Requirements of Administrative Due Process (Villa vs.

Lazaro)

a. right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s
legal right (Paterok vs BOC)

b. right to reasonable opportunity to appear personally or with the assistance of counsel and defend his right
and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, by testimony or otherwise, and to controvert
the evidence of the other party. (Lumiqued vs Exevea)

c. right of a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction, so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance
of honesty and impartiality (Casimiro vs Tandog & Lozano vs. Delo Santos)

d. right to a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing or
at least ascertained in the records, or disclosed or made known to the parties affected. (Globe vs NTC)

Case No. 45: Lumiqued vs. Exevea (GR No. 117565 November 18, 1997)

FACTS: Petitioner was dismissed from his position as Regional Director of DAR-CAR pursuant to AO No. 52
issued by Pres. Ramos after the DOJ investigating committee, headed by respondent, found petitioner guilty of
Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct based on the evidence submitted by petitioner and complainant.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Pres. but was denied. On his second appeal, he invoked, among other
things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during hearing. The OP found this untenable,
ruling that the right to counsel is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.

ISSUE: WON the right to counsel is indispensable in administrative proceedings.

RULING: No. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. In administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. This constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever
irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.

Case No. 46: Casimiro vs. Tandog (GR No. 146137 June 8, 2005)

FACTS: Petitioner was the appointed Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon when she was separated from
service pursuant to AO No. 1 issued by therein Mayor Tandog based on a recommendation by the fact-finding
investigation committee finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and malperformance of duty due to committed
irregularities in the issuance of various Tax Declarations. Petitioner appealed the Mayor’s decision to the CSC,
then to the CA, but all affirmed the latter’s action. Petitioner then elevated the appeal to the SC pointing out
the bias and partiality of the fact-finding committee, hence, deprived her of procedural and substantive due
process when she was terminated from office.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded and impartial and fair treatment in the course of the proceedings.

RULING: Yes. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Petitioner was
accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a
careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC
and the Court of Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. She has even brought the
matter to the SC for final adjudication. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. There should be hard
evidence to prove it, as well as manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source
or some other basis. Petitioner miserably failed to substantiate her allegations. In effect, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of duty prevails.

Case No. 47: Lozano vs. Delos Santos (GR No. 125221 June 19, 1997)

FACTS: Petitioner was the President of KAMAJDA, while private respondent Anda was the President of
SAMAJODA. Both associations agreed to consolidate and form UMAJODA, where the elected President of
which shall take the responsibility of collecting daily dues from association members. Petitioner won as
President, but was disputed and refused to be recognized by Anda alleging fraud in elections, as such, he
continued to collect daily dues despite desistance by petitioner. Petitioner thus filed a civil case to MCTC –
Mabalacat & Magalang, Pampanga against Anda. Anda filed a motion to dismiss due to the lower court’s lack
of jurisdiction and alleging SEC has the proper jurisdiction on the matter, but was denied. The decision was
reversed by the RTC upon appeal by Anda, finding that the conflict was intracorporate in nature hence, is
under the jurisdiction of SEC.

ISSUE: WON SEC has the proper jurisdiction over the dispute between petitioner and private respondent.

RULING: No. The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be viewed in the light of its nature and function under
the law. This jurisdiction is determined by a concurrence of two elements: (1) the status or relationship of the
parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. The first element requires
that the controversy must arise out of intracorporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the State in so far as it concerns their individual franchises. The
second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of
the corporation, partnership or association or deal with the internal affairs of the corporation, partnership or
association. After all, the principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control of corporations,
partnerships and associations with the end in view that investments in these entities may be encouraged and
protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development.

UMAJODA was not duly registered with the SEC. The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA are duly registered
with the SEC, but these associations are two separate entities. The dispute between petitioner and private
respondent is not within the KAMAJDA nor the SAMAJODA. It is between members of separate and distinct
associations. Petitioner and private respondent have no intracorporate relation much less do they have an
intracorporate dispute. The SEC therefore has no jurisdiction over the complaint. (I can’t shorten this. I think
the whole ruling is significant for our understanding. Kayo na bahala magshort cut sa digest to fit it in one
page. hehe)

Case No. 48: Globe vs. NTC (GR No. 143964 July 26, 2004)

FACTS: Acting on a complaint filed by Smart against Globe for the latter’s failure to cooperate in effecting
CMTS-to-CMTS interconnection of SMS, the NTC issued an Order holding, among others, that both Globe and
Smart have been providing SMS without authority from it. However, NTC refrained from issuing a Show Cause
Order with a Cease and Desist Order, and instead directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to
provide SMS within 30 days, subject to the payment of fine in the amount of P200 from the date of violation
and for every day during which such violation continues. The Order was appealed by petitioner to the CA
which affirmed the same, hence, was elevated to the SC, alleging, among others, that the Order is a patent
nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently
charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process.

ISSUE: WON NTC acted with due process in levying the fine against Globe.

RULING: No. The assailed NTC’s determination and corresponding penalty were rendered in the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions. Therefore, all the requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of quasi-
judicial power apply to the present case. The assailed Order of NTC violated due process for failure to
sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and
for imputing violation to, and imposing a corresponding fine on, Globe, despite the absence of due notice and
hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf.

ELECTION LAWS:
Disqualifications Under RA 7160

a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude (Villaber vs. COMELEC) or for
an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence;

b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case (Grego vs. COMELEC & Reyes vs.
COMELEC);

c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

d. Those with dual citizenship (Mercado vs. Manzano & Lopez vs. COMELEC);

e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad (Rodriguez vs. COMELEC);

f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code (Caasi vs. Court of Appeals); and

g. The insane or feeble-minded.

Case No. 49: Villaber vs. COMELEC (GR No. 148326 November 15, 2001)

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for Congressman of 1st District of
Davao del Sur and thereby cancelling his COC, which proceeding from a complaint by his opponent, Cagas,
alleging that petitioner was disqualified to run for office due to his conviction of a violation of BP 22, a crime
involving moral turpitude, by the Manila RTC Branch 15. The assailed resolutions were appealed by petitioner
to the CA, which affirmed the same, and hence, to the SC arguing that violation of BP 22 is not a crime
involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE: WON violation of BP 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude to warrant petitioner’s disqualification
from office.

RULING: Yes. Violation of BP 22 is a crime involving moral turpitude, because the accused knows at the time
of the issuance of the check that he does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon presentment. A conviction thereof shows that the accused is guilty of
deceit, and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of the person.

Case No. 50: Grego vs. COMELEC (GR No. 125955 June 19, 1997)

FACTS: In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon finding of serious misconduct in
an administrative complaint. In 1988, Basco ran for City Councilor of Manila in which he won, was re-elected
for a second term in 1992 and for the third and final term in 1995. Petitioner contested Basco’s election for
the third term alleging that the latter should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had
been removed from office as a result of an administrative case pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of RA 7160 which took
effect on January 1, 1992. Basco sought for the dismissal of the petition for disqualification by petitioner
which was granted by the COMELEC hence, petitioner elevated the matter to SC, alleging that Sec. 40(b) of RA
7160 must nonetheless be given a retroactive effect and applied to Basco’s dismissal from office which took
place in 1981.

ISSUE: WON Section 40(b) of RA 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect
on January 1, 1992.

RULING: No. There is no provision in RA 7160 which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. It, therefore, follows that Sec. 40(b) of RA 7160 is not applicable to the present case. An
elective local official who was removed from office as a result of an administrative case prior to January 1,
1992 (the date of effectivity RA 7160), is not disqualified from running for an elective local public office,
because Sec. 40 of the same cannot be given retroactive effect.

Case No. 51: Reyes vs. COMELEC (GR No. 120905 March 7, 1996)

FACTS: Petitioner was the incumbent Mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro when various administrative
complaints were lodged against him in 1994, wherein the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in 1995, found him
guilty of such and ordered him to vacate his position. Petitioner consistently refused to receive such order
despite several attempts of serving the same to him. Petitioner again filed his COC and won the 1995
elections. De Castro sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing Sec. 40(b) of RA
7160, in which the COMELEC 2nd Division ruled in the former’s favor. Petitioner appealed the decision to the
COMELEC en banc, alleging that the decision in the administrative case against petitioner was not yet final and
executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was disqualified pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of RA 7160.

RULING: Yes. Petitioner, a Municipal Mayor who had been ordered removed from office by the Sanggunian
Panlalawigan, was disqualified, even as he alleged that the decision was not yet final because he had not yet
received a copy of the decision, inasmuch as it was shown that he merely refused to accept delivery of the
copy of the decision.

Case No. 52: Mercado vs. Manzano (GR No. 135083 May 26, 1999)

FACTS: Respondent won as the Vice Mayor of Makati City in the 1998 elections. Mamaril petitioned for his
disqualification pursuant to Section 40(d) of RA 7160 alleging that respondent was a US citizen, where
petitioner herein sought to intervene. Respondent asserts that he was born in US of Filipino parents and was
considered as a US citizen under the US laws, but, notwithstanding, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified respondent for the position, but was reversed upon
respondent’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner appealed the COMELEC’s reversal to the SC.

ISSUE: WON respondent is disqualified due to his dual citizenship.

RULING: No. The SC clarified in Valles vs. COMELEC “dual citizenship” disqualification and reconciled the
same with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution on “dual allegiance”. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another State, the Court explained that “dual citizenship” as a disqualification
must refer to citizens with “dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under the disqualification. Furthermore, for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship.

Case No. 53: Lopez vs. COMELEC (GR No. 182701 July 23, 2008)

FACTS: Petitioner, a candidate for Barangay Chairman for the October 2007 election, was sought to be
disqualified for being an American citizen. He argued that he is a dual citizen under RA 9225. COMELEC ruled
that respondent should have made a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, failing
which he is disqualified from running for an elective office. Thus, the recourse to SC.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC erred in disqualifying petitioner for his failure to personally swear renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship.

RULING: No. In the case of a former Filipino who lost Philippine citizenship and thereafter reacquires it by
taking the oath of allegiance as required in RA 9225, he must personally swear to an oath renouncing all
foreign citizenship at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy is not sufficient, because Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 categorically requires the individual to state in clear
and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship, failing which he is disqualified from running
for an elective office

Case No. 54: Rodriguez vs. COMELEC (GR No. 120099 July 24, 1996)

FACTS: Petitioner won as governor of Quezon in the 1992 elections. Marquez filed a quo warranto alleging
that petitioner left the US where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, was pending against him for
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. As such, he is
considered a fugitive of justice which must be disqualified from any elective position.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is fugitive from justice to warrant disqualification from any elective position.

RULING: No. A “fugitive from justice”, as defined by the SC in Marquez v. COMELEC, “includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution”. Rodriguez cannot be considered a “fugitive from justice”, because his arrival in the Philippines
from the US preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court and the issuance of the arrest
warrant by the same foreign court, by almost five months. It was impossible for petitioner to have known
about such complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and
arrest warrant – much less conviction – to speak of yet at such time.

Case No. 55: Caasi vs. Court of Appeals (GR No. 88831 November 8, 1990)

FACTS: Miguel won as the municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan in the local elections. His opponent,
herein petitioner, sought to disqualify Miguel for being a green card holder pursuant to Sec. 68 of BP 881.
Miguel counter-argued that his green card was only for convenience in order to freely move in and out of US,
but nevertheless intended to be a permanent residence of Bolinao. COMELEC ruled in favor of Miguel, hence,
the appeal of petitioner to SC.

ISSUE: WON Miguel was disqualified to run for an elective office.

RULING: Yes. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate
who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of
itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver
of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any
elective office"