TORTS

 SPRING  2013     1  

INTENTIONAL  TORTS  
GENERAL  DUTY  NOT  TO  INTEND  HARM  TO  OTHERS  
BATTERY  
− PHYSICAL  CONTACT   Cases  
− Vosburg  Rule:  Single  Intent—Must  intend  the  contact,  don’t  have   Vosburg  
to  intend  the  harm    
− Restatement:  Dual  Intent—Intend  the  Contact  and  the  Harm    
− Thin  Skull/Thin  Shin:  liable  for  all  bodily  harm  to  P,  even  if  it  was    
unreasonable,  as  long  as  it  was  foreseeable  that  there  would  be   Policy  
some  harm   Social  Justice  
Corrective  Justice  
Single  Intent  Easier  to  Prove  
Punitive  Damages  

ASSAULT  
− NO  PHYSICAL  CONTACT   Cases  
− Rule: Mere  words  are  not  enough.  Context  matters.   Tuberville  
− Do  not  need  fear,  just  apprehension  and  anticipation   Brower  
− Key  Issues:  Immediate  and  Extra  Sensitive  P   I.  de.  S  
Policy  
Private  Attorney  General  
 
INTENTIONAL  INFLICTION  OF  EMOTIONAL  DISTRESS  
− Rule  –  Wilkinson:  Extreme  and  outrageous  conduct  which  causes   Cases  
physical  harm  or  mental  distress  creates  a  valid  cause  of  action   Wilkinson  v.  Downton  
  Westboro  Church  
− Two  Requirements:  
(1) Extreme  outrageousness  of  defendant’s  conduct   Policy  
(2) Severity  of  plaintiff’s  distress       Judicial  Economy  
Rules  vs.  Standards    
 
WHEN  DO  INTENTIONAL  TORTS  MATTER?  
1. Establishing  a  record  for  repeat  offenders  (public  record/safety)  
2. 2A  Compensatory  damages  (bodily)  –  intentional  may  create  sympathy  for  P  →  higher  
damages  
3. 2B  Pain  and  suffering  compensatory  damages  –  intentionality  increases  
4. Punitive  damages:  usually  not  in  negligence  since  depends  on  reprehensibility  
5. Contributory  negligence  –  “trump  card”  –  what  you  did  is  intentional  –  worse  comparatively  
6. Multiple  defendants  //  Children:  get  around  reasonableness  standards  
7. Expressive  function  –  values,  social  justice,  redress,  corrective  justice  

 
TORTS  SPRING  2013     2  

DUTY  (ON)  
Is  there  a  duty?  Is  so  what  is  the  legal  standard  for  liability  in  this  case?  
1. Duty  not  to  intend  harm?  Not  to  be  reckless?  
2. Duty  not  to  be  negligent/  duty  to  act  reasonably?  
3. Duty  to  pay  for  any  harm  done?  (strict  liability)  
4. Duty  of  utmost  care  as  an  innkeeper  or  common  carrier  –  heightened  duty?  
5. 5.  Limited  Duty  (misfeasance)?  Limits  not  to  exercise  reasonable  care?  
Is  there  a  DUTY  TO  RESCUE?  
− Always  have  a  duty  not  to  intend  harm  to  others   Cases  
− Rule  -­‐  Hurly:  In  absence  of  special  circumstance  or  a  special   Hurley  v.  Eddingfield  
relationship,  one  person  has  no  affirmative  duty  to  rescue  another   Yania  v.  Bigan  
person  from  a  position  of  danger,  either  by  action  or  warning  
− Nonfeasance:  no  duty,  no  liability;  tort  law  gives  individuals  the   Policy  
freedom  to  act  “unreasonably”  and  not  rescue  or  warn   Economy  (manageable  rules)  
Corrective  justice  
What  triggers  a  DUTY  TO  ACT?  
− BUT  a  duty  can  be  created  by:  negligent/unreasonable  action,   Cases  
starting  rescue  but  abandoning,  feasance,  special  relationships,   Montgomery  v.  National  
enabling  torts     Convoy  
− Feasance:  reasonable  “non-­‐tortious”  risk-­‐creation  -­‐  when  risk   Newton  v.  Ellis  
happens,  have  duty  to  prepare  or  warn;  duty  of  reasonable  care  to   Stockberger  v.  US  
prevent  or  minimize  harm   Policy  
− Misfeasance:  unreasonably  risky;  liable  for  foreseeable   Corrective  justice  
consequences;  duty  to  mitigate  damages   Best  cost  avoider  
 
Is  there  a  DUTY  TO  THIRD  PARTIES?  
− Restatement  Section  315   Cases  
− special  relation  exists  between  the  actor  and  third  person   Weirum  v.  RKO  
which  imposes  duty  upon  actor  to  control  third’s  conduct   Tarasoff  
− a  special  relation  exists  between  the  actor  and  the  other    
which  gives  to  the  other  a  right  to  protection   Policy  
− Weirum:  An  intervening  actor  can  be  just  an  instrument  of   Best  Cost  Avoider  
increased  risk  created.  

Is  there  a  DUTY  OF  OWNERS  AND  OCCUPIERS?  

− Originally  three  categories   Cases  
− Rowland:  7  factors       Robert  Addie  v.  Drumbeck  
− Foreseeability  of  harm  to  P   − Preventing  Future  Harm   Rowlands  v.  Christian  
− Certainty  of  injury   − Burden  to  D    
− Closeness:  conduct/injury   − Prevalence  of  insurance   Policy  
− Moral  blame   Shift  focus:  guest    host  
− R3d:  attempts  to  develop  this  approach  –  flagrant  (limited  duty)   Attractive  Nuisance  
vs.  non-­‐flagrant  trespassers  (all  the  circumstances  duty)   Crystals  and  Mud  
TORTS  SPRING  2013     3  

DUTY:  NEGLIGENCE  (ON)  

Failure  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to  avoid  injury  or  damage  
NEGLIGENCE  VS.  STRICT  LIABILITY  
− Negligence:  a  failure  to  exercise  reasonable  care   Cases  
− Strict  Liability:  liability  without  fault   Brown  v.  Kendall  
  Rylands  v.  Fletcher  
− Shift  from  directness  to  foreseeability  and  whether  take  the   Bolton  v.  Stone  
reasonable  precautions   Brown  v.  Collins,  
  Hammontree  v.  Jenner  
− From  trespass  to  general  negligence,  triumph  of  negligence    
− Likely  to  do  mischief  and  nonnatural  is  strictly  liable  
− Americans  had  frosty  reception  to  strict  liability:  not  liable  for  the  
Policy  
natural  consequences  of  escape  of  things  brought  onto  the  land  
Moral  Neg.:  D’s  rights  
− Struck  with  sudden  illness  is  not  strictly  liable  
Moral  S/L:  Victims’  rights  
 
Economic  Neg.:  Subsidy  for  
 
industry/“industrial  social  K”  
Third  Restatement:  Abnormally  Dangerous  Activities:  
Economic  S/L:  Best  cost  
(1) foreseeably  and  highly  significant  risk,  even  when  reasonable  care  
avoider  
is  exercised  by  all  actors  
 
(2) activity  is  not  common.    (e.g.,  storing  or  transporting  highly  
flammable  or  toxic  materials)  
 
THE  REASONABLE  PERSON  
− The  Reasonable  Person:  general  duty  to  use  “due  care,”  a  duty   Cases  
not  to  be  negligent  or  careless  towards  others  –  classic  duty  of  "all   Vaughn  v.  Menlove  
to  all;  “negligence"  or  "carelessness"  is  usually  defined  in  terms  of   Daniels  v.  Evans  
what  is  reasonable  vs.  unreasonable   Jankee,  Gould  
  Breuning  
− Ordinary  care  is  a)  contextual  and  b)  objective    
  Policy  
−  “The  Reasonable  Person:”  A  man  of  ordinary  prudence   Subjective  vs.  Objective:  
− Elderly:  Old  age  does  not  remove  liability  for  negligence   − Uniformity  
− Analyze  as  a  person  of  the  same  physical  condition   − Encourages  more  care  
− Children:   − More  predictable  
− Insanity:  Insanity  no  defense  unless  sudden  and  unforeseen,   − More  clarity  for  jury  
unless  already  institutionalized   − Prevents  fraud  
− Experts:  adjusted  to  level  of  reasonable  expert   − More  manageable  
− Wealth:  level  of  care  constant  regardless  of  wealth  
   
 

 
 
 
TORTS  SPRING  2013     4  

BREACH  (ON)  
PROOF  OF  NEGLIGENCE:  FAILURE  TO  ACT  REASONABLY  
FORESEEABILITY  
− Once  we  know  which  duty  or  standard  of  care  which  applies  to  the  case   Cases  
generally,  did  the  actor  breach  that  level  of  care  in  this  specific  case?   Blyth  v  Birmingham    
− Foreseeability  Test:  know  or  knowable  possible  that  there  exists  a   Policy  
possibility  of  risk  of  harm   Also  test  for  prox  cause  
COST  BENEFIT  
− Burden,  Probability,  Injury  =  Learned  Hand  Test   Cases  
− B  =  Cost  or  burden  of  the  untaken  precaution   Carroll  Towing  
− P  =  Probability  of  accident   Cooley  
− L  =  Gravity  of  loss  or  Injury   Andrews  v.  United  Airlines  
− Rule:  Take  the  precaution  when  B  <  PL   Policy  
− Care  level:  the  specifics  of  care  in  how  one  conducts  an  activity.     Ross  Settled  Out  of  Court  
− Activity  level:  the  general  activity   Costs/Benefits  
− Untaken  Precaution    
CUSTOM  
− Rule:  custom  is  admissible,  but  not  dispositive  –  not  a  “slam  dunk”   Cases  
− Medical  Malpractice:  Custom  is  dispositive   TJ  Hooper  
− Strict  Locality  Rule:  “conspiracy  of  silence”   Medical  Malpractice  
− Abandoned  with  nationwide  standards   Policy  
− Respectable  Minority:  if  followed  by  respectable  minority  of   Advantages/Disadvantages    
professionals,  not  malpractice   Malpractice  Reform  
NEGLIGENCE  PER  SE/STATUTES  
− Rule:  Negligence  as    a  matter  of  law;  R2d  §286,     Cases  
− Minority  Rule:  not  per  se  but  still  admissible   Osborne  v.  McMasters  Martin  
− R3d  §14  Statutory  violations  as  negligence  per  se..if  designed  to  present   v.  Herzog  
against  (1)  type  of  accident  (2)  victim  within  class  of  persons  protected  by   Tedla  v.  Ellman  (bad)  
statute   Uhr  v.  Greenbush  
− Statutory  violation  supplements  existing  case  w.  dispositive  evidence   Stimpson,  Gorris  
− Considered  by  judge  as  a  matter  of  law   Policy  
− Defenses:  Necessity,  emergency,  incapacity,  harm  within  purpose   Stick  it  to  the  breacher  
RES  IPSA  LOQUITUR  
− Circumstantial  Evidence:  burden  shifting  if  the  plaintiff  doesn’t  have   Cases  
enough  evidence  to  defendant  if  the  reasonable  jury  could  infer  negligence   Byrne  v  Boadle  
− Restatement  2  and  3:  three  elements,  and  inference  of  negligence   Colmenares  v.  Vivas  
− Three  Requirements:  (1)  harm  ordinarily  occurs  because  of  negligence,  (2)   Ybarra  v.  Spangard  
instrument  causing  harm  must  be  in  exclusive  control  of  the  defendant    
(nondelegable),  (3)  injury  must  not  be  due  to  voluntary  action  or    
contribution  of  the  plaintiff   Policy  
− When  should  RIL  apply?  (1)  Asymmetrical  information,  (2)  victim  cannot   Burden  shifting  
ascertain  cause,  (3)  defendant  creates  the  risk  or  danger  and  has  a  duty  to   Not  really  used  with  modern  
control  that  danger,  (4)  or  the  accident  itself  creates  an  inference  of   discovery  
negligence  (prima  facie  evidence)  
− Smoking  out  the  evidence:  Incentive  for  D  when  multiple  Ds  to  testify  
TORTS  SPRING  2013     5  

CAUSATION:  CAUSE  IN  FACT  (OFF)  

Factual  Causation:  “Did  the  defendant  cause  this  plaintiff  actual  harm?”  
BUT  FOR  TEST  
− “But  for  the  negligence  or  tortious  conduct,  the  harm  probably   Cases  
would  not  have  happened.”       New  York  v.  Grimstad  
− If  this  statement  is  TRUE,  then  the  negligence  was  a    
NECESSARY  CAUSE.   Policy  
− R3d:  factual  cause  must  be  a  necessary  condition  for  the  outcome;   Deterrence  
need  only  be  a  (vs.  the)  factual  cause  of  the  other’s  harm   Justice  w  parties  
SEND  IT  TO  THE  JURY  
− When  in  doubt,  send  to  jury  (AKA  a  way  to  stick  it  to  the  breacher)   Cases  
− Policy:   Kiricinich  and  Zinnel  
− Uncertainty   Reyes,  Reynolds,  Sanchez  
− Asymmetry  of  Information   Zuchowitz  
− Questions  remain  

BURDEN  SHIFTING  
− SHIFT  the  BURDEN  against  the  NEGLIGENT  PARTY   Cases  
− Send  to  jury  and  allow  for  inference  because  lack  of  evidence  is   Haft  
because  of  negligence    
− If  it  increased  the  risk  of  harm  -­‐  negligence  added  insult  to  injury   Policy  
− To  require  P  to  prove  further  would  not  feasible  with  evidence     Evidence  

LOST  CHANCE  
− The  harm  is  redefined,  not  death  but  the  lost  chance  of  survival   Cases  
− But  for  the  negligent  diagnosis,  the  lost  chance  would  not  have   Herskovits  
happened   Policy  
− Majority  of  courts  follow  for  medical  malpractice     Stick  it  to  the  breacher  
− Herskovitz  Concurrence:  lost  chance  –  majority  rule  for  damages   Fairness  

MULTIPLE  CAUSES  
− Where  two  causes  each  attributable  to  the  negligence  of  a   Cases  
reasonable  person  concur  in  producing  an  injury  to  another  either   Kingston  v.  Chicago  
of  which  would  produce  it  regardless  of  the  other  
− Restatement  432  
− Three  situations:  
o Two  simultaneous:  causes  both  negligent  
o Two  simultaneous:  one  negligent  one  not  (most  –  neg.  liable)  
o Sequential  causes:  neither  can  be  but  for  but  one  was  the  
actual  physical  cause  (if  first  party  is  negligent  then  liable)  

 
TORTS  SPRING  2013     6  
ALTERNATIVE  CAUSATION  
− Each  was  as  probable  as  not  but  for  cause,  but  not  more  than   Cases  
probable   Summers  v  Tice  
− Rule:  R2d  -­‐  Where  the  conduct  of  two  or  more  actors  is  tortious,    
and  it  is  proved  that  harm  has  been  caused  to  the  P  by  only  one  of    
them,  but  there  is  uncertainty  as  to  which  one  has  caused  it,  the   Policy  
burden  is  upon  each  such  actor  to  prove  that  he  has  not  caused   Often  involves  2  Ds  that  
the  harm   know  each  other  

INDUSTRY  WIDE  (ENTERPRISE)  LIABILITY  

− “Concert  of  Action:”  separate  parties  must  have  coordinated  or   Cases  
conspired  –  rarely  applied   Hall  v  DuPont  
− Hall  v.  DuPont:  silent  conspiracy  between  blasting  cap  manuf.   Alaska  Hypo  
− If  could  establish  that  more  likely  than  not  that  any  of  6  Ds  
manuf.  the  cap,  burden  shifted  to  each  D  to  disprove  causation  

MARKET  SHARE  
− Main  Issue:  you  cannot  pinpoint  the  defendant   Cases  
− Requirements:   Sindell  
− Fungible   Hymowitz  
− Most  Ts  are  Ds   Lead  Paint  (fungible)  
− All  Ds  are  potential  Ts  for  this  P   Policy  
− Not  Ps  fault     Moral/Corrective  Justice  
− Limitations:  no  signature  disease  (only  one  cause),  relevant  market   Stick  it  to  the  breacher  (D  
share  data  not  always  available,  not  always  chemically  identical,   should  bear  cost)  
not  always  feasible  to  sue  all  possible  Ds  (out  of  business)   Best  cost  avoider  

SUBSTANTIAL  FACTOR  
− Minority  Rule   Cases  
− Substantial  Factor  Test:  in  bringing  about  P’s  injury  or  damage;   Mitchell  v.  Gonzalez  
finding  that  defendant’s  negligence  was  influential  in  some  way;    
full  damages   Policy  
− Did  the  negligence  substantially  increase  the  risk  of  harm?   Simpler  but  muddier/vague  
− Mitchell:  “A  legal  cause  of  injury  is  a  cause  is  a  substantial  factor  in   Lower  threshold  
bringing  about  the  injury.”  

JOINT  AND  SEVERAL  LIABILITY  

− Each  defendant  is  potentially  liable  to  for  100%  of  the  damages  as  if  sole  wrongdoer  
− Three  Situations:  Applies  broadly  
− Joint  tortfeasors  (can’t  divide  across  Ds)  
− Independent  tortfeasors  for  single,  theoretically  indivisible  harm  (combined)  
− Individual  tortfeasors  for  single,  theoretically  divisible  but  practically  indivisible  harm  
− Ex:  one  car  accident  followed  quickly  by  another  one  
− Modern  Rule:  each  D  is  entitled  to  prove  how  much  harm  caused  and  if  successful,  liability  
apportioned  based  on  that,  but  otherwise  all  held  under  3  jointly/severally  
TORTS  SPRING  2013     7  
 

CAUSATION:  PROXIMATE  CAUSE  (OFF)  

Proximate  Cause:  Scope  of  Liability  
Was  the  harm  so  remote,  so  unforeseeable,  so  bizarre,  so  interrupted,  or  so  outside  the  scope  of  
liability/public  policy  that  the  defendant  is  not  legally  responsible?  
HARM  WITHIN  THE  RISK  
− Of  the  Defendant’s  Conduct   Cases  
− If  not  harm  within  the  risk,  didn’t  increase  risk  of  harm  and  what   Berry  v.  Sugar  Notch  
happened  wasn’t  foreseeable  (in  the  sense  of  being  imaginable)   Central  Georgia  
Hines  
FORESEEABILITY  +  DIRECTNESS  
− Foreseeability:  D’s  negligence  is  proximate  cause  of  P’s  harm  if  causing   Cases  
harm  was  a  foreseeable  result  of  acting  as  D  did   Palsgraf  
− Directness  Test:  negligence  is  proximate  cause  if  that  negligence  caused   Kinsman  
harm  to  P  directly;  D’s  negligence  must  always  be  close  in  time  and  space   Wagon  Mound  1  &  2  
to  occurrence  –  chain  of  causation  (like  Andrews  in  Palsgraf)   Marshall  v.  Nugent  
− Unforeseeable  Plaintiff:  Generally  not  liable  
o Cardozo  –  Palsgraf:  Duty  of  liability  is  limited  to  the  foreseeable  P  
− Unforeseeable  type  or  kind  of  harm:  Case  by  case.  
o Kinsman:  Interpret  “foreseeable”  broadly,  and  include  even  very  low  probability  events  
− Unforeseeable  manner  of  harm:  Often  liable,  unless  totally  weird  
o Marshall  v.  Nugent:  Foreseeable  P  and  type  of  injury,  but  occurs  in  peculiar  manner  
− Unforeseeable  extent  of  harm:  Often  liable  
o Vosburg:  Thin  Skull/Shin  Rule  
INTERVENING  PAUSES  +  CAUSES  
− Rule:  Even  though  unforeseeable  force  intervened,  D  will  generally  be   Cases  
liable  for  harm  where  negligent  act  produced  foreseeable  result   Brower  v.  New  York  Central,  
− Exception:  If  intervening  is  intentional  or  criminal  act,  as  long  as  not   Wagner  v.  International  
foreseeable   Central  GA,  Hines  
− If  its  foreseeable  it  does  not  break  the  chain  of  causation  
− When  debatable  go  to  the  Jury  
− If  unforeseeable,  superseding  cause  and  not  prox  cause  as  matter  of  law  

PUBLIC  POLICY  
− whether  the  injury  is  too  remote  from  the  negligence;  
− whether  the  injury  is  wholly  out  of  proportion  to  the  culpability  of  the  negligent  tortfeasor;  
− whether  in  retrospect  it  appears  too  extraordinary  that  neg.  should  have  brought  about  harm;  
− whether  allowance  of  recovery  would  place  an  unreasonable  burden  on  the  negligent  tortfeasor;  
− whether  allowance  of  recovery  would  be  too  likely  to  open  the  way  to  fraudulent  claims;  or  
− whether  allowance  of  recovery  would  enter  a  field  that  has  no  sensible  or  just  stopping  point  

ANALYZING  PROXIMATE  CAUSE  

1. Foreseeability  is  the  most  important  consideration!  
2. Harm  within  the  risk:  was  the  harm  a  foreseeable  reason  why  the  risk  was  considered  negligent  
3. Six  degrees:  emphasize  moving  parts  (Palsgraf)  
4. Shift  from  proximate  cause  analysis  to  policy  analysis  
TORTS  SPRING  2013     8  

DAMAGES  
Functions  of  Damages:  
Corrective  Justice,  Deterrence,  Recognizing  D’s  Responsibility  for  Loss  
COGNIZABLE  DAMAGES  
− Parasitic:  P  can  recover  for  some  emotional  harm  or  economic  harm,  as   Cases  
long  as  that  harm  is  “parasitic”  upon  concrete  physical  harm;  ex:  out  of   Pure  Emotional:  
pocket  medical,  lost  wages   Mitchell  v.  Rochester  
− Pure:  emotional  or  economic  harm  are  claims  by  a  P  with  no  concrete   Dillon  v.  Legg  
physical  harm;  limited   Pure  Economic:  
− Pure  Economic  Loss:  denies  recovery  for  pure  outright;  only  modest   Union  Oil  v  Oppen  
change  away  from  this  rule   People  Express  Airlines  
− Pure  Emotional  Loss:  Only  a  limited  duty  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to    
avoid  causing  emotional  distress   Policy  
− Independent  vs.  Derivative  Duty   <<  Underdeterrence  with  
− Dillon:  (1)  Proximity  (2)  Relationship  (3)  Contemporaneous  Observance   wrongful,  etc.  
− Normally  an  uninjured  victim  cannot  recovery  
− Wrongful  Death,  Survival  Action,  Loss  of  Consortium    
COMPENSATORY  DAMAGES  
− Rule:  victim  is  to  be  made  whole  (compensated)  from  the  loss  caused   Cases  
by  D’s  act  or  omission   McDougald  v.  Garber  
− Burden  of  Proof:  P  must  prove  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence  that    
has  suffered,  or  will  suffer  in  future,  losses  for  which  claims  damages    
  Policy  
− Non-­‐Economic  Damages:  McDougald  –  P&S,  loss  of  enjoyment   Commodified/non  
− Economic  Damages:  medical  expenses,  past  lost  wages,  lost  future   Architecture  of  Bias  
earning  capacity,  custodial  care,  incidentals,  property  damage   Collateral  source  rule  
− Damage  Control:  remittitur,  additur   Subrogation  
PUNITIVE  DAMAGES  
− Kemezy:  No  burden  of  production  on  P  to  justify  punitive  damages   Cases  
− Generally  limited  to  specific  cases   Kemezy,  State  Farm  
− State  Farm/BMW:  Three  factors  to  evaluate  constitutionality:   BMW  v.  Gore  
o Degree  of  reprehensibility  of  D’s  conduct    
o Disparity  or  proportion  between  harm  or  potential  harm  from  D’s   Policy  
conduct  and  amount  of  compensatory  damages  awarded   Corrective  justice  
 State  Farm:    quantified  –  single  digit  ratio  (9:1  or  less)   Deterrence  
o Difference  between  this  remedy  and  civil/criminal  penalties  to   Reform  
punish  Ds  in  similar  cases  
 
− Non-­‐Party  Harm:  a  defendant’s  dissimilar  acts  from  which  liability  was  
premised  cannot  be  used  as  a  basis  for  punitive  damages  
 

 
TORTS  SPRING  2013     9  
 
DEFENSES  (OFF)  
Was  the  victim/plaintiff  responsible  for  the  harm  or  assume  the  risk?  
CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE  
− Complete  Defense   Policy  
− Failure  of  P  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to  protect  himself  or  his   Fairness  
property  from  the  risk  of  harm  or  loss   Check  on  jury  
− Exceptions:  (sub-­‐crystals)   Subsidy  thesis  
o Jury  question   o Last  clear  chance   Rule  vs.  Standards  
 
o Greater  degree  of  blame   o Safety  statute     Incentivize  more  care  

COMPARATIVE  NEGLIGENCE  
− Contributory  negligence  of  P  doesn’t  necessarily  bar  recovery   Cases  
− Recovery  is  reduced  in  proportion  to  amount  attributable  to  him   Li  v.  Yellow  Cab  
− Pure:  plaintiff’s  negligence  is  never  a  complete  bar  to  recovery;  
applies  regardless  of  how  much  more  negligent  P  was  than  D  
− Modified:  party  not  barred  from  recovery  so  long  as  negligence   Policy  
doesn’t  equal  or  exceed  combined  negligence  or  fault  of  other   Apples  and  Oranges  
parties  involved   (comparative  causation)  

ASSUMPTION  OF  RISK  

− Primary:  With  obviously  risky  activities,  the  participant  completely   Cases  
assumes  those  general  risks.   Murphy  v  Steeplechase  
− Secondary:  With  non-­‐obvious  specific  risks  created  by  the  defendant   Meistrich  (Ice  Skater)  
on  top  of  the  obvious  general  risks,  the  question  is  whether  the   Dalury  v.  S-­‐K-­‐I  
participant  recognized  and  assumed  those  risk   6  Tunkl  factors  
   
Primary   General  and   No  breach   Law  (and   Assumption  of   Policy  
more  objective     obvious/patent   Judge)   risk  as  total  bar  
Blood  v.  Money  
risks  
Secondary   Specific  and   D  breach     Fact  (and   Merges  with  
Express  Assumption  by  K  
subjective  –   hidden/latent   (but  maybe   Jury)   Comparative   Arbitration  Agreements  
particular  P,   risks   P,  too)     negligence   Conscious,  Reasonable  
 
expertise   Risk  Taking  

NECESSITY  
− Public  Necessity:  immunity  is  obsolete;  absolute  privilege   Cases  
− Private  Necessity:  between  private  party;  conditional  privilege   Ploof    
− Mouse’s:  General  Average  Contribution     Vincent  
− Ploof:  Necessity  will  justify  entries  upon  land  and  interference  with    
personal  property  that  would  otherwise  have  been  trespass   Policy  
− Vincent:  Public  necessity  may  require  taking  of  private  property  for   Coase  Theorem  
public  purposes,  but  system  of  jurisprudence  requires  compensation.   Trolley  Problem  
Property  vs.  Liability  Rules  
 
TORTS  SPRING  2013     10  
 
STRICT  LIABILITY  
Liability  Without  Fault  
NUISANCE  
− Trespass:  intentional  physical  infringement,  no  damage  requirement  VS.   Cases  
− Nuisance:  substantial  and  unreasonable  interference  with  another’s  right  of  use  and   Boomer  v.  Atlantic  
enjoyment  of  his  or  her  land;  public  v.  private    
Four  Situations   Policy  
− No  nuisance nuisancer  gets  property  right  –  D  enjoins  P’s  future  enjoyment   Successive  damages  
− Nuisance:  D  compensates  P  and  continues  –  nuisance  gets  property  +  liability   Free  rider  
− Nuisance:  P  enjoins  the  D  –  neighbors  get  property  right   Holdout  
− Nuisance:  P  compensates  D  for  stopping  –  nuisancee  gets  property  +  liability  rule    

ABNORMALLY  DANGEROUS  ACTIVITIES  

− Pockets  of  Strict  Liability  Today:     Cases  
− Ancient:  fire  animals  nuisance  strict  liability   Powell  v.  Fall  
− Modern:  blasting,  ultrahazardous,  products  liability  -­‐  manufacturing  defects   Indiana  Harbor  
− R2d:  (1)  Degree  of  risk,  (2)  Probability  of  harm,  (3)  Inability  to  eliminate  risk  by  exercise  of   Rylands  
reasonable  care,  (4)  uncommon,  (5)  inappropriate  to  area,  (6)  extent  that  value  to   Madsen  
community  outweighed  by  dangerousness    
− R3d:  (1)  Activity  creates  a  foreseeably  and  highly  significant  risk  of  physical  harm    
whenever  when  all  actors  exercise  reasonable  care;  (2)  Activity  is  not  a  matter  of  
common  usage  
− Defenses  to  S/L:  Restatement  524  
− Harm  within  the  risk/Abnormal  sensitivity:  is  a  defense  
− Act  of  God,  Natural  forces:  is  not  a  defense   Policy  
− Unforeseeable  3d  party  intervention:  not  a  defense  (innocent/neg./reckless)   Incentives  
− Criminal/intentional  3d  party  intervention:  defense  if  foreseeable   Harm  within  risk  
− Assumption  of  risk:  is  a  defense   Best  cost  avoider  
− 2d:  Contributory  negligence:  can  be  one  if  P  knowingly/unreasonably  subjected   K  v.  torts  
himself  to  risk  of  harm     Activity  vs.  care    
− 3d:  Comparative  Responsibility:  P’s  recovery  is  reduced  in  accordance  with  share  
Oil  drilling,  fumigation,  gasoline  storage  and  transport,  other  flammable  liquids;  nuclear  
materials,  explosives.  
Mixed  courts:  fireworks,  large  quantities  of  liquids,  highly  toxic  substances  
VICARIOUS  LIABILITY  
− Rule:  liability  if  employee  acting  for  employer’s  “purposes”;  “scope,”  “course”   Cases  
− Who  is  an  employee?   Ira  Bushey  
− Independent  Contractors:  possibility  of  control  is  minimal,  and  the  actual  IC’s    
employer  is  likely  to  have  deep  pockets  like  other  employer   Policy  
− Is  it  within  the  scope  of  employment?   Efficiency  
− Detour  vs.  Frolic:  employer  is  liable  for  torts  committed  on  mere  “detour”  by   Loss  Spreading  
employee,  but  not  for  torts  committed  while  employee  is  on  frolic  of  his  own    
ADVANTAGES  +  DISADVANTAGES  
1. Optimal  Deterrence  (clarity,  vigilance,  incentivize  best  cost  avoider,  R&D  incentives)    
2. Loss  spreading  and  best  insurer  (but  slippery  slope  of  too  many  costs?)  
3. Judicial  economy:  simpler  litigation/settlement  vs.  more  litigation.  
4. Simplification  of  proof  problem  (shifting  problem  from  plaintiff  to  defendant)  vs.  more  litigation  
5. Corrective  Justice:  fairness  to  pay  for  harm  you  cause  vs.  unfairness  for  paying  when  not  at  fault  
6. Disadvantages:  fairness,  efficiency/judicial  economy,  and  overdeterrence  
TORTS  SPRING  2013     11  
 
PRODUCTS  LIABILITY  
− Manufacturing  Defect:  strict-­‐one  time-­‐one  product  off   Cases  
− Design  Defect:  mostly  negligence  (but  can  be  quasi  strict  w/o   Escola  
foreseeability)   Denny  v  Ford  Motor  
− Risk  Utility  Test:  ask  whether  risks  posed  by  design  outweigh  utility   Daly  v  GM  
(benefits)   Wyeth  v  Levine  
− Consumer  Expectation:  if  design  isn’t  as  safe  as  consumers  expect  it   Policy  
to  be,  defective   Best  cost  avoider  
− Warning  Defect:  reasonable  warning,  negligence  standard   Asymmetry  of  info  
  Difficulty  accessing  evidence  
− Defense:  Preemption,  Contributory  Negligence  (R2d)   Loss  minimization/spreading  
 

ALTERNATIVES  TO  TORT  

PREEMPTION  
− Wyeth:  Historic  police  powers  of  state  are  not  superseded  by  Federal  Act   Cases  
unless  clear  and  manifest  purpose  of  Congress  to  do  so.   Wyeth  v.  Levine  
   
− Agency  Deference:  courts  should  scrutinize  agency  record  and  giver   Policy  
deference  only  to  extent  that  agency  considered  precise  risk  at  issue     Capture  of  agencies  vs.  
− Institutional  Competence:  juries  don’t  have  great  ability  to  process   Independence  of  juries  
detailed  scientific  info  and  complex  risk  tradeoffs,  but  are  unbiased  and  
have  knowledge  of  community  standards  

WORKERS’  COMPENSATION  
− Compensable  Event:    “Arising  out  of  the  course  of  employment”   Cases  
− Measure  of  Recovery:  Limited  recovery  –  “average  weekly  wage”   Clogdo  v.  Rentavision  
− Payment  Mechanism:  insurance,  deep  pockets   Policy  
  Employers:  predictable,  avoid  
− Broad  S/L  –  fault  replaced  by  cause  as  basis  of  liability   litigation,  PR,  increase  safety,  
− Clogdo  Factors:  (1)  extent  and  seriousness  of  deviation;  (2)  completeness   much  lower  award,  social  
of  deviation  (abandonment  or  commingled  with  work);  (3)  extent  to  which   benefit  
activity  had  become  accepted  part  of  employment;  and  (4)  extent  to   Employees:  get  money  faster,  
which  nature  of  employment  may  be  expected  to  include  some  horseplay   no  litigation,  same  cost  
− Issues  with  fraud  and  abuse   VS:  less  punitive,  no  defenses  
NO-­‐FAULT  
− No  Fault  Auto:  Pure  vs.  Modified  vs.  Add-­‐On  vs.  Choice   Policy  
− No  Fault  Medical:  Designated  compensable  events,  Vaccines   How  to  define  compensable  
− Funds:  ex:  9/11,  BP  Oil  Spill   event?  

STATUTORY  REFORMS  
1. Absolute  dollar  ceilings  on  amount  of  wards  for  pain  and  suffering  and  punitive  
2. Limitations  on  complete  elimination  of  joint  and  several  liability  
3. Abolition  of  collateral  source  rule