G.R. No.
109406 September 11, 1998 Whether or not AO 29 AND AO 268 UNLAWFULLY USURP THE
REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA et al, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANGEL C. ALCALA, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON. CARLITO
R. ALETA, in his capacity as the Director of the Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments
and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292"), otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292. On
January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos ("President Ramos") issued
Administrative Order No. 29 ("AO 29") authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and
reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 268
("AO 268"), enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein
respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners' salaries or allowances of
the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
In G.R. No. 119597, the petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees
of the Philippine Tourism Authority ("ADEPT"), is an association of
employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority ("PTA") who were
granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6971 ("RA 6971"), otherwise known as the Productivity
Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the
Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was "prohibited under
Administrative Order No. 29 dated January 19, 1993."
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not PTA is within the coverage of RA 6971.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY GRANTED SOLELY TO THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION.
Held:
First Issue
Petitioner contends that the PTA is a government-owned and controlled
corporation performing proprietary function, and therefore the Secretary of
Labor and Employment and Secretary of Finance exceeded their authority in
issuing the aforestated Supplemental Rules Implementing RA 6971.
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or
proprietary functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have
been created. If the purpose, is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn
pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health,
safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the
public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as
"proprietary" are those intended for private advantage and benefit.
The legislative intent to place only government-owned and controlled
corporations performing proprietary functions under the coverage of RA 6971
is gleanable from the other provisions of the law. To repeat, employees of
government corporations created by special charters have neither the right to
strike nor the right to bargain collectively, as defined in the Labor Code.
The provisions of RA 6971, taken together, reveal the legislative intent to
include only government-owned and controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions within its coverage.
It is thus evident that PTA, being a government-owned and controlled
corporation with original charter subject to Civil Service Law, Rules and
Regulations, 25 is already within the scope of an incentives award
systern under Section 1, Rule X of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
EO 292 issued by the Civil Service Commission ("Commission"). Since
government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters
do have an incentive award system, Congress enacted a law that
would address the same concern of officials and employees of
 government-owned and controlled corporations incorporated under the
general corporation law.
All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds no
reversible error in the finding by respondent Commission that PTA is not
within the purview of RA 6971.
Second Issue
Petitioners theorize that AO 29 and AO 268 violate EO 292 and since the
latter is a law, it prevails over executive issuances. Petitioners likewise assert
that AO 29 and AO 268 encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Civil
Service Commission to adopt measures to strengthen the merit and rewards
system and to promulgate rules, regulations and standards governing the
incentive awards system of the civil service.
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits
without prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over
the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of control
over executive departments.
Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the
Commission on Civil Service to grant benefits to government personnel. AO
29 and AO 268 did not revoke the privilege of employees to receive incentive
benefits. The same merely regulated the grant and amount thereof.
Conformably, it is "the President or the head of each department or agency
who is authorized to incur the necessary expenses involved in the honorary
recognition of subordinate officers and employees of the government." It is
not the duty of the Commission to fix the amount of the incentives. Such
function belongs to the President or his duly empowered alter ego.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and
112056 are hereby DIMISSED, and as above ratiocinated, further deductions
from the salaries and allowances of petitioners are hereby ENJOINED.
In G.R. No. 119597, the assailed Decision of respondent Commission on
Audit is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR,
Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued,
Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX
T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by
DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF
Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private
Respondent, respondents.
Facts:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V.
Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No.
52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his
heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such
order.
Lumiqued was charged with malversation through falsification of official
documents.
In the second affidavit-complaint, private respondent accused Lumiqued with
violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989,
he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00.
The third affidavit-complaint, charged Lumiqued with oppression and
harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints
prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional
Cashier without just cause.
Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order
No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued.
In his counter-affidavit, Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed
against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were
initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of
Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10,
1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing
date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the
services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued
nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee
rendered a report finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal
or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges against him.
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative
Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him
from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as
well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily
established. In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos,
Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated
to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and
existing rules and regulations." Lumiqued filed a second motion for
reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the
constitutional right to counsel during the hearing, however, before his motion
could be resolved, Lumiqued died. Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus praying for the "payment of retirement benefits
and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable
to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from
service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994."
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued
of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to
counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the
presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended
the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a
counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should
have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
Issue: Whether or not the right to counsel is applicable in an administrative
case.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which
cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected
in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In
the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal
proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below.
The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be
held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.
While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall
"administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
offenders and administration of the correctional system, conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other
functions as may be provided by law," prosecutors may be called upon to
conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating
committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct
the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be
akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to
determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the
dignity of government service.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more
practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. An actual hearing is not
always an indispensable aspect of due process. As long as a party was given
the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process. Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee.
Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of
administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in
administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the
committee's recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed
tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government
officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong
evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, which petitioners have
not successfully disputed in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby
DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-34526 August 9, 1988
HIJO PLANTATION INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, TWIN RIVERS
PLANTATION, INC. and MARSMAN & CO., INC., for themselves and in
behalf of other persons and entities similarly situated, petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Facts:
Hijo Plantation, Inc., Davao Fruits Corporation, Twin Rivers Plantation, Inc.
and Marsman Plantation (Manifestation, Rollo, P. 18), collectively referred to
herein as petitioners, are domestic corporations duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, all of which are engaged in the production
and exportation of bananas in and from Mindanao.
Congress passed Republic Act No. 6125 entitled "an act imposing
STABILIZATION TAX ON CONSIGNMENTS ABROAD TO ACCELERATE
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES," to eliminate the necessity for said circular and to
stabilize the peso.
During the first nine (9) months of calendar year 1971, the total banana export
amounted to an annual aggregate F.O.B. value of P8,949,000.00 (Answer,
Rollo, p. 73) thus exceeding the aggregate F.O.B. value of five million United
States Dollar, bringing it within the ambit of Republic Act No. 6125.
Accordingly, petitioners through their counsel sought the authoritative
pronouncement of the Central Bank (herein referred to as respondent),
therein advancing the opinion that the stabilization tax does not become due
and collectible from the petitioners until July 1, 1972 at the rate of 4% of the
F.O.B. peso proceeds of the exports shipped from July 1, 1972 to June
30,1973.
With the denial of petitioners' request for reconsideration, respondent thru its
agent Bank, Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation has been collecting from
the petitioners who have been forced to pay under protest, such stabilization
tax.
Petitioners view respondent's act as a clear violation of the provision of
Republic Act No. 6125, and as an act in excess of its jurisdiction, hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued Monetary Board Resolution
No. 1995, series of 1971 which in effect reaffirmed Central Bank Circular No.
309, enacted pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1179.
There is here no dispute that the banana industry is liable to pay the
stabilization tax prescribed under Republic Act No. 1995, it being the
admission of both parties, that the Industry has indeed reached and for the
first time in the calendar year 1971, a total banana export exceeding the
aggregate annual F.O.B. value of five million United States dollars.
In the very nature of things, in many cases it becomes impracticable for the
legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for
the various and varying details for the management of a particular department
of the Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative
department of the government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for
the conduct, control, and management of the work of the particular
department of the government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the
management and control of such department.
Such is the case in RA 6125.
Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law, whenever
they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general purposes
and objects of the law. Such regulations once established and found to be in
conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding upon all
the parties, as if the regulation had been written in the original law itself.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, the Monetary Board issued Resolution
No. 1179 which contained the rules and regulations for the implementation of
said provision which Board resolution was subsequently embodied in Central
Bank Circular No. 309. Section 3 of Central Bank Circular No. 309, "provides
that the stabilization tax shall begin to apply on January first following the
calendar year during which such export products shall have reached the
aggregate annual F.O.B. value of more than $5 million and the applicable tax
rates shall be the rates prescribed in schedule (b) of Section 1 of RA No.
6125 for the fiscal year following the reaching of the said aggregate value."
Central Bank Circular No. 309 was subsequently reaffirmed in Monetary
Board Resolution No. 1995 herein assailed by petitioners for being null and
void (Rollo, pp. 97- 98).
Moreover, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic
law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Sto. Tomas v. Board
of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, 51
SCRA 340). Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence
to act to the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate to the statute
relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. Department zeal may
not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute (Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Santiago L-29236, August 21,
1974, 58 SCRA 493; cited in Tayug Rural Bank v. Central Bank, L-46158,
November 28,1986,146 SCRA 120,130).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46158 November 28, 1986
TAYUG RURAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Plaintiff-Appellee, Tayug Rural Bank, Inc., is a banking corporation in Tayug,
Pangasinan. During the period from December 28, 1962 to July 30, 1963, it
obtained thirteen (13) loans from Defendant-Appellant, Central Bank of the
Philippines, by way of rediscounting, at the rate of 1/2 of 1% per annum from
1962 to March 28, 1963 and thereafter at the rate of 2-1/2% per anum. The
loans, amounting to P813,000.00 as of July 30, 1963, were all covered by
corresponding promissory notes prescribing the terms and conditions of the
aforesaid loans (Record on Appea, pp. 15-53). As of July 15, 1969, the
outstanding balance was P 444,809.45 (Record on Appeal, p. 56).
On December 23, 1964, Appellant, thru the Director of the Department of
Loans and Credit, issued Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8, informing all rural
banks that an additional penalty interest rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum
would be assessed on all past due loans beginning January 4, 1965.
On June 27, 1969, Appellee Rural Bank sued Appellant in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch III, to recover the 10% penalty imposed by
Appellant and to restrain Appellant from continuing the imposition of the
penalty. Appellant justified the imposition of the penalty by way of affirmative
and special defenses, stating that it was legally imposed under the provisions
of Section 147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks
promulgated by the Monetary Board on September 5, 1958, under authority of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended (Record on Appeal, p. 8,
Affirmative and Special Defenses Nos. 2 and 3).
Appellant appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, for
determination of questions of facts and of law. However, in its decision
promulgated April 13, 1977, the Court of Appeals, finding no controverted
facts and taking note of the statement of the lower court in its pre-trial Order
dated March 3, 1970 that only a legal question has been raised in the
pleadings, (Record on Appeal, p. 61), ruled that the resolution of the appeal
will solely depend on the legal issue of whether or not the Monetary Board
had authority to authorize Appellant Central Bank to impose a penalty rate of
10% per annum on past due loans of rural banks which had failed to pay their
accounts on time and ordered the certification of this case to this Court for
proper determination (Rollo, pp. 34-35).
Issue:
whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on
Appellee's past overdue loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964.
Held:
The answer is in the negative.
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8 issued by the Director of Appellant's
Department of Loans and Credit on December 23, 1964, reads as follows:
Pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 1813 dated
December 18, 1964, and in consonance with Section 147 and
148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks
concerning the responsibility of a rural bank to remit immediately
to the Central Bank payments received on papers rediscounted
with the latter including the loan value of rediscounted papers as
they mature, and to liquidate fully its maturing loan obligations
with the Central Bank, personal checks, for purposes of
repayment, shall considered only after such personal checks
shall have been honored at clearing.
In addition, rural banks which shall default in their loan
obligations, thus incurring past due accounts with the Central
Bank, shall be assessed an additional penalty interest rate of
ten per cent (10%) per annum on such past due accounts with
the Central Bank over and above the customary interest rate(s)
at which such loans were originally secured from the Central
Bank. (Record on Appeal, p. 135).
The above-quoted Memorandum Circular was issued on the basis of Sections
147 and 148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks of the
Philippines approved on September 5, 1958, which provide:
A Rural Bank failing to comply with the provisions of the
preceding paragraph shall ipso facto lose its right to the
rediscounting or loan period, without prejudice to the Central
Bank imposing additional reasonable penalties, including
curtailment or withdrawal of financial assistance.
The "Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks" was published in the
Official Gazette, 55 O.G., on June 13, 1959, pp. 5186-5289. It is by virtue of
these same Rules that Rural Banks re-discount their loan papers with the
Central Bank at 2-1/2% interest per annum and in turn lend the money to the
public at 12% interest per annum (Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's
Memorandum, Record on Appeal, p. 130).
The specific provision under the law claimed as basis for Sections 147 and
148 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Rural Banks, that is, on
Appellant's authority to extend loans to Rural Banks by way of rediscounting
is Section 13 of R.A. 720, as amended, which provides:
SEC. 13. In an emergency or when a financial crisis is imminent
the Central Bank may give a loan to any Rural Bank against
assets of the Rural Bank which may be considered acceptable
by a concurrent vote of at least, five members of the Monetary
Board.
Nowhere in any of the above-quoted pertinent provisions of R.A. 720 nor in
any other provision of R.A. 720 for that matter, is the monetary Board
authorized to mete out on rural banks an additional penalty rate on their past
due accounts with Appellant. As correctly stated by the trial court, while the
Monetary Board possesses broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the
retroactive imposition of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a
measure supervisory in character. (Record on Appeal, p. 141).
Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law (Valerio
v. Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 7 SCRA 719;
Commissioner of Civil Service v. Cruz, 15 SCRA 638; R.B. Industrial
Development Company, Ltd. v. Enage, 24 SCRA 365; Director of Forestry v.
Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Gonzalo Sy v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 70
SCRA 570).
There are, however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative
agencies. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress
authorizes promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement
given legislation, all that is required is that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes
(Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183). The Court held in the same
case that "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its
promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statute granted by the
legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated
therein or its innate wisdom ...." On the other hand, "administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that
finally determine what the law means." Indeed, it cannot be otherwise as the
Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power
resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser
administrative, executive office, or agency then can, contrary to the express
language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative.
Necessarily, it is bound to observe the constitutional mandate. There must be
strict compliance with the legislative enactment.
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued
to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim,
108 Phil. 1091).
Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided in
the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less
one that is applied retroactively.
Such clause was not a part of the promissory notes executed by Appellee to
secure its loans. Thus, while there is now a basis for the imposition of the
10% penalty rate on overdue accounts of rural banks, there was none during
the period that Appellee contracted its loans from Appellant, the last of which
loan was on July 30, 1963. Surely, the rule cannot be given retroactive effect.
The contention that Appellant is entitled to the 10% cost of collection in case
of suit and should therefore, have been awarded the same by the court below,
is well taken. It is provided in all the promissory notes signed by Appellee that
in case of suit for the collection of the amount of the note or any unpaid
balance thereof, the Appellee Rural Bank shall pay the Central Bank of the
Philippines a sum equivalent to ten (10%) per cent of the amount unpaid not
in any case less than five hundred (P500.00) pesos as attorney's fees and
costs of suit and collection. Thus, Appellee cannot be allowed to come to
Court seeking redress for an wrong done against it and then be allowed to
renege on its corresponding obligations.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification that Appellee Rural Bank is ordered to pay a
sum equivalent to 10% of the outstanding balance of its past overdue
accounts, but not in any case less than P500.00 as attorney's fees and costs
of suit and collection.