Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 91797 August 28, 1991

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, respondents.

Quijano & Padilla for petitioner.

Santiago & Santiago for private respondent.
Jose Teodorico V. Molina for intervenor-oppositor.

BIDIN, J.:

From the decision rendered by respondent court dated November 27, 1989, declaring respondent
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) as the registered owner of the disputed parcel of
land, petitioner Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (Widora), interposes this petition for review
seeking ng to annul the aforesaid judgment and prays that the case be remanded to the trial court
and there be tried on the merits. The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follows:

On August 27, 1974, respondent Widora filed LRC Case No. Q-336 before the respondent
(trial) court an application for registration of title of a parcel of land as shown in Plan No. LRC
(SWO)-l5352. Widora alleged that the parcel of land is covered by Titulo de Propriedad
Numero 4136, dated April 25, 1894, issued in the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban. Later, on June 14, 1978, Widora filed an amended application for registration of
the said parcel of land. It alleged that the parcel of land is situated at Malitlit-Uoogong,
Quezon City, with an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in Plan No. LRC (SWO)-
15352; and that the applicant acquired said property from the heirs of Don Mariano San
Pedro on December 12, 1954. The amended application prayed that said parcel of land be
ordered registered in the name of Widora.

On August 25, 1978, respondent Dolores Molina filed an opposition, claiming ownership over
12 to 14 hectares of Lot 8 (LRC) SWO-15352, and praying for a decree of registration over
said portions of Lot 8.

On October 24, 1978, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging, among
others, that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the case, the land being applied for
having been already registered under the Torrens System and in the name of Ortigas under
TCT 77652 and TCT 77653.

On April 20, 1979, the respondent (trial) court issued an order directing the applicant to prove
its contention that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original
certificates of titles from which they were purportedly issued, and setting the case for hearing
on June 28, 1979, at 8:30 a.m.
On June 27, 1979, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsideration of said order of April
20, 1979, alleging that a Torrens title becomes indefeasible after a year and that the same
becomes conclusive upon the entire world; that the Land Registration Commission itself has
advised the court that the 156 hectare property sought to be registered is covered by valid
and subsisting titles in the name of Ortigas; that Courts of First Instance and the appellate
courts in previous cases had sustained the Ortigas titles over the land in question.

On October 3, 1979, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Ortigas was denied by the
respondent (trial) court, but the latter set the motion to dismiss for hearing on October 18 and
19, 1979 at 8:30 a.m., for the purpose of enabling the applicant to prove its contention that
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are not proper derivatives of the original certificates of title from
which they were purportedly issued.

The parties presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before the respondent
(trial) court in support of their respective positions.

On March 30, 1988, the respondent (trial) court denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner
Ortigas, holding, among others, that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 on their face show that they
were derived from OCT 337, 19, 336, 334, pursuant to Decree 1425; that if there was error in
the correct number of OCT on said titles, no step or measure to rectify the same was taken;
that Decree No. 1425 shows that it covers a total area of only 17 hectares, more or less,
located in Sta. Ana, Manila, which was four kilometers away from the land subject of the
application for registration which covers an area of 156 hectares, more or less, described in
Plan No. LRC (SWO)-15352 situated at Malitlit-Uoogong, Quezon City; that the contention of
Ortigas that Decree No. 1425 covers an area in Manila and also a part of Rizal is not
credible, for if this were true then the area of said Rizal portion should appear on the face of
said decree of registration, which is not the case; that TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 were not
derived from any decree of registration, and that the said TCTs being null and void, cannot
be used as basis to contest the right of the applicant to apply for registration over the subject
land. The order of March 30, 1988, in its dispositive portion stated:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Omnibus Motion dated October 4, 1978

and Motion to Dismiss, dated, October 23, 1978 filed by oppositor Ortigas &
Company, Limited Partnership are both DENIED for lack of merit; while this Court's
order of September 15, 1978 directing the City Assessor of Quezon City to issue a
separate tax declaration corresponding to the 12 or 14 hectares which is an
undivided portion of the land applied for registration and now belonging to the said
Dolores V. Molina; further, authorizing the City Treasurer of Quezon City to accept
the corresponding realty taxes due thereon; and further the said Dolores V. Molina is
allowed to intervene in these proceedings, is hereby affirmed; likewise, the City
Treasurer is directed to accept the whole of the taxes due on the property subject of
the instant petition from applicants Widows & Orphans Association, Inc., as prayed
for in its Manifestation with Motion subject to the right of the oppositor Dolores V.
Molina as contained in this Court's order of September 15, 1978."

On April 26, 1988, petitioner Ortigas filed a motion for reconsider consideration of the said
order of March 30, 1988, taking exception to the ruling that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 are
null and void, and alleging, among others, that respondent (trial) court had no jurisdiction to
hear an application for registration of a previously registered land; that the parcels of land
applied for are covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 in the name of Ortigas; that the
parcels of land covered by TCT 77652 and TCT 77653 are within the parcel of land covered
by OCT 351; and that OCT 351 is a copy of Decree No. 1425 issued on April 26, 1905. The
 motion for reconsideration prayed the respondent court to reconsider its order of March 30,
1988 on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the application for registration, the parcels
of land subject thereof being already covered by Torrens Certificates of Title.

On May 19, 1989, the respondent (trial) court issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration of Ortigas, and setting the hearing on the merits on July 26, 1989, ... for the
"eventual presentation of the parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged ownership
of the property subject of this petition." (Rollo, pp. 24-26)

Not satisfied, respondent Ortigas instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
respondent court praying for the annulment of the March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 orders of the
trial court. It also prayed that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the land registration case.

On November 27, 1989, respondent court rendered the decision sought to be reviewed, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of petitioner Ortigas &
Company Limited Partnership is GRANTED. The orders of March 30, 1988 and May 19,
1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in LRC Case No. Q-336, are
REVERSED and ANNULLED, and said LRC Case No. Q-336 is DISMISSED. The injunction
issued by the Court, per Resolution of August 8, 1989, is made permanent. (Rollo, p. 35)

Based on the plan and other evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas at the hearing of its
application for preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the hearing of LRC
Case No. Q-336, respondent court held that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, albeit reflecting their
origins as OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336 and 334, are actually derivatives of OCT No. 351, the latter having
been issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is allegedly a copy of Decree 1425,
the mere fact that the original copy of Decree 1425, or a certified copy thereof, can no longer be
located or produced, does not mean that Decree 1425 covering the lots embraced in TCT Nos.
77652 and 77653 was not issued. Concluding, respondent court said:

It may be that TCT 77652 and 77653 do not show on their face (sic) that they were derived
from OCT 351. But the fact remains, as shown above, that the parcel of land covered by
OCT 351 embraced the parcels of land, Lots 7 and 8, of TCT 77652 and 77653. There was,
therefore a mistake in the entries in TCT 77652 and 77653 when the same referred to OCTs
337, 19, 336, 337 (sic) and 334, as their source, for the correct OCT insofar as Lots 7 and 8
are concerned, should be OCT 351. (Rollo, p. 27)

In this petition, petitioner WIDORA avers that the respondent Court of Appeals has decided
questions of substance contrary to law and the applicable decisions of this Court because:

THE COURT OF APPEALS INSISTED IN UPHOLDING THE EXISTENCE OR VALIDITY OF

TCTs 77652 and 77653 DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A SUPPORTING DECREE OF
REGISTRATION.

II

THE QUESTIONED DECISION UTILIZED SECONDARY EVIDENCE DESPITE THE

EXISTENCE AND AVAILABILITY OF THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT.
 III

THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ENJOIN THE TRIAL

ON THE MERITS OF LRC NO. Q-336 SINCE JURISDICTION RESIDES WITH THE RTC
ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT.

In essence, it is the contention of petitioner that respondent court's grounds and reasoning in support
of its findings that respondent Ortigas is the registered owner of the disputed property are baseless
in law and fact. Petitioner argues that respondent court erred in sustaining the validity of TCTs Nos.
77652 and 77653 despite the absence of a supporting decree of registration and instead utilized
secondary evidence, OCT 351 which is supposedly a copy of Decree 1425. Petitioner maintains that
Decree 1425 is itself existing and available at the Register of Deeds of Manila and on its face shows
that it covers a parcel of land with an area of only 17 hectares in Sta. Ana, Manila while the parcel of
land applied for contains an area of 156 hectares, located at Malitlit-Uoogong Quezon City, four (4)
kilometers away from Sta. Ana, Manila and is certified by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forestry as alienable and disposable.

Respondent Ortigas claims that respondent court committed no error in rectifying the mistake in the
entries in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 as regards their sources and/or origins arguing that the
correction was justified by the fact that the plan of OCT 351 coincides with the parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653; that OCT 351 was issued pursuant to Decree 1425 and that
OCT 351 is a copy of the Decree itself.

We find the petition impressed with merit.

Undoubtedly, the evidence (i.e., plan submitted by respondent Ortigas, testimony of its surveyor and
OCT 351) adduced by private respondent to prove the contents of Decree 1425 and admitted by
respondent court is merely secondary and should not have been admitted in the first place.

Before secondary evidence may be admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original
writing and 2) that it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it is in the
possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after reasonable notice (Michael and
Co. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 [1915]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 146 [1976]). Private
respondent has not shown compliance with the above requisites which would justify the admission of
the secondary evidence used and erroneously relied upon by respondent court.

Furthermore, the unilateral action of respondent court in substituting its own findings regarding the
extent of the coverage of the land included in TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653, ostensibly to correct the
error in, and conform with, the technical description found in OCT 351 based on the plan and other
evidence submitted by respondent Ortigas cannot be sustained. That function is properly lodged with
the office of the trial court sitting as a land registration court and only after a full-dress investigation
of the matter on the merits. It is before the land registration court that private respondent must
adduce the proof that the disputed parcels of land is legally registered in its favor.

In Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court (179 SCRA 163 [1989]), this Court held that "(w)hile it is
true that the Court of Appeals is vested with the 'power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised ..." (Sec. 9 [3], BP
129), there was not even a request for evidentiary hearing filed in this case. The Court of Appeals
therefore should not have admitted said evidence without giving the adverse party opportunity to
present counter evidence, if any. Besides, "evidence necessary in regards to factual issues raised in
cases falling within the Appellate Court's original and appellate jurisdiction contemplates incidental
facts which were not touched upon, or fully heard by the trial or respondent Court. The law could not
have intended that the Appellate Court would hold an original and full trial of a main factual issue in a
case, which properly pertains to trial courts" (citing Lingner & Fisher GMBH v. IAC, 125 SCRA 522
[1983]). In the case at bar, it appears that the parties have yet to fully present their respective
evidence in support of their claims before the trial court. As a matter of fact, the trial court had set the
case for hearing on the merits in its order dated May 19, 1989. What is more, the case involves a
vast tract of land consisting of 156 hectares, separately situated in two outlaying localities (i.e.,
Quezon City and Sta. Ana, Manila.) The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown trial on
the merits if only to afford the contending parties their respective days in court. Further, a ground for
dismissal based on disputed facts, as in this case is not proper in a motion to dismiss (Spouses
Jayme and Solidarios v. Alampay, 62 SCRA 131 [1975]).

In the case at bar, respondent Ortigas alleges that Decree 1425 embraces the lots covered by its
TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 which are identical to the lots applied for by petitioner. On the other
hand, petitioner maintains that Decree 1425 covers a 17-hectare lot located at Sta. Ana, Manila
while the lot applied for is alienable and disposable as certified by the Bureau of Lands and by the
Bureau of Forestry and has an area of 156 hectares located in Quezon City four (4) kilometers away
from Sta. Ana, Manila. Hence, the necessity of a trial on the merits to ascertain the disputed facts,
i.e., whether the lot applied for is covered by Decree No. 1425 or is alienable and disposable. Under
Act 496, it is the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission which is the
basis for the subsequent issuance of the certificate of title by the corresponding Register of Deeds
that quiets the title to and binds the land (De la Merced v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 240 [1962]).
Consequently, if no decree of registration had been issued covering the parcel of land applied for,
then the certificate of title issued over the said parcel of land does not quiet the title to nor bind the
land and is null and void.

Besides, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, unless it constitutes
clearly a grave abuse of discretion or was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, the error, if any,
should be corrected by appeal in due time, after trial and judgment on the merits and not by the
extraordinary writ of prohibition (Moreno v. Macadaeg, 7 SCRA 700 [1963]; National Investment and
Development Corporation v. Aquino, 163 SCRA 53 [1988]).

Furthermore, on grounds of pre-maturity, interlocutory orders cannot be decided by the appellate

courts until the lower court shall have decided the merit of the case. Thus, in Villegas v.
Fernando (27 SCRA 1119 [1969]), this Court held:

This first assigned error (assailing the personality of the appellees to ask for a review of the
decision and decree in the registration case) is actually directed at an earlier order dated 26
April 1961 denying appellants heirs' motion to dismiss the petitions for review filed by the
present appellees. And inasmuch as said order of 26 April 1961 is interlocutory, there being
as yet no trial and decision on the merits of the petition for review, it is premature to raise
said assigned error in appellants heirs' instant appeal. We shall rule thereon only when the
proper time comes, i. e., after the lower court shall have settled not only the still unresolved
status and rights of the parties, particularly those of petitioners (sic) for review, now
appellees herein, almost all of whom are claiming that they are not mere homestead or free
patent applicants but patent or title holders, but also whether the original decision should be
maintained or not. For the court below, after receiving and hearing the parties, may still
conclude in favor of appellants herein. (Emphasis supplied)

But not only that. Respondent court committed a procedural lapse in correcting the alleged error in
the questioned TCTs. A certificate of title cannot be altered, amended or cancelled except in a
1âw phi 1

direct proceeding in accordance with law (Sec. 48, PD 1529; Natalia Realty Corp. v. Vallez, 173
SCRA 534 [1989]; Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915]). Also, no correction of certificate of title
shall be made except by order of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered (Sec. 112, Act 496; now Sec. 108, PD
1529). While the law fixes no prescriptive period therefor, the court, however, is not authorized to
alter or correct the certificate of title if it would mean the reopening of the decree of registration
beyond the period allowed by law (Rodriguez, v. Tirona, 68 Phil. 264 [1939]).

Respondent Ortigas, on the other hand, argues that this Court has already recognized the fact that
the parcel of land under TCT No. 227758 from which TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued, are
covered by, among others, Decree 1425 issued in GLRO Record No. 917 (Rollo, p. 94).

The argument is without merit True this Court declared in Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v.
Ruiz (148 SCRA 326 [1987]) that "petitioner is the duly registered owner of the land * (then) in
dispute as evidenced by OCT Nos. 13, 33, 334, and 337 by virtue of Decrees Nos. 240, 1942 and
1925 issued in GLRO Record Nos. 699, 875 and 917 ..." Nowhere in said decision, however, is a
pronouncement that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 were issued from TCT No. 227758. On the
contrary, it is not disputed by the parties that TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 themselves show that they
were derived from OCT No. 337, 19, 336 and 334 and not from OCT 351 or TCT 227758. If indeed,
the real origin thereof is OCT No. 351, what respondent Ortigas should have done was to file a
petition for the correction of the TCTs in question as stated earlier.

While it may be true, as respondent Ortigas argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction
over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is nevertheless true that the aforesaid
rule only applies where there exists no serious controversy as to the certificate's authenticity visa vis
the land covered therein. In the case at bar, the claimed origin of the questioned TCTs evidently
appear to be different from what is stated therein. It does not appear indubitable that the disputed
parcels of land are properly reflected in the TCTs relied upon by private respondent. Off-hand, and
as the parties admit, the TCTs do not show that they are actually derivatives of OCT 351. Such
being the case, the rule relied upon cannot therefore apply. One who relies on a document
evidencing his title to the property must prove not only the genuineness thereof but also the identity
of the land therein referred to (CF. Lasam v. Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 637 [1938]). In the case at
bar, private respondent's TCT Nos. 77652 and 77653 trace their origins from OCT Nos. 337, 19, 336
and 334 and not from OCT 351 as it is now claimed by respondent Ortigas.

The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply
because the TCTs relied upon by the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed origin. Thus,
in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769 [1926]) this Court held that the "simple possession
of a certificate of title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor the true owner of all
the property described therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes
by mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the Torrens System, he does not, by
virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included (citing Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915])." TMs pronouncement was reiterated by the Court in
Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 718 [1984]; Coronel v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(155 SCRA 270 [1987]; Goloy v. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 26 [1989]; and Miranda v. Court of
Appeals (177 SCRA 303 [1989]). As it is in this case, a certificate of title cannot be considered
conclusive evidence of ownership where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported origin.

Further, the fact that respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss was denied does not mean that it could
no longer participate in the resolution of the case and factual determination of the parties'
allegations. As correctly stated by the trial court, "(i)t is to be stressed, however, that the denial of
oppositor Ortigas' instant motion for reconsideration does not necessarily mean that it is deprived of
any participation in the instant petition. For as already stated, what follows after its denial is the
eventual presentation of all the parties' respective evidence respecting their alleged ownership of the
property subject of this petition." (Rollo, p. 65)

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of respondent court is SET ASIDE and the orders of the trial
court in LRC Case No. Q336 entitled, "In Re-Application for Registration of Title, WIDOWS and
ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, Inc., Applicant, ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and
DOLORES V. MOLINA, Oppositors", dated March 30, 1988 and May 19, 1989 are hereby
REINSTATED insofar as the denial of oppositor Ortigas' motion to dismiss and motion for
reconsideration, respectively, are concerned and the case remanded to the trial court for trial and
adjudication on the merits.

SO ORDERED.