Importance:

G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Presidential Agency on

Reforms and Government Operations, and the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO), petitioner,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
XXIII, and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer of Manila, and
ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SIMILARLY SITUATED, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Ist. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali
and Solicitor Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioners.

Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable
Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in
Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which
reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be
issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas
in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,1 the
President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.2 Purposedly, he charged the
Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:3

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and

corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other
activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft
and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
 h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee
and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of
an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take
testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.4

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,

issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to
declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968 with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its
legality.

On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be
issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas
in connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for reconsideration
first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity.6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys
the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering,
the organization and the analysis of evidence.7 Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for
supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for
purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be
done.8 An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings
of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information
upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness,
administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the
production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the
same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such
subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted
sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents
would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions
enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with
the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and
erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena power of the
Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions would therefore imperil or
inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised.
Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when the
law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena issued under
the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and the authority to require the production
of documents under a subpoena duces tecumor otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the
same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be
validly seized upon to require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a
specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be
in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial
subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized,
however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what
the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court,
and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications"
referred to in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code could mean the restraints against
infringement of constitutional rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when
the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15

Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations,
whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown 16 and even
before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific
charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is
enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is
to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered
evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is
enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed
witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power
is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it
does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may
not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of
inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of
the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the
inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the
information is reasonably relevant. 22

There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions 23 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be
elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is
reasonably relevant to the investigations.

We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations,
generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled
that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the respondent therein may result
in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal
or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without
encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v.
Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in the administrative proceedings
against a medical practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the
medical profession. Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando
Manalastas is not facing any administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection
with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila
with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of
future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise. 30Anyway, by all
means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to
disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of the

President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated, respondents would now
challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended
in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of
executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be
collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the court below as to
be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question
of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. 35

Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner Quirico
Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal competence of the Agency
to issue.

WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set aside
and declared of no force and effect.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J., concurs in the result.

Barredo, Makasiar, and Concepcion, Jr., JJ, took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It
reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to
now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two
authoritative American treatises that of
Davis1 and that of Jaffe.2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion.3 A
similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz,4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt.5 A
concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional
rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A
recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives
of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a
person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be
a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.

1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside.
6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the
Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the
pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt
Co.,7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such
American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into
corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under
inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... .
But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite
and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement,
expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.""8 It has been given
approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words
of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an
inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses
the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is
unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the
"right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches
and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated
associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful
demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy
. ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry
with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing
more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is
consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of
the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been
cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its
command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is
concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on
search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the
Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate
oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present
Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily,
the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may
contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is
called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling
in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the
question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my
concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a
pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous
if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the
Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called
as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my
misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able
opinion of Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and
sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would
therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila
(and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to
matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating
certain City officials or other public officers."1

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the
PARGO,2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any
administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding
investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding
charges",3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or
one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly
as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation."4

Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by
the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the
City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a
number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1
of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced
equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus
operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he
allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn
statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them
during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated)
are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal
charges.)

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan,6 wherein the Court through then
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness
stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for
alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one
and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain
silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any
and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's
writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the
witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the
proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but
also to take the witness stand."8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of
humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion,
whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with
the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
to surrender to his detriment."

That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and
effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated
above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice)
that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of
other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in
connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.

The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact
and in law: respondent was in factbeing investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting
to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the
1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege
against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that
"Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silentand to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use
of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.

Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination
and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.
Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine
of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be
defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was
avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare
respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent
court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the
injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of
course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions
were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding
investigation" and subpoenas.
The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and
must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the
constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against
self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be
investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law
enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured
by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who
may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office,
like what was done in other cases." 13

There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner
in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find
no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the
fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner
as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled
doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to
refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's
subpoena.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and comprehensive. It
reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American Administrative Law, which up to
now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in accordance with the views expressed in two
authoritative American treatises that of
Davis1 and that of Jaffe.2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same conclusion.3 A
similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz,4 and McFarland and Vanderbelt.5 A
concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not conclude matters though. The constitutional
rights of a person who may be involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A
recognition of the expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives
of a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a
person who may find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be
a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.

1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside.
6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the
Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading in mind that I view the
pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt
Co.,7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such
American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation into
corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under
inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., ... .
But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite
and the information sought is reasonably relevant. "The gist of the protection is in the requirement,
expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.""8 It has been given
approval in an impressive number of subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words
of Justice Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its lending itself to the construction that an
inroad into the right of search and seizure is now permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order transgresses
the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is
unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. ... Although the
"right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men," ... is not confined literally to searches
and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, ... neither incorporated nor unincorporated
associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. ... While they may and should have protection from unlawful
demands made in the name of public investigation, ... corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy
. ... They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry
with them an enhanced measure of regulation. ... Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as caused by nothing
more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is
consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of
the subpoena power to trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd having been
cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its
command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not apply where an individual is
concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on
search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the opinion of the
Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate
oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and respect. What is more, the present
Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily,
the last sentence of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may
contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-
incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is
called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling
in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the
question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my
concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a
pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenuous
if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the thought that the force of the
Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called
as a witness and is thus compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my
misgivings. At any rate, concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able
opinion of Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the petition and
sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July 1, 1968 and would
therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city public service officer of Manila
(and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to
matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating
certain City officials or other public officers."1

While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the
PARGO,2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing any
administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the fact-finding
investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding
charges",3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B-1 that
respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or
one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly
as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's alleged "fact-finding investigation."4

Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles, investigated by
the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as commission agent to the
City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a
number of other city officials named and unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1
of the petition is the sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced
equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus
operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he
allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."

All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed sworn
statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly asking for them
during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent Manalastas (and others similarly situated)
are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal
charges.)

Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan,6 wherein the Court through then
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully refused to take the witness
stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee investigating the complaint against him for
alleged unexplained wealth (since such proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one
and his position was virtually that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain
silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any
and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.

Pascual Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower court's
writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein petitioner to take the
witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in view of the penal nature of the
proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but
also to take the witness stand."8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished
and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according
to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More
and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, "the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the
dignity and integrity of its citizens."" and that "while earlier decisions stressed the principle of
humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion,
whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with
the right to privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
to surrender to his detriment."

That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in substance and
effect criminal in nature against him as a respondent (and not merely as witness) as indicated
above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pamaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice)
that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 10) and a number of
other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in
connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.

The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the
privilege (against self-incrimination)would thus be unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact
and in law: respondent was in factbeing investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting
to the investigation was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the
1973 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege
against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that
"Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silentand to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use
of any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.

Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination
and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's subpoena.
Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the doctrine
of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be
defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was
avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare
respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent
court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the
injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of
course been proven baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions
were in fact filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding
investigation" and subpoenas.

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources can and
must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same time respect the
constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and due process and against
self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be
investigated and followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law
enforcement agencies as provided in the petitioner's executive charter 12 and the evidence secured
by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who
may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office,
like what was done in other cases." 13

There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted petitioner
in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations conducted by it. 14 I find
no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this dissent is based directly on the
fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner
as respondent and a prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled
doctrine, he had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to
refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of petitioner's
subpoena.

EN BANC

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 164171

HON. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC),
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO),
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC
BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF
OF LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE,
Petitioners,
Present:

Panganiban, C.J.,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES,
INC., represented by its President JOSE
T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS,
INC., represented by its President
DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN,
INC., represented by its President
MARIANO C. SONON,
Respondents.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 164172
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATION (DOTC),
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO),
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, SUBIC
BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF
LTO, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE,
Petitioners,

- versus -
SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO
VENTURES CORP., represented
by its President YOLANDA AMBAR,
Respondent.

x -------------------------------------------------------- x

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 168741

HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE CHIEF OF THE LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE,
Petitioners,

- versus -
MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS
ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY
FREEPORT, INC., represented by Promulgated:
its President ALFREDO S. GALANG,
Respondent. February 20, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the Decisions of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, in Civil Case No. 20-0-04
and Civil Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 24, 2004; and the February 14, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284, which declared Article
2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional. Said executive
issuance prohibits the importation into the country, inclusive of the Special
Economic and Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used
motor vehicles, subject to a few exceptions.

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued
EO 156, entitledPROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE INDUSTRIAL
POLICY AND DIRECTIONS FOR THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM AND ITS IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES. The challenged
provision states:

3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the Freeport, of all
types of used motor vehicles is prohibited, except for the following:

3.1.1 A vehicle that is owned and for the personal use of a returning resident
or immigrant and covered by an authority to import issued under the No-dollar
Importation Program. Such vehicles cannot be resold for at least three (3) years;

3.1.2 A vehicle for the use of an official of the Diplomatic Corps and
authorized to be imported by the Department of Foreign Affairs;

3.1.3 Trucks excluding pickup trucks;

1. with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by an authority to import
issued by the DTI.
2. With GVW above 6.0 tons.

3.1.4 Buses:
 1. with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by an authority to import issued
by DTI;
2. with GVW above 12 tons.

3.1.5 Special purpose vehicles:

1. fire trucks
2. ambulances
3. funeral hearse/coaches
4. crane lorries
5. tractor heads and truck tractors
6. boom trucks
7. tanker trucks
8. tank lorries with high pressure spray gun
9. reefers or refrigerated trucks
10. mobile drilling derricks
11. transit/concrete mixers
12. mobile radiological units
13. wreckers or tow trucks
14. concrete pump trucks
15. aerial/bucket flat-form trucks
16. street sweepers
17. vacuum trucks
18. garbage compactors
19. self loader trucks
20. man lift trucks
21. lighting trucks
22. trucks mounted with special purpose equipment
23. all other types of vehicle designed for a specific use.

The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory relief before
Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all seeking the declaration
of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1 of said executive order. The cases
were filed by herein respondent entities, who or whose members, are classified
as Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among others,
importing and/or trading used motor vehicles.

G.R. No. 164171:

On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,

(SOUTHWING) United Auctioneers, Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS),
and Microvan, Inc. (MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed as
Civil Case No. 20-0-04,[1] against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of Customs, Assistant Secretary
and Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the
Chief of the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
SOUTHWING, UNITED AUCTIONEERS and MICROVAN prayed that
judgment be rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional
and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs,
Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation of
used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the Land Transportation Office and its
subordinates inside the Subic Special Economic Zone to process the registration of
the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the unimpeded entry
and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the required
customs duties.

Upon filing of petitioners answer/comment,

respondents SOUTHWING and MICROVAN filed a motion for summary
judgment which was granted by the trial court. On May 24, 2004, a summary
judgment was rendered declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes
an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with
Congress. The trial court further held that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of
Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring

Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal;
directing respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the
importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227;
directing respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates
inside the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of
imported used motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and
importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment
of the required customs duties.

SO ORDERED.[2]

From the foregoing decision, petitioners sought relief before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 164171.
G.R. No. 164172:

On January 20, 2004, respondent Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corporation

(MACRO VENTURES) filed with the same trial court, a similar action for
declaratory relief docketed as Civil Case No. 22-0-04,[3] with the same prayer and
against the same parties[4] as those in Civil Case No. 20-0-04.

In this case, the trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment on May 24,
2004, holding that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant to the
constitution.[5]Elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari, Civil
Case No. 22-0-04 was docketed as G.R. No. 164172.

G.R. No. 168741

On January 22, 2003, respondent Motor Vehicle Importers Association

of Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (ASSOCIATION), filed another action for declaratory
relief with essentially the same prayer as those in Civil Case No. 22-0-04 and Civil
Case No. 20-0-04, against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Chief of
the Land Transportation Office, Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs at
SBMA and the Chairman of SBMA. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 30-0-
2003,[6] before the same trial court.

In a decision dated March 10, 2004, the court a quo granted

the ASSOCIATIONs prayer and declared the assailed proviso as contrary to the
Constitution, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring
Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal;
directing respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow the
importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227;
directing respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates
inside the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of
imported used motor vehicles; directing the respondent Chairman of the SBMA to
allow the entry into the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA imported used
motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation of used
motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of the required
customs duties.
 SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a petition for
certiorari[8] with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284) which denied the
petition on February 14, 2005 and sustained the finding of the trial court that Article
2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is void for being repugnant to the constitution. The
dispositive portion thereof, reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The

assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch
72, Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, accordingly, STANDS.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court
and docketed as G.R. No. 168741. In a Resolution dated October 4, 2005,[10] said
case was consolidated with G.R. No. 164171 and G.R. No. 164172.

Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section 3.1 of
EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including the Freeeport. In
support of their arguments, they raise procedural and substantive issues bearing on
the constitutionality of the assailed proviso. The procedural issues are: the lack of
respondents locus standi to question the validity of EO 156, the propriety of
challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability of a
judgment on the pleadings in this case.

Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation ban
considering that their certificate of registration and tax exemption do not authorize
them to engage in the importation and/or trading of used cars. They also aver that
the actions filed by respondents do not qualify as declaratory relief cases. Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be
filed before there is a breach or violation of rights. Petitioners claim that there was
already a breach of respondents supposed right because the cases were filed more
than a year after the issuance of EO 156. In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,
numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against imported used motor
vehicles belonging to respondent ASSOCIATIONs members.
 Petitioners arguments lack merit.

The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative

issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement[11]has been satisfied in the instant case. The broad subject of the
prohibited importation is all types of used motor vehicles. Respondents would
definitely suffer a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because their
certificate of registration and tax exemption authorize them to trade and/or import
new and used motor vehicles and spare parts, except used cars.[12] Other types of
motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the
category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their
business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail the validity of
EO 156.

As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the executive

issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of respondents will not affect
the case. In Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province
of Cebu,[13] the Court entertained a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the
doubt as to the proper interpretation of the conflicting laws involved,
notwithstanding a violation of the right of the party affected. We find no reason to
deviate from said ruling mindful of the significance of the present case to the national
economy.

So also, summary judgments were properly rendered by the trial court because
the issues involved in the instant case were pure questions of law. A motion
for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need
not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no
genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court
for the prompt disposition of a civil action in which the pleadings raise only a legal
issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.[14]

At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by petitioners truly
exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside these technicalities and taking
cognizance of the action filed by respondents considering its importance to the
public and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.[15]
 We now come to the substantive issues, which are: (1) whether there is
statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the answer is in the affirmative,
whether the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, reasonable and within
the scope provided by law.

The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it was
issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines and that
its application should be extended to the Freeport because the guarantee of RA 7227
on the free flow of goods into the said zone is merely an exemption from customs
duties and taxes on items brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all
kinds of goods and materials without restriction.

In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1
of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President to issue the
same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles is an
exercise of police power vested on the legislature and absent any enabling law, the
exercise thereof by the President through an executive issuance, is void.

Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional

limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It
is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well
as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.[16] Such
delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative
body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law
and implement legislative policy.[17] To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as
an executive order, must comply with the following requisites:

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.[18]
 Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually satisfied
the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both constitutional and
statutory bases.

Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section 28(2)

of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.[19] (Emphasis supplied)

The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:

1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in the
interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, to, inter alia,
prohibit the importation of any commodity. Section 401 thereof, reads:

Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.

a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national

security, and subject to the limitations herein prescribed, the President, upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: x x x (2) to establish
import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be
necessary; x x x Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff
Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual
reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code,
including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section. (Emphasis supplied)

2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the Philippines
which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of legislative power under the Provisional Freedom
Constitution,[20] empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on the
importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished products. Pertinent
provisions thereof, read:

ART. 4. Composition of the board. The Board of Investments shall be

composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary of Trade and Industry, three (3)
 Undersecretaries of Trade and Industry to be chosen by the President; and three (3)
representatives from the government agencies and the private sector x x x.

ART. 7. Powers and duties of the Board.

xxxx

(12) Formulate and implement rationalization programs for certain

industries whose operation may result in dislocation, overcrowding or inefficient
use of resources, thus impeding economic growth. For this purpose, the Board may
formulate guidelines for progressive manufacturing programs, local content
programs, mandatory sourcing requirements and dispersal of industries. In
appropriate cases and upon approval of the President, the Board may restrict,
either totally or partially, the importation of any equipment or raw materials
or finished products involved in the rationalization program; (Emphasis
supplied)

3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the Safeguard Measures Act
(SMA), and entitled An Act Protecting Local Industries By Providing Safeguard
Measures To Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports And Providing
Penalties For Violation Thereof,[21] designated the Secretaries[22] of the Department
of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture, in their capacity
as alter egos of the President, as the implementing authorities of the safeguard
measures, which include, inter alia, modification or imposition of any quantitative
restriction on the importation of a product into the Philippines. The purpose of the
SMA is stated in the declaration of policy, thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote competitiveness of
domestic industries and producers based on sound industrial and agricultural
development policies, and efficient use of human, natural and technical resources.
In pursuit of this goal and in the public interest, the State shall provide safeguard
measures to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports
which cause or threaten to cause serious injury to those domestic industries and
producers.

There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing the
President to ban or regulate importation of articles and commodities into the country.

Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the
nature of the administrative issuance is properly determined. As in the enactment of
laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative issuances requires
previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself
requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation.[23] This exception pertains to the issuance
of legislative rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which give no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed; [24] and are
designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing.[25] A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of
subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of

[26]
Appeals, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Inc.,[27] the Court enunciated the doctrine that when an administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render less cumbersome
the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those
governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
to be heard and, thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the force
and effect of law.

In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to

implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect the
domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified product not
previously subject to such prohibition. The due process requirements in the issuance
thereof are embodied in Section 401[28] of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections
5 and 9 of the SMA[29] which essentially mandate the conduct of investigation and
public hearings before the regulatory measure or importation ban may be issued.

In the present case, respondents neither questioned before this Court nor with
the courts below the procedure that paved the way for the issuance of EO 156. What
they challenged in their petitions before the trial court was the absence of substantive
due process in the issuance of the EO.[30] Their main contention before the court a
quo is that the importation ban is illogical and unfair because it unreasonably drives
them out of business to the prejudice of the national economy.
Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to the
contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed to be
valid,[31] and there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in
the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said executive issuance duly
complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law.

To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and fourth
requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit, that it was issued within the
scope of authority given by the legislature and that it is reasonable, an examination
of the nature of a Freeport under RA 7227 and the primordial purpose of the
importation ban under the questioned EO is necessary.

RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and
balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special Economic and
Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the economic and
social development of Central Luzon in particular and the country in general.

The Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 specifically defines the

territory comprising the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special Economic and
Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227 as "a separate customs territory consisting
of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the
lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced,
covered and defined by the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Base Agreement as
amended and within the territorial jurisdiction of Morong and Hermosa, Province
of Bataan, the metes and bounds of which shall be delineated by the President of the
Philippines; provided further that pending establishment of secure perimeters around
the entire SBF, the SBF shall refer to the area demarcated by the SBMA pursuant to
Section 13[32] hereof."

Among the salient provisions of RA 7227 are as follows:

SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone.

xxxx

The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:

xxxx

(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the
Constitution and the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code,
the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining,
 industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign
investments;

(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a
separate customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital
within, into and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as
provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital
and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the territory of
the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall
be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of the Philippines;

The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods and
capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract investors to
invest their capital in a business climate with the least governmental
intervention. The concept of this zone was explained by Senator Guingona in this
wise:

Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is successful

in many places, particularly Hong Kong, which is a free port. The difference
between a special economic zone and an industrial estate is simply expansive in the
sense that the commercial activities, including the establishment of banks, services,
financial institutions, agro-industrial activities, maybe agriculture to a certain
extent.

This delineates the activities that would have the least of government
intervention, and the running of the affairs of the special economic zone would
be run principally by the investors themselves, similar to a housing
subdivision, where the subdivision owners elect their representatives to run
the affairs of the subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines.

We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong Kong, Mr.
President, where there is a hub of free port and free entry, free duties and
activities to a maximum spur generation of investment and jobs.

While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule, because

of red tape and perceived delays, we envision this special economic zone to be an
area where there will be minimum government interference.

The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the Authority
as envisioned here, but from them themselves, because they would be encouraged
to invest not only for the land but also for the buildings and factories. As long as
they are convinced that in such an area they can do business and reap reasonable
 profits, then many from other parts, both local and foreign, would invest, Mr.
President.[33] (Emphasis, added)

With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in general,

engage in any kind of business as well as import and export any article into and out
of the Freeport. These are among the rights accorded to Subic Bay Freeport
Enterprises under Section 39 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227,
thus

SEC. 39. Rights and Obligations.- SBF Enterprises shall have the following
rights and obligations:

a. To freely engage in any business, trade, manufacturing, financial or service

activity, and to import and export freely all types of goods into and out of
the SBF, subject to the provisions of the Act, these Rules and other
regulations that may be promulgated by the SBMA;

Citing, inter alia, the interpellations of Senator Enrile, petitioners claim that
the free flow or movement of goods and capital only means that goods and material
brought within the Freeport shall not be subject to customs duties and other taxes
and should not be construed as an open floodgate for entry of all kinds of
goods. They thus surmise that the importation ban on motor vehicles is applicable
within the Freeport. Pertinent interpellations of Senator Enrile on the concept
of Freeport is as follows:

Senator Enrile: Mr. President, I think we are talking here of sovereign

concepts, not territorial concepts. The concept that we are supposed to craft here is
to carve out a portion of our terrestrial domain as well as our adjacent waters and
say to the world: Well, you can set up your factories in this area that we are
circumscribing, and bringing your equipment and bringing your goods, you are not
subject to any taxes and duties because you are not within the customs jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines, whether you store the goods or only for purposes
of transshipment or whether you make them into finished products again to
be reexported to other lands.

xxxx

My understanding of a free port is, we are in effect carving out a part

of our territory and make it as if it were foreign territory for purposes of our
customs laws, and that people can come, bring their goods, store them there
and bring them out again, as long as they do not come into the domestic
commerce of the Republic.
 We do not really care whether these goods are stored here. The only thing
that we care is for our people to have an employment because of the entry of these
goods that are being discharged, warehoused and reloaded into the ships so that
they can be exported. That will generate employment for us. For as long as that is
done, we are saying, in effect, that we have the least contact with our tariff and
customs laws and our tax laws. Therefore, we consider these goods as outside of
the customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines as yet, until we draw
them from this territory and bring them inside our domestic commerce. In which
case, they have to pass through our customs gate. I thought we are carving out this
entire area and convert it into this kind of concept.[34]

However, contrary to the claim of petitioners, there is nothing in the foregoing

excerpts which absolutely limits the incentive to Freeport investors only to
exemption from customs duties and taxes. Mindful of the legislative intent to attract
investors, enhance investment and boost the economy, the legislature could not have
limited the enticement only to exemption from taxes. The minimum interference
policy of the government on the Freeport extends to the kind of business that
investors may embark on and the articles which they may import or export into and
out of the zone. A contrary interpretation would defeat the very purpose of
the Freeport and drive away investors.

It does not mean, however, that the right of Freeport enterprises to import all
types of goods and article is absolute. Such right is of course subject to the limitation
that articles absolutely prohibited by law cannot be imported into
the Freeport.[35] Nevertheless, in determining whether the prohibition would apply
to the Freeport, resort to the purpose of the prohibition is necessary.

In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation under Article

2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to rationalize the importation of used motor
vehicles and to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine motor manufacturing firms
to be globally competitive producers of completely build-up units and their parts and
components for the local and export markets.[36] In justifying the issuance of EO 156,
petitioners alleged that there has been a decline in the sales of new vehicles and a
remarkable growth of the sales of imported used motor vehicles. To address the
same, the President issued the questioned EO to prevent further erosion of the
already depressed market base of the local motor vehicle industry and to curtail the
harmful effects of the increase in the importation of used motor vehicles.[37]
 Taking our bearings from the foregoing discussions, we hold that the
importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative order. To
be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling
statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which
the other branches of the government cannot usurp. As held in United BF
Homeowners Association v. BF Homes, Inc.:[38]

The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated

legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope
intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and regulations
may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are
subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute.

In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the President to
regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic industry. EO
156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the prohibition on
the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some
extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is
actually the customs territory which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227, as follows:

the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national tariff and customs
laws are in force and effect.[39]

The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be operative

only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within the ambit of the
prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed, when the application of
an administrative issuance modifies existing laws or exceeds the intended scope, as
in the instant case, the issuance becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also
for being unreasonable.
 This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative law
that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid.[40]

There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic
industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The deterioration of the local
motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles is an
urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the
exercise of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly proscribe the
importation of these vehicles. Thus, in Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v.
Board of Transportation,[41] the Court held that a regulation phasing out taxi cabs
more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power. The regulation was
sustained as reasonable holding that the purpose thereof was to promote the
convenience and comfort and protect the safety of the passengers.

The problem, however, lies with respect to the application of the importation
ban to the Freeport. The Court finds no logic in the all encompassing application of
the assailed provision to the Freeport which is outside the customs territory. As long
as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm
sought to be prevented or remedied will not arise. The application of the law should
be consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex,
et cessat lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not the letter
alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life.[42] To apply the proscription to
the Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the general
economy of the country, the application of the importation ban in the Freeport would
subvert the avowed purpose of RA 7227 which is to create a market that would draw
investors and ultimately boost the national economy.

In similar cases, we also declared void the administrative issuance or

ordinances concerned for being unreasonable. To illustrate, in De la Cruz
v. Paras,[43] the Court held as unreasonable and unconstitutional an ordinance
characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan,
prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and dance halls within its
jurisdiction for the protection of public morals. As explained by the Court:

x x x It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power

by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does
not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized
by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition
in Salaveria should be heeded: The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there
was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the
case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in
terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,[44] is a case involving a resolution issued by

the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from
attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the like three
days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and purity of
the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being unreasonable on its face
and violative of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than
what was necessary, viz:
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee
that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least
minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of
review or preparation on those last three precious days when they should be
refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and
preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself
would be like uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be
done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right
there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so
be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked. x x x

In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,[45] the

Court likewise struck down as unreasonable and overbreadth a city ordinance
granting an exclusive franchise for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, to one
entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal
facility in Lucena City. While professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic
congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus
and jeepney terminals within the city, the ordinance was held to be beyond what is
reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in the city.

By parity of reasoning, the importation ban in this case should also be declared
void for its too sweeping and unnecessary application to the Freeport which has no
bearing on the objective of the prohibition. If the aim of the EO is to prevent the
entry of used motor vehicles from the Freeport to the customs territory, the solution
is not to forbid entry of these vehicles into the Freeport, but to intensify
governmental campaign and measures to thwart illegal ingress of used motor
vehicles into the customs territory.

At this juncture, it must be mentioned that on June 19, 1993, President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97-A, Further Clarifying The Tax And Duty-
Free Privilege Within The Subic Special Economic And Free Port Zone, Section 1
of which provides:
SECTION 1. The following guidelines shall govern the tax and duty-free
privilege within the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic and Free Port
Zone:

1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in

former Subic Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the
SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners) residing
within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital goods, equipment,
and consumer items tax and dutry-free. Consumption items, however, must be
consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of raw materials, capital goods,
equipment and consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ
registered enterprises shall be subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may
be provided herein.

In Tiu v. Court of Appeals[46] as reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners

Association, Inc. v. Torres,[47] this provision limiting the special privileges on tax
and duty-free importation in the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base has
been declared valid and constitutional and in accordance with RA 7227. Consistent
with these rulings and for easier management and monitoring of activities and to
prevent fraudulent importation of merchandise and smuggling, the free flow and
importation of used motor vehicles shall be operative only within the secured area.
 In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void insofar
as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to the separability clause[48] of EO
156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the
Philippine territory outside the presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base
area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into
the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may
be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they
cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the May 24, 2004
Decisions of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, in Civil Case No.
20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04; and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63284, are MODIFIED insofar as they
declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 156, void in its entirety.

Said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory

outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and VOID with
respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164171), pp. 81-90.
[2]
Id. at 68; rollo (G.R. No. 164172), p. 65. Penned by Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas.
[3]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164172), pp. 78-86.
[4]
The Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and Communication, Commissioner of Customs, Assistant
Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Collector of
Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone, and the Chief of the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay
Freeport Zone.
[5]
The dispositive portion thereof is identically worded as the quoted decretal portion of the decision in Civil Case
No. 20-0-04.
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 168741), pp. 139-153.
[7]
Id. at 264. Penned by Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas.
[8]
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284.
[9]
Dated February 14, 2005, rollo (G.R. No. 168741), p. 125. Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and
concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals on June 28, 2004, id. at 126.
[10]
Id. at 354.
[11]
Miranda v. Aguirre, 373 Phil. 386, 397 (1999).
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 164171), pp. 94-96 and rollo (G.R. No. 164172), p. 88.
[13]
422 Phil. 519, 531 (2001).
[14]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, 140.
[15]
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47, 62.
[16]
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Torres, 350 Phil. 315, 331 (1998).
[17]
Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law, 2003 Edition, p. 24.
[18]
Id. at 41.
[19]
Essentially the same provision is embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Constitution (1935), Art. VI, Sec 22, par. (2):
The Congress may by law authorize the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix,
within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues.
Constitution (1973), Art. VII, Sec 17, par. (2):
The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts.
[20]
Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 Edition, p. 610.
[21]
Enacted on July 17, 2000. See Filipino Metals Corporation v. Secretary of Trade and Industry, G.R. No.
157498, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 616, 619.
[22]
Secretary as defined under Section 4 (n) of the SMA refers to either the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry in the case of non-agricultural products or the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural products.
[23]
Cruz, supra note 17 at 53.
[24]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1007 (1996).
[25]
Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, G.R. No. 108524,
November 10, 1994, 238 SCRA 63, 69.
[26]
Supra.
[27]
453 Phil. 1043, 1058 (2003).
[28]
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause.
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security, and subject to the limitations
herein prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as NEDA), is hereby empowered: (1) to increase, reduce or remove existing protective rates
of import duty (including any necessary change in classification). The existing rates may be increased or decreased
but in no case shall the reduced rate of import duty be lower than the basic rate of ten (10) per cent ad valorem, nor
shall the increased rate of import duty be higher than a maximum of one hundred (100) per cent ad valorem; (2) to
establish import quota or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; and (3) to impose an additional duty
on all imports not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem whenever necessary; Provided, That upon periodic
investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual
reduction of protection levels granted in Section One Hundred and Four of this Code, including those subsequently
granted pursuant to this section.
b. Before any recommendation is submitted to the President by the NEDA pursuant to the provisions of this
section, except in the imposition of an additional duty not exceeding ten (10) per cent ad valorem, the Commission
shall conduct an investigation in the course of which they shall hold public hearings wherein interested parties shall
be afforded reasonable opportunity to be present, produce evidence and to be heard. The Commission shall also hear
the views and recommendations of any government office, agency or instrumentality concerned. The Commission
shall submit their findings and recommendations to the NEDA within thirty (30) days after the termination of the
public hearings.
[29]
SEC. 5. Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures. The Secretary shall apply a general
safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the Commission that a product is being imported into the
country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of
serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the secretary
shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest.
SEC. 9. Formal Investigation. Within five (5) working days from receipt of the request from the Secretary, the
Commission shall publish the notice of the commencement of the investigation, and public hearings which shall afford
interested parties and consumers an opportunity to be present, or to present evidence, to respond to the presentation
of other parties and consumers, and otherwise be heard. Evidence and positions with respect to the importation of the
subject article shall be submitted to the Commission within fifteen (15) days after the initiation of the investigation by
the Commission.
The Commission shall complete its investigation and submit its report to the Secretary within one hundred
twenty (120) calendar days from receipt of the referral by the Secretary, except when the Secretary certifies that the
same is urgent, in which case the Commission shall complete the investigation and submit the report to the Secretary
within sixty (60) days.
[30]
Rollo (G.R. No. 168741), pp. 144-145; rollo (G.R. No. 164172), pp. 205-206; rollo (G.R. No. 164171), pp. 87-86.
[31]
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, supra note 15 at 62-63.
[32]
Section 13 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 provides: Establishment of Secure Perimeters,
Points of Entry and Duty and Tax Free Areas of the SBF. - Pending the establishment of secure perimeters around the
entire SBF, the SBMA shall have the authority to establish and demarcate areas of the SBF with secure perimeters
within which articles and merchandise free of duties and internal revenue taxes may be limited, without prejudice to
the availment of other benefits conferred by the Act and these Rules in the SBF outside such areas. The SBMA shall
furthermore have the authority to establish, regulate and maintain points of entry to the SBF or to any limited duty
and tax-free areas of the SBF.
[33]
RECORDS, SENATE 8TH CONGRESS, SESSION (JANUARY 14, 1992).
[34]
Id.
[35]
SEC. 45. Importation of Articles. In general, all articles may be imported by SBF Enterprises into the SBF free of
customs and import duties and national internal revenue taxes, except those articles prohibited by the SBMA and those
absolutely prohibited by law. (Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227)
[36]
Whereas clauses of EO 156.
[37]
Rollo (G.R. No. 168741), pp. 77-79; rollo (G.R. No. 164172), p. 46; rollo (G.R. No. 164171), p. 48.
[38]
369 Phil. 568, 579-580 (1999).
[39]
Definitions, Section 3 (n).
[40]
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77372, April 29, 1988, 160 SCRA 848, 858-859.
[41]
202 Phil. 925, 935-936 (1982).
[42]
Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 160328, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 495, 508.
[43]
208 Phil. 490, 499-500 (1983).
[44]
Supra note 40 at 860.
[45]
G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 174.
[46]
361 Phil. 229 (1999).
[47]
Supra note 15.
[48]
Article 7, Section 3:
Sec. 3. Separability Clause. The provisions of this Executive Order are hereby declared separable and in the
event any of such provisions is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions, which are not affected, thereby remain
in force and effect.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
 568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
 reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
 no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the

Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither
the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering
the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
 EN BANC

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA, G.R. No. 180146

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
POLICE DIRECTOR VELASCO, JR.,
REYNALDO P. VARILLA,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NACHURA,
NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION, POLICE OFFICE REYES,
and ATTY. RUFINO JEFFREY DE CASTRO, and
L. MANERE, REGIONAL
LEGAL AFFAIRS SERVICE, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:
 December 18, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision[1] dated 9 August 2007 and
Resolution[2]dated 18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500 dated 24 August
2005 and 23 August 2006, respectively, of the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
dismissing petitioner Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the police service.

The following are the factual antecedents:

Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned to

the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon City, when the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044[3] on 9 September 1998
dropping him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend the Law
Enforcement and Enhancement Course (LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National
Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. Montoya
had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days, from 23
January 1998 to 31 March 1998.
 On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from the rolls,
Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP Regional
Director for the National Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998,
he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form
approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had
already been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not
approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his
control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe
body pain. Montoya attached to his Motion a certification simply dated 1998,
issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and authenticated by Police Chief
Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y. Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD.

Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR
Regional Director issued on 11 June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling Special
Order No. 1044. Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8 June
to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his administrative liability. The 67
days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately
deducted from his leave credits.
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by
Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of
the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR
Regional Director rendered a Decision[4] on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya from
the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective
immediately. Montoya received a copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000.

Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the

CPD office a Petition for Review/Motion for Reconsideration[5] of the 23 June 2000
Decision of the NCR Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP Chief. In a
Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate for Personnel and Records
Management of the PNP Headquarters, Montoyas Petition/Motion was denied for
lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from
service imposed by a PNP regional director may only be appealed to the Regional
Appellate Board (RAB).
 Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal of the 23 June 2000
Decision of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB of the National Capital Region
(RAB-NCR), alleging lack of due process considering that he was not even notified
of any hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of the
opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in
the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal from
police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC, without even looking into
his side of the controversy.

On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its Decision[6] granting

Montoyas appeal and ordering his reinstatement. Pertinent provisions of the said
Decision read:

The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO), P/Supt. Francisco Don Montenegro, conducted the
hearing ex-parte on the basis only of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [herein
petitioner Montoya] in which he categorically stated that on January 22, 1998, when he
went to Police Station 2 to have his sick leave form approved, he was informed that his
name was already forwarded to NCRPO to undergo LEEC schooling. With that
information, the SHO concluded that appellant, PO2 Montoya, should have proceeded to
STU, NCRPO to inform his superior about his physical predicament. However, [Montoya]
did nothing to have the officers of STU, NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that
appropriate actions can be instituted. Sixty-seven days is too long for a period for
[Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to present his Medical
Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment. Thus, [Montoya] was ordered dismissed
from the Police Service.

xxxx

This Board, after careful review and evaluation of the records and arguments/evidence
presented by herein [Montoya] finds this appeal meritorious and tenable. Nothing on the
records would show that [Montoya] was notified of the summary hearing conducted by
the Summary Hearing Officer nor was he given a chance to explain his side and submit
controverting evidence on his behalf. On the other hand, what appeared on the record is
the fact that the Summary Hearing Officer, who was tasked to resolve this case,
conducted the hearing ex-parte. Thereafter, he recommended for the [Montoyas]
dismissal from the police service on the ground that the latter failed to inform his
superiors about his physical predicament since [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers
 of STU, NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that appropriate actions can be instituted.
Summary Hearing Officer further concluded that sixty-seven days is too long for a period
(sic) for [Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to present his
Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment.

The RAB-NCR decreed in the end:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby

reversed and movant-appellant PO2 Ruel Catud Montoya is hereby ordered to be
reinstated in the police service without loss of seniority rights and with full payment
of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective from the time of his
dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement.[7]

Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director authorized Police Senior Superintendent

(P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere (Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions
involving different police officers,[8] including the Decision dated 11 December
2002 on Montoyas case, before the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG). The NCR Regional Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating
Montoya in the police service on the following grounds:

a. Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his appeal to the Appellate
Board, as provided by Sec. 2, Rule III, MC # 91-007;

b. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the fact that the decision of
the NCRPO dated 23 June 2000 had already become final and executory.

c. The Board erred in giving backwages despite the no work, no pay policy.

On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police personnel[9] reinstated
in the service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.),
filed before the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal
of the NCR Regional Director.

On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. issued an Order denying the
appeal of the NCR Regional Director.[10] DILG Secretary Lina noted that the NCR
Regional Director received a copy of the RAB-NCR decision on Montoyas case on 10
February 2003, but it only appealed the same to the DILG on 30 April 2003, beyond
the 15-day reglementary period for appeals. DILG Secretary Lina also declared that
neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director has personality to appeal the RAB-
NCR decision to the DILG. The right to appeal from the decision of the RAB to the
DILG is available only to the active complainant or the respondent who was
imposed a penalty of demotion in rank, forced resignation, or dismissal from the
service. Manere, representing the NCR Regional Director, is not a party
complainant or a respondent aggrieved by the adverse decision, hence, he cannot
appeal the said decision. Similarly, there is no specific provision allowing the NCR
Regional Director, in his capacity as the judge and/or arbiter of PNP disciplinary
cases, to file an appeal to the DILG from the decision of the RAB. Finally, DILG
Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an appeal by either party under Section
45 of Republic Act No. 6975[11] covers only demotion and dismissal from the service
and never exoneration and suspension. Thus, the appeal of the RAB-NCR decision
exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for the reason
that the said decision had already become final and executory. The dispositive
portion of DILG Secretary Linas decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeals are hereby denied for lack of merit. The assailed
decisions of the Regional Appellate Board National Capital Region, 4th Division, are hereby
affirmed in toto.[12]

The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed the Order

dated 10 November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). The NCR Regional Director asserted its right to appeal citing Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy.[13]
 On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611
reinstating Montoya, et al., without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR
Regional Director before the CSC.

Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution No. 05-1200

which recognized the right of the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the decision
of the RAB-NCR to the DILG. The CSC set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG
Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional Director dismissing
Montoya, et al., from police service. According to the CSC, Montoya, in particular,
was guilty of laches and abandonment of his position. It also held that the 11
December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoyas case, affirmed by DILG
Secretary Lina, was based on mere affidavits which were not substantiated.

The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et al., in

Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23 August 2006 for lack of new evidence or any valid
reason that warrants the setting aside or modification of its Resolution No. 05-
1200.

Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition

for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96022.

On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing

CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, since there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CSC in issuing Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500. The dispositive portion
of said Decision states:

Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS Resolution No. 05-1200
dated August 24, 2005 and Resolution No. 06-1500 dated August 23, 2006 of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the Order dated November 10, 2003 of the DILG
 Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. affirming the nine (9) decisions of the Regional Appellate Board
reinstating [Montoya, et al.] to the police service is SET ASIDE. The decisions of the NCRPO
Regional Director dismissing petitioners-police officers Enrique C. Paulino, Rebecca P.
Fernandez, Donato L. Geda, Marlo S. Quiambao, Danilo De Leon Nuqui, Ruel C. Montoya,
Cecilia Z. de Leon, Alberto S. Mendoza and Rodolfo C. de Leon are hereby AFFIRMED.[14]

Aggrieved, Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP

No. 96022, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 18
October 2007.

Hence, the present Petition[15] in which Montoya raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MANERE FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES.

II. WHETHER OR NOT MANERE HAS THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO APPEAL THE
DECISION EXONERATING THE PETITIONER.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF PETITIONER WAS VIOLATED.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DELAYED IN APPEALING THE DECISION

SUMMARILY DISMISSING HIM.

V. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DESERVED TO BE DISMISSED FROM SERVICE.

The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.

Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and

often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic
and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process is
applicable to administrative proceedings.[16]

Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an

opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.[17] Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated, strips down
administrative due process to its most fundamental nature and sufficiently justifies
freeing administrative proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In
particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal
vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4)
a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.[18]

Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are

not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they are still bound by law and
equity to observe the fundamental requirements of due process. Notice to enable
the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
trivial matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings.[19] In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.[20]

In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya

were flawed from the very beginning when these were conducted without due
notice to him. The NCR Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the
fact that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice
to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings, present
written or oral arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely
deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him
and was irrefragably denied due process.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional

rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a partys right to
due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.[21] The rule must be equally true for quasi-judicial administrative
bodies, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by what type of proceedings
(whether judicial or administrative) he stands to lose the same.Consequently, the
Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya
from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the latters due process.

The foregoing finding of this Court precludes a ruling that Montoya delayed
appealing the NCR Regional Directors Decision of 23 June 2000, and the said
decision has already become final and executory.

The Court reviews the vital dates. Montoya was able to receive a copy of
the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from service
on 20 July 2000. He erroneously filed his Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. The PNP denied Montoyas
Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002, two years after the filing thereof, citing lack of
jurisdiction, considering that the proper appellate body is the RAB-NCR. Thus,
Montoya was only able to file his appeal of the decision of the NCR Regional
Director before the RAB-NCR on 2 September 2002.

Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of
1990, provides:
 SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. The disciplinary action imposed upon a
member of the PNP shall be final and executory: Provided, That a disciplinary
action imposed by the Regional Director or by the PLEB involving demotion
or dismissal from the service may be appealed to the Regional Appellate
Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the notice of
decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of
the PNP involving demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided, furthermore,
That, the Regional or National Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide
the appeal within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of appeal: Provided,
finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate Board to act on the appeal within
said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice,
however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with
the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied.)

Obviously, Montoyas appeal on 2 September 2002 with the RAB-NCR, the

appellate body with jurisdiction, was filed way beyond 10 days from his receipt of
a copy of the NCR Regional Directors decision on 20 July 2000.

As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the
failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and
executory.[22] The Court, however, reiterates its previous pronouncements herein
that the Summary Dismissal Proceedings were conducted without notice to
Montoya and in violation of his right to due process. The violation of Montoyas
fundamental constitutional right deprived the NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction
over Montoyas administrative case; and the decision rendered by the NCR Regional
Director therein was void. A void judgment does not become final and executory
and may be challenged at any time.

A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial administrative body)

without jurisdiction is null and void; hence, it can never logically become final and
executory. Such a judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally.[23] Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of due process may
be regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight,
or ignored wherever it exhibits its head."[24]

The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny Montoyas
Petition/Motion before it, even though the PNP Chief manifestly did not have
jurisdiction over the same. While Montoya did err in first filing his appeal with the
PNP Chief, the prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to re-file his
appeal sooner before the appropriate forum, the RAB-NCR.

As to the issue of whether the NCR Regional Director may appeal the
Decisions dated 11 December 2002 and 10 November 2003 of the RAB-NCR and
DILG Secretary Lina, respectively, the Court answers in the negative.

Prior to Dacoycoy, case law held that dismissal of the charges against or
exoneration of respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings is final and
not subject to appeal even by the government. On 29 April 1999, the Court
promulgated its Decision in Dacoycoy, in which it made the following
pronouncements:

At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the party adversely
affected who may take an appeal from an adverse decision of the appellate court in an
administrative civil service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent
Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Civil Service
Commission adverse to him. He was the respondent official meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the
petitioner therein, herein respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission
as public respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who now may appeal the
decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent,
who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant George P. Suan, who was
merely a witness for the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has
 become the party adversely affected by such ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil
service system. Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule
extant jurisprudence that the phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to
the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for the purpose
of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or salary,
transfer, removal or dismissal from office and not included are cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary or when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there
is no occasion for appeal. In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the
Civil Service Law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges enunciated in Paredes v. Civil Service
Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission; Magpale v. Civil Service
Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service Commission and Export Processing Zone
Authority and more recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.[25] (Emphasis ours.)

Subsequently, the Court qualified its declarations in Dacoycoy. In National

Appellate Board of the National Police Commission v. Mamauag,[26] citing Mathay,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[27] this Court elucidated that:

RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of

the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize either party to appeal
in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent
when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the
service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the
penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the services is the
proper penalty.

However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority
or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is
prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous
situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead
of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the
respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided after Dacoycoy, the Court
declared:
 To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission
were brought before the Court of Appeals, the Civil Service Commission
was included only as a nominal party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil
Service Commission can be likened to a judge who should detach himself
from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review.

In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission

dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became an
advocate. Its mandated function is to hear and decide administrative
cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments and to review decisions and actions of its offices
and agencies, not to litigate.

While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal the decision
exonerating respondent public officer or employee from administrative charges, it
was Mamauag which specifically required that the government party appealing
must be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal
which heard the administrative case.

In the present case, Montoya appealed to the RAB-NCR the 23 June

2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing him from service. The RAB-
NCR, in its 11 December 2002 Decision, reversed the appealed decision of the NCR
Regional Director and ordered Montoyas reinstatement. The NCR Regional Director
then appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR to the Office of the DILG Secretary. DILG
Secretary Lina, in his Decision dated 10 November 2003, affirmed the decision of
the RAB-NCR. Once more, the NCR Regional Director filed an appeal with the CSC,
where he was able to secure a favorable ruling.
It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting as the
investigating and disciplining authority when he rendered his Decision dated 23
June 2000dismissing Montoya from the service. The pronouncement
in Mamauag, that the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the one appealing the
subsequent exoneration of the public officer or employee, squarely applies to the
NCR Regional Director.
 In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group,[28] the Court explained:

It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself from cases where
his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is
the fact that a judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide
the issues without his active participation. When a judge actively participates in the
appeal of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial and has become adversarial
instead.

The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial, not only
when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is brought on
appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-judicial agency
must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the controversies between
parties in accordance with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and completely state his findings of
fact and law. There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it
is appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer
intervenes as a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and
impartiality, and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no
longer only to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the appellants
assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on
appeal.

The NCR Regional Director, in actively appealing the reversal of his Decision,
had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and had become adversarial. His interest
was only in seeing to it that his decision would be reinstated.

The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the decisions of the
RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina exonerating Montoya from the administrative
charges against him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a bureau. It was
the PNP, in the exercise of its authority to implement internal discipline among its
members, which instigated the administrative investigation of Montoya, so it may
be deemed the prosecuting government party. And it is the PNP which stands to
suffer as a result of the purportedly wrongful exoneration of Montoya, since it
would be compelled to take back to its fold a delinquent member.

Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the RAB-NCR,
affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, reinstating Montoya to the service. It was only the
RAB-NCR which properly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and
was able to render a decision after a consideration of both sides to the
controversy. In Go v. National Police Commission,[29] the Court already issued a
caveat, worth reiterating herein:

We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and that not even
the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence of his guilt is in the opinion of
his superiors strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of
this case. It is precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the
drive to clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are denied justice or,
through blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to escape punishment.

Before finally writing finis to this case, the Court still finds it necessary to
address the remaining issue on the supposed failure of the NCR Regional Director
to exhaust administrative remedies. Montoya argues that the NCR Regional
Director failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed the 10
November 2003 Decision of DILG Secretary Lina directly to the CSC, without first
filing an appeal with the Office of the President.

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party

is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed himself of all the means of administrative processes afforded
him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted
to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted
first before courts judicial power can be sought.[30] The administrative agency
concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its
forum.[31]

Montoyas reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

is misplaced, for said doctrine does not find application in the instant case. The
doctrine intends to preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial administrative
body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case. Montoya is questioning the
supposed premature resort of the NCR Regional Director from the decision of
the DILG Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office of the President; obviously,
he is challenging the resort from one administrative body to another.

Furthermore, Montoyas assertion that DILG Secretary Linas decision should

have first been appealed to the Office of the President before the CSC is baseless.

PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and supervision of the
DILG,[32] which, in turn, is under the administrative control and supervision of the
CSC.

In Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,[33] the Court settled that the one and only
Philippine police force, the PNP, shall be civilian in character[34] and, consequently,
falls under the civil service pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution, which states:

Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,

instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.

It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 that

the decision of the Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the
administrative penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service is appealable to the
RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the DILG
Secretary.
 Now the question is, from the DILG Secretary, where can the aggrieved party
appeal?

In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, his decision
may be appealed to the CSC.[35]

Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:

SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department
[DILG].

Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary proceedings under the

Civil Service Law also applies to administrative disciplinary proceedings against
PNP members. The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of
1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that in cases where the
decision rendered by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of the PNP) is appealable to the
Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department (i.e.,
DILG) and finally to the Commission (i.e., CSC).[36]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review

on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution dated
18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine National Police is ORDERED to
reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C. Montoya to the police service without loss of
seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the
period effective from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his
reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente
S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 90-106.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 108-109.
[3]
Id. at 40.
[4]
Annex D.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 45-51.
[6]
RAB Case No. 2002-0088 SD; rollo, pp. 60-65.
[7]
Id. at 65.
[8]
SPO2 Enrique C. Paulino, SPO1 Rebecca P. Fernandez, SPO1 Donato L. Geda, PO2 Marlo S. Quiambao, PO3
Danilo de Leon Nuqui, SPO1 Cecilia Z. de Leon, SPO1 Alberto S. Mendoza and SPO1 Rodolfo C. de Leon.
[9]
Id.
[10]
The Order addressed all the appealed RAB-NCR decisions, but the Court shall only present herein the rulings
particular to Montoyas case.
[11]
An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and for Other Purposes; RA 6975 was later on amended by RA 8551, approved on 25 February
1998 and published in newspapers on 5 March 1998.
[12]
CA rollo, p. 316.
[13]
366 Phil. 86 (1999).
[14]
Rollo, p. 105.
[15]
Montoyas co-petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022 have a separate pending petition with this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. 180063.
[16]
Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, 361 Phil. 486, 491 (1999).
[17]
Westmont Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Samaniego, G.R. Nos. 146653-54, 20 February 2006, 482 SCRA 611, 619.
[18]
Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940, 952-953 (1997).
[19]
National Power Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 89, 107 (1997); citing Philippine
National Construction Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. L-80485, 11 November 1988, 167 SCRA
294, 301.
[20]
Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 184 Phil. 419, 424 (1980).
[21]
State Prosecutors v. Muro, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-876, 19 September 1994, 236 SCRA 505, 522-523; see
also Paulin v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 103323, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 386, 392.
[22]
Videogram Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 820, 828 (1996).
[23]
Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 169.
[24]
People v. Bocar, G.R. No. L-27935, 16 August 1985, 138 SCRA 166, 171.
[25]
Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, supra note 13 at 104-105.
[26]
G.R. No. 149999, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 624, 641-642.
[27]
378 Phil. 466, 483-484 (1999).
[28]
G.R. No. 169982, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 534, 549.
[29]
338 Phil. 162, 171 (1997).
[30]
Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146, 152-153 (1997).
[31]
Id.
[32]
The PNP, as a bureau, is now a part of the reorganized DILG. (Cabada v. Alunan III, 329 Phil. 669 [1996].)
[33]
G.R. No. 139658, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 399.
[34]
Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution provides:
Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
[35]
Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM, supra note 33.
[36]
Cabada v. Alunan, III, supra note 32.