Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 85177 August 20, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MOISES MASPIL, JR. y WAYWAY and SALCEDO
BAGKING y ALTAKI, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Peter C. Fianza for defendants-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares
the accused MOISES MASPIL, JR. y
WAYWAY and SALCEDO BAGKING y
ALTAKI, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal transportation of
marijuana as charged and hereby sentences
EACH of them to suffer LIFE
IMPRISONMENT; to pay a fine of
P20,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay their proportionate shares in the costs.
The confiscated marijuana (Exhibits "B",
"B-1 " to "B-23"; "C" to "C-16", "D", "D-1"
to "D-20"; "E", "E-1", to "E-14", "F", "F-1",
"G", "G-l") are hereby declared forfeited in
favor of the Government and upon the
finality of this decision, the Branch Clerk of
Court is directed to turn over the same to the
Dangerous Drugs Board (NBI), through the
Chief, PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit
No. 1, Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet, for disposition in accordance ' with
law. (Rollo, pp. 25-26)
In Criminal Case No. 4263-R, the information filed against the
two accused alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of November,
1986, at Sayangan, Municipality of Atok,
Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding each
other, and without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly transport and carry in transit
from Sinto, Bauko, Mt. Province to Atok,
Benguet One Hundred Eleven Kilos and
Nine Grams (111.9 kilos), more or less, of
dried marijuana leaves which are sources of
dangerous and prohibited drugs and from
which dangerous and prohibited drugs may
be derived and manufactured, in violation of
the said law. (Rollo, p. 11)
The narration of facts by the trial court is as follows:
According to Jerry Valeroso, Sgt. Amador
Ablang and Sgt. Florentino Baillo, all
members of the First Narcotics Regional
Unit of the Narcotics Command stationed in
Baguio City, (See also Exhibit "I") on
October 30, 1986, they established a
checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at
Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along
the Halsema Highway, to check on vehicles
proceeding to Baguio City because their
Commanding Officer, Maj. Basilio
Cablayan had been earlier tipped off by
some confidential informers that the herein
accused Maspil and Basking would be
transporting a large volume of marijuana to
Baguio City. The informers went along with
the operatives to Sayangan.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning
of November 1, the operatives intercepted a
Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil with
Bagking as his companion. Upon inspection,
the jeep was found loaded with two (2)
plastic sacks (Exhibits "B" and "D"), one (1)
jute sack (Exhibit "C") and three (3) big
round tin cans (Exhibits "E", "F" and "G")
which, when opened contained several
bundles of suspected dried marijuana leaves
(Exhibits "B-1", to "B-23", "C-1" to "C-16",
D-1" to "D-20", "E-1" to "E-14","F-1" and
"G-1").
Maspil and Basking were arrested and the
suspected marijuana leaves were
confiscated.
The confiscated items were later on referred
to the PC Crime Laboratory, Regional Unit
1, for examination (Exhibit "A"). Forensic
Chemist Carlos V. Figuerroa performed the
requested examination and determined that
the specimen, with an aggregate weight of
115.66 kilos, were positive to the standard
tests for marijuana.
The accused admitted that the marijuana
dried leaves were indeed confiscated from
the jeep being then driven by Maspil with
Bagking as his helper. However, they
claimed that the prohibited drugs belonged
to two of their passengers who loaded them
in the jeep as paying cargo for Baguio City
without the accused knowing that they were
marijuana.
The accused declared that on October 31,
1986, at the burned area along Lakandula
Street, Baguio City, a certain Mrs. Luisa
Mendoza hired the jeep of Maspil to
transport her stock of dried fish and canned
goods contained in cartons to Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet, because her own vehicle
broke down. They left Baguio City at about
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon (11:30 in the
morning, according to Bagking) with Mrs.
Mendoza, her helper and salesgirls on board
the jeep with Maspil as driver and Bagking
as his own helper. They arrived at Abatan at
about 6:00 o'clock in the evening.
After unloading their cargo, Maspil and
Bagking repaired to a restaurant for their
dinner before undertaking the trip back to
Baguio City. While thus eating, they were
approached by two persons, one of whom
they would learn later on to be a certain
Danny Buteng. Buteng inquired if they were
going to Baguio City and upon being given
an affirmative answer, he said that he would
ride with them and that he has some cargo.
Asked what the cargo was, Buteng replied
that they were flowers in closed tin cans and
sealed sacks for the commemoration of All
Souls Day in Baguio City. After Buteng had
agreed to Maspil's condition that he would
pay for the space to be occupied by his
cargo, Buteng himself and his companion
loaded the cargo and fixed them inside
Maspil's jeep.
Maspil and Bagking left Abatan at about
7:00 o'clock that same evening of October
31. Aside from Buteng and companion they
had four other passengers. These four other
passengers alighted at Natubleng, Buguias,
Benguet.
Upon reaching Sayangan, Atok, Benguet,
Maspil stopped at the Marosan Restaurant
where they intended to take coffee. Their
remaining passengers-Buteng and
companion alighted and went to the
restaurant. However, a soldier waved at
Maspil to drive to where he was, which
Maspil did. The soldier secured Maspil's
permission to inspect their cargo after which
he grabbed Maspil on the latter's left
shoulder and asked who owned the cargo.
Maspil told the soldier that the cargo
belonged to their passengers who went to
the restaurant. The soldier called for his
companions and they went to look for
Maspil's passengers in the restaurant. Later
on, they returned and placed Maspil and
Bagking under arrest since their cargo
turned out to be marijuana.
Lawrence Balonglong, alias Banawe, a radio
reporter of DZWX Bombo Radio who was
invited by Lt Valeroso to witness the
operation, affirmed the unsuccessful pursuit
of the alleged two companions of Maspil
and Bagking. He recalled that he was
awakened from his sleep at the townhall in
Sayangan after the arrest of Maspil and
Bagking. When he went to the scene, the
NARCOM operatives boarded the jeep of
Maspil to chase the two companions of
Maspil and Bagking. Balonglong climbed on
top of the jeep with his camera to join the
chase. They proceeded toward the direction
of Bontoc but failed to catch anyone. Hence,
they returned.
Thereupon, Maspil and Bagking were taken
to the townhall where they were allegedly
maltreated to admit ownership of the
confiscated marijuana. At about 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon of November 1, the soldiers
took them away from Sayangan to be
transferred to their station at Baguio City.
On their way, particularly at Km. 32 or 34,
they met Mike Maspil, an elder brother of
Moises Maspil, and the soldiers called for
him and then Lt. Valeroso and his men
mauled him on the road.
Mike testified that between 3:00 and 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, he
was informed by a neighbor that his brother
Moises was detained at the Atok Municipal
Jail. So he called for Jose Pos-el and James
Longages, his driver and helper,
respectively, to go along with him to see
Moises. They rode in his jeep. On the way,
they met the group of Lt. Valeroso. For no
apparent reason, Lt. Valeroso boxed and
kicked him several times. Thereafter, Lt.
Valeroso placed him under arrest together
with his driver and helper. They were all
brought to a shoe store on Gen. Luna Road,
Baguio City, together with Moises and
Bagking. There, Lt. Valeroso got his wallet
containing P21000 and Seiko wrist watch
but the receipt (Exhibit "3") was issued by a
certain Miss Pingil, a companion of
Valeroso. He was released after nine days.
 He then went to Lt. Valeroso to claim his
wallet, money and watch but he was told
that they were with Miss Pingil. However,
when he went to Miss Pingil, the latter said
that the items were with Lt. Valeroso. He
sought the assistance of then Tourism
Deputy Minister Honorato Aquino who
assigned a lawyer to assist him. The lawyer
advised him to file a case against Lt.
Valeroso but because of the intervening
congressional elections, the matter has never
been pursued. (Rollo, p. 21-24)
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors in their
appeal, to wit:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
MARIJUANA AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION IS DIFFERENT FROM
THAT PRESENTED FOR LABORATORY
EXAMINATION.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE WERE ONLY
TWO OCCUPANTS, THE APPELLANTS,
IN THE VEHICLE WHERE THE
ALLEGED MARIJUANA WAS
CONFISCATED
III.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED KNEW
THAT THE CARGO THEY WERE
TRANSPORTING WAS MARIJUANA.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ALLEGED CONFISCATED
MARIJUANA.
V
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
SHIPPING FROM THE PROSECUTION
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED TO THE APPELLANTS TO
PROVE THEIR INNOCENCE." (Rollo, p.
40)
The main defense of the appellants is their claim that the
prohibited drugs belonged to their two passengers who loaded
them in the jeep as paying cargo without the appellants
knowing that the cargo was marijuana.
In the second and third assignment of errors, the appellants
claim that the trial court erred in not appreciating their version
of the facts.
The appellants state that the trial court's reliance on Sgt.
Baillo's testimony that they were the only ones in the jeep
cannot be given credence as Sgt. Baillo's testimony is full of
inconsistencies.
The appellants cite Sgt. Baillo's inconsistencies as to the time
of the arrest whether morning or afternoon, the time the
checkpoint was removed and the person who were with him at
the time of arrest.
It has been ruled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses not on material points is not fatal.
Moreover, minor inconsistencies are to be expected but must
be disregarded if they do not affect the basic credibility of the
evidence as a whole. (People v. Marcos, G. R. No. 83325,
May 8, 1990).
The defense even state that there were l lot of policemen
(T.S.N., December 1, 1987, p. 22) and it was but natural that
there would be confusion on who was there at the time of the
arrest.
The trial court gave credence to the positive and categorical
statement of Sgt. Baillo that there were only two occupants,
and these were the appellants inside the jeepney at the time
(T.S.N., June 30, 1987, p. 18). We see no cogent reason to
reverse this finding of fact.
There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was
motivated by any reason other than the desire of the police
officers to accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full
faith and credit to police officers when the facts and
circumstances surrounding their acts sustain the presumption
that they have performed their duties in a regular manner.
(Rule 131, Section 5 (m), Rules of Court; People v. Marcos,
supra; People v. Yap and Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 87088-89, May
9,1990)
The appellants put forward the testimony of Lawrence
Balonglong which corroborates and affirms their stand that
there were, indeed, passengers in the jeepney.
However, a close perusal of said testimony reveals no such
corroboration. The pertinent portions of Balonglong's
testimony is as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where were you when
these two persons were
apprehended?
 A I was in the Municipal
Hall asleep, sir.
Q How did you know then
that these people were
apprehended?
A It is like this, sir, on the
night of October 31, 1 was
then asleep and at around
11:00, 1guess, p.m., they
awakened me so I went
and I saw these two guys
being apprehended by the
Narcom operative.
Court:
Q You saw them being
apprehended?
A No, sir ... I saw them
there.
Q Already apprehended?
A Already apprehended.
Atty. Fianza:
Q And when you saw
these persons, what did
you do, if any?
A What I recall is that
when I went to the road,
where these two guys
were apprehended, the
operatives boarded the
same jeep and I even
climbed the jeep . . . on
top of the jeep holding my
camera and tape recorder
and we . . . I don't know ...
they chased, according to
the operatives, they chased
two companions of the
two arrested guys. (T.S.N.,
May 11, 1988, p. 4)
In their brief, the appellants even admit that "he (Balonglong)
did not see the passengers" and it was just his impression that
there were other people present. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7)
The appellants maintain that they did not know what was in
the cargo. Their main concern was in going back to Baguio
City and they saw no need to question their two passengers on
why flowers were being kept in closed cans and sacks. They
were apprehended after midnight. They traversed a lonely and
reputedly dangerous portion of the mountain highway.
The appellants' version is not believable. It is inconceivable
that the appellants would not even bother to ask the names of
the strangers who approached them in a restaurant at night
wanting to hire their jeepney, considering that they were
familiar with the Identity of the passenger, Luisa Mendoza,
who hired them to transport her goods to Abatan, Buguias,
Benguet.
It is likewise incredible that the appellants did not show the
slightest curiousity as to why flowers were being kept in
closed tin cans and sealed sacks and cellophane. On the other
hand, the appellants had clear knowledge that Luisa Mendoza
was transporting cartons containing dried fish and canned
goods on the trip out of Baguio. It is contrary to human
experience that the appellants would inquire about the name of
the passenger and the cargo she was loading on their jeep and
not doing the same about another who would transport goods
on a midnight trip.
Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed, must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must
be credible itself. No better test has yet been found to measure
the value of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge
and common experience of mankind. (People v. Maribung,
149 SCRA 292, 297 [1987] ; People v. Aldana, G.R. No.
81817, July 27, 1989; People v. Pascua, G.R. No. 82303,
December 21, 1989).
The appellants further allege that if, indeed they knew about
the contents of their cargo, they would have adopted means to
prevent detection or to evade arrest.
At the time the appellants were being motioned by the
policemen to come nearer the checkpoint, there was no way
that the appellants could have evaded the arrest without
putting their lives in jeopardy. They decided to just brazen it
out with police and insist on their version of the story.
As for the other assigned errors, the appellants in the first
assigned error, contend that since there is a discrepancy of
3.76 between the number of kilos stated in the information
(111.9 kilos) and in the report (115.66 kilos) of the forensic
chemist, it is very likely that the marijuana presented as
evidence was not the one confiscated from the appellants or
even if they were the same, it could have already been
tampered with. The appellants conclude that the marijuana
then, cannot be admitted as evidence.
The marijuana examined by the forensic chemist, which was
contained in three big round tin cans, two jute sacks (there was
really only one jute sack colored light green which was
confiscated but since one of the plastic sacks [green] appeared
to be tattered, some of its contents were transferred to a white
jute sack), (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 5) and two plastic bags
colored yellow and green (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 3), was
positively Identified to be the same as those confiscated from
the appellants. This is very clear from the testimony of Lt.
Valeroso who stated:
xxx xxx xxx
 Q When you went down,
where were these two
suspects, as you said?
A They were sitted (sic) at
the front seat.
Q Front seat of what?
A The jeep, sir.
Q And did you ask or see
what was inside the jeep?
A Yes.
Q And what were those?
A It was all suspected
marijuana dried leaves
contained in three big
cans, one sack colored
green, two sacks colored
yellow and green. (Italics
supplied, T.S.N.,
September 16, 1987, P. 4)
Lt. Valeroso further testified that Exhibits "B" (yellow plastic
big), "C" light green jute sack, "D" (green plastic bag), "E"
(one big can), "F" (second can), "G" (third can) were, indeed,
the same articles which he saw at the back of the jeepney of
the appellants. (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 5)
One of the appellants, Moises Maspil, even admitted that the
articles Identified by Lt. Valeroso in his testimony were
indeed, the same articles confiscated from their jeepney at
Sayangan, Atok, Benguet. (T.S.N., February 24, 1988, pp. 34-
35)
Moreover, the words "more or less" following the weight in
kilos of the marijuana in the questioned information declare
that the number of kilos stated therein is just an
approximation. It can therefore be a little lighter or heavier.
The slight discrepancy is not material.
Another ground stated by the appellants for the inadmissibility
in evidence of the confiscated marijuana is that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them was a product of an unlawful
search without a warrant.
In the case of Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988,
September 29, 1989, the Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the men
in uniform, in the same manner that all
government power is susceptible of abuse.
But at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable
limits are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.
The search was conducted within reasonable limits. There was
information that a sizeable volume of marijuana will be
transported to take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday
wherein there will be a lot of people going to and from Baguio
City (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 6). In fact, during the
three day (October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of
the checkpoint, there were also other drug related arrests made
aside from that of the two appellants.
But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search would still
be valid. This case involves a search incident to a lawful arrest
which is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a
search warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of
Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
and Rule 113, Section 5 (11) which state:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants
were caught in flagrante delicto since they were transporting
the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. (People v.
Tangliben, G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was
actually being committed.
The appellants, however, cite the case of People V.
Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In said case, the PC
officers received information that the accused-appellant, on
board a vessel bound for Iloilo City, was carrying marijuana.
When the accused-appellant was descending the gangplank,
the PC officers detained him and inspected the bag that he was
carrying and found marijuana. The Court ruled that since the
marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence.
There are certain facts of the said case which are not present in
the case before us. In the Aminnudin case, the records showed
that there was sufficient time and adequate information for the
PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The officers knew the
name of the accused, that the accused was on board M/V
Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival of
the said vessel.
On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to
the exact description of the vehicle and no definite time of the
arrival. A jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger ship on
the high seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case, is not
applicable to the case at bar.
As for the fifth and last assigned error we agree with the
Solicitor General that:
Examination of the testimonies of appellants
show that they admit the fact that the
confiscated marijuana was taken from their
jeep while they were transporting it from
Abatan, Buguias, Benguet to Baguio City.
This being so, the burden of the prosecution
to prove illegal transportation of prohibited
drugs punished under Section 4 of RA 6425,
as amended, has been satisfactorily
discharged. The rule in civil as well as in
criminal cases is that each party must prove
his own affirmative allegations. The
prosecution avers the guilt of the accused
who is presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved. Therefore, the
prosecution must prove such guilt by
establishing the existence of all the elements
of the crime charged. But facts judicially
known, presumed, admitted or confessed
need not be proved. (Rule 129, Sec. 4, Rules
on Evidence) (Appellee's Brief, p. 26-27)
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellants having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Umil vs. Ramos
FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas
corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the
“confidential information” that the authorities received.
Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged,
the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the
New People’s Army.
RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion
cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a
continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith.
On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an
information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests
were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other
than members of the NPA.
The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by
the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be
considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information
can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set
aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a
trial free from error.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was
nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were
bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not
caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the
authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.
2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the
state. People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife went to the booth
of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with
them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the
owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and
gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the
owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before
the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's
husband inspected the package and found marijuana which
was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against
Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and
seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an
act of the State would result in serious legal complications and
an absurd interpretation of the constitution
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST
WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING
OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE
PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE
CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente
only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and
when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the
instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow
block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death.
The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one
of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen
had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they
had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN
WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN
INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The
search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful
because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to lawful
arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was
a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice
Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it
was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked
for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting
officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF
CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There is no
merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in
convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo
and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr.
Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's
skull could have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr.
Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person
dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim,
smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve
the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when
there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one
conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she
overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill
Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a
piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death.
"When there is no evidence indicating that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive,
the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199
SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving
full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO
P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in
the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison,
189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which found the
appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as
maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder for which
crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the
accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of
R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to
twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the
accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating
circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00,
and in the amount of P17,609.00 as funeral expenses, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the
full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation
of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without justification, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession
and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with
markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are
considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren
who are both at large, was charged with Murder in Criminal
Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and
signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as
follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the
municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused together with two (2) others who are still at
large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not
yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow
(sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit
with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito
B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly
caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April
30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo
Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is
about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution
witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the
three men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace.
She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel,
papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren
allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin
natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue,
papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan
to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The
prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she
witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow
against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and
Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the
head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow
block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged
Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia
of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the
Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to
the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the
victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive
fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right
away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal
Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo
de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they
found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and
two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the
prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the
killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three
men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who
was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and
they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia
frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which
contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried
leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be
marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the
police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are
still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him
for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for
Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not
guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held.
On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of
Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are
ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana
leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-
appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence of
evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting
the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his
constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and
seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him
in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We
do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the
marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they
were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene
of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used
to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating
that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could
lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he
would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused
without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he had shot to
death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this
Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui,
63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most
depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful
because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was
a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice
Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it
was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked
for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting
officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within
his immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court
erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated
with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the
testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the
back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one
person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one
person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the
victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace
for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of
one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by
the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she
overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill
Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a
piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death.
"When there is no evidence indicating that the principal
witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive,
the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199
SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving
full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no
indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's
brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA
643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs
of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120163. March 10, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. DATUKON BANSIL y ALOG, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
 This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 93-128854
finding accused-appellant Datukon Bansil y Alog guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 [2] for having in his
possession a .45 cal. pistol and six (6) live ammunitions without
the required license, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant herein is a twenty-eight (28) year-
old construction worker residing in Quiapo, Manila, who was
arrested by a team of policemen allegedly led by Major Jaime
Ortega of Substation 3 of the Western Police District (WPD),
upon an informers tip that appellant was one of the suspects in
the killing of three persons some weeks before in Quiapo,
Manila.
The facts as presented by the prosecution show that on
October 28, 1993 at around 5:00 o clock in the afternoon, the
desk officer of Sub-station 3 of the Western Police District
(WPD) received information from an informant (whose identity
was not divulged) that a suspect in a killing in Quiapo some
weeks before was in the vicinity of the Muslim Mosque in
Quiapo, Manila.[3] Responding to the information, Sub-station
Commander Jaime Ortega, PO3 Liquido Delgado, Mario
Montes and SPO4 Oscar V. Clemente proceeded to the Muslim
area where they saw several persons conversing at the corner of
Elizondo St.. One of said persons had a suspicious bulge in his
stomach, and when frisked, a .45 cal. pistol with an extended
magazine and six (6) live bullets was recovered from the center
front of his waist line. Major Ortega took the gun and brought
appellant to the sub-station.[4] SPO4 Redolfin Coloma notified
SPO3 Jaime D. Mendoza of the WPD Homicide Division to
take custody of the appellant. That same day, SPO3 Mendoza
received the person of the accused and the subject firearm for
safekeeping.
The defense contradicts the prosecutions
version. According to the defense, prior to his arrest appellant
was given by his cousin, Mike Mancupao, the patrolman
commander of precinct no. 3, to Major Ortega, one of the
arresting officers, as a helper.[5] On three occasions, Major
Ortega asked appellant to collect money from a certain Hadji
Baddie allegedly arising from certain drug deals. On the fourth
occasion, appellant was unable to locate Hadji Baddie at his
residence near the Pasig River.[6] His further efforts to locate
Hadji Baddie proved futile, hence, appellant stopped reporting
to Major Ortega. On October 28, 1993, at around 3:00 oclock
in the afternoon, while appellant and his companions, Hidrain
Soliman and Teecaria, were having halo-halo at the Hadji Asia
Restaurant at Elizondo St. in Quiapo, Manila, Major
Ortega came up to him, companionably placed his hand on his
shoulder and invited him to talk outside. [7] The two then
proceeded in the direction of the Barter Trade Area. This
exchange was witnessed by one of the waitresses in said
restaurant, Serabanon Angcob, who also testified in court that
she knows both appellant and Major Ortega since the two used
to have halo-halo at the restaurant where she worked.
Appellant claims that Major Ortega asked him about the
money from Hadji Baddie and appellant explained that he could
no longer find him, which made Major Ortega angry. Major
Ortega then brought appellant to the precinct where he was
locked up.[8] Thereafter, according to appellant, several persons
showed him a gun; they insisted it belonged to him. He was told
that to prevent further harm on himself, he should sign a
document admitting that he committed a crime. When appellant
adamantly refused to do so, some unidentified persons mauled
him before sending him back to jail.[9]
Appellant insists that he never met the prosecution witness
SPO4 Clemente prior to the court hearing, and that the only
person who arrested him was Major Ortega.[10] He categorically
denies ever having in his possession a gun at the time he was
arrested by Major Ortega.
In an Information[11] dated November 4, 1993, Assistant
City Prosecutor Tomas R. Romaquin charged the accused-
appellant with the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully have in his possession and under his control and
custody a .45 Colt pistol with Serial No. FG-788041 with six
(6) live ammunitions which was tucked in his waist, without
first securing the necessary license or permit therefor from the
proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on December 22, 1993, appellant,
assisted by counsel de oficio, Atty. Bonifacio M.
Macabaya,[12] entered a plea of not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
namely: (1) SPO3 Romeo T. de Guzman, a representative from
the Firearms and Explosives Unit of Camp Crame, whose
testimony was dispensed with when the defense stipulated with
the prosecution that the certification (Exh. A) dated January 21,
1994 (that the accused is not a licensed/ registered firearms
holder of any kind and caliber) was duly issued and signed by
the proper authorities;[13] (2) SPO4 Oscar V. Clemente, one of
the apprehending officers; (3) SPO3 Jaime D. Mendoza, the
investigating officer; and (4) Police Chief Inspector Manolo G.
Martinez, who testified that his participation in the case is
limited to the fact that the firearm allegedly confiscated from
the appellant was turned over to his division for safekeeping
purposes only.[14]
On the other hand, the defense presented two witnesses:
(1) appellant Datukon Bansil himself, and (2) Serabanon
Angcob, the waitress at the Hadji Asia Restaurant.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision[15] finding
appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of P.D.
1866 as charged and therefore, the accused, Datukon Bansil y
Alog is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
 Hence, the present appeal. Appellant seeks reversal of his
conviction on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866
VIOLATES SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE BULGING WAISTLINE OF APPELLANT
DATUKON BANSIL MADE THE SEARCH AND
ARREST LEGAL.
III.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE ARREST OF APPELLANT DATUKON
BANSIL WAS UNLAWFUL.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANT DATUKON BANSIL GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION
OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866 AND IN
THUS NOT ACQUITTING APPELLANT DATUKON
BANSIL.
V.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT MAJOR JAIME ORTEGA ALONE ARRESTED
APPELLANT DATUKON BANSIL.
VI.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT JAIME ORTEGA FELT ILL WILL ON
APPELLANT DATUKON BANSIL.
VII.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
ESTABLISH BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
THAT THE GUN IDENTIFIED BY SENIOR POLICE
INSPECTOR MARTINEZ WAS CONFISCATED
FROM APPELLANT DATUKON BANSIL.
Concisely put, the issues are first, whether or not P.D. No.
1866 is unconstitutional considering that the penalty imposed
therein is allegedly disproportionate to the offense committed
in violation of the constitutional proscription against excessive
fines and cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment under
Article III, Section 19 of the 1987 Constitution. Second,
whether or not the trial court correctly gave credence to the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses over the denial of the
appellant. Third, whether or not appellant was lawfully
arrested.
The question of proportionality of penalty to the crime
charged has been rendered moot and academic with the passage
of Republic Act No. 8294,[16] which lowered the penalty for the
crime of illegal possession of firearms from the
previous reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866 to prision mayor in
its minimum period and a fine of P30,000.00 in cases involving
high powered firearms under R.A. No. 8294. We also deem it
not necessary to delve into the constitutionality of P.D. No.
1866 considering that it has long been
settled by this Court in no less than two en banc decisions
- Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648 (1990), and Baylosis v.
Chavez, 202 SCRA 405 (1991).[17]
The decisive issue then is whether or not the trial court
erred in relying on the testimony of the prosecution witnesses,
in particular the testimony of SPO4 Oscar V. Clemente, one of
the apprehending officers, in convicting appellant. After a
thorough scrutiny of SPO4 Clementes testimony, we find the
same insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
culpability of the appellant for the crime charged.
Generally, the issue of credibility of witnesses is best
ascertained by the trial court which had the opportunity to
observe the witnesses directly and to test their credibility by
their demeanor on the stand.[18] Hence, the general rule is that
factual findings of the trial court are accorded respect and are
not disturbed on appeal.[19] However, a review of the records of
the case compels us to take exception to the aforesaid rule. We
believe that the trial court erred in adopting the prosecutions
story hook, line and sinker albeit riddled with patent
inconsistencies and improbabilities on material points.
We find the testimony of SPO4 Clemente full of
inconsistencies on material points, such as how the arresting
team was able to single out appellant as the suspect, and among
them who actually recovered the firearm from appellant.
Initially, SPO4 Clemente testified that they were able to
identify appellant because the informant told the desk officer
the attire of the accused, yet upon further questioning, he could
not even remember the supposed attire of the appellant used in
identifying the latter at the time of arrest.[20] Further, on direct
examination, SPO4 Clemente initially testified that he was the
one who recovered the subject firearm from the
appellant;[21] however, on cross-examination, he testified that it
was actually another operative whose name he can no longer
recall who recovered the firearm from the
appellant.[22] Considering that there were only four members of
the arresting team, including himself, his memory lapses
renders his credibility suspect.
While a police officer is not expected to remember every
single detail regarding the arrest, he is supposed to remember
the important details relating to the commission of the crime,
most especially when such incident occurred in his presence
and with his active involvement. Further, no seizure receipt was
issued by the arresting team for the gun, if indeed it was taken
from the accused. Receipts for seized items are mandatory on
the part of apprehending and seizing police officers.[23]
We are aware of the time-honored rule that credence
should be given to the narration of an incident by prosecution
witnesses who are police officers and presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.[24] However the instant case calls for
the application of the exception rather than the rule. The
testimony of the prosecution witness who was a member of the
arresting team is replete with inconsistencies and contradictions
that reliance thereon by the trial court seems to be misplaced.
While the trial court found that appellant was lawfully
arrested without a warrant since he was actually committing a
crime in the presence of a peace officer under Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure based on the
informants tip and the bulging waistline of the appellant, we
find that there was no probable cause for the arrest of the
appellant. The arresting team was only armed withthe
knowledge of the suspects attire which the prosecution witness
admitted during trial he cannot even remember. The team
did not have a physical description of the suspect nor his name.
They were not even given a specific place within which to target
their search of the suspect, only a vicinity of the Muslim Area
in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the arresting team
directly zeroed in on the accused and his companions who were
only eating halo-halo at a small restaurant, surely not a crime in
itself. While SPO4 Clemente claims that accused had a bulging
waistline, this alone, in the light of the availing circumstances,
is insufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
Moreover, in crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the
fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have
the license or permit to possess the same.[25] The essence of the
crime of illegal possession is the possession, whether actual or
constructive, of the subject firearm, without which there can be
no conviction for illegal possession. After possession is
established by the prosecution, it would only be a matter of
course to determine whether the accused has a license to possess
the firearm. In the instant case, the link of the accused to the
subject firearm is tenuous at best. The prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the gun which was
allegedly recovered from the accused is the same gun which
was examined by its corroborating witnesses, Jaime Mendoza
and Manolo Martinez.
Faced with outright denial of the accused of the possession
of the gun, the prosecution had all the opportunity to cross-
examine the accused and his witness in order to ferret out the
truth and expose the falsity of their allegations. This the public
prosecution failed to do. On the other hand, we find the
testimony of the accused and his witness delivered in a
spontaneous, natural, and consistent manner. No
ulterior motive was ascribed to witness Serabanon Angcob to
testify in favor of accused.
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[26] On the whole,
the meager evidence for the prosecution casts serious doubts as
to the guilt of accused. It does not pass the test of moral
certainty and is insufficient to rebut the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and appellant DATUKON BANSIL is hereby
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants immediate release is
ordered unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DATUKON
BANSIL y ALOGG.R. No. 120163 March 10, 199
FACTS
Appellant herein is a twenty-eight (28) year-old construction
worker residing in Quiapo, Manila, who was arrested by a
team of policemen, upon an informer's tip that appellant was
one of the suspects in the killing of three persons some weeks
before in Quiapo, Manila.
Responding to the information, the officers proceeded to the
Muslim area. One of said persons had a suspicious bulge in his
stomach, and when frisked, a .45 cal. pistol with an extended
magazine and six (6) live bullets was recovered from the
center front of his waist line.
That same day, SPO3 Mendoza received the person of the
accused and the subject firearm for safekeeping.
The defendant categorically denies ever having in his
possession a gun at the time he was arrested
RTC: [T]he accused is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of P.D. 1866 as charged and
therefore, the accused, Datukon Bansil y Alog is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: WoN the trial court erred in relying on the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses in convicting appellant?
HELD: Yes. We find the same insufficient to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the culpability of the appellant for the crime
charged. We find the testimony of SPO4 Clemente full of
inconsistencies on material points. We find that there was no
probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the appellant
notwithstanding the putative application of Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure based on the informant's tip and
the "bulging waistline" of the accused. The arresting team was
only armed with the knowledge of the suspect's "attire" which
the prosecution witness admitted during trial he cannot even
remember. The team did not have a physical description of the
suspect nor his name. They were not even given a specific
place within which to target their search of the suspect, only a
vicinity of the Muslim Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim
Mosque. Yet the arresting team directly zeroed in on the
accused and his companions who were only eating halo-halo
at a small restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4
Clemente claims that accused had a "bulging waistline", this
alone, in the light of the availing circumstances, is insufficient
to constitute probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
Further, the essence of the crime of illegal possession is the
possession, whether actual or constructive, of the subject
firearm, without which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. Faced with outright denial of the accused of the
possession of the gun, the prosecution had all the opportunity
to cross-examine the accused and his witness in order to ferret
out the truth and exposé the falsity of their allegations. This
the public prosecution failed to do. WHEREFORE, the
appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
appellant DATUKON BANSIL is hereby ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Appellant's immediate release is ordered unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91483. November 18, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. SAMUEL MAHUSAY y FLORES AND
CRISTITUTO PASPOS @ Toto y Esmarlita Paspos, who is the sister of appellant Paspos. The
CATARIG, accused-appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Appellants Samuel Mahusay and Cristituto Paspos, along
with Felomino Galo, Alfredo Mendio, Justiniano Velacsi (at
large), and Tanciong Egloba (at large), were charged with the
crime of robbery with rape and physical injuries in Criminal
Case No. N-1283 before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Subprovince of Biliran, Leyte, Branch 16, under an
information[1]dated July 19, 1988, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of April, 1988, in the
Municipality of San Isidro, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, armed with deadly weapons,
with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation on the person, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, take and carry away:
1. Cash money - P12,000.00
2. Wallclock - 500.00 (Silclox Quartz brand)
3. Ring - 250.00
4. Fighting cock - 100.00
5. Long bolo - 50.00
T o t a l - P12,900.00
========
to the damage and prejudice to (sic) the said Troadio Bughao
in the aforesaid amount; and on the occasion thereof, did, then
and there box, maul and manhandle Troadio Bughao and
Manuelito Brignas and through force, violence and
intimidation wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with Marilou Bughao against her will in their own
dwelling to their damage and prejudice.
That aggravating circumstances of nighttime and by a band are
attendant in the commission of this offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
On April 19, 1988, at around 6:45 oclock p.m., six armed
men barged into the Bughao residence and introduced
themselves as members of the New Peoples Army. After
extinguishing the three oil lamps inside the house, they tied the
arms and feet of Troadio Bughao, his wife and househelper
group split in two, ransacked the cabinets, and cleaned out the
premises of every valuable item they could carry.
Bughaos daughter Maria Luisa (a.k.a., Marilou) was
brought upstairs by three men who successively ravished
her. She recounted that when she was being violated, a
flashlight was focused on her face, thus, giving her ample
illumination and enabling her to look intently at one of her
assailants. She, however, failed to identify the other two
because she fainted in the course of the ordeal she underwent.
Esmarlita Paspos, on the other hand, testified that she
immediately recognized one of the men as her brother
Cristituto, the only malefactor wearing a mask, through his
movements and physical features. She likewise identified
Mahusay and Mendio as the persons who ordered her to serve
food.
The following day, the incident was reported to the
police. A police team[2] from the Integrated National Police
Station of San Isidro, Leyte led by Sgt. Manuel Bughao was
promptly dispatched to Sitio Sumakab, Barangay Inangatan,
Tabango, Leyte to arrest the suspects. The police were able to
recover from them a wall clock, cash amounting to P1,445.00,
a ring and two caliber .38 paltik revolvers.
During the investigation, appellants allegedly admitted
responsibility for the crime charged. Considering, however,
that the searching inquiry was done without the assistance of
counsel, the trial court correctly disregarded the same.
Appellants, on the other hand, invoke alibi as their
defense.
On April 17, 1988, Mahusay and Mendio, both drivers and
residents of Navotas, Metro Manila, alleged that they went on a
trip to Medellin, Cebu to visit the formers uncle, Elezer
Cuyaco. Three days later, or on April 20, 1988, they departed
for San Isidro, Leyte to attend a fiesta. With them on the
pumpboat was Galo whom Mahusay came to know in a dance
in his brief stay in Cebu. Galo was apparently instructed by his
aunt to go to San Isidro to collect a P660.00 debt from Paspos.
Arriving in San Isidro at noon of April 20th, they repaired
to the house of Paspos who served them steamed
bananas. While resting and conversing with one another, four
policemen suddenly pounced upon them and brought them to
the police station where they were allegedly maltreated and
illegally detained for two months.
After trial on the merits, Galo was acquitted of the crime
charged while Mahusay, Paspos and Mendio were proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt in a decision by the trial court,[3] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused Samuel Mahusay, Alfredo Mendio and Cristituto
Paspos, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Rape defined and penalized under article 294
(2) of the Revised Penal Code and sentences them to suffer
and undergo imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify
Maria Luisa Bughao P20,000.00 jointly and severally without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and each to pay
one third of the costs.
They are credited with the full period of their preventive
detention.
Accused Felomino Galo is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt. He is ordered released immediately unless he has been
convicted or stands charged of any other offense which would
warrant his continued detention.
Exhibits D the solclox (sic) quartz, F and F-1 the rings and E
to E-18 the P1,445 cash are ordered returned to Troadio and
Maria Luisa Bughao.[4]
Of the three convicted felons, only Mahusay and Paspos
filed a notice of appeal.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in ruling that
their apprehension was valid and that their guilt was proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
At the outset, we note that the court a quo erroneously
declared that appellants were apprehended in hot pursuit, thus,
negating the need for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In view
thereof, it is imperative for the Court to once again explain the
requisites of a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
x x x x x x x x x.
Under Section 5(b) of the aforequoted rule, two conditions
must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the person
to be arrested must have just committed an offense, and second,
the arresting peace officer or private person must have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is
the one who committed the offense.[5] It has been ruled that
personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion.[6]
In the case at bar, appellants were arrested on the sole
basis of Bughaos verbal report. The arresting officers were led
to suspect that, indeed, appellants had committed a crime. Thus,
the arrest was made in violation of their fundamental right
against an unjustified warrantless arrest. This notwithstanding,
appellants cannot find comfort solely in this error.
The Court has ruled on several occasions that any
objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived.[7] Indeed, it is too late for
appellants to raise the question of their arrest. When appellants
were arrested and a case was filed against them, they pleaded
not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and
presented their respective evidence. Appellants are thus
estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest.[8] At the
outset, appellants should have moved for the quashal of the
information before the trial court on this
ground.[9] Accordingly, any irregularity in their arrest was Maria Luisas unsullied virtue. They likewise departed hastily
cured when they voluntarily submitted themselves to the from the scene of the crime. Evidently, these acts manifest their
jurisdiction of the trial court. joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. [14]
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had credible witnesses to Accordingly, conspiracy having been established,
support the conviction of appellants. Bughaos categorical, appellants are liable as co-principals because in contemplation
straightforward and spontaneous testimony imputing to of law, the act of one is the act of all.
appellants the crime charged is buttressed by the fact that they
have not shown any plausible reason why the offended parties WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
would charge them with an offense so grave and heinous as DISMISSED and the decision of the trial court finding
robbery with rape. Esmarlita Paspos positive identification of appellants Samuel Mahusay and Cristituto Paspos guilty
her brother Cristituto, Mahusay and Mendio as some of the beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape is
malefactors certainly deserves credence because, as the one hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellants
who served them food, she had the opportunity to observe at shall each suffer three (3) terms of reclusion perpetua. In line
close range their faces. with recent jurisprudence,[15] appellants are ordered to
indemnify Maria Luisa Bughao in the amount of P50,000.00
Appellant Paspos challenged Bughaos assertion that it was each as indemnity. Costs against appellants.
the former whom he saw that fateful night because the man
whom the latter saw was wearing a mask. When the robbery SO ORDERED.
was in progress, however, Bughao immediately knew it
was Paspos, the latter being his neighbor and a son of his
tenant. This finding was even corroborated by Esmarlita when
she whispered to Bughao that one of them was her brother
Cristituto. Notably, the latter was the only one in disguise
without which he would have been more easily recognized by
the Bughao family. It is a rule that appellants denial of
culpability cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
positive declaration of a credible witness who testified on
affirmative matters.[10]
Maria Luisa testified that she was slapped and struck with
the butt of a gun which produced contusions on her face, lips
EN BANC
and neck. While she was on the bed with her hands tied behind
her, Mahusay mounted her and forced her legs apart using his
hands and legs while his two unidentified companions stood
guard at the door. After Mahusay, the other two took turns in
raping her. [G.R. No. 141943-45. November 13 ,2002]

She maintained that although appellants extinguished the

oil lamps, she managed to recognize Mahusay from the
illumination shed by the flashlight he carried. She, however, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
failed to positively identify the other two since she felt so vs. DIOSDADO RECEPCION Y PALASO
weakened while being ravished. (deceased), FELIPE DELA CRUZ Y REYES,
AUDIE DONA Y BINAN, ALFREDO BARACAS
Appellants were convicted of robbery with rape under the
Y CONCEPCION, EDUARDO PALACPAC Y
conspiracy theory where the act of one may be imputed to all of
ROSALES, BERNARDO RANARA Y
the conspirators. It is well-settled that conspiracy exists when
MORATALLA (at large), JOEMARI DELOS
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
REYES Y CONCEPCION, DOMINADOR
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[11] Proof of the
RECEPCION Y PALASO and ROBERT
agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
ALFONSO Y MARTIZANO, appellants.
inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that DECISION
the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part in the VITUG, J.:
commission of the offense.[12] In such a case, the act of one
becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be
deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.[13] Five innocent men met their sudden death at a not-so-
forlorn corner of Caloocan City when a group of malefactors,
In the case at bar, the concerted acts of the appellants without apparent provocation or reason, had cast their terror on
reveal a common criminal intent indicative of conspiracy. They the early morning of 28 July 1999.
arrived together at the scene of the crime and simultaneously
ransacked the place searching for money. While they were Eight1 persons were charged with multiple murder,
robbing and tormenting the entire Bughao family, three violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, 2 and robbery
members of the group were upstairs successively assaulting in band in three separate accusatory Informations that read:
In Criminal Case No. 57208
That on or about 1:15 oclock a.m. of July 28, 1999 in
Caloocan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery after posing as customers
and armed with unlicensed handguns entered Sabungan
Fastfood & Videoke and once inside, without any provocation
from anyone suddenly, unexpectedly and in totally senseless
and surprising act or rampage attacked, assaulted and shot five
(5) customers, namely: Benjamin E. Valdez, Rodolfo O.
Ortega, Augusto A. Billodo, Ruperto S. San Juan and Renato
T. Cleofas, Sr., thereby hitting and mortally wounding the said
five (5) persons causing their instantaneous death.3
In Criminal Case No. 57209 -That on or about 1:00 to 3:00
A.M. or thereabout, on July 28, 1999 in Caloocan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above-named accused had in their possession,
custody and control the following firearms/handguns loaded
with ammunitions to wit:
a. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-760006;
b. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-51 900;
c. One (1) Cal. 38 Armscor SN-51952;
d. One (1) Cal. 38 Squires Bingham SN-1095906;
e. One (1) Pistol 9mm Noringco SN-861406966;
f. Fifty-two (52) pcs. Cal. 38 live ammunitions;
g. Twenty eight (28) pcs. 9 MM live ammunitions;
h. Eight (8) pcs. Cal. 38 empty shells,
without the necessary license or authority as required by law
and which firearms were used in the commission of multiple
murder (killing of five persons, namely: Benjamin E. Valdez,
Rodolfo D. Ortega, Augusto A. Billodo, Ruperto S. San Juan
and Renato T. Cleofas, Sr. at Sabungan Fastfood & Videoke,
which is within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court). 4
In Criminal Case No. 57210
That on or about 1:15 A.M. on July 28, 1999 in Caloocan
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above-named accused, acting in concert, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent of
gain, by means of force, threats, violence or intimidation, and
immediately after accused totally unprovoked and unexpected
shooting rampage, which resulted in the death of several
customers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of their unlicensed firearm, forcibly
and violently take, divest, and carry away from LENY
GATICA, FREDEBERT DADON, DENNIS SERRANO and
RODEL FESARIT, the following cash and personal
belongings, namely: a lady bracelet worth P3,500.00, three (3)
men wristwatches worth P7,500.00 and the establishment
earnings of P5,000.00, to the loss, damage and prejudice of the
above-named owner/s.5
The indictees, when arraigned, pled not guilty to all the
charges. The cases were tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution -
Marie Flamiano was a waitress at Sabungan Fastfood and
Videoke Pub, located along Samson Road, in Caloocan City. At
about one-thirty on the morning of 28 July 1999, she was
attending to customers when seven men, she identified to be
Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes,
Bernardo Ranara, Dominador Recepcion, Robert Alfonso and
Audie Dona, entered the pub while one was tailing behind at the
entrance. The men occupied table 12 and ordered beer from
waitress Eliza Bautista. A few minutes later, three men from the
group transferred to table 10. Just as Marie was approaching
table 13 to get the microphone from a customer, one of the men
stood up and fired his gun at another customer. Marie identified
this gunman to be Alfredo Baracas.
Eliza Bautista, the waitress who served the group, among
them Diosdado Recepcion, Robert Alfonso, Audie Dona,
Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Joemari delos Reyes and
Dominador Recepcion, saw another man pull out a gun and shot
a customer, Rodolfo Ortega, while on his knees. The women
later identified the gunman to be Diosdado Recepcion. Rosalia
Juanica, a co-waitress who had meanwhile dashed out and hid
at the nearby St. Joseph Store, saw Rodolfo Ortega, kneeling
with both hands raised in plea, but one of the men, she likewise
identified to be Diosdado Recepcion, fired his gun at pointblank
range.
Jojo Paraiso was with his co-security guards having a
drinking spree when a group of armed men, started shooting.
Some of the men shouted, dapa, but Jojos companion,
Benjamin Valdez, unfortunately took a bullet shot before he
could get the chance to heed the warning. Jojo identified the
person who fired at Valdez to be Robert Alfonso. He hid under
the table and could only watch the men gone berserk. The last
of the gunmen who left the pub, still firing his gun, was Joemari
delos Reyes.
Jhosa Reyes, a waitress at the A & E Kitchenette just
across the Sabungan, saw the gunmen and their cohorts scamper
away after the shooting incident. She recognized three of the
gunmen, Robert Alfonso, Joemari delos Reyes and Eduardo
Palacpac, as being regular customers at the A & E Kitchenette.
Shortly before the shooting, Alfonso, delos Reyes, Palacpac and
another companion were drinking at the kitchenette but soon
headed towards the alley near the pub.
Found sprawled on the floor, when the shooting finally
stopped, were the lifeless bodies of five men - Benjamin
Valdez, Augusto Billodo, Renato Cleofas, Rodolfo Ortega and
Ruperto San Juan.
Ruben Labjata, a jeepney driver, was waiting for
passengers at Dagohoy Street, Caloocan City, when he heard
gunshots. He was about to leave with only a few passengers
when, unexpectedly, three men arrived and ordered all the
passengers to get off the vehicle. The men menacingly pointed
their guns at Labjata and ordered him to drive. Moments later,
five more men boarded his jeepney. Three of the men stayed
with the driver at the front seat while the other five sat at the
rear. The group directed Labjata to drive
towards Monumento and then to EDSA. After stopping briefly
at Petron Station to refuel, the group proceeded to Quezon City.
At a 7-11 convenience store in Tandang Sora, some of the men
alighted from the vehicle. More gunshots were fired. Boarding
once again the jeepney, the men told Labjata to go north until
they finally reached, hours later, Paniqui, Tarlac. At Paniqui,
the men debated on the drivers fate. After hearing one suggest
that he should be killed (tumba), Labjata panicked and begged
the group to spare him -maawa po kayo, may pamilya po
ako. One of the men allowed him to go home with a warning
that he should not report the incident to the police. In open
court, he identified the malefactors to be Audie Dona, Alfredo
Baracas, Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara, Eduardo
Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes and
Robert Alfonso.
Conrado Marquez, a tricycle driver, was waiting for
passengers along the highway of Paniqui, Tarlac, when he saw
a group of men alight from a dirty jeepney. Four of the men
rode in his tricycle, while the other four took two more tricycles.
Marquez brought the group to Brgy. Coral, Ramos, Tarlac.
Around lunchtime on 29 July 1999, the Bulacan Police
invited Ruben Labjata for questioning. Taken by police
authorities to Tarlac, he pointed to the exact place where the
armed men got off from his vehicle. Conrado Marquez, likewise
invited by the police for interrogation, readily informed the
police of the place where he brought the men who hired his
tricycle. The police promptly cordoned the area and the group,
along with FO1 Felipe dela Cruz, surrendered after several
calls by the police. Taken into custody were Felipe dela Cruz,
Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo
Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador
Recepcion. Diosdado Recepcion, then a special agent of the
Narcotics Command, was intercepted at the national highway
of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on board a tricycle. At the Tarlac
Police Station, Labjata identified his passengers, namely, Audie
Dona, Alfredo Baracas, Diosdado Recepcion, Bernardo Ranara,
Eduardo Palacpac, Dominador Recepcion, Joemari delos Reyes
and Robert Alfonso.
Diosdado Recepcion, Felipe dela Cruz, Audie Dona,
Alfredo Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Joemari
delos Reyes, Dominador Recepcion, and Roberto Alfonso were
charged with multiple murder, violation of P.D. No. 1866, and
robbery in band before the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Branch 129, Caloocan City. The incident that
occurred at the 7-11 convenience store also spawned several
separate criminal informations (not involved in the instant cases
under review).
During the trial, Diosdado Recepcion died in an escape
attempt, while accused Bernardo Ranara escaped and remained
at large.
The Version of the Defense
The defense interposed alibi.
According to Dominador Recepcion, he was, at the time
of the reported shooting incident, fast asleep at Greenwoods
Subdivision in Cainta, Rizal, where he was a construction
worker. His co-workers were Eduardo Palacpac and Robert
Alfonso. On the evening of 27 July 1999, the trio went to Pansi,
Paniqui, Tarlac, to help Dominador Recepcions nephew,
Joemari delos Reyes, find a job. It was after one oclock in the
afternoon when Joemari brought them to the house of his
cousin FO1 Felipe dela Cruz.
Joemari delos Reyes testified that, on the afternoon of 28
July 1999, he was at home when his uncle Dominador
Recepcion arrived with Robert Alfonso and Eduardo Palacpac.
He brought his guests to the house of Felipe dela Cruz where
they partook of beer.
Felipe dela Cruz stated that on 28 July 1999, about one
oclock in the afternoon, his father fetched him from a cousins
house. When he arrived home, he was met by Joemari delos
Reyes along with the latters companions, namely, Eduardo
Palacpac, Robert Alfonso, and Dominador Recepcion. In the
evening of the same day, about eight oclock, he invited his
visitors to join him in attending a wake just a few meters away,
and they stayed there until dawn. The following morning of 29
July 1999, policemen arrived and cordoned his house. He was
arrested together with Joemari delos Reyes, Audie Dona and
Alfredo Baracas. During a series of questioning at the Caloocan
Police Station, dela Cruz insisted that he was attending a wake
at the time the shooting incident occurred in Caloocan City.
Audie Dona said that on 28 July 1999, he and his friend
Alfredo Baracas, went to Pansi, Ramos, Tarlac, to visit his
cousin Joemari delos Reyes and to get some fresh fish and
vegetables. When he did not find Joemari at his house, he and
Baracas proceeded to the place of dela Cruz where they were
invited to join the group of Felipe dela Cruz, Joemari delos
Reyes, Eduardo Palacpac, and Dominador Recepcion in a
drinking spree. Dona and Baracas stayed until nine oclock in
the evening when they repaired to the house of Joemari to spend
the night. On 29 July 1999, he and Baracas went back to see
dela Cruz but found Joemari still sleeping. The two dozed off
while waiting for Joemari to wake up until they all found
themselves surrounded by the police.
When the trial was over and weighing the evidence before
it, the court a quo found the several accused guilty in Criminal
Case No. C-57208 for multiple murder but acquitted them in
Criminal Case No. C-57209 for the charge of illegal possession
of firearm and Criminal Case No. 57210 for robbery in band
because of insufficiency of evidence. The trial court adjudged
thusly:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the TOTAL - 186,000.00
following accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Multiple Murder in Criminal Case No. C-57208, as defined 4. Estella Ablong San Juan -
and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 7659:
a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00

1. Audie Dona b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00

2. Alfredo Baracas
c) Funeral expense - 17,500.00

3. Bernardo Ranara (escaped) TOTAL - 167,500.00

4. Eduardo Palacpac
5. Heirs of Augusto Billodo -

5. Dominador Recepcion a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00

6. Joemari delos Reyes

b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00

7. Robert Alfonso TOTAL - 150,000.00

Accordingly, the 7 above-named accused shall each serve the

or the aggregate amount of P843,500.00.
penalty of DEATH FIVE (5) TIMES OVER corresponding to
the 5 victims they murdered.
Considering that the accused Diosdado Recepcion is now
deceased, he is hereby dropped from these cases, pursuant to
By way of civil liabilities, the 7 above-named accused shall
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
jointly and severally pay the following amounts of money to
the following complaining witnesses, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency: Considering also that the accused Bernardo Ranara is now at
large after having escaped on November 22, 1999, let an
Order of Arrest be issued against him for the service of his
1. Divina Ortega -
sentence in Criminal Case No. C-57208 for Multiple Murder.

a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00

As an Accessory to Multiple Murder under Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused FOl Felipe dela Cruz shall
b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00 serve the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10
years and 1 day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4
c) Funeral expense - 20,000.00 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with
all the accessory penalties under the law and shall pay the
T O T A L - 170,000.00 costs.

2. Virginia Cleofas - Criminal Case No. C-57209 for Illegal Possession of Firearms
is ordered dismissed, the filing thereof being unnecessary,
a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00 pursuant to Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294.

Criminal Case No. C-57210 for Robbery in Band is likewise

b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
ordered dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
c) Funeral expense - 20,000.00
The Branch Clerk of this Court shall now issue the
corresponding Commitment Order to the Director, Bureau of
TOTAL - 170,000.00 Corrections, thru the City Jail Warden of Quezon City.

3. Jocelyn Valdez - Pursuant to Section 22 of Rep. Act 7659, the Branch Clerk
shall elevate the complete records of this case to the
a) Death Indemnity - P 50,000.00 Honorable Supreme Court within 20 days but not earlier than
15 days after this promulgation, for automatic review.6
b) Moral Damages - 100,000.00
The capital punishment having been imposed on herein
c) Funeral expense - 36,000.00 appellants for the crime of multiple murder, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review. In their brief,
appellants ascribed to the trial court a number of alleged errors
but, by and large, they focused on the issue of credibility of the
witnesses and the imposition of the death penalty.
Appellants argue that the witnesses presented by the
prosecution have committed several inconsistencies, mainly on
the identities of the gunmen, said to be well enough to discredit
their testimony. The poor lighting condition of the pub, they
claim, could have easily blurred the vision of the witnesses
frustrating any clear identification of the assailants. The defense
also belabors the finding of conspiracy and, in general, of their
conviction by the trial court.
In criminal cases, particularly where the capital
punishment is imposed, this Court takes a most painstaking
effort to ascertain the guilt or innocence of the convicted
accused. Nevertheless, it has long been a standing rule that the
findings on the credibility of witnesses by the trial court are
hardly disturbed on appeal. The appellate court adheres to such
deference in view of the vantage that a trial court enjoys in its
reception of testimonial evidence, It is only when there
evidently are matters of substance that have been overlooked
that an appellate court would feel justified to ignore the
evaluation and assessment made by the trial court on such
evidence. Looking closely at the records, nothing significant is
disclosed to warrant a reversal of the rule. Observe thusly -
Testimony of Eliza Bautista
Q Miss Bautista, you said you are a waitress of
Sabungan Fastfood and Videoke?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as such, one of your duties is to serve food,
drinks or whatever to your customers?
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Daosos
Q Did you recall if you reported for work sometime
at around 12 to 1:00 oclock midnight at
Sabungan Fastfood on July 28, 1999?
A Yes, sir. I was there, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Daosos
Q Alright. You said you have 2 customers in the
name of San Juan and Ortega. And then, you
said also you pointed to the group of the
accused and you said that they were [y]our last
customers. Alright, more or less, what time did
[these] new customers or last customers of
yours arrived?
A 1:15 a.m., sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, when you saw them entering the Sabungan
Restaurant, what if any did you do being a
waitress?
A After they entered together, they ordered 7 beers.
So, I served 7 beers and then occupied a table
and after occupying the table, the 3 transferred
to another table, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Lets go back Miss Bautista to your last customers.
You said that you served beer to 7 customers
and you said they were your last and in fact,
you just pointed them because they are here, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Interpreter
Witness pointing to the accused.
Fiscal Daosos
Q Alright. How are you so sure that they were the
last customers on that early morning of July 28,
1999 at around 1:20 in the morning?
A Because I was the one serving them and I was able
to talk to them, sir.
Q Can you recall who among the 7 whom you talked
with first?
A That one, sir.
Interpreter
As witness pointing to the person who identified
himself as Robert Alfonso when asked.
Fiscal Daosos
Q Was he also the one who ordered beer from you?
A That one, sir. He was the one who ordered the 7
beers.
Interpreter
As witness pointing to the person who ordered 7
beers and identified himself as Audie Dona.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Daosos
Q Is there anything unusual that happened?
Court
Answer.
A I did not notice anything unusual when I served
beer, sir. Because after I gave them a bottle of
beer, after that they have put their beers on a
glass, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q After pouring beer to their glass, what else
happened?
A Nothing happened, sir. They just sat [there].
Q Alright. You said that Ortega and San Juan [were] Q In the evening of July 27, 1999?
shot dead. Now, would you know or recall who
shot Ortega and San Juan? A 6:00 p.m., sir.

A I know who shot Ortega. But I dont know who Q Up to what time?
shot San Juan, sir. A Up to 2:00 a.m., sir.
Q Alright, who shot Ortega? Q In the early morning of July 28, 1999 at about
A That man, sir. 1:20, do you recall of any unusual incident that
occurred in Sabungan Restaurant?
Interpreter
A Yes, sir.
Witness pointing to a person who identified himself
as Diosdado Recepcion when asked. Q What was that incident?

xxx xxx xxx A They shot somebody, sir.

Fiscal Daosos Q Who shot somebody?

Q Alright. We go back Miss Witness to the 7
customers that you served beer. Now, [these] 7
customers that you [said] became your last
customer[s] that evening, would you be able to
identify or recognize their faces if you see them
again?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court
Teka, isa-isahin mo. Sige.
Interpreter
As witness pointing to Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo
Baracas, Audie Dona, Robert Alfonso,
Eduardo Palacpac, Joemari delos Reyes,
Dominador Recepcion.
Fiscal Daosos
Q Thank you Miss Witness. Alright, Miss Bautista,
do you recall if all or anyone of these 7
customers that you have just identified were
old or former customers of Sabungan
Restaurant?
A Not our former customers, sir.7
Testimony of Marie Flamiano
Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
A They are here in Court, sir.
Q Whom did you see shooting somebody at that
time?
A Para silang walang awang namaril..
Atty. Ongteco
Your Honor, the answer is irresponsive.
Court
Let it remain, just answer what is being asked of you.
Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
You said that there were persons who shot
individuals in Sabungan, how many were they?
A Seven (7), sir.
Q Now, if they are here in Court, will you be able to
recognize them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you point to them if they are here in Court?
Interpreter
Witness is pointing to 7 male persons inside this
Courtroom, who when asked their names,
answered..Diosdado Recepcion, Alfredo
Baracas, Joemari delos Reyes, Bernardo
Ranara, Dominador Recepcion, Robert
Alfonso and Audie Dona.

Ms. Witness, you said you are a waitress at
Sabungan Restaurant, how long have you been
a waitress thereat?
A For 7 months, now, sir.
Asst. Chief Pros. Mariano
These 7 persons whom you identified, do you know
what particular acts they did at the Sabungan
incident?

Q Do you remember having reported for work on the A They were shooting.
evening of July 27, 1999?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Aside from the fact that you saw them with guns,
Q And what is your working hours at the Sabungan what else did you see?
Restaurant?
A I saw the dead person outside, that person was
A From 6:00 p.m., sir. already kneeling and begging for life but they
still killed that person.
Q And do you know who shot that person who was
already kneeling?
A The first person I pointed out in Court.
Q And you are referring to?
A Diosdado Recepcion, sir.8
On cross-examination, this witness elaborated:
Q And what could be your basis in pointing to
Diosdado Recepcion as well as to accused
Alfredo Baracas and the rest, when you did not
see who shot whom?
A Because I saw them, sir.
Q How far were you from these two accused that I
mentioned during the shooting incident?
A About 7 to 8 meters, sir.
Q At that time the shooting incident occurred, what
was your duty, if ever?
A Because it was almost our closing time, I was just
sitting, I have nobody to serve.
Q When these 7 persons entered, were there other
customers in the establishment?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words, when you scampered outside, you
did not see with particularity the accused
shooting the victim, is that correct?
A While I was running, I saw them, they were
shooting the victims, sir.
Q You mean to tell me that during the time you were
running outside, your head was turning back to
where the accused were situated shooting?
A Yes, sir. (Witness is pointing as to the direction of
the door of the restaurant)
Q With that distance you are pointing to, to the
corner of this room, you could have not
ascertain[ed] Mr. Diosdado Recepcion holding
a gun and shooting at somebody, is that
correct?
A I saw him, sir.
Q In fact in your testimony, you cannot identify
whether it was a short gun or a long gun?
A Yes, sir, I could not identify the kind of guns they
were using.
Q Because you became very scared, frightened and
nervous that is why you scampered outside?
A Yes, sir.
Q And also because of that nervousness and fright
that you experienced, you are in doubt whether
it was really Diosdado Recepcion whom you
saw?
A I saw him sir. (Siya po).
Q That incident on July 28, 1999 was the first time
that you saw this person whom you pointed as
Diosdado Recepcion, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, how can you be very sure that it was him who
was holding a gun and shooting at somebody
when you said that was the first time that you
saw him and your distance was quite far and
likewise you cannot determine or ascertain
whether he was holding a long gun or short
gun?
A Because I saw them standing, sir.
Q You mean to tell me that aside from Diosdado
Recepcion, all the 7 accused were all standing?
A Yes, sir, they were all standing.
Q And you also would like to impress before this
Court that all the 7 accused were holding a gun
and were all standing and were all shooting at
somebody?
A I am not sure but all of them stood up and shot
somebody.9
Testimony of Jojo Paraiso
Q Now, on the said date, July 28, 1999 at around
1:30 in the morning, do you still remember
your whereabouts?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at Sabungan Restaurant, sir.
Q Accordingly, you were on duty on said date, July
28, 1999. Why were you at Sabungan
Fastfood?
A I was already off-duty at that time, sir.
Q Now, who were with you at Sabungan Restaurant,
if any?
A We were 5, sir.
Q Please tell us their names or some of them?
A Our Asst. OIC, Benjamin Valdez, Fisaret, Daniel
Aycardo, Jimmy Serrano and myself, sir.
Q Would I get from you that all these companions of
yours were also security guards?
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Bajar
While you and your 4 other companions were inside
the Sabungan Restaurant on July 28, 1999 at
 around 1:30 in the early morning, do you
remember any unusual incident that happened
inside or outside thereat?
A Yes, sir.
Q But before that, what were you and your other 4
companions doing at the Sabungan Restaurant
on the wee-hours of July 28, 1999?
A We were having a drinking spree, sir.
Q What was that unusual incident that happened
inside the Sabungan Restaurant?
A A shooting incident suddenly took place and then
we dropped ourselves on the ground because of
that shooting incident, sir.
Q But before that shooting incident, do you recall
what particular place inside the Sabungan
Restaurant were you seated?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you particularly seated?
A Near the side of the Sabungan Fastfood and we
were in front of the videoke machine, sir.
Q When you said in front you were just very near?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, [was] there any other persons inside the
Sabungan Fastfood aside from you and your
companions?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many, if you remember?
A We were 9, sir.
Court
And aside from the 5 of them?
A There were 9 customers in all in that restaurant,
sir.
Court
Q Including you or excluding you?
A Including me, sir. We were 9 customers.
Fiscal Bajar
Q How about the non-customers?
A 7, sir.
Q And what were [these] non-customers doing
inside the Sabungan Restaurant?
A They also ordered beer and they also posed as
customers, sir.
But they were not able to drink beer and when they
ordered they already fired their guns, sir.
Fiscal Bajar
Q Now, where were [these] other non-customers
who were ordering beers situated inside the
Sabungan Restaurant in relation to where you
were seated?
A They positioned themselves at the center of the
videoke machine but at first they were together
and then they ordered, the 3 separated from the
group, sir.
Q And how far was your table from this table of the
non-customers?
A About 3 meters away from our table, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Bajar
Q Okay. Now, after the group parted ways and the 3
occupied another table, what happened?
A 3 minutes after, the 3 separated from the group and
the shooting started, sir.
Q And where did the shooting come from?
A From the 3 persons who separated from the group,
sir.
Q Why did you say that it came from the 3 persons?
A Because after hearing the first shot, I looked at that
direction, sir.
Q And were you able to see the firearms used in
firing the shots?
A I saw a light or spark that came out from the nozzle
of the gun after I heard the shot, sir.
Q And to what direction does the firing directed or
pointed to?
A To the persons they shot, sir.
Q Where were [these] persons firing located?
A They were seated because they were also drinking,
sir.
Q In relation to where you were seated and drinking,
where were these persons located?
A They were at the side of the restaurant and near
the table who fired the shots, sir.
Q And how many table[s] were [occupied by these]
persons and to where the firing was directed?
A Only one (1), sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Bajar
Q Now, how many shots did you hear?
A Many, sir. And I could not count it, sir.
Q And how about you, what did you do when you
heard this successive shots from the table of
this 3 persons?
A One of them shouted dapa, that is why I hid myself
under the table, sir.
Q Now, how about your other 4 companions, what
did they do after you dropped yourself [on] the
ground?
A The other one who was shot remained seated in
front of his table. But my other 3 companions
docked on the table, sir.
Q And what happened to that person who was shot?
That [lone] person that according to you who
was shot?
A He died, sir.
Q And after you have yuko, did you notice what
happened next?
A I looked outside, sir. And then I found out that my
[companion was] shot and then the one beside
him was shot next, sir.
Q Now, where did this person who shot your
companions come from because, according to
you, you were looking outside?
A That person who shot my companion was near the
table of my other companion that was shot and
the distance of my companion from the one
who shot him was only about a meter away, sir.
Q When you said companion who was shot, you
referring to the one who transferred to another
table?
A Yes, sir. Our companion, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, after you saw your companions shot, what did
you do, if any?
A I remained there under the table but sometimes I
would look and sometimes I would bow my
head.
Q And to whom were you looking at?
A To our companions, sir.
Q And do you remember how many times [you
performed] that yuko, tingin, yuko, tingin?
A Whenever I noticed that they were looking at me,
I [would] look down or bow my head, sir.
Court
What do you mean they?
A The one who [shot] my companions, your Honor.
Fiscal Bajar
Q And how far was this person who [shot] your
companions from you who was looking at him
and to the one who looked at you?
A About 4 meters, sir.
Q Now, if that person is in Court, would you be able
to identify him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him if he is around? You [tap] his
shoulder, if you want?
A Yes, sir. This one, sir.
Interpreter
Witness tapped the shoulder of Robert Alfonso.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Could you recognize anyone of them?
A The one who shot our companions and he was
with the 4 persons in that table, sir.
Q So, the question is if you have recognized anyone
of the persons who remained in the table?
A Yes, sir. The one who came out last after the
shooting, sir. But when he came out he fired a
gun.
Q If that last person you saw was on their way out
from the Sabungan Restaurant is in Court, can
you point to him? Please step down and tap the
shoulder if he is around?
A Yes, sir. This one, sir.
Interpreter
As witness stepped down from the witness stand and
tapped the shoulder of the accused Joemari
Delos Reyes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, please demonstrate to us how your
companion was shot by Robert Alfonso?
A Like this, sir. The accused was in the standing
position when he fired [at] my companion at a
distance of one (1) meter. And after shooting
my companion, that gun man fired again at a
man beside my companion, sir.
Q And what was the position of your companion
when he was fired upon?
A He was seated, sir. -
Q And what was then your position when you saw
your companion being shot?
A I was under the table but I was looking at their
direction, sir.10
On cross-examination, Paraiso continued:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that the shooting incident
happened at 1:30 in the early morning of July
28, 1999. What time did you start drinking at
the Sabungan Restaurant?
A About 12:45 a.m., sir.
Q How many bottles of what were you drinking?
A Beer, sir.
Q How many bottles of beer have you already
consumed?
A During the shooting incident 2 bottles, sir.
Q Now, according also to you it was the 3 men who
separated from the larger group [who]
transferred to another table?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it was after about 15 minutes that one of them
started shooting?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How did you position yourself when you hid
yourself under the table? How did you position
yourself? Did the table completely cover you?
A The table completely covered me, sir.
Q Could you say that you were not shot because you
were not seen by the gunman?
A Yes, sir. I know that they did not notice me there
under the table, sir. Maybe if they noticed me
that I was there under the table looking at them,
maybe they would shoot me, sir.
Q So, we can presume that you were not shot
because you were not seen by the gunman?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were not seen because the table was about 3
x 3 ft. Do you mean to tell us Mr. Witness that
3 ft. x 3 ft. table was able to accommodate all 5
of you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you were also not seen by the gunman
because the table was covered by the table
cloth?
A No cover, sir.
Q You felt that at that time that you present yourself
under the table was not detected by the gunman
because none of them noticed you under the
table?
A I know that I was [not] noticed by them, sir.
Because they have noticed me under the table
and they know that I was looking at them, they
will shoot me, sir.11
Testimony of Jhosa Reyes
Q In the early morning of July 28, 1999, do you
remember of any unusual incident that
happened at your place of work?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident, if you can still recall?
A There was a shooting incident, sir.
Q Where was that shooting incident?
A In Sabungan, sir, in front of the place where I
work.
Q How far is that Sabungan from your place of
work?
A Across the highway, sir.
Q Do you know who were the persons who fired
their guns at Sabungan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know these persons?
A Because the persons who fired their guns were our
customers first before they transferred to
Sabungan, sir.
Q How often do you see these persons at your dining
place?
A Twice, sir.
Q When was the first time that you saw them?
A Every week, sir.
Q What were they doing when they [went] to your
place?
A They [drank], sir.
Q How many are these persons, if your can
remember?
A Because the 3 persons used to go to our place but
recently they were 4 already but the other one
was not drinking, sir, just [went] back and
forth.
Q These customers whom you said were the ones
who started shooting at Sabungan, who were
these persons, if you know?
A I was able to recognize Ricky, Edwin.
Q Who else? I thought you said there were 4 of them.
Court
The question [was], who fired the gun?
FISCAL MARIANO
Q Who were these persons who fired the gun?
Court
Ricky, Edwin, sino pa?
Witness A I was about to leave then and I have already
passengers when some people suddenly
Those are the only two but almost all of them, Your arrived, sir.
Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Mariano
Q Did you, if you did notice if the 3 men who
If they are in Courtroom, will you be able to identify ordered immediately to let your passengers get
them? off the jeep, if they were armed?
A Yes, sir. Atty. Ongteco
Q Please point them out. The same objection.
Atty. Ongteco Court
May we request that the witness tell the Court who Same ruling, you are practically telling the witness
is Ricky, Edwin? that they were armed.
Court Fiscal Daosos
Unahin si Ricky. Tumayo ang itinuro. Q Alright, while the 3 ordered you, did you notice
Mr. dela Cruz anything, if you did any?

Witness pointed to a person who when asked of his A They were armed with guns, sir.
name, answered to the name of Robert Alfonso. Q What kind of guns, are they long arms or short
Court arms?

Sino pa? Iyong bumaril, ha? A Short arms, sir.

Mr. dela Cruz xxx xxx xxx

Witness pointed to a person who when asked
of his name answered to the name of Joemari
delos Reyes.
Court
Sino pa?
Mr. dela Cruz
Witness pointed to a person who when asked
of his name answered to the name of Eduardo
Palacpac.12
Testimony of Ruben Labiata
Q Mr. Labjata, will you tell this Honorable Court
where were you in the early morning of July
28, 1999?
A I was in Dagohoy with my jeepney waiting for
passengers, sir.
Q More or less, what time was that when you were
with your jeep and waiting for passengers?
A Between twelve and one a.m., sir.
Q Do you recall, Mr. Labjata, of any unusual
incident that occurred while waiting for
passengers inside your jeepney?
A While my jeep was parked there, I heard gunshots,
sir.
Q What else, if any, happened?
Q Other than the 3 were there other persons who
boarded your jeep?
Atty. Ongteco
Same objection.
Court
I will allow that.
Atty. Ongteco
But that is the same banana because according to the
witness, the 3 persons ordered the other
passengers of the jeep to alight.
Court
That was ordering the passengers to alight. The
question now is, were there other persons who
boarded your jeep. I will allow that. Answer
that.
Witness
When they told me to start the jeep, there were some
persons who boarded the jeep, sir.
Fiscal Daosos
Q Can you also tell the Honorable Court briefly what
was the condition of this other group who also
boarded?
A They were also holding guns, sir.
Q More or less, how many of them, the one[s] that
boarded again?
A When I start[ed] the engine or already driving the
jeep I saw 8, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Daosos
Q When you were ordered to go, what did you do, if
any?
A I drove the jeep and then we made a turn near the
Monumento Circle and proceeded to Edsa, sir.
Q While you were proceeding to Edsa, did you
notice anything unusual again?
A Yes, sir, I noticed something unusual because
while they were conversing to each other, I
heard somebody said that hindi ako ang
bumaril.
xxx xxx xxx
Q From Petron Gas Station after you have gassed up,
where did you go, if you went somewhere else?
A We proceeded to the highway and then when we
were already far from Petron, we made a left
turn, sir.
Q In what direction was this left [turn] going
towards?
A I am not familiar with that route, sir.
Q By the way, who among the group ordered you to
what direction you [were] going to?
A The one on my left side, sir.
Q At that point of time, did the group tell you where
you [were] going?
A I do not know where to go but they ordered me
and I followed them.
Q Now, as a jeepney driver from Bulacan, can you
tell the Honorable Court to what direction or
route you were going?
A After making a left turn, we passed by a 711 store,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were driving your jeep from Caloocan
City to Tarlac, was there a time whether one of
the group told you what to do?
A Yes, sir. They poked a gun at me and told me to
follow them whatever they wanted me to do,
sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q While you were so scared because you were
ordered and you realized that you reached
Paniqui, was there at any moment while
driving your jeep that you [felt] that you might
be killed by this armed men?
Atty. Ongteco
Leading.
Fiscal Daosos
I am asking for his feelings.
Court
Did you ever feel that you might be killed? I will
allow it.
Witness
Because when we arrived [at] Tarlac, I heard one of
them said tumba.
xxx xxx xxx
Court
What did you do after hearing tumba? Witness may
answer.
Witness
I told them, Sir, maawa naman po kayo.
Fiscal Daosos
Q To whom did you address your words?
A I just said, Maawa naman po kayo, huwag ninyo
po akong itumba because, I have a family.
Q After you told the group of the accused that,
Sir, huwag naman ninyo akong itumba, what
else transpired?
A One of them said, in behalf of your
family, bubuhayin ka namin for the sake of
your family. (Alang-alang sa pamilya mo).
Q What else, if any, after one of them told you that
for the sake of your family, we will not kill you.
A They told me that after reaching Tarlac, I will
return back and without turning my head and
do not report to the police or else they will
shoot me.
Q So, after you received those orders, what did you
do, if any?
A When they alighted from the jeep, I did not look
at them. Once they alighted, I proceeded or
went back to Bulacan, sir.
Q You said that after hearing their orders and
reaching Paniqui, Tarlac, they went down.
They alighted. Did all of them alight at the
same time?
A They alighted one after the other, sir.
Q After they have alighted, what else if any
transpired?
A I left at a place where they alighted and then I went
back to Bulacan, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When did you see them again?
A After they were arrested from their hideout, sir.
Q Where exactly did you meet them at Paniqui,
Tarlac?
A At the Municipal Hall of Paniqui, Tarlac, sir.
Q More or less, what time was that already?
A About past eight in the morning, sir.
Q You said that at around past eight, you saw the
group again who commandeered your jeep.
How did you know that they were the same
persons who commandeered your jeep that
early morning of July 28, 1999?
A Because I was able to recognize the faces of the
others, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, if you can see the faces of this group
of persons who commandeered your jeep and
who threatened to kill you and who ordered you
to stop at Paniqui, Tarlac, and which you saw
again the following day in the morning at
Paniqui, Tarlac, would you be able to recognize
their faces again if you will see these people?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, will you please stand, Mr. Witness, and look
around this courtroom and then point to the
faces of those people whom you said
commandeered your jeep in that early
morning?
Mr. Nestor dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Audie Dona.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Alfredo
Baracas.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Diosdado
Recepcion.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Bernardo
Ranara.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Eduardo
Palacpac.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Dominador
Recepcion.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Joemari
delos Reyes.
Fiscal Daosos
Who else?
Mr. dela Cruz
The witness pointed to a man, who when asked of
his name, answered to the name of Robert
Alfonso.13
The eyewitnesses categorically identified the malefactors.
The alleged discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses
could easily be explained by the fact that they saw the incident
from different angles of the shooting. The impact of events, as
well as the unconscious working of the mind, it is said, could
readily warp the human perception in varying ways and
degrees. Empiric data is yet to be found in order to accurately
measure the value of testimony of a witness other than its
conformity to human behavior and the common experience of
mankind.14
The defense of alibi proffered by appellants is much too
weak against the positive identification made by the
eyewitnesses. It is not enough for an alibi to prosper to prove
that the person raising it has been somewhere else when the
crime is committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that it
would have been physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.15 Where there is the least chance to be
present at the locus criminis, alibi will not hold much
water.16 The bare evidence given by appellants to vouch their
individual claims and establish alibi is far from being iron-clad
against the possibility of their having been at the crime scene.
Article 24817 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, makes a person guilty of murder
if the killing is attended by, among other circumstances (but not
here appurtenant), treachery or evident premeditation. An
essence of treachery is not only the swiftness and the surprise
in the attack upon an unsuspecting victim but also the
attendance of two concurring conditions, i.e., that the
malefactor must have employed means, method or manner of
execution that would insure his safety from the retaliatory act
of the victim, and such means, method or form of execution are
consciously and deliberately adopted by the malefactor. The
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, on the other
hand, requires that the execution of the criminal act be preceded
by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the
criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a
calm judgment.18Evident premeditation needs proof of the time
when the intent to commit the crime is engendered in the mind
of the accused, the motive which gives rise to it, and the means
which are beforehand selected to carry out that intent. All such
facts and antecedents which make notorious the pre-existing
design to accomplish the criminal purpose must be proven to
the satisfaction of the court.19
A scrutiny of the facts in evidence would indicate a scanty
showing of the requirements to qualify the senseless killing of
the five victims, either by treachery or by evident
premeditation, to murder. While the attack upon the victims
could be described as being unexpected, somehow voiding any
risk to the perpetrators thereof, there, is, however, insufficient
evidence to indicate that the means adopted by the appellants
have consciously been adopted. Mere suddenness of the attack
is not enough to show treachery; it should also be shown that
the mode of attack has knowingly been intended to accomplish
the wicked intent.20 Neither would evident premeditation
qualify the offense to murder in the absence of clear
substantiation that the appellants have definitely resolved to
commit the offense and have reflected on the means to bring
about the execution following an appreciable length of time.
The trial court, however, correctly appreciated conspiracy.
The presence of conspiracy could be revealed by the acts done
before, during and after the commission of the crime that made
evident a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.21 The several acts of appellants during and after the
shooting rampage disclosed a unison of objectives. Not one
tried to stop the other in the perpetration of the crime. All were
clearly in it together, performing specific acts with such
closeness and coordination as would unmistakably show a
common scheme. The attendance of treachery would thus
render it unnecessary for the prosecution to show who among
the conspirators actually hit and killed their victims, each of
them being equally liable with the other in the perpetration of
the crime.
Without proof of any circumstance that would qualify it,
the killing could not amount to murder. Appellants should thus
be held liable only for homicide for the death of each of the
victims. It was alleged in the accusatory information and shown
in evidence that the crimes were indeed perpetrated with the use
of unlicensed firearms. Pursuant to Republic Act
829422(amending Presidential Decree No. 1866), which was
already in effect when the killing spree occurred, if homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such
use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
The trial court has convicted FOl Felipe dela Cruz as an
accessory. This Court, however, finds no evidence to convict
him as such accessory. Under Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code, the actual knowledge of the commission of the crime is
an important element to being an encubridor, and the records
are bereft of sound proof that dela Cruz has had knowledge of
any or all of the nefarious deeds earlier committed by his guests.
The arrest of appellants has been made in hot pursuit, an
exception from the rule that warrantless arrests are illegal. In
any event, appellants can no longer assail the illegality of their
arrest since such a claim has not been brought up before or
during the arraignment. The failure to timely move for the
quashal of the Information on this basis operates as a waiver of
the right to question the supposed irregularity of the arrest. 23
The crime of homicide is punishable under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code by reclusion temporal with a duration
of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the appellants may be held to suffer
imprisonment, as minimum, of anywhere within the full range
of prision mayor of from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and, as
maximum, to anywhere within the range of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, considering the attendance of
the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm,
of from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
The damages awarded by the trial court accord with
prevailing jurisprudence except for the grant of P100,000.00
moral damages to the heirs of each of the victims which amount
should be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a
quo convicting appellants is AFFIRMED subject to the
following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
Appellants Dominador Recepcion, Audie Dona, Alfredo
Baracas, Eduardo Palacpac, Bernardo Ranara, Joemari delos
Reyes and Robert Alfonso are all hereby found guilty of
homicide, on five counts, and each of them shall suffer five
imprisonment terms, each for the death of their five victims, of
the indeterminate penalty of 9 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, and shall pay,
jointly and severally, the sums adjudged by the trial court
except that the P100,000.00 moral damages to each victim is
reduced, correspondingly, to P50,000.00.
Appellant Felipe dela Cruz is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
DELFIN LIM and JIKIL TAHA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCO PONCE DE LEON AND ORLANDO
MADDELA, defendants-appellees.
Ricardo L. Manalilig for plaintiffs-appellants.
Iñigo R. Peña for defendants-appellees.
MARTIN, J.:
Appeal on a question of law from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Palawan in Civil Case No. 416, entitled
"Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha vs. Francisco Ponce de Leon and
Orlando Maddela", dismissing the complaint of the plaintiffs
and ordering them to pay each of the defendants jointly and
severally the sum of P500.00 by way of actual damages;
P500.00 by way of attorney's fees; and P1,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
On April 29, 1961, plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a
certain Alberto Timbangcaya of Brooke's Point, Palawan a
motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on
April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after
the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from
him.
On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity
as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Palawan the corresponding information for
Robbery the Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil
Taha. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2719.
On June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon
being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan
requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in
Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. 1
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request
to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking
custody of the same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the
motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim and impounded it.
On July 15, 1962 plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with
Orlando Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter
refused. Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through
his counsel made representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to
return the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but
Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was
the subject of a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to naught,
plaintiffs-appellants Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha, on November
19, 1962, filed with the Court of First Instance of Palawan a
complaint for damages against defendants-appellees Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that
on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of
Delfin Lim without a search warrant and then and there took
away the hull of the motor launch without his consent; that he
effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who
knew fully well that his office was not vested with authority to
order the seizure of a private property; that said motor launch
was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration
of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) of which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance
payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the
motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July
6, 1962, the said motor launch had been moored at the Balabac
Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had
become worthless and beyond repair. For the alleged violation
of their constitutional rights, plaintiffs-appellants prayed that
defendants-appellees be ordered to pay jointly and severally
each of them the sum of P5,750.00 representing actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material
allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses
alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by
Jikil Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was
sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon
persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo
Timbangcaya without the latter's knowledge and consent, thus
giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery against
Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to
seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for
being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando
Maddela merely obeyed the orders of his superior officer to
impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-
appellees alleged that because of the malicious and groundless
filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-appellants, they were
constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them
paying P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each and actual damages
in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of
them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000.00.
On September 13, 1965, the trial court rendered its decision,
upholding the validity of the seizure of the motor launch on
the ground that "the authority to impound evidences or
exhibits or corpus delicti in a case pending investigation is
inherent in the Provincial Fiscal who controls the prosecution
and who introduces those exhibits in the court." Accordingly,
the trial court dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants
and ordered them to pay jointly and severally each of the
defendants-appellees the amount of P500.00 by way of actual
damages another amount of P500.00 for attorney's fees and
P1,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Hence, this appeal.
Two vital issues call for resolution by this Court. First,
whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had
the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question
without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime. Second, whether or
not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-
appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them granting
that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
The gravamen of plaintiffs-appellants' argument is that the
taking of the motor launch on July 6, 1962 by Orlando
Maddela upon the order of Fiscal Ponce de Loon was in
violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures since it was done without a warrant.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution then in force reads:
3) The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 3
A cursory reading of the above provision easily brings into
focus the unreasonableness of the seizure of the
aforementioned motor launch. A search and seizure to be
reasonable, must be effected by means of a valid search
warrant. And for a search warrant to be valid: (1) it must be
issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause,
the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized. 4 Thus in a long
line of decisions, this Court has declared invalid search
warrants which were issued in utter disregard of the
constitutional injunction. 5
Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela
entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor
launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he
effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and
without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question
that without the proper search warrant, no public official has
the right to enter the premises of another without his consent
for the purpose of search and seizure. 6 And since in the
present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch
without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right
of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Defendants-appellees however would want to justify the
seizure of the motor launch even without a warrant because of
Fiscal Ponce de Leon's alleged inherent power to order the
seizure of a personal property which is the corpus delicti of a
crime, he being a quasi judicial officer who has the control of
the prosecution and the presentation of the evidence in the
criminal case. They argue that inasmuch as the motor launch
in question was allegedly stolen by Jikil Taha from
Timbangcaya, Fiscal Ponce de Leon could order its seizure
even without a search warrant. We cannot agree. Under the
old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested
in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no search
and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the time
the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule
that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a
search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the
motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de
Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which
amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which
confers upon the provincial fiscal; the authority to issue
warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a
personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime.
True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of
provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but
said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to
determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether
or not probable cause exists therefor. 8
Moreover, under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court 9 which complement the constitutional provision earlier
cited, two principles are made clear, namely: (1) that in the
seizure of a stolen property search warrant is still necessary;
and (2) that in issuing a search warrant the judge alone
determines whether or not there is a probable cause. The fact
that a thing is a corpus delicti of a crime does not justify its
seizure without a warrant. As held in U.S. v. de los
Reyes and Esguerra, 10 citing McClurg v. Brenton: 11
The mere fact that a man is an officer,
whether of high or low degree, gives him no
more right than is possessed by the ordinary
private citizen to break in upon the privacy
of a home and subject its occupant to the
indignity of a search for the evidence of
crime, without a legal warrant procured for
that purpose. No amount of incriminating
evidence whatever its source, will supply the
place of such warrant. At the closed door of
the home be it palace or hovel even
bloodhounds must wait till the law, by
authoritative process, bids it open.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon would also invoke
lack of time to procure a search warrant as an excuse for the
seizure of the motor launch without one. He claimed that the
motor launch had to be seized immediately in order to
preserve it and to prevent its removal out of the locality, since
Balabac, Palawan, where the motor launch was at the time,
could only be reached after three to four days' travel by
boat. 12 The claim cannot be sustained. The records show that
on June 15, 1962 13 Fiscal Ponce de Leon made the first
request to the Provincial Commander for the impounding of
the motor launch; and on June 26, 1962 14 another request was
made. The seizure was not effected until July 6, 1962. In short,
Fiscal Ponce de Leon had all the time to procure a search
warrant had he wanted to and which he could have taken in
less than a day, but he did not. Besides, there is no basis for
the apprehension that the motor launch might be moved out of
Balabac because even prior to its seizure the motor launch was
already without its engine. 15 In sum, the fact that there was no
time to secure a search warrant would not legally justify a
search without one. 16
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages, plaintiffs-
appellants anchor their claim for damages on Articles 32 and
2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in part as follows:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for
damages.
xxx xxx xxx
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
xxx xxx xxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) Illegal search;
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Acts and action referred to in Articles
21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose
constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled
to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary
damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim claimed that he purchased the motor
launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00, having
given P2,000.00 as advanced payment; that since or seizure on
July 6, 1962 the motor launch had been moored at Balabac
Bay and because of exposure to the elements it has become
worthless at the time of the filing of the present action; that
because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he
suffered moral damages in the sum of P1,000.00; and that
because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were
constrained to engage the services of a lawyer whom they
have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find these claims
of Delfin Lim amply supported by the evidence and therefore
should be awarded the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages;
P1,000.00 as moral damages and P750.00 for attorney's fees.
However, with respect co plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled
to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered from
the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had
already transferred the ownership and possession of the motor
launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore,
he has no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure.
Well settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 17 Consequently, one who is not the owner, lessee, or
lawful occupant of the premise searched cannot raise the
question of validity of the search and seizure. 18 Jikil Taha is
not without recourse though. He can still collect from his co-
plaintiff, Delfin Lim the unpaid balance of P1,000.00.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted to wash his
hands of the incident by claiming that "he was in good faith,
without malice and without the slightest intention of inflicting
injury to plaintiff-appellant, Jikil Taha" 19when he ordered the
seizure of the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his
defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that
defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Dr.
Jorge Bocobo, Chairman of the Code Commission, gave the
following reasons during the public hearings of the Joint
Senate and House Committees, why good faith on the part of
the public officer or employee is immaterial. Thus:
DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding
individual rights; Attorney Cirilo Paredes
proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to
make a public official liable for violation of
another person's constitutional rights only if
the public official acted maliciously or in
bad faith. The Code Commission opposes
this suggestion for these reasons:
The very nature of Article 32 is that the
wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be
malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of
 Article 32 which is the effective protection
of individual rights. Public officials in the
past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the
object of the Article is to put an end to
official abuse by the plea of good faith. In
the United States this remedy is in he nature
of a tort.
Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of
the fundamental articles introduced in the
New Civil Code to implement democracy.
There is no real democracy if a public
official is abusing, and we made the article
so strong and so comprehensive that it
concludes an abuse of individual rights even
if done in good faith, that official is liable.
As a matter of fact, we know that there are
very few public officials who openly and
definitely abuse the individual rights of the
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified
on a plea of desire to enforce the law to
comply with one's duty. And so, if we
should limit the scope of this article, that
would practically nullify the object of the
article. Precisely, the opening object of the
article is to put an end to abuses which are
justified by a plea of good faith, which is in
most cases the plea of officials abusing
individual rights. 20
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held
accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the
order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may
be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior
officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant
Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that
after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the
Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was
reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders
from his superior officer. 21It was only after he was furnished a
copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26,
1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the
necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that
the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not
prevent the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he
impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter
coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was
led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to
impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior
officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor
launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his
Commander, Maddela was left with no alternative but to seize
the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are not
disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from
is hereby reversed and another one entered declaring the
seizure illegal and ordering defendant-appellee Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages, plus P1,000.00
moral damages, and, in addition, P750.00 for attorney's fees.
With costs against defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon.
SO ORDERED.
Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29, 1975
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL
CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor
launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later or on April
9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale
Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the
motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial
Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the
detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take
custody of the motor launch.
On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request
to the Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking
custody of the same. 2 So, on July 6, 1962 upon order of the
Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor
launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim
and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco
Ponce de Leon and Orlando Maddela, alleging that on July 6,
1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull
of the motor launch without his consent; that he effected the
seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well
that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure
of a private property; that said motor launch was purchased by
Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three Thousand
Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which
has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a
consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor launch, its
sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said
motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and
because of exposure to the elements it had become worthless
and beyond repair.
In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material
allegations of the complaint and as affirmative defenses alleged
that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha
to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in
April 1962, forcibly taken with violence upon persons and with
intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without
the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing
of a criminal charge of robbery against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal
Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the
motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for being the corpus delicti of
the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the
orders of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way
of counterclaim, defendants-appellees alleged that because of
the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by
plaintiffs-appellants, they were constrained to engage the
services of lawyers, each of them paying P500.00 as attorney's
fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00
each. They also prayed that each of them awarded exemplary
damages in the amount of P1,000.00.
ISSUES/HELD:
whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the
power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question
without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.
ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is
vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no
search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant
whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to
plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them
granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of
the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of
the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required
that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.
Except for Madella who was merely acting under orders.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor
launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional
right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant
is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no other officer and no
search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. At the
time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or
rule that recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue
a search warrant. In his vain attempt to justify the seizure of the
motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de
Leon invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which
amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the Revised
Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which
confers upon the provincial fiscal; the authority to issue
warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of
a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime.
True, Republic Act No. 732 has broadened the power of
provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but
said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to
determine, before issuing the corresponding warrant, whether
or not probable cause exists therefor. 8
We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be
liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs
and it is not required that defendants should have acted with
malice or bad faith.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held
accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the
order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may
be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior
officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant
Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that
after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the
Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant
to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his
superior officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of
the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the
letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of
the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the
subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent
the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded
the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from
the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe
that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.
Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the
delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 23 Faced with a
possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela
was left with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light
of the above circumstances. We are not disposed to hold
Maddela answerable for damages.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-61388 July 19, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR
DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE,
SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINA GRACIA,
IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA,
ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO
TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA
GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO
GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ, JOSEFINA GARCIA
PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL
FABIAN C. VER GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT.
COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents.
Lorenzo Tanada, Jose W. Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Efren H.
Mercado and Alexander A. Padilla for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Garcia Padilla v. Minister Enrile, 1 is an application for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of fourteen
detainees, nine of whom were arrested on July 6,
1982, 2 another four on July 7, 1982, 3 and the last one on July
15, 1982. 4 The writ was issued, respondents were required to
make a return, and the case heard on August 26, 1982. 5
In such return, it was alleged: "The detainees mentioned in the
petition, with the exception of Tom Vasquez, who was
temporarily released on July 17, 1982, after his arrest on July
15, 1982, are all being detained by virtue of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, pursuant
to LOI No. 1211 dated March 9, 1982, in relation to
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045 dated January 17, 1981.
The said PCO was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos
for violation of P.D. No. 885 ... ." 6
The facts were set forth thus in the opinion of the Court
penned by retired Justice Pacifico de Castro: "At the time of
the arrest of the nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein
on July 6, 1982, records reveal that they were then having
conference in the dining room of Dr. Parong's residence from
10:00 a.m. of that same day. Prior thereto, all the fourteen (14)
detainees were under surveillance as they were then Identified
as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
engaging in subversive activities and using the house of
detainee Dr. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, as
their headquarters. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9)
detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions
leaving on top of their conference table numerous subversive
documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence,
stationeries, and other papers, including a plan on how they
would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named
YORK). Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight
(8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16
armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos P
l8,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted
medicine packed and ready for distribution, a sizeable quantity
of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized. 7
According to the main opinion of the Court, concurred in full
by six other members: 8 "The function of the PCO is to
validate, on constitutional ground, the detention of a person
for any of the offenses covered by Proclamation No. 2045
which continues in force the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, if the arrest has been made initially
without any warrant. Its legal effect is to render the writ
unavailing as a means of judicially inquiring into the legality
of the detention in view of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ. The grant of the power to suspend the said privilege
provides the basis for continuing with perfect legality the
detention as long as the invasion or rebellion has not been
repelled or quelled and the need therefor in the interest of
public safety continues." 9 Further: "The significance of the
confernment of this power, constitutionally upon the President
as Commander-in-Chief, is that the exercise thereof is not
subject to judicial inquiry, with a view to determining its
legality in the light of the bill of rights guarantee to individual
freedom." 10
The opinion then went on to reiterate the doctrine that with the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
right to bail is likewise suspended and to hold "that under LOI
1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which
is the executive prerogative of the President under the
Constitution, may not be declared void by the Courts, under
the doctrine of 'political question,' as has been applied in the
Baker and Castañeda cases, on any ground, let alone its
supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting,
if not abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang
case." 11 Finally, the Court held "that upon the issuance of the
Presidential Commitment Order against herein petitioners,
their continued detention is rendered valid and legal, and their
right to be released even after the filing of charges against
them in court, to depend on the President, who may order the
release of a detainee or his being placed under house arrest, as
he has done in meritorious cases." 12
The dispositive portion of the decision promulgated on April
20, 1983 reads as follows: "[Wherefore], the instant petition
should be, as it is hereby dismissed." 13
Thereafter, on June 6, 1983, a motion for reconsideration was
filed by petitioner Garcia Padilla. The stress is on the
continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang 14 as well as the
existence of the right to bail even with the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The motion asserted
further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not vest the President with the power to
issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders,
and that even it be assumed that he has such a power, the
Supreme Court may review its issuance when challenged. It
was finally alleged that since petitioners were not caught
in flagrante delicto, their arrest was illegal and void.
In the comment of respondents on the motion for
reconsideration, it was the submission of Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question
and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a
period. On the question of whether or not the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President
with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential
commitment orders, this is what the Comment stated: "It is to
be pointed out that this argument was not raised in the
petition. Nonetheless, suffice it to point out that an arrest order
by the President incident to the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is essentially preventive in
nature." 15 It added: "Besides, PD No. 1836 and LOI 1211
have vested, assuming a law is necessary, in the President the
power of preventive arrest incident to the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In addition, however, it
should be noted that the PCO has been replaced by Preventive
Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877 dated July
21, 1983. As provided for in the said decree, a PDA constitute
an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons
committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period not
exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest
subjected to review by the President or by the Review
Committee created for that purpose." 16 The last argument of
petitioner, namely that the detainees were not caught
in flagrante delicto and therefore the arrest was illegal was
refuted in the Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses
the point. As this Court correctly observed, the crimes of
subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses. Besides this
point involves an issue of fact. 17
It suffices to refer to the above Comment for the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration. As therein noted, Presidential
Decree No. 1877 dated July 21, 1983 limits the duration of the
preventive detention action for the period not exceeding one
year. In the language of such Decree: "When issued, the
preventive detention action shall constitute authority to arrest
the subject person or persons, and to preventively detain him
or them for a period not exceeding one year and sequester all
arms, equipment or properly used or to be used in the
commission of the crime or crimes." 18 There is no need to
mention the amendments as there is no change as to the
preventive detention period remaining at "not exceeding one
year." This Presidential Decree No. 1877 explicitly provides in
its Section 8: "The Minister of Defense shall promulgate the
rules and regulations to implement this Decree." 19 Such
implementing rules and regulations were issued on September
7, 1983 by Minister of National Defense, respondent Juan
Ponce Enrile and duly approved by the President of the
Philippines. One of its Sections deals with the period of
detention under a presidential commitment order thus: "The
period of detention of all persons presently detained by virtue
of a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall not
extend beyond one (1) year from and after the date of
effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended. Upon
the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of
persons presently detained under a presidential commitment
order or its derivatives shall be governed by Presidential
Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations." 20
Subsequently, on May 28, 1985, respondents filed the
following Manifestation: "1. The persons listed below who
were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order
(PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, and in whose behalf the
above-captioned cases was filed have been released detention
by the military authorities concerned on the dates appearing
opposite their names, to wit: Names of Detainees — Dates of
Release: a. Dr. Aurora Parong-December 12, 1983: b.
Norberto Portuguese- January 31, 1985; c. Sabino Padilla —
January 31, 1985; d. Francis Divinagracia — January 31,
1985; e. Imelda delos Santos — October 20, 1983; f.
Benjamin Pineda — January 3l 1985; g. Zenaida Mallari —
January 31, 1985 h. Tito Tanguilig — October 21, 1983; i.
Letty Ballogan — March 4, 1983; j. Bienvenida Garcia —
October 20, 1983; k Eufronio Ortiz, Jr. January 31, 1985; 1.
Juanito Granada — October 20, 1983. 2. The foregoing
information was received from the Off ice of Civil Relations,
Ministry of National Defense, through Major Felizardo O.
Montero, JAGS-GHO 3. As regards Tom Vasquez, who was
included in the instant petition, he was released on July 17,
1982, after his arrest on July 15, 1982, since he was not named
in the PCO 4. Anent Mariano Soriano, the undersigned have
been informed by the Office of Civil Relations that the subject
escaped from detention two (2) years ago and as of date hereof
is still at large." 21
There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of
a presidential commitment order issued as far back as July 12,
1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for
reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of
habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by
such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing
manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla,
Francis Divina gracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda,
Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty
Ballogan, Bienvenida Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito
Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition
as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr.
Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued
by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for
illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is
likewise declared moot and academic. No costs.
Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce
Enrile et al
November 17, 2010
Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine & Reinstatement of the
Montenegro Doctrine
In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were
having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were
arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was
authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina,
mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant
of arrest was issued but rather it was just a warrant of arrest
hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause.
Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later
transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned
the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is
valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in
the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon
Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The
questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of
the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the
president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the
writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the
president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the
suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective.
If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of
the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the
course thereof will be released, they would, without the least
doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing
the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang
Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the
Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 89103 July 14, 1995
LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR GLORIA LASTIMOSA
MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod City, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated July
20, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44,
Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 5331, which nullified the order
earlier issued by the Municipal Trial Circuit Court (MTCC) of
the City of Bacolod. The MTCC Order directed the return to
petitioner of the amount of P14,000.00 which had been seized
by the police.
I
On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the
issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he
received information that petitioner had in his possession at
his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16
Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal.
Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive
Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be
used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p. 14). On the same day, the
application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the
items specified in the application (Rollo, p. 15).
At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team
searched the house of petitioner and seized the following
articles:
(1) Two (2) envelopes containing cash in the
total amount of P14,000.00 (one envelope
P10,000.00 and another P4,000.00);
(2) one (1) AR 280 handset w/antenae (sic)
SN-00485;
(3) one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R
w/Antenae (sic);
(4) one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base;
(5) one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V.
13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC;
(6) one (1) brown Academy Notebook &
Assorted papers; and
(7) Four (4) handsets battery pack (Rollo, p.
16).
On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on petitioner's
urgent motion for the return of the seized articles, issued an
order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search
warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to
the court. Not considering the report as a "return in
contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying
that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and verified
inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel
manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance
of the search warrant, he was not present when it was served.
On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a
motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal
and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his answer to
the motion, Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres, the station commander of
the Bacolod City Police, said that the amount of P14,000.00
had been earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the
Armed City Partisan (ACP) and other "known NPA
personalities" operating in the City of Bacolod.
On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing
Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner. The
court opined that in the implementation of the search warrant,
any seizure should be limited to the specific items covered
thereby. It said that the money could not be considered as
"subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects
of gambling.
Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC,
Branch 44, Bacolod City a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331).
The petition alleged that assuming that the seizure of the
money had been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its
return citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
(1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986). In those
cases, the Court held that pending the determination of the
legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain
in custodia legis. The petition also averred that a criminal
complaint for "any of the crimes against public order as
provided under Chapter I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code"
had been filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and
therefore, should the money be found as having been
earmarked for subversive activities, it should be confiscated
pursuant to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code.
On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting
the petition for certiorari and directing the clerk of court to
return to the MTCC the money pending the resolution of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the city
prosecutor on the criminal complaint. In said order, the RTC
held:
The Court observed that private respondent
Leon Tambasen never questioned the
validity of the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge Demosthenes L.
Magallanes. A perusal of private
respondent's "Motion to Declare Search and
Seizure Illegal and to Return Seized
Properties" dated October 7, 1988 shows
that respondent Tambasen questions not the
validity of the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge Demosthenes Magallanes,
but rather, the execution or implementation
of the said warrant principally on the ground
that the articles seized are not allegedly
mentioned in the search warrant. However,
the question thus raised involves matters
determinative of the admissibility in
evidence and the legality of the articles
seized. These matters, it is submitted, go
beyond the immediate and limited
jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to
inquire into the validity of the search
warrant he issued. These issues which relate
exclusively or principally with the intrinsic
and substantive merits of the case or cases
which are being prepared against respondent
Tambasen, and insofar as Tambasen is
concerned involve matters of defense which
should be properly raised at the criminal
action or actions that may be filed against
respondent Leon Tambasen (see DOH v. Sy
Chi Siong Co., Inc. et. al., G.R. No. 85289,
Feb. 20, 1989). They cannot be addressed to
the respondent Judge because the respondent
Judge has no jurisdiction over the said issue.
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge
has transcended the boundaries of his
limited jurisdiction and had in effect
encroached upon the jurisdiction of the
appropriate trial court or courts that will try
the criminal case or cases against respondent
Leon Tambasen, in issuing the assailed
order dated December 23, 1988. Ostensibly,
the assailed order, if not corrected, will
unduly deprive the prosecution of its right to
present the evidence in question and,
consequently, will improperly oust the trial
court, which will try the criminal case or
cases against private respondent Leon
Tambasen of its original and exclusive
jurisdiction to rule on the admissibility and
legality of the said evidence. This order of
respondent court is tantamount to a denial of
due process. It may be considered as a grave
abuse of discretion reviewable
by certiorari (Esparagoza v. Tan, 94 Phil.
749) (Rollo, pp.
47-48).
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition praying for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order commanding the city prosecutor to
cease and desist from continuing with the preliminary
investigation in BC I.S. No. 88-1239 and the RTC from taking
any step with respect to Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed
that Search Warrant No. 365 and the seizure of his personal
effects be declared illegal and that the Order of July 20, 1989
be reversed and annulled.
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three
offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite rifle and .45 cal.
pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and dynamite
sticks; and (3) illegal possession of subversive documents"
(Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the legality of the seizure
of the articles which were not mentioned in the search warrant.
Moreover, since a complaint against him was filed only after
his house had been searched, petitioner claimed that the police
were "on a fishing expedition."
During the pendency of the instant petition, a series of events
related to the questioned search and seizure transpired. At
around 10:30 P.M. of March 1, 1990, petitioner, who was then
on board a passenger vehicle, was arrested by intelligence
operatives in Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City and
forthwith detained. On the strength of sworn statements of two
rebel returnees, the police filed a complaint for subversion
against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor. The
following day, the City Prosecutor filed an information for
violation of the Anti-Subversion Law against petitioner with
RTC, Branch 42, Bacolod City (Criminal Case No. 8517). An
order for the arrest of petitioner was issued on March 2, 1990.
On March 6, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information in Criminal Case No. 8517.
On March 15, 1990, RTC, Branch 42 granted petitioner's
motion to quash and recalled the warrant of arrest. The court
also directed the City Prosecutor to resolve BC-I.S. Case No.
88-1239.
On March 20, 1990, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria
Lastimosa Marcos manifested before RTC, Branch 42 that
petitioner had been "dropped" from BC-I.S. No. 88-1239.
However, the City Prosecutor had, by then, filed a motion for
the reconsideration of said Resolution of March 15, 1990. The
motion was denied.
Under this factual matrix, this Court is confronted with the
question of whether RTC, Branch 44 gravely abused its
discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioner's
house, specifically the amount of P14,000.00, be retained and
kept in custodia legis.
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a
search warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption
of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special
laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-
Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a
"scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v.
Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]).
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the
search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their
authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should
particularly describe the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to
be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end
that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and
that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137
SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.] Inc. v. Ruiz, 37
SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886
[1920]). The same constitutional provision is also aimed at
preventing violations of security in person and property and
unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving
remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search
warrant, had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact
that the members of the police team were doing their task of
pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal
seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against
the constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v.
Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169,
176 [1925]). Although public welfare is the foundation of the
power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v.
Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts
it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal
in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary
methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
For the retention of the money seized by the police officers,
approval of the court which issued the search warrant is
necessary (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In
like manner, only the court which issued the search warrant
may order their release (Temple v. Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295
[1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]).
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as
the sole accused, was ordered quashed by the trial court and
the prosecution's motion for the reconsideration of the quashal
order had been denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239,
which was being investigated by Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent.
Hence, there appears to be no criminal prosecution which can
justify the retention of the seized articles in custodia legis.
A subsequent legal development added another reason for the
return to him of all the seized articles: R.A. No. 1700, the
Anti-Subversion Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and,
therefore, the crimes defined in the repealed law no longer
exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the People of
the Philippines is ORDERED to RETURN the money seized
to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE [246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.
89103; 14 JUL 1995]
Tuesday, February 03, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt.
Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he
received information that Petitioner had in hispossession at his
house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal.pistols,
dynamite sticks and subversive documents”, which were “used
or intended to be used” for illegal purposes.
The application was granted.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner
and seized “2 envelopes containing P14000, handset
with antennae, transceiver withantennae, regulator supply,
academy notebook and assorted papers and handset battery
pack”. In October, petitioner moved that the search
andseizure be declared illegal and that the seized articles be
returned to him. In December, MTCC, in its order, directed Lt.
Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that
any seizure should be limited to the specified items covered
thereby. SolGen petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of
the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination of
legality of seizure of the articles, they should remain in custogia
legis. RTC granted the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not
mentioned in the search warrant was legal.
Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to
be seized. The police acts beyond the parameters of their
authority if they seize articles not described in the search
warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is
to limit the things to be seized, to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion; that unreasonable search and seizure may
not be made and that abuses may not be committed.
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return
the money seized.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 16009 September 21, 1920
UY KHEYTIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO VILLAREAL, Judge of First Instance for the
Twenty-third Judicial District, ET AL., respondents.
Crossfield & O'Brien for petitioners.
Attorney-General Paredes & Assistant Attorney-General
Santos for respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, filed in this court, for the writs of
injunction and prohibition. It appears from the record that on
April 30, 1919, one Ramon Gayanilo, corporal of the
Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the
said Ramon Gayanilo stating in his application; "That in the
house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, Iloilo,
under the writing desk in his store, there is kept a certain
amount of opium." The application was subscribed and sworn
to by the said complainant before the Honorable L. M.
Southworth, judge of the Twenty-third Judicial District.
Upon that application the said judge, on the same day, issued a
search warrant in the following terms:
The United States, to any officer of the law.
Whereas on this day proof , by affidavit, having been
presented before me by Corporal Ramon Gayanilo,
Philippine Constabulary, that there is probable cause
to believe that in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto.
Niño St., No. 20, under the desk for writing in his
store there is kept a certain amount of opium.
Therefore, you are hereby commanded during day or
night to make an immediate search on the person of
Uy Kheytin or in the house, Sto. Niño St., No. 20, for
the following property opium and, if you find the
same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before
me in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Witness my hand this 30th day of April, 1919.
(Sgd.) L. M. SOUTHWORTH,
Judge of the Court of Iloilo.
Armed with that search warrant, the respondent M. S.
Torralba, lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary,
accompanied by some of his subordinates, on the same day
(April 30th) searched the house of the petitioner Uy Kheytin
and found therein 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to
search also the bodega on the ground-floor of the house, but
Uy Kheytin positively denied that it was his or that he rented
it. Lieutenant Torralba wanted to be sure, and for this reason
he placed a guard in the premises to see that nothing was
removed therefrom, and then went away to find out who the
owner of the bodega was. The next morning he learned from
the owner of the house, one Segovia, of the town of Molo, that
the Chinaman Uy Kheytin was the one who was renting the
bodega. Thereupon Lieutenant Torralba and his subordinates
resumed the search and then and there found and seized the
following articles:
No. 2. — One wrap of paper containing a broken
bottle of opium liquid, which is kept in a tin box No.
1.
No. 3. — One wrap of paper containing an opium
pipe, complete, one opium container, one wrap of
opium ashes, one rag soaked in opium and one
thimble with opium.
No. 4. — One leather hand bag containing 7 small
bottle containing opium, with two cedulas belonging
to Tian Liong, with key.
No. 5. — One wooden box containing 75 empty cans,
opium containers.
No. 6. — One tin box containing 23 small empty
cans, opium containers.
No. 7. — One cardboard box containing 3 pieces of
wood, one old chisel, one file, one piece of soldering
lead, one box of matches, 5 pieces of iron plates, and
several other tin plates.
No. 8. — One roll of 7 ½ sheets of brass.
No. 9. — Three soldering outfits.
No. 10. — One hammer.
No. 11. — One Chinese scale for opium.
No. 12. — Twelve small bottles empty.
No. 13. — Two bottles containing opium.
No. 14. — One bundle of Chinese books of accounts
with several personal letter of Chine Uy Kheytin.
No. 15. — One tin box containing 60 cans of
molasses, with 1 small bottle containing molasses.
Thereafter a criminal complaint was filed in the court of the
justice of the peace of Iloilo against all the petitioners herein,
charging them with a violation of the Opium Law. They were
duly arrested, and a preliminary investigation was conducted
by the justice of the peace, after which he found that there was
probable cause for believing that the crime complained of had
been committed and that the defendants were the persons
responsible therefor. The cause was duly transmitted to the
Court of First Instance.
While said cause was in the Court of First Instance, pending
the filing of a complaint by the provincial fiscal, the
defendants, petitioners herein, through their attorney, filed a
petition in the Court of First Instance, asking for the return of
"private papers, books and other property" which the
Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon
the ground that they had been so seized illegally and in
violation of the constitutional rights of the defendants. It was
urged (1) that the search warrant of April 30th was illegal
because the requisites prescribed by the General Orders No.
58 had not been complied with in its issuance; (2) that the
searches and seizures made on May 1st had been made
without any semblance of authority and hence illegal; and (3)
that the seizure of the defendants' books and letters was a
violation of the provisions of the Jones Law providing that no
person shall be compelled to testify against himself, and
protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures.
After a hearing upon said motion, the Honorable Antonio
Villareal, judge, in a very carefully prepared opinion, reached
the conclusion that the searches and seizures complained of
had been legally made, and consequently, denied the
defendants' petition.
Thereafter and on November 22, 1919, the said defendants,
petitioners herein, filed the present petition in this court,
praying as follows:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing allegations, it is
respectfully prayed that a preliminary injunction
issue.
First, restraining the respondent judge, and his
successors from making any cognizance of any action
of any kind which has or may be brought against
these petitioners which have resulted directly or
indirectly from the unlawful searches and seizures
above-mentioned;
Second, restraining the respondent clerk of the court,
the respondent fiscal, the respondent commandant of
the Constabulary, and the successors of any of them,
and the assistants of any of them, from any further
examination of the private papers, books, and other
property unlawfully seized as above alleged; from
making or using the same for the purpose or in such a
manner that the character or reputation of these
petitioners might be injured; from making or using
any copies, memorandum, notes, or extracts obtained
from the books, papers, etc., so seized; from making
any examinations of any of the property thus
obtained or from using any reports or from
publishing in any manner any reports already
prepared as a result of the examination of such
property; or from making any other use of the
property and papers so obtained until orders are
received from this court regarding the disposition of
the same.
It is further requested, that a writ of prohibition issue,
restraining the respondent judge from at any time
taking cognizance of any action or prosecution
growing out of the unlawful searches and seizures
 above-mentioned, and directing such judge or his
successor to order the immediate return to these
petitioners of all of the papers and other property thus
unlawfully obtained, together with all copies,
extracts, memorandum, notes, photographs, reports,
samples, or evidence obtained by reason of such
searches and seizures whereby the reputation and
character of petitioners may be further damaged;
furthermore enjoining all of the respondents and their
assistants from divulging any of the secrets or
information which they have thus unlawfully
obtained from these petitioners; and especially
ordering the respondent judge to dismiss all actions
or prosecutions already filed before him or which
may hereafter come before him as a result of the
unlawful acts herein alleged.
I case, however, the judge did not examine any witness under
THE SEARCH WARRANT OF APRIL 30TH
The petitioners contend that the search warrant of April 30,
1919, was illegal, (1) because it was not issued upon either of
the grounds mentioned in section 96 of General Orders No.
58, and (2) because the judge who issued it did not determine
the probable cause by examining witnesses under oath, a
required by section 98 of said General Orders No. 58.
Section 96 of General Orders No. 58 is as follows:
SEC. 96. It (a search warrant) may be issued upon
either of the following grounds:
1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it
as the means of committing a felony.
In support of their first contention the petitioners argue that
the property ordered to be seized, namely, opium, under the
said search warrant, had not been stolen or embezzled, nor had
it been used or intended to be used as the means of committing
a felony; that the word "felony" is applicable only to a serious
crime which is malum per se and not to one which is
merely malum prohibitum, such as the possession of opium.
For the purpose of this decision we deem it unnecessary to
draw the distinction between the words "felony" and
"misdemeanor" a used in the common law. Suffice it to say
that, whatever may be the technical common-law meaning of
the word "felony," which is used in paragraph 2 of section 96
above quoted, we believe it would be the height of absurdity
to hold, upon technical grounds, that a search warrant is illegal
which is issued to search for and seize property the very
possession of which is forbidden by law and constitutes a
crime. Opium is such property. "Search-warrants have
heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods
supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation
of the revenue laws, for implements of gaming or
counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or prohibited liquors kept for
sale contrary to law, for obscene books and paper kept for sale
or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and
dangerous material so kept as to endanger the public safety."
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 432.)
In support of their second contention, the petitioners invoke
section 98 of General Orders No. 58, which provides a follow:
SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing
the warrant, examine on oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing.
Section 97 provides that "a search warrant shall not issue
except for probable cause" and section 98 above quoted
provides the manner in which that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge issuing the warrant. In the present
oath but relied solely upon the sworn application of the
Constabulary officer in determining whether there was
probable cause. In that application the complainant swore
positively: "That in the house of Chino Uy Kheytin, Sto. Niño
St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store, there is
kept a certain amount of opium." This statement was found to
be true by the subsequent finding and seizure of a considerable
quantity of opium in the place mentioned. The question now
is, whether the omission of the judge to comply with the
requirements of section 98 would, under the circumstances,
justify the court in declaring that the search warrant in
question was illegal and ordering the return of the opium
found and seized under said warrant.
A search warrant may be likened to a warrant of arrest. The
issuance of both is restricted by the same provision of the
Jones Law (sec. 3) which is as follows:
That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized.
A person, then, is protected from unreasonable arrests just as
much as he is protected from unreasonable searches. But
suppose he happened to be arrested without any warrant, or
upon a warrant which had been issued by a judge without first
properly determining whether there was probable cause, and
upon investigation it should be found, from his own
admission, that he was the author of the crime, — should he
be released upon the ground that he had not been legally
arrested? In the case of Ker vs. Illinois (119 U. S., 436) Ker
having committed the crime of larceny, escaped and went to
Peru. He was kidnapped in Peru and brought back to the State
of Illinois without any pretense of authority. Passing upon the
question of the constitutionality of the arrest of Ker, the
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Miller, said:
We do not intend to say that there may not be
proceedings previous to the trial in regard to which
the prisoner could invoke in some manner the
provisions of this clause of the Constitution; but for
 mere irregularities in the manner in which he may be
brought into the custody of the law, we do not think
he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all
for the crime with which he is charged in a regular
indictment. He may be arrested for a very heinous
offense by persons without any warrant, or without
any previous complaint, and brought before a proper
officer, and this may be in some sense said to be
"without due process of law." But it would hardly be
claimed that after the case had been investigated, and
the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer
for the crime, he could plead that he was first arrested
"without due process of law." (Followed in U. S. vs.
Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 146; U. S. vs.
Wilson, 4 Phil., 317.)
In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of
the search warrant in question in that the judge did not first
examine the complainant or any witnesses under oath, as
required by section 98 of General Orders No. 58. But the
property sought to be searched for and seized having been
actually found in the place described by the complainant,
reasoning by analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we
are of the opinion that that irregularity is not sufficient cause
for ordering the return of the opium found and seized under
said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating the latter.
II
THE SEARCH MADE ON MAY 1ST
Petitioners content that this was made without any search
warrant and without any authority of law; that the search
warrant of April 30th could not be used on May 1st because
that warrant had been executed on the day of its issuance. In
support of this contention counsel for the petitioners, in the
lower court, argued that:
While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days
after the date of issuance, this cannot be interpreted
to mean that a search warrant can be used every day
for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day.
This would be absurd. It is admitted, for sake of
argument, that if upon a search, under a legally issued
warrant, some other prohibited articles than those
named in the warrant should be found, these articles
might be seized. Also, it might possibly be true, that
if a warrant was issued to search for a certain article
and it was not found after the first search, that
another search could be made sometime within the 10
days. But this is certainly the furthest possible
extreme the doctrine could be carried. It certainly
could not be interpreted to allow a search to be made,
and after the articles for which the warrant was issued
had been seized, to use this same warrant as authority
to make another search.
We agree with counsel that a search warrant cannot be used
every day for ten days, "and for a different purpose each day,"
and that after the articles for which the warrant was issued
have been seized the same warrant cannot be used as authority
to make another search. But this argument is not applicable to
the facts in this case. It appears from the oral evidence
adduced during the hearing of the petitioners' motion in the
court below that the search for opium, the property mentioned
in the warrant, was not completed on April 30th; it was
interrupted by the necessity to ascertain who the owner of
the bodega on the ground-floor was, because the petitioner Uy
Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership thereof. In other words,
the search of May 1st was not made "for a different purpose,"
nor could it be considered "another search," but was really a
continuation of the search begun on April 30th. This is shown
by the fact that during the interval between the two searches
the premises in question were guarded by Constabulary
soldiers, and the petitioners were made to understand on April
30th that the authorities were not yet through with the search
and would continue the same as soon as they found out that
the bodega was also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the search made on May
1st was authorized under the search warrant of April 30th
III
THE SEIZURE OF BOOKS, LETTERS, ETC.
The important question that remains to be decided is whether,
under a search warrant for opium, the officers of the law were
authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property
having a remote or no connection with opium. The respondent
M. S. Torralba, lieutenant of the Constabulary, testified that he
seized these articles because he believed or suspected that they
had some relation with the opium in question; in other words,
he thought that they might be used as evidence against the
petitioners when they are prosecuted for a violation of the
Opium Law. The respondents contend that this was a
sufficient justification under the law for the seizure of such
articles under the same warrant for opium.
We are of the opinion that the respondent's contention in
untenable. Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders
No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search warrant
should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. The evident purpose and intent of this
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches
and seizures" may not be made, — that abuses may not be
committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this
constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities.
In order to comply with the constitutional provisions
regulating the issuance of search warrants, the
property to be seized under a warrant must be
particularly described therein and no other property
can be taken thereunder. The goods to be seized must
be described with such certainty as to identify them,
and the description must be so particular that the
officer charged with the execution of the warrant will
be left with no discretion respecting the property to
be taken. . . . Under a warrant to search a person for
stolen goods, the officer cannot lawfully take from the
 person a letter, such letter not being particularly
described in the warrant as property to be searched
for. (24 R. C. L., 714, 715.)
It is a violation of the declaration of rights respecting
searches and seizures for an officer, while searching
one's person under a search warrant for stolen goods,
to take from it, against the party's will, a letter written
to him. (State vs. Slamon, 87 Am. St. Rep., 711.)
We have said that if the officer follows the command
of his warrant, he is protected; and this is so even
when the complaint proves to have been unfounded.
But if he exceed the command by searching in places
not described therein, or by seizing persons or
articles not commanded, he is not protected by the
warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases
where he assumes to act without process. Obeying
strictly the command of his warrant, he may break
open outer or inner doors, and his justification does
not depend upon his discovering that for which he is
to make search. (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, 7th ed., p. 434)
That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers,
etc., which they seized might be used as evidence against the
petitioners herein a criminal action against them for a violation
of the Opium Law, is no reason or justification under the law
for the seizure: First, because they were not "particularly
described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second,
because, even if they had been mentioned in the search
warrant, they could not be legally seized, for a search warrant
cannot be used for the purpose of obtaining evidence; and
third, because to compel a person to produce his private papers
to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to
compelling him to be a witness against himself.
1. The authorities for the first proposition have already been
given above.
2. It may be said that —
Books of account, private documents, and private
papers are property which men may lawfully possess.
It is not believed that the stature (subsection 2 of
section 96, G. O. 58) was intended to cover property
of this class. Granting that property of which men
may lawfully possess themselves has been used in the
commission of a crime and not possessed nor created
purely for the purpose of committing a crime, and not
likely to be used again, then certainly its seizure can
only be for the purpose of using the same as evidence
to prove the commission of the crime already
committed. This purpose is not contemplated by the
provision of the law. The finding of evidence can not
be the immediate reason for issuing the search
warrant. To use a search warrant for the purpose of
obtaining possession of property for this purpose
would be an "unreasonable" use of the remedy by
search warrant, which is prohibited by law. (Regidor
vs. Araullo, 5 Off. Gaz., 955, 961, 962; U. S. vs. De
los Reyes and Esguerra, 20 Phil., 467.)
Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 7th
ed., p. 431, says:
The warrant is not allowed for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of an intended crime; but only
after the lawful evidence of an offense actually
committed. Nor even then is it allowable to invade
one's privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining
evidence against him, except in a few special cases
where that which is the subject of the crime is
supposed to be concealed, and the public or the
complainant has an interest in it on its destruction.
3. In the case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S., 616), the
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr.
Justice Bradley, said:
The seizure or compulsory production of a man's
private papers to be used in evidence against him is
equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against
himself, and, in a prosecution for a crime, penalty or
forfeiture, is equally within the prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment.
Both amendments (fourth and fifth) relate to the
personal security of the citizen. They nearly run into
and mutually throw light upon each other. When the
thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely,
compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is
the object of a search and seizure of his private
papers, it is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
within the Fourth Amendment.
Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be
used in evidence for the purpose of convicting him of
a crime, recovering a penalty, or of forfeiting his
property, is totally different from the search and
seizure of stolen goods, dutiable articles on which the
duties have not been paid, and the like, which
rightfully belong to the custody of the law. (Se
also Silverthorne Lumber Co. vs. United States,
decided Jan. 26, 1920, by the Supreme Court of the
United States.)
The seizure of a person's private papers, to be used in
evidence against him, is equivalent to compelling
him to be a witness against himself. (State vs.
Slamon, 73 Vt., 212; 87 Am. St. Rep., 711.)
From all of the foregoing our conclusions are:
1. That although in the issuance of the search warrant in
question the judge did not comply with the requirements of
section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not
entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which
were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are
they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the
judge.
2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the
search begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not
require another search warrant.
3. That the seizure of the petitioner's books, letters, telegrams,
and other articles which have no inherent relation with opium
and the possession of which is not forbidden by law, was
illegal and in violation of the petitioners' constitutional rights.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed that each and all of
the respondents herein, their assistants or successors, be, and
they hereby are, forbidden from examining or making any use
of said books, letters, telegrams, etc., namely, the articles
described in items Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 of the
sheriff's return (Exhibit 3, reproduced at the top of page 3 of
this decision 1) and they are hereby ordered to immediately
return the said articles to the petitioners. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES,
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MARINDUQUE, BRANCH XXXVIII; THE
PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE; THE
PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP
MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the
ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less if
we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we
do annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society
is the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house.
That right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of
history to the mighty English kings in their fortresses of
power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own castle where
he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble
cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the
forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few
libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to
dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are
among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after
the ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect
it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
not be violated, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication
and cor- respondence shag be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety and order require
otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the
victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the
military authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to
be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms. He asks that their admission be temporarily
restrained (which we have) 1 and thereafter permanently
enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent
judge on May 10, 1984. 2 The petitioner's house was searched
two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. 3 However, the officers conducting the search
found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen
live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of
the charge against the petitioner. 4
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable
cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized
officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. No less important, there must be a specific
description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the
warrant. 5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v.
Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense. 7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente
J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His
purpose was the strengthening of the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition
did not appear in the corresponding provision of the federa
Constitution of the United States which served as our model it
was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of
the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily
accepted the proposal and it was thereafter, following a brief
debate, approved by the Convention. 8
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in
what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. —
The municipal or city judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the
respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this is
not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of
the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit
executed by them. 9 It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar
interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P.
Quinosa personally filed his application for
a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he
appeared before me in the company of his
two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus
Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented
to me their respective affidavits taken by
Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator
assigned to the PC-INP command at Camp
Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was
not yet subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded
to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents
thereof to ascertain, among others, if he
knew and understood the same. Afterwards,
he subscribed and swore to the same before
me. 10
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa
on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among
others, if he knew and understood the same," and only because
"the application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The
suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all
if the affidavit had already been completed when it was
submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own
searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the
affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing
and attach them to the record, together with the affidavit
presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona: 11
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he niay produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary
in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it
wifl be found later that his declarations are
false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant
is tainted with illegality by the failure of the
Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in
writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to
have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he
was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the
information provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose
depositions as aforementioned had already been taken by the
undersigned." 12
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of
the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." 13 The rationale of the requirement, of course,
is to provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the
warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses
themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
apphcant's claims. 14
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the
depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant
himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application. 15
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a
mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except
that they were made in the form of answers to the questions
put to them by the respondent judge. Significantly, the
meaningful remark made by Tohilida that they were
suspicious of the petitioner because he was a follower of the
opposition candidate in the forthcoming election (a
"Lecarista") 16 did not excite the respondent judge's own
suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the
motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible
misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the
witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to
the petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. 17 This was
supposedly done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything
through an open window of the house while he was near the
gate. 18 He could even positively say that six of the weapons
were.45 caliber pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers. 19
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the
caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his
presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were
really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses,
considering that these acts were against the law. These would
have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously
omitted. Instead, the declarations of the witnesses were readily
accepted and the search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant
invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that
whatever defect there was, was waived when the petitioner
voluntarily submitted to the search and manifested his
conformity in writing. 20
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the
military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to
sign the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible
challenge later to the validity of the search they were
conducting. Confronted with the armed presence of the
military and the presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the
petitioner had no choice but to submit. This was not, as we
held in a previous case, 21 the manifestation merely of our
traditional Filipino hospitality and respect for authority. Given
the repressive atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was
here, as we see it, an intimidation that the petitioner could not
resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and
the eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner were
illegal per se and therefore could have been taken by the
military authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the
said articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles
could be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the
search is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no
valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right
thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the
military officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no
right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the
pistol and bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of
this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply
because they are prohibited. A search warrant is still
necessary. If the rule were otherwise, then the military
authorities could have just entered the premises and looked for
the guns reportedly kept by the petitioner without bothering to
first secure a search warrant. The fact that they did bother to
do so indicates that they themselves recognized the necessity
of such a warrant for the seizure of the weapons the petitioner
was suspected of possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be
validly made without warrant and articles may be taken
validly as a result of that search. For example, a warrantless
search may be made incidental to a lawful arrest, 22 as when
the person being arrested is frished for weapons he may
otherwise be able to use against the arresting officer. Motor
cars may be inspected at borders to prevent smuggling of
aliens and contraband 23 and even in the interior upon a
showing of probable cause. 24 Vessels and aircraft are also
traditionally removed from the operation of the rule because of
their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the state's
jurisdiction. 25 The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. 26 And it has
also been held that prohibited articles may be taken without
warrant if they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer
comes upon them inadvertently. 27
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of
the accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim
that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is
that these things were deliberately sought and were not in
plain view when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is
that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated
illegally and therefore are protected by the exclusionary
principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later
expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding
that there may be occasions when the criminal might be
allowed to go free because "the constable has blundered,"
Chief Justice Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule
was nonetheless "the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction" against abuse. The decision cited
Judge Learned Hand's justification that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, know
that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be
repressed. "
The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for
illegal possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case,
however, the said articles must remain in custodia legis.
Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before
coming to this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the
search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the
normal procedure. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised. 28
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null
and void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of
August 6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the
respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house was
searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the
warrant was discovered. However, the officers conducting the
search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and
eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the
bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa
personally filed his application for a search warrant on May 10,
1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2)
witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom
likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by
Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application
was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among
others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he
subscribed and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with
the proper procedure in issuing the Search Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if
it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and
attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have
applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he was
applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information
provided by the witnesses whose depositions had already been
taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the
search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95357 June 9, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO GELAVER, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Joffrey L. Montefrio for accused-appellant.
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato, finding Eduardo
Gelaver, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide (Art.
246, Revised Penal Code) and sentencing him to "suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of his
wife, Victoria Pacinabao, in the amount of P30,000.00."
(Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 28)
In the Information filed with the trial court and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 643, Eduardo Gelaver, was charged with
Parricide committed as follows:
 That on or about the 24th day of March,
1988 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, more or
less, in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
Sto. Niño, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, said accused with
intent to kill and being then armed with a
knife did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
VICTORIA GELAVER Y PACINABAO,
his lawfully wedded wife, with the use of
the said knife hitting her and wounding her
on the different parts of her body and as a
result thereof said Victoria Gelaver y
Pacinabao died instantly. (Rollo, p. 7)
At his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty",
and thereafter trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Randy Mamon, who testified that at
7:00 a.m. of March 24, 1988, he heard shouts coming from the
house of Tessie Lampedario in Barangay Poblacion,
Municipality of Sto. Niño, South Cotabato. He saw the
appellant and a woman having a heated argument. Thereafter,
appellant held the neck of the victim, dragged her and with a
knife on his right hand, stabbed the latter three times on the
breast. Appellant then went out of the gate and fled in the
direction of the public market of Sto Niño. (TSN, June 27,
1988, pp. 7-10)
Eduardo Gelaver admitted killing his wife but claimed that he
did so after catching her having carnal act with her paramour.
Appellant testified that he was married to Victoria Pacinabao,
with whom he begot four children. (TSN, December 19, 1988,
p. 9) They lived together at their conjugal home until July 3,
l987 when she abandoned her family to live with her
paramour. (TSN, December 19, 1988, pp. 10-11) He did not
know the name of his wife's paramour nor the name of the
owner of the house where his wife and her paramour had lived
together.
Appellant further testified that on March 24, 1988, after he
was informed by his daughter that his wife and paramour were
living at a house in front of the Sto. Niño Catholic Church,
appellant immediately repaired to that place. Upon entering
the house, he saw his wife lying on her back and her paramour
on top of her, having sexual intercourse.
Appellants version of the killing was that when his wife saw
him, she pushed her paramour aside. Her paramour
immediately stood up, took a knife placed on top of the
bedside table and attacked appellant. The latter was able to
wrest possession of the knife and then used it against the
paramour, who evaded the thrusts of the appellant by hiding
behind the victim. Thus, it was the victim who received the
stab intended for the paramour.
As to why he continued to stab his wife, appellant said that his
mind had been "dimmed" or overpowered by passion and
obfuscation by the sight of his wife having carnal act with her
paramour.
Appellant faults the trial court in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide, instead of the
penalty of destierro for killing under exceptional
circumstances pursuant to Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
Appellant's contention is bereft of merit.
Before Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code can be
operative, the following requisites must be compresent:
1. That a legally married person or a parent
surprises his spouse or his daughter, the
latter under 18 years of age and living with
him, in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them
or inflicts upon any or both of them
any serious physical injury in the act or
immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated
the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or
that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse. (II Reyes, The
Revised Penal Code, 12th Ed., pp. 452-53;
Emphasis supplied)
These requisites must be established by the defense.
Implicit in this exceptional circumstance is that the death
caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in
the act of infidelity (People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735 [1987]).
In this case, appellant wants this Court to believe that he
caught his wife and her paramour in sexual intercourse.
However, his testimony is tainted with inconsistencies which
leads Us to believe otherwise.
Appellant's failure to inform the police that he killed his wife
when he saw her having sexual intercourse with her paramour,
devastated in one fell swoop whatever credibility could
possibly be accorded to his version of the incident. As noted
by the Solicitor General, the natural thing for a person to do
under the circumstances was to report to the police the reason
for killing his wife. (Appellee's Brief, p. 8; Rollo, p. 76)
Appellant's contention that he thought that only the killing
itself should be blottered, reserving the details to the defense
lawyer, sounded like a spoonfed afterthought.
If there was a naked man with the victim, he would have had
no time to get dressed because he was then under attack by
appellant. There would then have been the spectacle of a man
in the nude running in the streets.
The trial court noted several contradictions in appellant's
testimony. Appellant claimed that he chased the paramour but
was unable to overtake him and at the same time, he testified
that the paramour stayed in the room and used the victim as a
shield against appellant's attack with the knife. Appellant also
claimed that upon entering the gate of the fence, he saw his
wife and her paramour having carnal act and at the same
breath, he testified that he saw his wife and her paramour only
when he opened the main door of the house.
People vs. Dichoso, GR Nos. 101216-18

The trial court found as contrary to human nature appellant's
claims that he went to confront the paramour of his wife
unarmed and that he never learned the name of the paramour
inspite of the fact that his wife, allegedly, had been living with
the paramour in the same town for almost a year before the
incident.
Absent any substantial proof that the trial court's decision was
based on speculation, the same must be accorded full
consideration (People v. Martinada, 194 SCRA 36 [1991) and
should not be disturbed on appeal (Mercury Drug v. CIR, 56
SCRA 694 [1974]).
Appellant's claim that on the day prior to his killing of the
victim, his daughter Sheryl had confided to him that her
mother was living with a paramour at the house in front of the
Sto. Niño Catholic Church was belied by Sheryl herself. In her
testimony, she stated that she did not know the house where
the crime was committed and she had not gone to that place.
She further testified that she had not seen her mother in any
other house except that of her grandfather's. (TSN, January 17,
1989, p. 5)
Posted by Pius Morados on November 11, 2011
(Constitutional Law – Search and Seizure, Search Warrant,
General Warrant, Inadmissible Evidence)
Facts: A search warrant of marijuana and shabu in appellant’s
residence was issued after probable cause was personally
determined by the judge after examination of the applicant.
Appellant contends that the search warrant is a general warrant
which does not satisfy the particular offense which he
violated, and the search conducted was unconstitutional and
the items obtained inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible.
Held: No. The search warrant cannot be assailed as a general
warrant, it particularizes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized and specifies the offense involved. Items
seized are admissible.

The trial court was correct in finding the presence of the CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II (BILL OF RIGHTS)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the
authorities. Appellant, immediately after committing the
offense, voluntarily placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities as evidenced by the entry in the official police
blotter.
(Exh. "1")
SECOND DIVISION
However, the trial court erred in finding the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation "as a result
of his (appellant's) wife leaving their home and their children."
(Rollo, p. 28) Before this circumstance may be taken into
consideration, it is necessary to establish the existence of an G.R. No. 100910 July 25, 1994
unlawful act sufficient to produce such a condition of mind.
The act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of vs.
time, during which the accused might have recovered his LORETO SALANGGA and LAURETO LOPEZ, accused.
equanimity. (I Revised Penal Code, Aquino, 1987 ed., p. 267)
The crime was committed almost a year after the victim had LORETO SALANGGA, accused-appellant.
abandoned the conjugal dwelling.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED
except with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity, be
increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Sison, 189 700 [1990]). Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Loreto Salangga, alias "Dodong," and
Laureto Lopez, alias "Retoy," were haled to court as
conspirators in the rape and killing of a fifteen-year old barrio
lass named Imelda Talaboc, allegedly committed in
Magsaysay, Davao del Norte on or about July 18, 1987. 1
Assisted by counsel de oficio, both accused pleaded not guilty
during their arraignment. After trial, judgment was rendered
by said trial court on February 21, 1991 finding appellant
Salangga guilty of attempted rape with homicide, imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua but with full credit
for his preventive imprisonment, and ordering him to pay
P30,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim. Accused
Laureto Lopez was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 2
It appears that in the late afternoon of July 18, 1987,
in Sitio Ogsing, Barangay Tacul, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur,
Imelda Talaboc was sent by her mother to fetch water from the
spring, or "bugac," the only source of water in the vicinity.
Imelda left with two one-gallon containers.
At around 5:30 to 6:30 of the same afternoon, when the dusk
of twilight was enveloping the area, one Ricky Monterde, a
friend and brother in faith of the Talaboc family, who resided
only two hundred meters away from the latter's residence,
likewise went to fetch water. On his way, he saw appellant
Salangga walking about three meters ahead of Imelda. He
noticed that appellant kept glancing back towards Imelda who
was carrying water containers. Trailing the girl was accused
Lopez who was walking behind her at a distance of about
twenty fathoms. 3
On the same occasion, Lenie Alingay, a twelve-year old
elementary student residing at Sitio Ogsing, was on her way
home from her grandfather's house. She recounted that she
met Imelda at the downhill crossing leading towards the
barrio. Lenie explained that she was about four meters away
from Imelda, while the latter was following appellant and
walking about two meters behind him. As Imelda came
abreast with Lenie, the former asked the latter if she was going
to school on Monday. Then, as Lenie proceeded on her way
home, she saw that Lopez who was sitting on a rice paddy
suddenly stood up and followed Imelda. At about the same
time, Lenie also saw Ricky Monterde fetching water from the
spring.
When Bernardo Talaboc, father of Imelda, came home from
work, he was informed by his wife that Imelda, whom she sent
to the "bugac" earlier, was missing. Talaboc set out to look for
Imelda. On his way to the spring, he came upon two water
containers left standing at a spot about four hundred meters
away from their house. 4
His search for Imelda led Talaboc to the house of Ricky who
told him that he had earlier seen Imelda on her way home with
appellant walking ahead of her. Ricky then accompanied
Talaboc and his son to the house of the barangay captain,
Severino Laput, to whom they reported Imelda's
disappearance. Thereafter, together with the members of his
household and some neighbors, they continued looking for
Imelda. At around 8:00 o'clock that same night, they found the
corpse of Imelda lying in the bushes about twenty meters
away from where the water containers were earlier found.
Imelda was found with her clothes on but her panty was
missing. Her face was disfigured by physical blows, she had
been stabbed by a knife, and her eyes were gouged out. The
searching party brought home the body of the victim.
Talaboc went to see Lenie Alingay and her family to inquire
whether they witnessed any unusual happening that fatal
afternoon, since the "bugac" is only about twenty meters away
from their house. Lenie told him about her brief encounter
with Imelda, as earlier narrated.
Appellant and Lopez were arrested that same night at around
8:00 o'clock, after the corpse of Imelda had been found, upon
the orders of Barangay Captain Laput based on the
information given by Ricky and Lenie implicating the two of
them. They both became the main suspects responsible for the
grievous fate of Imelda, as they were the persons last seen
with her before the tragedy. The soldiers of the 46th Infantry
Brigade of the Philippine Army took them into custody.
At the army detachment, said suspects were bodily searched.
According to the prosecution, the soldiers recovered from
appellant a piece of lady's underwear, later identified by
Talaboc to be that of his daughter, Imelda. Afterwards, both
suspects were ordered to undress. The prosecution claims that
appellant's body bore what looked like bite marks and
scratches, but none was found on the body of Lopez.
The following morning, the suspects were brought to the
office of Station Commander Manuel Macabutas in the
municipal hall where both were investigated by P/Sgt. Mario
Gataber of the Magsaysay Police Station. Appellant scrawled
his quivery signature on an unsworn statement, 5 handwritten
by some other person, wherein he admitted the crime charged,
except that he was not able to consummate his bestial desire
because Imelda fought very hard against him.6
The defense had a different version to tell. It was claimed that
on July 18, 1987, at about 9:00 P.M. while appellant was
repairing a wall in his kitchen, some members of the 46th
Infantry Brigade and Lopez came to his house. He was
informed that Barangay Captain Laput was requesting for
their presence at his house. Both accused complied with the
request and went to the residence of Laput. The latter asked
them if they were responsible for the death of Imelda and they
vehemently denied any participation in the crime.
The accused were then brought to the 46th Infantry Brigade
Headquarters where they were allegedly subjected to severe
physical beatings by the soldiers. Unable to bear the
maltreatment any further, they were compelled to admit the
earlier accusations against them.
The next day, a strong and painful kick in the stomach was
inflicted on appellant by one of his custodians for refusing to
carry a lady's underwear and a pair of blue slippers in his
pocket, which items were later identified by Talaboc as
belonging to his daughter. Consequently, he carried the same
with him when they were brought to the Magsaysay Municipal
Hall where they were investigated by Sgt. Gataber.
Afterwards, appellant was asked to sign a document,
explained to him as having something to do with his food, to
which importing the unlettered appellant acceded.
Unfortunately, the document turned out to be his supposed
statement admitting his guilt for attempting to rape Imelda and
subsequently killing her. 7
Appellant Loreto Salangga has now come before us, through
counsel de oficio, contending that the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime charged on the basis of
insufficient circumstantial evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person when (a) in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) an offense has in fact just been committed and
he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof, the person to be arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7, Rule 112.
From these provisions, it is not hard to conclude that appellant
was arrested in violation of his fundamental right against
unjustified warrantless arrest. On the night he was arrested, he
was in his house peacefully attending to some domestic chores
therein. It cannot be suggested that he was in any way
committing a crime or attempting to commit one. Also, the
soldiers had no personal knowledge of the crime he was being
charged with, nor was he a fugitive from the law.
The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable
searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute
or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of a
warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be
extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law. 8
Bernardo Talaboc testified that both accused were frisked and
asked to undress before him, some soldiers of the 46th
Infantry Brigade, and Barangay Captain Laput inside the
Army detachment. If he is to be believed, that body search
incredibly yielded a lady's panty from the pocket of appellant
and which underwear he identified as that of his daughter. It
would surely have been the height of stupidity for appellant to
be keeping on his person an incriminating piece of evidence
which common sense dictates should have been destroyed or
disposed of. For that matter, according to Barangay Captain
Laput before whom appellant was brought shortly after his
apprehension and who was also present therein, nothing was
taken from said appellant. 9
In any event, the underwear allegedly taken from the accused
is inadmissible in evidence, being a so-called "fruit of a
poisonous tree." Likewise, there is definitely an improbability
in the claim of Talaboc that he was able to recognize the
underwear of his daughter. It is an a typical and abnormal
situation under Filipino customs for a father to be familiar
with the underwear of his daughter. This is highly improbable,
and it is plain common sense that improbabilities must be
carefully scrutinized and not readily accepted.
Again, during the initial investigation of Barangay Captain
Laput on July 23, 1987 before Sgt. Gataber, nothing was ever
mentioned regarding the supposed scratches and bite marks
allegedly found on the chest of appellant. The truth is that
these matters were mentioned in the trial court only after about
two and a half years from the arrest of appellant. It is indeed
strange that such vital evidence conspicuously found on the
body of appellant, if true, could be omitted in the sworn
statement of Laput 10 which was taken four days after the
alleged discovery. He and the investigator could not have been
unaware that the supposed scratches and bite marks were
obviously relevant in this kind of crime, more particularly to
prove the reported struggle of the victim against her unknown
killer.
The aforesaid testimony of Laput thus suffers from serious
flaws attendant to its taking which accordingly taint its
credibility. The long delay in his disclosure bolsters the
suspicion that such testimony is biased, if not fabricated.
Laput's claim that he revealed the aforesaid facts to Sgt.
Gataber 11 is belief by his own sworn statement. It is true, and
we was have so held, that sworn statements executed before
police officers are usually incomplete and contain data which
are inconsistent with the facts narrated by the witnesses to said
officers. For this reason, courts have generally brushed aside,
as inconsequential, contradictions in the sworn statement of a
witness and his testimony as long as these dwell only on minor
and reconcilable matters. 12
However, the aforesaid allegations on the supposed scratches
and bite marks on the body of appellant can by no means be
considered as minor or trivial matters. The prosecution, in
fact, relies heavily thereon to support its theory of the case.
Since every circumstance must be taken into consideration in
passing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, it becomes
crucial for his eventual acquittal when such discrepancies
touch on substantial and irreconcilable facts, as when the
omission in the sworn statement concerns an important detail
which the affiant would not have failed to mention, and which
omission could accordingly affect his credibility. 13
We are not persuaded by the theory that the accused waived
their right against the said unreasonable search and seizure,
simply because they did not object thereto. To constitute
waiver, it must appear, firstly, that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; and, lastly, that
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. 14 Courts understandably indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and do
not deduce acquiescence in the loss of elementary rights. 15
Coming now to Sgt. Gataber's testimony, we find that the
same seriously undermines the case for the People. On the
witness stand, he recited the rights of an accused but
apparently none of these were granted to or applied in his
investigation of appellant. This is partly explained by the fact
that he had a wrong, if not a weird, perception or
understanding regarding a "person under custodial
interrogation," his duty to apprise such person of his rights,
and the right of that person to counsel, as demonstrated below.
Q How would you say that
a person is under custodial
interrogation?
A When the accused is
assisted by a counsel of
his own choice.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words, if the
accused is not assisted by
counsel in the
investigation he is not
under custodial
interrogation, is that what
you mean?
A Yes.
Q In other words, (in) this
particular case, you
considered this
investigation on accused
Salangga as not under
custodial interrogation
because he was not
assisted by counsel?
A Yes, because that is not
the proper custodial
interrogation.
Q In other words, on that
day that you conducted the
investigation, you did not
apprise him of his rights to
have counsel?
A I apprised him but there
was no available lawyer in
our place but I considered
his statement is true.
Q Will you please go over
this statement if you can
find a portion wherein you
apprised the declarant of
his right to counsel?
A I did not apprise
because of some
circumstantial facts.
Q What are these
circumstantial facts
A I did not bother to write
the rights of the accused.
Q Did you not find it
important . . . because this
case it quite serious?
A I made that question
and interrogation in my
office but I was doubtful
whether that would be
acceptable in Court
because that question and
answer was not subscribed
and sworn to before the
municipal judge.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words, you did
not tell him that the
government can provide
him counsel if he cannot
afford one?
A Yes.
Q You did not tell him
that?
A I told him that if you
cannot afford to have a
counsel, the government
will give you one.
Q Did you place that in
your question and
interview?
A No.
Q Why did you not place
that in your question and
interview?
A Because my question
and interview which I
made before him is not
acceptable.
xxx xxx xxx
 Q Because you thought
that Salangga was under
custodial interrogation of
the Police Station of
Magsaysay at the time . . .
why did you not require
him to have counsel of his
own choice as you have
attended a lot of seminars?
A That is the reason why
because there is no
available lawyer in our
place.
Q And you are aware
about Atty. Mat(i)as
Acquiatan?
A Yes, but sometimes he
is out of Magsaysay.
Q And despite that fact,
you did not find ways and
means to contact the
CLAO or Atty. Acquiatan
in order to assist Salangga
in the interview?
A There were several
lawyers which I
approached to assist the
suspect but they refused
and at that time I also
approached Atty.
Acquiatan and he advised
me to see the lawyer of
CLAO.
Q But in this particular
case, you never tr(ied) to
approach Atty. Acquiatan
to assist accused
Salangga?
A No.
Q Neither did you
approach the lawyer of
CLAO in that particular
interview?
A No." 16
It is consequently evident that since appellant was not assisted
by any counsel during his custodial investigation, his supposed
incriminatory statement is inadmissible and cannot be
considered in the adjudication of this case. Oddly enough,
even Sgt. Gataber was skeptical as to the validity of the
statement he took from appellant. 17 The rule, of course, is that
no in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it be in
the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any
person in his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf. 18
While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must
be effected voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Further,
waiver must be with the assistance of counsel. 19 The absence
of counsel at that stage makes the statement, in contemplation
of law, involuntary, even if it was otherwise voluntary in a
non-technical sense.
With the Court now unanimously upholding the exclusionary
rule in toto, the constitutional mandate is given full force and
effect. This constitutional edict has been proved by historical
experience to be the practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby
removing the incentive part of the military and police officers
to disregard such basic rights. This is of special public
importance and serves as a shield in the remote provinces and
rural areas to the people who have no access to courts for
prompt and immediate relief from violations of their rights. 20
Section 5 of Rule 133 provides that when no direct evidence is
available, circumstantial evidence will suffice when the
following requirements are present: (a) there are more than
one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, before conviction can be had
upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved
should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime. 21
A meticulous and closer inquiry into the records reveals that
there is really but one sole circumstance upon which the court
relied in its decision, that is, that Imelda was seen trailing
behind appellant by a few meters on the path towards her
house. The prosecution presented two witnesses on this very
same fact but the testimony thereon of two witnesses cannot
convert one circumstance into two. All other "circumstances"
under the prosecution's theory, such as the underwear
allegedly found in appellant's pocket, the supposed scratches
and bite marks on his body, and his dubious confession to Sgt.
Gataber are all products of an illegal process, aside from their
questionable veracity.
Assuming arguendo that appellant was seen walking in front
of Imelda about two hours before the discovery of the death of
the latter, such fact could not lead a prudent man to conclude
that appellant was the one responsible for the misfortune that
befell the victim. Also, Sgt. Gataber believed that Lenie
Alingay and Ricky Monterde could shed light on the case and
so he claimed to have taken their statements, but, surprisingly,
no sworn statements were executed by them. Later, he
retracted what he said, announcing instead that he actually
referred the taking of the statements to Sgt. Saraum, but he
could not remember if the statements, if thereafter taken, were
attached to the records. 22
We reject the People's hypothesis on the alleged "confession"
of appellant to a certain Pastor Juan Tapic. The records reveal
that there was a statement of appellant merely saying that he
and Lopez were suspects in the rape and death of Imelda but
never did he say that they were the ones responsible for such
crime. Also, if the prosecution really believed that the
appellant truly admitted to Pastor Tapic his participation in the
crime, it is puzzling that said pastor was not called by the
prosecution to take the witness stand. A party's failure to
produce evidence, which if favorable would naturally have
been produced, is open to the inference that the facts were
unfavorable to his case. 23 Verily, that failure to present Pastor
Tapic can only mean that the prosecution itself doubted what
appellant precisely meant when he said that there are two of
them, that is, himself and Lopez.
We also note that while the prosecution presented a medical
certificate 24 to prove the alleged rape, it failed to present the
physician to affirm it. In the absence of the doctor's testimony,
the contents thereof are hearsay. 25 At any rate, even if the
physician had been presented there was in fact no need for him
to make that affirmation since the conviction of appellant is
based merely on his supposed inculpatory statement which has
no probative value for having been taken in violation of
explicit constitutional mandates and proscriptions.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of facts of trial
courts carry great weight for these courts enjoy the advantage
of having observed the demeanor of the witnesses on the
witness stand and, therefore, can discern if these witnesses are
telling the truth or not. However, likewise well-settled are the
exceptions thereto, which are when (1) the conclusion is a
finding based entirely on speculations, (2) the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, (3) there is a
grave abuse of discretion, and (4) the finding is based on a
misapprehension of the facts. 26 The evidentiary bases for the
conclusions of the lower court having been demonstrated to be
either incompetent in law or incredible in fact, the exceptive
circumstances have to be given full sway.
The prosecution's evidence regrettably leaves much to be
desired, unfortunately as a consequence of faulty investigative
work in the first place. This Court must, however, be guided
by a rule of long standing and consistency that if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one or
more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. 27
In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is
not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. This
determinant, with the constitutional presumption of innocence
which can be overthrown only by the strength of the
prosecution's own evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, irresistibly dictate an exoneration in this case. It is
indeed a bitter truth for the victim's family to face, that human
justice seems to have failed then due to the foregoing
confluent factors. We deeply commiserate with them and
sincerely hope that, somehow and in God's own time, divine
retribution shall be visited upon the evil author of this human
tragedy.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Loreto
Salangga is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered to be
immediately released unless there are other grounds for his
continued detention, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-
appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special
Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section
2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as
follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m.,
the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and
no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending
the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the
transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and
address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision,
p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could
examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages
simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on
inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were
then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by
two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the
bottom and on top of the packages before the box
was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box
ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes
(proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for
final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside.
Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a
cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the
contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987;
Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the
shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the
cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's
shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30 o'clock
in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987.
He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics
Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of
the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job
Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer,
went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p.
30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's
packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI
agents, opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the
gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have
been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn,
p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was
likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried
marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly
contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned
out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge
of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a
"Receipt" acknowledging custody of the said effects
(tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no
avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the
Manila Central Post Office, the agents requested assistance
from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987,
appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office,
was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted
shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the
Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the
Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It
turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops
as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-
11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors,
to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND
SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE FOUR
PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT
THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE
APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief,
p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed
offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in
evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
 nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935
Charter which, worded as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
(Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth
Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the
Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States
Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are
considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v.
Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]), this Court, in Stonehill v.
Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any
evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted
in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the
admissibility of evidence was not affected by the illegality of
its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV)
constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to
the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the
exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co.,
(Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See
also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR No. 81510, March
14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to,
the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State
acting through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character
since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and participation
of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated?
Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly
in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345
[1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable
search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's
person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government, included in which is his residence, his
papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as
such have the access except under the circumstances
above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his
house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government,
which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . .
. (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966]
and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886];
Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65
L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against
unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in
previous cases, its protection applies to governmental
action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign
authority, and was not intended to be a limitation
upon other than governmental agencies; as against
such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of
unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of
seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d
661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the
automobile to ascertain the owner thereof found marijuana
instead, without the knowledge and participation of police
authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d
121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon private
individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49
Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903
(1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517
(1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however,
was made by a private citizen — the owner of a
motel in which appellant stayed overnight and in
which he left behind a travel case containing the
evidence***complained of. The search was made on
the motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he
became suspicious, called the local police, informed
them of the bag's contents, and made it available to
the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it
do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen. Rather, the
amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession
of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against
him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI
agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later
on used in prosecuting the case which resulted in his
conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be
clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to
fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily
foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal
search and seizure of the prohibited merchandise. Records of
the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of
Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of
packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts
(TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing
the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and
later summoned the agents to his place of business. Thereafter,
he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents.
Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less
an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert
the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless
search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to
observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v.
State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927];
Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963];
Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was
likewise held that where the property was taken into custody
of the police at the specific request of the manager and where
the search was initially made by the owner there is no
unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds
support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the
land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship
speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he
himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of
fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional
democracy. Protection against whom? Protection
against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals,
between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some
forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to
any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of
Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis
supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a
warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test
of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.
In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the
1935 Constitution has been modified by the present
phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police
authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p.
8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in
laying down the principles of the government and fundamental
liberties of the people, does not govern relationships between
individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the
modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2,
Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or
warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the
issuance thereof (See Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
[1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12
[June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against
unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The
restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and
seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual
unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To
agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in
violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an
act of the State would result in serious legal complications and
an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an
individual effected through private seizure equally applies,
in pari passu, to the alleged violation, non-governmental as it
is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that
the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed
fact that his rights under the constitution while under custodial
investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully
examined the records of the case and found nothing to
indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that appellant was not
informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements
without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified
that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their
duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be
given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the
contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is
that appellant refused to give any written statement while
under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI,
Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job
Reyes. What about the accused here, did you
investigate the accused together with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with
the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional
right not to give any written statement, sir. (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was
not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As
borne out by the records, neither was there any proof by the
defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while
being investigated. What is more, we have examined the
assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any
reference made to the testimony of appellant while under
custodial investigation which was utilized in the finding of
conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore
misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error,
appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of
the packages which contained prohibited drugs but rather a
certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a
pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and
gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the
German national was about to leave the country the next day
(October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find
appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary
to human experience. It can easily be fabricated. An
acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour
could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four
(4) parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for
appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking
without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial
court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of
considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and
the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the
Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and
ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so"
(Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to
do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs.
Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering
that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously
convicted of possession of hashish by the Kleve Court in the
Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the
consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also a
Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is
just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich,
Switzerland (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records,
p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind
can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v.
Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37
N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989];
People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA,
92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As records further show, appellant did
not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete
address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the
German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant
should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh.
"B", Original Records, p. 40). On the contrary, appellant
signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving
more weight to the presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estopped to claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial
court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
People vs Marti Case Digest
October 26, 2012
People vs Marti
By maechmedina
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
LawPhil’s Full text
link: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/jan1991/gr_
81561_1991.html
FACTS:
August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife,
Sherly Reyes, went to the booth of the “Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders” carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The
appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked
if she could examine and inspect the packages. She refused
and assures her that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves.
Before the delivery of appellant’s box to the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor),
following the standard operating procedure, opened the boxes
for final inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and
that the gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and
reported to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations.
The dried marijuana leaves were found to have contained
inside the cellophane wrappers.
The accused – appellant assigns the following errors: The
lower court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of
search and seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?
HELD:
Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RATIONALE:
Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution
Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule
Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence
obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning
in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs
People’s Court.
The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of state authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim
that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession
of the government without the latter transgressing appellants
rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees
no cogent reason whty the same should not be admitted.
FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS – Readily foreclose the
proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and
seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI
agents made no search and seizure much less an illegal one,
contrary to the postulate of accused / appellant.
CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is
open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof
BILL OF RIGHTS
The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of
constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection
against the STATE.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193
SCRA 57) Case Digest
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife,
Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export
Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was
received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the
packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to
seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being
sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of
the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made
him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported
this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the
package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened
the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves
inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A.
6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an
appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional
right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired
from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against
private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner
Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between
the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the
law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one
who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his
place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not
convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a
warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not
a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293 May 9, 1995
GIL V. MANLAVI, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Regional Trial
Court, Branch 47, City of Puerto Princesa, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed against respondent,
the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47,
Puerto Princess City.
I
Complainant, a senior police officer, charged respondent with
partiality, miscarriage of justice and knowingly rendering an
unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of Criminal
Cases Nos. 9210 (Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended
for Illegal Fishing) and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally
Caught Fish). The cases were consolidated for trial.
The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the
ground that the evidence of the prosecution was the product of
a warrantless and illegal search and seizure. Respondent
granted the motion in the Order dated July 9, 1992, citing the
admission of the prosecution that the search and seizure was
not covered by a search warrant, and that the search warrant
presented in court was issued after the fact.
Complainant contended that the confiscation of the fish in the
absence of a search warrant was allowed under Circular No.
130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the President.
The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9211 on the
ground that the information failed to charge the offense of
illegal possession of fish caught by explosives for its failure to
allege the element "for profit."
The information in said case reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of January,
1991, at Bgy. Mandaragat, Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together with
John Doe, Peter Doe and William Doe
whose true identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and one
Virgilio Laguna, a military officer, which
case was forwarded to the JAGO, did then
and wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess illegally caught assorted fish with
the use of explosives, weighing more or less
Eight (8,000) Thousand Kilos.
In his comment, the City Prosecutor admitted the omission in
the information of the phrase "for profit" but he claimed that
said omission was a mere technicality.
In his Order dated June 25, 1992, respondent granted the
Motion on the ground that the information area fatally
defective, because it failed to allege two essential elements:
(1) that the accused had knowledge that the fish were illegally
caught with the use of explosives; and (2) that they intended to
dispose of or sell the fish for profit.
The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order
arguing: (1) that the word "knowingly" was substituted with
the word "wilfully"; and (2) that P.D. No. 704 punishes the
separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of
illegally caught fish or aquatic products. The motion for
reconsideration was denied.
II
In his comment, respondent denied the charges against him
and asserted that his orders were supported by law and
evidence. He moved for the dismissal of the instant complaint.
As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9210, complainant
himself admitted that the search and seizure was conducted in
the absence of a warrant. The search warrant produced by the
complainant was issued after the search and seizure took
place.
Moreover, complainant cannot justify the warrantless search
and seizure by invoking Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the
Office of the President. The circular pertains to the procedure
in the confiscation of fish caught through the use of
explosives. Such confiscation may be exercised only by the
Commissioner of fisheries or his representatives, who can only
take a sample of the fish (not to exceed one kilo) for testing if
the fish were indeed caught through the use of explosives. It is
only upon the determination that the fish were caught through
the use of explosives when the seizure of the entire catch may
be authorized. Thereafter, an appraisal of the value of the fish
caught shall be made, which shall be paid to the accused
should he be subsequently acquitted in the criminal case filed
against him.
We note that the arresting officers failed to show compliance
with the procedure prescribed by the very circular they invoke.
As to the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 9211, respondent
erred in holding that the information was defective in not
alleging that the offense was committed "knowingly." The
element of knowledge was encompassed within the word
"wilfully" used by the prosecutor.
However, the information suffers from infirmity for failure to
allege the element "for profit." Section 33 (Illegal fishing,
dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic products) of
Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended, provides:
. . . It shall person likewise, be unlawful for
any person knowingly to possess, deal in,
sell or in any manner dispose of, for profit,
any fish or fishery/aquatic products which
 have been illegally caught, taken or gathered
(Emphasis supplied).
It is true that the provision prohibits the separate acts of
possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of illegally caught
fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done
"knowingly" but also "for profit," an essential element of the
offense.
Complainant's argument — that a quashal of the complainant
or information cannot be done without the prior written
approval of the provincial prosecutor — is misplaced.
Complainant invokes Section 4, Rule 112 of the New Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No complaint or information may be filed or
dismissed by an investigating fiscal without
the prior written approval of the provincial
or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor.
xxx xxx xxx
Said provision applies to the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, which is within the control of the public
prosecutor. It has no application in a case where the
information is already filed before the proper court. In fact, the
epigraph of Rule 112 is "Duty of investigating fiscal."
In the case at bench, the accused moved for the quashal of the
criminal cases after their arraignment. As a general rule, an
accused can move for the quashal of the information on any
ground before arraignment (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117,
Sec. 1). However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as
where there is no offense charged (Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 117, Section 8; Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA
145 [1991]), for what controls is not the designation of the
offense charged in the information but the allegations of the
constitutive elements of the offense (People v. Aczon, 225
SCRA 237 a [1993]). Any ambiguity in the information shall
be resolved in favor of the accused (People v. Bondoy, 222
SCRA 216 [1993]).
Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to
his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary power,
unless when they are committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or bad faith (Abiera v. Maceda; 233 SCRA 520
[1994]).
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129566. October 7, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NOEL NAVARRO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In rejecting this appeal, the Court reiterates the following
doctrines: (1) a retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier
credible testimony; (2) the testimony of a single witness, if
positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction, even in a charge for murder; (3) the rule on res
gestae relates to the admissibility of evidence, not to its weight
and sufficiency; (4) alleged violations of the rights against
illegal arrest and seizure are deemed waived by the appellant's
failure to assert them prior to arraignment; (5) where the killing
is qualified by treachery, which is alleged in the information,
the crime committed is murder; and (6) where the existence of
the unlicensed firearm allegedly used in the killing has not been
clearly established, the charge of illegal possession of firearm
cannot be considered an aggravating circumstance in murder.
The Case
On January 6, 1994, two Informations, one for
murder[1] and the other for violation of Presidential Decree
1866,[2] were filed at the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan against Noel Navarro. On January 19, 1994,
Navarro, through Counsel Romeo L. Gutierrez, filed two
motions, one to remand the case to the provincial prosecutor for
preliminary investigation and the other to
suspend the proceedings before the court.[3] Judge Segundo B.
Paz granted the motions.[4] Thereafter, on March 3, 1994, filed
against the appellant was this amended Information for
murder:[5]
"That on or about January 5, 1991, in the evening, near Enok
Theater at Poblacion, [M]unicipality of Alaminos, [P]rovince
of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot FERDINAND RABADON @ "BOYET"
several times which caused his instantaneous death as a
consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code." [6]
Affirmed, on the other hand, was this Information for
violation of PD 1866:
"That on or about January 5, 1991, in the [M]unicipality of
Alaminos, [P]rovince of Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, control and custody one short firearm without
first securing the necessary license and permit to possess the
same and said firearm was used in the killing of Ferdinand
Rabadon.
Contrary to P.D. 1866." [7]
On April 5, 1994, appellant, assisted by his
aforementioned counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him.[8] He then filed a petition for bail. A protracted
full-blown hearing on the matter then ensued, during which the
prosecution and the defense presented their respective
witnesses and documentary evidence. The petition was denied.
The trial court adopted the proceedings during said hearing and
thereafter, rendered the assailed 22-page Decision,[9] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [m]urder as described
in the Information in Criminal Case No. 2762-A and,
therefore, he is ordered to suffer the single and indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The said accused should
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00
as provided for by law plus another sum of P50,000.00 for
actual damages that the mother of the victim has spent for the
funeral services and wake.
"That the illegal possession of firearm subject of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 2763-A is considered
merely as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime of murder, considering that the alleged firearm used
was not recovered by the authorities and never presented in
court.
xxxxxxxxx
"SO ORDERED."[10]
Hence, this appeal.[11]
The Facts According to the Prosecution
The solicitor general narrated the People's version of the
facts as follows:
"On January 5, 1991, around 9:00 in the evening, Jose Rabago
went to Enoc Theater located at Poblacion, Alaminos,
Pangasinan to view some stationary pictures exhibited outside
the theater (p. 11, TSN, May 20, 1994). When he was about to
go home on board his motorcycle, he was invited by
Ferdinand Rabadon, who was drinking beer inside Adela's
Restaurant, to join him. Rabago obliged (p.12, id.).
"Later, Rabadon borrowed Rabago's motorcycle which he
used in going to the bus terminal to check if his wife had
already arrived from Zamboanga (p. 13, id.) Upon his return,
Rabadon invited Rabago to Five Doors Disco but the latter
opted to go home (p. 14, id.). Rabadon, who was still on the
motorcycle holding its handle bars, offered to drive Rabago
home. (id.).
"When Rabago was about to mount the motorcycle, he was
pushed by one Ming Basila, causing him to fall on his
buttocks, after which Basila shot Rabadon twice at the back.
While Rabadon was already lying down with his leg pinned by
the motorcycle, appellant shot him three (3) times (pp. 14-
15, id.).
"Rabago ran away, but after noticing that appellant and Basila
[had] left the scene, he returned and saw Rabadon dying and
gasping for breath (pp. 17-18, id.).
"Rabago saw Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, a policeman, to whom
he reported Rabadon's killing (pp. 19-20, id.). On January 6,
1991, Rabago was investigated by policeman Rolando
Rabadon but he said that he did not see anything (p. 3, TSN,
June 13, 1994).
"During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did
not divulge the identities of the assailants for fear of his life (p.
37, TSN, May 20, 1994). He claimed that some policemen in
Alaminos, Pangasinan [were] members of the Aguila Gang
which kill[ed] people (pp. 41-42, TSN, June 13, 1994). The
gang [was] allegedly led by one Ramon Navarro, appellant's
brother.
"The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) interrogated
Rabago on January 3, 1994, at which time, Rabago named
appellant and Ming Basila as the authors of Rabadon's killing
(p. 20, TSN, June 13, 1994).
"Dr. Francisco Viray, who autopsied Rabadon's cadaver,
found five (5) gunshot wounds and concluded that the
immediate cause of death [was] "cardio-respiratory arrest;
antecedent cause: brain injury and underlying cause: gunshot
wounds" (p. 11, TSN, August 8, 1994)." [12]
According to the Defense
Appellant Noel Navarro denied any participation in the
killing of Rabadon in his 16-page Brief,[13] which we quote:
"On January 5, 1991, in the evening, one Ferdinand Rabadon
was shot to death near the Enoc Theater at Poblacion,
Alaminos, Pangasinan. Almost immediately after the shooting
incident, Jose Rabago reported the incident to one policeman,
Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon, was inside a restaurant near the
Victory Liner Terminal that his (Jose Rabago) companion was
shot without him telling the policeman Virgilio "Itlog"
Rabadon who shot his companion. Policeman Rabadon
responded by going to the place pointed to by Jose Rabago,
but the victim was no longer at the place of the incident as he
was brought to the hospital. Later, Jose Rabago was
investigated by policeman Rolando "Lando" Rabadon
regarding the shooting incident, but Jose Rabago, when asked,
told policeman Rolando[14] Lando Rabadon that he did not see
anything. Considering the negative result of the police
investigation, no case was filed by the police against anybody
for the shooting to death of Ferdinand Rabadon.
"Three (3) years later, on January 5, 1994, at about 8:00 o'
clock in the evening, a composite team of the National Bureau
of Investigation led by Atty. Teofilo Gallang served a search
warrant and warrant of arrest to one Ramon Navarro, brother
of accused-appellant in his residence and failing to find
Ramon Navarro, the composite team of the NBI went to the
house where accused-appellant was staying where they saw
him (Noel Navarro). Accused-appellant was searched, but
[nothing was found] in his body. Accused-appellant was
arrested right then and there without any warrant of arrest
shown to him by the NBI. In fact, it was admitted that the NBI
composite team at the time [had] no warrant of arrest against
accused-appellant.
"The NBI composite team boarded accused-appellant in a
white van and was brought to the house of now Congressman
Hernani Braganza in Alaminos, Pangasinan. Later, the NBI
composite team went to Lucap, Alaminos, Pangasinan to fetch
Fiscal Rabina and from there, they all proceeded to the police
station of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Accused-appellant inquired
from Fiscal Rabina if there [was] a warrant for his arrest and
Fiscal Rabina simply said, sorry, my son, I cannot do
anything, okay?
"The following day, January 6, 1994, Prosecutor Rabina filed
the [I]nformation charging accused-appellant of [m]urder, x x
x for allegedly killing Ferdinand Rabadon on January 5, 1991,
three (3) years earlier, without conducting a preliminary
investigation. Also filed [was] an [I]nformation for [violation]
of P.D. 1866 x x x."[15]
The defense presented three witnesses: Jose Rabago, who
recanted his previous testimony; NBI Director Teodoro Galang,
who testified as to the circumstances surrounding the arrest of
the appellant without warrant; and Noel Navarro, the appellant
himself.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder, based
on Jose Rabago's testimony as a prosecution witness, which it
found to be positive, credible and sufficient to support a
judgment of conviction. It ratiocinated as follows:
"Jose Rabago was positive about the identity of the killers of
the victim. He was just one (1) meter away from Ming Basila
and he was facing Ming Basila when he fell down. He saw the
gun firing when it was Noel Navarro's turn to [shoot] the
victim, and he [had] already taken three steps to [run] away
towards the Philippine Rabbit Bus Station, but he claim[ed]
that he looked back.
"There is no doubt from his testimony that Jose Rabago
recognized Noel Navarro. He knew Noel Navarro when they
were both students of the Royal Carpenter Academy. [In spite]
of the hour of the night, he recognized Noel Navarro because
there were three lights x x x [h]is distance [was] just three
steps away from Noel Navarro. Even assuming that he [had]
his back turned toward the accused, because he scampered
away, Jose Rabago testified that upon reaching the bus station,
he looked at the two who lingered at the scene of the shooting.
He also saw them [leave] and disappear at the corner."[16]
Rabago's recantation of his testimony as a prosecution
witness was disregarded by the court a quo in this wise:
"x x x the Court cannot find any evidence or any indications
that Jose Rabago [had] a sinister scheme to prevaricate and
therefore this Court must respect as trustworthy, and with full
faith and credence, his testimony as eyewitness for the
prosecution."[17]
Citing jurisprudence, the lower court further declared that
"mere retraction by [the] prosecution witness does not
necessarily deshape the original testimony, if credible," and that
" [courts] look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. The rationale for the rule is obvious;
the retraction can easily be secured from witnesses usually
through intimidation or monetary consideration." [18]
In all, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder,
after finding that the killing was qualified by treachery and
merely aggravated by illegal possession of firearms.[19]
The Assigned Errors
The appellant contends that the lower court committed the
following errors:
"1. In not considering the report of Prosecution Witness Jose
Rabago to policeman Virgilio "Itlog" Rabadon that his
companion was killed, but did not tell policeman Virgilio
"Itlog" Rabadon that accused-appellant and one Ming Basila
killed the deceased, as part of the res gestae;
"2. In not considering the result of the investigation conducted
by Policeman Rolando Lando Rabadon when Witness Jose
Rabago was asked if he saw the assailant and did not mention
the name of the accused-appellant and one Ming Basila, but
instead, answered he did not see anything, as part of the res
gestae;
"3. In giving credence to the testimony of witness Jose Rabago
despite the fact that he narrated three (3) versions of the
incident, in his report to the police authorities and the
investigation conducted by the police authorities later
immediately after the incident, and in his testimony as a
prosecution witness and as a defense witness;
"4. In finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder despite serious and material
inconsistencies in the testimony of Jose Rabago, the lone
witness of the prosecution who [claimed] to have [witnessed]
the killing of Ferdinand Rabadon." [20]
In sum, the defense disputes the trial court's ruling
identifying appellant as one of the authors of the crime. To
resolve the appeal fully, the following issues will be discussed:
(1) credibility and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence,
(2) res gestae, (3) the defenses of denial and illegality of arrest
and (4) the characterization of the killing. In addition, the Court
will discuss the validity of the lower court's ruling that illegal
possession of firearms should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance in the killing.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution
Evidence
In the present controversy, the judge who penned the
assailed Decision did not hear all the evidence presented by the
parties. In fact, three judges handled the case: Judge Segundo
B. Paz, in whose court the Informations were filed and the
evidence of the parties was heard until August 17, 1994; Judge
Leo M. Rapatalo, who took over on December 7, 1994 and
resolved the petition for bail; and Judge Jules A. Mejia, who
presided over the case from February 26, 1997 onwards. Hence,
the rule granting finality to the factual findings of trial courts is
inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the Court meticulously
pored over the records, especially the transcript of stenographic
notes, but after a careful study and deliberation, the Court finds
no reason to disturb the factual findings of Judge Mejia.
Appellant contends that the testimony of Prosecution
Witness Jose Rabago was filled with serious and material
inconsistencies, allegedly because he gave three versions of the
incident. First, he did not mention appellant's name when he
reported the incident to SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon; and when
asked by Patrolman Rolando Rabadon, he said that he did not
see anything. Second, he identified the appellant as one of
Rabadon's killers only when he was questioned by agents of the
National Bureau of Investigation three years after the
incident. As a prosecution witness, he maintained this
assertion. Third, when presented as a defense witness, he
changed his testimony and swore that it was not the appellant
who had shot Rabadon, but a "short and stout man." [21]
The argument does not persuade. True, Rabago did not
mention the name of the appellant when he reported the killing
to both SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon and Patrolman Rolando
Rabadon;[22] however, he explained that he was apprehensive
about talking to the police, as he suspected that some of them
were members of the dreaded Aguila Gang, viz.:
"x x x x x x x x x
Q Mr. Witness, when you were asked by policeman Lando
Rabadon about what you learned of the shooting to
death of Boyet Rabadon, you told him you did not see
anything, why did you tell policeman Lando Rabadon
that you did not see anything?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q And why were you afraid?
A I did not have confidence [in] the police.
Q Didn't you have confidence [in] the police?
A Because some policemen are members of Aguila.
Q And what is Aguila?
xxxxxxxxx
A Aguila gang, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q What is the Aguila gang?
A It is killing people, sir.
x x x x x x x x x"[23]
He further testified to the pervasive climate of fear
engulfing his town:
"x x x x x x x x x
Q In your affidavit, Mr. Witness, you mentioned that there
were other witnesses [to] the killing. [A]ccording to
you, on January 5, 1994, there were other witnesses x
x x, and your answer was "yes", but nobody there
talked anymore due to fear for their lives.
A Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And what about your statement that these other witnesses
fear for their lives, was that not your statement in your
sworn statement?
A Yes, sir, they are afraid.
Q And what about you, are you not afraid of the Navarros?
A I am afraid, sir.
Q Are you saying, Mr. Witness, that a lot of people here in
Alaminos are afraid of the Navarros?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x"[24]
 With regard to Rabago's recantation of his previous
testimony as a prosecution witness, narrating the killing of
Rabadon and identifying the appellant as one of the
malefactors, suffice it to say that this earlier testimony was
clear, candid and consistent, as shown hereunder:
"x x x x x x x x x
Q After Ming Basila shot Boyet Rabadon, what happened
next?
A Noel Navarro followed.
Q What did Noel Navarro do after Ming Basila shot
Rabadon from behind?
A Boyet Rabadon was already lying down and he [shot]
him.
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that Noel Navarro shot Ferdinand Rabadon,
how many times did Noel Navarro shoot Boyet
Rabadon?
A Thrice, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Mr. Witness, considering that it was about nine o' clock
in the evening when Ming Basila and Noel Navarro
shot Boyet Rabadon, how were you able to see Basila
and Noel Navarro shoot Boyet Rabadon?
xxxxxxxxx
A There was a light, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How many lights were there?
A About three.
xxxxxxxxx
Q How far were you from Boyet Rabadon when Ming
Basila and Noel Navarro shot him?
A About three steps, sir.
x x x x x x x x x"[25]
It must be stressed also that Rabago's testimony was
compatible with the findings of Dr. Francisco E. Viray, [26] the
medicolegal officer who autopsied the victim's body. Rabago
said that Rabadon had been shot five times, once in the nape
and four times in other parts of his body. [27] Such details of his
testimony as a prosecution witness, aside from the fact that no
ill motive or bias was ascribed to him by the appellant, lends
earmarks of truth to said testimony.
In contrast, Rabago's testimony as a defense witness was
bereft of particulars that should have indicated, at the very least,
that his testimony as a prosecution witness was false. His
testimony as a defense witness, albeit brief, did point out that it
was not the appellant but a "stout and short" man, along with
Ming Basila, who shot the victim. He claimed that he was
testifying anew because he was bothered by his conscience;
however, he did not state any reason why he had previously
identified the appellant as one of Rabadon's killers. Also
suspect was the way he parried questions regarding his
appearance as a defense witness. Worth repeating is the trial
court's elucidation on the matter:
"The Court wonders why of all things, Rabago will apply for
witness protection program of the government, if it [was] not
true that he had witnessed the occurrence of the events as he
related them when he was presented as [a] prosecution
witness.
"And later on, after giving his version of the incident that
happened as a witness for the prosecution, why of all things,
will he come to know the date of the trial or hearing for
[the] defense when according to him, not even the accused,
not even the lawyer of the accused, not even the subpoena had
reached him, and yet, surprisingly, he was present on June 16,
1995 to given again his testimony in favor of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
"His only reason why he [had] to testify for the defense [was]
that his conscience bothered him, but this Court cannot buy
that kind of explanation and believe it." [28]
Because the prosecution was able to substantiate its
charge of murder against the appellant through the detailed,
clear and consistent testimony of Rabago as a prosecution
witness (pointing to the appellant as one of the malefactors), the
defense should have emphatically and clearly established that
such testimony was false and ill-motivated. Appellant failed to
do this.
The Court has held in a number of cases that a recantation
of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the
probability that such recantation may later on be itself
repudiated.[29] Courts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or for monetary consideration.[30] A retraction does
not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.[31] Where a
witness who testified for the prosecution subsequently testifies
for the defense by retracting his previous testimony, as in the
present case, the test to decide which testimony to believe is a
comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of
evidence.[32]
In all, we agree with the court a quo in upholding the
detailed, clear and straightforward testimony of Jose Rabago as
a prosecution witness and in debunking his brief and indecisive
recantation of such testimony.
It is a legal truism that in criminal cases, the guilt of the
accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To sustain
conviction, the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
evidence; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of that of
the defense.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of Appellant Noel Navarro with moral
certainty. Indeed, the Court has held that the testimony of a
single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction, even in a charge for murder.[33]
 Second Issue: Res Gestae
The appellant contends that, in considering the statements
which Rabago gave to both SPO2 Virgilio Rabadon and
Patrolman Rolando Rabadon, the trial court erred in concluding
that such statements were not part of res gestae.[34]
At the outset, it must be stated that res gestae pertains to
the admissibility of evidence, and not to its weight and
sufficiency,[35] as the Office of the Solicitor General correctly
pointed out. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence
pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.[36]
Res gestae is defined as follows:
"Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res
gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal
act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res
gestae."[37]
Rabago's statement to SPO2 Rabadon that someone had
killed his companion can be considered part of the res gestae,
and is thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule. It was a spontaneous statement that was made right after a
startling occurrence and that refers to such occurrence.
However, the same cannot be said of his statement to Patrolman
Rabadon, as it lacked the requisite spontaneity, having been
given in answer to questions propounded in an investigation, a
day after the incident in question.
The appellant seems to imply that when Rabago reported
the incident to SPO2 Rabadon, Rabago's silence regarding the
identity of the killers created doubt as to the appellant's
culpability for such killing and, thus, should have been likewise
considered by the lower court in appellant's favor as part of
the res gestae.[38] This proposition deserves scant
consideration.Such omission cannot be taken to mean that
appellant was not the culprit. The witness was simply silent as
to the identity of the assailant. Such omission, as has been
discussed, can be attributed to Rabago's fear of the Navarros.
Witnesses' delayed reporting of what they know about a
crime does not render their testimonies false or incredible, for
the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most
people and their abhorrence to get involved in a criminal case.
But more than this, there is always the inherent fear of reprisal,
which is quite understandable, especially if the accused is a man
of power and influence in the community.[39] In People v.
Vias,[40] it was held that "[t]he natural reluctance of a witness to
get involved in a criminal case, as well as to give information
to the authorities is a matter of judicial notice."
Third Issue: Denial and Illegal Arrest
While the appellant denied that he killed Ferdinand
Rabadon,[41] he did not offer any evidence to prove his
assertion; instead, his testimony focused on the
circumstances surrounding his alleged illegal arrest and
subsequent detention.
Contrary to the appellant's assertion that he was denied
due process by virtue of his alleged illegal arrest, such claim is
negated by his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, as manifested by the voluntary and counsel-assisted
plea he entered during arraignment and by his active
participation in the trial thereafter.[42]
Faced with the detailed, clear and consistent testimony of
Jose Rabago, against whom no ill motive was imputed,
Appellant Navarro, whom the former pointed to as one of the
killers of Ferdinand Rabadon, cannot escape conviction merely
by issuing an unsubstantiated denial and resorting to
constitutional guarantees which he has already voluntarily
waived.
Fourth Issue: The Crime
The crime committed was murder. As alleged in the
Information, the trial court correctly concluded that the killing
of Ferdinand Rabadon was qualified by treachery.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person attacked.[43] Treachery exists when any of the crimes
against persons is committed with the employment of
means, methods or forms that tend directly and especially
to insure its execution, such that the offender faces no risk
that may arise from the defense which the offended party
might make.[44] In the present case, not only was the victim
caught off guard by the unexpected attack of the appellant and
Ming Basila, but the testimony of Jose Rabago likewise
indubitably established that the appellant shot the victim when
the victim was already lying prostrate and defenseless.[45]
Illegal Possession of Firearms
While we affirm the trial court's conviction of the
appellant for murder, we do not agree with its disquisition
finding the charge of illegal possession of firearms to have
aggravated the killing.
To prove illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution
must establish two things: first, the existence of the subject
firearm; second, the fact that the accused, who owned or
possessed the firearm, did not have the corresponding license
or permit to carry the same outside his residence.[46]
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January
5, 1991, the appellant had in his possession an unlicensed
firearm which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This
firearm was allegedly recovered on January 5, 1994, when
appellant was arrested. However, said firearm was not
presented in court or offered as evidence against the
appellant. Although Rabago testified that he saw the appellant
with a "short" firearm when the latter shot Rabadon on January
5, 1991, no other proof was presented to show that such gun,
allegedly used on January 5, 1991, was the same one recovered
on January 5, 1994. The prosecution was not able to establish
sufficiently the existence of the subject firearm, and this fact
was not offset by SPO1 Edmund Garcia of the PNP Firearms
and Explosives Unit, who testified that appellant was not a
licensed firearm holder in Pangasinan. Since the charge of
illegal possession of firearms was not proven, the same could
not be considered to have aggravated the killing of Ferdinand
Rabadon.
The court a quo would have been correct in considering
illegal possession of a firearm an aggravating circumstance, if
such possession had been established beyond reasonable
doubt.This is in line with RA 8294 (amending PD 1866),
which regards the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide.[47]
In any case, since the killing was qualified by treachery,
the crime committed was murder. Whether with or without this
alleged generic aggravating circumstance, the
penalty, reclusion perpetua, would still be the same, because
the killing was committed in January 1991, when the imposition
of the capital penalty was still proscribed by the Constitution,
and RA 7659 had not yet been enacted.
Damages
While we affirm the award of P50,000 as indemnity for
the death of Ferdinand Rabadon, we have found no evidence in
the records that can support the lower court's additional award
of P50,000 as actual damages. To justify a grant of actual
damages, it is necessary to show the amount of actual loss with
the best evidence obtainable.[48] In the present case, while
Ofelia Rabadon testified that P25,000 was spent for the wake
and burial of her son, she did not present receipts or any other
documents to substantiate such claim.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of actual
damages is DELETED. Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR
BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE,
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN,
ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO
MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH
PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER,
CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO
SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO
TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA
TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON,
COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT.
COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO
AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT.
PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT.
RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
YAP, J.:
This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore
passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a
civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages
may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations:
only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well.
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and
other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by
various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered
by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view
of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in
Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying
with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the
raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without
proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them
employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on
them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of
plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and
deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize,
harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to
and sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to
P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary
damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total
of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less
than P200,000.00.
A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their
counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging
that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the
circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the
present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the
complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs
Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel
Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983,
and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan
Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara,
Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio
Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21,
1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed
by defendants' counsel.
Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C.
Fortun, Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to
dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants'
contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry
into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court
can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from
liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action
against defendants, since there is no allegation that the
defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs'
purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional
rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo
Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of
torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty
to exercise direct supervision and control of their subordinates
or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated, "After a
careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the
same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be granted. On the
other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are
lacking in merit."
A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a
supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the
plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983,
respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a
comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a
copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely,
Attys. Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento,
Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro
B. Ella Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo,
Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.
On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order
voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the
case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the
order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion
that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending
motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to
put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no
authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This
order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion
for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee,
by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad
on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a
comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.
In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban
Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside
order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:
It appearing from the records that, indeed,
the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca,
Danilo de la Fuente and Marco Palo,
represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W.
Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by
counsel, Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses
Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-
Marcelino, represented by counsel, Atty.
Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos
represented by counsel, Atty. Rene
Sarmiento, and Rolando Salutin, represented
by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to
file a motion to reconsider the Order of
November 8, 1983, dismissing the
complaint, nor interposed an appeal
therefrom within the reglementary period, as
prayed for by the defendants, said Order is
now final against said plaintiffs.
Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it
was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino,
Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando
Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of
November 8, 1983 dismissing the complaint, within the
reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set
aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory
motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs,
although signed by only some of the lawyers.
In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court
dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11,
1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the
resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and
(2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the
defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the
order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:
(1) That the motion to set aside the order of
finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the
Resolution of dismissal of the complaint of
 plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la
Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino,
Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed
for lack of merit;
(2) For lack of cause of action as against the
following defendants, to wit:
1. Gen Fabian Ver
2. Col. Fidel Singson
3. Col. Rolando Abadilla
4. Lt. Col. Conrado
Lantoria, Jr.
5. Col. Galileo Montanar
6. Col. Panfilo Lacson
7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro
8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango
9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo
10. Lt. Raul Bacalso
the motion to set aside and reconsider the
Resolution of dismissal of the present action
or complaint, dated November 8, 1983, is
also denied but in so far as it affects and
refers to defendants, to wit:
1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and
2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba
the motion to reconsider and set aside the
Resolution of dismissal dated November 3,
1983 is granted and the Resolution of
dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and
modified.
Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on
March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent
court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11,
1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984.
Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which
it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners
on August 26, 1986.
We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due
course.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil
Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or
any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to
maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal
detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property
without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when
private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the
laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person,
house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing
the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and
correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of
associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable
assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary
servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against
excessive bail;
 (17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against ones self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel
and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article,
whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
against grieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct
civil action for damages, and for other relief.
Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to
provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms
enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man
may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times
of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the
temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather
than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that
certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be
sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the
ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will
perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the
rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to
nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant
power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of
progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by
him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this
respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism.
On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life
demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not
derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the
respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts
done in the performance of official duties or function In
support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Their primary
duty is to safeguard public safety and order.
The Constitution no less provides that the
President may call them "to prevent or
supress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent
danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII,
Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued
Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law
but providing for the continued suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in view of the remaining dangers to the
security of the nation. The proclamation also
provided "that the call to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and
subversion shall continue to be in force and
effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that
their causes of action proceed from
respondent General Ver's order to Task
Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive
strikes against communist terrorist
underground houses in Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that this order and its
subsequent implementation by elements of
the task force resulted in the violation of
their constitutional rights against unlawful
searches, seizures and arrest, rights to
counsel and to silence, and the right to
property and that, therefore, respondents Ver
and the named members of the task force
should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike
against communist terrorists, respondent
members of the armed forces merely
performed their official and constitutional
duties. To allow petitioners to recover from
respondents by way of damages for acts
performed in the exercise of such duties run
contrary to the policy considerations to
shield respondents as public officers from
undue interference with their duties and
from potentially disabling threats of hability
(Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and
 upon the necessity of protecting the
performance of governmental and public
functions from being harassed unduly or
constantly interrupted by private suits
(McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605;
Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from
liability arising from the performance of
their duties is now a settled jurisprudence
Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v.
Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas,
161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631;
Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438
US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894;
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v.
Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune,
602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed
the lawful orders of the President and his
call for the suppression of the rebellion
involving petitioners enjoy such immunity
from Suit. 3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties written the ambit of their
powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in
damages or otherwise for doing in a legal
manner what he had authority, under the
law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-
General had authority, under the law to
deport or expel the defendants, and
circumstances justifying the deportation and
the method of carrying it out are left to him,
then he cannot be held liable in damages for
the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the
courts are without authority to interfere in
any manner, for the purpose of controlling
or interferring with the exercise of the
political powers vested in the chief
executive authority of the Government, then
it must follow that the courts cannot
intervene for the purpose of declaring that
he is liable in damages for the exeercise of
this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their
duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with
Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting
of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such
objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged
communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission
untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen
enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer
or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under
the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with
vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the
Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right,
or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our
democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What
we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and
mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed,
otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In
the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is
just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that
psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that
faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be
abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs'
cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that
"Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege
of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same
purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their
detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action
is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their
causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of
violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the
habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention.
Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial
inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ
will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot
do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President,
petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering
the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause
of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No.
1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by
adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the
rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict)
arises from or out of any act, activity or
conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from
Martial Law including the arrest, detention
and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their
rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of
respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the
violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional
issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation
Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore
has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a
superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and
liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent
superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine
of respondent superior has been generally limited in its
application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship
exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in
our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and
liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer
for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and
asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official
relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to
answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against
the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen.
Part of the factors that propelled people power in February
1986 was the widely held perception that the government was
callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the
rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly
be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it
should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article
32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as
well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General
Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col.
Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo
Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo
Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their
subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that
they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to
have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the
plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a
delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such
finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with
law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5
Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence"
which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies
as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal
detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property
without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person,
house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and
correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a
witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being
induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make a confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with
abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional
rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code
were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint
speaks of, among others, searches made without search
warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially
defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper
receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs
and other items of property which were not subversive and
illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention
of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and
illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several
undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological
torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for
the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated
upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have
participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the
Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or
indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well
established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action must be based on what appears on the face of the
complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of
action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others,
should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's
ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint
against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo
and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained
allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted
hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or
causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the
Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in
dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez,
Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo
Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged
failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of
the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the
respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of
November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel.
True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo,
counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales,
counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty.
Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos
Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara;
Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty.
Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the
motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must
have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel
himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he
furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed
the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys.
Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren
Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr.,
Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene
Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8,
1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff.
They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of
an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be
assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party
or the party concerned, which was never done in this case.
Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to
take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the
order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed
only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it
was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of
them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage
under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of
the complaint had already become final with respect to some
of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for
reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity
cannot be sanctioned.
Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the
resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983,
its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated
September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the
respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and
other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by
various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered
by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view
of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in
Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying
with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places,
employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding
party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging
to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their
arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that
plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence
and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed
threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to
obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to
punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights
were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to
forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from
plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans
being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the
respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done
in the performance of official duties or function
ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other
violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained,
who can be held liable for such violations: only the military
personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties written the ambit of their
powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they
claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No.
2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on
January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch
pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist
underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket
license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the
rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the
supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low,
civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or
employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the
said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an
otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5
Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence"
which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies
as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties
enumerated therein, among others —
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with
abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights
and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were
violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of,
among others, searchesmade without search warrants or based
on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants;
seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and
personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by
the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without
warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal
circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed
places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado
and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other
inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of
extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains
a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have
participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the
Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions
those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect,
is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our
law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on
what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8