G.R. No.
80762 March 19, 1990 ISSUES: Whether or not the appellant is liable in the felony of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES
and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., accused-appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GONZALES
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.
FACTS: In a decision dated October 31, 1984, the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No.
13661, entitled People VS. Gonzales, et. al., found all the
accused, except Rogelio Lanida, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada,
44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara,
Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course
Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's
decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before
judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals,
however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to
pursue their respective applications for parole before the
then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division.
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified
the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs
of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. The
appellant is appealing to the court regarding his participation
in the killing of the victim. He claims that he did not
participate in the killing based on the claim that he was not
present in the said act.
murder as presented in the evidence.
RULING: No. The evidence is insufficient to convict the
appellant of the crime charged.
(1) The Investigation conducted left much to be desired.
Centeno gave the date of commission as March 21, 1981. The
sketch made was troubling, as it did not effectively indicate
the extent of the blood stains in the scenes of crime. This
would have added a lot of weight to any one of the versions
of the incident.
(2) Sazon, who claimed that Gonzales surrendered to him,
failed to state clearly the reason for the surrender. It may
even be possible that Augusto surrendered just so he could
be safe from the victim’s kin. Sazon also admitted that
Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other
persons in the killing.
(3) Rojas’ statement showed two possibilities for the killing.
Fausta’s admission that she was the only killer is plausible.
(4) Huntoria’s testimony, of which the prosecution’s
argument solely rests, needs to be examined further.
Huntoria’s claims in his testimony did not exactly match with
those from his cross-examination. He first claimed that he
recognized the people involved. However, in the
cross-examination, he “only saw flashes.” This implies that he
may not have recognized anyone at all.
Thus, Huntoria’s testimony was dismissed as he is found an
unreliable witness. He could not could not place a definite act
committed or contributed by the appellant in the killing of
the deceased.
On the criminal liability of the appellant:
(1) There is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of
the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation
under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution
that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the
same Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under
paragraph 3 thereof.
(2) Article 4 of the Revise Penal Code provides how criminal
liability is incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. Article 3 of the RPC states that acts
and omissions punishable by law are felonies. Felonies are
committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
Huntoria’s credibility as a witness is questionable:
(1) He came out eight months after the killing. He claims that
he feared for his life, but there was no proof that he was
being threatened, nor was the length of time reasonable
given the circumstances.

(2) He is not exactly a disinterested/neutral witness. He

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate admitted to being a tenant of the deceased, and stated that
intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from one of the reasons why he testified was because the victim
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. was his landlord.

(3) The lone witness could not properly establish any acts or
omissions done by the appellant. He stated that he does not
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond
know who hacked or stabbed the victim, thus implying that
reasonable doubt. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
he does not know what the appellant did. With this, the
reversed and set aside and the appellant is hereby
essential elements of felonies may not even be present.
ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

(4) Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab wounds
and six accused would imply that one of them may not have
caused a grave wound (especially given the statement of the
physician). This may have been the appellant, and given that
there is no evidence that the appellant caused any of the
wounds, coupled with the prosecution’s failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy, it weakens the arguments against the
appellant.

(5) Finally, based on Philippine customs and traditions, it is

unlikely for the appellant to be in the scene of the crime, as
under our family culture, aging parents are usually sheltered
and insulated from possible harm. It is improbable for the
accused to bring their aging father when they were clearly in
better shape than he was, and it was unlikely for the
appellant to offer his services as they were more or less
enough to handle what could have been a perceived enemy.
Although alibi is a weak defense, in cases like this where the
participation of the appellant is not clear, it may be
considered. In light of the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient for an acquittal.
G.R. No. 175942 September 13, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM, MANUEL DELIM
alias "BONG," NORBERTO DELIM and RONALD
DELIM alias "BONG," Accused,
NORBERTO DELIM, Accused-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DELIM
G.R. No. 142773. January 28, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACT: Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision,
dated January 14, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
46, Urdaneta City, finding accused-appellants Marlon Delim,
Leon Delim and Ronald Delim guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer
the supreme penalty of death. The victim is Modesto Manalo
Bantas, an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname
Delim after he was adopted by the father of Marlon, Manuel
and Robert. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert, and Ronald Delim
suddenly barged into the house of Modesto. Each of the
three intruders was armed with a short handgun. Marlon
poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald
simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the victim. A piece of
cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto. Marlon, Robert
and Ronald herded Modesto out of the house on their way
towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and
Randy, Modesto’s 16-year-old son and wife, were warned by
the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who
were also armed with short handguns, stayed put by the
door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to
stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of
Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the following day, January
24, 1999.Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January
25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as
their evidence against the charge.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented
was sufficient for conviction.
(2) Whether of not an alibi can be used as a defense against
testimony of witnesses.
(3) Whether or not conspiracy and treachery are present in
accusing the appellant of the crime.
(4) Whether or not the crime committed is categorized under
kidnapping, murder, or homicide.
RULING:
(1) Yes. Rules on evidence and principles in jurisprudence
sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence, defined as that which "indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from
the evidence established." Resort thereto is essential when
the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon
free. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that
circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if: (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, to justify a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a
way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused. Indeed, the combination of the circumstances which
comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that
points to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime,
for the following circumstances: (a) the forcible abduction of
the victim by the appellant and two other accused, (b)
appellant’s two other co-accused, Manuel Delim and Leon
Delim, armed with short firearms, guarded and prevented
household members from getting out until the following
morning, and (c) four days after the abduction, the victim’s
dead body was found with multiple gunshot wounds.
(2) No. alibi cannot be given greater evidentiary value than
the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.28 Positive identification destroys the
defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where
such identification is credible and categorical.Besides, basic is
the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime.Physical impossibility refers to the
distance between the place where the appellant was when (4) The Court subscribe to appellee’s stand that appellant
the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, should be convicted and sentenced only for the crime of
as well as the facility of access between the two places. homicide and not murder since the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was not proved. The circumstance allegedly
Appellant failed to use his alibi as a defense due to the pointed out as implying treachery had reference to victim
foregoing established facts that it was not physically Modesto Delim’s forcible abduction by Marlon, Ronald and
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of by appellant Norberto Delim and not when he was killed.
the killing. Moreover, the Court held that the kidnapping that occurred
was just used by the perpetrators as a means in order to
consummate the crime of murder.
(3) Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and
decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or Thus, the Court finds appellant’s guilt for the crime of
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct homicide to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the
commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose. The Court stated that while there was no previous
agreement between accused Norberto Delim and all other
accused to kill the victim, the simultaneous acts of accused
Marlon, Ronald and Norberto Delim in forcibly taking hold
and bringing out the victim from his house and the use of
Manuel and Leon Delim as guards to watch the wife and son
and other members of the household showed unity of
purpose. The concerted action of all the afore-named
accused against the victim, Modesto Delim, made them
co-principals by direct participation, and therefore conspiracy
is proved. Conspiracy having been established, the act of one,
therefore, is the act of all and everyone of the conspirators,
appellant included, is guilty with the others in equal degree.

On the other hand, treachery cannot be appreciated in this

case so as to elevate the killing to murder. As defined by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Murder is
committed by a person who kills another with treachery.
Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against
persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense or retaliatory act which the victim might make. For
treachery to be correctly appreciated, the following elements
must be shown: (1) that the means of execution employed
prevented the victim from defending himself or retaliating
and (2) it was deliberately and consciously adopted. The
Court stated that although the victim may have been
defenseless at the time he was seized but there is no
evidence as to the particulars of how he was assaulted and
killed, treachery cannot be appreciated against the accused.
G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988 in the country. The fleeing of the accused after killing and
taking CAGAMPANG’s firearm implies admission of guilt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Accused’s alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
vs. of the witness who had no base motive to accuse him of the
VICENTE TEMBLOR alias crime. In order for alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is
"RONALD," defendant-appellant. not enough for the appellant to be elsewhere when the
crime was committed, but it must be proven beyond
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. reasonable doubt that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime. Nasipit is accessible to Talo-ao
Wilfred D. Asis for defendant-appellant. by jeep or tricycle for 15to 20 minutes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES VS. TREMBLOR

G.R. No. L-66884 May 28, 1988

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS: On Dec. 30, 1980, at around 7:30 pm in Brgy. Talo-ao,

Buenavista, Agusan del Sur, TEMBLOR bought a half-pack of
Hope cigarette from the store of JULIUS
CAGAMPANG.While the latter was opening the pack, a gun
shot was heard and CAGAMPANG fell to the floor with a
gunshot wound in the head. The accused, together with
another, barged into the room, demanding the firearms of
the victim. Before fleeing with the victim’s .38 caliber gun,
TEMBLOR fired two more shots.

On Aug. 1981, during the mass surrender of dissidents,

TEMBLOR surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona. On Nov.
26,1981, he was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the
public market and detained at the municipal jail where he
was seen by VICTORIA CAGAMPANG, the victim’s widow
and was positively identified. TEMBLOR’s defense was an
alibi: on the said date, he and his father had been in the
house of SILVERIO PEROL in Brgy. Camagong.

Issue: Whether or not motive is essential in convicting the

appellant.

Held: No. Decision of lower court affirmed; civil indemnity

increased to P30,000. Motive is not essential when culprit
has been identified. Fact that accused has knowledge of the
deceased’s firearm is sufficient enough for motive as killings
perpetrated by members of the New People’s Army for the sole
purpose of acquiring more arms and ammunition for their
group are prevalent not only in Agusan del Norte but elsewhere

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
THE UNITED STATES VS. AH CHONG
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.:
FACTS: Ah Chong was employed as a cook at Fort McKinley.
He was roommates with the deceased, PASCUAL
GUALBERTO at officer’s quarters #27, about 40 meters away
form the nearest building, without a lock and had only 1 door
opening to the porch and 1 window. As a safety precaution,
Ah Chong and Gualberto had an understanding that if either
returned late at night, he should knock and acquaint the
other as to his identity.On Aug. 14, 1908 at around 10pm, he
was awakened by someone trying to force open the door. He
called out twice,“Who is there?”, to which no answer was
given. Because of the vines covering the porch, the room was
very dark. While calling out a threat to the invader, he was
struck above the knee by the edge of the chair which was
thrown towards his direction when the door was opened
forcibly. Getting the common knife under his pillow and
struck wildly at the intruder which turned out to be
GUALBERTO. Seeing it was his roommate, Ah Chong ran back
to his room to secure bandages and called to his employees
in Room #28 for help. Prior to the incident, there had been
several instances of robberies inside the port.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not mistake of fact set off the liabilities of the
accused in committing homicide.
(2) Whether or not malice or criminal intent is an essential
element of the crimes of homicide and assassination as
defined and penalized in the penal code.
RULING:
(1) Yes. Ah Chong was not held liable for the death of his
roommate. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s
conviction of homicide, saying that Ah Chong committed a
mistake of fact. He would not have stabbed his roommate
had he known the identity of the person who entered the
room. If the person who opened the door had really been a
robber instead of his roommate, he would not be criminally
liable if he had stabbed that person in self-defense.
(2) Yes. The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in
the penal code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring
that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the
crime. Nevertheless, the provisions of Art. 1 indicate malice
and
criminal intent as an essential requisite. Voluntary act is a
free, intelligent and intentional act, and which, without
intention there can be no crime. Voluntary implies and
includes the words “con malice” or with malice. When the act
which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, in
general without intention, there can be no crime.
*Requisites of Mistake of fact:
-The act would have been lawful had the facts be how the
accused believed them to be;
-The intention would have been lawful;
-The mistake was not attended by any fault or negligence on
the
part of the accused.
-There must be no reasonable opportunity to ascertain the
facts
-Excessive force negates mistake of fact (OANIS)
Decision reversed; accused is acquitted.
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 appreciated in their favor and sentenced to reclusion
temporal. The person in the room being then asleep,
THE PEOPLE OF THE appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect
vs. a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO been made, as the victim was unarmed. Ignorantia facti
GALANTA, defendants-appellants. excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or carelessness. No unnecessary or unreasonable force
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf. shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta. shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant for his detention. A peace officer cannot claim exemption
Attorney Torres for appellee. from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence
in making an arrest.
MORAN, J.:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OANIS

G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943

CARSON, J.

FACTS: On December 24, 1938, Provincial Inspector, CAPT.

GODOFREDO MONSOD received a telegram from MAYOR

GUIDO ordering the arrest (whether dead or alive) of one

ANSELMO BALAGTAS, who was an escaped convict. The

said convict was informed to be with a bailarina named

IRENE. MONSOD then informed the defendants and
instructed them to

arrest Balagtas, and if overpowered, they were to follow the

instructions in the telegram. OANIS, knowing a certain
IRENE, accompanied GALANTA and went to the location of
IRENE at Rizal St. Upon reaching the place, they asked
BRIGADA MALLARE to point where IRENE’s room was. They
were also informed that Irene was sleeping with her
paramour. When they reached the room, seeing a man with
his back towards the door, they simultaneously and
successively fired at him killing him. The man killed turned
out not to be Balagtas, but one SERAPIO TECSON.

ISSUE: Whether or not mistake of facts exempts the accused

from criminal liability in the killing of Tecson.

RULING: No. Defendants are guilty of murder with the

mitigating circumstance of incomplete requisites of
performance of duty
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for
accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of
commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between Miranda and the
accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of
the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of
the accused is to make fun of Miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective
criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from
different acts directed against Miranda is individual NOT
collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was
committed by him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PUGAY Thus, Pugay is found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide for having failed to exercise diligence necessary
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act
MEDIALDEA, J. committed by his companions who at the same time were
making fun of the deceased, and Samson is found guilty of
FACTS: The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and homicide granted the mitigating circumstance that he never
the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to run errands INTENDED to commit so the crime.
for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of
May 19, 1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza
of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one
was a ferris wheel.S ometime after midnight of the same
date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and
reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the
accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived.
These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy
and noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby,
they started making fun of the deceased Miranda. They made
the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of
wood.Then, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel and
poured its contents on the body of the former. Gabion told
Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process
of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set
Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were
arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the
incident gave their written statements.

ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy is present in the

commitment of the crime.

RULING: No. There is no conspiracy involved. Conspiracy is

determined when two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven
with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not
essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous
 LADONGA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not
mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of
G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005 the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak,
the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not
MEDIALDEA, J.
proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in
all criminal cases. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish
the guilt of the petitioner with moral certainty.
FACTS: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga,
petitioner, became the regular customer of Alfredo Oculam
in his pawnshop. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga
The decision was reversed and the accused was acquitted.
spouses obtained a loan from him, guaranteed by check of
United Coconut Planters Bank, issued by Adronico. On last
week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990 the
spouses obtained additional loan guaranteed by UCPD. And
between May and June 1990, the spouses obtained the third
loan guaranteed by UCPD. The three checks bounced upon
presentment for the reason that the account was closed.
When the spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminal complaint against
them.

While admitting that the checks issued by

Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or
the account was closed, the spouses claim that the checks
were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an
agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when
they mature, and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, who was not the issuer
of the three checks that bounced, could be held liable for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 as conspirator.

RULING: No. Conspiracy is not present to hold the

petitioner liable of the violation. Article 8 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that “a conspiracy exist when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To be held
liable guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the
accused must be shown to have perform an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.

It was not proven by direct evidence; petitioner

was merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks.
However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. Conviction must rest on hard evidence
showing that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner, Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in
PHILIPPINES, respondents. violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the
intended act does not amount to a crime.
INTOD VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

kCAMPOS, JR., J. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when

FACTS: In February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian,
Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the
house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, they had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany them.
Otherwise, he would also be killed. At 10:00 pm of that same
day, all of them were armed and arrived at Palangpangan's
house. They fired at Palangpangan's bedroom. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No
one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No
one was hit by the gun fire. The Regional Trial Court
convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony
of the witness.
extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond
his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots
the place where he thought his victim would be, although in
reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again:
Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is
done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite
apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the
incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is
in reason committed.
Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime
is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had
the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to
be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.

Intod filed a petition for review of the affirmation made by

the Court of Appeals of the decision held by the Regional
Trial Court. Petitioner seeks from this court a modification of
judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime
ISSUE: Whether of not Intod and his accomplices are guilty
of impossible crime only.
Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the
law, and to pay the costs.

RULING:

YES. Article 4 Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code States that

Criminal Liability shall be incurred: (b) By a person
committing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment, or on account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means
  That the act was alone with evil intent; and

JACINTO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or
the means employed was either inadequate or
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009 ineffectual.

PERALTA, J.

The time that petitioner took a possession of the check

meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of
-collector of Mega Foam, a post dated checked worth
accomplishment in this case.
P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam
International, Inc. The said check was deposited to the
account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena
Recablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T.
phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking Jacinto is found GUILTY of an impossible crime and suffer
for Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay
had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph Dyhenga talked to courts.
Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said
that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August
1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.

Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment operation
with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were
arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft
against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED
THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
Five (5) years, Five (5) months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6)
years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the

definition of Impossible Crime.

RULING: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing

offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash replacement
should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.

The requisites of an impossible crime are:

 That the Act performed would be an offer against

persons or property;
 VALENZUELA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR. No. 160188 June 21, 2007
TINGA, J.
FACTS: While a security guard was manning his post the open
parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel
Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent
and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was
waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and
later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter,
Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the boxes of
detergent inside. As the taxi was about to leave the security
guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandise.
The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently
apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both
Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft.
Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that
he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not
able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the
trial court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of
frustrated theft.
HELD: No. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a felony is
consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of
theft, the following elements should be present – (1) that there
be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that
the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The
court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of
personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is
immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose
the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts
of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already
ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a
frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DE LA CRUZ
OFFICIAL GAZETTE VoL. 43, No. 8, pp. 3202 April 29, 1947
Endencia, J.
PEOPLE VS LAMAHANG
GR No. 43530, Aug 03, 1935
RECTO, J.
FACTS:
 The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from
a decision finding him guilty of attempted robbery.
 At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose
Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on Delgado
and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo,
caughtthe accused in the act of making an opening
with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap
goods located on the last named street.
 At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was
sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
 The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one
board and in unfastening another from the wall,
when the policeman showed up, who instantly
arrested him and placed him under custody.
ISSUE: WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of
attempted robbery.
RULING:
YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted
robbery.
It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. In the case of
robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended
to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, it may
only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident
intention was to enter by means of force said store against
the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical
injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there
is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses
not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the
nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be
ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature
of the acts executed (accion medio). The relation existing
between the facts submitted for appreciation and the
offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be
direct; the intention must be ascertained from the facts and
therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable
instances of injustice.
Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of
the opinion that the fact under consideration does not
constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to
dwelling. Against the accused must be taken into
consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime
and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows
that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been
rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction.
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CRUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS: In December 1993, Norberto Cruz (Norberto) and his
wife went to La Union to sell plastic and glass wares. Along
with them is AAA and BBB. Upon reaching their destination,
they set up a tent in order that they will have a place to
sleep.
At around 1 AM, AAA was awakened when she felt that
somebody was on top of her. The person was Norberto who
was mashing her breast and touching her private parts. He
fought back and kicked Norberto twice. He was not able to
pursue his lustful desires; he offered AAA money and told her
not to tell the incident to her mother. Thirty minutes later,
when AAA retured to her tent, she again saw Norberto
touching private parts of BBB.
Later that day, they reported the incident to the police.
Norberto was summoned to the police station which resulted
to an argument. He deined the allegations contending that
there were many people around who were preparing for the
“simbang gabi”, and that once AAA and BBB would scream,
the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them.
RTC found Norberto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.
CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the
petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388, but
acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness.
ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of attempted rape.
RULING: NO. There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this
own spontaneous desistance.
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but
the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of
having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the
female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its
attempted stage requires the commencement of the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the
offender performing all the acts of execution that should
produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts
performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal
relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female.
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was
already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing
her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and
effectively ended his designs on her. It is obvious that the
fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing
of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act
touching the external genitalia of the female Without such
showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is
committed.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred
against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if
any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape.
In People v. Bugarin, the Court said that The accused was
held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent
to commit rape “is not apparent from the act described,” and
the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not
inferable from the act of licking her genitalia.
The Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO
CRUZ y BARTOLOMEguilty of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS.
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SIMON
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
REGALADO, J.: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABELLA

FACTS: Accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013
on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II REYES, J.:
of RA 6425 under an indictment alleging that on or about FACTS:
October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga, he sold four tea bags to a Narcotics Command ISSUE:
(NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of
P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to a laboratory RULING:
examination, were found positive for marijuana. On
December 4, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting appellant, and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is

applicable to the case.

RULING: Yes. Drug offenses are not included in nor has

appellant committed any act which would put him with
within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be
imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua to death. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of
compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favour of
the accused. /Since there was overlapping error in the law,
the SC had to harmonize conflicting provisions by providing
for degrees of graduation. As a rule, degrees applied
depending on quantity then apply mitigating or aggravating
circumstance. Least penalty should be prision correccional so
as not to depreciate seriousness of crime. Justified in
applying RPC provisions because law adopted penalties under
RPC in their technical terms thus significations and effects
will also apply. It rules in people v. Tsang Hin Wai that when
special law grants discretion to SC to apply penalties, Code
won’t be held. Otherwise, SC should be guided by rules in
RPC that being the expert in criminal law administration.

PENTECOSTES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167766 April 7, 2010
PERALTA, J.

G.R. No. 198400 October 7, 2013

FE ABELLA y PERPETUA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.