption that they are approved. (Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U. S., 549, 558; 33
S. Ct. 585; 57 Law. ed., 960; Porto Rico vs. American, etc., R. R., 254 F., 369; 165 C. C. A., 589; Camunas vs. P. R. Ry., etc., Co. [C. C.
A.], 272 F., 924, 931, and cases cited.)

The result is that all Porto Rican legislation now on the statute books is — in a very real sense, though indirectly — the output of our
Federal Government. Under such conditions, the court should not lightly assume that the tax acts of Porto Rico, now contended to
be in conflict with section 20 of the Organic Act, are inconsistent and therefore invalid. Doubtless the relation of the Organic Act to
the Porto Rican Government is in certain respects, like the relation of a state Constitution to a state Legislature. (Camunas vs. P. R.
Ry., etc., Co. [C. C. A.], 272 F., 924, 928.)

But the analogy is not complete; for, after all, the Organic Act is nothing but federal legislation, and Porto Rican legislation, approved
expressly or impliedly by Congress, has exactly the same import.

The only prohibition to the appointment of members of the Philippine Legislature to executive public offices is that contained in section 18 of
the Jones Law, which says that "No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he may have been elected, be eligible to any
office the election to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to any office of trust or profit which shall have been created or
the emoluments of which shall have been increased during such term." The present Speaker of the House of Representatives is clearly not
within said prohibition, as Act No. 2705 creating said committee was enacted in 1917, before his term of office began in 1922; so the now
President of the Senate, for which the said Act was passed during his term of office, that term had already expired in 1922, and he is not serving
another term (1922-1928).

Therefore, the Philippine Legislature may not only create the voting committee but designate the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee, always granting, for the sake of argument, that membership therein is a
public office.

It only remains now for us to dispose of another question, that of the power of the Governor-General to vote the stock of the Government
alone, granting again, for the sake of argument, that section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822, is unconstitutional in so far as it
refers to the designation of the President if the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of the voting
committee.

The provision in constitutions as to distribution of powers, and as to the executive power of the state being vested in the Governor,
is declaratory and does not confer any specific powers" (12 C. J., 898; Field vs. Peo, 3 Ill., 79). The power to vote the stock of the
Government is delegated to a committee to be composed exclusively of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the rule is "Where the power is delegated for a mere private purpose, all the persons
(if more than one), upon whom the authority is conferred must unite and concur in the exercise. In case of the delegation of a public
authority to three or more persons, the authority conferred may be exercised and performed by a majority of the whole member. If
the act to be done by virtue of such public authority requires the exercise of discretions and judgment, — in order words, if it is a
judicial act, — the persons to whom the authority is delegated must meet and confer together, and be present when the act is
 performed; or at least a majority must meet, confer, and be present after all have been notified to attend. Where the act is to be
done is merely ministerial, a majority must concur and unite in the performance of the act, but they may act separately. (18 C. J.,
472, note 3-a; Perry vs. Tynen, 22 Barb [N. Y., 137, 140].)

Whether we consider the delegation of the power to vote the stock of the Government as for public or private purpose, the Governor-General
alone cannot exercise it as the voting requires the exercise of discretion and judgment, and at least a majority must concur after all have been
notified.

To recapitulate, we believe that we have demonstrated the following propositions:

1. That the National Coal Company is not an agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Philippine Islands.

2. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, as mere corporator, if it had to vote its own stock would have to do so in the
capacity of a private citizen, and not in its sovereign capacity.

3. That the voting committee in exercising the power delegated to it does so in the same capacity as its principal.

4. That the voting of the stock of the Government is a private act, and the committee in doing so performs a private function, and
therefore membership therein is a private and not a public office.

5. That membership in the voting committee being a private position and not a public office, the designation by the Philippine
Legislature of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members thereof was not
an encroachment upon the power of supervision and control over all executive functions of the Government vested in the Governor-
General.

6. That even granting that membership in said committee is a public office, still the Philippine Legislature has the power to designate
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said committee, by virtue of
the residuum of power placed in its hands by the Congress of the United States.

7. That whether we consider the delegation of the voting power as for public or private purposes, the Governor-General alone
cannot exercise that power as it requires discretion and judgment, and at least a majority must concur.

8. That, finally, the Congress of the United States by its reserved power and authority to annul any law of the Philippine Legislature,
has by its silence impliedly ratified Act No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822.

For the foregoing considerations we are of the opinion that the demurrer should be sustained and the complaint be dismissed.

EN BANC

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 192935

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,

Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. G.R. No. 193036
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.,
Petitioners, Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
 BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and VILLARAMA, JR.,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY PEREZ,
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, MENDOZA, and
Respondents. SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 7, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established,

limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.[2] The Constitution is the basic and paramount

law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. [3] Constitutional

doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of

situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it.[4]

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive

Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity

as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article

VI of the Constitution[6] as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.[7]

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano

Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon

Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino

people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft

and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing

the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public
office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times
be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this
mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a
very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of
society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples trust and
confidence in the Government and its institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government
and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred
to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft
and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has
chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers;

c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the House of
Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the
Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the regular courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as
the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice
be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be
admitted for that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a
special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their
private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission
finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable
laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the
agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in
the discharge of its functions and duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by it as
necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out
the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings,
including the presentation of evidence;

k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes
of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
 SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel who, without
lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission refuses
to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to
administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for the Commission
to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively,
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances
of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the
validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under

the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and

employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and

recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an independent collegial body, it is

essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc

body is one.[8]

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the

Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards
in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make

recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a

fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial

fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys

past.[9] They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms

for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2)

they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish

their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or

empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy

recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about

past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.[11]

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a

retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent

future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while

the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer[12] puts it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural
speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs
that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow
crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to

enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the

same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
 economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth Commission
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations,
which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines is
mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching
pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread
poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or
even a statute.[13]

In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the

legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence
that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but
a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ),because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar

bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay,

Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE)by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and

Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.[18]

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and

question Executive Order No. 1;

 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by

usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for

a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual

case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity

of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will

sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the

issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[19]

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal

stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any

personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not

sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1.

Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly

justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights

as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a
resort to the courts.
 Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their

office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives

as legislators.[22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget

for its operations.[23] It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those

funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action

but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct

injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his

clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David

v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the
relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is
affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or
taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has
to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction
was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category
from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the
latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case
v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of
every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with
which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United
State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v.
Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of
the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
 Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for

nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is

of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.[25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious

constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no

direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers were

allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common

with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance[28] laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in

this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the

exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their

seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but

also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all. [30] Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to

know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not

due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to

perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body

of the Office of the President.[31]Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a

statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed [32] since there is no provision in the

Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission. [33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative

Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth

commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.[34] Insofar as it

vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is

inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity

thereof.[35]

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and

not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the

Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the

reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office

of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such
continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the

limits of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a

truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public offices

within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized.[37]According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of

government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated

functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.[38] This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers

wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.[39]

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to

ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the

functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the President to

investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the

exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing

purposes[42] and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.[43]

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices

and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the

legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may

create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the government.[45]

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as

expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and

structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units

thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other

Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice

versa.Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy

of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be

effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in

the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in

the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure
of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive

Secretary,[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the
executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which
constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office
of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls
under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis
Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter

or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the

former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is

inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the

laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416,

as amended by P.D. No. 1772.[48] The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including

the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and

activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has

been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is

already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the

administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the

purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.
 Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by

P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficioupon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987

Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was enacted
to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary.
Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the legislative
and executive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416 should
not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation,
adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed
repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of

the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are

faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all

powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case,

fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of

the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes

does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the
separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
 power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are

not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this

constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if

laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative

Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of

Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate,
the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
[Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the

President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and

enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past

like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the

government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds

have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public

office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already

appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is

no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever

funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission.[55] Moreover, since the

amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-

execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as

a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the

functions of the executive department.[57]

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the

appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons
who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the

legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same

law.[58] In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the

judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on

Human Rights.[59] Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on,
study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or
inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course,
is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding
or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the
inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful
inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation"
being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am
J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court
case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree,
or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included.
Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency

or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as

such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the

law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to

appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-

judicial power.[61]

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the

investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the

recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual

prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, [63] is certainly not a function given to the

commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary

interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the

courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized

government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the
local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No.

6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases
supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the

determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to

obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the

laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is

by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its

predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory

in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation.

These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments

for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in

upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in

Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
 The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not

apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC

an adventure in partisan hostility.[66] Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption

in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.[67]

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed

not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the same magnitude of controversies

and anomalies[68] were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the

respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials

targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second,

the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption. [69] In order to attain constitutional

permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo

administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the initial subject of the

investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said

administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the

petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the transactions of public officers

during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane

to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the

following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous
administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the
reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate
consequence of the policies of the previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality
that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally
dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by
a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President
Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former
President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada
under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of

the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the

requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any

form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.

But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal

protection clause.[74]

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated

alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals

in a similar manner.[76] The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and

arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted

authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw

distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions cover all the

departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection

of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. [80]

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply

requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits

classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification

rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[81] Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[82]

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the

class.[83] The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and

obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class

should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by

the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that

class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him.[84]

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number

included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must
not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'

Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality,
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The

clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption

during the previous administration[87] only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has

been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred
to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft
and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people,
committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken
thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past

administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal

protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for

vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these

distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The reports of

widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations
which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo

administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the

previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily

overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.[89] The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate

and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.[90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations

were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the

subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys

limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys

worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its

mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate

all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being

unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view

that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all

private rights determined and all public authority administered.[93] Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for

being unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1,

to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial

distinctions would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case

of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those

include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more

generally the exercise of first amendment rights.

 To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who

naturally belong to the class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude

additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar

circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and

which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the

same way as are the members of the class.[97]

The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection

clause.[98] Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach.[99] It has

been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to

be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the

purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by step process.[101] With regard to equal protection

claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to

cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked.[102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and

intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that

Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created

in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103]

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only

confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration. [104] The OSG points to Section 17 of

Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances
of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC

so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in

the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to

include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was

crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]
 The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter

(composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision, however, was devoid of any

discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally

mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue

interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like

the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political

situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to

progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that includes

the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine

whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the government.

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This

power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,

instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court,

on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over

the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary

mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or

invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting

claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and

guarantees to them.[107]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making

sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said

review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.

Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
 It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the

nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the means. No matter how

noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with

constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[108] The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to

uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present

administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of

reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most

interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized

that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of men. [110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of

the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No.

1.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See separate opinion (concurring)

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See dissenting opinion Please see dissenting opinion

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I certify that Justice Velasco left his concurring vote See concurring & dissenting opinion
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion See separate opinion (concurring)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion see my separate concurring opinion

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate dissenting opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate opinion (concurring)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003

SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,

ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,
HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR.,
CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL
ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,
AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS,
JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO,
CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE, CELSO
LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ,
RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING
MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER
BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003

HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON,
JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S. MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003

SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003

LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO
MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO
PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR.
BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS,
ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO
GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL
MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003

ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR.
MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003

CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO,
LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-
ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF
MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEÑA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO
G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003

DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA], REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF
CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND
BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over
the determination by the independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where
the Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.

Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-
equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to
chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.

There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the instant petitions – whether the filing
of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more
truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.

In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary
nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.

In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of
separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official
acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality.

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is
wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the
greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.

Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

ARTICLE XI

Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
 (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators
shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside,
but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under
the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House Impeachment
Rules are shown in the following tabulation:

11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF IMPEACHMENT

Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. –
Impeachment shall be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof or by a verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House.
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. – Impeachment Proceedings Deemed
Initiated. – In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of impeachment
or a citizen files a verified complaint that is
endorsed by a Member of the House through a
resolution of endorsement against an
impeachable officer, impeachment proceedings
against such official are deemed initiated on the
day the Committee on Justice finds that the
verified complaint and/or resolution against such
official, as the case may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date the House votes to
overturn or affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.

In cases where a verified complaint or a

resolution of impeachment is filed or endorsed, as
the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the House, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment with the Secretary General.

RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of

BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within the period of one (1)
Impeachment Proceedings. – Within a period of
one (1) year from the date impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment proceedings,
as such, can be initiated against the same official.
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 year.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other
high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, 7 and was
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent
to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee
on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted
and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7,
8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin
respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct
the impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting
further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction
that the second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for
Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the
second impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the
House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending
of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege
in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second
impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the
Senate President from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a
citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the
second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to
uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III
of the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.

In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is
a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House
of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.

In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national
and transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the
unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from
receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint due course.

In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and
Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without
jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."

In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding
interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the
Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint
is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and
Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.

In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint
involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles
of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.

In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1)
the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives
be declared null and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R.
No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In
addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.

Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before
October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.

Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions;
(b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than
4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished
legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties
and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.

Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by
way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the
House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion
to Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court
over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment
court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to
the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions;
(b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003.

On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it
is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no
justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only upon its
receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the
proceedings in the House of Representatives.

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to
Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in
Intervention were admitted.

On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and
Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3,
2003, to wit:

Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.

In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:

a) locus standi of petitioners;

b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);

c) political question/justiciability;

d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;

e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;

f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and

g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether
or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet
remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.

Judicial Review

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.

This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987
Constitution:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)

Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v.
Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:

x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred,
if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
 As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power
of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth
in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels,for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and
restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no express
constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its
historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our
Constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers?
The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of
government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of the
judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power
has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case
of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is
first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.

Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised
by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review
in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances
which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that
its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction,
and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments
in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the
definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary in that balancing operation."34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government,"
the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called
"expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship
speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:

xxx

The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that
is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations
thereof during the martial law regime. x x x

xxx

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs
the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where
we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these
are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:

A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been
held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and
the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to
construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:

x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through
Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:

x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others.When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction
with all other provisions of that great document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be
so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be
considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed
to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union
v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings
 are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that
respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker
De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v.
United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to
the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and
balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in
fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of review in
cases of impeachment.

Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited
to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the
Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the
interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.

Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the
case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which
are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of
judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court
and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between
Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the
legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises
a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a resolution of
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing
the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy
the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Essential Requisites for Judicial Review

As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is
subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than
that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.68 (Italics in the original)

Standing

Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has
sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly
contends.

Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and transcendental importance,71 and that
procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that,
when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical
reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.

The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . .
. that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring
that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader
policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the
public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

xxx

On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)

While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of
the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of
their own rights – as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession
– which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.

In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court opts to grant standing
to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing
trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office.83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,84 especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome
will affect their vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general.
It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax
the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect
the interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were
before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the
numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and
taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.

The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in
G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.

There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case
of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack
of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.

In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such liberality does
not, however, mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to
allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have standing.

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.
Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria,
et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261.
Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of
Representatives is successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.

Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.

Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that
differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of
Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which
the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to
Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.

Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet
the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:

x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses
of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)

In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public
funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to
clothe him with standing.

Ripeness and Prematurity

In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then may the
courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.

The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in
accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts
having been carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have
already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed
before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.

Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of
constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.

Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment
are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to
the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.

The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore, petitioners
would continue to suffer their injuries.

Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by
the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness
on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the
judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant
it.

Justiciability

In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:

[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking
cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and
refused to exercise its power of judicial review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved,
this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was
ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.

The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos
regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and
its application on issues involving political questions, viz:

MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three
major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to
enforce its decisions or commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and is the
most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by
the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

I suppose nobody can question it.

The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.

Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part or instrumentality of the government.

Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus,
that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for the
benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22,
although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration
had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22,
the media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only because our main writers were
already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of
martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own
colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of Malacañang. In
17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14
months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free
discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word
famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and
criticized with such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the
holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15.
But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the
supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays."
Thus the barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto, suggesting
that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When
the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of the
President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the
referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room
where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973
Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in force.

A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

xxx

The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the
Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
 Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is
not the only major case in which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.

x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.

xxx

x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?

The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided
case, a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what
her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital
duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity."

This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable
...

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government, the
Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.

Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters
of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.

I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the
judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:

MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but
also in other lower courts as may be created by law.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?

MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?

MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a
political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
 xxx

FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for
votes.

On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?

MR. CONCEPCION. No.

FR. BERNAS. It is not.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .

FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.

When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.

FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question doctrine.

MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also
a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion
hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."

Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On
the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.

In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.106 x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a
recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v.
Carr111 attempts to provide some:

x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.112(Underscoring supplied)

Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.

The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept,
for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a
constitutional issue.

In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-
bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now apply
this standard to the present controversy.

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.

II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.

III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.

V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More
importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114 Clearly, the issue calls upon
this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

Lis Mota

It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:

x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional
or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground
upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
 consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]

The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act
No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:

It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]

Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.

As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise
several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or
all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should
not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it
directly resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to
likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of
the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality
of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and
distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This
opinion is further strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.

En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v.
Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self.123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et.
al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did
not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was
not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the
"Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:

"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to
automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not
merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they
concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section
3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there
should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the
signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by
at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated by the
Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment
complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the
provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated
petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other
petitioners as well.

Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact
that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.

In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1)
whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Judicial Restraint

Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review
over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.

On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction
over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment."125But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to
them.

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court
is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed
with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas,
"jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction
of duty."

Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge
because no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it,
it has acted upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally
and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render
justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the
Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to
said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification
was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but
which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration — that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less
than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment
thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24
seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply
place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators,
singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself
from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of
an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the
three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:

Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the
Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power.
And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of
this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It
affects the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Court no alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership
of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)

Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial review.

In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'

2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of
the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
 4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal
or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided (citations omitted).

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might
also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home
and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument
by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode
public confidence and faith in the judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon
their constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.

Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
 x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has
passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences.
Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the
necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent
and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions,
or to sustain respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the
martial law regime.

Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless
manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any
of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.

Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their
office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by
those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and
enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure

for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress

Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3
(1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in
3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated
as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.

The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.

That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong
during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on
the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the
complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it.

"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice
Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in this
wise:

Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end.
The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading
to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.

Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
 language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:

MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which
have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang
Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting
with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the
Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the
one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this.
I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The
proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided.
Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.

xxx

MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all
affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United
States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to
18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF,
so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each
Member shall be recorded."

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles
of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of
a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will
not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United
States Congress. Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)

This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public
Officers.144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with
the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment
proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must
be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.

During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:

Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

xxx

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)

refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."

Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case."
The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted
first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the
House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case
in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the
Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place
not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House
of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or
upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same
complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a
vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official
is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.

Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.

The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A
vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a
proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read
ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers
confuse it.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House
of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to
the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a
doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.

Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by
the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a
meaning different meaning from filing and referral.

In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who
were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this Court likened the
former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in
these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings thereof.

Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to
promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out.
Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:

Section 3. (1) x x x

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making
power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.

In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best
judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,150 Justice
(later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v.
De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of the
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more
emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of
rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is
in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:

"x x x

"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or
clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a
rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional
restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154

xxx

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower
courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935
and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted
this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power were
shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the Legislative
departments of government.155

xxx

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely
to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality
of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected by the people.156

xxx
 The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-à-vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x

xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the
new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as
nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress – this Court
is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must
discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once
more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust
as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure,
it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights
and the Constitution are involved.

Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides
that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how
this "sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard
to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions
articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.

The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient
in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."

Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23,
2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.

Conclusion

If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and
collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the
seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally
and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be
the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the
Chief Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various sectors of society - from
the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith – offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official
relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.

Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged
and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment
complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court,
the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial
self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.

This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all
the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine
constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation
of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no
other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.

The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all
the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the
judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of
having founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.

It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the
members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake
as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve
conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time,
unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long
as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just
because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the
validity of a government branch's official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of any
member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to
regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as
essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does
not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice
Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen
to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it
is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use
of force and aggression upon each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner,
in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter
to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and
orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold
though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ
may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this
jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The
terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged
act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without
or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to
courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other
tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the
writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the
provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
 No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to
the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has
taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church
the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29,
1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now
that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their
oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with
its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere
religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men
and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively
to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made
legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows
divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of
the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052
of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY
FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS
WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the
same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the
whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs
and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the
Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the
postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government"
does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the
Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not
issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the
contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned
merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as
the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an
event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more
or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20
Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and
state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its
officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very
serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has
been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question
still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step
taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional
inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

U.S. Supreme Court

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 Cranch 137 137 (1803)

Marbury v. Madison

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137

Syllabus

The clerks of the Department of State of the United States may be called upon to give evidence of transactions in the Department which are not
of a confidential character.

The Secretary of State cannot be called upon as a witness to state transactions of a confidential nature which may have occurred in his
Department. But he may be called upon to give testimony of circumstances which were not of that character.

Clerks in the Department of State were directed to be sworn, subject to objections to questions upon confidential matters.
Some point of time must be taken when the power of the Executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time
must be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And the power has been exercised when the last act required from
the person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.

If the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the commission of an officer, it has been delivered when executed, and given to the Secretary
of State for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the party.

In cases of commissions to public officers, the law orders the Secretary of State to record them. When, therefore, they are signed and sealed,
the order for their being recorded is given, and, whether inserted inserted into the book or not, they are recorded.

When the heads of the departments of the Government are the political or confidential officers of the Executive, merely to execute the will of
the President, or rather to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear
than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the
performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country
for a remedy.

The President of the United States, by signing the commission, appointed Mr. Marbury a justice of the peace for the County of Washington, in
the District of Columbia, and the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the
signature, and of the completion of the appointment; and the appointment conferred on him a legal right to the office for the space of five
years. Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that
right for which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

To render a mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is directed must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ must be
directed, and the person applying for it must be without any other specific remedy.

Where a commission to a public officer has been made out, signed, and sealed, and is withheld from the person entitled to it, an action of
detinue for the commission against the Secretary of State who refuses to deliver it is not the proper remedy, as the judgment in detinue is for
the thing itself, or its value. The value of a public office, not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained. It is a plain case for a mandamus,
either to deliver the commission or a copy of it from the record.

To enable the Court to issue a mandamus to compel the delivery of the commission of a public office by the Secretary of State, it must be
shown that it is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or that it be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
the cause.

The authority given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial system of the United States to issue writs of mandamus to public
officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity,
expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each.

If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

At the December Term, 1801, William Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, Robert Townsend Hooe, and William Harper, by their counsel,

Page 5 U. S. 138

severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not
issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the District of
Columbia. This motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts: that notice of this motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr.
Adams, the late President of the United States, nominated the applicants to the Senate for their advice and consent to be appointed justices of
the peace of the District of Columbia; that the Senate advised and consented to the appointments; that commissions in due form were signed
by the said President appointing them justices, &c., and that the seal of the United States was in due form affixed to the said commissions by
the Secretary of State; that the applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commissions, who has not complied with that
request; and that their said commissions are withheld from them; that the applicants have made application to Mr. Madison as Secretary of
State of the United States at his office, for information whether the commissions were signed and sealed as aforesaid; that explicit and
satisfactory information has not been given in answer to that inquiry, either by the Secretary of State or any officer in the Department of State;
that application has been made to the secretary of the Senate for a certificate of the nomination of the applicants, and of the advice and
consent of the Senate, who has declined giving such a certificate; whereupon a rule was made to show cause on the fourth day of this term.
This rule having been duly served,

Page 5 U. S. 139

Mr. Jacob Wagner and Mr. Daniel Brent, who had been summoned to attend the court and were required to give evidence, objected to be
sworn, alleging that they were clerks in the Department of State, and not bound to disclose any facts relating to the business or transactions of
the office.

The court ordered the witnesses to be sworn, and their answers taken in writing, but informed them that, when the questions were asked, they
might state their objections to answering each particular question, if they had any.

Mr. Lincoln, who had been the acting Secretary of State, when the circumstances stated in the affidavits occurred, was called upon to give
testimony. He objected to answering. The questions were put in writing.

The court said there was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there had been, he was not obliged to answer it, and if he thought
anything was communicated to him confidentially, he was not bound to disclose, nor was he obliged to state anything which would criminate
himself.

The questions argued by the counsel for the relators were, 1. Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus in any case. 2.
Whether it will lie to a Secretary of State, in any case whatever. 3. Whether, in the present case, the Court may award a mandamus to James
Madison, Secretary of State.

Page 5 U. S. 153

Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

At the last term, on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case requiring the Secretary of State to show
cause why a mandamus

Page 5 U. S. 154

should not issue directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the
District of Columbia.

No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its
circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion
to be given by the Court is founded.

These principles have been, on the side of the applicant, very ably argued at the bar. In rendering the opinion of the Court, there will be some
departure in form, though not in substance, from the points stated in that argument.

In the order in which the Court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided.

1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?

3. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?

The first object of inquiry is:

1. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?

His right originates in an act of Congress passed in February, 1801, concerning the District of Columbia.

After dividing the district into two counties, the eleventh section of this law enacts,
"that there shall be appointed in and for each of the said counties such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the President
of the United States shall, from time to time, think expedient, to continue in office for five years. "

Page 5 U. S. 155

It appears from the affidavits that, in compliance with this law, a commission for William Marbury as a justice of peace for the County of
Washington was signed by John Adams, then President of the United States, after which the seal of the United States was affixed to it, but the
commission has never reached the person for whom it was made out.

In order to determine whether he is entitled to this commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed to the office.
For if he has been appointed, the law continues him in office for five years, and he is entitled to the possession of those evidences of office,
which, being completed, became his property.

The second section of the second article of the Constitution declares,

"The President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for."

The third section declares, that "He shall commission all the officers of the United States."

An act of Congress directs the Secretary of State to keep the seal of the United States,

"to make out and record, and affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States to be appointed by the President, by and
with the consent of the Senate, or by the President alone; provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same
shall have been signed by the President of the United States."

These are the clauses of the Constitution and laws of the United States which affect this part of the case. They seem to contemplate three
distinct operations:

1. The nomination. This is the sole act of the President, and is completely voluntary.

2. The appointment. This is also the act of the President, and is also a voluntary act, though it can only be performed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.

Page 5 U. S. 156

3. The commission. To grant a commission to a person appointed might perhaps be deemed a duty enjoined by the Constitution. "He shall,"
says that instrument, "commission all the officers of the United States."

The acts of appointing to office and commissioning the person appointed can scarcely be considered as one and the same, since the power to
perform them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the Constitution. The distinction between the appointment and the commission
will be rendered more apparent by adverting to that provision in the second section of the second article of the Constitution which authorises
Congress

"to vest by law the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of
departments;"

thus contemplating cases where the law may direct the President to commission an officer appointed by the Courts or by the heads of
departments. In such a case, to issue a commission would be apparently a duty distinct from the appointment, the performance of which
perhaps could not legally be refused.

Although that clause of the Constitution which requires the President to commission all the officers of the United States may never have been
applied to officers appointed otherwise than by himself, yet it would be difficult to deny the legislative power to apply it to such cases. Of
consequence, the constitutional distinction between the appointment to an office and the commission of an officer who has been appointed
remains the same as if in practice the President had commissioned officers appointed by an authority other than his own.
It follows too from the existence of this distinction that, if an appointment was to be evidenced by any public act other than the commission,
the performance of such public act would create the officer, and if he was not removable at the will of the President, would either give him a
right to his commission or enable him to perform the duties without it.

These observations are premised solely for the purpose of rendering more intelligible those which apply more directly to the particular case
under consideration.

Page 5 U. S. 157

This is an appointment made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is evidenced by no act but the
commission itself. In such a case, therefore, the commission and the appointment seem inseparable, it being almost impossible to show an
appointment otherwise than by proving the existence of a commission; still, the commission is not necessarily the appointment; though
conclusive evidence of it.

But at what stage does it amount to this conclusive evidence?

The answer to this question seems an obvious one. The appointment, being the sole act of the President, must be completely evidenced when
it is shown that he has done everything to be performed by him.

Should the commission, instead of being evidence of an appointment, even be considered as constituting the appointment itself, still it would
be made when the last act to be done by the President was performed, or, at furthest, when the commission was complete.

The last act to be done by the President is the signature of the commission. He has then acted on the advice and consent of the Senate to his
own nomination. The time for deliberation has then passed. He has decided. His judgment, on the advice and consent of the Senate concurring
with his nomination, has been made, and the officer is appointed. This appointment is evidenced by an open, unequivocal act, and, being the
last act required from the person making it, necessarily excludes the idea of its being, so far as it respects the appointment, an inchoate and
incomplete transaction.

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the Executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time
must be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act required from
the person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission. This idea seems to have prevailed with
the Legislature when the act passed converting the Department

Page 5 U. S. 158

of Foreign Affairs into the Department of State. By that act, it is enacted that the Secretary of State shall keep the seal of the United States,

"and shall make out and record, and shall affix the said seal to all civil commissions to officers of the United States, to be appointed by the
President: . . . provided that the said seal shall not be affixed to any commission before the same shall have been signed by the President of the
United States, nor to any other instrument or act without the special warrant of the President therefor."

The signature is a warrant for affixing the great seal to the commission, and the great seal is only to be affixed to an instrument which is
complete. It attests, by an act supposed to be of public notoriety, the verity of the Presidential signature.

It is never to be affixed till the commission is signed, because the signature, which gives force and effect to the commission, is conclusive
evidence that the appointment is made.

The commission being signed, the subsequent duty of the Secretary of State is prescribed by law, and not to be guided by the will of the
President. He is to affix the seal of the United States to the commission, and is to record it.

This is not a proceeding which may be varied if the judgment of the Executive shall suggest one more eligible, but is a precise course accurately
marked out by law, and is to be strictly pursued. It is the duty of the Secretary of State to conform to the law, and in this he is an officer of the
United States, bound to obey the laws. He acts, in this respect, as has been very properly stated at the bar, under the authority of law, and not
by the instructions of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.

If it should be supposed that the solemnity of affixing the seal is necessary not only to the validity of the commission, but even to the
completion of an appointment, still, when the seal is affixed, the appointment is made, and
Page 5 U. S. 159

the commission is valid. No other solemnity is required by law; no other act is to be performed on the part of government. All that the
Executive can do to invest the person with his office is done, and unless the appointment be then made, the Executive cannot make one
without the cooperation of others.

After searching anxiously for the principles on which a contrary opinion may be supported, none has been found which appear of sufficient
force to maintain the opposite doctrine.

Such as the imagination of the Court could suggest have been very deliberately examined, and after allowing them all the weight which it
appears possible to give them, they do not shake the opinion which has been formed.

In considering this question, it has been conjectured that the commission may have been assimilated to a deed to the validity of which delivery
is essential.

This idea is founded on the supposition that the commission is not merely evidence of an appointment, but is itself the actual appointment -- a
supposition by no means unquestionable. But, for the purpose of examining this objection fairly, let it be conceded that the principle claimed
for its support is established.

The appointment being, under the Constitution, to be made by the President personally, the delivery of the deed of appointment, if necessary
to its completion, must be made by the President also. It is not necessary that the livery should be made personally to the grantee of the office;
it never is so made. The law would seem to contemplate that it should be made to the Secretary of State, since it directs the secretary to affix
the seal to the commission after it shall have been signed by the President. If then the act of livery be necessary to give validity to the
commission, it has been delivered when executed and given to the Secretary for the purpose of being sealed, recorded, and transmitted to the
party.

But in all cases of letters patent, certain solemnities are required by law, which solemnities are the evidences

Page 5 U. S. 160

of the validity of the instrument. A formal delivery to the person is not among them. In cases of commissions, the sign manual of the President
and the seal of the United States are those solemnities. This objection therefore does not touch the case.

It has also occurred as possible, and barely possible, that the transmission of the commission and the acceptance thereof might be deemed
necessary to complete the right of the plaintiff.

The transmission of the commission is a practice directed by convenience, but not by law. It cannot therefore be necessary to constitute the
appointment, which must precede it and which is the mere act of the President. If the Executive required that every person appointed to an
office should himself take means to procure his commission, the appointment would not be the less valid on that account. The appointment is
the sole act of the President; the transmission of the commission is the sole act of the officer to whom that duty is assigned, and may be
accelerated or retarded by circumstances which can have no influence on the appointment. A commission is transmitted to a person already
appointed, not to a person to be appointed or not, as the letter enclosing the commission should happen to get into the post office and reach
him in safety, or to miscarry.

It may have some tendency to elucidate this point to inquire whether the possession of the original commission be indispensably necessary to
authorize a person appointed to any office to perform the duties of that office. If it was necessary, then a loss of the commission would lose the
office. Not only negligence, but accident or fraud, fire or theft might deprive an individual of his office. In such a case, I presume it could not be
doubted but that a copy from the record of the Office of the Secretary of State would be, to every intent and purpose, equal to the original. The
act of Congress has expressly made it so. To give that copy validity, it would not be necessary to prove that the original had been transmitted
and afterwards lost. The copy would be complete evidence that the original had existed, and that the appointment had been made, but not
that the original had been transmitted. If indeed it should appear that

Page 5 U. S. 161

the original had been mislaid in the Office of State, that circumstance would not affect the operation of the copy. When all the requisites have
been performed which authorize a recording officer to record any instrument whatever, and the order for that purpose has been given, the
instrument is in law considered as recorded, although the manual labour of inserting it in a book kept for that purpose may not have been
performed.
In the case of commissions, the law orders the Secretary of State to record them. When, therefore, they are signed and sealed, the order for
their being recorded is given, and, whether inserted in the book or not, they are in law recorded.

A copy of this record is declared equal to the original, and the fees to be paid by a person requiring a copy are ascertained by law. Can a keeper
of a public record erase therefrom a commission which has been recorded? Or can he refuse a copy thereof to a person demanding it on the
terms prescribed by law?

Such a copy would, equally with the original, authorize the justice of peace to proceed in the performance of his duty, because it would, equally
with the original, attest his appointment.

If the transmission of a commission be not considered as necessary to give validity to an appointment, still less is its acceptance. The
appointment is the sole act of the President; the acceptance is the sole act of the officer, and is, in plain common sense, posterior to the
appointment. As he may resign, so may he refuse to accept; but neither the one nor the other is capable of rendering the appointment a
nonentity.

That this is the understanding of the government is apparent from the whole tenor of its conduct.

A commission bears date, and the salary of the officer commences from his appointment, not from the transmission or acceptance of his
commission. When a person appointed to any office refuses to accept that office, the successor is nominated in the place of the person who

Page 5 U. S. 162

has declined to accept, and not in the place of the person who had been previously in office and had created the original vacancy.

It is therefore decidedly the opinion of the Court that, when a commission has been signed by the President, the appointment is made, and that
the commission is complete when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the Secretary of State.

Where an officer is removable at the will of the Executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern, because the act
is at any time revocable, and the commission may be arrested if still in the office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the
Executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed.

The discretion of the Executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power
over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person
appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.

Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed, and as the law
creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the Executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in
the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country.

To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.

This brings us to the second inquiry, which is:

2. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?

Page 5 U. S. 163

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain, the King himself is sued in the respectful form of a
petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.

In the third volume of his Commentaries, page 23, Blackstone states two cases in which a remedy is afforded by mere operation of law.

"In all other cases," he says,

"it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is
invaded."
And afterwards, page 109 of the same volume, he says,

"I am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the Courts of common law. And herein I shall for the present only remark that all
possible injuries whatsoever that did not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime tribunals are, for
that very reason, within the cognizance of the common law courts of justice, for it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England
that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress."

The Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve
this high appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.

If this obloquy is to be cast on the jurisprudence of our country, it must arise from the peculiar character of the case.

It behooves us, then, to inquire whether there be in its composition any ingredient which shall exempt from legal investigation or exclude the
injured party from legal redress. In pursuing this inquiry, the first question which presents itself is whether this can be arranged

Page 5 U. S. 164

with that class of cases which come under the description of damnum absque injuria -- a loss without an injury.

This description of cases never has been considered, and, it is believed, never can be considered, as comprehending offices of trust, of honour
or of profit. The office of justice of peace in the District of Columbia is such an office; it is therefore worthy of the attention and guardianship of
the laws. It has received that attention and guardianship. It has been created by special act of Congress, and has been secured, so far as the
laws can give security to the person appointed to fill it, for five years. It is not then on account of the worthlessness of the thing pursued that
the injured party can be alleged to be without remedy.

Is it in the nature of the transaction? Is the act of delivering or withholding a commission to be considered as a mere political act belonging to
the Executive department alone, for the performance of which entire confidence is placed by our Constitution in the Supreme Executive, and
for any misconduct respecting which the injured individual has no remedy?

That there may be such cases is not to be questioned. but that every act of duty to be performed in any of the great departments of
government constitutes such a case is not to be admitted.

By the act concerning invalids, passed in June, 1794, the Secretary at War is ordered to place on the pension list all persons whose names are
contained in a report previously made by him to Congress. If he should refuse to do so, would the wounded veteran be without remedy? Is it to
be contended that where the law, in precise terms, directs the performance of an act in which an individual is interested, the law is incapable of
securing obedience to its mandate? Is it on account of the character of the person against whom the complaint is made? Is it to be contended
that the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of their country?

Whatever the practice on particular occasions may be, the theory of this principle will certainly never be maintained.

Page 5 U. S. 165

No act of the Legislature confers so extraordinary a privilege, nor can it derive countenance from the doctrines of the common law. After
stating that personal injury from the King to a subject is presumed to be impossible, Blackstone, Vol. III. p. 255, says,

"but injuries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by the Crown without the intervention of its officers, for whom, the law, in
matters of right, entertains no respect or delicacy, but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors and misconduct of those agents by
whom the King has been deceived and induced to do a temporary injustice."

By the act passed in 1796, authorizing the sale of the lands above the mouth of Kentucky river, the purchaser, on paying his purchase money,
becomes completely entitled to the property purchased, and, on producing to the Secretary of State the receipt of the treasurer upon a
certificate required by the law, the President of the United States is authorized to grant him a patent. It is further enacted that all patents shall
be countersigned by the Secretary of State, and recorded in his office. If the Secretary of State should choose to withhold this patent, or, the
patent being lost, should refuse a copy of it, can it be imagined that the law furnishes to the injured person no remedy?

It is not believed that any person whatever would attempt to maintain such a proposition.
It follows, then, that the question whether the legality of an act of the head of a department be examinable in a court of justice or not must
always depend on the nature of that act.

If some acts be examinable and others not, there must be some rule of law to guide the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

In some instances, there may be difficulty in applying the rule to particular cases; but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty in laying
down the rule.

By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the

Page 5 U. S. 166

exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own conscience. To
aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his
orders.

In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and,
being entrusted to the Executive, the decision of the Executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the
act of Congress for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely
to the will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be
examinable by the Courts.

But when the Legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the
rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law, is amenable to the laws for his conduct,
and cannot at his discretion, sport away the vested rights of others.

The conclusion from this reasoning is that, where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the Executive, merely to
execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the
laws of his country for a remedy.

If this be the rule, let us inquire how it applies to the case under the consideration of the Court.

Page 5 U. S. 167

The power of nominating to the Senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated, are political powers, to be exercised by the
President according to his own discretion. When he has made an appointment, he has exercised his whole power, and his discretion has been
completely applied to the case. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the President, then a new appointment may be immediately
made, and the rights of the officer are terminated. But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed, the appointment
cannot be annihilated, and consequently, if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the President, the rights he has acquired are
protected by the law, and are not resumable by the President. They cannot be extinguished by Executive authority, and he has the privilege of
asserting them in like manner as if they had been derived from any other source.

The question whether a right has vested or not is, in its nature, judicial, and must be tried by the judicial authority. If, for example, Mr. Marbury
had taken the oaths of a magistrate and proceeded to act as one, in consequence of which a suit had been instituted against him in which his
defence had depended on his being a magistrate; the validity of his appointment must have been determined by judicial authority.

So, if he conceives that, by virtue of his appointment, he has a legal right either to the commission which has been made out for him or to a
copy of that commission, it is equally a question examinable in a court, and the decision of the Court upon it must depend on the opinion
entertained of his appointment.

That question has been discussed, and the opinion is that the latest point of time which can be taken as that at which the appointment was
complete and evidenced was when, after the signature of the President, the seal of the United States was affixed to the commission.

It is then the opinion of the Court:

1. That, by signing the commission of Mr. Marbury, the President of the United States appointed him a justice
Page 5 U. S. 168

of peace for the County of Washington in the District of Columbia, and that the seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of
State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment, and that the appointment conferred on
him a legal right to the office for the space of five years.

2. That, having this legal title to the office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that
right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.

It remains to be inquired whether,

3. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on:

1. The nature of the writ applied for, and

2. The power of this court.

1. The nature of the writ.

Blackstone, in the third volume of his Commentaries, page 110, defines a mandamus to be

"a command issuing in the King's name from the Court of King's Bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature
within the King's dominions requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to their office and duty, and which
the Court of King's Bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice."

Lord Mansfield, in 3 Burrows, 1266, in the case of The King v. Baker et al., states with much precision and explicitness the cases in which this
writ may be used.

"Whenever," says that very able judge,

"there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a franchise (more especially if it be in a matter of public concern or attended
with profit), and a person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and

Page 5 U. S. 169

has no other specific legal remedy, this court ought to assist by mandamus, upon reasons of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of
public policy, to preserve peace, order and good government."

In the same case, he says,

"this writ ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government
there ought to be one."

In addition to the authorities now particularly cited, many others were relied on at the bar which show how far the practice has conformed to
the general doctrines that have been just quoted.

This writ, if awarded, would be directed to an officer of government, and its mandate to him would be, to use the words of Blackstone,

"to do a particular thing therein specified, which appertains to his office and duty and which the Court has previously determined or at least
supposes to be consonant to right and justice."

Or, in the words of Lord Mansfield, the applicant, in this case, has a right to execute an office of public concern, and is kept out of possession of
that right.

These circumstances certainly concur in this case.

Still, to render the mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to whom it is to be directed must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may
be directed, and the person applying for it must be without any other specific and legal remedy.

1. With respect to the officer to whom it would be directed. The intimate political relation, subsisting between the President of the United
States and the heads of departments, necessarily renders any legal investigation of the acts of one of those high officers peculiarly irksome, as
well as delicate, and excites some hesitation with respect to the propriety of entering into such investigation. Impressions are often received
without much reflection or examination, and it is not wonderful that, in such a case as this, the assertion by an individual of his legal claims in a
court of justice, to which claims it is the duty of that court to attend, should, at first view, be considered

Page 5 U. S. 170

by some as an attempt to intrude into the cabinet and to intermeddle with the prerogatives of the Executive.

It is scarcely necessary for the Court to disclaim all pretensions to such a jurisdiction. An extravagance so absurd and excessive could not have
been entertained for a moment. The province of the Court is solely to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the Executive or
Executive officers perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political or which are, by the Constitution and laws,
submitted to the Executive, can never be made in this court.

But, if this be not such a question; if so far from being an intrusion into the secrets of the cabinet, it respects a paper which, according to law, is
upon record, and to a copy of which the law gives a right, on the payment of ten cents; if it be no intermeddling with a subject over which the
Executive can be considered as having exercised any control; what is there in the exalted station of the officer which shall bar a citizen from
asserting in a court of justice his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim or to issue a mandamus directing the performance of a
duty not depending on Executive discretion, but on particular acts of Congress and the general principles of law?

If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act under colour of his office by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be
pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment
of the law. How then can his office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct if the case be such a case as
would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?

It is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done, that the propriety or impropriety of
issuing a mandamus is to be determined. Where the head of a department acts in a case in which Executive discretion is to be exercised, in
which he is the mere organ of Executive will, it is

Page 5 U. S. 171

again repeated, that any application to a court to control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without hesitation.

But where he is directed by law to do a certain act affecting the absolute rights of individuals, in the performance of which he is not placed
under the particular direction of the President, and the performance of which the President cannot lawfully forbid, and therefore is never
presumed to have forbidden -- as for example, to record a commission, or a patent for land, which has received all the legal solemnities; or to
give a copy of such record -- in such cases, it is not perceived on what ground the Courts of the country are further excused from the duty of
giving judgment that right to be done to an injured individual than if the same services were to be performed by a person not the head of a
department.

This opinion seems not now for the first time to be taken up in this country.

It must be well recollected that, in 1792, an act passed, directing the secretary at war to place on the pension list such disabled officers and
soldiers as should be reported to him by the Circuit Courts, which act, so far as the duty was imposed on the Courts, was deemed
unconstitutional; but some of the judges, thinking that the law might be executed by them in the character of commissioners, proceeded to act
and to report in that character.

This law being deemed unconstitutional at the circuits, was repealed, and a different system was established; but the question whether those
persons who had been reported by the judges, as commissioners, were entitled, in consequence of that report, to be placed on the pension list
was a legal question, properly determinable in the Courts, although the act of placing such persons on the list was to be performed by the head
of a department.

That this question might be properly settled, Congress passed an act in February, 1793, making it the duty of the Secretary of War, in
conjunction with the Attorney General, to take such measures as might be necessary to obtain an adjudication of the Supreme Court of the
United
Page 5 U. S. 172

States on the validity of any such rights, claimed under the act aforesaid.

After the passage of this act, a mandamus was moved for, to be directed to the Secretary of War, commanding him to place on the pension list
a person stating himself to be on the report of the judges.

There is, therefore, much reason to believe that this mode of trying the legal right of the complainant was deemed by the head of a
department, and by the highest law officer of the United States, the most proper which could be selected for the purpose.

When the subject was brought before the Court, the decision was not that a mandamus would not lie to the head of a department directing
him to perform an act enjoined by law, in the performance of which an individual had a vested interest, but that a mandamus ought not to
issue in that case -- the decision necessarily to be made if the report of the commissioners did not confer on the applicant a legal right.

The judgment in that case is understood to have decided the merits of all claims of that description, and the persons, on the report of the
commissioners, found it necessary to pursue the mode prescribed by the law subsequent to that which had been deemed unconstitutional in
order to place themselves on the pension list.

The doctrine, therefore, now advanced is by no means a novel one.

It is true that the mandamus now moved for is not for the performance of an act expressly enjoined by statute.

It is to deliver a commission, on which subjects the acts of Congress are silent. This difference is not considered as affecting the case. It has
already been stated that the applicant has, to that commission, a vested legal right of which the Executive cannot deprive him. He has been
appointed to an office from which he is not removable at the will of the Executive, and, being so

Page 5 U. S. 173

appointed, he has a right to the commission which the Secretary has received from the President for his use. The act of Congress does not,
indeed, order the Secretary of State to send it to him, but it is placed in his hands for the person entitled to it, and cannot be more lawfully
withheld by him than by another person.

It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a specific legal remedy for the commission which has been withheld from Mr.
Marbury, in which case a mandamus would be improper. But this doubt has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the
thing itself, or its value. The value of a public office not to be sold is incapable of being ascertained, and the applicant has a right to the office
itself, or to nothing. He will obtain the office by obtaining the commission or a copy of it from the record.

This, then, is a plain case of a mandamus, either to deliver the commission or a copy of it from the record, and it only remains to be inquired:

Whether it can issue from this Court.

The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court

"to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under
the authority of the United States."

The Secretary of State, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the
description, and if this Court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional,
and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.

The Constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from
time to time, ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and consequently,
in some form, may be exercised over the present

Page 5 U. S. 174

case, because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power. it is declared that

"The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."

It has been insisted at the bar, that, as the original grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme and inferior courts is general, and the clause assigning
original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the Legislature to assign original
jurisdiction to that Court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited, provided those cases belong to the judicial
power of the United States.

If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts
according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power and
the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage -- is entirely without meaning -- if such is to be
the construction. If Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction
shall be original, and original jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.

Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed, and, in this case, a negative or exclusive sense
must be given to them or they have no operation at all.

It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect, and therefore such construction is inadmissible
unless the words require it.

Page 5 U. S. 175

If the solicitude of the Convention respecting our peace with foreign powers induced a provision that the Supreme Court should take original
jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them, yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases if
no further restriction on the powers of Congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such
exceptions as Congress might make, is no restriction unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.

When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system divides it into one Supreme and so many inferior courts as the Legislature may
ordain and establish, then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them as to define the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by
declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction, the plain import of the words
seems to be that, in one class of cases, its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other, it is appellate, and not original. ,If any other
construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to the
obvious meaning.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them
to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that, if it be the will of the Legislature
that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true; yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in
effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong to

Page 5 U. S. 176

appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this to enable the Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.

The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States to issue writs of mandamus
to public officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution, and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can
be exercised.

The question whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United
States, but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have
been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor
can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from
which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.

This original and supreme will organizes the government and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here
or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.

The Government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with
limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited

Page 5 U. S. 177

and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant
to it, or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.

Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,
or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written
Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.

Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,
and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.

This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this Court as one of the fundamental
principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.

If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give
it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact
what was established in theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more
attentive consideration.

It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of
necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.

Page 5 U. S. 178

So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either
decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.

If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and
not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.

This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written Constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that, if the Legislature shall do what is
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the Legislature a practical and
real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that
those limits may be passed at pleasure.

That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions -- a written Constitution, would of
itself be sufficient, in America where written Constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the
peculiar expressions of the Constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the Constitution.

Page 5 U. S. 179

Could it be the intention of those who gave this power to say that, in using it, the Constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising
under the Constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises?

This is too extravagant to be maintained.

In some cases then, the Constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read
or to obey?

There are many other parts of the Constitution which serve to illustrate this subject.

It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of
flour, and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the Constitution,
and only see the law?

The Constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed."

If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be prosecuted under it, must the Court condemn to death those victims whom
the Constitution endeavours to preserve?

"No person,' says the Constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court."

Here. the language of the Constitution is addressed especially to the Courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be
departed from. If the Legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must
the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?

From these and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent that the framers of the Constitution

Page 5 U. S. 180

contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the Legislature.

Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner to their conduct in their
official character. How immoral to impose it on them if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating
what they swear to support!

The oath of office, too, imposed by the Legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words:

"I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will
faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the
Constitution and laws of the United States."

Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution of the United States if that Constitution forms no rule for his
government? if it is closed upon him and cannot be inspected by him?

If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe or to take this oath becomes equally a crime.

It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first
mentioned, and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.

The rule must be discharged.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,

vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR,respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.

LAUREL, J.:

This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit
the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent,
against the election of said petitioner as member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:

(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo
and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province
of Tayabas;

(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly
for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;

(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;

(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following resolution:

[No. 8]

RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES NO SE HA PRESENTADO

PROTESTA.

Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado debidamente
una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la presente, son aprobadas y
confirmadas.

Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.

(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest"
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8
aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the
first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified;
 (6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which provides:

6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.

(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before
the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe
the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for
its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the
prescribed period;

(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there
is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National
Assembly after confirmation;

(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal";

(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936, denying
herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."

The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:

(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly;

(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said election contests, which
power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the National Assembly;

(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive jurisdiction relates solely
to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to matters involving their internal organization, the
Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate
such proceedings;

(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;

(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-
McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of
article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it
involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.

On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral Commission interposing the
following special defenses:

(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested
with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests
against the election of any member of the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the
implied powers granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and functions
conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the
petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted
in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth
Government, and hence said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;

(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the members of the National
Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction
to take cognizance of election protests filed within the time that might be set by its own rules:
 (c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the Constitution as an instrumentality
of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226
and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against which prohibition would lie.

The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting forth the following as his
special defense:

(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there was no existing law fixing
the period within which protests against the election of members of the National Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December
9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission
was exercising a power impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;

(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, the last day fixed
by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;

(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent and over the parties
thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was
an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;

(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of its members, and
that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral
Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasi-judicial functions,
whose decision are final and unappealable;

( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, within the
terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II
(should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in
the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;

(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united States) has no application
to the case at bar.

The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary
writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by
resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.

There was no appearance for the other respondents.

The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:

1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing
related facts, and in the affirmative,

2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed
the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?

We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the question of jurisdiction having been
presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to
overlook the broader aspect of the question and leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of
counsel were we not to pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our
Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however, is subject to
the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-
fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he
chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the
conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The
Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.

But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however,
sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our
people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the
restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels,
for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article
VIII of our constitution.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.

But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in
the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty . . . the people who are authors of this
blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their
constitution." In the Last and ultimate analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the
crucible of Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the
said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous
confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the
effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere
surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said
date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on
the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the
light of American experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a
constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the
limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not
subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting
claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the
judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government, the framers of
our constitution adopted the American type where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some
countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of
direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a
similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece,
Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak Republic,
February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in
our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are
clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."

Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and determine whether the
Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the
National Assembly on December 3, 1935. As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:

"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
It is imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the intention of its framers
and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import and significance.

The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the rule that "the assembly shall
be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of
the United States providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act
of Congress of August 29, 1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members . . ."
apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to
characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete"
(Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)

The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the legislature was taken by
the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee
submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but
also against the election of executive officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment
proceedings against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be composed of
three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to which the contest corresponds, three
members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is
also a member in which case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to
the Convention on September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four members,
that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two representatives to be designated one each
from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two
representatives to be designated by the President.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on September 24, 1934
subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as follows:
 The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the election of any of their
members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House, by three members elected by the members of
the party having the largest number of votes therein, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number
of votes, and as to its Chairman, one Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.

The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the Committee on Constitutional
Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in
favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited
jurisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative
Power with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the project of adopting a
unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:

(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of
its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest
number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes,
and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike out the whole subsection
of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of
December 4, 1934, as to the scope of the said draft:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines, paragraph 6, page 11 of the
draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases contesting the
election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz
whether the election and qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is why the word "judge" is
used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a member, there is nothing to be submitted to the
Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be determined.

Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the election of those whose
election is not contested?

Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of Representatives confirming the
election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his
credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.

Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the auditor, in the matter of
election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.

Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens with regards to the
councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims
— in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case;
there is no need on the part of the Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by
the gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected. From example, in a
case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the citizenship of the man who has been elected
is in question.

However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers upon its first meeting
when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral Commission all the powers exercised by the
assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be
judged.

Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.

Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.

 Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte when I arose a while
ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases
contesting the election as separate from the first part of the sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.

Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already included in the phrase "the
elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was inserted merely for the sake of clarity.

Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm the elections of the
members."

Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.

Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?

THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.

Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.

Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the assembly, the assembly on its
own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds of the assembly believe
that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him for that reason.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.

Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility of its members?

Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and make the question before the
Electoral Commission.

Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not contested.

Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.

Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority to pass upon the
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not been raised.

Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.

In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura,
Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas
speaking for the Sponsorship Committee said:

xxx xxx xxx

Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios Delegados al efecto de que
la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly" parece
que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para
obviar esa dificultad, creemos que la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como
 sigue: "All cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a los casos en que
haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was voted upon the following interpellation
also took place:

El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera

El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?

El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.

El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres a la Corte Suprema, ¿no
cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria
como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo
que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.

El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidismo?

El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.

xxx xxx xxx

The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98)
against fifty-six (56).

In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party
and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission.

As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:

(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National
Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme
Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.

The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and
of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of
votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its
chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.

When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President Recto, to effectuate the
original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to" between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the
elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.

The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature long lodged in the legislative
body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere experiment in the science of government.

Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid account of the "scandalously
notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the House of Commons in the following passages which are
partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum of March 14, 1936:
 153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications
of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the determination of controverted elections, and
rights of membership. One of the standing committees appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the
committee of privileges and elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to time. When an election
petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses and other evidence, and made a report of all the
evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by
the house. The other mode of proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was
heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of privileges and elections
although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a select committee was usually what is called an
open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee, a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all
the members of the house were at liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.

154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually assumed a political
character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had been tried and determined by the house of
commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir
Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the
Chippenham election. Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house were insensibly, but too
successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters, and in questions of higher importance to the
public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the
evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770, obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of
controverted elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr.
Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their respective causes, the
principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly
canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of
justice, but by the discretionary impulse of our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many
members of this house, who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon which they should
determine with the strictest impartiality."

155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with the approbation of both
houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the celebrated law since known by the name of the
Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the
security of the constitution, that was ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or
the apparent success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a judgement,
which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been entirely confirmed by subsequent
experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey, afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson,
who had been clerk of the house, and Mr. Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an
essential alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and jurisdictions of
the house of commons.

As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of the controverted elections of
its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with
rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary
Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32 Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act, 1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of
England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the
House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts. Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally
determined by each house, are since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of
members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916, chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The
Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to
decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the German Reich of July 1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the
Constitution of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.

The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary is by no means unknown in
the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the number of electoral votes received by each of the two
opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877
(United States Statutes at Large, vol. 19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by
the Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth justice to be selected by the
four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although
there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field,
who was a member of that body on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate
Power under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the experiment has at least
abiding historical interest.

The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature in years and experience.
To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When , therefore, they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of
their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of
the wisdom and "ultimate justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this
body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited
and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any
other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a
body separate from and independent of the legislature.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; State vs.Whisman, 36
S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of
the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of
power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine
contested cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority
from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A
sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but
in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen to act, a
situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National
Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.

We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the importance and necessity of
respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate department of the government and of according validity to
its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against
members of the National Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled
rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or
the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its regulative authority by admitting
protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But
the possibility of abuse is not argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second
place, if any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be
sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not intended to be corrected by the
judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive
determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All
the agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ working within
its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great
ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenge
in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.

But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable character that should not
be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November
15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new
National Assembly convened on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner was filed
on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on
December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of
election protest. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized. As a
mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives division of the National Assembly attached to the record of
this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the
Electoral Commission were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming
non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time for the presentation of protests, the
result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had
already barred the presentation of protests before the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and
method to be followed in a matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.

From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests had been filed at
the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While
there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when
the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the
National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As
contended by the Electoral Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the
protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can
discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a
member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National
Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).

Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States, confirmation is neither necessary
in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting
such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol.
21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A., Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse
to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the Speaker of the House of
Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals,
and to give such directions for confirming or altering the return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the
determination as circumstances may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the
particular house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing, Law and Practice
of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).

Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed the time when protests
against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the
sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to
respectively prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality,
after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution confirming or approving the
returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the
filing of further protests against the election of those members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature,
Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp.
892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly
abrogated also, for the reason that with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus no law nor
constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on December 3, 1935, the time for the
filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection
through the medium of confirmation.

Summarizing, we conclude:

(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of power into the
legislative, the executive and the judicial.

(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult the delimitation of the
powers granted.

(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power
and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and
perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the governments.

(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly.

(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was
respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members.

(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to contests
relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.

(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with it ex
necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.

( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass upon all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations
regarding the manner of conducting said contests.

(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine
Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act
No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its
members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and
expenses of contest.

(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to
take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the
resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional creation and as to the scope
and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission
is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

I concur in the result and in most of the views so ably expressed in the preceding opinion. I am, however, constrained to withhold my assent to
certain conclusions therein advanced.

The power vested in the Electoral Commission by the Constitution of judging of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, is judicial in nature. (Thomas vs. Loney, 134 U.S., 372; 33 Law. ed., 949, 951.) On the
other hand, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, is legislative in character.
(M'Elmoyle vs. Cohen, 13 Pet., 312; 10 Law. ed., 177; Missouri vs. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496; 50 Law. ed., 572.)

It has been correctly stated that the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of the separation of powers
into legislative, executive, and judicial. Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly. (Article VI, sec. 1.) In the absence of any clear
constitutional provision to the contrary, the power to regulate the time in which notice of a contested election may be given, must be deemed
to be included in the grant of legislative power to the National Assembly.

The Constitution of the United States contains a provision similar to the that found in Article VI, section 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines.
Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States provides that each house of the Congress shall be the judge of the elections, returns,
and qualifications of its own members. Notwithstanding this provision, the Congress has assumed the power to regulate the time in which
notice of a contested election may be given. Thus section 201, Title 2, of the United States Code Annotated prescribes:

Whenever any person intends to contest an election of any Member of the House of Representatives of the United States, he shall,
within thirty days after the result of such election shall have been determined by the officer or board of canvassers authorized by
law to determine the same, give notice, in writing, to the Member whose seat he designs to contest, of his intention to contest the
same, and, in such notice, shall specify particularly the grounds upon which he relies in the contest. (R. S., par. 105.)

The Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as the Jones Law, also contained a provision to the effect that the Senate and House of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective members. Notwithstanding
this provision, the Philippine Legislature passed the Election Law, section 478 of which reads as follows:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the time and manner of filing contest in the
election of members of said bodies, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any,
and shall fix the costs and expenses of contest which may be paid from their respective funds.

The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Commission was not to erect a body that would be above the law, but to
raise legislative elections contests from the category of political to that of justiciable questions. The purpose was not to place the commission
beyond the reach of the law, but to insure the determination of such contests with the due process of law.

Section 478 of the Election Law was in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, Article XV, section 2, of which provides that —

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter,
such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so
far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

The manifest purpose of this constitutional provision was to insure the orderly processes of government, and to prevent any hiatus in its
operations after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. It was thus provided that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall
remain operative even after the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, and that all
references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
government and corresponding officials under the Constitution. It would seem to be consistent not only with the spirit but the letter of the
Constitution to hold that section 478 of the Election Law remains operative and should now be construed to refer to the Electoral Commission,
which, in so far as the power to judge election contests is concerned, corresponds to either the Senate or the House of Representative under
the former regime. It is important to observe in this connection that said section 478 of the Election Law vested the power to regulate the time
and manner in which notice of a contested election may be given, not in the Philippine Legislature but in the Senate and House of
Representatives singly. In other words, the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the elections of members of the
Philippine Legislature was by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed with power to decide such contests. Construing section 478 of the
Election Law to refer to the National Assembly, as required by Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, it seems reasonable to conclude that
the authority to prescribe the time and manner of filing contests in the election of members of the National Assembly is vested in the Electoral
Commission, which is now the body clothed with power to decide such contests.

In the light of what has been said, the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, could not have the effect of barring the
right of the respondent Pedro Ynsua to contest the election of the petitioner. By the same token, the Electoral Commission was authorized
by law to adopt its resolution of December 9, 1935, which fixed the time with in which written contests must be filed with the commission.

Having been filed within the time fixed by its resolutions, the Electoral Commission has jurisdiction to hear and determine the contest filed by
the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the petitioner Jose A. Angara.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957

LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,

vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and
FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.

Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate,
at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo,
Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-
elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias,
Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-
in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .

The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose
Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner
Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon
nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong,
the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal.
Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary,
respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2)
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said
Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.

Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier
and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of
23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the Citizens Party;
that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office
therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the
appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and
Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators
Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged
members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3)
senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3)
Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is
the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said
five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".

Petitioners pray that:.

"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be
immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being
occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.

"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded
therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.".

Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the election of
respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators.
Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to
direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of
action, because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more
Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .

I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the
constitutional convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission
provided for in the original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial
forum", but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".

We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon
(46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek
to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the
Constitution provides that the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of
Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).

Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very
enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.

"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether
the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate
branch of the, government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one
case we are seeking to ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine
whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-
Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).

The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said
case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President
over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from
the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into
the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an
act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise
of the so-called "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the
powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain
acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.

In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of
Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be
evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.

Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In
the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been
suspended by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this
decision, as a precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to
determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed
for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate
electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in
the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate.

The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main
purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half
(1/2) of the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence,
the issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and
of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass
upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest
number of votes in the Senate. The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised,
either by the Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.

xxx xxx xxx

ISSUE: The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper
remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether
the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.

In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use petitioner,
Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief
against the acts complained of in the petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate,
in the course of the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he would
suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Tañada replied:.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there
is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as
Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the
Supreme Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The
theory of separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President,
notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in
the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been
done here is pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as
members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada was
made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this
connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass
judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by
statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with
the question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government
because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or
political policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted
him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a
certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not
be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to
designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d
29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with
the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .

In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court
has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The
question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it
would seem to be finally settled.

xxx xxx x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948,
19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St.
Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the
people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters
which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from
judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable,
not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control.
But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the
people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be
one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417;
emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member
and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the
constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with
"full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.

".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has
by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity
with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory
rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by
the parties herein.

ISSUE II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the
Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of
the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to
nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those
who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate.
Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having
the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal,
the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator
Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party
in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further stated that he
reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After
some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning,
February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).

Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada, but, also,
maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs
to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said
party may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other
Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate
consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be
remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp.
377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf
of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is Senator
Lorenzo M. Tañada.".

Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this
proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to
complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.

"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco,
not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these
additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the
largest number of votes to nominate three.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.

"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the
last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el
Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios
Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis
supplied.).

Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said
party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be
members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is,
admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9)
members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that
when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that,
when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law,
relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members
of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and
lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to
the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three
Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the
present composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that
although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that
Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the
Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.

"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing
Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we
should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32;
emphasis supplied.).

Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to
nominate," adding that:.

".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party,
and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Tañada was
included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista
Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party,
he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere
coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that
the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id.,
p. 360; emphasis supplied.).

The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we
like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the
Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is
within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the
opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege" to
nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any,
objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the
Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional
provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and
that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.

Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the
question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a
general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any
application". As a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive
interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that
"the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional
provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of
some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if
in the judgment of the court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount
considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.

The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential to
give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning
of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and
spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public
policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall",
as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method
prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and
the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar
as the number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More
important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and
back up the theory of petitioners herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the
adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a
member of said Convention, says:.

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political
justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the
dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent
injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the
organs of public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by
no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the
Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and
Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol.
1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in a
position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make
each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and
dictate the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the
expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system,
like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only
through the intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the
rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to
dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of
them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these
members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to
a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
351; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.

"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative
bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So
the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive
body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should
continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system
obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested
in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest,
purely political as has been observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.

Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.

"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the equal
representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the
Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in
the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking
body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:.

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority
party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many
times in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the
moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough
guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.

`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this
intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any
fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of
the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon
the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought
before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of
the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral
matters having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.

`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests.
Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or
incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I
repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the
protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the
intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in
power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the
tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three
members of the majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices
of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).

The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.

"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and experience.
To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they
deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and
determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of
their own experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral
Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98
against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of
the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this
body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its
membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.

"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala
mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la
minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunbo.

"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran
del partidisrno?.

"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis
supplied.).

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the
disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a)
the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each
House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that
partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the
Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the
former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to
Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with
it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.

"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to
prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.

"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the
members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .

"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they
will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to
decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that
even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that
we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three
from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along
party liner, still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the
three Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the
majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the
Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no
partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when
they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.

xxx xxx x x x.

"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its
decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the
decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or
protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate
questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative of
the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes
maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties
respectively making the nominations. 10.

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest, number of
votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It
is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting
equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present
Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be
organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true
intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit
of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is
not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its
spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).

"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those
which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is
to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does
not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which
would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of
permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such
that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as
mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed
directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory
construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new
law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done
is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial
construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute
is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and
prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as
directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in
a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to
be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be
done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or
proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before
certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp.
463-467; emphasis supplied.).

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme
Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection
of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence,
compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.

It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven
(7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our
Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its
letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal
consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2)
members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one
member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party.
The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other
two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the
aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five
(5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With
the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The
equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the
Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations
in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove
to forestall. 13.

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when
Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon
the principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the
political parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of
the individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great
note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must
limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they
believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms
and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the
party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34,
supra.).

In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the
Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.

" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for
the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with
unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed
elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the
reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in
judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral
Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully,
we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt
and ruthless party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.

xxx xxx x x x.

".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority
against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by
candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation
made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for
the obvious and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal.

xxx xxx x x x.

"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates who
were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).

The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional
provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure
his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted
in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it
applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect,
which Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or
party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.

The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator
Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to
make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies
to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp.
490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of
Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the
legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not
been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may
nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these
three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that
the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said
Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.

As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their
appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14
or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter
falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in
relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not
been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are
hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection
with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:.

In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution provided that "There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated
by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As all the members
of the National Assembly then belonged to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to comply with the constitutional
requirement that three members of the Electoral Commission should be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes,
the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional provision involved. Secretary of Justice Jose
A. Santos accordingly rendered the following opinion:.

"Sir:.

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 24, 1939, thru the office of His Excellency, the President, in which you
request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':.

`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members
chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes therein.'.

"You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly belong to the Nacionalista Party, it is impossible to comply with the last
part of the provision which requires that three members shall be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Assembly.'.

"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1) that there shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of the six members to be
chosen by the National Assembly, three shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes and three by the party having the
second largest number of votes.

"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the first two drafts it was provided that the Electoral Commission shall be
composed of `three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of vote three elected by the members of the
party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court ..(Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 260-
261). But as finally adopted by the Convention, the Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen by the National
Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, an and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes' (Aruego, The Framing of the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).

"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is evident that the intention of the framers of our Constitution was that
there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. It was also intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any
partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission. The primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively on
partisan considerations.

"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six members in the
Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be
exercised, it logically follows that the only party the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution
that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could not have been intended. We cannot say that the
Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always
have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they shall not be taken to
mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the circumstances may have so changed as to make a different
rule after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral
Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any member of the
minority party is protested. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the
majority in the Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no
minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to
be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has undergone since it was first
introduced until finally adopted by the convertion, as well as, the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in
adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme
Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to such
nomination.".

Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral Commission was formally organized, with six members of the National
Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly
adopted in 1940, and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. It is now provided that "Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by
each house, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of
votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Article VI, Section 11, of the Constitution.).

If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the amendment of 1940 the framers of which may be assumed to have been
fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the Secretary of
Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in such a form as to nullify said opinion, Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution not only
did not substantially depart from the original constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that "Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members," the intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times the Electoral Tribunal shall have nine
Members regardless of whether or not two parties make up each house of Congress.

It is very significant that while the party having the second largest number of votes is allowed to nominate three Members of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further that the six
Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither controlling nor
necessary.

Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient Members belonging to the party having the second largest of votes, the
latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the Chief Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd, would
frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the possibility of deadlocks. It
would not be accurate to argue that the Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the Supreme Court would naturally vote
along purely partisan lines, checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices; otherwise membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to
the Justices of the Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives. Upon the other hand,
he framers of the Constitution-not insensitive to some such argument-still had reposed their faith and confidence in the independence,
integrity and uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does
everybody, to decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme Court election contests exclusively upon their merits.

In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada of the Citizens Party, the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the Electoral Tribunal, the Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional
mandate, to choose-as it did-said two Members.

I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endencia, J., concurs.

LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.

I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.

The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco and Delgado were elected by the Senate members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is as follows:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman." (Section II, Article VI of the Constitution.).
I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional provision, is mandatory in character and that this character is true not only of
the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be chosen.
Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory construction.

"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional provisions will be given mandatory effect than is true of any other class
of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords with the generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its character is such as to
require absolute compliance in all cases without exception. And the very principles of our institutions, involving as they do concepts of
constitutional supremacy, are such as to form reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a constitution intended that just such
efficacy be given to it .." (Sec. 5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p.84.).

The majority helds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the Senate who does not belong to the Nacionalista Party, has refused to
exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two other members the Senate may not elect said two other members. And
the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority. This holding
is subject to the following fundamental objections. In the first Place, it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a mandatory provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the power
that the constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e., that of electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or
prerogative is lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority,
contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third place, it would make the supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination
lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and paramount over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by the
ruling of the majority, a procedural provision overrides a substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important mandatory provision
that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by interpretation inserted a
provision in the Constitution, which the Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce, namely, a proviso to the effect that if the
minority fails or refuses to exercise its privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be
correspondingly reduced. This arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law or reason.

I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator Tañada to nominate the two other members must be construed as a waiver
of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the constitutional provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason. The above
principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes membership at nine and that
which outlines the procedure in which said membership of nine may be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is the legal principle that
provisions which in their application may nullify each other should be reconciled to make them both effective, if the reconciliation can be
effected by the application of other legal principles. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the principle of waiver.

While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step in, when a constitutional mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate
even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear that the
form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been
clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil., 67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil., 44;
Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compania Gral. de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez,
40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil 599; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil., 1; People vs. Pomar, 46
Phil., 440. Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil., 676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo, 50 Phil., 348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50
Phil, 399; Manila Electric vs. Pasay Transp., 57 Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs.
Rilloraza, 45 Off. Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm. investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off.
Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall. 457;
Civil Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S. vs. S. Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. and Charleston Railroad Co.], 109 U.
S. 3 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S. 286.

2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is substantially identical to each of the Electoral Tribunals under the Constitution
as amended.

3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and Rodriguez vs. Teasurer of the Philippines, 84 Phil., 368, 45 Off. Gaz., 4411,
4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil., 101, 47 Off. Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De los Santos vs.
Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93; Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93 Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz.,
2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51 Off. Gaz., 5607.

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_ 4 "From the very nature of the American system of government with Constitutions
prescribing the jurisdiction and powers of each of the three branches of government, it has devolved on the judiciary to determine whether the
acts of the other two departments are in harmony with the fundamental law. All the departments are of the government are unquestionably
entitled and compelled to judge of the Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the obligations imposed in the instrument,
and in the order of time pointed out by it. When the, judiciary has once spoken, if the acts of the other two departments are held to be
unauthorized or despotic, in violation of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen, they cease to be operative or binding.

xxx xxx x x x.

"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary as well as the other departments of government and the judges are
sworn to support its provisions, the court are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands. It is their duty in authorized proceedings to
give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of such provisions.

"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be
declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is
directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty
of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional cause they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts
to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a
statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would
lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not
decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the
judicial tribunals." (11 Am. Jur., pp. 712-713, 713-715; emphasis supplied).

5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29 Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100; State vs. Swift, 69 Ind. 505;
State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785; Prohibition and Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler vs. Hill, 14 N. W.
738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W. 1064; University vs. Melver, 72 N. C. 76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs. Powell, 27 South,
927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs. Palmer, 96 S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.

6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the, constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six in the
Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot be
exercised, it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the Constitution
that there shall be six members from the National Assembly would be nullified.

"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the Commission were not and could have been intended; We cannot say that the
Commission should have nine members during one legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must always
have a consistent application. The membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not dependent upon the
existence or non-existence of one or more parties in the Assembly.

`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they shall not be taken to
mean one thing at one time and another thing at another time, even though the circumstance may have so changed as to make a different rule
seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.

"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral
Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to protect their interests, especially when the election of any member of the
minority party is protected. The basic philosophy behind the constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a check on the
majority of the Electoral Commission, with the members of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as there is no
minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that is expected to
be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme Court.

"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional provision in question, the changes that it has undergone since it was first
introduced until finally adopted by the Convention, as well as the considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention in
adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the Supreme
Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to such nomination."
Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.

6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein raised has not been taken up or discussed, until the events leading to the
case at bar (in February 1956).

6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the respondents maintained that the Electoral Commission formed part of the
National Assembly, citing in support thereof the principle of contemporaneous and practical construction-this Court deemed it unnecessary to
refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view.

7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on February 22. 1956, in the following language:.
"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to represent, in the manner prescribed in the Constitution, the party that
received the highest number of votes, meaning the majority party which is the Nacionalista Party now, and three to represent the party
receiving the next highest number of votes therein, meaning the minority party, the party receiving the next highest number of votes. But there
was a great deal of opinion that it would be better if this political organization, so far as the legislative department is concerned, could be
tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which could be done by drafting three, as to each Electoral Tribunal, from the Supreme Court. And
that, I think, was the reason because a great majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention accepted that principle. That is why we
have nine members in each electoral tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one reason that I remember then and I am speaking from
memory, Mr. President, was that it is likely that the three members representing a party would naturally favor the protestants or protestees,
and so on. So it would be better that even on that hypothesis or on that supposition it would be better, in case they annul each other because
three votes in favor or three votes against, depending on the party of the protestants or the protestees, that the Supreme Court decide the
case because then it would be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on the theory that the Justices of the Supreme Court are
supposed to be beyond influence, although that may not be true. But having reached the highest judicial position of the land, these persons
would likely act impartially." (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, p. 376.).

8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known as the National Assembly.

9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

10 Senator Lim said:.

"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should belong to the party having the second largest number of votes,
precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain equilibrium because partisan considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart of a senator
belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I agree with Your Honor, Your Honor can see that the spirit of the provision of the
Constitution is clear that the three must come from the party having the highest number of votes and the other three nominated must belong
to the party having the second highest number of votes. Your Honor can see the point. If we allow Your Honor to back up your argument that
equilibrium should be maintained, because partisan considerations enter when one is with the majority party, and that no party should prevail,
Your Honor should also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to obviate that to the extent that the only three can be
nominated from the party having the largest number of votes and three from the party having the second largest number of votes."
(Congressional Record of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis supplied.).

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

The statement of Senator Sabido was:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the
members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation.".

xxx xxx x x x.

".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers of the Constitution is that those participating in the electoral tribunal
shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order to insure
impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be finally rendered." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 349,
352; emphasis supplied.).

_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.

Senator Cea declared:.

".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only members of the two major parties in the Senate in the Electoral Tribunal."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 350; emphasis supplied.).

The words of Senator Paredes were:.

".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members three of them
belonging to the party having largest number of votes, and three from, the party having the second largest number of votes so that these
members my represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a
party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
351; emphasis supplied.).
11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the factors already adverted to, but, also, by the fact that constitutional provisions,
unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be mandatory, "unless the contrary is unmistakably manifest." The pertinent rule of statutory
construction is set forth in the American Jurisprudence as follows:.

"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts
usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard provisions
which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not to leave any
direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is
unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to be merely directory. The analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory
statutes are of little value in this connection and are rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.

"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has even been said that neither by the
courts nor by any other department of the government may any provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that each
and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without reference to the rules and distinguishing between the
directory and the mandatory statutes." (II Am. Jur. 686-687; emphasis supplied.).

12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the Senate.

13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then Justice, Laurel, speaking for this Court, recalled that:.

"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party
and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the
commission."(emphasis supplied.).

Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded from being done by direct action or grant of authority in the Charter of
our Republic should not receive judicial sanction, when done by resolution of one House of Congress, a mere creature of said charter

14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, or a total of six (6) members of the
Tribunal.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989

REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,

vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission
on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido,
the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen
and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party. 1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number
to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing
the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP. 3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the assumption of
his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary
restraining order that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments because his election
thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the
said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained
political stability.

For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed
its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it
required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.

In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in compliance with an
order from the Court.

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act
on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act on the
matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us
because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner
from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the
Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the
minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own
ranks, to complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court,
contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate,
"three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes
therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two
seats pertaining to the minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an internal matter that
only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing
the respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of
filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:

Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether
the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by Senator Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-
behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ... of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and
hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to
be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of
the proceeding in connection therewith.

... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the
legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine
whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has been
applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determine the principal
issue raised by the parties herein."

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or legality of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume
that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be technically correct in arguing
that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this
controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the
respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers
Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy has since then been
consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:

In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the Court. It is their view
that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit
cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law
standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.

The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for
ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore,
that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional
statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.

Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan
to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.

In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an
independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the
Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House
leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize
the chamber. Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista
congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.

Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected by the
Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to
this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from
their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of
the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House
of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court held:

... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like
the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of
the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be
reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution could not have
intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of
Congress.

The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been
registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called
party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like
the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.

The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows reorganization at any time to
reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the
bulk of the former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change fully
justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:

Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House,
respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes
the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may
take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by
reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which
they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political parties
in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats
 in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by
the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.

In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the Solicitor General) an
important development has supervened to considerably simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument
heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization. As he insists:

(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered
political party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See.
160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered in determining the
required proportional representation of political parties in the House of Representatives. 9

xxx xxx xxx

... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right of
representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered with the
Comelec. 10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on Elections in an en banc
resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political
party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.

The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.
Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be
entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal
Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom
to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The Liberal Party won. At that
time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the
Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6 members in the
Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently
from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these
are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a
number of socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still temporary because of
such discord.

If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would have to be denied
representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the
petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no
political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.

It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it did not
express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has
been cut by more than half.

As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional election, the LDP has
doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of
Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.

To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable rather political, involving as
it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by
the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged
technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside,
conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of
the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not
include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts
of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Commission on
Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional
stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing
our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply
the Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The Court holds that the
respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant
to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cows, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local
Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN
OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity as
Provincial Treasurer, respondents,

GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528
converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.

On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was
signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1

On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city, viz:

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO
AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words an independent thereon so that
said Section will read as follows:

SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city to be known as the City
of Santiago, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of the Municipality of Santiago,
Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.

Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire section and in its stead substitute the following:

SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial
Position for the Province of Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial
Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other elective provincial positions of the Province of Isabela,
and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office.

Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law
for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the
petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are
residents of Santiago City.

In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of
petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.

Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor General also contends that
petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
 A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela.4 He
contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely
allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a
plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.

Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed
the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.

We find merit in the petition.

First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be
challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he
filed the present petition in his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city council of
Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere component city
will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct
and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners
rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city
thru a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to strike the law as
unconstitutional.

Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political
question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
defines judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this
Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:

xxx

The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which
under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.

In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a
remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.

Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a
right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners
have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress comply with the requirements of the
Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances
of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.

Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that
the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.

This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress.8 This power
is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. 9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the
mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city
to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether
or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities
per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this
constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our
people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the
past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare
of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to
any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance
where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy
thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to
local government units.

The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city
are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city
mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of
Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the
province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10

Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had merely re-classified Santiago City from an independent
component city into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be, actually, that of
conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the political culture and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and
the Province of Isabela. Santiago City from an independent component city will revert to the Province of Isabela, geographically, politically and
administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will be to
the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue
allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land
area and population of local government units, provinces included.

The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City
Government, will be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other
quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No.
7160). The Provincial Government will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic) diminished funds for the local
operations of the City Government because of reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of the R.A.
No. 7160. The City Governments share in the proceeds in the development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain
portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A. No.7160).

The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).

The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every
component city and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions
(Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section
455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455
(b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section 63, R.A. No.
7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is
the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4
(ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).

The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the
former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No. 7160).

It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it
required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be
called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more
reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that:

(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect
unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance
prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

x x x.

The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local
government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.

A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has
the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment
merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city
dissolved by R.A. No. 8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the local government
unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. They may call the
downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically
change its physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.

On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the classification involves changes in
income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people x x x."

With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to
repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code
on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected."

In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements
on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government
Code does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have been satisfied. On
the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political
unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the
principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.12

It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local
Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified
indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the Department of
Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources." In
contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political representatives of the people themselves
than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries are "xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but also be
approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision will also eliminate
the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the
autonomy of local government units."13

The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it
was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to an independent component city barely two and a
half (2 1/2) years ago and the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the sudden move
to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political status. The only reason given
for the downgrading is to enable the people of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is
unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of
officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the
province of Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its
people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of
the Committee anounced the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body." We quote the
debates, viz:14

"BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as reported out under Committee Report No. 971.

"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion is approved.

"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill
without prejudice to inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.

"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF
SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO

_______________________________________________________

The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729

Insert
 _______________________________________________________

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be
recognized.

"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a
simple measure which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of the Province of Isabela.

"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent
component city, however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a local political unit. To use the language
of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an island in the provincial milieu.

"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of
Isabela.

"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and authority of general supervision over the city and its
officials, which power and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far away from Santiago City.

Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the
said province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a
component city of Isabela.

"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee
on Local Government , recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.

"Thank you, Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of interpellations.

"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of interpellations is closed.

"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.

"Senator Roco. Mr. President.

"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?

"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on the motion to close the period of interpellations just to be
able to ask a few questions?

"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.

"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of the period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the
motion is approved.

"Senator Roco is recognized.

"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?

"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee on Local Government, we were with the sponsors when we
approved this bill to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that time, I remember it was the cry of the
city that it be independent. Now we are deleting that word independent.

"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want some explanation on what happened between
then and now that has made us decide that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and should now become a
component city.

"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the public hearing that they are no longer vested with the power
and authority of general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being exercised by the Office of the President and
it is quite far from the City of Santiago.

"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that they want to participate in the provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on record, however. I think there was a majority of 14,000 who
approved the charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some degree of respect. But if there has been a
change of political will, there has been a change of political will, then so be it.

"Thank you, Mr. President.

"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very important point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to place it
on the Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee amendment is that, originally, there was an
objection on the part of the local officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That was the
solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city
into a component city.

"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had special pictures (sic) in the city -- is that I thought it should
be put on record that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent city. But now if it is their request, then,
on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it be so.

"Thank you.

"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.

"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?

"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend, the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the opinion of
the citizens of Santiago City, there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997 opposing the conversion of
Santiago from an independent city.

"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor,
one of the amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.

"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of our Minority Leader -- is that, at this time we should not
be passing it for a particular politician.

"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the additional territory be added to the election of the
provincial officials of the province of Isabela.

"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.

"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.

"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor, Senator Alvarez is recognized.

"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I share some information.

"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership,
because the provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.

"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral
process, and whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons why this
amendment is being put forward.

"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who signed the resolution were not the whole of the
council. This bill was sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.

"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the
people, the law which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as we do give account to many of
the legislations coming from the House on local issues.

"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is that, as Senator Roco said, just two-and-a-half years ago we
passed a bill which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that phrase-- the citizens of the City of Santiago in the matter of the
provincial election. Two-and-a-half years after, we are changing the rule.

"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in order to approve the conversion of the city into
an independent city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to
another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an
amendment.

"Thank you very much, Mr. President.

 "Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the change from an independent to a component city be subjected
to a plebiscite.

Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in
adherence to this constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word conversion appears in that provision wherein we must call a
plebiscite. During the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting that this is not a conversion; this is
merely a reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.

We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city. That is how the members of the committee
felt. That is why we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no
provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be
enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To
them, this is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela deciding for them.

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the period of interpellations.

"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr. President.

"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:

"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE
THE FOLLOWING:

"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL
TAKE EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR
THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE
SUCH PLEBISCITE.

"The President. Is there any objection?

"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.

"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.

"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.

"SUSPENSION OF SESSION

"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.

"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no objection. [There was none]

"It was 7:54 p.m.

"RESUMPTION OF SESSION

"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.

"The President. The session is resumed.

"Senator Sotto is recognized.

"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the elders of the Body, I withdraw my amendment.

"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.

"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.

 "The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.

"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the amendment.

"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great fan of the Senator from Isabela -- but it so happens that
this is a local bill affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter.

"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as
possible, accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district of other senators. I
need not remind them.

"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.

"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.

"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for the statement of the gentleman from Ilocos and
Laguna. Whatever he may have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly become his great fan for the
evening.

"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but
because it had disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of the
province. How could we extricate the town from the province?

"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the Committee.

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.

"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the period of committee amendments be closed.

"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word independent preceding component city?

"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title of this House Bill No. 8729 is An Act Amending Certain
Sections of Republic Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think that we should amend that anymore.

"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state the motion?

"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.

"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.

"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we close the period of individual amendments.

"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period of individual amendments is closed.

"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING

"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.

"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall now vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.

"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.

"Several Members. Aye

As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]

"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."

The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to
listen to the voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.

In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its people
in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose
behind its enactment, viz:

"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the new Province a fait accompli by the time elections are
held on February 7, 1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials shall by then have been
installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for President and Vice-President. Thus, the petitioners reported after the
event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a new set
of government officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the
political machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte
during the elections - the unashamed use of naked powerand resources - contributed in no small way to arousing peoples power and steel the
ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.

"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite,
the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the
plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining
areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las
Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an
and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that
no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without the approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected. It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed
new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate
and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its
boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as
allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle
of majority rule.

Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent component cities were downgraded
into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos,
Pangasinan17 whose charters were amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to which
their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly
situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities
were chartered but were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered
independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18

"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of
provincial officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever
that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City
of San Carlos as of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said earlier, grants the voters of
the city, the power to vote in provincial elections, without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this reason
that I vote in favor of this bill.

It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the
province of Misamis Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta City was
consistent with its status as a component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy
the anomalous situation then obtaining xxx where voters of one component city can vote in the provincial election while the voters of another
component city cannot vote simply because their charters so provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities
prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby
issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Panganiban, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., joins J. Mendoza in his dissenting opinion.
Buena, J., see dissenting opinion.
EN BANC
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 186616
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

PUNO, C.J.,

CARPIO,
CONRADO CRUZ, SANTIAGO P. GO, RENATO F. BORBON, LEVVINO
CHING, CARLOS C. FLORENTINO, RUBEN G. BALLEGA, LOIDA ALCEDO,
CORONA,*
MARIO M. CAJUCOM, EMMANUEL M. CALMA, MANUEL A. RAYOS,
WILMA L. CHUA, EUFEMIO S. ALFONSO, JESUS M. LACANILAO, CARPIO MORALES,
BONIFACIO N. ALCAPA, JOSE H. SILVERIO, RODRIGO DEVELLES, NIDA
R. PAUNAN, MARIANO B. ESTUYE, JR., RAFAEL C. AREVALO, ARTURO CHICO-NAZARIO,
T. MANABAT, RICARDO O. LIZARONDO, LETICIA C. MATURAN,
RODRIGO A. ALAYAN, LEONILO N. MIRANDA, DESEDERIO O. VELASCO, JR.,I**
MONREAL, FRANCISCO M. BAHIA, NESTOR R. FORONDA, VICENTE B.
QUE, JR., AURELIO A. BILUAN, DANILO R. GATCHALIAN, LOURDES R. NACHURA,
DEL MUNDO, EMMA O. CALZADO, FELIMON DE LEON, TANY V.
CATACUTAN, AND CONCEPCION P. JAO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

Respondents. BRION,

PERALTA,***

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

November 20, 2009

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128

(RTC), against the following highlighted portion of Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay

and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991):

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after
the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official was elected.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The present petition, filed by the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.[1]

THE ANTECEDENTS

Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then incumbent officials

of several barangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-

highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:

I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.

II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law.

III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.

 The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-term limit

for barangay officials under the following reasoning:

When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith, a
different term was ordained. Here, this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code
specifically exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule
considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was significantly separated from the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as
regards to (sic) all local elective officials except barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to
include barangay elective officials, then no excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof
or, by implication, the contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).

xxxx

Clearly, the intent of the framers of the constitution (sic) is to exempt the barangay officials from the three (3) term limits
(sic) which are otherwise applicable to other elected public officials from the Members of the House of Representatives
down to the members of the sangguniang bayan/panlungsod. It is up for the Congress whether the three (3) term limit
should be applied by enacting a law for the purpose.

The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the term of office of barangay elective officials from three
(3) years to five (5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be noted that no consecutive term limit for the election
of barangay elective officials was fixed therein.

The advent of R.A. 9164 marked the revival of the consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective
officials after the Local Government Code took effect. Under the assailed provision of this Act, the term of office
of barangay elective officials reverted back to three (3) years from five (5) years, and, this time, the legislators expressly
declared that no barangayelective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. The
petitioners are very clear that they are not assailing the validity of such provision fixing the three (3) consecutive term
limit rule for the election of barangay elective officials to the same position. The particular provision the constitutionality
of which is under attack is that portion providing for the reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit
of barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.

xxx

Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A. 9164 is not a mere restatement of Section 43(c) of the Local Government
Code. As discussed above, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code does not provide for the consecutive term limit
rule of barangay elective officials. Such specific provision of the Code has in fact amended the previous enactments (R.A.
6653 and R.A. 6679) providing for the consecutive term limit rule of barangay elective officials. But, such specific
provision of the Local Government Code was amended by R.A. 9164, which reverted back to the previous policy of fixing
consecutive term limits of barangay elective officials. [3]
In declaring this retroactive application unconstitutional, the RTC explained that:

By giving a retroactive reckoning of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule for barangay officials to the
1994 barangay elections, Congress has violated not only the principle of prospective application of statutes but also the
equal protection clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the barangay elective officials were singled out that their
consecutive term limit shall be counted retroactively. There is no rhyme or reason why the consecutive limit for
these barangay officials shall be counted retroactively while the consecutive limit for other local and national elective
officials are counted prospectively. For if the purpose of Congress is [sic] to classify elective barangay officials as
belonging to the same class of public officers whose term of office are limited to three (3) consecutive terms, then to
discriminate them by applying the proviso retroactively violates the constitutionally enshrined principle of equal
protection of the laws.

Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to determine such successive term limit of barangay elective
officials, the exercise of the authority granted shall not otherwise transgress other constitutional and statutory privileges.

This Court cannot subscribe to the position of the respondent that the legislature clearly intended that the provision of
RA No. 9164 be made effective in 1994 and that such provision is valid and constitutional. If we allow such premise, then
the term of office for those officials elected in the 1997 barangay elections should have ended in year 2000 and not year
2002 considering that RA No. 9164 provides for a three-year term of barangay elective officials. The amendment
introduced by R.A. No. 8524 would be rendered nugatory in view of such retroactive application.This is absurd and
illusory.

True, no person has a vested right to a public office, the same not being property within the contemplation of
constitutional guarantee. However, a cursory reading of the petition would show that the petitioners are not claiming
vested right to their office but their right to be voted upon by the electorate without being burdened by the assailed
provision of the law that, in effect, rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Such right to run for
office and be voted for by the electorate is the right being sought to be protected by assailing the otherwise
unconstitutional provision.

Moreover, the Court likewise agrees with the petitioners that the law violated the one-act-one subject rule embodied in
the Constitution. x x x x The challenged laws title is AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS, AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7160 OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. x x x x

xxxx

To this court, the non-inclusion in the title of the act on the retroactivity of the reckoning of the term limits posed a
serious constitutional breach, particularly on the provision of the constitution [sic] that every bill must embrace only one
subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
 x x x the Court is of the view that the affected barangay officials were not sufficiently given notice that they were already
disqualified by a new act, when under the previous enactments no such restrictions were imposed.

Even if this Court would apply the usual test in determining the sufficiency of the title of the bill, the challenged law
would still be insufficient for how can a retroactivity of the term limits be germane to the synchronization of an election x
x x x.[4]

The COMELEC moved to reconsider this decision but the RTC denied the motion. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.

The Petition

The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local

Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according

to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts

that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested

rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive

application of RA No. 9164.

The COMELEC also argues that the RTCs invalidation of RA No. 9164 essentially involves the wisdom of the law the aspect of the law

that the RTC has no right to inquire into under the constitutional separation of powers principle. The COMELEC lastly argues that there is no

violation of the one subject-one title rule, as the matters covered by RA No. 9164 are related; the assailed provision is actually embraced within

the title of the law.

THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious. The RTC legally erred when it declared the challenged proviso unconstitutional.

Preliminary Considerations
 We find it appropriate, as a preliminary matter, to hark back to the pre-1987 Constitution history of the barangay political system as

outlined by this Court in David v. COMELEC,[5] and we quote:

As a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines. The
word barangay is derived from the Malay balangay, a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores.
Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado Benitez wrote that the barangay was
ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic
structure of government, they stripped the dato or rajah of his powers. Instead, power was centralized nationally in the
governor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayor and
the gobernadorcillo. The dato or rajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who was elected by the local
citizens possessing property. The position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a mere government
employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted the post.

After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as barrios. For some time, the
laws governing barrio governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and later in the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. Barrios were granted autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally
recognized as quasi-municipal corporations by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime,
barrios were declared or renamed barangays -- a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names -- by PD. No. 86 and PD No.
557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly adopted as the Barangay Charter, were
retained. However, the titles of the officials were changed
to barangay captain, barangay councilman, barangay secretary and barangay treasurer.

Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) and
six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and members
of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six
years which began on June 7, 1982.

The Local Government Code of 1983 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at six years. Under
this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punongbarangay, six elective sangguniang barangay members,
the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.

B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, reiterated that barangay officials shall hold office for six years, and
stated that their election was to be held on the second Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the
same day every six years thereafter. [Emphasis supplied.]

The 1987 Philippine Constitution extended constitutional recognition to barangays under Article X, Section 1 by

specifying barangays as one of the territorial and political subdivisions of the country, supplemented by Section 8 of the same Article X, which

provides:
 SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected. [Emphasis supplied.]

The Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 8 show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the

term of office of barangayofficials, but also to the application of the three-term limit. The following deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission are particularly instructive on this point:

MR. NOLLEDO: One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term of the office
of barangay officials as provided for?

MR. DAVIDE: As may be determined by law.

MR. NOLLEDO: As provided for in the Local Government Code?

MR. DAVIDE: Yes.

xxxxxxxxx

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to this proposed new section as
submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted by the Committee?

MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more than three consecutive terms
apply to barangay officials?

MR. DAVIDE: Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office did not include
the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of the
Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials must
be determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the
restriction on the number of reelections will be included in the Local
Government Code.

MR. RODRIGO: So that is up to Congress to decide.

 MR. DAVIDE: Yes.

MR. RODRIGO: I just wanted that clear in the record.[6] [Emphasis supplied.]

After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the barangay election originally scheduled by Batas Pambansa Blg. 881[7] on the

second Monday of May 1988 was reset to the second Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter by RA No. 6653.[8] Section 2 of

RA No. 6653 changed the term of office of barangay officials and introduced a term limitation as follows:

SEC. 2. The term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years from the first day of January following
their election. Provided, however, That no kagawad shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms. [Emphasis
supplied]

Under Section 5 of RA No. 6653, the punong barangay was to be chosen by seven kagawads from among themselves, and they in turn, were to

be elected at large by the barangay electorate. The punong barangay, under Section 6 of the law, may be recalled for loss of confidence by an

absolute majority vote of the Sangguniang Barangay, embodied in a resolution that shall necessarily include the punong barangays successor.

The election date set by RA No. 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was postponed yet again to March 28, 1989 by RA

No. 6679 whose pertinent provision states:

SEC. 1. The elections of barangay officials set on the second Monday of November 1988 by Republic Act No.
6653 are hereby postponed and reset to March 28, 1989. They shall serve a term which shall begin on the first day of
May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994.

There shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and on the
same day every five (5) years thereafter. Their term shall be for five (5) years which shall begin on the first day of June
following the election and until their successors shall have been elected and qualified: Provided, That
no barangay official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.

The barangay elections shall be nonpartisan and shall be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive
manner.
Significantly, the manner of election of the punong barangay was changed

Section 5 of the law provided that while the seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, (t)he candidate who

obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the

supervision of the Commission on Elections.

More than two (2) years after the 1989 barangay elections, RA No. 7160 (the LGC) introduced the following changes in the law:

SEC. 41. Manner of Election. -- (a) The x x x punong barangay shall be elected at large x x x by the qualified
voters therein.

SEC. 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this
Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for by law, except that
of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local elections immediately following
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3)
years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangayofficials on the second Monday of May 1994.

SEC. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. -- (a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven
(7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and
a barangay treasurer.

xxxxxxxxx

SEC. 390. Composition. -- The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed
of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sanguniang barangay members elected at large
and the sanguniang kabataan chairman as members. [Emphasis supplied.]

This law started the direct and separate election of the punong barangay by the qualified voters in the barangay and not by the

seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.[9]

 Subsequently or on February 14, 1998, RA No. 8524 changed the three-year term of office of barangay officials under Section 43 of

the LGC to five (5) years. On March 19, 2002, RA No. 9164 introduced the following significant changes: (1) the term of office

of barangay officials was again fixed at three years on the reasoning that the barangayofficials should not serve a longer term than their

supervisors;[10] and (2) the challenged proviso, which states that the 1994 election shall be the reckoning point for the application of the

three-term limit, was introduced. Yet another change was introduced three years after or on July 25, 2005 when RA No. 9340 extended the

term of the then incumbent barangay officials due to expire at noon of November 30, 2005 under RA No. 9164 to noon of November 30, 2007.

The three-year term limitation provision survived all these changes.

Congress Plenary Power to

Legislate Term Limits for Barangay Officials and Judicial Power

In passing upon the issues posed to us, we clarify at the outset the parameters of our powers.

As reflected in the above-quoted deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to

determine by legislation not only the duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the application to them of a consecutive term

limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.

Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of the term of office

of barangay officials and their term limitation. Given the textually demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the

authority to determine the term duration and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it established that whatever

Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny,[11] subject only to

the certiorari jurisdiction of the courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to invalidate any

law contrary to the Constitution.[12]

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.[13] These questions, previously impervious to judicial

scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window provided by Section 1, Article VIII. Estrada v. Desierto[14] best describes this

constitutional development, and we quote:

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not
just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987
Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. xxxx

Thus, we can inquire into a congressional enactment despite the political question doctrine, although the window provided us is narrow; the

challenge must show grave abuse of discretion to justify our intervention.

Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary to any provision of the

Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the legal standards provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the

wisdom of the enactment. To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful or equivocal

one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality.[15] These are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of

a law must overcome.

The present case, as framed by the respondents, poses no challenge on the issue of grave abuse of discretion. The legal issues posed

relate strictly to compliance with constitutional standards. It is from this prism that we shall therefore resolve this case.

The Retroactive Application Issue

a. Interpretative / Historical Consideration

The respondents first objection to the challenged provisos constitutionality is its purported retroactive application of the three-term

limit when it set the 1994 barangayelections as a reckoning point in the application of the three-term limit.
 The respondents argued that the term limit, although present in the previous laws, was not in RA No. 7160 when it amended all

previous barangay election laws. Hence, it was re-introduced for the first time by RA No. 9164 (signed into law on March 19, 2002) and was

applied retroactively when it made the term limitation effective from the 1994 barangay elections. As the appealed ruling quoted above shows,

the RTC fully agreed with the respondents position.

Our first point of disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a retroactive application of the term

limitation was made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has

been there all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the

LGC and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.

The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term

limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term

limit. This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term

limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 the LGC followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term

limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.

Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide

range of subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession

(Chapter II), c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).

These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary

application is provided with respect to the length of the term of office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does

not apply to barangay officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of an exception to a

general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce

include barangay officials.

An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as independently standing and self-

contained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to the term of local elective

officials, except barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms, relates to all

local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.
 Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import of Section 43 in the context

in which it is found in Title II of the LGC.

To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 43 are the general law for

elective officials (other than barangayofficials); and paragraph (c) is the specific law on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c)

on term limitation for barangay officials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from the application of the three-term

limit. This reading, however, is flawed for two reasons.

First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the plain texts of these

provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local elective officials, except elective barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all local

elective officials without exclusions or exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the same kind

as the other. Their separate topics additionally strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to the term of office while Section 43(b) refers

to the three-term limit. These differences alone indicate that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way

the RTC suggested. Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).

Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total disregard of the historical background of Section 43(c) a backdrop that

we painstakingly outlined above.

From a historical perspective of the law, the inclusion of Section 43(c) in the LGC is an absolute necessity to clarify the length of term

of barangay officials. Recall that under RA No. 6679, the term of office of barangay officials was five (5) years. The real concern was how

Section 43 would interface with RA No. 6679. Without a categorical statement on the length of the term of office of barangay officials, a

general three-year term for all local elective officials under Section 43(a), standing alone, may not readily and completely erase doubts on the

intended abrogation of the 5-year term for barangay officials under RA No. 6679. Thus, Congress added Section 43(c) which provided a

categorical three-year term for these officials. History tells us, of course, that the unequivocal provision of Section 43(c) notwithstanding, an

issue on what is the exact term of office of barangay officials was still brought to us via a petition filed by no less than the President of the Liga

ng Mga Barangay in 1997. We fully resolved the issue in the cited David v. Comelec.
 Section 43(c) should therefore be understood in this context and not in the sense that it intended to provide the complete rule for

the election of barangay officials, so that in the absence of any term limitation proviso under this subsection, no term limitation applies

to barangay officials. That Congress had the LGCs three-term limit in mind when it enacted RA No. 9164 is clear from the following

deliberations in the House of Representatives (House) on House Bill No. 4456 which later became RA No. 9164:

MARCH 5, 2002:

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Majority Leader.

REP. ESCUDERO. Mr. Speaker, next to interpellate is the Gentleman from Zamboanga City. I ask that the Honorable
Lobregat be recognized.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). The Honorable Lobregat is recognized.

REP. LOBREGAT. Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Speaker, this is just

REP. MACIAS. Willingly to the Gentleman from Zamboanga City.

REP. LOBREGAT. points of clarification, Mr. Speaker, the term of office. It says in Section 4, The term of office of all
Barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three years. Then it says,
No Barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.

Mr. Speaker, I think it is the position of the committee that the first term should be reckoned from election of what year,
Mr. Speaker?

REP. MACIAS. After the adoption of the Local Government Code, Your Honor. So that the first election is to be reckoned
on, would be May 8, 1994, as far as the Barangay election is concerned.

REP. LOBREGAT. Yes, Mr. Speaker. So there was an election in 1994.

REP. MACIAS. Then an election in 1997.

REP. LOBREGAT. There was an election in 1997. And there will be an election this year
 REP. LOBREGAT. election this year.

REP. MACIAS. That is correct. This will be the third.

xxx xxx

REP. SUMULONG. Mr. Speaker.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.) The Honorable Sumulong is recognized.

REP. SUMULONG. Again, with the permission of my Chairman, I would like to address the question of Congressman
Lobregat.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Espinosa, E.R.). Please proceed.

REP. SUMULONG. With respect to the three-year consecutive term limits of Barangay Captains that is not provided for
in the Constitution and that is why the election prior to 1991 during the enactment of the Local Government Code is
not counted because it is not in the Constitution but in the Local Government Code where the three consecutive term
limits has been placed. [Emphasis supplied.]

which led to the following exchanges in the House Committee on Amendments:

March 6, 2002

COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS

REP. GONZALES. May we now proceed to committee amendment, if any, Mr. Speaker.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Rep. Gonzalez). The Chair recognizes the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms.
 REP. SYJUCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 2, line 7, after the word position, substitute the period (.) and add the following:
PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. So that
the amended Section 4 now reads as follows:

SEC. 4. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after
the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.

No barangay elective local official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position COLON (:) PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE TERM OF OFFICE SHALL BE RECKONED FROM
THE 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected.

The House therefore clearly operated on the premise that the LGC imposed a three-term limit for barangay officials, and the challenged proviso

is its way of addressing any confusion that may arise from the numerous changes in the law.

All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the application of

the three-term limit to the barangayelections of 1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming

up with the challenged proviso.

With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the proviso based on retroactivity must fail.

b. No Involvement of Any

Constitutional Standard

Separately from the above reason, the constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental reason the respondents

retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any constitutional standard.

Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is the Civil Code,[16] not the

Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the
Civil Code is of course self-explanatory laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have retroactive effect. The Civil Code

established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.

The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a laws retroactive application will impair

vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due

process issue may arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are the ones that may be

considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming that they did, the respondents

themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office.[17] As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an

elective post in view of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises.

Aware of this legal reality, the respondents theorized instead that they had a right to be voted upon by the electorate without being

burdened by a law that effectively rendered them ineligible to run for their incumbent positions. Again, the RTC agreed with this contention.

We do not agree with the RTC, as we find no such right under the Constitution; if at all, this claimed right is merely a restatement of

a claim of vested right to a public office. What the Constitution clearly provides is the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for

elective local posts;[18] thus, the question of eligibility for an elective local post is a matter for Congress, not for the courts, to decide. We dealt

with a strikingly similar issue in Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections[19] where we ruled that SK membership which was claimed as a

property right within the meaning of the Constitution is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros instructively tells us:

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer
qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them
from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change
or even withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust. No
one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo
v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled:
 Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office a property. It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office is
not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a
public trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular
representative government, the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where
no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every
officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the
people he represents.

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a
proprietary right to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative
council, the law does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local
legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary claim to
public office. Even the State policy directing equal access to opportunities for public service cannot bestow on petitioners
a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs, this policy refers to
those who belong to the class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth
qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age
group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once an employee reaches
mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since
petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to
their SK membership. [Emphasis supplied.]

To recapitulate, we find no merit in the respondents retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not provide for

the retroactive application to barangayofficials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA No. 9164 simply continued what had been there

before; and (2) the constitutional challenge based on retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.

The Equal Protection Clause Issue

The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: Nor shall any person

be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and

among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the

basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be

treated differently in law.[20]

Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the present

case for an equal protection challenge.The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the

Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear

distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local

elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by
Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the

Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.

From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did

not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on

the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive application.

Violation of the Constitutional

One Subject- One Title Rule

Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Farias v. Executive

Secretary[21] provides the reasons for this constitutional requirement and the test for its application, as follows:

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that
the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.

xxxx

x x x This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general subject.

xxxx
 x x x Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title
is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.

We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-one title rule.

First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataang Elections, amending

Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, states the laws general subject matter the

amendment of the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the barangay and

SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related

with length of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office.This

natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.

Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent were fully informed of the

purposes, nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the

legislators and the public.

Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject matters

dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the challenged proviso

under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
EN BANC

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ G.R. No. 193459

Petitioner,

Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON CARPIO MORALES,
JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, VELASCO, JR.,*
FELIPE PESTAO, EVELYN PESTAO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., NACHURA,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN BRION,
MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO PERALTA,
RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG BERSAMIN,
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, DEL CASTILLO,
ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION ABAD,
OF PEOPLES LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, VILLARAMA, JR.,
CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, PEREZ,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
Respondents.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,

Respondent-Intervenor.

Promulgated:

February 15, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1

and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public respondent).

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the

Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel

group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden

Bello.[2]
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty. Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives,

transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.[3] who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the

Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4]

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James

Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List

Representatives Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan, Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even

date, the House of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter

still of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9,

2010,[8] also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on Rules,[9] instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr.,

Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two

complaints in the Order of Business,[10] which was complied with by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11,

2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public

respondent.[11]

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered

to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published on September 2, 2010.

On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public

respondent refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer

to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the

Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by

public respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to impeach could

be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10

days.[13]

Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with

application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status
quo ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court subsequently, by Resolution of September 21,

2010, directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition

The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which filed the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG

and private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and 30, 2010.

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4, 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010.

Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a

Consolidated Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within the given 15-day period.

The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first resolve.

Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not

exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it was exercising a

political act that is discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.[17]

These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives.[18] The argument that impeachment proceedings are

beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in
the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.

There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though
vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may
also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.

xxxx

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
 grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify
an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v.
Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination,
and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political parties
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that
the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject
to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of
any member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.

Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects,

includes the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the

part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[21]

In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and

prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of

the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of

jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the

Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.[22]

Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the

petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of

the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition[23] on September 13, 2010,

it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints.

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite

of ripeness.[24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an individual by the challenged

conduct.[25] In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two

complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House

(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
 The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke

judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that

only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process

clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.

Due process of law

Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation

she is conducting, while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the

proceedings taken by public respondent in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of

form and substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere

suspicion of partiality does not suffice.[26]

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc.

v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] teaches:

First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority vote out of the three
members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the
chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote
coming from the rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient
to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.

Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does
not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. [28]

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it

decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29]

Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a respondent in the
charges that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,] his father was likewise a respondent in another
case. How can he be expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law under that
matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Is he a one-man committee?
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
 He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then (interrupted)

JUSTICE MORALES:
So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, does
that mean that your client will be deprived of due process of law?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with the Ombudsman,
which goes with the element of due process is the lack of impartiality that may be expected of him.

JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of the committee as in
this case there were objections relative to the existence of the implementing rules not heard, there was
objection made by Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional crisis.

JUSTICE MORALES:
That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite which makes it
mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that he had previously been found liable for
violation of a law[?]

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the situation whereby
with that background as the material or pertinent antecedent that there could be no violation of the right
of the petitioner to due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot come from
an impartial adjudicator.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and

substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat.

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of

Justice[31] holds:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The
orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the
circumstances peculiar to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence
other than a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift
completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the
presumably regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
 Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As

mandated by the Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer

starts with the filing of an answer.

JUSTICE MORALES:
Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in
form and substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
That is correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MORALES:
During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the
proceedings and related irregularities?

JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your
Honor, because it is only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without that but it may be asked, how is
not your action premature, Your Honor, our answer is- no, because of the other violations
involved and that is (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly

Section 5[34] which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer

starts after the Committee on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to accept petitioners

motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the

Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the

basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35]

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional

grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the

discharge of that power and in the exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and substance of

an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry

out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in determining the

sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must

be a verified complaint or resolution,[36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital of facts constituting the offense charged

and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.[37]

Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an

impeachment complaint is made necessary.This requirement is not explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the

Constitution basically merely requires a hearing.[38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of

form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment process, hence,

such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.

Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in

the complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a

determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from

the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question

which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds

raised, upon a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.

In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process, questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the

Impeachment Rules.

To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment

Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that

of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40]

Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on

September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on

Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the

purpose of this section.

Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the publication of rules in any medium of information, not

necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]

Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations [43] which held that the Constitution

categorically requires publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is

intended to merely enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI of Constitution.
 Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as

To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act of
announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to
become known or obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied)

While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a statutory difference in their usage.

The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times.[45] A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various

rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices.

To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate and publish, the case of the Judiciary is in point. In

promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court

has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however,

promulgation means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.[46]

Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of

the certificates in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010

national elections on May 25, 2010,[47] it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules

effective upon its adoption.

In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-

stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or

adoption.

Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt

generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a

word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used.[49]

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be understood to have been

used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same

way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and

publication.

It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a

specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
 Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make known its

rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that

x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the
basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this
Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement
them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)

Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case

of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is no other single formal term in the English language to

appropriately refer to an issuance without need of it being published.

IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is

the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. Significantly notable

in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions directive, without any reliance on

or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had

kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of making

known the issuances.

From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado

intended Section 3(8), Article XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment process.

MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional section because, for instance,
under Section 3 (2), there is mention of indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging
ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other words, it is just like a provision in the rules
of court. Instead, I propose that this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to avoid
harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new section 4 which shall read as follows: THE
CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
THEREOF. I think all these other proceduralrequirements could be taken care of by the Rules of
Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any

circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its

details.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more
like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
 . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-
executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be
considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.[53] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the

Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where

impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would

already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In

effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the

publication requirement.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the

purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper

to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with

the effective implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress

Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement

the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. It is

axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected,

nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural

laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.

It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is

primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.[55]

Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather,

x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void,
considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and
effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain

provisions[57] of the Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for reconsideration and later filed the present

petition. The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.
The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than

once within a period of one year.

Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four

days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment

complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the

impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee, following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the

initiation ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the

Senate. Respondent Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its

impeachment complaint could withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.[59] The

initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of

the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the

complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.

Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to

the Committee on Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas

and Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the

complaint.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled
with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period.[62] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings ─ Sections 16[63] and 17[64] of Rule V thereof ─ clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI since they g[a]ve the term initiate a

meaning different from filing and referral.[65]

Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly

Commissioner Maambongs statements[66]that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint.

Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word. Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the

complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase.

Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this,[67] for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations

loosely used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.

MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of
one-fifth of the membership of the House under the 1935 Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required to initiate proceedings.

MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth vote of the membership of the House is
required; for conviction, a two-thirds vote of the membership is required.

xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the legislature to overturn a report of the committee,
we have here Section 3 (4) which reads:

No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.

So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow one-fifth of the members of the National
Assembly to revive an impeachment move by an individual or an ordinary Member.

MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the possibility of a very liberal impeachment
proceeding. Second, we were ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a verified complaint
rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a
period for the Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule a mere verified complaint,
are some of the questions we would like to be discussed.

MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-
half or a majority, or one-fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not amount to
a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner Teodulo Natividad:
MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?

MR. BENGZON. One-third.

MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is different from to convict. To impeach means to file
the case before the Senate.

MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of Impeachment.

MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of
Impeachment. That is my understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:

[I]
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of the amendment
submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of
the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with
the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles
of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.

As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on
the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard
Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of
Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only
approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the
words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are
with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this
on record.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

[II]
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will
not at all affect the substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.

I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines
17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19
after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and replace the
word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the
Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the case of
the direct filing of a verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of
the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.

Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation, Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the

complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice, which is the action that sets the complaint

moving. Francisco cannot be any clearer in pointing out the material dates.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.[72] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits

that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that had already been done, [73] apparently citing Bernas

discussion.

The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.

What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action on the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It

did not state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must be done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the

verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the

impeachment proceedings.

Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the

singular tense of the word complaint[74] to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory

construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75]

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of

impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however,

cannot light up the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint to the proper committee

ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the

candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle

starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets

the attention of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism wherein government resources are devoted. A

prospective complainant, regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly desecrate the entire process by the

expediency of submitting a haphazard complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the effort of other prospective

complainants who, after diligently gathering evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later from filing an

impeachment complaint.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable purpose into a laughable matter. One

needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed

out worms in high offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere

happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly

participating in the impeachment process.

Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file

subsequent impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk of violating the Constitution since they would have

already initiated a second impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate a second or third impeachment

proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them with knowledge, even

members of the House of Representatives could not readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at the time of

committing their endorsement.

The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that

administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas disquisition[76] in Francisco,

a proceeding which takes place not in the Senate but in the House[77] precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact,

petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control of the House of

Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately decide to

initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress

alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to its processes.

The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in

forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone

either, which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public

plenary session, which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the

initiation of a second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.

Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is

only made subject to the five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a

committee may be debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. [80] With respect to complaints for

impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official

records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has already been referred to the

said committee and the one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally prohibited second

impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as the

Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within which to make the proper referral.

As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that

[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper

Committee within three session days thereafter.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the allegedly belated referral of the first impeachment

complaint filed by the Baraquel group.For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, there was yet then no session in Congress. It was

only four days later or on July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day session period started to run. When, by

Memorandum of August 2, 2010, Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint in its Order of Business, it was

well within the said 10-day session period.[81]

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that

impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs

the agony and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the

promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.

But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into

motion the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of

initiation should refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes

group, initiation means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. [83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the

Committee on Justices recommendation to the House plenary.[84]

The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the

Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress.The present case involving an impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent

reason for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief

Justice. To change the reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-political considerations of respondents

does not sit well in a court of law.

x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. This doctrine, which is really
"adherence to precedents," mandates that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly
the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity
for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated in his treatise
The Nature of the Judicial Process:

It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite
way between another. "If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the same
decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was
decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I
am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it
would be an infringement, material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be
the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of
justice in the courts.[85]
As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the

Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its

initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice

for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.[86]

Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each

having their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until

and unless the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary

resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),[88] or the

Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-

intervenor). Each of these scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposed one-year bar. Opening the

floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding.

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice

Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-

fold: to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to

the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:

MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect public officials who, in this case, are of
the highest category from harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is
lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow multiple impeachment charges on the same
individual to take place, the legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied)

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The

impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official

functions and duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its main

work of law-making. The doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing andreferral remains congruent to the rationale of the

constitutional provision.

Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the

intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral.

As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent-intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for

an impeachable officer abound.The requirements or restrictions of a one-year bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement

by a House member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be met before bothering a respondent to answer already

weigh heavily in favor of an impeachable officer.

Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to

pre-agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once

and for all on the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it

does not have the stated preliminary requisites.

To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression.

Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of

complaints filed. This is non sequitur.What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend

oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or

offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially

if the charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or

internal disposition of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The measure of

protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it

just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full

year. This is the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.

Applicability of the Rules

on Criminal Procedure

On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the

same rules she earlier chastised.

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House

promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as

practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.

Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively

carrying out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.

First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application

of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except

when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and
substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. She concludes that public

respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own rules.

Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers

of the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official

functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from completing its report within the deadline.

Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and

the nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be

defined with the same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of

political judgment, which issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which the Baraquel group adds that

impeachment is a political process and not a criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint or information

referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the Philippines.

The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the

Baraquel and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since

impeachment prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to hold any public office even for various offenses. Both

groups also observe that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this issue during the oral arguments.

Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.

Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional

provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of the application of the one

offense per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the House[93] which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court

finds that petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the

indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the

Articles of Impeachment.[94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.

The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the

Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.

Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that
[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination
of the sufficiency in form and substance, and that for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to
consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.[95] Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely
contemplated.[96]
 Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to
make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that

consolidation is a legal anomaly fails.Petitioners theory obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already

brushed aside.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the

House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September

14, 2010 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

I join the dissent of Mr. Justice brion

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See concurring opinion (No Part)

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate opinion I join the dissent of Justice Brion

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
See: dissent I join the dissent of J. Brion
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I certify that Mr. Justice Bersamin sent in his vote joining the (see separate concurring and dissenting opinion)
dissenting opinion of Mr. J. Brion MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See concurring opinion MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
Associate Justice
See separate concurring and dissenting opinion

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See concurring opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN
DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL
TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT
and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 208493

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 209251

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"Experience is the oracle of truth."1

-James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel
System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing
the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling
out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage
their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of
American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of their districts. 5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the
actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized
projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7Some scholars on the subject further use it to
refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the
Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" in the
Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval.
Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. "The committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution
 made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section
provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may,
for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any
other item hereunder."

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of fund release
and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works act was
modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they
‘being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or civil
leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil groups, and
individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a
legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the
majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it
was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly
ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was declared, an
era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had
already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development
Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP
that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving
₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and
Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local
Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It
has been further reported that "Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public
works projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which
would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional Pork
Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund" which were
created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and ₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development
projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and
the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which
was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other
priority community projects."

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be released
directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual legislators,
as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported 26 that by 1992, Representatives were
receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or
qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges,
and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon the
submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time, the
1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million
each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each, and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as found
in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to submit
 reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the
funds.33

Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing
agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF
allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in
the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted
within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects
not included in the list herein required."

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release
of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to
perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the
budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the
lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM,
purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building
Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation
Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and
when these appropriations were to be spent.41

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the "Food Security
Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44and the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress
for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The requirement
of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were directly released to the
implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any
expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services
and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the
2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the
release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose
and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and
Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of
implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects under the ten
point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies." It also introduced
the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies from which a
particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006
and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently integrated into
the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In
contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61anent certain
aspects of project implementation.
 Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations
(NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with
respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the
law stated that "the amount of at least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of
school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven track records in the construction
of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the
DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-
2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA
9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement, 67 the procedure
whereby the Procuring Entity68(the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO,
provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an express
statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given
₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million
was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft
projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed
only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development,
Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries
shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x
x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the
said priority list.74

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles; but
the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition,
the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to
implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent
patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written concurrence of the
legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF
funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may
be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress, the present
cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds
of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up
a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in
the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the special fund created
under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV 84 of PD 1869,85 or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years
after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it
stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the
regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous Presidents who
reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the
"Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on
the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks." 91 He said that "the
kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of
the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school
buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few
days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996,
accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 GAA for being
unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress," the petition was dismissed.95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that "the
government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six
(6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of
pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were
supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private
accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers‘ chiefs -
of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs
set up by Napoles.98

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99covering the use of
legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to
determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the
DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in
PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to
have been made nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103

● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their respective
allocations.

● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and without considering
their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies themselves but by NGOs
endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to ₱6.156
Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or
in part their utilization of the Funds.
 ● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the
projects were not compliant with law.

As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO."104 According
to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing
"one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.105

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural
antecedents in these cases are as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a Petition for Prohibition of even
date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of
prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the
incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating
funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica,
et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica
Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent
Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to
immediately cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to
the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use
of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x
x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto."108 Also,
they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum, discretionary funds including,
but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No.
208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23, 2012 (Nepomuceno
Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund
priority projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the
DPWH, the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National
Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112

On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public respondents to comment on
the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any
of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013,
and (2) Malampaya Funds under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government‖ under
the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of even date before the Court,
seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30, 2013, Villegas filed a
separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013
(Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the Oral Arguments scheduled
on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza
(Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able
to competently and completely answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision
dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of
Budget and Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances;
(d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."

Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle certain ancillary issues as
prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119and,
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x." Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
"involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning
that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through
advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions."124

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing
for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result
of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms
undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be
served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014
budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President‘s
declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government
has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be
done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on
this point is the following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the President has a duty to execute the
laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and
that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the releases in the meantime, to
investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now
if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of the CoA Report, because of the
reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-
blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate, and prosecute, he has done
that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or this Court declares it
unconstitutional, correct?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional
issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.129

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the
Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and balances,
accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved

– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and expended
undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have
been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings
made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the
Court upheld the CoA‘s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:

The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check
and balance system inherent in our form of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such
as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to
enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its
rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings
under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the system‘s
constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands of notices of disallowances will be
issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen
(Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to
formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the
expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by
constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before the Court does not cease with the passage of a
"PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends
a semblance of truth to petitioners‘ claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,136 the government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition but evading
review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly holds true to these cases. Indeed, the
myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of
repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it" or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast against
this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do
them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such, "urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to resolve. A
political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure." 141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. It
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise
of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision
did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal
branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed
intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help
ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society.
For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they "dutifully contribute
to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork
Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound
to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a
claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have raised may be classified as
matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 148 The CoA Chairperson‘s
statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of
controls"149 amplifies, in addition to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis which means "follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its
prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny
of the entire "Pork Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a
judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing that, indeed, there were direct
releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to
demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As
such, the Court up held, in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as the
Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes
the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts
are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF Article, was resolved by the
Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power given to the Members of Congress to propose and
identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or
the repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution." 154 In deference to the foregoing submissions,
the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of appropriation, or the "power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the
appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by
Members of Congress are merely recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation
of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the
contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other,
formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful
countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which similarly
countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in
allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power
of appropriation which has been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority
to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in Congress, then
it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised
within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such
authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in
the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for
such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am
afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among
others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment
identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative as it is innovative."
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155(Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s
allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the
Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork Barrel System," "Congressional
Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of government to
accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as political
largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the
appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or
expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects
funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing
official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of discretionary public
funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF; 158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork
Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159

Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are
utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel
System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various
post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional
Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to
determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of
government, through Congress,164belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,165 belongs
the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the
three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the
law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law." 168 The principle of
separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to
avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the
other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are
equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch
of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.170

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain
of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch
may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be
violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and
properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon. Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the
phase of budget execution "covers the various operational aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial
plans for individual activities," the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers
inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and
prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing
the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
"Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its
own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins.
So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the
Executive."176

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only
pertains to "any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be confined to mere oversight.
Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to
impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178

Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation.1âwphi1 In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power
to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of
responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have
ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an
illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the President maintains "ultimate
authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain
that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such
proposal and identification are recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article
follows the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to
participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded post-
enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013
PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3
as well as the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced
from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project falls under a general program
listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed,
submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator
may make his choice. The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to "projects to be
identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects identified by each legislator. Finally,
paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as
the case may be." From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release and
realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to participate in the area of fund release through congressional
committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first , paragraph 2,
Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖
; and, second , paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with
the concurrence of the legislator concerned."

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of
budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona,
Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and
the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon
its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as
such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the identification authority of
legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral
Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a
funding source, thereby highlighting the indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the identification by the individual
legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would doubt very much, Your Honor,
because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the
legislator.
xxxx

Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can a legislator make sure that
he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify,
he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out by Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:

Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have,
after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of
the DBM, and both Houses of Congress has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought
that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we
should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into the law or informal
practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has
conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the
process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments
which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the
authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency,197or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies
for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in
the case of People v. Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the
nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are
necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law."

xxxx

Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry
into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund
from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF
Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the
2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that they are absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.203

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is
found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada,
the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after
the required publication."205

Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon, explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His
disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the
executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of
the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)

The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,207 impose fiscal
restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the budgetary process. 208 In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad
laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209

For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto.
An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation
or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of
appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)

On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto,
must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.

Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an
allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows
the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the
same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which
state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item
veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component percentages or values; however, it is
crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper
line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by
accounting and budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the
related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power. Finally, special purpose funds and
discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular
correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available
as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary
funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by
appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law."

In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be
said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President
may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds
some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally,
it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still
have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

b. Application.

In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of
the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." 212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item
veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to meet the demands of a
modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially address situations which are barely foreseen when a
GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-
grounded.214

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further
divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is
passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the
General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between
(a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since
it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79
Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, "limited state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she
recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar
operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies
cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means
do not justify even commendable ends.218

c. Accountability.

Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies public accountability as it
renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each
legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-
interested partners."219 They also claim that the system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective
officials." Finally, they add that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the
decisions of senators.‘"220

The Court agrees in part.

The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various
mechanisms in the Constitution which are designed to exact accountability from public officers.

Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is the power of congressional
oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘
power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and
be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; 223 or (b) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224

The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF
Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of
the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:

Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis
supplied)

Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another office of government –
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per
se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to
this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-
case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department,
through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of
politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial
assessment.

In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus
impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as
unconstitutional.

4. Political Dynasties.

One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to
perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution225 which states that:

Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined
by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated
how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.

5. Local Autonomy.

The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which
read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

ARTICLE X

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.

Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), wherein the policy on local
autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:

Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall
enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them
more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local government
units.

xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local
government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program
is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to
develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine
Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228

This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the
needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of
Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments
will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public
affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in purely local affairs
which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of
the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it
allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The
Court agrees with petitioners.

Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that individual members of
Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective
constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence
by stating that "the relatively small projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development
goals to the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are preoccupied with
mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that
the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for
communities that the LGU concerned cannot afford.233

Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
"making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken
into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent
which is "to make equal the unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator
and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic
and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction." 234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor
duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body. The
undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the
following wise:236

With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only contributed little to the overall development of the district,
but has even contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."

Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert genuine local autonomy, the 2013
PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is deemed unconstitutional.

With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues involving the Presidential Pork
Barrel.

C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.

1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of
authorizing the release of public funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since
the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special Fund
incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the allocation of
the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and
Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their
proper appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239

The Court disagrees.

"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a)
sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum
designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or
apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241

There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the
questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the
questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed
(In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242

To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The word appropriate means to
allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the sense of the constitution means the setting apart a
portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is
plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary and specific" purpose of the
law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision designates a determinate or determinable amount of money
and allocates the same for a particular public purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.

Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:

Section 8. Appropriations. x x x

All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and agreements such as
application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all money collected from concessionaires, representing
unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals,
production share on service contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)

Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:

Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government
in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00
shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the
restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines. (Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special
Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to
be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which
similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said
constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of
intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made
by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under
the 2013 PDAF Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the
individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an
"appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability
principle as afore-discussed.

2. Undue Delegation.

On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to determine for what
purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same
section and thus, construe the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other
purposes related "to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244

The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.

While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist,
the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for
the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring
the law into actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative
guidelines for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that a law is
complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate. On the other hand, the second test
is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient,
the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented.248

In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to "energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government" states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development
programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use
of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally
effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya
Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD 1993
which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the amendatory provision may be readily examined under the
current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately
curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a
"priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said
term could pertain to any kind of facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a
system, especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to support commerce as
well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" must be
stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by
any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
remains legally effective and subsisting.

D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.

Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.

Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context of its pronouncements
made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of
the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b)
"the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the
PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987
Constitution which read as follows:

ARTICLE II

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.

ARTICLE III Sec. 7.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.

Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As explained in the case of
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256

While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional
right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State
are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.

The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner
is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)

Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information does not include the right to
compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has
a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required."
Hence, without the foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte
are hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does
not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to
perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido,
G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.

The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
(Emphases supplied)

In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF
Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the
bases of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to
the CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any petition before the Court to
be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court
recognizes that the information requested is a matter of significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure
are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘
prayer on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate
petition.

It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such schedule/list and report and not
in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable
regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition, access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court
denied the application for mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the
latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that
undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,

"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to
secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.

2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.

Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently, off-budget, lump sum,
discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the
Executive‘s Social Funds."260

Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the prerogative of the political
branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their prayer on this score.

3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.

The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds. In response to the Court‘s
September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-
8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which pertinently reads as follows:

3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) has been issued by the DBM
and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and
disbursements thereto effected by the agencies concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are:
first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the
Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.

Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the
PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation [(NCA)]." 261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.

For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments." They explain that once a SARO
has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of
the TRO because they cannot be considered as ‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the
DBM.262

The Court agrees with petitioners in part.

At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be lifted is a matter rendered
moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting
the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for
2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.

The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a practical impact on the
execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at
the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.

On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be
"released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to
incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of
which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority."263

Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically
speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In
fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual
release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the
statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265

Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?

xxxx

Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into commitments. The NCA, Your
Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x
The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on
the projects or projects covered by the SARO and the NCA.

Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?

Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn by the DBM.

Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?

Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In this respect, therefore, the
disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of
this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the
declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already
obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not released – meaning, those
merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section
8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects" pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional.
However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

E. Consequential Effects of Decision.

As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.

To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain
legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced
and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 266 the doctrine
merely "reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to
a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘" 268

For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.

Conclusion

The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it
has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system
has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has
authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions,
it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds
intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification
of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein
pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence
or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and
its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and
vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what
has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its
course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other‘s.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively
organized into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as
but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment,
unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the
previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from
which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the
Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both
failing the sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT. Thus, the disbursement/release
of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
910, and (2) the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12
of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time this Decision is promulgated, not covered
by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED.
The remaining PDAF funds covered by this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated
surplus of the general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to be utilized for
their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the
Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit
complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to
official documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is without prejudice to a proper
mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue through a separate petition.

The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary deliberations of Congress as
the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and
accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or
unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel System.

This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See Concurring Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion NO PART

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I concur and also join the concurring opinion of Justice I join the Opinion of Justice Carpio, subject to my Concurring
Carpio. & Dissenting Opinion.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the concurring opinion of J. A.T. Carpio of the ponencia

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION (IBAAEU), petitioner,

vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA, respondents.

Sisenando R. Villaluz, Jr. for petitioner.

Abdulmaid Kiram Muin colloborating counsel for petitioner.

The Solicitor General Caparas, Tabios, Ilagan Alcantara & Gatmaytan Law Office and Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office for
respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order dated November 10, 1979, of respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, Amado G. Inciong, in
NLRC case No. RB-IV-1561-76 entitled "Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (complainant-appellee), vs. Insular Bank of Asia and
America" (respondent-appellant), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment. promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of
merit (p. 109 rec.).

The antecedent facts culled from the records are as follows:

On June 20, 1975, petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of
Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office No. IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties,
the case was certified for arbitration on July 7, 1975 (p. 18, NLRC rec.

On August 25, 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano rendered a decision in the above-entitled case, granting petitioner's complaint for
payment of holiday pay. Pertinent portions of the decision read: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 xxx xxx xxx

The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank were not paid their wages on unworked regular holidays as
mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 208. Right to holiday pay.

(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and
service establishments regularly employing less than 10 workers.

(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter, shall include: New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday,
Good Friday, the ninth of April the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth
of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for
holding a general election.

xxx xxx xxx

This conclusion is deduced from the fact that the daily rate of pay of the bank employees was computed in the past with
the unworked regular holidays as excluded for purposes of determining the deductible amount for absences incurred Thus,
if the employer uses the factor 303 days as a divisor in determining the daily rate of monthly paid employee, this gives
rise to a presumption that the monthly rate does not include payments for unworked regular holidays. The use of the
factor 303 indicates the number of ordinary working days in a year (which normally has 365 calendar days), excluding the
52 Sundays and the 10 regular holidays. The use of 251 as a factor (365 calendar days less 52 Saturdays, 52 Sundays, and
10 regular holidays) gives rise likewise to the same presumption that the unworked Saturdays, Sundays and regular
holidays are unpaid. This being the case, it is not amiss to state with certainty that the instant claim for wages on regular
unworked holidays is found to be tenable and meritorious.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

(a) xxx xxxx xxx

(b) Ordering respondent to pay wages to all its employees for all regular h(olidays since November 1, 1974 (pp. 97-99,
rec., underscoring supplied).

Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision. Instead, it complied with the order of Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano by paying their holiday
pay up to and including January, 1976.

On December 16, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 850 was promulgated amending, among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right
to holiday pay to read as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wages during regular holidays, except in
retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation
equivalent to twice his regular rate and

(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first
of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December,
and the day designated by law for holding a general election.

Accordingly, on February 16, 1976, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor) promulgated
the rules and regulations for the implementation of holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. — Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the
number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be
presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
 For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory minimum wage multiplied by 365 days
divided by twelve" (italics supplied).

On April 23, 1976, Policy Instruction No. 9 was issued by the then Secretary of Labor (now Minister) interpreting the above-quoted rule,
pertinent portions of which read: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the case of
monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to
the benefit.

Under the rules implementing P.D. 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the entitlement
of monthly paid employees, The new determining rule is this: If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than
P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from January to December, he is presumed
to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account
of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays. ..." (emphasis
supplied).

Respondent bank, by reason of the ruling laid down by the aforecited rule implementing Article 94 of the Labor Code and by Policy Instruction
No. 9, stopped the payment of holiday pay to an its employees.

On August 30, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter's decision of August 25, 1975, whereby the
respondent bank was ordered to pay its employees their daily wage for the unworked regular holidays.

On September 10, 1975, respondent bank filed an opposition to the motion for a writ of execution alleging, among others, that: (a) its refusal to
pay the corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, is based
on and justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules implementing P. D. 850; and (b) that the said award is already repealed
by P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16, 1975, and by said Policy Instruction No. 9 of the Department of Labor, considering that its
monthly paid employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and their monthly pay is uniform from January to December, and that no
deductions are made from the monthly salaries of its employees on account of holidays in months where they occur (pp. 64-65, NLRC rec.).

On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the respondent bank to
continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay on the following grounds: (a) that the judgment is already final and the findings which is
found in the body of the decision as well as the dispositive portion thereof is res judicata or is the law of the case between the parties; and (b)
that since the decision had been partially implemented by the respondent bank, appeal from the said decision is no longer available (pp. 100-
103, rec.).

On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the above-cited order of Labor Arbiter Soriano to the National Labor Relations
Commission, reiterating therein its contentions averred in its opposition to the motion for writ of execution. Respondent bank further alleged
for the first time that the questioned order is not supported by evidence insofar as it finds that respondent bank discontinued payment of
holiday pay beginning January, 1976 (p. 84, NLRC rec.).

On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated its resolution en banc dismissing respondent bank's appeal, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£

In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as we hereby dismiss, respondent's appeal; to set aside Labor
Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano's order of 18 October 1976 and, as prayed for by complainant, to order the issuance of the
proper writ of execution (p. 244, NLRC rec.).

Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on February 9, 1979 or almost eight. (8) months after it was promulgated,
while copies were served on the respondent bank on February 13, 1979.

On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office of the Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to
stay execution, alleging therein the following: (a) that there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, in dismissing the respondent's appeal on pure technicalities without
passing upon the merits of the appeal and (b) that the resolution appealed from is contrary to the law and jurisprudence (pp. 260-274, NLRC
rec.).
On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's appeal and alleged the following grounds: (a) that the office of the
Minister of Labor has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal pursuant to the provisions of P. D. 1391; (b) that the labor arbiter's decision
being final, executory and unappealable, execution is a matter of right for the petitioner; and (c) that the decision of the labor arbiter dated
August 25, 1975 is supported by the law and the evidence in the case (p. 364, NLRC rec.).

On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending appeal, praying that a writ of execution be issued by the National
Labor Relations Commission pending appeal of the case with the Office of the Minister of Labor. Respondent bank filed its opposition thereto
on August 8, 1979.

On August 13, 1979, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The Chief, Research and Information Division of this Commission is hereby directed to designate a Socio-Economic
Analyst to compute the holiday pay of the employees of the Insular Bank of Asia and America from April 1976 to the
present, in accordance with the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated August 25, 1975" (p. 80, rec.).

On November 10, 1979, the Office of the Minister of Labor, through Deputy Minister Amado G. Inciong, issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, let the appealed Resolution en banc of the National Labor Relations Commission
dated 20 June 1978 be, as it is hereby, set aside and a new judgment promulgated dismissing the instant case for lack of
merit (p. 436, NLRC rec.).

Hence, this petition for certiorari charging public respondent Amado G. Inciong with abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

The issue in this case is: whether or not the decision of a Labor Arbiter awarding payment of regular holiday pay can still be set aside on appeal
by the Deputy Minister of Labor even though it has already become final and had been partially executed, the finality of which was affirmed by
the National Labor Relations Commission sitting en banc, on the basis of an Implementing Rule and Policy Instruction promulgated by the
Ministry of Labor long after the said decision had become final and executory.

WE find for the petitioner.

WE agree with the petitioner's contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the
then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended
them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 1 1, rec.).

Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in
retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. ...

The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Code's holiday pay provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof which reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Art. 82. Coverage. — The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether
for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel members of the family of the
employer who are dependent on him for support domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and
workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

... (emphasis supplied).

From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the
implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by
inserting, under Rule IV, Book Ill of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that: "employees who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed
to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not. "
Public respondent maintains that "(T)he rules implementing P. D. 850 and Policy Instruction No. 9 were issued to clarify the policy in the
implementation of the ten (10) paid legal holidays. As interpreted, 'unworked' legal holidays are deemed paid insofar as monthly paid
employees are concerned if (a) they are receiving not less than the statutory minimum wage, (b) their monthly pay is uniform from January to
December, and (c) no deduction is made from their monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur. As explained in Policy
Instruction No, 9, 'The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily paid employees. In case of monthly,
only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal holidays are entitled to the benefit' " (pp. 340-341,
rec.). This contention is untenable.

It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit -
it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid
their regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor
of labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the
most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)

Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.

Public respondent vehemently argues that the intent and spirit of the holiday pay law, as expressed by the Secretary of Labor in the case of
Chartered Bank Employees Association v. The Chartered Bank (NLRC Case No. RB-1789-75, March 24, 1976), is to correct the disadvantages
inherent in the daily compensation system of employment — holiday pay is primarily intended to benefit the daily paid workers whose
employment and income are circumscribed by the principle of "no work, no pay." This argument may sound meritorious; but, until the
provisions of the Labor Code on holiday pay is amended by another law, monthly paid employees are definitely included in the benefits of
regular holiday pay. As earlier stated, the presumption is always in favor of law, negatively put, the Labor Code is always strictly construed
against management.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given
great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the
role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of
the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that stems ultimately
from some legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme Court in Modern Role, C. B. Swisher 1958, p. 36).

Thus. in the case of Philippine Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission (106 SCRA 444, July 31, 1981) where the
Secretary of Labor enlarged the scope of exemption from the coverage of a Presidential Decree granting increase in emergency allowance, this
Court ruled that: têñ.£îhqwâ£

... the Secretary of Labor has exceeded his authority when he included paragraph (k) in Section 1 of the Rules
implementing P. D. 1 1 23.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, the inclusion of paragraph k contravenes the statutory authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, and the same
is therefore void, as ruled by this Court in a long line of cases . . . .. têñ.£îhqwâ£

The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the administration of
the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found
in the early case of United States vs. Barrios decided in 1908. Then came in a 1914 decision, United
States vs. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119) delineation of the scope of such competence. Thus: "Of
course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general
provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. So long, however, as
the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid." In
1936, in People vs. Santos, this Court expressed its disapproval of an administrative order that
would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official We
reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made clear that where an
administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, 'the
mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed. Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court in
Victorias Milling inc. vs. Social Security Commission, citing Parker as well as Davis did tersely sum up
the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the Courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation
is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the
 courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. ... On the other
hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine chat the law means."

"It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all
executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative
executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution assert for
itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate.
There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed the
statute requires adherence to, not departure from its provisions. No deviation is allowable. In the
terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency "cannot amend an act of
Congress." Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be shown that the rules and
regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the Veterans Bill of Rights
provides" (Phil. Apparel Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, supra, 463, 464,
citing Teozon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, PVA 33 SCRA 585; see also Santos vs.
Hon. Estenzo, et al, 109 Phil. 419; Hilado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 100 Phil. 295; Sy Man vs.
Jacinto & Fabros, 93 Phil. 1093; Olsen & Co., Inc. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil. 259).

This ruling of the Court was recently reiterated in the case of American Wire & Cable Workers Union (TUPAS) vs. The National Labor Relations
Commission and American Wire & Cable Co., Inc., G.R. No. 53337, promulgated on June 29, 1984.

In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy instruction No. 9 issued by the then
Secretary of Labor must be declared null and void. Accordingly, public respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong had no basis at
all to deny the members of petitioner union their regular holiday pay as directed by the Labor Code.

II

It is not disputed that the decision of Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, had already become final, and was, in fact,
partially executed by the respondent bank.

However, public respondent maintains that on the authority of De Luna vs. Kayanan, 61 SCRA 49, November 13, 1974, he can annul the final
decision of Labor Arbiter Soriano since the ensuing promulgation of the integrated implementing rules of the Labor Code pursuant to P.D. 850
on February 16, 1976, and the issuance of Policy Instruction No. 9 on April 23, 1976 by the then Secretary of Labor are facts and circumstances
that transpired subsequent to the promulgation of the decision of the labor arbiter, which renders the execution of the said decision impossible
and unjust on the part of herein respondent bank (pp. 342-343, rec.).

This contention is untenable.

To start with, unlike the instant case, the case of De Luna relied upon by the public respondent is not a labor case wherein the express mandate
of the Constitution on the protection to labor is applied. Thus Article 4 of the Labor Code provides that, "All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor and Article
1702 of the Civil Code provides that, " In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer.

Consequently, contrary to public respondent's allegations, it is patently unjust to deprive the members of petitioner union of their vested right
acquired by virtue of a final judgment on the basis of a labor statute promulgated following the acquisition of the "right".

On the question of whether or not a law or statute can annul or modify a judicial order issued prior to its promulgation, this Court, through
Associate Justice Claro M. Recto, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

We are decidedly of the opinion that they did not. Said order, being unappealable, became final on the date of its
issuance and the parties who acquired rights thereunder cannot be deprived thereof by a constitutional provision
enacted or promulgated subsequent thereto. Neither the Constitution nor the statutes, except penal laws favorable to the
accused, have retroactive effect in the sense of annulling or modifying vested rights, or altering contractual
obligations" (China Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324, emphasis supplied).

In the case of In re: Cunanan, et al., 19 Phil. 585, March 18, 1954, this Court said: "... when a court renders a decision or promulgates a
resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said
law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no
effect." Thus, the amendatory rule (Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code) cannot be given retroactive effect as to modify
final judgments. Not even a law can validly annul final decisions (In re: Cunanan, et al., Ibid).

Furthermore, the facts of the case relied upon by the public respondent are not analogous to that of the case at bar. The case of De Luna
speaks of final and executory judgment, while iii the instant case, the final judgment is partially executed. just as the court is ousted of its
jurisdiction to annul or modify a judgment the moment it becomes final, the court also loses its jurisdiction to annul or modify a writ of
execution upon its service or execution; for, otherwise, we will have a situation wherein a final and executed judgment can still be annulled or
modified by the court upon mere motion of a panty This would certainly result in endless litigations thereby rendering inutile the rule of law.

Respondent bank counters with the argument that its partial compliance was involuntary because it did so under pain of levy and execution of
its assets (p. 138, rec.). WE find no merit in this argument. Respondent bank clearly manifested its voluntariness in complying with the decision
of the labor arbiter by not appealing to the National Labor Relations Commission as provided for under the Labor Code under Article 223. A
party who waives his right to appeal is deemed to have accepted the judgment, adverse or not, as correct, especially if such party readily
acquiesced in the judgment by starting to execute said judgment even before a writ of execution was issued, as in this case. Under these
circumstances, to permit a party to appeal from the said partially executed final judgment would make a mockery of the doctrine of finality of
judgments long enshrined in this jurisdiction.

Section I of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "... execution shall issue as a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to
appeal ... or if no appeal has been duly perfected." This rule applies to decisions or orders of labor arbiters who are exercising quasi-judicial
functions since "... the rule of execution of judgments under the rules should govern all kinds of execution of judgment, unless it is otherwise
provided in other laws" Sagucio vs. Bulos 5 SCRA 803) and Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that "... decisions, awards, or orders of the
Labor Arbiter or compulsory arbitrators are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10)
days from receipt of such awards, orders, or decisions. ..."

Thus, under the aforecited rule, the lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment and the judgment
becomes final ipso jure (Vega vs. WCC, 89 SCRA 143, citing Cruz vs. WCC, 2 PHILAJUR 436, 440, January 31, 1978; see also Soliven vs. WCC, 77
SCRA 621; Carrero vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC, decided jointly, 77 SCRA 297; Vitug vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 436; Ramos vs. Republic, 69 SCRA
576).

In Galvez vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., 3 SCRA 422, 423, October 31, 1961, where the lower court modified a final order, this
Court ruled thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

The lower court was thus aware of the fact that it was thereby altering or modifying its order of January 8, 1959.
Regardless of the excellence of the motive for acting as it did, we are constrained to hold however, that the lower court
had no authorities to make said alteration or modification. ...

xxx xxx xxx

The equitable considerations that led the lower court to take the action complained of cannot offset the dem ands of
public policy and public interest — which are also responsive to the tenets of equity — requiring that an issues passed
upon in decisions or final orders that have become executory, be deemed conclusively disposed of and definitely closed
for, otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting at naught the main role of courts of justice, which is to
assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiciable
controversies with finality.

xxx xxx xxx

In the recent case of Gabaya vs. Mendoza, 113 SCRA 405, 406, March 30, 1982, this Court said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

xxx xxx xxx

In Marasigan vs. Ronquillo (94 Phil. 237), it was categorically stated that the rule is absolute that after a judgment
becomes final by the expiration of the period provided by the rules within which it so becomes, no further amendment or
correction can be made by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. And such final judgment is conclusive not only
as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but as to any other
admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose (L-7044, 96 Phil. 526). In the earlier case of Contreras
and Ginco vs. Felix and China Banking Corp., Inc. (44 O.G. 4306), it was stated that the rule must be adhered to regardless
 of any possible injustice in a particular case for (W)e have to subordinate the equity of a particular situation to the over-
mastering need of certainty and immutability of judicial pronouncements

xxx xxx xxx

III

The despotic manner by which public respondent Amado G. Inciong divested the members of the petitioner union of their rights acquired by
virtue of a final judgment is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law Public respondent completely ignored the
rights of the petitioner union's members in dismissing their complaint since he knew for a fact that the judgment of the labor arbiter had long
become final and was even partially executed by the respondent bank.

A final judgment vests in the prevailing party a right recognized and protected by law under the due process clause of the Constitution (China
Ins. & Surety Co. vs. Judge of First Instance of Manila, 63 Phil. 324). A final judgment is "a vested interest which it is right and equitable that the
government should recognize and protect, and of which the individual could no. be deprived arbitrarily without injustice" (Rookledge v.
Garwood, 65 N.W. 2d 785, 791).

lt is by this guiding principle that the due process clause is interpreted. Thus, in the pithy language of then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Concepcion "... acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings
suffering from the same flaw are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding (Vda. de Cuaycong vs.
Vda. de Sengbengco 110 Phil. 118, emphasis supplied), And "(I)t has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divested
the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights" (Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Organization
vs. Phil. Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 211, June 5, 1973).

Tested by and pitted against this broad concept of the constitutional guarantee of due process, the action of public respondent Amado G.
Inciong is a clear example of deprivation of property without due process of law and constituted grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated November 10, 1979.

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER
RICARTE T. SORIANO DATED AUGUST 25, 1975, IS HEREBY REINSTATED.

COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Guerrero, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Abad Santos, JJ., concur in the result.

Concepcion Jr., J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-93-944 July 20, 1994

RIZALIA CAPUNO AND THELMA VILLANUEVA, complainants,

vs.
JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-959 July 20, 1994

PSM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND CELIA PAMPLONA,
vs.
JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO, JR., respondent.

Salonga & Associates for complainants in AM RTJ-93-944.

Nelson A. Loyola for complainants in AM RTJ -93-959.

Manuel Singson for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, San Pablo City, is
charged with various corrupt practices detrimental to the administration of justice.

Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 was referred to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court of Appeals,1 and
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez,2 for investigation, report and recommendation. In the
meantime, we directed respondent judge to go on leave. 3 On 27 October 1993, we ordered the consolidation of the complaints. 4

Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted their
reports. We shall deal with respondent's administrative liability on the basis of the investigators' findings and recommendations. 5

I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944

The complaint in this case was initiated by a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 28 August 1992 of complainants Rizalia Capuno and Thelma
Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus —

(1) Na si Pedro Calara, Jr. ay nagdemanda ng "writ of possession" laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala ni Judge Ausberto
Jaramillo ng RTC-San Pablo City.

(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng "writ of possession" si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa nasabing kaso,
ay nagpunta si Sheriff Leonardo Ho sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at sinabi kay Rizalia na gusto siyang makausap ni Judge
Jaramillo.

(3) Na nagpunta si Rizalia, na kasama ng kanyang anak na si Thelma, at ni Gregorio Capistrano, sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo,
mga alas 10:00 ng umaga at pinapasok sila sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo.

(4) Sinabi sa kanila ni Judge Jaramillo na kung gustong hindi mapaalis sa bahay si Rizalia, ay magbigay ng halagang
P200,000 cash na kung maa-ari ay puro dadaanin, at saka isang tsekeng P150,000 na postdated 30 days.

(5) Na sinabi ni Thelma na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga, at ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo kay Thelma na
subukan na maghanap ng nasabing halaga at bumalik sa loob ng dalawang araw.

(6) Nang mga alas 11:00 ng umaga, bumalik si Thelma at si Gregorio Capistrano sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo pagkatapos
ng dalawang araw, at sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na halagang takda ni Judge. Sabi ni
Judge na kung hindi kaya ni Thelma ang P200,000 cash ay kahit na P150,000 na cash na lang, puera doon sa tsekeng
P150,000 na postdated 60 days, pero dapat ang mga ito ay maibigay ni Thelma sa kanya ng alas 2:00 ng hapon noong
araw na iyon din.

(7) Na sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga. Ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo na
kung ganoon ay wala na siyang magagawa.

(8) Na ang demanda ni Rizalia Capuno laban kay Pedro Calara, Jr. na pa walang bisa ang pagkabenta at pagka-ilit ng
kanyang lupa ay bumagsak din sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, kaya siya ay nakikiusap kay Judge Jaramillo na ilipat ang
nasabing kaso sa ibang hukuman. 6
Required to comment, respondent judge denies the charges against him. He maintains that this complaint was filed out of pure harassment. 7

On 19 November 1993, after due investigation of the case, Justice Ibay-Somera submitted her report the pertinent portions of which follow —

During the testimony of complaint Thelma Villanueva, she only identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay she executed with her
mother Rizalia Capuno, and affirmed the truth of the contents thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

On cross-examination, complainant Thelma Villanueva admitted that her mother, complainant Rizalia Capuno borrowed
the amount of P15,000.00 sometime in 1987 from one Pedro Calara, Jr., for which the questioned property consisting of
85 sq. m. and originally covered by Tax Declaration No. 34-1260, was mortgaged as a security thereof (pp. 9 & 12, tsn,
July 28, 1993). It was also shown that despite partial payments on said loan (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-6), the mortgaged property
was extrajudicially foreclosed on August 21, 1990 and a certificate of sale was issued by the respondent judge on the
same date of August 21, 1990, and registered with the office of the Register of Deeds on October 12, 1990 (Tsn p. 16, July
28, 1993; Exh. 6), and that the buyer of said property was Pedro Calara, Jr., in the amount of P47,021.00 (Exh. 2-A, p. 17,
tsn, July 28, 1993). Subsequently, an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of sale were made and executed by
Pedro Calara, Jr., and were registered with the Register of Deeds on December 9, 1991, which caused the cancellation of
Tax Declaration No. 541260 and a new one was issued, Tax Declaration No. 34-2753, in the name of Pedro Calara, Jr. (Exh.
6). A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by said Pedro Calara, Jr., on February 24, 1992 was assigned to
the Branch of respondent Judge (p. 25, tsn, July 28, 1993), who issued the corresponding Decision on May 15, 1992
granting the said petition (Exh. 11), and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession and was
implemented by Sheriff Aranguren (Exh. "15"). Said complainant met the respondent Judge for the first time sometime in
March 1992, "to know how much more" the complainants were to pay Pedro Calara, Jr. (TSN, July 29, 1993, pp. 2 & 15),
upon advice of the Sheriff Ho (tsn, p. 9, July 29, 1993). Complainants, together with one Gregorio Capistrano, went to see
the respondent Judge sometime in May or June 1992 for the second time, who, in one of those meetings, asked whether
said complainants "could pay P350,000.00", P200,000.00 of which should be in cash, all in P100-bills, to be displayed on
his table "so that Pedro Calara's eyes will bulge and I will take care of everything", and P150,000.00 in postdated check
(pp. 16-17, tsn, July 29, 1993). Complainant Thelma Villanueva informed the Judge that she could not afford the amount,
thus the Judge reduced the proposal to P150,000.00 in postdated check, which amount should be brought to him at 2:00
p.m., and that they (complainants) "should not talk to anybody" (p. 20, tsn, July 29, 1993). Because the complainant
failed to comply with the demand, complainant Rizalia Capuno was evicted from the questioned premises and her house
was demolished. The testimony of the other witness for the complainants, Gregorio Capistrano, was just corroborative of
the testimony of Thelma Villanueva, that he met the respondent Judge on those two (2) occasions when Thelma
Villanueva went to see the respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., testified that he has been the Presiding Judge of Branch 30, Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City, since January 30, 1987; that he came to know Thelma Villanueva when she testified in Sp. Proc.
Case No. 852 in a prayer for issuance of a writ of possession over a parcel of land filed by one Pedro Calara, Jr.; that he
issued the writ prayed for. Respondent Judge further testified that he, in his effort to settle the parties' differences, as
per request of Deputy Sheriff Leonardo Ho, tried to mediate in order to help them settle for the purchase price (tsn, p. 5,
Aug. 30, 1993). He likewise testified that it was complainant Thelma Villanueva who voluntarily offered to pay Pedro
Calara the amount of P200,000.00 cash and to pay the balance in P150,000.00 in postdated checks (tsn, p. 6, Aug. 30,
1993). Another case was filed by the complainant against Pedro Calara, Jr., before the Branch of respondent Judge, where
the complainant moved for respondent's inhibition, which motion he granted. Respondent Judge vehemently denied that
he demanded money from the complainants.

xxx xxx xxx

From the testimonies and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, and considering their (sic) demeanor of the
parties during the hearings, this Court concludes that there was indeed a color of truth in the complaint. The
complainants are simple and ordinary people, who prefer to live a simple life than engage themselves in complicated and
perplexed lives. And should they become part of complexed court battles, it is not of their own choosing but because of
circumstances. It may not be amiss to stress that "the courts exist to promote justice; and thus to aid in securing the
contentment and happiness of the people. Their administration should be speedy and careful. Every judge should at all
times be alert in his rulings and in the conduct of the business of his court so far as he can, to make it useful to litigants
and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the
courts instead of the courts for the litigants." (Adm. Order No. 162, Canons of Judicial Ethics). The complainants failed to
get the justice they are requesting from the respondent Judge for their failure to deliver the amount asked of them.
 Hence, the complainants' allegation that the respondent Judge demanded from them money when they were trying to
seek his assistance in amicably settling their case and which demand, when not met by them resulted to their eviction
from the premises, is meritorious and credible. It is well-settled rule that "acts of the respondent judge of demanding . . .
money from a party-litigant before his court constitute serious misconduct in office" (Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 508). Likewise, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, "a judge's official conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."

Finding respondent judge guilty of the charge, the Investigating Justice recommended his suspension for one (1) month without pay with
admonition and reprimand. 8

The Investigating Justice is correct in finding respondent judge guilty of the charge. As judge, respondent knows fully well that he should avoid
such actions as would subject him to suspicion of interest in a case in his court. Yet, he threw all caution to the winds, so to speak, and left
nothing but telltale evidence of his guilt.

The active mediation of respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 852 allegedly to settle the differences between complainants and Pedro Calara, Jr.,
was highly questionable. Firstly, the mediation was initiated not by the parties themselves nor their lawyers but by respondent's sheriffs,
Leonardo Ho and Regalado Aranguren, whose words were heavily relied upon by respondent. 9 Secondly, the meetings were unrecorded and
unattended by counsel of the parties. 10 Respondent's excuse that "in the (p)rovince, we mediate the differences of the parties, especially at
that particular time the parties have (sic) no counsel," is faulty and unacceptable practice. Unless a judge is conducting a pre-trial under Rules
20 and 118, his role in the administration of justice is to decide contentious cases with finality. In the absence of their lawyers, a judge ought
not to meddle in issues confronting the parties even on the pretext of settling their cases. For to do so would compromise the integrity of his
office which he is mandated to uphold. 11 Once more, judges are strongly reminded that the office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is
a public trust. 12 A judicial office demands that the incumbent should conduct himself in such a manner as to merit the respect, reverence and
confidence of the people. 13

Respondent's defense that the parties have no lawyers fails to convince us. We gather from his testimonies that the intended to see the parties,
alone, thus —

Justice Somera:

Q During the first meeting you said the parties were not represented by counsel then there was a
request for a first meeting with you by the parties.

A They have no more lawyers at that time, Your Honor.

Q But they were represented by a lawyer during the hearing?

A During the hearing.

Q Why did you not require Calara to bring with him his counsel?

A Because I do not have time to talk to Calara, Your Honor.

Q When Villanueva and Capuno appeared before you during the hearing of the petition for
issuance of the writ of possession, were they also represented by counsel?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q During this first meeting, why did you not require the lawyers to appear before you for the
arrangement?

A The lawyer of the Capunos withdrew as counsel, Your Honor.

Q Why did you not advise them to get another counsel?

A According to my Sheriff, I told my sheriff "I want their counsels to be present" my lawyer (sheriff)
told me "ayaw na ho wala na raw silang abogado dahil wala na daw silang pambayad."
 Q Who was always in contact with Capuno and Villanueva?

A My Sheriff, Your Honor. 14

Yet, respondent in his earlier testimony revealed that complainant had a lawyer —

Justice Somera:

Q After they (complainants) left, did you have any occasion to meet them either Calara or Rizalia
Capuno and her daughter, Thelma Villanueva, altogether?

A There was a hearing of a motion to dismiss that is the time I realized a new case was filed by the
complainants mother and daughter. In that hearing, the Calaras were absent, Rizalia Capuno was
absent but Thelma Villanueva was present.

Q Before whom?

A Before me, Your Honor. I talk(ed) to Thelma asking her was it not that you are the same person
who failed to meet the other party? She answered in the affirmative, I ask(ed) her what is your
pleasure now? Shall we wait for the Calaras because she has a motion to dismiss and to talk it over
with the spouses and she reply (sic) that she will just consult her lawyer and ask for time to file
opposition.15

Significantly, the rendezvous between respondent and complainants took place in his chambers without the attendance of his staff. Considering
that there was still the question as to whether complainants could come up with the repurchase price of the lot, the meetings conducted inside
the chambers of respondent were uncalled for. We have cautioned judges to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his
counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only act impartially and with propriety but are
also perceived to be impartial and proper. 16

Further, respondent judge insists on his good intention to help the parties agree on the repurchase price of the lot. But, we find that his
meetings were always with complainants and not once did Pedro Calara, Jr., participate therein. Such situation gives us the impression that
Pedro Calara, Jr., did not have any notion at all of these conferences. This suspicion is bolstered by (a) respondent's testimony 17 that ". . . I
likewise told them (complainants) that according to may sheriff they have been promising cash to Calara and further told them that if they have
cash they have to bring it during an arranged meeting to Calara and show the money to Calara so that they will know they are negotiating in
good faith." His statement clearly signified that he had not as yet set up an appointment with Calara, Jr., and, (b) the contradictory stand among
respondent judge and his witnesses regarding the presence of Pedro Calara, Jr., in the alleged conferences of the parties.

In his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 16 February 1993, Sheriff Regalado M. Aranguren confirmed the presence of Calara, Jr., in all the
conferences. 18 He stated that "(n)a sa lahat ng beses ng conferencia ay palaging dumarating si Pedro Calara, Jr., at laging naghihintay kay
Thelma Capuno." For his part, Sheriff Leonardo L. Ho, in his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 15 February
1993, 19 declared that "(a)t nang malaman ng mga naghabla ang kahilingan ng mga Capunos tungkol sa pagbaba ng presyo ng bilihan, ako ay
pinakiusapan ng mga naghahabla na sabihin sa mga Capunos na sila ay magkita sa hukuman para sa isang conferencia upang mapagusapan
ang tungkol sa presyo ng bilihang mabibiling muli; (n)a, hindi nakatupad ang mga Capunos sa una nilang tipanan kung kaya ang conferencia ay
nakansela," thus implying that Calara, Jr., was present during the first meeting. However, respondent judge rebutted these statements when he
testified that nobody appeared in both meetings except complainants who came two days after the appointed date of the second meeting. 20

Admittedly, the amount of P350,000.00 was the subject of conversation between respondent judge and the complainant Thelma Villanueva.
Respondent judge denies that he demanded such sum but that complainant volunteered the information that she had a checking account and
that she was ready to pay P200,000.00 in cash and the balance of P150,000.00 in postdated checks. 21 He asserts that he could not have
demanded money from complainants as they did not strike him as moneyed. 22

We note with interest that respondent then had a contrary opinion about the economic condition of complainants. He unwittingly disclosed in
his comment that "[f]or whatever it is worth, according to reliable sources, Thelma Villanueva was given by her sister abroad to pay the
repurchase price of the Calaras; that Thelma Villanueva used the money instead in constructing her own house . . . " 23 The reliable sources
referred to were none other than his sheriff and the latter's wife. According to Sheriff Aranguren, "[h]abang ang kaso ay nabibinbin pa sa
hukuman hanggang sa ito ay natapos na, si Thelma Capuno (Villanueva) ay palagi pa ring pumupunta sa aking upisina upang siya ay bigyan pa
ng kaunting panahon dahilan sa iniintay pa lang niya ang perang padala ng kanyang kapatid na nasa America. Sinabi pa rin niya na may
hinihintay pa ring pera siya galing sa kanyang asawa na sabi niya ay hindi nagtatrabaho sa San Pablo." 24 Concepcion L. Aranguren, utility
worker assigned to respondent's court, supported her husband's statement by saying that ". . . Siya (Thelma Villanueva) ay umiiyak habang
nakikipagusap na kung maari daw ay bigyan siya ng palugit dahil may dadating daw siyang pera galing sa kanyang kapatid sa
Amerika." 25 With such information, it is not farfetched for respondent judge to demand money from complainant. Evidently, he was led by his
sources to believe that complainant had the money to buy back the property from the Calaras.

Verily, the act of respondent in meeting with complainants without the presence of counsel and warning them not to tell anyone, and
demanding money under the guise of forging peace between her and Pedro Calara, Jr., constitutes grave misconduct. Additionally, his failure to
uphold the integrity of the judiciary has undoubtedly diminished the faith of our people in the administration of justice. Given these serious
indiscretions, a more severe penalty than one (1) month suspension without pay should be imposed. A judge who established a common fund
purportedly for his low income employees and who himself together with his employees solicited contributions from litigants and visitors for
such fund was dismissed from the service. 26 We can do no less in this case.

II. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959

This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judge to disciplinary action or to dismissal from office for violation of: (1) Sec. 3, pars.
(b), (c) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, (2) Sec. 7, pars. (a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713, and, (3) Arts. 206 and 210 of The Revised Penal Code.

Complainant Celia E. Pampolina, President of PSM Development Corporation and the duly designated and appointed Executrix of the Last Will
and Testament of Pastor S. Marino, alleges that on 6 April 1992, a decision was rendered by respondent judge dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 849(92),
"IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF PASTOR S. MARINO," for lack of merit; that during the pendency of the case, respondent ordered
Jesus Azores, nephew of Pastor S. Marino, to surrender, among other properties, a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon car to the court; that after
the car had been surrendered to the court, respondent requested complainant and the Board of the PSM Corporation to issue a resolution to
have the luxury car at his disposal during weekends and to use it as he pleased; that the corporation appropriated the sum of P10,000.00 to pay
for the reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up of the engine of the car; that respondent had the custody of the car from April 1992 to 5 May
1993; that he also demanded and received food, money, valuable properties (jewelries) from complainant and her grandfather, the later Pastor
S. Marino; that further, respondent judge requested favors from complainant in securing an exemption from the Gun Ban during the election
period; that, in this regard, respondent called up complainant using the name "E. Pilapil" and further extorted money; that, upon the death of
Pastor S. Marino, complainant filed a "Petition for the Probate of the Will of the Late Pastor S. Marino," docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 859(92); that
the petition was raffled to the respondent's sala; that one of the basic issues raised in the petition was the mental capacity and the sound
disposition of the testator; that this issue was already passed upon by respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 849(92); that during the pendency of
the probate proceeding, respondent judge called the parties to a conference at Roño's Place, a public restaurant in San Pablo City; that the
meeting started at eight o'clock in the evening and lasted until midnight; that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss possible settlement of
the probate case; that shares and other properties were discussed except the car; that respondent intentionally omitted to include the car in
the list of properties which he himself prepared so he could still make use of the car; that despite the fact the complainant was named
executrix in the will, respondent appointed Rosevelinda Calingasan and Antonio Azcarate as joint special administrators; that such order was
issued without notice and hearing; that her motion for reconsideration on this ground was denied; that, shortly after, respondent judge
ordered complainant to produce stock certificates in the name of the late Pastor S. Marino, the books of the corporation, and other papers;
that she moved for reconsideration of this order but the same was denied; that the joint special administrators filed a motion to cite
complainant in contempt for her refusal to obey the order of respondent; that in view of the insistence of the respondent to continue hearing
the probate proceedings, complainant moved for the inhibition of respondent judge; that respondent threatened to cite complainant in
contempt because of her statement that respondent had custody, possession and enjoyment of the luxury car of the corporation; that he set
the hearing for the contempt proceeding on 29 January 1993 at eight-thirty in the morning; and, that as a result, complainant filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.

In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no valid cause of action against him. He explains that the car was in the possession of
the court, although on few occasions, he drove it merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the battery. The car also needed minor repairs and
the expenses were paid for by the corporation which appropriated P10,000.00 for the purpose. However, he insists, there was not instance that
he demanded money, food for valuables from complainant.

With regard to the telephone call using the name "E. Pilapil," respondent claims that he wanted to be discreet with his calls. 27 He only wanted
to get the names of the two (2) persons whom complainant mentioned earlier who could help him secure exemption from the Gun Ban. He
never called up complainant to extort money. He got the exemption on his own efforts. Besides, complainant also used "E. Pilapil" when she
called him up at his residence.

Lastly, respondent contends that his orders in the probate proceedings were just and properly issued without bias. He admits that he set the
pre-trial conference of the probate proceedings at Roño's Place because it was the site selected by the parties.

On 8 July 1993, after due investigation, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted his report —

The complaint is an aftermath of the adverse Orders dated November 27, 1992, December 22, 1992 and January 25, 1993
issued by respondent Judge against Celia Pampolina relative to SP 859(92) In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the
Will of Pastor S. Marino, appointing Antonio Azcarate and Rosevelinda Calingasan as Joint Special Administrators instead
of the named executrix in the will which (sic) is the complainant herein.
Most of the issued raised by complainant in this administrative complaint are the very errors assigned by complainant in
her petition filed before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30073 entitled "PSM Corporation and Celia
Pampolina vs. Hon. Judge Ausberto Jaramillo (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, San Pablo City). (Rollo, p. 35-57)
Thus, the undersigned cannot properly rule on complainant's assertions that respondent herein knowingly rendered an
unjust interlocutory order because of the case being sub judice on appeal.

xxx xxx xxx

However, in A.M. No. RTJ-92-859 (Natividad Calauan Uy, et al. vs. Judge Florentino M. Alumbre, Assisting Judge, RTC, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila), respondent Judge Alumbre was imposed a FINE of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for appointing a
special administrator without a hearing.

Admittedly, however, there were mistakes or omissions in the acts of respondent Judge in his handling of some incidents
in the case. One mistake he made was conducting a pre-trial conference of SP 859(92) at the Roño's place, a public place
(Restaurant), rather than inside his chambers and/or the Courtroom. While the Rules of Court does not specifically
provide for the venue of pre-trial conferences, propriety demands that it should be confined within the four (4) walls of
his sala to avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all his activities (Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Judge Geronilla, July
25, 1981 and Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct).

Strangely, likewise, is (sic) the actuations of respondent in the matter of the custody of the Super Saloon Car. He has
demeaned himself and compromised his position as a Judge when he obligated upon himself the recharging of its
batteries and the inflating of its tires.

Thus, it is difficult to conceive how a Judge would willingly go out of his way to recharge the batteries and inflate the tires
of a vehicle in custodia legis by driving the car himself to the battery shop unless there is that intent on his part to use the
car.

Against the testimonies of his witnesses, there is no doubt that indeed he used the car if not on all occasions that he went
home to Parañaque where he resides coming from his Court in San Pablo but at least on some occasions.

The appearance in the glove compartment of the car receipt of a beauty parlor located within the vicinity of their house
admittedly patronized by the wife of the respondent is a glaring proof that the car must have been used and operated by
the respondent.

Regardless of whether the same was used in his official capacity, his motive could still be misinterpreted; and, in the
course of events, his actuations would come in conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties. In Adm.
Matter No. 690-CFI entitled "Benito B. Nate vs. Hon. Enrique A. Agana, Sr., et. al." (91 SCRA 1) the Honorable Court there
ruled that it is misconduct for a judge to use a car that it levied in execution by virtue of an order issued by him and was
censured and admonished. In his separate opinion, however, then Justice Claudio Teehankee recommended that the
commensurate penalty should be six (6) months suspension considering the great responsibility and trust vested in
respondent. Justice Herrera, on her part, recommended three months suspension. However, in the case of Nate, the
judge intended to acquire ownership of the car. This does not appear to be the case here.

Likewise, another aspect which is highly questionable is the use of respondent Judge of an alias "E. Pilapil". If indeed
there were no shady deals/transactions between complainant and respondent, why was there a necessity to use an alias
in their telephone conversations and/or why would there be a need for a Judge to talk over the phone to a party who had
a pending case before him.

The charges of bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, despite the vehemence of complainant's
language, have not been proven satisfactorily, there is no clear showing and/or proof that indeed respondent Judge
demanded and/or received money, jewelries and food from the complainant.

The claim of complainant that respondent Judge demanded and received money and jewelries from her is not supported
by independent testimonies and documents. In an apparent effort to mislead this Office into believing her theory,
complainant resorted to annexing various documents, which if taken separately will definitely lead into a different
conclusion. One concrete example is here diary in which she allegedly recorded all her transactions such as
appointments, telephone calls, withdrawals from the bank, collections and every minute details that transpired in her
life, yet the demand for Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) was never recorded nor was the delivery of the advance two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) likewise recorded. When confronted on the matter, she merely gave the
excuse that the demand was almost everyday, hence, there was no need to record the same. Likewise, the alleged
 delivery of the jewelries was made on April 26, 1992 but the unofficial receipt . . . was issued only on July 20, 1992 or only
after three (3) months.

Administrative charge against a judge is highly penal in nature. Such charge must therefore be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, otherwise, the charge will be dismissed (Adm. Case No. 270-J, Enriquez vs. Araulla, in re: Horellano, 43 Phil.
212). 28

On the basis of his foregoing findings, Deputy Court Administrator Suarez recommends that: (1) the charge for knowingly rendering an unjust
order/decision be DISMISSED for having been prematurely filed; (2) the charge for bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act
be likewise DISMISSED for lack of factual evidence; and, (3) respondent judge be found guilty for the use of the car while in custodia legis and
for the issuance of an order appointing Special Administrators without notice to the parties, submitting the appropriate penalty however to the
discretion of the Court.

We do not fully subscribe to the foregoing recommendations. Respondent judge cannot be made administratively liable for issuing the order
appointing the special administrators. On 13 July 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing complainant's petition
for certiorari but at the same time granting her plea for the inhibition of respondent judge from hearing the probate case. We agree that while
there was no notice of the hearing for the appointment of the special administrators, petitioner (complainant) was nevertheless heard on her
motion for reconsideration of the appointment of the special administrators; and, that what the law prohibits is not the absence of notice but
absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that considering that respondent judge
admitted using the car, he should have immediately inhibited himself once his objectivity and impartiality were put in question by petitioner
(complainant) in line with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 29

While respondent judge may not necessarily be held administratively liable for issuing the orders complained of, he certainly is accountable for
violating Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of committing a corrupt practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6713.

The records sufficiently establish that during the guardianship proceedings, respondent judge had no qualms in taking advantage of the
authority granted by complainant and the Board of Directors of PSM Development Corporation for him to use the Mitsubishi Galant Super
Saloon on weekends or as he pleased. 30 This fact alone would have already raised valid speculations about his objectivity in acting on the
guardianship proceedings. Yet, he did nothing to apprise complainant and the Board about the impropriety of accepting the favor. 31 Nor did he
require them to forthwith withdraw the authority granted him. 32 Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the pendency of the
guardianship proceedings for over a year constituted a corrupt practice under Sec 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, 33 i.e., acceptance by a public officer
of a favor from any person in the course of his official duty.

Respondent judge did not only exhibit a personal interest in the vehicle but also accepted the offer to use it. In fact, by his own admission, he
drove it several times. In the conference held at Roño's Place, respondent judge purposely omitted the car in the list of properties belonging to
the estate of Pastor S. Marino. We are not persuaded by his argument that the car was not part of the decedent's estate. His later testimony
revealed that the parties then desired to include all properties even those which supposedly belonged to the deceased but deeded to the
corporation. 34 The car was one such property, but respondent never volunteered its inclusion. He justified his omission by saying that the car
was not mentioned in the discussion. Understandably, no one dared to do so as they were fully aware that respondent was in possession and
enjoying the use of the car. Besides, he should have been the one to call the attention of the parties about the existence of the vehicle as
belonging to the estate. Obviously, he did not want to part with the vehicle.

Respondent judge even personally supervised the maintenance of the car beyond what the duties of his office would call for. He had the
scratches of the car repainted, the tires inflated and the battery recharged six (6) times. All the expenses for the reconditioning, adjustment and
tune-up, repainting and battery recharging were charged against the P10,000.00 appropriated by the Board of Directors of PSM Development
Corporation. 35 The records do not however disclose who kept the P10,000.00. Neither was there any accounting of the expenses nor any
statement made on the amount left of the P10,000.00. Considering the extra pains taken by respondent in the upkeep of the car, the possibility
that the P10,000.00 was in his possession is not remote. Respondent's conduct in this regard cannot be any different from that of a judge who
was removed from office because of manifest interest in a vehicle in custodia legis by spending for its repairs and thereafter using it for her
benefit and convenience. 36

Another reprehensible conduct of respondent which distresses us was his availment of the battery recharging service of Cortes Battery Shop
free of charge. 37 In so doing, respondent compromised his exalted position as a judge. It bears repeating that integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue; it is a necessity. We dismissed a judge who not only had the seats of his "Lite Ace" van repaired but also received new seat
covers both for free from a litigant. 38 Likewise, we terminated the services of a judge upon finding that he accepted the benefit of riding
regularly in Sarkies Tour Buses free of charge. 39

Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting interests in society cannot be overemphasized. As the visible representation of
law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the
judicial system. They are particularly mandated not only to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in their actions. 40 For judges sit as the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse
where all other institutions have failed. 41 Sadly, respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial norms. Worse, his acceptance
of the Galant Super Saloon for his personal use and convenience as well as his evident personal interest in it have defiled the "public trust"
character of the judicial office. These serious transgressions cannot be countenanced. By his actions, respondent has clearly demonstrated his
difficulty and inability to keep up with the conduct required of judges. Consequently, he should not be permitted to stay a minute longer in
office. We have repeatedly held that there is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and
integrity. 42

WHEREFORE, for his gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, and his violation of Sec.
7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, and Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, respondent JUDGE AUSBERTO JARAMILLO,
JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San Pablo City, is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, if any. This dismissal
shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.

Mendoza, J., took no part.

EN BANC

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO G.R. No. 187883

and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.
LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,

- versus -

SPEAKER PROSPERO C.
NOGRALES, Representative,
Majority, House of Representatives,
Respondent.
x----------------------x

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 187910

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. CARPIO,
NOGRALES, Speaker of the CORONA,
House of Representatives, CARPIO MORALES*,
Congress of the Philippines, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondent. VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 16, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION

PUNO, C.J.:
 This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirk its bounden duty to wield its judicial

power to settle "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there

has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

government."[1] Be that as it may, no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper.

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the

nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of

Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. In essence, both

petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which

provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While

some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they

cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by this Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.

It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is.[2] The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the

powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of

constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its solemn and sacred obligation under the

Constitution.[3] This Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having

adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised

or the very lis mota presented.[4] The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent

questions,[5] lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.[6] In the illuminating words of the

learned Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission[7]:

Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether

a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.[8] Another approach is

the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties

entailed by withholding court consideration.[9] In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the

plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging

it.[10] An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a

branch of government before the courts may step in.[11]

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners

have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only

resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the

Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet
been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves

a quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The

House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.

Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners filed a petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Langley

resolution, which dealt with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The court resolved the issue thus:

More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution
as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled or a new precedent being
announced, it is controlling. It is implicit in the rule of law.[12]

Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to

litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal

conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy

being sought.[13] In the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to

sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the

presentation of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.[14] The lack of petitioners personal stake

in this case is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.

Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned

citizens. A taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from

taxation.[15] It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a

citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount

public interest is involved.[16] While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence

of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the transcendental importance doctrine.

The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,

which mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated

in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] viz.:

x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors
to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no
means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to
warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government." It
thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.

xxxx

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is
economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to
our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them
to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is
an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.
 Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent

requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open

invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.

In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is

exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury.[18] When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, this

Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(on official leave)

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS, respondents.

Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V. Gallego and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:

The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions
conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.

A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to the record.

The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of
the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.

Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.

Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the
Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all
private schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public and the parties
concerned.

It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law
aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized
statute.

It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty
and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.)

When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to
consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.)

In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No.
2706 as amended which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of
Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them
have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent Secretary of
Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law—and, naturally need no relief in the
form they now seek to obtain.

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is interest common to all members of the public. (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S.
633 82 L. Ed. 493.)

Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405; Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public Works vs. Mitchell,
330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)

Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of
statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed
as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real,
earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 1138.)
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a
justiciable controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)

And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January,
1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem
may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to
avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995, Law Ed.,
Vol. 99, p. 511.)

The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United States Supreme Court quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing
censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have decided to look into the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of
clear violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property.

Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not
originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?

In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of
education in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe,
Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial
examination of the local educational system, and submitted a report with recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The following
paragraphs are taken from such report:

PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS

There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even
immoral character, from opening a school to teach the young. It it true that in order to post over the door "Recognized by the
Government," a private adventure school must first be inspected by the proper Government official, but a refusal to grant such
recognition does not by any means result in such a school ceasing to exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such unrecognized
private schools than of the recognized variety. How many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps records only of the
recognized type.

Conclusion.—An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private Adventure Schools leads but to one
conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who
organize and administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious
that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The
suggestion has been made with the reference to the private institutions of university grade that some board of control be organized
under legislative control to supervise their administration. The Commission believes that the recommendations it offers at the end
of this chapter are more likely to bring about the needed reforms.

Recommendations.—The Commission recommends that legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school by an individual
or organization without the permission of the Secretary of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the Secretary
assure himself that such school measures up to proper standards in the following respects, and that the continued existence of the
school be dependent upon its continuing to conform to these conditions:

(1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the rooms, the nature of the lavatories, closets,
water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and methods of cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both pupils
and teachers.

(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the needs of instruction in the subjects taught.

(3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per teacher. The Commission recommends 40 as a maximum.

(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of teachers in the public schools of the same grade.

xxx xxx xxx

In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise of its police power to correct "a
great evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other
statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that
"All educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate
establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C. J. S. 4.)

What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to revoke such permit on account of violation of rules or regulations of the
Department.

II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned statutes "conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power
and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power."

This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as amended, provides:

It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and
colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade
of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise,
inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same,

"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description, either general or specific, of what constitutes a 'general standard of
efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.'
Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine
the 'efficiency of instruction.'"

The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides:

The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of
primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other
academic degree. It shall also from time to time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law,
medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and other medical or vocational schools or colleges giving instruction of a
technical, vocational or professional character.

Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The
Secretary of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the
exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate standard. . . .."

It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and
efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as the
legislature has not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"—and for that reason constitutionality
objectionable. The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and
efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission
and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only
shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of
Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private
school.

At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason
exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the power by the Secretary of Education.

True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power
has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those
regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For
it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute.

Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon
holding the statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture to "designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and sisal"
against vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.

Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of
law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards
justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power.

In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental power of
supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to
indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our
decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it.
(Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.)

We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed in the hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the
various activities of private schools, and why the statute should be struck down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute
does not in express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give
them official permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This does not amount to complete control. If
any of such Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and seeks to
establish complete control, it would surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but besides not having before us the text of
such circulars, the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating the National
Board of Education, opportunity for administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is amply afforded herein
petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more technically competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, convenience or
relevancy of the measures criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.)

If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control over private schools, the question arises whether the power of
supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is
enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for control of Education by the State. (See Tolentino,
Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)

The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the
duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)

The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the
Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater power than mere regulation.

III. Another grievance of petitioners—probably the most significant—is the assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private
schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as
amended by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as follows:

SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private Education shall be met by the regular amount appropriated in the annual
Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for additional expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools, colleges and
universities and in the purchase of textbook to be sold to student of said schools, colleges and universities and President of the
Philippines may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to levy an equitable assessment from each private educational institution
equivalent to one percent of the total amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-payment of the assessment herein
provided by any private school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of
the permit for recognition granted to it.

Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional right—the right to open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim
this is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both
constitutional privileges—have been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a constitutional right.

The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the further collection of the assessment,
courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is
one against the State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving "the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within
the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.

There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere fee—and not a tax—to finance the cost of
the Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation
and examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would
still be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.

The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1 provides:
 The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board (Board
of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to
offend the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the general policies
of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.

This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest form". They cite two U. S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes
that impose previous restraints upon publication of newspapers, or curtail the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of
government institutions or policies.

Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question is really whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's
constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some
think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently
possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is
conflict between an express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must
yield to the former—conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education ismerely implied from the police power, it is feasible
to uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and
Minnesota, states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly produced.

However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks
has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the
State prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper?
What's the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the
danger to civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm. Much
depends, however, upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's
effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely steers a middle course between
the Scylla of "dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will
develop. Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative appeal to the National Board of Education
created by Republic Act 1124.

Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is
suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries
and protect individual liberties.

IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the right to institute in the proper court, and at the proper time, such
actions as may call for decision of the issue herein presented by them, this petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-34161 February 29, 1972

EUGENE A. TAN, SILVESTRE J. ACEJAS and ROGELIO V. FERNANDEZ, on their behalf and on behalf of the People of the
Philippines, petitioners,
vs.
DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, on his behalf and on behalf of the other Delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, respondents.

RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:p

A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas and Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City,
Romblon and Davao City, for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves and the Filipino people, in assailing
the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution,1 dealing with the range of the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, would have this
Court declare that it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt
proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form now outlined in the
present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the
general plan laid down therein."2 Such a plea of the utmost seriousness was sought to be compressed in a five-page pleading. It is
understandable, therefore, why the petition could hardly be characterized as possessed of merit. Accordingly, on October 8, 1971, this Court
issued a resolution dismissing it. Then came on the last day of that month a printed thirty-two page motion for reconsideration. It is evident
that petitioners took some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on a secondary authority, American Jurisprudence.3 The
show of diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality is something else. A perusal thereof yields the conclusion that petitioners are
oblivious of the authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction. The approach is not distinguished by its conformity with the law as it stands. In this
sphere as elsewhere, new cults may be eroding considering, however, the compulsion of the ancient faiths. Considering, however, the
compulsion of the fundamental principle of separation of powers, this Court cannot exercise the competence petitioners would erroneously
assume it possesses, even assuming that they have the requisite standing, which is the first question to be faced.

1. What calls for prior determination is whether or not petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a declaration of the alleged nullity of a
resolution of the Constitutional Convention.4 In the categorical and succinct language of Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."5 There has been a relaxation of this rule. So it was announced by the present Chief Justice
inPascual v. The Secretary of Public Works.6 Thus: "Again, it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing
for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the "expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer."7 Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been considered as possessed of the requisite personality
to bring a suit. Thus in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,8 it was a member of the Senate who was heard by this Court in a suit for prohibition to prevent
the enforcement of the congressional resolution proposing the parity rights amendment.9 Likewise, in the latest case in point, Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections, it was a Senator who brought action challenging the validity of Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. He was quite sucessful too. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify under such a category.

Moreover, as far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. It is our view
that a negative answer is indicated. Nor should petitioners feel discriminated against just because in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 10 a
member of the Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his action for prohibition instituted by him as a
taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause for legitimate resentment as such suit could be distinguished from the present.

2. Petitioner Gonzales in accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing his suit until after the enactment of
the statute 11 for the submission to the electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution. 12 It was only then that the matter was
ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to keep its hands off. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other
departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The judiciary as Justice Laurel emphatically asserted "will neither direct
nor restrain executive [or legislative]
action ... ." 13 The legislative and executive branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do. Judicial inquiry has to be
postponed in the meanwhile. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture. At such a time, it may pass on the validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding."14

Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the competence lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary
must leave it free to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. There is to be no interference. Its autonomy is to be respected. It cannot be
otherwise if it is to perform its function well. Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency but also because its powers are
transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting for popular ratification proposals which may radically alter the organization and functions of
all three departments, including the courts. It is therefore much more imperative that the rule of non-interference be strictly adhered to until
the appropriate time comes.

More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only
after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being
overruled or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. That is implicit in the rule of law. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration
cannot therefor be sustained.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN R. OSMEÑA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A.
No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in
violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;

(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at
only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as
the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of
Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond
by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig;
on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local
government units. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area
of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers
of government only within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will
sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to
avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No.
7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section
2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the
city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department
of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary disputes.4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from
defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing
boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering
these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the
Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:

Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated
therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" — was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of
local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently served.

Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to
serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
 to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital
cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was
used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the
slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the
strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent
of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap,
56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule
must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as
the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held
and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a
new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their
functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall
acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent
Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually
win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his
previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality
of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election
for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also
the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has
no jurisdiction.
III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter
provides:

Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic
Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held
after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the first district,
in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)

They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6cannot made by a special
law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts
may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of
not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.
Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly
stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of
the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command that the title of a law should
exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.
I.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or
converted should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to
describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution
does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts
with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the
conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Sec. 451. Cities Classified. — A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

II.

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified
by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.

In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines
under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

 xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number
of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few observations.

I.

Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or
converted should be properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to
describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution
does not provide for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government unit or its conversion
from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts
with the clause "as a general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the
conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:

Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. — (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters
from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a
province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

 Sec. 451. Cities Classified. — A city may either be component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria
established in this Code shall not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.

Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

II.

Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified
by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of
the reapportionment mentioned in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:

Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.

In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.

The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines
under the Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise
provided by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number
of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases supplied)

Footnotes

1 R.A. No. 7854 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 12240 sponsored by Congressman Joker Arroyo and Senate Bill No.
1244 sponsored by Senator Vicente Sotto III.

2 Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. — As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one
level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Land Area. — It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government
unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance the National Statistics Office
(NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 450. Requisites for Creation. — . . .

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

3 August 18, 1994, Senate Deliberations on H.B. No. 12240, pp. 23-28.

4 Ibid, citing as example the City of Mandaluyong.

5 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (19180); Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 24.

6 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.

7 Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

8 G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.

9 Section 5(1), Article VI.

10 In this connection, we take judicial notice of the fact that since 1986 up to this time, Congress has yet to pass a general
reapportionment law.

11 Section 1, Article II provides that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority from them."

12 Sec. 5. . . .

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.

xxx xxx xxx

13 As per the certificate issued by Administration Tomas Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the
population of Makati as of 1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240
(converting Makati into a highly urbanized city), p. 15.

14 Sec. 3 provides: "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or
such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not
be made within one hundred, and twenty days before the election."

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002]

ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH
OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Senate President and SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority
Leader of the Senate of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L.
SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN EMILIO C. MACIAS
II in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Local Government of the House of Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction.
The petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May 6,
2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age requirement for membership in the SK.

Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayers and class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths
similarly situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK
elections on May 6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is
limited to youths at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.

Petitioners allege that public respondents connived, confederated and conspired to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower
the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age. Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18
but not more than 21 years old will be summarily and unduly dismembered, unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly
disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization.[1]

Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction -

a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree, Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents issuances, orders and
actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK elections.

b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK elections set by the present law and in accordance with Comelec Resolutions
No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the SK elections.

c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said elections, for example,
July 15, 2002, and the present SK membership, except those incumbent SK officers who were elected on May 6, 1996, shall be allowed to run
for any SK elective position even if they are more than 21 years old.

d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently representing the SK in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate their post after the
barangay elections.[2]

The Facts

The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay (KB for brevity). The KB
was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized to
provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance.[3]

The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited SK membership to those youths at least 15 but not more than 21
years of age.[4] The SK remains as a youth organization in every barangay tasked to initiate programs to enhance the social, political, economic,
cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the youth.[5] The SK in every barangay is composed of a chairperson and
seven members, all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is composed of all citizens actually
residing in the barangay for at least six months and who meet the membership age requirement.

The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808 reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every
three years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec shall
promulgate. Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713[6] and 4714[7] to govern the SK elections on May 6,
2002.

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros (Montesclaros for brevity) sent a letter[8] to the Comelec, demanding that
the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon
receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo (Chairman Benipayo for brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the
Speaker of the House[9] and the Senate President[10]about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the
Comelec Chairman intimated that it was operationally very difficult to hold both elections simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec
Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the
SK elections to November 2002.

Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En
Banc Resolution No. 4763[11] dated February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but
holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.[12]

On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11,
2002, the Bicameral Conference Committee (Bicameral Committee for brevity) of the Senate and the House came out with a
Report[13] recommending approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050[14] and House Bill No. 4456.[15] The Bicameral
Committees consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but
not more than 18 years of age.

On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committees consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of
Representatives approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.

The Issues

Petitioners[16] raise the following grounds in support of their petition:

I.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO POSTPONE THE SK ELECTIONS.

II.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO DISCRIMINATE, DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND DISMEMBER
THE SK MEMBERS WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT LESS[17](SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7 MILLION YOUTH.

III.

RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY WILLFULLY FAILED TO FUND THE SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE
THE SAME IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS
FOR THE PURPOSE.

IV.

THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY TO THE ENVISION (SIC) OF THE
CREATION OF THE SK ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND CONSTITUTION.[18]

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

 At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since petitioners filed this petition:

1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled.

2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164[19] which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be at least 15 but less
than 18 years of age on the day of the election.[20] RA No. 9164 also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and
Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK
and Barangay elections.

Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises them,
preventing them from voting and being voted for in the SK elections. Petitioners theory is that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later
than May 6, 2002, the postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who will turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the
date of the new SK elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then
membership age of 15 but not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about seven million youths. The public respondents failure to hold
the elections on May 6, 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly situated.

Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be
postponed, the SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent public respondents from passing laws and issuing
resolutions and orders that would lower the membership age in the SK; and (3) compel public respondents to allow petitioners and those who
have turned more than 21 years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.

The Courts power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with,
namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case.[21]

In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later
than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK
elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.

Petitioners prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present
an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and
imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has
no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on
a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.[22] The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only after a law is enacted, not before.

Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill
according to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint:
the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of
approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal
processes or procedures of Congress.[23]

The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power
to review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to
compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal,
coordinate and independent branches of government.

Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the
maximum age for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right to the permanence of the age
requirement under Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal
by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the power to change
the laws.[24]

The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No.
9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after
May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members,
and cannot participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners remedy
is legislation, not judicial intervention.

Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be
denied some personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.[25] A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential
interest.[26]

In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21
years old. Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than
18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased
to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a
personal and substantial interest in the SK elections.

This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections
and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to
assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July
15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down
a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action and adequately argued.[27]

The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership is a property right
within the meaning of the Constitution.[28] Since certain public offices are reserved for SK officers, petitioners also claim a constitutionally
protected opportunity to occupy these public offices. In petitioners own words, they and others similarly situated stand to lose their
opportunity to work in the government positions reserved for SK members or officers.[29] Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the
president of the federation of SK organizations in a municipality, city or province is an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city council or
provincial board, respectively.[30] The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.[31] The
president of the national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member of the National Youth Commission, with rank of a Department
Assistant Secretary.[32]

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can
contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a
property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to
change or even withdraw the statutory right.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a [P]ublic office is a public trust.[33] No one has a vested right
to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,[34] decided in 1920, the Court
already ruled:

Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a property. It is, however,
well settled x x x that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public
trust or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and
not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer
accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public
office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners
a proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public
trust precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy directing equal access to opportunities for public service[35]cannot
bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.

Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youths involvement in public affairs,[36] this policy refers to those who belong to the
class of people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of
Congress. Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In
government service, once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke any property right to cling to his office. In the
same manner, since petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to
their SK membership.

The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended the postponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now the
law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections. Petitioners
are not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July
15, 2002 SK elections.

Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence consist of
the following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 that recommended the postponement of the SK elections to
2003; (2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate; and (3) the Conference Committee Report consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 and House Bill No. 4456.

The Comelec exercised its power and duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall[37] and to recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election spending.[38] The
Comelecs acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.[39] These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by
petitioners, that there exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present law. As the Court held
in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec,[40] the Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement and administration of elections laws, is
entitled to the presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.

The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest
effort to address the practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec
to recommend to Congress the postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the regular course of its official duties.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[41] Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional
powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.

Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in
power, depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK positions. This argument deserves scant consideration. While RA No.
9164 contains a hold-over provision, incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until their successors have been elected or qualified. On
July 15, 2002, when the SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires and all incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK
offices and their ex-officio public offices.

In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable
controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of public respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G. R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000]

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORMS; HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as Executive Secretary; COMMISSION ON AUDIT; ROBERTO AVENTAJADO, as Presidential
Consultant on Council of Economic Advisers/Economic Affairs; ANGELITO C. BANAYO, as Presidential Adviser for/on Political
Affairs; VERONICA IGNACIO-JONES, as Presidential Assistant/ Appointment Secretary (In charge of appointments), respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants from acting as such, and to enjoin Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations. In
addition, petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants,
advisers and assistants. Finally, petitioner prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain
matters.
 On January 28, 2000, respondent Hon. Andres R. Narvasa, impleaded in his capacity as Chairman of the PCCR, filed his Comment to the
Petition. The rest of the respondents, who are being represented in this case by the Solicitor General, filed their Comment with this Court on
March 7, 2000. Petitioner then filed a Consolidated Reply on April 24, 2000, whereupon this case was considered submitted for decision.

I. Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform

The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by virtue of
Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and
the manner of implementing the same.[1] Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a
public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.[2] Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the President is
intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.[3]

It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic. We agree.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or
dead.[4] Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. [5] However, on February 19, 1999, the
President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commissions work, viz

SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Time Frame. The Commission shall commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The
Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days from 31 December 1999.

The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had
likewise spent the funds allotted to it.[6]Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the
petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.

The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically,
petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such.[7] Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be
enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli.[8] At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the
permissible scope of judicial power.

In addition to the mootness of the issue, petitioners lack of standing constitutes another obstacle to the successful invocation of judicial
power insofar as the PCCR is concerned.

The question in standing is whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[9] In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. [10] A
citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct
of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.[11] In Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,[12]we denied standing to petitioners who were assailing a lease agreement between the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation, stating that,

in Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, G.R. No. 78716, Sept. 22, 1987, standing was denied to a petitioner who sought to declare
a form of lottery known as Instant Sweepstakes invalid because, as the Court held,

Valmonte brings the suit as a citizen, lawyer, taxpayer and father of three (3) minor children. But nowhere in his petition does petitioner claim
that his rights and privileges as a lawyer or citizen have been directly and personally injured by the operation of the Instant Sweepstakes. The
interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained
of.

We apprehend no difference between the petitioner in Valmonte and the present petitioners. Petitioners do not in fact show what
particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their
interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, d 2.

Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury
attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to
petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by
forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been
or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly,
petitioner has failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
 A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in
alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.[13], Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power.[14] This was our ruling in a recent case wherein petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines (TELEBAP) and GMA Network, Inc. questioned the validity of section 92 of B.P. No. 881 (otherwise knows as the Omnibus Election
Code) requiring radio and television stations to give free air time to the Commission on Elections during the campaign period. [15] The Court held
that petitioner TELEBAP did not have any interest as a taxpayer since the assailed law did not involve the taxing or spending power of
Congress.[16]

Many other rulings have premised the grant or denial of standing to taxpayers upon whether or not the case involved a disbursement of
public funds by the legislature. In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections,[17] the petitioners therein were allowed to bring a taxpayers suit to
question several presidential decrees promulgated by then President Marcos in his legislative capacity calling for a national referendum, with
the Court explaining that

...[i]t is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute Presidential Decrees are of such nature may be contested by one who will sustain
a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined,
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries an appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. The
interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with
that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds.

In still another case, the Court held that petitioners the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., a non-profit civic organization - had standing as
taxpayers to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as it provides for retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leaves to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses of Congress.[18] And in Pascual v. Secretary of Public
Works,[19] the Court allowed petitioner to maintain a taxpayers suit assailing the constitutional soundness of Republic Act No. 920 appropriating
P85,000 for the construction, repair and improvement of feeder roads within private property. All these cases involved the disbursement of
public funds by means of a law.

Meanwhile, in Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron,[20] the Court declared that the trial court was wrong in
allowing respondent Ravanzo to bring an action for injunction in his capacity as a taxpayer in order to question the legality of the contract of
lease covering the public market entered into between the City of Dagupan and petitioner. The Court declared that Ravanzo did not possess the
requisite standing to bring such taxpayers suit since [o]n its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into
between petitioner and the City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building.

Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was
created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is
appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The relevant provision states -

Appropriations. The initial amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the operational expenses of the
Commission to be sourced from funds of the Office of the President, subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. Additional amounts shall be released to the Commission upon submission of requirements for expenditures.

The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no an appropriation at all. In a strict
sense, appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be
paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a
certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors. [21] The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds
intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of
the Constitution.

In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will entertain a taxpayers suit.[22] In
the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of
the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[23] In other words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest -
that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit.[24] Nowhere in his pleadings
does petitioner presume to make such a representation.

II. Presidential Consultants, Advisers, Assistants

The second issue raised by petitioner concerns the presidential consultants. Petitioner alleges that in 1995 and 1996, the President
created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the President and appointed to said positions twenty (20) presidential consultants, twenty-two
(22) presidential advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.[25] Petitioner asserts that, as in the case of the PCCR, the President does
not have the power to create these positions.[26]

Consistent with the abovementioned discussion on standing, petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue before the Court.
First of all, he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment of such presidential
advisers. Secondly, petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in
this particular issue. Unlike the PCCR which was created by virtue of an executive order, petitioner does not allege by what official act, whether
it be by means of an executive order, administrative order, memorandum order, or otherwise, the President attempted to create the positions
of presidential advisers, consultants and assistants. Thus, it is unclear what act of the President petitioner is assailing. In support of his
allegation, petitioner merely annexed a copy of the Philippine Government Directory (Annex C) listing the names and positions of such
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants to his petition. However, appointment is obviously not synonymous with creation. It would be
improvident for this Court to entertain this issue given the insufficient nature of the allegations in the Petition.

III. Right to Information

Finally, petitioner asks us to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora to answer his letter (Annex D)
dated October 4, 1999 requesting for the names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments,
and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacanang.[27]

The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Under both the 1973[28] and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the
courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[29] wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public right and
when a [m]andamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that
the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. However, Congress may provide for reasonable
conditions upon the access to information. Such limitations were embodied in Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise knows as the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which took effect on March 25, 1989. This law provides that, in the performance of
their duties, all public officials and employees are obliged to respond to letters sent by the public within fifteen (15) working days from receipt
thereof and to ensure the accessibility of all public documents for inspection by the public within reasonable working hours, subject to the
reasonable claims of confidentiality.[30]

Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano[31] that [t]he incorporation of this right in
the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception
by the public of the nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decisionmaking if they are denied access to information of general
interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. The information to which the public
is entitled to are those concerning matters of public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want
to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to
or affects the public.[32]

Thus, we agree with petitioner that respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory
duty to answer petitioners letter dealing with matters which are unquestionably of public concern that is, appointments made to public offices
and the utilization of public property. With regard to petitioners request for copies of the appointment papers of certain officials, respondent
Zamora is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same subject to the reasonable limitations required for the orderly conduct of
official business.[33]

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with the information
requested.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad, on official business.
Puno, J., vote to dismiss on the ground that the case is moot.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997]

RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), the BOARD OF ELECTION
SUPERVISORS composed of Atty. RUBEN M. RAMIREZ, Atty. RAFAELITO GARAYBLAS, and Atty. ENRIQUE C. ROA, GUILLERMINA
RUSTIA, in her capacity as Director of the Barangay Bureau, City Treasurer Atty. ANTONIO ACEBEDO, Budget Officer EUFEMIA
DOMINGUEZ, all of the City Government of Manila, petitioners, vs. ROBERT MIRASOL, NORMAN T. SANGUYA, ROBERT DE JOYA,
 ARNEL R. LORENZO, MARY GRACE ARIAS, RAQUEL L. DOMINGUEZ, LOURDES ASENCIO, FERDINAND ROXAS, MA. ALBERTINA
RICAFORT,and BALAIS M. LOURICH, and the HONORABLE WILFREDO D. REYES,Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
36, Metro Manila, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 19, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
36),[1] nullifying an order of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), which in effect cancelled the general elections for the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) slated on December 4, 1992 in the City of Manila, on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990
served the purpose of the first elections for the SK under the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).

Section 423 of the Code provides for a SK in every barangay, to be composed of a chairman, seven (7) members, a secretary, and a
treasurer. Section 532(a) provides that the first elections for the SK shall be held thirty (30) days after the next local elections. The Code took
effect on January 1, 1992.

The first local elections under the Code were held on May 11, 1992. Accordingly, on August 27, 1992, the Commission on Elections issued
Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the holding of the general elections for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed the
SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the DILG, with the technical assistance of the COMELEC.[2] After two postponements,
the elections were finally scheduled on December 4, 1992.

Accordingly, registration in the six districts of Manila was conducted. A total of 152,363 youngsters, aged 15 to 21 years old, registered,
15,749 of them filing certificates of candidacies.The City Council passed the necessary appropriations for the elections.

On September 18, 1992, however, the DILG, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the City of
Manila from holding elections for the SK on the ground that the elections previously held on May 26, 1990 were to be considered the first
under the newly-enacted Local Government Code. The DILG acted on a letter of Joshue R. Santiago, acting president of the KB City Federation
of Manila and a member of City Council of Manila, which called attention to the fact that in the City of Manila elections for the Kabataang
Barangay (the precursor of the Sangguniang Kabataan) had previously been held on May 26, 1990. In its resolution, the DILG stated:

[A] close examination of . . . RA 7160 would readily reveal the intention of the legislature to exempt from the forthcoming Sangguniang
Kabataan elections those kabataang barangay chapters which may have conducted their elections within the period of January 1, 1988 and
January 1, 1992 under BP 337. Manifestly the term of office of those elected KB officials have been correspondingly extended to coincide with
the term of office of those who may be elected under RA 7160.

On November 27, 1992 private respondents, claiming to represent the 24,000 members of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set aside the resolution of the DILG. They argued that petitioner Secretary of Interior and
Local Government had no power to amend the resolutions of the COMELEC calling for general elections for SKs and that the DILG resolution in
question denied them the equal protection of the laws.

On November 27, 1992, the trial court, through Executive Judge, now COMELEC Chairman, Bernardo P. Pardo, issued an injunction,
ordering petitioners to desist from implementing the order of the respondent Secretary dated September 18, 1992, . . . until further orders of
the Court. On the same day, he ordered petitioners to perform the specified pre-election activities in order to implement Resolution No. 2499
dated August 27, 1992 of the Commission on Elections providing for the holding of a general election of the Sangguniang Kabataan on
December 4, 1992 simultaneously in every barangay throughout the country.

The case was subsequently reraffled to Branch 36 of the same court. On January 19, 1993, the new judge, Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes,
rendered a decision, holding that (1) the DILG had no power to exempt the City of Manila from holding SK elections on December 4, 1992
because under Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall is vested solely in the COMELEC; (2) the COMELEC had already in effect determined that
there had been no previous elections for KB by calling for general elections for SK officers in every barangay without exception; and (3) the
exemption of the City of Manila was violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because, according to the DILGs records, in
5,000 barangays KB elections were held between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 but only in the City of Manila, where there were 897
barangays, was there no elections held on December 4, 1992.

Petitioners sought this review on certiorari. They insist that the City of Manila, having already conducted elections for the KB on May 26,
1990, was exempted from holding elections on December 4, 1992. In support of their contention, they cite 532(d) of the Local Government
Code of 1991, which provides that:

All seats reserved for the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the different sanggunians shall be deemed vacant until such time that
the sangguniang kabataan chairmen shall have been elected and the respective pederasyon presidents have been selected: Provided, That,
elections for the kabataang barangay conducted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 at any time between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 shall
be considered as the first elections provided for in this Code. The term of office of the kabataang barangay officials elected within the said
period shall be extended correspondingly to coincide with the term of office of those elected under this Code. (emphasis added)
They maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City of Manila came within the exception clause of 532(d)
so as to be exempt from holding the elections on December 4, 1992.

The preliminary question is whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996[3] rendered this case moot and academic. There
are two questions raised in this case. The first is whether the Secretary of Interior and Local Government can exempt a local government unit
from holding elections for SK officers on December 4, 1992 and the second is whether the COMELEC can provide that the Department of
Interior and Local Government shall have direct control and supervision over the election of sangguniang kabataan with the technical assistance
by the Commission on Elections.

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties. For one thing, doubt may be
cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the
decision of the trial court and these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[4] For the question whether the COMELEC can
validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election and yet the question
may not be decided before the date of such elections.

In the Southern Pacific Terminal case, where the rule was first articulated, appellants were ordered by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to cease and desist from granting a shipper what the ICC perceived to be preferences and advantages with respect to wharfage
charges. The cease and desist order was for a period of about two years, from September 1, 1908 (subsequently extended to November 15),
but the U.S. Supreme Court had not been able to hand down its decision by the time the cease and desist order expired. The case was decided
only on February 20, 1911, more than two years after the order had expired. Hence, it was contended that the case had thereby become moot
and the appeal should be dismissed. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:

The question involved in the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission are usually continuing (as are manifestly those in the case at
bar), and these considerations ought not to be, as they might be, defeated, by short-term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading
review, and at one time the government, and at another time the carriers, have their rights determined by the Commission without a
chance of redress.[5]

In Roe v. Wade,[6] petitioner, a pregnant woman, brought suit in 1970 challenging anti-abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia on the
ground that she had a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy at least within the first trimester. The case was not decided until 1973
when she was no longer pregnant. But the U.S. Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case as moot. It was explained: [W]hen, as here,
pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term
before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive. Our laws should
not be that rigid. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading
review.[7]

We thus reach the merits of the questions raised in this case. The first question is whether then DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III had
authority to determine whether under 532(d) of the Local Government Code, the City of Manila was required to hold its first elections for SK. As
already stated, petitioners sustain the affirmative side of the proposition. On the other hand, respondents argue that this is a power which
Art.IX,C, 2(1) of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC. Respondents further argue that, by mandating that elections for the SK be held on
December 4, 1992 in every barangay, the COMELEC in effect determined that there had been no elections for the KB previously held in the City
of Manila.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

First. As already stated, by 4 of Resolution No. 2499, the COMELEC placed the SK elections under the direct control and supervision of the
DILG. Contrary to respondents contention, this did not contravene Art. IX, C, 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall
have the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall. Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of the COMELEC in the same way that, as we have recently held, contests
involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. In Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors,[8] it was
contended that

COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a) it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK
Chairman different from and inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2,
Article 1 of the said Code which explicitly provides that it shall govern all elections of public officers; and, (b) it constitutes a
total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and
administer all election laws as provided for in Section 2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the
Omnibus Election Code; and Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title 1, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code.[9]

Rejecting this contention, this Court, through Justice Davide, held:

Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELECs
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent
laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six
sangguniang bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same officers
referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial
courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional
Trial Courts.

....

In the light of the foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the
Constitution had made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does not
make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang
barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and
who are duly registered voters of the barangay.[10]

The choice of the DILG for the task in question was appropriate and was in line with the legislative policy evident in several
statutes. Thus, P.D. No. 684 (April 15, 1975), in creating Kabataang Barangays in every barangay throughout the country, provided in 6 that the
Secretary of Local Government and Community Development shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary to
effectively implement the provisions of this Decree. Again, in 1985 Proclamation No. 2421 of the President of the Philippines, in calling for the
general elections of the Kabataang Barangay on July 13-14, 1985, tasked the then Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports, and the Commission on Elections to assist the Kabataang Barangay in the conduct of the elections. On the other hand, in a
Memorandum Circular dated March 7, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Secretary of Local Government to issue the necessary
rules and regulations for effecting the representation of the Kabataang Barangay, among other sectors, in the legislative bodies of the local
government units.

The role of the COMELEC in the 1992 elections for SK officers was by no means inconsequential. DILG supervision was to be exercised
within the framework of detailed and comprehensive rules embodied in Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC. What was left to the DILG to
perform was the enforcement of the rules.

Second. It is contended that, in its resolution in question, the COMELEC did not name the barangays which, because they had conducted
kabataang barangay elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992, were not included in the SK elections to be held on December 4,
1992. That these barangays were precisely to be determined by the DILG is, however, fairly inferable from the authority given to the DILG to
supervise the conduct of the elections. Since 532(d) provided for kabataang barangay officials whose term of office was extended beyond 1992,
the authority to supervise the conduct of elections in that year must necessarily be deemed to include the authority to determine which
kabataang barangay would not be included in the 1992 elections.

The authority granted was nothing more than the ascertainment of a fact, namely, whether between January 1, 1988 and January 1,
1992 elections had been held in a given kabataang barangay. If elections had been conducted, then no new elections had to be held on
December 4, 1992 since by virtue of 532(d) the term of office of the kabataang barangay officials so elected was extended correspondingly to
coincide with the term of office of those elected under [the Local Government Code of 1991]. In doing this, the Secretary of Interior and Local
Government was to act merely as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will
was to take effect.[11] There was no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. That this is
constitutionally permissible is the teaching of our cases.[12]

Third. Respondents claim, however, that the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila were void because (a) they were called at the instance
of then Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez who did not have authority to do so and (b) it was not held under COMELEC supervision.

The 1990 elections for the Kabataang Barangay were called by then Manila Mayor Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., who in his Executive Order No.
21 dated April 25, 1990 stated:

WHEREAS, the Kabataang Barangay as an organization provided for under Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, has been practically dormant since the
advent of the present national administration;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to involve the youth in the affairs and undertakings of the government to ensure the participation of all
sectors of our population in the task of nation building;

WHEREAS, the last elections for the Kabataang Barangay officers were held in November 1985 yet, which is over their three years term of
office;

WHEREAS, most of the present crop of KB officers are way past the age limit provided for under the law;

....

The elections were actually held on May 26, 1990 in the 897 barangays of Manila. Later, on June 30, 1990, KB City Federation elections
were conducted.
 It was precisely to foreclose any question regarding the validity of KB elections held in the aftermath of the EDSA revolution and upon
the effectivity of the new Local Government Code that the exception clause of 532(d) was inserted. The proceedings of the Bicameral
Conference Committee which drafted the Code show the following:[13]

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Isa-cite na lang ko ano iyong title o chapter o section, ha!

HON. LINA: . . .

Page 436, lines 13 to 14 delete within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and in lieu thereof, insert from 1988 up to the
effectivity of the Code. The rationale. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: How should it be read?

HON. LINA: It will read as follows: Provided however, that the Local Government Units which have conducted elections for the
Kabataang Barangay as provided for, in Batas Pambansa Bilang 337,up to the effectivity. . . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: So, any deletion from the word within, ha, up to. . . .

HON. LINA: Remove the words, the phrase, within eighteen months prior to December 31, 1990, and insert from 1988 up to the
effectivity of this Code.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: From?

HON. LINA: From 1988 up to the effectivity of this Code. Kasi meron nang mga election, eh, na ginawa, eh. There are five thousand
barangays, based on the record of the DILG, out of forty thousand, imagine that, na nag-conduct na ng election nila based
on the KB Constitution and By-Laws, and theyre sitting already, now if we do not recognize that, mag[ka]karoon sila ng
question.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO: Accepted, Mr. Chairman.

Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective in effect, are enacted to
validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such
laws are recognized in this jurisdiction.[14]

Fourth. It is finally contended that the exemption of the barangays of the City of Manila from the requirement to hold elections for SK
officers on December 4, 1992 would deny the youth voters in those barangays of the equal protection of laws. Respondents claim that only in
the barangays in the City of Manila, which then numbered 897, were elections for SK not held in 1992 on the ground that between January 1,
1988 and January 1, 1992 there had already been SK elections held, when, according to petitioners own evidence, during that period, SK
elections had actually been conducted in 5,000 barangays.

Whether this claim is true cannot be ascertained from the records of this case. Merely showing that there were 5,000 barangays which
similarly held KB elections between January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992 does not prove that despite that fact these same barangays were
permitted to hold elections on December 4, 1992. For one thing, according to the Manila Bulletin issue of November 18, 1992 (p. 9), 568
barangays in the Province of Bulacan did not have SK elections on December 4, 1992 either, because they already had elections between
January 1, 1988 and January 1, 1992. For another, even assuming that only barangays in Manila were not permitted to hold SK elections on
December 4, 1992 while the rest of the 5,000 barangays were allowed even if KB elections had already been held there before, this fact does
not give the youth voters in the 897 Manila barangays ground for complaint because what the other barangays did was contrary to law. There is
no discrimination here.

In People v. Vera[15] this Court struck down the Probation Law because it permitted unequal application of its benefits by making its
applicability depend on the decision of provincial governments to appropriate or not to appropriate funds for the salaries of probation officers,
with the result that those not disposed to allow the benefits of probations to be enjoyed by their inhabitants could simply omit to provide for
the salaries of probation officers. The difference between that case and the one at bar lies in the fact that what youth voters in the other
barangays might have been allowed was not a right which was denied to youth voters in Manila. If those barangays were not entitled to have
SK elections on December 4, 1992 but nevertheless were allowed to have such elections, that fact did not mean those in Manila should similarly
have been allowed to conduct elections on December 4, 1992 because the fact was that they already had their own, just two years before on
May 26, 1990. Respondents equal protection argument violates the dictum that one wrong does not make another wrong right.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36 is REVERSED and the case filed against petitioner by private
respondents is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., and Torres, Jr., J., on leave.

EN BANC
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), PAMBANSANG
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN (PKSK), ALLIANCE OF G.R. No. 170516
PROGRESSIVE LABOR (APL), VICENTE A. FABE, ANGELITO R. MENDOZA,
MANUEL P. QUIAMBAO, ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, CONG.
LORENZO R. TANADA III, CONG. MARIO JOYO AGUJA, CONG. LORETA Present:
ANN P. ROSALES, CONG. ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, AND
CONG. EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, PUNO, C.J.,

Petitioners, QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

THOMAS G. AQUINO, in his capacity as Undersecretary of the CORONA,

Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Chairman and Chief
Delegate of the Philippine Coordinating Committee (PCC) for the Japan- CARPIO MORALES,
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, EDSEL T. CUSTODIO, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) AZCUNA,
and Co-Chair of the PCC for the JPEPA, EDGARDO ABON, in his capacity
TINGA,
as Chairman of the Tariff Commission and lead negotiator for
Competition Policy and Emergency Measures of the JPEPA, MARGARITA
CHICO-NAZARIO,
SONGCO, in her capacity as Assistant Director-General of the National
Economic Development Authority (NEDA) and lead negotiator for Trade
VELASCO, JR.,
in Services and Cooperation of the JPEPA, MALOU MONTERO, in her
capacity as Foreign Service Officer I, Office of the Undersecretary for NACHURA,
International Economic Relations of the DFA and lead negotiator for the
General and Final Provisions of the JPEPA, ERLINDA ARCELLANA, in her REYES,
capacity as Director of the Board of Investments and lead negotiator for
Trade in Goods (General Rules) of the JPEPA, RAQUEL ECHAGUE, in her LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, &
capacity as lead negotiator for Rules of Origin of the JPEPA, GALLANT
SORIANO, in his official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau BRION, JJ.
of Customs and lead negotiator for Customs Procedures and Paperless
Trading of the JPEPA, MA. LUISA GIGETTE IMPERIAL, in her capacity as
Director of the Bureau of Local Employment of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) and lead negotiator for Movement of Natural
Persons of the JPEPA, PASCUAL DE GUZMAN, in his capacity as Director
of the Board of Investments and lead negotiator for Investment of the
JPEPA, JESUS MOTOOMULL, in his capacity as Director for the Bureau of
Product Standards of the DTI and lead negotiator for Mutual Recognition
of the JPEPA, LOUIE CALVARIO, in his capacity as lead negotiator for
Intellectual Property of the JPEPA, ELMER H. DORADO, in his capacity as
Officer-in-Charge of the Government Procurement Policy Board
Technical Support Office, the government agency that is leading the
negotiations on Government Procurement of the JPEPA, RICARDO V.
PARAS, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and lead negotiator for Dispute Avoidance and Settlement
of the JPEPA, ADONIS SULIT, in his capacity as lead negotiator for the
General and Final Provisions of the JPEPA, EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, and ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity
as Secretary of the DFA,*
Respondents.

Promulgated:
July 16, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition

to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and

Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Taada III and Mario Joyo Aguja filed on January 25, 2005 House Resolution No. 551 calling for an

inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA. The Resolution became

the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into the negotiations

of the JPEPA.

In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the

Philippine Coordinating Committee created under Executive Order No. 213 (CREATION OF A PHILIPPINE COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO STUDY

THE FEASIBILITY OF THE JAPAN-PHILIPPINES ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT)[1] to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to

furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, however.
Congressman Aguja later requested for the same document, but Usec. Aquino, by letter of November 2, 2005, replied that the Congressman

shall be provided with a copy thereof once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the proposed agreement

has been conducted.

In a separate move, the House Committee, through Congressman Herminio G. Teves, requested Executive Secretary

Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with all documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers

etc.[2] Acting on the request, Secretary Ermita, by letter of June 23, 2005, wrote Congressman Teves as follows:

In its letter dated 15 June 2005 (copy enclosed), [the] D[epartment of] F[oreign] A[ffairs] explains that the Committees
request to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed
Agreement has been a work in progress for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will however be forwarded to
the Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled and complete. (Emphasis supplied)

Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA Director-General Romulo Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon, by letter

of July 1, 2005, for copies of the latest text of the JPEPA.

Chairman Abon replied, however, by letter of July 12, 2005 that the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the documents being

requested, albeit he was certain that Usec. Aquino would provide the Congressman with a copy once the negotiation is completed. And by

letter of July 18, 2005, NEDA Assistant Director-General Margarita R. Songco informed the Congressman that his request addressed to Director-

General Neri had been forwarded to Usec. Aquino who would be in the best position to respond to the request.

In its third hearing conducted on August 31, 2005, the House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA,

but the same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves information, then House Speaker Jose de Venecia had

requested him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.[3]

Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government within December 2005, the present petition was filed

on December 9, 2005.[4] The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime

Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article

VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. To date, the JPEPA is still being deliberated upon by the Senate.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the

Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs

procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural

persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment,

and general and final provisions.[5]

While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006,[6] respondents do not dispute that, at

the time the petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners Reply when the JPEPA was still being negotiated the initial drafts thereof were kept

from public view.

Before delving on the substantive grounds relied upon by petitioners in support of the petition, the Court finds it necessary to first resolve some

material procedural issues.

Standing

For a petition for mandamus such as the one at bar to be given due course, it must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of

any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. [7] Respondents deny that

petitioners have such standing to sue. [I]n the interest of a speedy and definitive resolution of the substantive issues raised, however,

respondents consider it sufficient to cite a portion of the ruling in Pimentel v. Office of Executive Secretary[8]which emphasizes the need for a

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy on questions of standing.

In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature,

petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and,

therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.[9] As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners

are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally

are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
Mootness

Considering, however, that [t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization

between the two States parties,[10] public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the

present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic.

With the Senate deliberations on the JPEPA still pending, the agreement as it now stands cannot yet be considered as final and binding

between the two States. Article 164 of the JPEPA itself provides that the agreement does not take effect immediately upon the signing

thereof. For it must still go through the procedures required by the laws of each country for its entry into force, viz:

Article 164

Entry into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which the Governments of the Parties
exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective legal procedures necessary for entry into force of
this Agreement have been completed. It shall remain in force unless terminated as provided for in Article
165.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

President Arroyos endorsement of the JPEPA to the Senate for concurrence is part of the legal procedures which must be met prior to the

agreements entry into force.

The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks

the disclosure of the full text thereof.

The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the

Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.[12]

A discussion of the substantive issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers, is thus in

order.

Grounds relied upon by petitioners

Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to

information on matters of publicconcern[13] and contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full

public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.[14]Second, they contend that non-disclosure of the same documents undermines

their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.[15] Lastly, they proffer that

divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of

the Executive, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.

Significantly, the grounds relied upon by petitioners for the disclosure of the latest text of the JPEPA are, except for the last, the same as those

cited for the disclosure of the Philippine and Japanese offers.

The first two grounds relied upon by petitioners which bear on the merits of respondents claim of privilege shall be discussed. The last, being

purely speculatory given that the Senate is still deliberating on the JPEPA, shall not.

The JPEPA is a matter of public concern

To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public

concern. Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:

 In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition.Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the

negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic

negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full

public disclosure.

Respondents claim of privilege

It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being

matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. The types of information which may be

considered privileged have been elucidated in Almonte v. Vasquez,[17] Chavez v. PCGG,[18] Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,[19] and most

recently in Senate v. Ermita[20] where the Court reaffirmed the validity of the doctrine of executive privilege in this jurisdiction and dwelt on its

scope.

Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.[21] In the present

case, the ground for respondents claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:

x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic character and under
negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically
invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.

The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties
fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of public
disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At the time when the Committee was requesting for
copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still
uncertain and subject to change. Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.
 Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the rolling texts which may undergo
radical change or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of
the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the
same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.[22] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains

to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations

The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to

information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and

executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.[23] Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld

in Peoples Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus[24] wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise

terms.

In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-going

negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.[25] The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign

countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information. The

Resolution went on to state, thus:

The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive
action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has been said about open
and secret diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed
and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:

A complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and
discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals.Delegates from other
countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with
other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain
circumstances and would not do under other circumstances. . . If these reports . . . should
become public . . . who would ever trust American Delegations in another conference? (United
States Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284.).
 xxxx

There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is
concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, It can be
said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world. (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J.
B. Lippincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we must
have open covenants, openly arrived at. He quickly abandoned his thought.

No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment that
negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to muscle in. An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank
declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to widespread
propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample
opportunity for discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young,
4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[26] that the President is the sole

organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz:

x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has
the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makestreaties with the advice and consent of the
Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless
to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, The President is
the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Annals, 6th Cong.,
col. 613. . . (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential

since there should be ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the

negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives

submitted their offers with the understanding that historic confidentiality[27] would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the

ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives

from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro

quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable

terms in an area of greater national interest. Apropos are the following observations of Benjamin S. Duval, Jr.:

x x x [T]hose involved in the practice of negotiations appear to be in agreement that publicity leads to grandstanding,
tends to freeze negotiating positions, and inhibits the give-and-take essential to successful
negotiation. As Sissela Bok points out, if negotiators have more to gain from being approved by their own sides than by
making a reasoned agreement with competitors or adversaries, then they are inclined to 'play to the gallery . . .'' In
fact, the public reaction may leave them little option. It would be a brave, or foolish, Arab leader who expressed publicly
a willingness for peace with Israel that did not involve the return of the entire West Bank, or Israeli leader who stated
publicly a willingness to remove Israel's existing settlements from Judea and Samaria in return for peace.[28] (Emphasis
supplied)

Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of

securing less critical ones.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears

emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does

not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances.Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be

determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally

privileged status.

Whether petitioners have established the presence of such a public interest shall be discussed later. For now, the Court shall first pass upon the

arguments raised by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus to the present case.

Arguments proffered by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus

Petitioners argue that PMPF v. Manglapus cannot be applied in toto to the present case, there being substantial factual distinctions between

the two.
 To petitioners, the first and most fundamental distinction lies in the nature of the treaty involved. They stress that PMPF

v. Manglapus involved the Military Bases Agreement which necessarily pertained to matters affecting national security; whereas the present

case involves an economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce between the Philippines and Japan, matters which, unlike those

covered by the Military Bases Agreement, are not so vital to national security to disallow their disclosure.

Petitioners argument betrays a faulty assumption that information, to be considered privileged, must involve national security. The recognition

in Senate v. Ermita[29] that executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying kinds, such that it may even be more accurate to speak of

executive privileges, cautions against such generalization.

While there certainly are privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving military secrets, not all

are founded thereon. One example is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or

persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. [30] The suspect involved need not be

so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance.Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable

in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial

to law enforcement efforts in general.

Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those

which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that

x x x [a] frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested
parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-makingof those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative
and Judicial power. x x x[31] (Emphasis supplied)

In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon, so presidential

communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security.

It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being

that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and

employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. [32] This qualification applies

whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.[33]
Closely related to the presidential communications privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed

by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,[34] deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions,

recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the

privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the obvious realization that officials will not

communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege

being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. [35]

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may

be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential

communications is similar, if not identical.

The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus[36] shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of

exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential

communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the

President, particularly in its capacity as the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign

nations. And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content

of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be

presumed confidential.

The decision of the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia in Fulbright & Jaworski v. Department of the Treasury[37] enlightens on the close

relation between diplomatic negotiations and deliberative process privileges. The plaintiffs in that case sought access to notes taken by a

member of the U.S. negotiating team during the U.S.-French taxtreaty negotiations. Among the points noted therein were the issues to be

discussed, positions which the French and U.S. teams took on some points, the draft language agreed on, and articles which needed to be

amended. Upholding the confidentiality of those notes, Judge Green ruled, thus:

Negotiations between two countries to draft a treaty represent a true example of a deliberative process. Much give-
and-take must occur for the countries to reach an accord. A description of the negotiations at any one point would not
provide an onlooker a summary of the discussions which could later be relied on as law. It would not be working law as
the points discussed and positions agreed on would be subject to change at any date until the treaty was signed by the
President and ratified by the Senate.

The policies behind the deliberative process privilege support non-disclosure. Much harm could accrue to the
negotiations process if these notes were revealed. Exposure of the pre-agreement positions of the French negotiators
might well offend foreign governments and would lead to less candor by the U. S. in recording the events of the
 negotiations process. As several months pass in between negotiations, this lack of record could hinder readily the U.
S. negotiating team. Further disclosure would reveal prematurely adopted policies. If these policies should be changed,
public confusion would result easily.

Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be comparable to releasing drafts of the treaty,
particularly when the notes state the tentative provisions and language agreed on. As drafts of regulations typically
are protected by the deliberative process privilege, Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Internal Revenue Service, C.A. No. 80-705
(D.C.Cir., May 21, 1982), drafts of treaties should be accorded the same protection. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative

process.

The Court is not unaware that in Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), et al. v. Office of U.S. Trade Representative[38] where the

plaintiffs sought information relating to the just-completed negotiation of a United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement the same district court,

this time under Judge Friedman, consciously refrained from applying the doctrine in Fulbright and ordered the disclosure of the information

being sought.

Since the factual milieu in CIEL seemed to call for the straight application of the doctrine in Fulbright, a discussion of why the district court did

not apply the same would help illumine this Courts own reasons for deciding the present case along the lines of Fulbright.

In both Fulbright and CIEL, the U.S. government cited a statutory basis for withholding information, namely, Exemption 5 of the Freedom of

Information Act (FOIA).[39] In order to qualify for protection under Exemption 5, a document must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be

either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature, and (2) it must be bothpre-decisional and part of the agency's deliberative or decision-making

process.[40]

Judge Friedman, in CIEL, himself cognizant of a superficial similarity of context between the two cases, based his decision on what he

perceived to be a significant distinction: he found the negotiators notes that were sought in Fulbright to be clearly internal, whereas the

documents being sought in CIEL were those produced by or exchanged with an outside party, i.e. Chile. The documents subject

of Fulbright being clearly internal in character, the question of disclosure therein turned not on the threshold requirement of Exemption 5 that

the document be inter-agency, but on whether the documents were part of the agency's pre-decisional deliberative process. On this basis,

Judge Friedman found that Judge Green's discussion [in Fulbright] of the harm that could result from disclosure therefore is
irrelevant, since the documents at issue [in CIEL] are not inter-agency, and the Court does not reach the question of deliberative

process. (Emphasis supplied)

In fine, Fulbright was not overturned. The court in CIEL merely found the same to be irrelevant in light of its distinct factual setting. Whether

this conclusion was valid a question on which this Court would not pass the ruling in Fulbright that [n]egotiations between two countries to

draft a treaty represent a true example of a deliberative process was left standing, since the CIEL court explicitly stated that it did not reach

the question of deliberative process.

Going back to the present case, the Court recognizes that the information sought by petitioners includes documents produced and

communicated by a party external to the Philippine government, namely, the Japanese representatives in the JPEPA negotiations, and to that

extent this case is closer to the factual circumstances of CIEL than those ofFulbright.

Nonetheless, for reasons which shall be discussed shortly, this Court echoes the principle articulated in Fulbright that the public policy

underlying the deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic negotiations should also be accorded privileged status, even if the

documents subject of the present case cannot be described as purely internal in character.

It need not be stressed that in CIEL, the court ordered the disclosure of information based on its finding that the first requirement of FOIA

Exemption 5 that the documents be inter-agency was not met. In determining whether the government may validly refuse disclosure of the

exchanges between the U.S. and Chile, it necessarily had to deal with this requirement, it being laid down by a statute binding on them.

In this jurisdiction, however, there is no counterpart of the FOIA, nor is there any statutory requirement similar to FOIA Exemption 5 in

particular. Hence, Philippine courts, when assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are more free to focus directly on the issue

of whether the privilege being claimed is indeed supported by public policy, without having to consider as the CIEL court did if these

negotiations fulfill a formal requirement of being inter-agency. Important though that requirement may be in the context of domestic

negotiations, it need not be accorded the same significance when dealing with international negotiations.

There being a public policy supporting a privilege for diplomatic negotiations for the reasons explained above, the Court sees no reason to

modify, much less abandon, the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus.

A second point petitioners proffer in their attempt to differentiate PMPF v. Manglapus from the present case is the fact that the petitioners

therein consisted entirely of members of the mass media, while petitioners in the present case include members of the House of

Representatives who invoke their right to information not just as citizens but as members of Congress.

Petitioners thus conclude that the present case involves the right of members of Congress to demand information on negotiations of

international trade agreements from the Executive branch, a matter which was not raised in PMPF v. Manglapus.

While indeed the petitioners in PMPF v. Manglapus consisted only of members of the mass media, it would be incorrect to claim that the

doctrine laid down therein has no bearing on a controversy such as the present, where the demand for information has come from members of

Congress, not only from private citizens.

The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect simply because the same privilege

is now being claimed under different circumstances. The probability of the claim succeeding in the new context might differ, but to say that

the privilege, as such, has no validity at all in that context is another matter altogether.

The Courts statement in Senate v. Ermita that presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds

of considerations [state secrets privilege, informers privilege, and a generic privilege for internal deliberations], and may be asserted, with

differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations,[41] implies that a privilege, once recognized, may be

invoked under different procedural settings. That this principle holds true particularly with respect to diplomatic negotiations may be inferred

from PMPF v. Manglapus itself, where the Court held that it is the President alone who negotiates treaties, and not even the Senate or the

House of Representatives, unless asked, may intrude upon that process.

Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens demands for information, but also in the

context of legislative investigations.

Hence, the recognition granted in PMPF v. Manglapus to the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations cannot be considered irrelevant in

resolving the present case, the contextual differences between the two cases notwithstanding.

As third and last point raised against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus in this case, petitioners proffer that the socio-political

and historical contexts of the two cases are worlds apart. They claim that the constitutional traditions and concepts prevailing at the time PMPF

v. Manglapus came about, particularly the school of thought that the requirements of foreign policy and the ideals of transparency were

incompatible with each other or the incompatibility hypothesis, while valid when international relations were still governed by power, politics

and wars, are no longer so in this age of international cooperation.[42]

Without delving into petitioners assertions respecting the incompatibility hypothesis, the Court notes that the ruling in PMPF v. Manglapus is

grounded more on the nature of treaty negotiations as such than on a particular socio-political school of thought. If petitioners are suggesting

that the nature of treaty negotiations have so changed that [a]n ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession

which are exacted or offered on both sides no longer lead[s] to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations, or that parties in treaty

negotiations no longer expect their communications to be governed by historic confidentiality, the burden is on them to substantiate the same.

This petitioners failed to discharge.

Whether the privilege applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process

Petitioners admit that diplomatic negotiations on the JPEPA are entitled to a reasonable amount of confidentiality so as not to jeopardize the

diplomatic process. They argue, however, that the same is privileged only at certain stages of the negotiating process, after which such

information must necessarily be revealed to the public.[43] They add that the duty to disclose this information was vested in the government

when the negotiations moved from the formulation and exploratory stage to the firming up of definite propositions or official

recommendations, citing Chavez v. PCGG[44] and Chavez v. PEA.[45]

The following statement in Chavez v. PEA, however, suffices to show that the doctrine in both that case and Chavez v. PCGG with regard to the

duty to disclose definite propositions of the government does not apply to diplomatic negotiations:

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitutedefinite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national security and public order. x x x[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed if they fall under recognized exceptions. The

privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions, for the footnote to the immediately quoted ruling cites PMPF

v. Manglapus itself as an authority.

Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege

It being established that diplomatic negotiations enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure, even against the demands of members of

Congress for information, the Court shall now determine whether petitioners have shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to

overcome the privilege in this instance.

To clarify, there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken into account. One is the presumed public interest in

favor of keeping the subject information confidential, which is the reason for the privilege in the first place, and the other is the public

interest in favor of disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by the party asking for information. [47]

The criteria to be employed in determining whether there is a sufficient public interest in favor of disclosure may be gathered from cases such

as U.S. v. Nixon,[48] Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,[49] and In re Sealed Case.[50]

U.S. v. Nixon, which involved a claim of the presidential communications privilege against the subpoena duces tecum of a district court in

a criminal case, emphasized the need to balance such claim of privilege against the constitutional duty of courts to ensure a fair administration

of criminal justice.

x x x the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A Presidents
acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas
the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal
prosecution may be totally frustrated. The Presidents broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be
 vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending
criminal cases. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Senate Select Committee v. Nixon,[51] which involved a claim of the presidential communications privilege against the

subpoena duces tecum of a Senate committee, spoke of the need to balance such claim with the duty of Congress to perform

its legislative functions.

The staged decisional structure established in Nixon v. Sirica was designed to ensure that the President and those upon
whom he directly relies in the performance of his duties could continue to work under a general assurance that their
deliberations would remain confidential. So long as the presumption that the public interest favors confidentiality can
be defeated only by a strong showing of need by another institution of government- a showing that the responsibilities
of that institution cannot responsibly be fulfilled without access to records of the President's deliberations- we
believed in Nixon v. Sirica, and continue to believe, that the effective functioning of the presidential office will not be
impaired. x x x

xxxx

The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the
subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In re Sealed Case[52] involved a claim of the deliberative process and presidential communications privileges against a subpoena duces tecum of

a grand jury. On the claim of deliberative process privilege, the court stated:

The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of
need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative
process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests," taking into
account factors such as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the
litigation," "the role of the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.
x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners have failed to present the strong and sufficient showing of need referred to in the immediately cited cases. The arguments they

proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard.
Petitioners go on to assert that the non-involvement of the Filipino people in the JPEPA negotiation process effectively results in the bargaining

away of their economic and property rights without their knowledge and participation, in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution. They claim, moreover, that it is essential for the people to have access to the initial offers exchanged during the negotiations since

only through such disclosure can their constitutional right to effectively participate in decision-making be brought to life in the context of

international trade agreements.

Whether it can accurately be said that the Filipino people were not involved in the JPEPA negotiations is a question of fact which this Court

need not resolve. Suffice it to state that respondents had presented documents purporting to show that public consultations were

conducted on the JPEPA. Parenthetically, petitioners consider these alleged consultations as woefully selective and inadequate.[53]

AT ALL EVENTS, since it is not disputed that the offers exchanged by the Philippine and Japanese representatives have not been disclosed to the

public, the Court shall pass upon the issue of whether access to the documents bearing on them is, as petitioners claim, essential to their right

to participate in decision-making.

The case for petitioners has, of course, been immensely weakened by the disclosure of the full text of the JPEPA to the public since September

11, 2006, even as it is still being deliberated upon by the Senate and, therefore, not yet binding on the Philippines. Were the Senate to concur

with the validity of the JPEPA at this moment, there has already been, in the words of PMPF v. Manglapus, ample opportunity for discussion

before [the treaty] is approved.

The text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise

their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published.

It is of public knowledge that various non-government sectors and private citizens have already publicly expressed their views on the JPEPA,

their comments not being limited to general observations thereon but on its specific provisions. Numerous articles and statements critical of

the JPEPA have been posted on the Internet.[54] Given these developments, there is no basis for petitioners claim that access to the Philippine

and Japanese offers is essential to the exercise of their right to participate in decision-making.
 Petitioner-members of the House of Representatives additionally anchor their claim to have a right to the subject documents on the

basis of Congress inherent power to regulate commerce, be it domestic or international. They allege that Congress cannot meaningfully

exercise the power to regulate international trade agreements such as the JPEPA without being given copies of the initial offers exchanged

during the negotiations thereof. In the same vein, they argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since

whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress,

pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.[55]

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but

the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes. Thus it provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII the article on the Executive Department

which states:

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external

relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary[56] where the Court held:

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign
policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his
conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.
 As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive Secretary[57] where the Court ruled:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with
the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic
relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides
a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only by delegation of that

body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the

concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to

enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464[58] may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already

inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty

negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since

the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.

It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty

negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration,

not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority

to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present

a sufficient showing of need that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not

include treaty-negotiation.

Respondents alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege

On respondents invocation of executive privilege, petitioners find the same defective, not having been done seasonably as it was raised only in

their Comment to the present petition and not during the House Committee hearings.

That respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim

of privilege should not be credited.Petitioners position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House

Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it.

When the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja requested respondents for copies of the documents subject of this case,

respondents replied that the negotiations were still on-going and that the draft of the JPEPA would be released once the text thereof is settled

and complete. There was no intimation that the requested copies are confidential in nature by reason of public policy. The response may not

thus be deemed a claim of privilege by the standards of Senate v. Ermita, which recognizes as claims of privilege only those which are

accompanied by precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of the information being sought.

Respondents failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the

Executive branch. As the immediately preceding paragraph indicates, what respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-

Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorlystated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier

resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecias alleged request to Committee Chairperson

Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.

While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials out of respect for their office until

resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call

for an assertion of executive privilege.

 The privilege is an exemption to Congress power of inquiry.[59] So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there

is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations

did not amount to a waiver thereof.

The Court observes, however, that the claim of privilege appearing in respondents Comment to this petition fails to satisfy in full the

requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermitathat the claim should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by order of the

President.[60] Respondents claim of privilege is being sustained, however, its flaw notwithstanding, because of circumstances peculiar to the

case.

The assertion of executive privilege by the Executive Secretary, who is one of the respondents herein, without him adding the phrase by order

of the President, shall be considered as partially complying with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita. The requirement that the

phrase by order of the President should accompany the Executive Secretarys claim of privilege is a new rule laid down for the first time

in Senate v. Ermita, which was not yet final and executory at the time respondents filed their Comment to the petition.[61] A strict application of

this requirement would thus be unwarranted in this case.

Response to the Dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice

We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our peoples right to information against any

abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share.

The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the

opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.

We respond only to the salient arguments of the Dissenting Opinion which have not yet been sufficiently addressed above.
1. After its historical discussion on the allocation of power over international trade agreements in the United States, the dissent concludes that

it will be turning somersaults with history to contend that the President is the sole organ for external relations in that jurisdiction. With regard

to this opinion, We make only the following observations:

There is, at least, a core meaning of the phrase sole organ of the nation in its external relations which is not being disputed, namely, that the

power to directly negotiate treaties and international agreements is vested by our Constitution only in the Executive. Thus, the dissent states

that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations but does not have the power to negotiate international

agreements directly.[62]

What is disputed is how this principle applies to the case at bar.

The dissent opines that petitioner-members of the House of Representatives, by asking for the subject JPEPA documents, are not seeking

to directly participate in the negotiations of the JPEPA, hence, they cannot be prevented from gaining access to these documents.

On the other hand, We hold that this is one occasion where the following ruling in Agan v. PIATCO[63] and in other cases both before and since

should be applied:

This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly. To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite the clear statutory prohibition against a direct government
guarantee would not only make a mockery of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent -- which is to expose the government
to the risk of incurring a monetary obligation resulting from a contract of loan between the project proponent and its
lenders and to which the Government is not a party to -- but would also render the BOT Law useless for what it seeks to
achieve - to make use of the resources of the private sector in the financing, operation and maintenance of infrastructure
and development projects which are necessary for national growth and development but which the government,
unfortunately, could ill-afford to finance at this point in time.[64]

Similarly, while herein petitioners-members of the House of Representatives may not have been aiming to participate in the negotiations

directly, opening the JPEPA negotiations to their scrutiny even to the point of giving them access to the offers exchanged between the Japanese

and Philippine delegations would have made a mockery of what the Constitution sought to prevent and rendered it useless for what it sought

to achieve when it vested the power of direct negotiation solely with the President.
What the U.S. Constitution sought to prevent and aimed to achieve in defining the treaty-making power of the President, which our

Constitution similarly defines, may be gathered from Hamiltons explanation of why the U.S. Constitution excludes the House of Representatives

from the treaty-making process:

x x x The fluctuating, and taking its future increase into account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to
expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive
knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to
national character, decision,secrecy and dispatch; are incompatible with a body so variable and so numerous. The very
complication of the business by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies, would of itself
afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the house of representatives, and the greater length of
time which it would often be necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in the
progressive stages of a treaty, would be source of so great inconvenience and expense, as alone ought to condemn the
project.[65]

These considerations a fortiori apply in this jurisdiction, since the Philippine Constitution, unlike that of the U.S., does not even grant the

Senate the power to advise the Executive in the making of treaties, but only vests in that body the power to concur in the validity of the treaty

after negotiations have been concluded.[66] Much less, therefore, should it be inferred that the House of Representatives has this power.

Since allowing petitioner-members of the House of Representatives access to the subject JPEPA documents would set a precedent for future

negotiations, leading to the contravention of the public interests articulated above which the Constitution sought to protect, the subject

documents should not be disclosed.

2. The dissent also asserts that respondents can no longer claim the diplomatic secrets privilege over the subject JPEPA documents

now that negotiations have been concluded, since their reasons for nondisclosure cited in the June 23, 2005 letter of Sec. Ermita, and later in

their Comment, necessarily apply only for as long as the negotiations were still pending;

In their Comment, respondents contend that the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be

allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are

accorded strict confidentiality. That respondents liken the documents involved in the JPEPA negotiations to judicial deliberations and

working drafts of opinions evinces, by itself, that they were claiming confidentiality not only until, but even after, the conclusion of the

negotiations.

Judicial deliberations do not lose their confidential character once a decision has been promulgated by the courts. The same holds true with

respect to working drafts of opinions, which are comparable to intra-agency recommendations. Such intra-agency recommendations are
privileged even after the position under consideration by the agency has developed into a definite proposition, hence, the rule in this

jurisdiction that agencies have the duty to disclose only definite propositions, and not the inter-agency and intra-agency communications

during the stage when common assertions are still being formulated.[67]

3. The dissent claims that petitioner-members of the House of Representatives have sufficiently shown their need for the same

documents to overcome the privilege. Again, We disagree.

The House Committee that initiated the investigations on the JPEPA did not pursue its earlier intention to subpoena the documents. This

strongly undermines the assertion that access to the same documents by the House Committee is critical to the performance of its legislative

functions. If the documents were indeed critical, the House Committee should have, at the very least, issued a subpoena duces tecum or, like

what the Senate did in Senate v. Ermita, filed the present petition as a legislative body, rather than leaving it to the discretion of individual

Congressmen whether to pursue an action or not. Such acts would have served as strong indicia that Congress itself finds the subject

information to be critical to its legislative functions.

Further, given that respondents have claimed executive privilege, petitioner-members of the House of Representatives should have, at least,

shown how its lack of access to the Philippine and Japanese offers would hinder the intelligent crafting of legislation. Mere assertion that the

JPEPA covers a subject matter over which Congress has the power to legislate would not suffice. As Senate Select Committee v. Nixon[68] held,

the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turns, not only on the nature and appropriateness of the function

in the performance of which the material was sought, but also the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment.This petitioners

failed to do.

Furthermore, from the time the final text of the JPEPA including its annexes and attachments was published, petitioner-members of the House

of Representatives have been free to use it for any legislative purpose they may see fit. Since such publication, petitioners need, if

any, specifically for the Philippine and Japanese offers leading to the final version of the JPEPA, has become even less apparent.

In asserting that the balance in this instance tilts in favor of disclosing the JPEPA documents, the dissent contends that the Executive has failed

to show how disclosing them afterthe conclusion of negotiations would impair the performance of its functions. The contention, with due

respect, misplaces the onus probandi. While, in keeping with the general presumption of transparency, the burden is initially on the Executive

to provide precise and certain reasons for upholding its claim of privilege, once the Executive is able to show that the documents being sought
are covered by a recognized privilege, the burden shifts to the party seeking information to overcome the privilege by a strong showing of

need.

When it was thus established that the JPEPA documents are covered by the privilege for diplomatic negotiations pursuant to PMPF

v. Manglapus, the presumption arose that their disclosure would impair the performance of executive functions. It was then incumbent on

petitioner- requesting parties to show that they have a strong need for the information sufficient to overcome the privilege. They have not,

however.

4. Respecting the failure of the Executive Secretary to explicitly state that he is claiming the privilege by order of the President, the same may

not be strictly applied to the privilege claim subject of this case.

When the Court in Senate v. Ermita limited the power of invoking the privilege to the President alone, it was laying down a new rule for which

there is no counterpart even in the United States from which the concept of executive privilege was adopted. As held in the 2004 case

of Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice,[69] citing In re Sealed Case,[70] the issue of whether a President must personally invoke the

[presidential communications] privilege remains an open question. U.S. v. Reynolds,[71] on the other hand, held that [t]here must be a formal

claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.

The rule was thus laid down by this Court, not in adherence to any established precedent, but with the aim of preventing the abuse of the

privilege in light of its highly exceptional nature. The Courts recognition that the Executive Secretary also bears the power to invoke the

privilege, provided he does so by order of the President, is meant to avoid laying down too rigid a rule, the Court being aware that it was laying

down a new restriction on executive privilege. It is with the same spirit that the Court should not be overly strict with applying the same rule in

this peculiar instance, where the claim of executive privilege occurred before the judgment in Senate v. Ermita became final.

5. To show that PMPF v. Manglapus may not be applied in the present case, the dissent implies that the Court therein erred in citing US

v. Curtiss Wright[72] and the book entitled The New American Government and Its Work[73] since these authorities, so the dissent claims, may not

be used to calibrate the importance of the right to information in the Philippine setting.
The dissent argues that since Curtiss-Wright referred to a conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government, the factual

setting thereof was different from that of PMPF v. Manglapus which involved a collision between governmental power over the conduct of

foreign affairs and the citizens right to information.

That the Court could freely cite Curtiss-Wright a case that upholds the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations

against congressional demands for information in the course of laying down a ruling on the public right to information only serves to

underscore the principle mentioned earlier that the privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force

and effect simply because the same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances.

PMPF v. Manglapus indeed involved a demand for information from private citizens and not an executive-legislative conflict, but so did Chavez

v. PEA[74] which held that the [publics] right to information . . . does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the

separation of powers. What counts as privileged information in an executive-legislative conflict is thus also recognized as such in cases involving

the publics right to information.

Chavez v. PCGG[75] also involved the publics right to information, yet the Court recognized as a valid limitation to that right the

same privileged information based on separation of powers closed-door Cabinet meetings, executive sessions of either house of Congress, and

the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

These cases show that the Court has always regarded claims of privilege, whether in the context of an executive-legislative conflict or a citizens

demand for information, as closely intertwined, such that the principles applicable to one are also applicable to the other.

The reason is obvious. If the validity of claims of privilege were to be assessed by entirely different criteria in each context, this may give rise to

the absurd result where Congress would be denied access to a particular information because of a claim of executive privilege, but the general

public would have access to the same information, the claim of privilege notwithstanding.

Absurdity would be the ultimate result if, for instance, the Court adopts the clear and present danger test for the assessment of claims of

privilege against citizens demands for information. If executive information, when demanded by a citizen, is privileged only when there is a

clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent, it would be very difficult for the Executive to establish the

validity of its claim in each instance. In contrast, if the demand comes from Congress, the Executive merely has to show that the information is
covered by a recognized privilege in order to shift the burden on Congress to present a strong showing of need. This would lead to a situation

where it would be more difficult for Congress to access executive information than it would be for private citizens.

We maintain then that when the Executive has already shown that an information is covered by executive privilege, the party demanding the

information must present a strong showing of need, whether that party is Congress or a private citizen.

The rule that the same showing of need test applies in both these contexts, however, should not be construed as a denial of the importance of

analyzing the context in which an executive privilege controversy may happen to be placed. Rather, it affirms it, for it means that

the specific need being shown by the party seeking information in every particularinstance is highly significant in determining whether to

uphold a claim of privilege. This need is, precisely, part of the context in light of which every claim of privilege should be assessed.

Since, as demonstrated above, there are common principles that should be applied to executive privilege controversies across different

contexts, the Court in PMPF v. Manglapusdid not err when it cited the Curtiss-Wright case.

The claim that the book cited in PMPF v. Manglapus entitled The New American Government and Its Work could not have taken into account

the expanded statutory right to information in the FOIA assumes that the observations in that book in support of the confidentiality of treaty

negotiations would be different had it been written after the FOIA.Such assumption is, with due respect, at best, speculative.

As to the claim in the dissent that [i]t is more doubtful if the same book be used to calibrate the importance of the right of access to

information in the Philippine setting considering its elevation as a constitutional right, we submit that the elevation of such right as a

constitutional right did not set it free from the legitimate restrictions of executive privilege which is itself constitutionally-based.[76] Hence, the

comments in that book which were cited in PMPF v. Manglapus remain valid doctrine.

6. The dissent further asserts that the Court has never used need as a test to uphold or allow inroads into rights guaranteed under the

Constitution. With due respect, we assert otherwise. The Court has done so before, albeit without using the term need.

In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a sufficient showing of need only means, in substance, that they

should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege.[77] Verily, the Court in such cases
engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental

rights. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[78] which was cited in the dissent, applied just such a test.

Given that the dissent has clarified that it does not seek to apply the clear and present danger test to the present controversy, but the balancing

test, there seems to be no substantial dispute between the position laid down in this ponencia and that reflected in the dissent as to what test

to apply. It would appear that the only disagreement is on the results of applying that test in this instance.

The dissent, nonetheless, maintains that it suffices that information is of public concern for it to be covered by the right, regardless of the

publics need for the information, and that the same would hold true even if they simply want to know it because it interests them. As has been

stated earlier, however, there is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier

concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the

JPEPA as an international trade agreement.

However, when the Executive has as in this case invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is indeed

covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of

public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and

effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information

is a matter of public concern.

Moreover, in view of the earlier discussions, we must bear in mind that, by disclosing the documents of the JPEPA negotiations, the Philippine

government runs the grave risk of betraying the trust reposed in it by the Japanese representatives, indeed, by the Japanese government

itself. How would the Philippine government then explain itself when that happens? Surely, it cannot bear to say that it just had to release the

information because certain persons simply wanted to know it because it interests them.

Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific showing of need

for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government

has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is

to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to

effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.[79]

7. The dissent maintains that [t]he treaty has thus entered the ultimate stage where the people can exercise their right to participate in the

discussion whether the Senate should concur in its ratification or not. (Emphasis supplied) It adds that this right will be diluted unless the

people can have access to the subject JPEPA documents. What, to the dissent, is a dilution of the right to participate in decision-making is, to

Us, simply a recognition of the qualified nature of the publics right to information. It is beyond dispute that the right to information is not

absolute and that the doctrine of executive privilege is a recognized limitation on that right.

Moreover, contrary to the submission that the right to participate in decision-making would be diluted, We reiterate that our people have been

exercising their right to participate in the discussion on the issue of the JPEPA, and they have been able to articulate their different opinions

without need of access to the JPEPA negotiation documents.

Thus, we hold that the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive privilege.

8. Against our ruling that the principles applied in U.S. v. Nixon, the Senate Select Committee case, and In re Sealed Case, are similarly applicable

to the present controversy, the dissent cites the caveat in the Nixon case that the U.S. Court was there addressing only the Presidents assertion

of privilege in the context of a criminal trial, not a civil litigation nor a congressional demand for information. What this caveat means, however,

is only that courts must be careful not to hastily apply the ruling therein to other contexts. It does not, however, absolutely mean that the

principles applied in that case may never be applied in such contexts.

Hence, U.S. courts have cited U.S. v. Nixon in support of their rulings on claims of executive privilege in contexts other than a criminal trial, as in

the case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services[80] which involved former President Nixons invocation of executive privilege to challenge

the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act[81] and the above-mentioned In re Sealed Case which

involved a claim of privilege against a subpoena duces tecum issued in a grand jury investigation.

Indeed, in applying to the present case the principles found in U.S. v. Nixon and in the other cases already mentioned, We are merely affirming

what the Chief Justice stated in his Dissenting Opinion in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability[82] a case involving an executive-legislative

conflict over executive privilege. That dissenting opinion stated that, while Nixon was not concerned with the balance between the Presidents

generalized interest in confidentiality and congressional demands for information, [n]onetheless the [U.S.] Court laid down principles and

procedures that can serve as torch lights to illumine us on the scope and use of Presidential communication privilege in the case at

bar.[83] While the Court was divided in Neri, this opinion of the Chief Justice was not among the points of disagreement, and We similarly hold

now that the Nixon case is a useful guide in the proper resolution of the present controversy, notwithstanding the difference in context.
Verily, while the Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full recognition to the validity of the

privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of executive power, as in this case. Otherwise, the Court would undermine its own

credibility, for it would be perceived as no longer aiming to strike a balance, but seeking merely to water down executive privilege to the point

of irrelevance.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, petitioners demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been

made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during

the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents claim of executive privilege being valid.

Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been recognized as

privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not

persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners both private citizens and members of the House of Representatives have failed to present

a sufficient showing of need to overcome the claim of privilege in this case.

That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents Comment to the present petition, and not during the hearings of the House

Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive

branch.

For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita that executive

privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary by order of the President.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 93100. June 19, 1997]

ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

[G.R. No. 97855. June 19, 1997]

PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some portions of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.[1]

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation,[2] Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention Archies
Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna[3] are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b),
11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10
Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner:

1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the constitution
limits agrarian reform only to agriculture lands.

2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated, and differently treat
aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional guarantee of the equal
protection of the laws.

3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers
even as Section 1 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and employment opportunities.

4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of
the Constitution mandate the State to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments and
to expansion and growth.

The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the case
of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[4] regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage.

The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned provisions insofar as they include in its coverage
lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.

In their first argument, petitioners contend that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[5] this Court has already
ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agriculture lands. In aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only
incidental to and not the principal factor in productivity and, hence, as held in Luz Farms, they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as
lands devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same reason. They also argue that they are entitled to the full benefit
of Luz Farms to the effect that only five percent of the total investment in aquaculture activities, fishponds, and prawn farms, is in the form of
land, and therefore, cannot be classified as agricultural activity. Further, that in fishponds and prawn farms, there are no farmers, nor farm
workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the constitutionally intended beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.

In their second argument, they contend that R.A. 6657, by including in its coverage, the raising of fish and aquaculture operations
including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and is, therefore, void. Further, the Constitutional Commission debates show that the intent of the constitutional
framers is to exclude industrial lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and fish farms belong.

Petitioners also claim that Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform are,
likewise, unconstitutional, as held in Luz Farms, and are therefore void as they implement the assailed provisions of CARL.

The provisions of CARL being assailed as unconstitutional are as follows:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the raising of fish in the definition of Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity. (Underscoring
Supplied)

(b) Section 11 which defines commercial farms as private agricultural lands devoted to fishponds and prawn ponds x x x. (Underscoring
Supplied)

(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d) Section 16 (d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be
paid for lands covered by the comprehensive Agrarian reform Law.

(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13-

x x x (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days at the end of the
fiscal year as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided,
That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application,
determines a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten percent (10%) of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said
regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year. x x x

While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues, neither will it
preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act. On
February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881[6] was approved by Congress. Provisions of said Act pertinent to the assailed provisions of CARL are
the following:

Section 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 3. Definitions. -- For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:

(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees,
including the harvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.--

xxx xxx xxx

b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided,
That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or
commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must
consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the
fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to
manage the same.

In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm
workers shall no longer be necessary, however, the provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Section 11, paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 11. Commercial Farming.-- Commercial Farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted to salt beds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable
and cut-flower farms, and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten
(10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial production
and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands,
upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations,
which shall thereafter manage the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries.

Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 a section to read as follows:

Sec. 32-A. Incentives.-- Individuals or entities owning or operating fishponds and prawn farms are hereby mandated to execute within six (6)
months from the effectivity of this Act, an incentive plan with their regular fishpond or prawn farm workers organization, if any, whereby seven
point five percent (7.5%) of their net profit before tax from the operation of the fishpond or prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60) days
at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other pond workers in such ponds over and above the compensation they currently
receive.

In order to safeguard the right of the regular fishpond or prawn farm workers under the incentive plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn
owners shall be subject to periodic audit or inspection by certified public accountants chosen by the workers.
The foregoing provisions shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequently converted to fishponds or prawn farms provided the size of the land
converted does not exceed the retention limit of the landowner.

The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of
CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with the
passage of R.A. No. 7881.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Francisco, JJ., on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004]

SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners,
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004]

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA,
JR., respondents.

[G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004]

REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP.
EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004]

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of
July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary
of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).[1]

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in full:

PROCLAMATION NO. 427

DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION

WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the
instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly
declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open
hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which
constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown
leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the government;

WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual and
on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of rebellion.

In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell
the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:

GENERAL ORDER NO. 4

DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION

WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the
instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly
declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open
hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which
constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown
leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the government;

WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief
of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic of
the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003,
do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to
barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through
Proclamation No. 435:

DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST

WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a state of rebellion was declared;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and
pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to
suppress and quell the rebellion;

WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare
that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist.

In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.

In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.),[2] party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM),
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces.[3] They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.[4]

Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social Justice
Society (SJS), Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers.[5] Like Sanlakas and PM, they claim that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion.[6] They contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that
confuses, confounds and misleads because [o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to
violate the constitutional right of private citizens.[7] Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement
under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law.[8] Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President.[9]

In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as
citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a
state of rebellion.[10] Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed Forces.[11] They argue, however, that the
declaration of a state of rebellion is a superfluity, and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.[12] Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to
a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.[13]

In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal
and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution.[14] In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion. [15]

Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.[16] In
addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit.[17]

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to
exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination
of actual controversies.[18] Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[19] The
case at bar is one such case.

Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion
through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into Malacaang.[20] Petitions were filed before this Court
assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of
the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases[21] precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.

To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of
rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
 Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject
issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, [22]this Court recognized that:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned
by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress
emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid
congressional scrutiny into the Presidents exercise of martial law powers.

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. Legal standing or locus
standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[23]

Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:

2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect,
uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine
society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens.

3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably
assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate
their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same.[24] [Emphasis in the original.]

Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected
in Lacson v. Perez:

petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to
arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest.Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being
threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal
rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.

At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[]s right to freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the
Constitution.

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first
instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.[25]

Even assuming that petitioners are peoples organizations, this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the
validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato: [26]

The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and
protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means, that
their right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. (Art.
XIII, 15-16)

These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke
the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy
requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts
from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.[27]

That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring
suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. [28] No such illegal
disbursement is alleged.
 On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[29] Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.

Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions
must fail.

It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of
a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]

The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated power[s].[30] From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial
law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or
rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.[31] However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora,[32][t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary,
the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of
rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
with Executive powers.

Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The executive power shall be vested in the President. As if by exposition,
Section 17 of the same Article provides: He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The provisions trace their history to the
Constitution of the United States.

The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. President executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in
their original simple form since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part:

Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America . . . .

....

Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . .

....
Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article II Executive Power]

Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding
action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign powers, which are drawn
chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of
State or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion.[33]

First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as the protector of the people, was President Andrew
Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the people by driving the patricians
from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the indissolubility of the Union by defeating South
Carolinas nullification effort.[34]

The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State Legislature
ordered an election for a convention, whose members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts
unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal
Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any who
sought to pay or collect customs duties.[35]

Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy. Technically, the President might send troops into a State only if the
Governor called for help to suppress an insurrection, which would not occur in the instance. The President could also send troops to see to it
that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at individual citizens, and provided no enforcement
machinery against violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a force bill.[36]

In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He wrote: . . . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a
constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the Union, the balance of the people composing this Union have a perfect right to coerce them to
obedience. Then in a Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon South Carolinians to realize that there could be no
peaceable interference with the execution of the laws, and dared them, disunion by armed force is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt? [37]

The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of
agreement, and the President announced that the national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the south had declared nullification
and accession confined to contempt and infamy.[38]

No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable, and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so daunting, as
Abraham Lincoln.

Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of Congress explicit and restricted, and sought some source of executive power not
failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage. He seized upon the Presidents designation by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to
the executive power provision and joined them as the war power which authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of
Congress.[39]

Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the Presidents independent power and duty under his oath directly to represent and protect
the people. In his Message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the
government forced upon him. He could not but perform the duty or surrender the existence of the Government . . . . This concept began as a
transition device, to be validated by Congress when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into an independent power under which he felt
authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States.[40]

Lincolns Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their first service, according to the proclamation, would be to recapture
forts, places and property, taking care to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of
peaceful citizens.[41]

Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincolns report to use the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The
decision was handed in the celebrated Prize Cases[42] which involved suits attacking the Presidents right to legally institute a blockade. Although
his Proclamation was subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants contended that under international law, a blockade could be instituted
only as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the State. Since under the Constitution only Congress is exclusively empowered to
declare war, it is only that body that could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4
vote, the Supreme Court upheld Lincolns right to act as he had.[43]

In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without
prior legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The United States introduced the
expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902.[44] The use of the power was put to judicial test and this
Court held that the case raised a political question and said that it is beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of the power.[45] Later, the
grant of the power was incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.[46]

Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to mean that it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the
maxim that Public office is a public trust, which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking
railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes and
violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme Court, the principal
issue was by what authority of the Constitution or statute had the President to send troops without the request of the Governor of the State.[47]
 In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,[48] the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the governments province to mix
in merely individual present controversies. Still, so it went on, whenever wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in
respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all
citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not
sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties.[49] Thus,
Clevelands course had the Courts attest.

Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt launched what political scientists dub the stewardship theory. Calling
himself the steward of the people, he felt that the executive power was limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in
the Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional powers.[50]

The most far-reaching extension of presidential power T.R. ever undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvanias
coal mines under his authority as Commander-in-Chief. In the issue, he found means other than force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he
had made detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal production
would begin again.[51]

Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In
the Philippines, this led to the incorporation of Section 6,[52] Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was later carried over with modifications
in Section 7,[53] Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18,[54] Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and
become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the
powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of
government or the integrity of the State.

In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was
vested with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the unitary and highly
centralized nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, There is no counterpart of the several states of the American union which
have reserved powers under the United States constitution. Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote:

. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the government in this manner: The legislative power shall be vested
in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be provided by
law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial
powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, a grant of legislative power means a grant of all the
legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If this
is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the
judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in
one official the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of
government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more
immediate and direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.[55]

The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a
general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines.[56] Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent
Charter has restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the Presidents powers as Chief
Executive.

In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld
the Presidents power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majoritys ruling rested on the Presidents

unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under
the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and
in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.[57] [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.]

Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for such
a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of
which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]

The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
superfluity.[58] At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress
it.[59] Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts
mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal
significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the
dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected
rights.[60] Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus,[61] then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions.[62] At
any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.

For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise
unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that [i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort
to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, [63] if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion.[64] In other words, a person
may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the
requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.

It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis.[65]

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of
the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that
military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to
exercise or has exercised martial law powers.

Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends
upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:

Sec. 23. (1) .

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Puno, J., in the result.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., joins J. Panganibans Opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the result.
Callejo, Sr., J., concurs in the separate opinion of J. Panganiban.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
[1]
Rollo, G.R. No. 159085, p. 7; Rollo, G.R. No. 159103, pp. 4-5; Rollo, G.R. No. 159185, pp. 4-5; Rollo, G.R. No. 159186, p. 9.

EN BANC

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, G.R. No. 191988

Petitioner,

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,*

versus PERALTA,**

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA and

SERENO, JJ.

JOSEPH ERAP EJERCITO

ESTRADA and COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS,

Respondents.

Promulgated:

August 31, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION

CORONA, C.J.:

What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: [t]he President shall not be eligible for

any reelection?

The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal

scholars and law students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue

before it has already been mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional requirement of the existence of a case or an

actual controversy for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure of making a grand pronouncement

that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding opinion.

The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from any reelection.

Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the

presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and

filed a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on Elections

(COMELEC).[1] His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.[2]

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari[3] on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition

would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed. [4] Besides, petitioner did

not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to

participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.[5]

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any

reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be
resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists.[6] There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that

touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.[7] No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in

this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.[8] As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the

existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.[9] The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or

abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.[10] In

other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.[11]

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become

academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the

issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken

by subsequent events.[12]

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10,

2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the

second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.

Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204603 September 24, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 204603 PHILIPPINES, represented by THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONALDEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE CHIEFOF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE, MORO CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE, FR. JOE DIZON, RODINIE SORIANO, STEPHANIE ABIERA, MARIA LOURDES
ALCAIN, VOLTAIRE ALFEREZ, CZARINA MAYALTEZ, SHERYL BALOT, RENIZZA BATACAN, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, LEANA CARAMOAN, ALDWIN
CAMANCE, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, ANNAMARIE GO, ANNA ARMINDA JIMENEZ, MARY ANN
LEE,LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, NORMAN ROLAND OCANA III, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS,
CHERRY LOU REYES, MELISSA ANN SICAT, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA TORNO, and HON. JUDGE ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN, as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 92, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the April 23, 20122 and July 31, 20123 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
92(RTC) in Special Civil Action (SCA) No. Q-07-60778, denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss (subject motion to dismiss) based on the following
grounds: (a) that the Court had yet to pass upon the constitutionality of Republic Act No. (RA) 9372, 4 otherwise known as the "Human Security
Act of 2007," in the consolidated cases of Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council5 (Southern Hemisphere);
and (b) that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was proper.

The Facts

On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition6 for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the following
sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,7 for being void for vagueness;8 (b) Section 7,9for violating the right to privacy of communication and due
process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships;10 (c)Section 18,11 for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post
facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as
for contradicting Article 12512 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;13 (d) Section 26,14 for violating the right to travel;15 and (e) Section
27,16 for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.17

Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,18 averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality
have been lodged before the Court.19 The said motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.20

On October 5, 2010, the Court promulgated its Decision21 in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.

On February 27, 2012, petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss,22 contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the Southern
Hemisphere cases.

In their Comment/Opposition,23 private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not resolve the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality in
Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the requisites for declaratory relief were
met.

The RTC Ruling

On April 23, 2012, the RTC issued an Order24 which denied the subject motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration25 which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2012.26The RTC observed that
private respondents have personal and substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the adverse consequences of the
aforesaid law’s implementation considering that the case is of paramount impact to the Filipino people.27

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to
dismiss.
Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the requirements for declaratory relief and that the Court
had already sustained with finality the constitutionality of RA 9372.

On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief have been satisfied and that the Court has yet to
resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372, negating any grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.28 It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or
gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.29 In this
relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.30The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be met.

Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC when it found
that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when
it ruled that private respondents’ petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject
motion to dismiss was altogether improper.

To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The
certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was
improper;31 (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;32and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy. 33 Therefore,
there was no grave abuse of discretion.

The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC’s ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents’ petition for
declaratory relief.

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:

first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or
ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have
been no breach of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through
other means or other forms of action or proceeding.34

Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,35 second,36 and third37requirements appear to exist in this
case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in this case.

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that
is conjectural or merely anticipatory. 38 Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed
with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a
full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is
not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing declaration.39

A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or
are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed
from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and
infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammeled. As their petition
would disclose, private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which were addressed to
the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared
towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
in Southern Hemisphere:

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.1âwphi1
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely
imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must
be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.41 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual
justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the
same.

It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the implementation
of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case.42 While it has been previously
held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury,43 it must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether
different genus of constitutional litigation.44 Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct
necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi,45 as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi,
as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.46

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since
the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely
theorized.1âwphi1 It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.47 This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no
impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first place.

All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of the sixth
requisite, private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot be
gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the April23, 2012 and July 31, 2012 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 92 in SCA No. Q-07-60778 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition for declaratory relief before the said court is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On Official Leave On Official Leave

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA** LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 On Leave
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

On Official Leave
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S.
MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ
II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR
GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006

NIÑEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO,
MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R.
MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES,
JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C.
NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY
AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO
SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS – KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ,
ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FELIMON C.
ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR
GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents.

x-------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1 Superior strength – the use of force – cannot
make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their
liberty.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice
should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws
and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity."2

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent
officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very
freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree
of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?3

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a
state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President.
. . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented
by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine
State – who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State – by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the people’s confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to
bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the
primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the
safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by
the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted
Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and
sabotaging the people’s confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to
bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary
duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the
safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic
of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry
out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the
President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;

WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive
issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA), and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-
over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.

During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners’ counsels.

The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity
of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he
explained that it is not respondents’ task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same,
narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.

On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members
of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they
vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham
regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5

On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during
the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet
members and President Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The
next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground.

On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash
disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National People’s Army (NPA), a tape recorder,
audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the
"Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to
defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed
and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and
unquestionable loyalty."

On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquino’s brother, businessmen and mid-level
government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon,
longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his group’s plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-
named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Army’s elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the
planned movement against Arroyo."8

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo
protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because
they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to
his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.

Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to
forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and
revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing
down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-
Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers
and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic
movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable
that the President’s ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.

Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as
additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three
(3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals
and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.10

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the
fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of
command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the
President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.

For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration
of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated
that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff
Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo
Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the
intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot
police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City
and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along
Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.

During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of
the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on
the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters,
documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and
business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper,
Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.

The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or
do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that
would not follow "standards set by the government during the state of national emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do
not follow the standards – and the standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is
in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will recommend a ‘takeover.’" National Telecommunications’ Commissioner Ronald Solis urged
television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced
reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency
will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is
threatened.14

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltran’s lawyer explained that the
warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a
party in any of these petitions.

When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.

Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon
City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.

Retired Major General Ramon Montaño, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the
Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmariñas, Cavite.

Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro
Casiño and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City.
Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely.

Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in
these petitions.

On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.

In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-
named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily
Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami,
typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.

In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of
Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They
alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the
possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so."

In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they
violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they
violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c)Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the
Constitution.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her
Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by
the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and
function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code."

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of
the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public
concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from
fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

In respondents’ Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being
moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.)
have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional
and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.

On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as
follows:

A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489(Cadiz et al.),
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

a. Facial Challenge

b. Constitutional Basis

c. As Applied Challenge

A. PROCEDURAL

First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle

One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v.
Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --

The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on
the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority
competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as
expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22

But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts may exercise such power only when the
following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of
constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.24

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific
relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered
"moot and academic" by President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021.

Such contention lacks merit.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, 26so that a declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29

The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days
that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It
must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal
contemplation, inoperative."30

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public;33and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged
that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s
interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty
to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar,
and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly,
respondents’ contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.

In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s Separate Opinion
in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice’s very statement that an otherwise "moot" case
may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of
its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.

II- Legal Standing

In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on
legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-
parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based
on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal
official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He
could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to
seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down
in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the
former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, however…the people are
the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a
taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus
hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct
injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that
action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."
The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la
Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted
the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues
raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no
personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.51

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the
principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following cases:

(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and
the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus
standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental importance of the issues
involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the
parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a
showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress’ taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely
and standing requirements may be relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled
early; and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Court’s attitude toward legal standing.

In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization does not give it the requisite personality
to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as
a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific
injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to
concerned citizens’ cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."

In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had
not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.

In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim
that the President’s declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative
powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing,
equating them with the LDP in Lacson.

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.

The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R.
No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search"
committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.

In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or
not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of
justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations
of their basic rights.

In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation,63 and Tañada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and
has an interest in the execution of the laws.

In G.R. No. 171483, KMU’s assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it
legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by
the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing,
having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance
of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court
declares that petitioner have locus standi.

In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement
of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her
prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her
because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she
has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017
will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may
relax the standing rules.

It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power.
This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No.
5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society
now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the
"transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will
degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the
performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution
necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any
other official, he remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.69

B. SUBSTANTIVE

I. Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.

The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the President’s exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its
distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino,
Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political questions," particularly those questions
"in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75 Barcelon and
Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision
is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that
the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the
principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x
only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted
is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court
of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of
Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a
need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control
for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the
People, and God."79

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar
to Lansang. While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed
that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of
1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82

As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than
to satisfy the Court not that the President’s decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is
not correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings."

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A
reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of
the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between
the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid.

Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or
suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories
relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of
emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the
promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act according to
discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral
restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its
abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where
they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85

Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of emergency.
According to him:

The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous
and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State…

It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed
its law to lapse...

If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme
lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general
will, and it clear that the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish.86

Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be
cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed
duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.87

John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the
assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship."88

Nicollo Machiavelli’s view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to
the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus:

Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra –constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be
beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under
that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every
emergency and fixed rules for applying it.89

Machiavelli – in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill – sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency
powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining
a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.90

Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have
employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means
for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period
of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements
of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at
the same time "imposing limitation upon that power."93Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the
conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively short…Dictatorship should always be strictly
legitimate in character…Final authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator
himself…"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be "strict political conservatism."

Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating power – in a government where power
has consciously been divided – to cope with… situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers,
subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what end."96 Friedrich, too, offered
criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by
constitutional means – i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency
powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the
constitutional order."97

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the
United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by
emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus:
 1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even
indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order…

2) …the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the
dictator…

3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its termination…

4) …all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of
constitutional or legal requirements…

5) … no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely
necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .

6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect…

7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the
existing constitutional order. . .

8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . .

9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the man
or men who constitute the dictator. . .

10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted…

11) …the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental conditions
existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship…99

Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress
final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional
investigating committees.100

Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, "the suggestion that
democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound
constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder
realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to
embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the
implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of constitutionalism" articulated by
Charles H. McIlwain:

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the
findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate
limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility.
McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted
that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible. He
refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and
substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of
government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism
with "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed
to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the
legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.101

In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists –- from Lock’s "theory of prerogative," to Watkins’
doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwain’s "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real
problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that
such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in
drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jackson’s "balanced power
structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each
is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as
limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In
other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and
wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

a. "Facial Challenge"

Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached on both
unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also
known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103

A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an
‘overbreadth’ doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech).

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:

It remains a ‘matter of no little difficulty’ to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when ‘such summary action’ is
inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional
rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State
to sanction moves from ‘pure speech’ toward conduct and that conduct –even if expressive – falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
"generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away
the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are
not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates
courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech
of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects,
not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before
the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of
detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this
situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show
that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and
application of PP 1017.

b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision:

"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"

Second provision:

"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;"

Third provision:

"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."

First Provision: Calling-out Power

The first provision pertains to the President’s calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O.
Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days
from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
he shall be released.

grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes
necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions
present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP
1017. Owing to her Office’s vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion.
This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser
power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and
the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyo’s authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her
powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. – Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence
of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order.

President Arroyo’s declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and
deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also
relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP
1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the
maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which
will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."113

In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,114an authority in constitutional
law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to
civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It
is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can
enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative
assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function,
nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its
use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of
news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as
Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s
calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate
policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before
assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute
its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief
of all the armed forces of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government.119

Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador
argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and
to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

Petitioners’ contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted 120 from Former President Marcos’
Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10,
Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law
and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the
laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of
PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?

PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue
any of the following:

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.

Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.

Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence
of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an
executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders.

Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to
the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be
embodied in memorandum circulars.

Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President
Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by
the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.121

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate
"decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family
and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent
to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over

The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:

x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to
enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?

The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority
or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos’ Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the
Secretary of National Defense to take over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air
Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present
national emergency."

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP
1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers.
To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can
be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to
declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the
intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency"
pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the
Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of
national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency
even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a
different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections,
and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each
other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be
read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate
such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it
wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with
public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not
claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied
from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive
Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The
Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a
theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to
our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of
private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nation’s lawmakers, not for its military
authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the
framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The
first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . ."126

Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon,"
"hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency."

Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being
beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception. 127 Emergencies, as
perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under
three (3) principal heads: a)economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and c) national security.130

"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic,
typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.131 This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional
Commission, thus:

MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committee’s definition of "national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads:

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.

MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.

MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?

MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."

MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service.132

xxxxxx

MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency?"

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.

MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133

It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the
President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in
Congress even in times of crisis.

"x x x

After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the
Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man
or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-
loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of
whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another
department – unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that
Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept
of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances ‘the various branches, executive, legislative, and
judicial,’ given the ability to act, are called upon ‘to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation
does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to
take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional
circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of
businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers
of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the
individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the
press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA
to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided
and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization."
Again, the basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were "turned away and dispersed" when they went
to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I.

A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O.
No. 5, of PP 1017.

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation
of a law render it unconstitutional?

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused135 and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and
its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s
calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had
accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly
or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no.
The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere
incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional
just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the
cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time
ago.

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his
subordinates precisely for the proper and efficientadministration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the
official who issues them and the official who receives them.139 They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their
source, and obedience, their object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not
arbitrary or capricious.

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably associated with
"invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law
defining and punishing acts of terrorism.

In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our country, but the
international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:

In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the
justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of
terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly
determined by strategic interests.

The basic problem underlying all these military actions – or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq –
consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation
movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One country’s terrorist is another country’s freedom fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack
of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation
movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were
originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen.

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts – the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of
national resistance or self-defense?

Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition.
The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any
violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the
concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious
groups within a state is concerned.

The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and
movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) – which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and
Muslims – the Kashmiri resistance groups – who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan – the earlier
Contras in Nicaragua – freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp – or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen
(later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the
United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that
cannot be reconciled in any way – because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.

How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be
explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a
state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of
terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory
and will therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting
interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in
regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has been the
unavoidable consequence.

This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states – and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble
to the United Nations Charter! – has become even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the
decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized;
and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141

The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when
a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and
immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act can
only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos
during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for
Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following provision: "That one who conspires with any
other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished
by reclusion temporal x x x."

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on
May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President
Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute,
without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the
media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the
name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to
suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)

The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search
and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain import of the language
of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective
authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.143

In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP
operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted,
photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him"
inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was
detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.

Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting
to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts
with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.146 Consequently, the
Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing
the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that
there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.147

But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right
to peaceably assemble.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary
consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other
words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may
not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is
intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not
committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned
from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the
oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a
crime, thus:

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.
Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and
peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the
persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order,
they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of
prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a
criminal charge.

On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483)
unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits previously issued by local
government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of
assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present
danger that the State may deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists
committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected
and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to
issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here,
petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. 150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the
dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a person’s right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic
government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners’ narration of
facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribune’s offices were searched without
warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o’ clock in the
morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of
the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.

Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid
was "meant to show a ‘strong presence,’ to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards –and the standards are if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 – we will
recommend a ‘takeover.’" National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with
the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of
any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.151

The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section
4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search
of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence
of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the
warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case
a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.

Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of
freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum"
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental
law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers in the above case,
yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain
censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey. 153Undoubtedly, the The Daily
Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard
of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a
representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribune’s offices and the seizure of its materials
for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus:

JUSTICE CALLEJO:

You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence
and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were
taken from the Tribune?

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for any
purpose.155

xxxxxxxxx

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So why do you have to go there
at 1 o’clock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition
or what?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017.

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and inspect and gather
clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Is it based on any law?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I don’t know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have
been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156

Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned,
thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

I don’t know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be
condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their
responsibility.157

The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in no constitutional or statutory
breaches if applied according to their letter."

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to
reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under
the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia.

SUMMATION

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 – a supervening event – would have normally rendered this case moot and
academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no
guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly
PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties
should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed
earlier. However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to
enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose
standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President – acting as Commander-in-Chief – addressed to
subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard – that the military and the police
should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts
of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the
said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts,
to determine the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf
S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of
standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some
articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers
concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant
criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific
pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.

It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military
the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a
democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be
arbitrary as to unduly restrain our people’s liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to
grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal
limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to
enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition,
the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such
declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior
legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have
not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members
during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

(On leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 - CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR
ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public
respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.)
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order 4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the
Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution5dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering
the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction 8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which further
enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman
against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and
violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases
of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an
investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5,
2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17 for
Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). 19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction
phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction
Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23without the required publication
and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80
on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March
28, 2011;28(5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural
design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2)
P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5)
P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural
design,43 and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with
Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97; 47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture & Interior
Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48.49

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative
adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders51 for each of the
OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on March
10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months
without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public
officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the
Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents
on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b)
(1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible
witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently,
the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to
immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a
member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation. 60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that
he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building
project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his
first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of
the purported irregularities.62 In support of his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold
public office, having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG
National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of the Makati City
Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m.,
Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.)
who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.64

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena,
Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more
prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were
established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the
condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman
to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the preventive
suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain. 72

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director Brion, the
officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or
degrading the administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded
as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March
19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO
issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order. 77

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, and, without
necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set
for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court,
assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015
Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the
CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that
no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof
is outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and
improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.84

In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA judicial
power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued the preventive
suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation
doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive
suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order
given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the charges
against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he may have committed during
his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the
Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for
contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt. 89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a
WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine,
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that
his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati
Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's
and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia
v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election,
reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there
was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013. 98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter
of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no
condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100

On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file their
respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his
Memorandum the following day.104

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG to
comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda. 106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG filed its
Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would file its
Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position."108 In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum,
the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.chanrobleslaw

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to be
resolved in seriatim are as follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;cralawlawlibrary

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;cralawlawlibrary
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining
the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504
is improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.chanrobleslaw

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.110

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency, x x x."111

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.113

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA -
and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is put
to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office
of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less
than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the
condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct
resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified.chanrobleslaw

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should
be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same
determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by
this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's
Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its
dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under
this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of injunction to
delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial writ, process or
proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for
and as an incident in the main action."120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the main
case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent
with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the office's
jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials
removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. 122 Note that the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but
has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the
Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly
this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear
what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of
statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that
when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become necessary
to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were,
under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into
operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable
period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled,
although it is not conclusive."124

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful
meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may
be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law. 126

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review of her office's
decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:127

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and in lieu
thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not on a petition for
review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be almost
conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will
be a very strict appeal procedure.

x x x x

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent, the
respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent, if there is f
no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the Ombudsman can take the
appropriate action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one can go to court, he
must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.

x x x x

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a petition for review to a
petition for certiorari?

Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of facts of the
Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal by certiorari , the
appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court, whether to give due course to the petition or
dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted without jurisdiction
and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a judicial review, but
should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition for certiorari ;
because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under
the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into
the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a
determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I
assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

x x x x

The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or should it be the
Supreme Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to make the final
determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change during the
period of Individual Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence] Hearing none,
the same is approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14, RA 6770,
as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review" that comes after
the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the decision of the
Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara
then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the
appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was
approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of Section
14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what specific procedural
remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on
pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification
made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any
case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely Section
27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's
decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive
nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt
of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;cralawlawlibrary

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be
resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of
the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed
by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way back in 1989 130and, hence, before the
advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred
to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the
provision's final approved version:

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by filing with the
Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion for reconsideration filed
in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon
without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of statutory
construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ;cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by
prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy" (subject to the exception
below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the
term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the
maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense.134 By the same principle, the word
"findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the
Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit from its
text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against "the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of
law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

x x x x

Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors made in the
court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of the judgment sought
to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A
verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the
petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the Court of
Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation of the whole
record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same
provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rules of
Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that a Rule 65 petition
is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c)
questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition
on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the
establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and
subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all
remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure
questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal -
which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower
courts,136 and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of
procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More
significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of
jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also
increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very
similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover,
this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies
only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or
other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43
appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act) and
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to
assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule
III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or
orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also
inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review
of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts
authorized by law." We pointedly said:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43. 141 (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and
thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
without its advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary
to the Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that
they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter jurisdiction
over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed,
the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its
bearings in settled case law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in
this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear ,
that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the
statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been recognized to
admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks
jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the
proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of
the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of the
court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex
mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized
right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the Ombudsman
was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here
being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as
sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing a final and unappealable order
of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the correct mode of review in this
case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated that while "a special civil action
for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed
with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001),
wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a
Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar156 (September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence, concludes
that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now examines the
objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the
preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.

III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional injunctive
writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in
conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's]
independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from
the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." 159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one
overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise
be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for airing
grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed to fully realize
their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political
independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers
previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these
cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973 Constitution,
its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in Section 27, Article II and the
standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruption.

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people" against
the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a
Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses and
excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to
further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad
powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function and consistent
with the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public
officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution
saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of
external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.
x x x x

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is
considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are
commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics - they
do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In
general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent
that the absence of 'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions"163;cralawlawlibrary

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge
of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and
utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the
Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based";164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of the 1973
Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service Commission, instead of one
created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards
insulating the Commission on Audit from political pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as that of the
foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or
supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on how the
"independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions, which have
been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they discharge functions that
are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as
Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the
independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President.

x x x x

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to the
independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political interstices of a
republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed
from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process," partially
unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating the principle of
independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned
since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence
the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and privileges,
be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;cralawlawlibrary

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes
germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of government so as to
impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an
internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to
free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to
all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage
of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not
cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the record whether
below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to
have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject this only
to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no lower courts should be allowed
to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the
Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman, including
interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue ancillary
mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the
Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172

With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits all courts,
except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the constitutionality of this provision
is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality was properly raised and presented during
the course of these proceedings.173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case.174

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government."176 The constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the principle of separation of powers. In the
landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one
branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another." 178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is
impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."179

Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by Congress. Thus,
through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals,181 the
Regional Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts183 were established. Later,
through the passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185 the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were
respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5186 of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod v.
Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the aforementioned
constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 is Section
9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section
21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution). In view of the
concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v.
Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming
regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.189

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers a court
exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by
law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.192

Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case conforms to the
limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which
judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over
the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised
in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This
does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter." 194

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935196 and
1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually
altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-
making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-
making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas
S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the
phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add
"the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual
reference to any form of Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies,
the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."201

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. As
pronounced in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is
no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's judicial power, the
provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the
action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled
that the sole objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial
controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they
are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to
a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction is defined
under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof,
a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs, processes, and
other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, f
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in
the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be
adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals] to issue a
writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction," 211 the Court ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter:"212

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that ; will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that
jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all
auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary,
prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before
it.213 (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce
its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.

x x x x cralawlawlibrary

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those
expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction;
or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly
appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction
and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the 1936
case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred."215

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which they are
thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation or exercise of
inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is
sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions."216

In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the enforcement of
a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". .
. the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make
that power effective in the administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power, and to this
end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15, and once and
for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its constitutional grant of power,
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court,
when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment
effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the constitutional realm of the
courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor is it within the purview of the legislature to
shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power may be or may not be granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the performance
of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x
x x x x

We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental to its
general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before it. . ." This
includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it could
control the appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally
granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is void of any right to
control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have preempted the field. 219 (Emphasis
supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this
Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under
the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for
temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the
case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court, as in the
cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and
controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees),
it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure 225 solely belongs to the Court, to
the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."226

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2,
Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the Court's own
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these
powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a
court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not
define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts,
particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this
provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure,
which utility is both integral and inherent to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may
be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while
the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory.
Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what
occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired
by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our
Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the
policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given
its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin T.
Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called provisional
remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy you have injunction, x x
x.

x x x x

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the Constitution, can
you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the competence, the
jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other colleagues, is
that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.
x x x x

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of t particular
[s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the absence of
jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with it but it
does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of Court, is that
not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers
of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 230

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations behind the
first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the
prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's
consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation of the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of the
CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its proper analysis, the Court
first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the
Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be suspended from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against
him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by
considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension
order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or
tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and
the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.
(Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So
Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of
the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232 (Emphases supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6) months,
without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of
the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending
an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.233ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the requisites
provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v.
CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the administrative
complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can no longer be
administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said
case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the
matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine, citing the
case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the
preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election
in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building
project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond
his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr.
cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the
condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments
were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.242

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of defense
which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees
with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive
relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was
duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr.
secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found
that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again,
there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be
administratively charged. In other words, with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the
onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject
injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if the CA
gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the
offender as if there had been no offense."246

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon - is not
based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva
Ecija,247 (Pascual),which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and was later re-
elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial Governor filed administrative
charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a
criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable
for the acts charged against him since they were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining
him during his second term. The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and
when the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective official
may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and "found that cases on the
matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views
with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct." 248Without going into the
variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a
prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in the United
States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies the right to
remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least
seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State
courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state
jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for misconduct which
he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional provision applicable to the facts of a
particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal
only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall be prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed
prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel. Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from
office for "acts of commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v.
Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon the
interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute containing the phrase
"misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative language making, the word "office" must
be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of
Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state
constitution was a time limitation with regard to the grounds of removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which
occurred; prior to the taking of the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana
which took the view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him
unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense (see State ex rel. Billon v.
Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court construed the words "in office" to refer
not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question
could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term
for misconduct for a previous one (Newman v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he has been
administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to condonation doctrine, is
premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct, but rather, regarded as one continuous
term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to
speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v.
City of Atlanta).263

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation doctrine was
invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of public funds was denied the defense of
condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally collected during the previous years are still
retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation
doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on
demand of the county commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as
nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the
country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in the US on the
condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous factors relevant to the debate
on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied upon as
precedents, but as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused
in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does
not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there
are powerful countervailing considerations against its application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when
circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid,
atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives. 270 In the words of a
recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide." 271

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience of the Filipino
People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is separate and
distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where
the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification
from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401;
Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs.
Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to elect
officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for
the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the above-stated
passages from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal
case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the former involves the People of the Philippines as a
community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In
addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the condonation doctrine was
applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.

(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by stating that the same is
justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective official from being "hounded" by administrative
cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court
mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-election covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related
therewith.279

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to then Cebu City Mayor
Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed
only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is
presumed to have known the petitioner's background and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was
deemed a condonation of his prior transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the
condonation doctrine should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a
prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the application of the
condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the doctrinal innovations in
the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the
administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days
before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged
misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of reelection.282 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since,
as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for the appellate
court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by the CA to
justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show that the basis for
condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of
these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which
was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to
administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an
administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of
that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the
legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our current laws in order to determine if there
is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land;284 thus, the unbending rule is that every statute
should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence, its interpretation
must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of government. 286

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution which
was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that
comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and
in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service." 287 Perhaps owing to the 1935
Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the
policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from
select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter
introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized, acknowledged, and
declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the
regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy.
More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding
public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an overarching
reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the
Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission, 290 and also, in the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section
60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and
took effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the r
following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;cralawlawlibrary
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;cralawlawlibrary
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;cralawlawlibrary
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;cralawlawlibrary
(e) Abuse of authority;cralawlawlibrary
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;cralawlawlibrary
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.

Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall
be disqualified from running for any elective local position:
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

x x x x

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor
constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the provision only
pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor
is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.

x x x x

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative
offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications required for the
office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of
condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction
to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done
during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed
interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative
cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal
cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked against
an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes
condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective
local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot be removed by a
misconduct committed during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in which the
official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b)
of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy
under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public accountability.
There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground; 298 while in
another case, which was not reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no
way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability,
none of these cases can be used as basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.

At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local
official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel Bagshaw v.
Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct
committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative
liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is
condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to
elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular constituency
chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies
condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If
condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been
provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that
such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are
shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always
unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of
Trenton304decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are reasoned out
on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness, connotes knowledge
and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this
discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered obsolete by
- the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the
CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that
they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound
to enforce obedience to them.307

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v.
Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which
provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit,
non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law
usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is
unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while it is truly
perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable length of time,
this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged on cases
enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the
case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at
that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 on the
merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon
him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present
administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order
is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no
more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order
subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine. As
explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in
this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine
now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply
impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and that public
officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape
administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of
exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against exacting
public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is
involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal
discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to
explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of
public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges filed against
them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases
from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years,
over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct -
were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case
is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential creation
and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render
the subject of discussion moot.chanrobleslaw

V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from office. 318 However, a
reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance,
in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to
Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:

Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the
Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the Petition/Amended and
Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due
course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has
been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this
score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the issuance of
provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;cralawlawlibrary

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;cralawlawlibrary

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr.
administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-
15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTEDto resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., no part.
Brion, J., no part/ on leave.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
Bersamin, J., please see my concurring & dissenting opinion.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 206794 November 26, 2013

BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and PERRY L. PE, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The petitioners, Bankers Association of the Philippines and Perry L. Pe, assail the constitutionality and legality of the respondent Commission on
Elections’ (Comelec's) Resolution No. 96881 dated May 7, 2013, entitled "In the Matter of Implementing a Money Ban to Deter and Prevent
Vote-Buying in Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" (Money Ban Resolution).2 The petitioners included a prayer for
the issuance of a status quo ante/temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation.

THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION

Under the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec resolved:

1. To prohibit the withdrawal of cash, encashment of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to 13,
2013 exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign currency, per day in banks, finance
companies, quasi-banks, pawnshops, remittance companies and institutions performing similar functions. However, all other non-
cash transactions are not covered.

For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the government are hereby deputized to implement
with utmost dispatch and ensure strict compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as
amended, and Republic Act No. 6426.

2. To prohibit the possession, transportation and/or carrying of cash exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) or its
equivalent in any foreign currency from May 8 to May 13, 2013. For this purpose, all cash being transported and carried exceeding
such amount shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation of the money ban. xxx.

3. All withdrawals of cash or encashment of checks or series of withdrawals or encashment of checks in cash involving a total
amount exceeding Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) within one (1) banking day from date of the publication of this
resolution until May 13, 2013 shall be presumed to be for the purpose of accumulating funds for vote-buying and election fraud and
shall therefore be treated as a "suspicious transaction" under Republic Act No. 9160 or the "Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001" as
amended by Republic Act No. 9194. For this purpose, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) is hereby deputized to monitor
and initiate investigations, and if necessary, inquire into and examine the deposit and related accounts involved in the suspected
transaction pursuant to procedure and requirements of Republic Act No. 10167.3

The Comelec’s Resolution No. 9688-A,4 issued on May 9, 2013, amended the Money Ban Resolution by:

1. exempting withdrawals that are routine, regular and made in the ordinary course of business of the withdrawing client on the
basis of the prevailing "Know-Your-Client/Customer" policy of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), which requires banks "not only
to establish the identity of their clients but also to have background knowledge of their normal business transactions," 5 and

2. presuming that the possession or transportation of cash in excess of ₱500,000.00 from May 8 to 13, 2013 was for the purpose of
vote-buying and electoral fraud when the same was without tenable justification or whenever attended by genuine reason
engendering belief that the money would be used for vote-buying.

The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9688-A on the same day that the petitioners filed the present petition.

On May 10, 2013, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order,6 enjoining the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing before the issuance of
the Money Ban Resolution.

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

The petitioners invoke the Court’s power of judicial review to strike down the Money Ban Resolution.
They contend that the Comelec’s Money Ban Resolution was issued without jurisdiction since the Comelec’s power to supervise and regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution does not extend to the BSP which is not a
holder of any special privilege from the government. The BSP’s power to regulate and supervise banking operations stems from its mandate
under the Constitution7 and Republic Act (RA) No. 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000).8 Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution states –

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for
the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation
or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. [emphasis ours]

They thus conclude that the Comelec’s power of supervision and regulation cannot be exercised over the BSP and the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) as they can exercise authority only over public transportation and communication entities given special privileges by the
government. The petitioners also posit that the Comelec’s power to deputize extends only to law enforcement agencies and only if the
President concurs. Section 2(4), Article IX-C of the Constitution states:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxxx

4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. [emphasis ours]

They argue that the BSP and the AMLC are not law enforcement agencies unlike the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine
National Police. Assuming they may be considered as such, the Comelec failed to secure the concurrence of the President to the deputation.

The petitioners note that paragraph 3 of the Money Ban Resolution effectively amended RA No. 9160 (Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 or
AMLA) by treating the withdrawal of cash or encashment of checks exceeding ₱500,000.00 within one banking day from May 8 to 13, 2013 as a
"suspicious transaction," thus authorizing the AMLC to monitor, initiate investigations, inquire into and examine the deposit. This type of
transaction, however, is not among those enumerated as suspicious under Section 3(b) of the AMLA. As an administrative issuance, the Money
Ban Resolution cannot amend a law enacted by Congress.

The petitioners also claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates a number of constitutional rights.

The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.9 The Money Ban
Resolution violates an individual’s due process rights because it unduly and unreasonably restricts and prohibits the withdrawal, possession,
and transportation of cash. The prohibition effectively curtails a range of legitimate activities, and hampers and prejudices property rights.
Though the intent (i.e., to curb vote-buying and selling) is laudable, the means employed is not reasonably necessary and is oppressive on an
individual’s rights. The limitation on withdrawal also goes against the non-impairment clause because the prohibitions and restrictions impair
the banks’ contractual obligations with their depositors.

Finally, the petitioners claim that the Money Ban Resolution violates the constitutional presumption of innocence because it declares that "all
cash being transported and carried exceeding [₱500,000.00] shall be presumed for the purpose of vote-buying and electoral fraud in violation
of the money ban."10 There is no logical connection between the proven fact of possession and transportation of an amount in excess of
₱500,000.00 and the presumed act of vote-buying because there are many other legitimate reasons for the proven fact.

The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on the petition, insisting on the validity of the Money Ban
Resolution and its amendment.

The Comelec argues that it has the constitutional authority to supervise and regulate banks and other financial entities, citing Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution. It alleges that its power to regulate covers banks and other finance companies, since these entities operate under an
"authority" granted by the BSP under Section 6 of RA No. 8791. This authority is of the same nature as "grants, special privileges, or
concessions" under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution; thus, it may be validly regulated by the Comelec.

The Comelec also claims that it may validly deputize the BSP, since the latter is a government instrumentality covered by Section 2(4), Article IX-
C of the Constitution. Contrary to the petitioners’ claim, the Comelec’s power to deputize is not limited to law enforcement agencies, but
extends to instrumentalities of the government. The constitutional intent is to give the Comelec unrestricted access to the full machinery of the
State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The Comelec further contends that Presidential concurrence with the exercise of the Comelec’s deputation power is required only if it involves
agencies and instrumentalities within the Executive Department, of which the BSP is not a part. Even assuming that Presidential concurrence is
required, this has been secured through Memorandum Order No. 52,11 s. 2013, where the President gave his blanket concurrence to the
deputation of all "law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government."12

That the BSP is constitutionally and statutorily tasked to provide "policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit," and vested with
"supervision over the operations of bank," does not preclude the Comelec from exercising its power to supervise and regulate banks during the
election period. Notably, the Comelec’s power is limited in terms of purpose and duration, and should prevail in this specific instance.

If the Comelec deems the supervision and regulation of banks necessary to curb vote-buying, this is a political question that the Court may not
inquire into. The choice of the measures that the Comelec may undertake to ensure the conduct of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible election is a policy question beyond the scope of judicial review.

The Comelec lastly defends the Money Ban Resolution as a reasonable measure that is not unduly oppressive on individuals. It merely limits
transactions involving cash (withdrawal, encashment, possession, etc.), but does not affect other non-cash transactions such as those involving
checks and credit cards. Hence, only the medium or instrument of the transaction is affected; the transaction may proceed using non-cash
medium or instrument. There is, therefore, no impairment of rights and contracts that would invalidate the Money Ban Resolution.

THE COURT’S RULING

We resolve to dismiss the petition for being moot and academic.

By its express terms, the Money Ban Resolution was effective only for a specific and limited time during the May 13, 2013 elections, i.e., from
May 8 to 13, 2013. The Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order on May 10, 2013; thus, the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the
most critical period of the elections – from May 10, 2013 to actual election day. With the May 13, 2013 elections over, the Money Ban
Resolution no longer finds any application so that the issues raised have become moot and academic.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.1âwphi1 The Court, as a rule, will decline to exercise jurisdiction over a
case and proceed to dismiss it when the issues posed have been mooted by supervening events. Mootness intervenes when a ruling from the
Court no longer has any practical value and, from this perspective, effectively ceases to be a justiciable controversy.13 "[W]ithout a justiciable
controversy, the [petition would] become a [plea] for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction."14

While the Court has recognized exceptions in applying the "moot and academic" principle, these exceptions relate only to situations where: (1)
there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (3) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review.15

In the present case, we find it unnecessary to consider the presence of the first, second and third requirements when nothing in the facts and
surrounding circumstances indicate the presence of the fourth requirement, i.e., the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

We note that the Comelec did not make any parallel move on or about the May 13, 2013 elections to address the evil that its Money Ban
Resolution sought to avoid and, in fact, it did not issue a similar resolution for the October 28, 2013 barangay elections. If the May 13, 2013
elections had come and gone without any need for the measures the assailed Resolution put in place and if no such measure was necessary in
the elections that immediately followed (i.e., the October 28, 2013 barangay elections), we believe that it is now premature for the Court to
assume that a similar Money Ban Resolution would be issued in the succeeding elections such that we now have to consider the legality of the
Comelec measure that is presently assailed.

We consider it significant that the BSP and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the Comelec’s
concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for any formal Comelec resolution if and when the need arises.
Congress, too, at this point, should have taken note of this case and has the plenary authority, through its lawmaking powers, to address the
circumstances and evils the Money Ban Resolution sought to address. In other words, Congress can very well act to consider the required
measures for future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for having become moot and academic. The Status Quo AnteOrder issued by the Court on May
10, 2013, having been rendered functus oficio by the May 13, 2013 elections, is hereby formally LIFTED.

SO ORDERED

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave) (On Leave)

BIENVENIDO L. REYES* ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Leave)
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

1
Rollo, pp. 82-85.

2
In the Whereas clauses of the Money Ban Resolution, the Comelec justified the restrictions on the following provisions of law:

WHEREAS, under Article IX-C, Section 2.1 of the Constitution, one of the Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) powers
and functions is to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall"; WHEREAS, the COMELEC has the power under Article IX-C, Section 2.4 of the same
Constitution to "deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections";
 xxxx

WHEREAS, under Article IX-C, Section 4, the COMELEC, during the election period, has the power to "supervise or
regulate … all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary", which supervisory
and regulatory authority cover all banks and quasi-banking institutions operating under the authority granted by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas;

WHEREAS, "vote buying" is a criminal offense defined by and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code, xxx.

xxxx

WHEREAS, COMELEC takes cognizance of the prevalence of vote-buying throughout the country. The Commission, in
pursuit of its constitutional mandate to ensure honest and credible elections, finds it necessary to adopt a multi-tiered
approach to prevent and apprehend vote-buyers, particularly the regulation and control of the flow of cash, which is the
primary medium used in vote-buying. [Id. at 82-83; italics supplied.]

3 Id. at 83-84; citations omitted, emphases and italics ours.

4
Id. at 86-88.

5 Citing the Circular Letter of BSP Deputy Governor Alberto Reyes dated April 11, 2003; BSP Circular No. 706, series of 2011.

6 Rollo, pp. 53-54.

7Section 20, Article XII of the Constitutions grants the BSP "supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory
powers xxx over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions."

8Section 5 of The General Banking Law of 2000 vests the Monetary Board power to "prescribe ratios, ceilings, limitations, or other
forms of regulation on the different types of accounts and practices of banks."

9 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 1.

10
Rollo, p. 83.

11
Id. at 89.

12 Id. at 72. The pertinent portion of which states:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law,
do hereby concur with COMELEC Resolution No. 9589 deputizing law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including the AFP, to assist the COMELEC in ensuring the free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
conduct of the 13 May 2013 Automated National and Local Elections.

The foregoing law enforcement agencies and other concerned agencies are hereby directed to coordinate and cooperate
with the COMELEC in the performance of their duties and functions. This Memorandum Order shall take effect
immediately.

DONE, in the City of Manila, this 9th of January, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Thirteen.

13Mendoza v. Villas, G.R. No. 187256, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 347, 356-357, citing Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 168792, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70, 76.

14 Separate Opinion of Chief Justice A. V. Panganiban in SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482, 525 (2004).

15 Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 754 (2006).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 152895. June 15, 2004]

OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Navotas, Metro Manila, respondent.

[G.R. No. 153151. June 15, 2004]

GLORIA S. DY, petitioner, vs. The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53, Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan
City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For resolution are two consolidated[1] petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with
prayers for a temporary restraining order. Both assail the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang
22.

In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Branch 54, to cease and desist from hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and then dismiss the case against her. In
G.R. No. 153151, petitioner Gloria S. Dy also prays that this Court order the MeTC of Caloocan City to cease and desist from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 212183, and subsequently dismiss the case against her. In fine, however, we find that what both petitioners seek is that the
Court should revisit and abandon the doctrine laid down in Lozano v. Martinez,[2] which upheld the validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.

The facts of these cases are not in dispute.

1. G.R. No. 152895

The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed
as Criminal Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatory portion of said Information reads:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO, to apply on account or for
value the check described below:

Check No : 00082270

Drawn Against : The Region Bank

In the Amount of : P740,000.00

Date : December 21, 1998

Payable to : Cash

said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. Arceta did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for reason DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee
with the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was
unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozanodoctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly
unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence.

On October 21, 2002,[4] Arceta was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should
be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court.

Arceta then filed the instant petition.

2. G.R. No. 153151

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed
by the MeTC of Caloocan City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy allegedly committed the offense in this wise:

That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Check No. 0000329230 drawn against
PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to apply for value in favor of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time
of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which
check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said
complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has been dishonored and had not
been paid.

Contrary to Law.[5]

Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise
believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of
the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition with this Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law voided for Constitutional
infirmity.

Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:

[a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored by the bank for lack of funds?

[b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to section 2 of BP 22?

[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?

[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat of imprisonment?

[e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debt?

[f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state?[6]

After minute scrutiny of petitioners submissions, we find that the basic issue being raised in these special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise put, the petitions constitute an oblique
attack on the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, a matter already passed upon by the Court through Justice (later Chief Justice)
Pedro Yap almost two decades ago. Petitioners add, however, among the pertinent issues one based on the observable but worrisome
transformation of certain metropolitan trial courts into seeming collection agencies of creditors whose complaints now clog the court dockets.

But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court
may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case.[7] Only when these requisites are satisfied may
the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsels spirited
advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met.

Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 1 [8] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a
special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[9] Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that the respondent judges acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of
discretion is manifested.[10]
 Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or
resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them understandably within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the
petitions are only copies of the Informations in the respective cases, nothing else. Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this Courts
power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action.

Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart before the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have
ignored the hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 4[11] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest
opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality
of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to
quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P.
Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could
not entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately
argued.[12] Taking into account the early stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions are patently premature.

Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.[13] We have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to
persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that
the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant
consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and
confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to
prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by
bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in
lower courts lies elsewhere.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on official leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself
and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million –
adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the
church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of
all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled
"An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and
for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by
women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further
acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers,
health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil
Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3)
children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who
is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at
a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of
one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels,
petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-
Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter
leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he
grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she
attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to
the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner
got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good.
He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital
affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of
financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations – 326 Realty
Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one
corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by
private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances
and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby
depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private
respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to
recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order
is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states
"regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any
danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal
dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the
Respondent will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters,
and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other
persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like.
Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police
Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical
expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January
2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not
later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished
to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the
Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND
TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which
included the following additional provisions:
 i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are
using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in
Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00)
per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally
resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of
the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros
Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private
respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus
Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal
dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal
home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be
submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners
(sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect
contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such
expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with
the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon
private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the
boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of
R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for
kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to
get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private
respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party,
either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia
and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of
1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the
schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any
manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the
schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to
September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should
the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken
by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in
the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and
other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-
168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION
ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person,
entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of
the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or
sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period
of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in
its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5,
had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is
hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for
renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the
due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of
an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended
TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional
issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the
validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on
said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now
before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A
BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the
dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it
may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has
limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial
Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A.
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence
against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to
pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international
or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M.
Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality
happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of
lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the
review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could
be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded
from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a
third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection
order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of
a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his
Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that
as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-
day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court,
he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this
case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the
case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting
permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should
not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In
Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to
be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and,
hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff
who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however,
that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with
far-reaching implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason
now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by
either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa
Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation
of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing
protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of
violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent
portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these
concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including
children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the
victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good
Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not
want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members
of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of
the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly,
Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to
protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their
live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be
abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their
women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no
matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho
Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have been included in
this proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most
likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases,
men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or
less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their
abusive behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I
recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and
dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this
particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned
by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of
Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment
rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact,
I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not
limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the
abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the
real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our
prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this
case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to
things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in
no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the
standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
(Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be
discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence
against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as
"gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant
roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads
to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression
of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of
Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to
eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force
on members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all
societies to be naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were
under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as
saying husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common
law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to
beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the
preservation of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of
Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or
to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that
the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a
simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and
their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation
movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue
into an important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a
1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical
Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them,
and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or
hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner
violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their
lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly
forced social and economic isolation of women, is also common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women
who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's
abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States
are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City,
Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our
1987 Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first
semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially
difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first
semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from
2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in
2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
 Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents
thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of
women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men
who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic
violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18
percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of
their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in
self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A.
9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles
the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals
and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the
city roads, "but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree,
but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less
seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices
against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal
system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the
police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be
involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and
irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and
presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her
of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and
lack of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an
"anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself
to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of
domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
prosecution and the judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and
children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for
human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental
freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol
to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women
equality with men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as
long as the safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not
limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim
belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and
dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple
marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above
are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely
controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that
they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may
likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship,
it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the
allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members,
and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily
life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to
curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize
the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from
violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility,
criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and
there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment
which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond
or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent
directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO
be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent
requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show
cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive
imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was
granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow
him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show
cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that
he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now
be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of
ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence,
remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the
private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence
to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this
provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process
by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a
subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In
addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate
equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme
Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued
by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination
of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by
any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15)
days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same
on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in
order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of
judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable
ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate
the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The
same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to
extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty
to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the
grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were
presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the
highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most
difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion: See: Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On official leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See Separate Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice