PEOPLE VS.
GAFFUD Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, Orly Salvador, nephew of
G.R. No. 168050
September 19, 2008
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060
finding the
accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime
of double murder and sentencing him to death, affirming with
modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated
August 28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125.
The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along
with two John Does were indicted for Double Murder for the killing
of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, under the following
Information:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses
Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. and two (2) JOHN DOES of the crime of
DOUBLE MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio
Biton, Barangay Wasid, Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of
Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and motivated by
long standing grudge, after conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, by means of fire, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, shot and burn Manuel Salvador and
Analyn Salvador which caused their instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Records)
It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador
were killed when the house they were staying in located at Sitio
Biton, Barangay Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino was burned down while
they were inside. An eyewitness pointed to accused-appellant
Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. as one of the arsonists.
Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to
appear despite being subpoenaed to submit his counter-affidavit,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that
charges for double murder by means of fire be filed against herein
appellant and two John Does, (p.14, Records).
When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr.
entered a plea of Not Guilty, (p. 48, Records), paving the way for his
trial.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant
Gaffud, Jr., namely Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel
Manuel Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid,
Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the deceased,
SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro
Hufana who conducted the autopsy on the deceased Manuel
Salvador.
Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of
May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador was on his way to the house of his uncle
Manuel Salvador to fetch the latter as they were going to attend a
wedding at the nearby barangay hall. He suddenly heard two
gunshots. Thereafter, he saw the house of his uncle burning.
Because of the glow emanating therefrom, he saw three persons
within the vicinity of the burning house. He saw them hurriedly
leaving the place towards the direction of the Cagayan river. One of
the three was holding a flashlight, whom he identified as appellant
Gaffud, Jr. He could not identify the two other persons. After the
house was burned, Orly went towards the barangay hall to see if his
uncle Manuel Salvador was there, but he met Brangay Captain
Potado Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the
barangay hall. They then proceeded to the burned house, and found
the charred remains of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador. (TSN,
October 10, 1995, pp. 3-8)
Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant
Gaffud, Jr. on the fateful day at around 6:30 PM, along the
riverbank, a few meters away from the house of Manuel Salvador.
When Potado asked what he was doing there, Gaffud, Jr. said he was
looking for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did
not own a boat. After a few minutes, Potado left to attend the
wedding party being held at the barangay hall. (TSN, November 4,
1996, pp. 2-5)
Dan Dangpals testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed
to the nature of the testimony he would have given, which tended
to show that sometime at about 8:00 PM on the fateful evening,
while inside his house, he heard successive gunshots, and when he
went out of his house, he saw the deceaseds house burning about
200 meters away. He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a
flashlight and persons moving away from the burning house. He
could not recognize any of them. (TSN, February 24, 1997; Exhibit D,
p. 8, Records)
Dominga Salvadors testimony tended to show that the appellant
Gaffud, Jr. was their neighbor. In the morning of May 10, 1994, she
went to the house of the appellant to see him about her husbands
share in the construction of the barangay hall, which was contracted
to the appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go to her house
that afternoon to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband.
Thereafter, she went home, and left again at around 11:00 AM,
leaving behind her husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter
Analyn. Later that night, she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a
seminar for hilot, (TSN, July 4, 1995, pp. 3-15). In her sinumpaang
salaysay, offered in evidence as Exhibit A, Dominga also related that
she had earlier filed a complaint in the barangay against the
appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.
SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated
the killing of Manuel and Analyn Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead
bodies hanging from a Melina tree. They were put there so that they
would not be reached by the dogs. He saw that one of the victims
had a fractured head, while the other had a wound on the side.
Pictures of the victims including the scene of the incident were taken
by them. Among those interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his
brother, (TSN, June 5, 1997, pp. 2-7).
Dr. Teodomiro Hufanas testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127,
Records) in view of the defense counsels admission of the contents
of his Autopsy Report on Manuel Salvador, (Exhibit C), which reads
in pertinent part:
FINDINGS
-Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine
(Large) protruding from the abdomen.
-Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in
diameter on the burned hand.
-Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed
downward to the body, probably gunshot wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
-CREMATION (Burned)
REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female
For the appellants defense, the defense presented the appellant
himself. His defense of alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita
Gaffud and in-law Balbino Bravo.
Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified
that the approximate time of the burning of the victims house, he
was at home, entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo and Rufina
Bravo, who was there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino
Bravo talked. At around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a
blaze coming from the other side of the Cagayan River, about 50 to
80 meters away from the house of the Bravos. They did not mind the
blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next morning, they heard news
about somebody being burned, and because of this, he and Balbino
Bravo hiked to the place of the incident. Thats where he found that
his pare Manuel Salvador and his daughter were burned in their
house. After seeing the dead bodies, appellant went home. He went
back later, and was even designated by the Barangay Captain to
guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was forced to
evacuate his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was
forcing him to testify against someone but he didnt want to. He was
told that something might happen to his family if he didnt leave,
(TSN, June 3, 2002).
The appellants defense was corroborated on its material points by
the testimony of his wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino
Bravo, both of whom testified that on May 10, 1994, the accused
was at his residence entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and stayed
there the whole night, (TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).
Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial,
she talked to Dominga Salvador about the settlement of the case
and even offered a certain amount for the said purpose, (TSN,
March 10, 2002, p. 12).[3]
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant
guilty of two (2) counts of murder, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Bernardino
Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for two (2) counts of murder and hereby
sentences him as follows, to wit:
a) Death penalty - for the death of Manuel Salvador;
b) Another death penalty - for the death of Analyn Salvador;
c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:
c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each count or
a total of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P150,000.00) as
death indemnities;
c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a total
of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral
damages;
c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count or a
total of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages;
and c-5) Costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[4]
As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this
Court for automatic review. In his Appellants Brief,[5] accused-
appellant argued that the RTC erred in: (i) failing to rule and resolve
whether or not conspiracy existed, as the information charged him
with conspiracy with two others in the commission of the crime; and
(ii) convicting him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven,
and also despite the fact that there was no proof whatsoever as to
what overt act he committed which would constitute the crime of
murder.
The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition per Resolution[6] of this Court dated August 24, 2004, in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo.[7] In disposing of the
assigned errors, the CA held that the lack of discussion of conspiracy
among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-accused in the
decision of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the crime
of murder, since the charge that he was a principal performer in the
killing of the victims was spelled out in the Information[8] filed
against him.[9] Moreover, in the absence of conspiracy, each of the
malefactors is liable only for the act committed by him.[10] As to the
sufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the CA
held that the circumstantial evidence in this case established
accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[11] Accordingly,
the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant
guilty of the complex crime of double murder, with the following
modifications:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED,
although the decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED, in
that: The accused Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of
the complex crime of double murder, and is hereby sentenced to the
supreme penalty of Death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs
of the victims: (1) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each victim, as civil
indemnity for the death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or
P50,000.00 for each victim, as moral damages; and (3) P10,000.00 as
nominal damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, the case was
elevated to this Court for review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to
prove conspiracy in this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct
participation of the accused in the commission of the crime,
conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence in
order to convict the accused.[13] In the case at bar, however, we
hold that the direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing
of the victims, Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was
established beyond doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.
Hence, a finding of conspiracy in this instance is not essential for the
conviction of accused-appellant.
On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a
quo that the evidence proffered by the prosecution, although
circumstantial in nature, leads to the conclusion that accused-
appellant is the perpetrator of the act resulting in the death of the
victims.
It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts
from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.[14]
In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:
(i) Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just
a few minutes before the crime was committed. Captain Potado
Bollang testified that he saw the accused-appellant at the riverbank,
about 100 meters from the house of the victims, coming to and fro,
allegedly looking for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew
that accused-appellant did not own one.[15]
(ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified
persons, was near the house of the victims at the time it was on fire.
Accused-appellant was identified by Orly Salvador as one of the
three men he saw about 5 meters from the house of his uncle,
Manuel Salvador, while it was burning. Previously, he heard two
gunshots as he was on his way towards the said house. He also saw
appellant fleeing with the other malefactors, while holding a
flashlight.[16] His testimony was corroborated by the admitted
testimony of Dan Dangpal who said that he heard two gunshots
while he was at his home, which was near that of the victims. When
he went out, he also heard men laughing, and saw them fleeing from
the burning house, illumined by a flashlight.[17]
(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the
incident without giving any help to his kumpare Manuel Salvador
and the latters daughter, Analyn. Orly Salvador testified that he saw
accused-appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave the
burning house of the victim, going towards the direction of the
river.[18]
(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because
of the complaint filed by Manuel Salvadors wife, Dominga Salvador,
and the fact that he owed Manuel Salvador some money. Dominga
Salvador testified that she had filed a complaint against accused-
appellant and his brother in their barangay for their act of
slaughtering her pig. Aside from this, in the morning of the same
fateful day, she went to the house of accused-appellant aiming to
collect her husbands share in the profits for the construction of the
barangay hall they had built, but the accused-appellant only told her
that he and his in-law would see her husband later that day.[19]
These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce
the conclusion that accused-appellant was responsible for the killing
of the victims by means of burning them inside their house.
Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that
against the convincing evidence of the prosecution, accused-
appellants defense of denial and alibi must fail:
The Court finds incredible appellants story that after seeing the
blaze across his house, he merely slept with his in-laws without
investigating. The Court finds it against human nature for one to
sleep soundly during a fire occurring just 50-80 metes from ones
house, even though the blaze is occurring across a river. Also,
appellant muse know, after seeing the location of the blaze, that the
house of his pare, or close friend, was in danger, and his natural
reaction at least was to verify the object of the conflagration.
Appellants story that he only slept soundly after seeing the blaze is
therefore unbelievable, and taints the credibility of his alibi.
Another telling factor on the appellants defense is his flight.
Appellant admitted that in his testimony that he fled Wasid,
Nagtipunan, Quirino after he was investigated at the Municipal Hall,
(TSN, June 3, 2002, p. 19). Appellant said he fled because of threats
from the Ilongots. However, appellant said it never entered his mind
to report the threats on him. Appellants explanation fails to
convince. It bears stressing that appellant fled right after being
investigated and questioned by police authorities, and during the
time that the preliminary investigation of the case was ongoing. This
is highly suspicious, as such time is the best time for him to defend
his innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is, appellant was
arrested in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a remote barangay by the
elements of the NBI, (Id., at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is
consistently held as and indication of guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291
SCRA 601 [1998]). There is no showing why such conclusion should
not be made in this case.[20]
We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held
liable for two (2) separate counts of murder or for the complex
crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as
well as in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one
penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime.[21]
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as
compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.[22]
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results
in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where
separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is
the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.[23]
In the landmark case People v. Guillen,[24] the Court held that the
single act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the
death of another person and injuring four others produced the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murders. Under
Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a person is killed
by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty
for the crime committed is death, the maximum penalty for murder,
which is the graver offense.
More recently, in People v. Carpo et al.,[25] we held that the single
act of hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the
death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the
complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder. Also, in
People v. Comadre,[26] we held:
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal
Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the
accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes
committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two
crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity
than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may
quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct
offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is
imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal
impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-
appellant burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main
objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador,
resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double
murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed by
means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for murder was
death, when the case was pending in the CA, the CA correctly
imposed the penalty of death for the complex crime of double
murder instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for
two counts of murder. In view, however, of the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346 (otherwise known as An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty in the Philippines), we reduce the penalty of death
to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.[27]
Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil
indemnity by the CA for the death of the victims from P100,000 or
P50,000 for each victim, to P150,000 or P75,000 for each victim in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.[28]
As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the
award by the RTC of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000,
or P25,000 for each victim.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It
becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the
offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates
the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity
from capture.[29] In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated
nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially
sought by accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan. Evidence
shows that accused-appellant waited for nighttime to consummate
his plan. It should be noted that accused-appellant was seen lurking
near the house of the victims earlier in the evening. The fact that he
brought with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to
commit the crime in darkness.
We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount of
P100,000, or P50,000 for each victim, in view of the grief and sorrow
suffered by the heirs of the victims. We likewise affirm the award of
nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 for the value of the
burned house as sufficiently explained by the RTC and affirmed by
the CA.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is
REDUCED to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to
P150,000, or P75,000 for each victim; and
(3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE VS. LAYSON
G.R. No. L-25177 October 31, 1969
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25,
1965 of the Court of First Instance of Davao in criminal case 8495
imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces.
On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino
Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony
serving sentences of conviction for the following crimes:
Nicolas Layson — kidnapping with robbery, homicide,
homicide and theft;
Cezar Ragub — frustrated murder and homicide;
Cezar Fugoso — robbery in an inhabited house and
theft;
Joventino Garces — robbery hold-up and robbery in an
uninhabited house.
In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the
four accused, armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell where
the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked
the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they
then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter
barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who
had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to
Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison guard. Afurong arrived,
identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they
handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and
surrendered themselves.
Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death
was caused by severe internal and external hemorrhage and shock,
all secondary to multiple stab wounds.
Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because
the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces
stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a week
before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual
slaying.
On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of
murder. The information recites:
The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso
and Joventino Garces of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in
relation to Art. 160, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony,
Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-mentioned accused, while
then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their
corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final judgment
imposed upon them, conspiring and confederating together and
helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed instruments, with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength,
and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino
Gasang, their co-inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon
him serious injuries which caused his death; with the aggravating
circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas
Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior
convictions.
Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de
officio, freely and spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding
the plea of guilty, the court a quo proceeded to receive testimony
because of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the
court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the crime of murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the
aggravating circumstances of recidivism and having been previously
punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter
penalty with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub,
the aggravating circumstance of having been punished with two or
more offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with
respect to the accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the
aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is
sufficient to qualify the crime to murder and the special aggravating
circumstance of having committed the crime charged while serving
the penalty imposed upon them for previous offenses as regards all
the accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code, hereby sentences all of them to DEATH, to indemnify jointly
and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino Gasang in the
amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty
imposed and to pay the costs proportionately.
For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one
hand, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery and the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of
guilty.
We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation be considered in
favor of all the accused. For this circumstance to exist, it is necessary
that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed from
the commission of the offense by a considerable length of time,
during which period the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity.1
Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against
Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups several
times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual
slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing.
All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January
17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that
sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their
equanimity. They moved their evil scheme forward to
consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates
whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances
negate the presence of passion and obfuscation; upon the contrary,
they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation.
Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy
report (exh. I) and the diagram (exh. J), plus the testimony of Dr.
Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was killed
in a manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the
execution of the offense, with resultant incapability of the victim to
offer resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength would
suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this circumstance must be
considered as absorbed in treachery.2
attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the
death penalty imposed by the court a quo.
It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the
aggravating circumstance of having been previously punished for
two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties
because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires
that the offender against whom it is considered shall have served
out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were
yet serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission
of the murder.
Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by
Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr., counsel de officio for the four
accused, who unqualifiedly recommends affirmance of the
judgment a quo.
It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence,
but ours is the inescapable duty to enforce the inexorable mandate
of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on
Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is
affirmed. The indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino
Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,7 to be paid jointly and
severally by the four accused. Costs de officio.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.,concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;3 evident premeditation

becomes a mere generic aggravating circumstance4 which is offset
by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A qualifying
circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name
but also places the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve
no other penalty than that specially prescribed for said crime.5

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160,

Rev. Penal Code) was correctly considered against all the accused,
who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were
undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous
convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the
accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law
for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.6

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused
admitted all the material facts and circumstances alleged in the
information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the