1. RODERICK DAOANG and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, Petitioners, v.

v. THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS

NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; ART. 335, (par. 1), CIVIL CODE; WORDS USED IN ENUMERATING DISQUALIFIED TO ADOPT; CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS. — We find, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

2. ID.; A STATUTE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS NEED NOT BE INTERPRETED. — Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of
statutory construction.

3. CIVIL LAW; ADOPTION; OBJECT. — Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the
consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency,
however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every
intendment is sustained to promote that objective.

4. ID.; CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CLUB; ADOPTION; HAVING A CHILD, NO LONGER A DISQUALIFICATION TO ADOPT. — Under the law now in force, having
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

DECISION

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive
part of which reads, as follows:j
"Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption
of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents,
Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names ‘Bonilla’ and
‘Marcos’ be changed with ‘Agonoy’, which is the family name of the petitioners.

"Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code.

"Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the
petitioners." 1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw librar
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of
the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda
Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37. 2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the Office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the
ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City. 3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the
aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors’ mother,
who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendered its
decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt
under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.cralawnad

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

x x x"

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondent judge held that "to add grandchild or grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is
included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included."

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not only
introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable
disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the
right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The
children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.cralawnad

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is
that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children,
are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would
have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating
through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the
promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that
objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for
disqualification to adopt. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as
to costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.
 2. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

DECISION

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the
instant case.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition[1] to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;[2] that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle
name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and
educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement
of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her
natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an
adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the
mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear
a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6)
her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an
intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code
and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that
the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.[7]

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is
defined as the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.[8] It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have
a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to
the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and
is continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname[10] of an individual whatever may be his status in
life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as Mrs.

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may
resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176[11] of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that an adopted child shall bear
the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino
custom of adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father, thus

Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the fathers surname indicates the
family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the
surname of the mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but
that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the following
example: Alfonso Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez Davids family
name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but he
may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of
Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because there are so
many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they
even include the Clan name.

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really
the Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters.[13] Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle
name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption.[14]

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.[15] It is
a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.[16] The
modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a
legitimate status.[17] This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child.[18] Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.[20]

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189[21] of
the Family Code and Section 17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18[24], Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of
his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
 Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal
happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but
will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The
interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27]

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It
will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28]

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we
find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname
GARCIA as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City
and SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.

DECISION

Indeed, whats in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name would smell as sweet?

This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure questions of law, the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994[1] in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran
and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y
Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.

The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition[2] to
adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications
as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same
petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in
keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private
respondents residence.[3]

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition
dated May 3, 1995,[4] petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing
that these petitions should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all
legal intents and purposes shall be known as Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective upon the filing
of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in the record of birth of the
adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila, for its appropriate action consisten(t) herewith.[5]

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein private respondents to be adopting parents
nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications under the law
to be adopters,[6] and have amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption,[7] with the findings of the trial court being recited thus:

To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this petition for hearing (Exh. A) was published in the March 31,
April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. B to E and submarkings). x x x

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record (Exhs. K to V); and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child
Kevin (Exh. W). Their qualification to become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by the DSWD through
Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:

Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly individuals. They are found physically healthy, mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable
to adopt Kevin Earl Moran a.k.a Aaron Joseph.

Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share their time, love and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously
provide him a happy and secure home life.

Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the Munsons. He had comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the Munsons
during the six months trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.

We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized.[8]

It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by legal and evidential support, are accorded high
respect and are binding and conclusive upon this Court.[9] Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the
petition for adoption.

The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows: (1) whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for
the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for
the change of name.
 I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally granted the prayer for the change of the given or proper
name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different
from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of
adoption and an authority to change the given or proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted separately, and the substantive
and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of
the Civil Code in relation to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with.[10]

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have been observed, but not those for a petition for change of
name.[11] Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter
and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a
substantial change of ones legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites
therefor being conformably satisfied.[12]

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which
allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is
argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a
single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e., jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met.[13]

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the natural interest of the State in maintaining a system of
identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of justice.[14] Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of
the Rules, the welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant proceeding.[15]

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that

Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been
prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the purpose of
preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a
petitioner of discernment.

The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual
obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It stands to
reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for change of Kevin Earls first name. In fact, to obviate any possible
doubts on the intent of petitioners, the prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption.[16]

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from
the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the
parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the
change of the adoptees surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be
contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil
register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptees registered Christian or first name. The automatic
change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an
adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the same,[17] and shall continue to be so used until the court orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil
register is a substantial change in ones official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a
change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made
should normally make its decree recording such change)[18]

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein, If a change in ones name is desired, this can only be
done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the person desiring to change his name resides. It
shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change of name is sought, and the name
asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for
the Government at such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the reasonableness of the causes for the
change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of
the municipality concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction for its adjudication.[19] It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted
by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as
the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of name of the adoptee,[20] all of which taken
together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order
therefor. It would be procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition for the latter
relief at law.

Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes
of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the pronouncements in Briz vs. Briz, et al.[21] and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al.[22] is misplaced.

A restatement of the rule and jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action in one action, the
statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration.[23] It is the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a
separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of
action in one declaration, complaint or petition.[24]

As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate
causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the
same factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined.[25] Modern statutes and rules governing joinders are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits
and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are
liberally construed.[26]

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one
complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out
of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one
action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of
litigation at minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of
a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it
should be made effectual as far as practicable,[27] with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice.[28]

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve kindred
rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The
dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between them.[29] While the rule allows a plaintiff to
join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact
involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.[30]

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties[31] and
requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented. effectively disallows unlimited joinder.[32]

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name,
we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common
question of fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity demanded
to sanction their joinder under our Rules.

As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is
individually governed by particular sets of laws and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called upon to
evaluate the proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a
petition for change of name, no family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the grounds supporting the
proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).

x x x Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither action is dependent on the other.[33]

The rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties (Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).

These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in
nature and purpose, not related to each other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption proceeding is the
proposed adopters fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds
supporting the change requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name. And similarly, a change of first name
cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common
ground, thus the joinder would be improper.

In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4,
Comment).

We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application
to pronounce the husband an absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the wife. In Briz, an action for
declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to recover the land subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the
commonality of relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and change of name. Thus the rulings
in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.

Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared feasible, the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and
instead remanded the matter for further proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a complete
determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they
are not allowed where the conditions are not satisfactorily met.[34]

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all matters pertaining to the coetaneous
grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with
respect to the prayer for change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of
action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively
settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are
best taken up individually.

In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al. ,[35] the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action:

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive provision of law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to
join all his causes of action and bring them at one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that he must, unite
several causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified. This, therefore, leaves it to the plaintiffs option whether the causes of action
shall be joined in the same action, and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file another action based on the
remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor. (Italics supplied.)

The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal construction thereof in general, and for change of
name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein
there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation.[36] It has long been recognized that strict compliance
with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.[37]

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or
complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful
confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.[38]

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.[39] We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that:[40]
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a
mistake to propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules
should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a
matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.
Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule
of court.

x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does
not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.

Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy
such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such
situations, the courts are empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules.[41]

We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the reglementary procedure for the change in the proper
or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and
benefit. Nor is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State that stands to be prejudiced by a
wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of
identification of its citizens.

The danger wrought by non-observance, of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure prescribed by law prevents the proper
determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as
relate to the form of the action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public policy.[42] They are matters of
public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular
convenience.[43]

In Garcia vs. Republic,[44] we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and the importance of seeking relief under the appropriate
proceeding:

x x x The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply one procedure for another lest we create confusion in the application of the
proper remedy.

Respondent judges unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the
prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be
characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.

II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name without citing or proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only
justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the adoptees baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to
live with private respondents.[45]

Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new
identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for
in the petition, so they claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives.This largely echoes the opinion of
the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural
parents to freely select the first name of their adopted child.[46]

The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this manner:

As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law. x x x.

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all
intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor
at birth.[47]

We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus set it aside.

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a persons name is a word or combination of words by which he is known and identified, and distinguished
from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that
every person must have a name. The name of an individual has two parts:

The given or proper name and the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him
from other individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The given name may
be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[48]

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a persons birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person is that given him in the civil register. That is
his name in the eyes of the law.[49] And once the name of a person is officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its
precise mandate: no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the interest of the State in names
borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.[50]

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court.[51] For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be
changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, impressed as it is
with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the
proceedings a nullity.[52]

It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the
duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to
change his name, that is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable
cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.[53]

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable
or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.[54]

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under which he has been known and which he used,
has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned.[55] For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name.[56] Neither
does the fact that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of
name.[57] A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil
register - is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.[58]
 The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and applicability. The only grounds offered to justify
the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it
was the name by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from the time he came to live with private respondents.[59] Apart from
suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private
respondents. The legal bases chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to allow the adoptee
herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned
upon.[60]

The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is
fixed by law x x x.

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the
intentions of giving him away. The naming of the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming the minor at
birth and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.

The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In the Wong case, therein petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his
surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong.Upon reaching the age of majority,
he filed a petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He adduced proof that the use of the surname
Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
Muslim community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to the change of name sought. This Court
granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.

It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal consequences thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That
it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity
of seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures.

Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is
previously conferred a first name by his natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive parents. In the first
case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give the childs first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a
name (Tolentino, A., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case, however, as in the case at bar, private
respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the
natural parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right asserted by private respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming
the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. [61]

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of adoption and ensures to the
adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted
child,[62] should be understood in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence.

The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child presupposes that no other name for it has
theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of
identification, the same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain unaltered save when, for the most
compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit judicial approval.

While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-
name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does
not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are
what are of concern to the Court.

Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private respondents privilege to legally change the proper or
given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned
on strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally adopted child of private respondents shall
henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS,

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI who ordered the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction in the entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 3043-R.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those
harmless and innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or corrections involving civil
status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in
the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served
on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the present petition seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and
nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or
citizenship may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition or to disprove the same; that
respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and have also caused the order
for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of
Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from
"married" to "single" the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the
status of their mother.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.

After trial on the merits during which the parties were given all the opportunity to present their evidence and refute the evidence and arguments of the other side,
the lower court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant petition and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the
necessary cancellation and/or correction on the following entries:

A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE instead of
LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';

B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said Jessica Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of 'LEGITIMATE'
and father's (GO ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and

C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to change the entry on Petitioner's Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.

Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall forthwith enter the cancellation and/'or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go
in the Civil Registry as adverted to above.

From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed to us by way of this petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this petition, stating that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND
CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO.

The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic (94 Phil. 321) to the 1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67),
that entries which can be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are
clerical in nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous (Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496). In Republic v. Medina (119 SCRA 270) citing the case of Chua Wee, et
al, v. Republic (38 SCRA 409), there was this dicta:

From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there
was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or
alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a
procedure which should be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the
civil register. Rule 108, lie all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule- making
authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye
or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy or paternity
or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving
nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However,
it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that
even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the
Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding as follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p.
716, 718, 110 Was. 39).

The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code and fullblown adversary proceedings which are
conducted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

She states:

It will please be considered that the nature of the matters that may be changed or corrected are of two kinds. It may either be mistakes that are
clerical in nature or substantial ones. Under the first category are those 'harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.,' (Ansaldo v. Republic, No. L-10276, Feb. 14, 1958, 54 O.G. 5886) or 'one' that is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding'. (Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848).

To the second category falls those which affect the civil status or citizenship or nationality of a party (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, No. L-5609, Feb. 5,
1954, 94 Phil. 321: Tan Su v. Republic, No. L-12140, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 578: Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848;
Bantoco Coo v. Republic, No. L-14978, May 23,1961, 2 SCRA 42: Barillo v. Republic, No. L-14823, Dec. 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 725).

Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were governed, at first, by Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) which placed these matters
exclusively upon the sound judgment and discretion of the civil registrars. With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950, these
matters were governed by Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before an entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected.
This requirement was deemed necessary to forestall the commission of fraud or other mischief in these matters.

But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under Article 412 of he Civil Code. The nature of the corrections sought has to be
considered and if found to refer only to clerical errors the same may be allowed under said article which was construed to contemplate only a
summary proceeding.
 And so in the Ty Kong Tin case, this Honorable Court took occasion to draw a distinction between what entries in the civil register could be
corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code and what could not. In the process, to our mind, this Honorable Court set down propositions
which hold true not only in that case but also in the subsequent cases for the latter merely reiterated the Ty Kong Tin decision. These are:

First, that proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code are summary:

Second, that corrections in the entires in the civil register may refer to either mere mistakes that are clerical in nature or substantial ones which
affects the civil status or -the nationality or citizenship of the persons involved; and

Third, that if the change or correction sought refers to mere correction of mistakes that are clerical in nature the same may be done, under
Article 412 of the Civil Code; otherwise, if it refers to a substantial change which affects the civil status or citizenship of a party. the matter
should be threshed out in a proper action.

To our humble estimation, these propositions do not altogether bar or preclude substantial changes or corrections involving such details as the
civil status or nationality of a party. As a matter of fact, just three years after the Ty Kong Tin decision, this Honorable Court allowed a party to
correct mistakes involving such substantial matters as his birthplace and citizenship in the birth certificates of his two sons. (Lim v. Republic, No.
L-8932, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1235)

Only that where the correction pertains to matters which are important and controversial certain conditions sine que non have to be complied
with. Thus it was held:

If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action ... .' (Ty
Kong Tin v. Republic, supra)

. . . . for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are grave and important matters which may have
a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to seek said changes, it is not only the
State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either
to support the allegations of the petition or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be made in the
entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or nationality of a person therein involved. (Ansaldo v.
Republic, 54 O.G. 5886; Emphasis supplied; Reiterated in the cases of: Tan Su v. Republic, supra; Bantoto Coo v. Republic, supra; Barillo v.
Republic, supra; San Luis de Castro v. Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963; Ilu Lin v. Republic, L- 18213, Dec. 24, 1963; Reyes v. Republic, No.
L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Calicdan Baybayan v. Republic, L-20707, March 18, 1966; Tan v. Republic, L-19847, April 29, 1966).

If at all what is forbidden is, in the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, 'only the entering of material corrections or amendments in the record of
birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action against the Civil Registrar. (Matias v. Republic, No.
L-26982, May 8, 1969.

It will thus be gleaned from the foregoing that corrections involving such matters as the civil status of the parents, their nationality or
citizenship may be allowed provided the proper suit is filed.

The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of
administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system,

Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the Association of American Law Schools and the American Bar Association explain why:

An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the
familiar that which is not yet fully known. The arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing
interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is time to explore all of its peculiarities and
nuances.

These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the public hearing of the cause. When we take into account the preparation that
must precede the hearing, the essential quality of the advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent. Preceding the hearing inquiries
must be instituted to determine what facts can be proved or seem sufficiently established to warrant a formal test of their truth during the
hearing. There must also be a preliminary analysis of the issues, so that the hearing may have form and direction. These preparatory measures
are indispensable whether or not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by advocates.

Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage in the fact that the area of dispute may be greatly reduced by an exchange
of written pleadings or by stipulations of counsel. Without the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the parties, this
essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible. But here again the true significance of partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching once more
the integrity of the adjudicative process itself. It is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it
purports to be in theory; a public trial of the facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the hearing prepared to present his proofs and
arguments, knowing at the same time that his arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may be rejected as inadequate. It is a part of
his role to absorb these possible disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has not
represented to the public that any fact can be proved, that any argument is sound, or that any particular way of stating a litigant's case is the
most effective expression of its merits.

These, then, are the reasons for believing that partisan advocacy plays a vital and essential role in one of the most fundamental procedures of a
democratic society. But if we were to put all of these detailed considerations to one side, we should still be confronted by the fact that, in
whatever form adjudication may appear, the experienced judge or arbitrator desires and actively seeks to obtain an adversary presentation of
the issues. Only when he has had the benefit of intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he feel fully confident of his decision.

Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate appears, not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable part of a larger
ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy is not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the
design of a social framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization. (44 American Bar Association
Journal (1160-1161, 1958)

Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an orde, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same,
and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once
in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
 SEC, 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and
(2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order
fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either
by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted,
the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by
respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General. the
Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any
interest under the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the petition was consequently filed by the
Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support
of her petition. The Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.

We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit
or appropriate action.

In Matias v. Republic (28 SCRA 31), we held that:

. . . In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of
the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. Considering
the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, the fact that no doubt is cast on the truth of petitioner's allegations, or upon her evidence in
support thereof, the absence of any showing that prejudice would be caused to any party interested (since petitioner's own father testified in
her favor), and the publicity given to the petition, we are of the opinion that the Ty Kong Tin doctrine is not controlling this case. "

Only last year, we had occasion to clarify the Ty Kong Tin doctrine, further. In Republic v. Macli-ing (135 SCRA 367, 370-371), this Court ruled:

The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which private respondents anchor their Petition is
applicable only to changes contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not
controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. (Tiong v. Republic, 15 SCRA 262 [1965]).

It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the father. (Barillo v. Republic, 3 SCRA 725 [1961])
In that sense, it can be said to be substantial. However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction prayed for. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as subsequent cases predicated thereon, we forbade only the entering of
material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action. the proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower Court once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in accordance with law. The Solicitor General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of
hearings. He filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly served with copy of the Petition.
A Fiscal was always in attendance at the hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings,
particularly, in the cross-examination of witnesses. And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to show cause why
the petition should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose except the State through the Solicitor General. But neither did the State present
evidence in support of its Opposition.

To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any way intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a
proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.

Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1) other brother born of the same father and mother. Not only are all five registered
as Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict policy of the government
regarding professional examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board exams for pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural born citizenship.
(See. 18, Republic Act 5921 and Sec. 1, P.D. 1350)

The sisters and brother are:

1. Sally Go, born on April 29, 1934 was licensed as a Pharmacist after passing the government board examinations in 1956.

2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered Nurse who passed the government board examinations in 1960.

3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the trial of this case in 1970 was a fourth year medical student, qualified to take the government board examinations
after successfully completing the requirements for a career in medicine, and presumably is a licensed physician now.

4. Antonio Go, born February 14, 1942 was an engineering student during the 1970 trial of the case and qualified by citizenship to take government board
examinations.

5. Remedios Go, born October 4, 1945 was a licensed Optometrist after passing the government board examinations in 1967.

The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to refute the citizenship of the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.

In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings by arguing that the proper procedure was not followed.

There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and had always exercised her right of suffrage from the time she reached voting age until
the national elections immediately preceding the filing of her petition. The five other sisters and brother are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of
suffrage.
An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected twice as councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Respondent Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land as per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46104 and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-37275. These allegations are well documented and were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly observed by the lower court.

The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is also true with respect to the acquisition of a real property. The evidence
further shows that her children had been allowed to take the Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens only.

It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born of the same mother
and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not
been followed.

We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

5. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.

The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition3 for
the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos
who was born on August 5, 1989. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos;
their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by
Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her
children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8 to
the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and
have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the
Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor
children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow the family name of
petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) entered its appearance but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf. Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.
The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and
notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following
recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons:

1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to
provide the parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint
Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love,
care, guidance and support to ensure their protection and well being.

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt
Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview
concerning the adoption of her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal
relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for
their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that
her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the
petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds
petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience
and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is
dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the
children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of
the above-mentioned minors.

SO ORDERED.

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief21 for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY
LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES.

On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos, the children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was
executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough
to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors:

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE
CHILDREN.

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their
biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the
law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the
joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment
should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the
overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court’s position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
 (a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires
that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If
said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written
Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for
Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who
provided for the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by
twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the
Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the
adoption of her three children by the petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if
the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner that
the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity
to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s
testimony on that matter follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.38

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

IV. Background of the Case:

Since the mother left for Italy, minor siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle,
cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor
children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal.

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages
openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consults (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her
in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husband’s relatives,
she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land
which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on
November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The
three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
providing his legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10, 000-P15, 000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic)
children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to
leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her
now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send
financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and
the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has
emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest
of the child that takes precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly
upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the
same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court
in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication
are made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an
ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the
acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private
document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the makers.

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in
evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and
commitment of her children and her siblings. Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has
savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to
provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited
income." Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however,
states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of
the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner
is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner
was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the
children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows
that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She
only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct
in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover,
the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the
ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

6. ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), respondent.

DECISION

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization could have likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado
Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin
enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on legally adopting Jose
Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense
than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to
Jose Melvin Lahom.

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred -
7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner
particularly her husband until the latter died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was prevented by
petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation
Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice
of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern
from a son, but respondent remained indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when
petitioner would need most the care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is
not expected of a son.

15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner’s nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they
were only motivated by their desire for some material benefits from petitioner.

16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered
wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and
her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards
respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is
no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.[1]

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The
new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is
incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal
maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and
failure to comply with parental obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for
causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner
had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552
should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then Article 348[2] of the Civil Code and Article
192[3] of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in
A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.

On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).

Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the
face of the petition, indeed there is lack of cause of action.

Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument,
that petitioner is entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period allowed by the
Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5)
years, prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100 Revised Rules of Court)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed.[4]

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans undertook adoption to assure male
heirs in the family.[5] The continuity of the adopter’s family was the primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the
adopter. There was hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted.[6] Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort to preserve inheritance
within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption.[7] It was only much later when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of
the child became a paramount concern.[8] Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law concept of adoption
which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe,
made the interests of the child an overriding consideration.[9] In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva
Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,[10] followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the
Child,[11] were written instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines[12] of 1950 on adoption, later
modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code[13] and then by the Family Code of the Philippines,[14] gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the principle that
adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights
and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society as well. The
new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its
jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.

The concept of vested right is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process[15] that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;[16] it includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested.[17] Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,[18] absolute, unconditional,
and perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[20] a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the
case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the husband and wife, took
effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt Jason,
having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being joined by her husband,
according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July
1988, the couple filed a petition to formalize Michael’s adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603
allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988
disqualifying aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument posed by the
Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new
law,[22] had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its
earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of
Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory
privileges.[24] While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child.[26] Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the
State.[27] Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.[28]

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might
clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that
those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid
reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny
to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

7. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE MINOR, ENGRACIO GULIGADO, JR MRS. DINTOY TAN SUAREZ, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. ADOPTION; PROOF OF CONSENT OF THE MINOR’S NATURAL PARENTS; CASE AT BAR. — The statement, subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, by the
natural parents of the child sought to be adopted, wherein they expressed their conformity to the adoption of their minor child by the petitioner, was correctly
admitted in evidence, although no testimonial evidence identifying the signatures on the said statement had been introduced by the petitioner, because said
statement was duly authenticated and the other evidence on record strongly indicate that it is what it purports to be.

2. ID.; ADOPTED CHILD CANNOT BEAR ADOPTER’S SURNAME AS A MARRIED WOMAN. — An adopted child cannot bear the surname of the adopter, as a married
woman, where the latter’s husband had not joined her in the petition for adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous marriage.

DECISION

Appeal by the Solicitor General from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, granting the petition of appellee, Mrs. Dintoy Tan Suarez, for the adoption of the
minor Engracio Guligado, Jr., and declaring that the latter shall hereafter be known as Engracio Tan Suarez. Appellant maintains that the lower court erred: 1) in
authorizing the adoption, despite the alleged absence of competent proof of the consent thereto of the natural parents of said minor; and 2) in permitting the latter
to bear the petitioner’s surname as a married woman, although her husband has not joined in the adoption.

The minor Engracio Guligado, Jr. is the son of Capt. Engracio Guligado and Guneng T. Guligado. The latter is a younger sister of petitioner herein. Engracio Guligado is,
in turn, a half-brother of petitioner’s husband, Col. Alejandro Suarez, Ret., who has several children by a previous marriage and has expressly consented to the
adoption of said child by his wife. Shortly after the birth of Engracio Guligado Jr. in Jolo, Sulu, on May 28, 1951, his parents left him in the custody of petitioner herein,
a resident of said island. Since then, the child had lived continuously with petitioner, whom he regards as his mother, who, in turn, has treated him as such, and
supported him, as well as sent him to school. Meanwhile, his natural parents had left Jolo and are now residing in San Juan del Monte, Rizal.

Petitioner testified that she had written to them about her intention to apply for the adoption of the minor and that they had given their consent thereto. And
understandably so, for, in addition to their close relationship by consanguinity and affinity, petitioner is fairly well of financially, inasmuch as she owns real estate in
the Islands of Jolo and Siasi with an aggregate assessed value (for real estate tax purposes) of P73,310, aside from a 35-door building under construction in the Jolo
townsite when this case was heard. In fact, petitioner has attached to the petition a statement, subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, on February 4, 1958,
by Captain Engracio Guligado and his wife Guneng T. Guligado, confirming the foregoing facts, and expressing their conformity to the adoption of Engracio Guligado,
Jr. by petitioner herein, not only for the reasons already adverted to, but, also, because the affiants now have several other children, whereas petitioner has none.
However, no testimonial evidence, identifying the signatures on said statement, was introduced by petitioner herein and, hence, the assistant provincial fiscal, who
appeared at the hearing of this case in the lower court, objected to the admission of said statement, when petitioner offered it as part of her evidence.

The lower court did not err in overruling said objection, admitting said statement in evidence, and considering, as a proven fact, that the natural parents of the minor
being adopted had given their written consent to the adoption. Apart from the fact that said statement was duly authenticated by a Notary Public, the other evidence
on record strongly indicate that it is what it purports to be.

We agree, however, with appellant herein that the minor cannot bear petitioner’s surname as a married woman, for her husband has not joined in this petition for
adoption and cannot join it, because he has children by a previous marriage. As stated in the case of the adoption of the minor Ana Isabel Henriette Antonia
Concepcion Georgiana, L-18284 (April 30, 1963),

"Since the adoption gives the person adopted the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Art. 341, par. 1, Civil Code), much confusion
would indeed result, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, if the minor child herein were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who did not join in the
adoption.

"For one thing, to allow the minor to adopt the surname of the husband of the adopter, would mislead the public into believing that she has also been adopted by the
husband, which is not the case. And when later, questions of successional rights arise, the husband’s consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he has
actually joined in the adoption.

"It is to forestall befuddling situations that may arise in the future, that this Court is inclined to apply strictly provision of the Civil Code to the effect that an adopted
child use the surname of the adopter himself or herself, and not that which is acquired by marriage."

With the modification that the minor shall hereafter be known as Engracio Tan, the decision appealed from is, therefore, affirmed in all other respects, without
special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.