Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 8692 September 10, 1913

GODOFREDO B. HERRERA, as municipal president of Caloocan, petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO BARRETTO, judge of first instance of Rizal, and CONSTANCIO JOAQUIN, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for petitioner.

R. Diokno, and Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for respondents.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an application for a writ of certiorari to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal.

It appears that on or about the 1st of March, 1913, Constancio Joaquin, believing himself entitled to a
license to open and exploit a cockpit in the municipality of Caloocan, and the authorities thereof refusing to
issue it to him, began an action against Godofredo B. Herrera as municipal president of said municipality,
the officer whose duty he claimed it was to issue cockpit licenses, to obtain a mandamus compelling said
official to issue such license.

On the presentation of the verified complaint and upon the facts stated therein and the exhibits annexed
thereto, the plaintiff asked that the court issue a mandatory injunction directed to the defendant requiring
him to issue a provisional license under which the plaintiff might conduct his cockpit during the pendency
of the action. The court, in pursuance of such request and upon the facts stated in the complaint and exhibits
annexed thereto, issued such order ex parte without notice of the defendant.

Thereupon the defendant in that action began a proceeding in this court against the judge of the Court of
First Instance who had issued the mandatory injunction relative to the provisional license referred to,
Honorable Alberto Barretto, and Constancio Joaquin, plaintiff therein, for a writ of certiorari, alleging that
the court below and had acted without jurisdiction in the following particulars:

1. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory
injunction, because, according to paragraph ( j), section 40, of the Municipal Code and article 4 of
municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan (Exhibit 1 a), the issuance of cockpit licenses in Loma and
Maypajo does not pertain to the municipal president of Caloocan but to the municipal council
thereof.

2. That the said Honorable Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing the mandatory
injunction ex parte without giving the municipal president opportunity to show cause why such
injunction should not be issued as required by section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

3. That the said Alberto Barretto exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing such mandatory injunction for
the reason that the cockpit license which the president of Caloocan had erroneously issued in favor
of Constancio Joaquin, on the day of __________, 1913, has been annulled and cancelled by virtue
of ordinance No. _____ of the municipal council of Caloocan, which ordinance has been duly
approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
 4. That there being another action pending between the same parties, founded upon the same facts
and reasons, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to issue the mandatory
injunction of the 1st of March, 1913 (Exhibit 4), for the reason that such injunction tends to render
inefficacious and null the final decision which this honorable court will render in civil case No. 8673.

The action referred to in this paragraph is one begun by Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., windows of
Angeles, against Godofredo B. Herrera and others relating to the validity of a certain ordinance.

5. That there being pending civil case No. 986 mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the Court of
First Instance of Rizal lacked jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction which he issued on the
1st of March, 1913, for the reason that it tends to render inefficacious and null the decision which
the Honorable Richard Campbell will render in civil cause No. 986.

This objection is based upon an action previously begun by Antonio Bertol and Tranquilina T., windows of
Angeles, against the municipality or the officials thereof for the purpose of having declared null and void
municipal ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan, which is the same ordinance upon which was based the complaint
of Constancio Joaquin and in which the mandatory injunction was issued.

6. That the said Constancio Joaquin at the present time does not possess a license to maintain
and run the said cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor does he have the right to exploit the same.

It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears
that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will be not be issued
to cure errors in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or of fact. If the court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decisions upon all questions pertaining to the cause are
decision within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected
by certiorari. The Code of Civil Procedure giving Court of First Instance general jurisdiction in actions
for mandamus, it goes without saying that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the present case to
resolve every question arising in such an action and to decide every question presented to it which pertained
to the cause. It had already been held by this court that, while it is a power to be exercised only in extreme
cases, a Court of First Instance has power to issue a mandatory injunction to stand until the final
determination of the action in which it is issued. While the issuance of the mandatory injunction in this
particular case may have been irregular and erroneous, a question concerning which we express no
opinion, nevertheless its issuance was within the jurisdiction of the court and its action is not reviewable
on certiorari. It is not sufficient to say that it was issued wrongfully and without sufficient grounds and in the
absence of the other party. The question is, did the court act with jurisdiction?

It has been urged that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in requiring the municipal president to issue the
license, for the reason that he was not the proper person to issue it and that, if he was the proper person,
he had the right to exercise a discretion as to whom the license should be issued. We do not believe that
either of these question goes to the jurisdiction of the court to act. One of the fundamental questions in
a mandamus against a public officer is whether or not that officer has the right to exercise discretion in the
performance of the act which the plaintiff asks him to perform. It is one of the essential determination of the
cause. To claim that the resolution of that question may deprive the court of jurisdiction is to assert a novel
proposition. It is equivalent to the contention that a court has jurisdiction if he decides right but no jurisdiction
if he decides wrong. It may be stated generally that it is never necessary to decide the fundamental
questions of a cause to determine whether the court has jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction is
preliminary and never touches the merits of the case. The determination of the fundamental questions of a
cause are merely the exercise of a jurisdiction already conceded. In the case at bar no one denies the
power, authority, or jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to take cognizance of an action
for mandamus and to decide every question which arises in that cause and pertains thereto. The contention
that the decision of one of those questions, if wrong, destroys jurisdiction involves an evident contradiction.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power
to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon
the rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, as we have said before, the
decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

In the case of Chase vs. Christianson (41 Cal., 253), the court said: "Here, then, was jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the person and these conditions conceded, the decision of all other question arising
in the case is but the exercise of that jurisdiction and an erroneous decision of any of these other questions
could not impair the validity and binding force of the judgment when brought in question collaterally.

It is not the particular decision given which makes up jurisdiction, but it is the authority to decide
the question at all. Otherwise all distinction between erroneous exercise of jurisdiction upon the
hand, and a total want of it upon the other, must be obliterated.

In the case of Freeman vs. Thompson (53 Mo., 183), the following is quoted with approval from Paine vs.
Mooreland(15 Ohio, 435): "The court once having, by its process, acquired the power to adjudicate upon a
person of thing, it has what is called jurisdiction. . . . The distinction is between a lack of power or want of
jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the first instance, all acts of
a court, not having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter, voidable only. A court, then may act, first
without power or jurisdiction; second, having power or jurisdiction, may exercise it wrongfully; or third,
irregularly. In the first instance the act or judgment of the court is wholly void, and is as though it as though
it had not been done; the second is wrong and must be reversed upon error; the third is irregular and must
be corrected by motion."

In Hardin vs. Lee (51 Mo., 241), the court said: "The judgment though grossly erroneous was not void, the
court having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . . In a word, error and nullity are not legal
equivalent or synonymous."

In Hagerman vs. Sutton (91 Mo., 519), the court said: "The power to decide correctly and to enforce a
decision when correctly made necessarily implies the same power to decide incorrectly and to enforce a
decision when incorrectly made. (Devis vs. Packard, 10 Wend., 71.)"

In Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435), the court said: "The distinction is between a lack of power or want
of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of the power. In the first instance all acts
of the court, now having jurisdiction or power, are void; in the latter voidable only."

In the case of Colton vs. Beardsly (38 Barb., 51), the court said: "The test of jurisdiction is, whether the
court has power to enter on the inquiry, and not whether its decision is right or wrong."

In Wertheimer vs. Boonville (29 Mo., 25 4), the court said: "It is hard to conceive how the question of
jurisdiction can be made to depend on the fact whether the judgment was right or wrong. The mayor
unquestionably has authority to decide whether the ordinance had been violated, and after he has
determined it, how can it be said he had no jurisdiction?"

In O'Rielly vs. Nicholson (45 Mo., 160), the court said: "A judgment, though informal, even to the extent of
granting a relief not contemplated in the petition, when the parties are before the court and the relief is
within its jurisdiction, is not a void proceeding. The doctrine laid down in Fithian vs. Monks (43 Mo., 502),
'in that it fails to make the readily observable distinction between jurisdiction to act in a given cause, and
erroneous exercise of such jurisdiction, . . . should no longer be followed . . . Jurisdiction being acquired
error could not oust it, although that error consisted in granting relief not warranted by law.'"
In the case of Gray vs. Bowles (74 Mo., 419), the court said: "When a court has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action and the parties to it, a judgment rendered by it, although it may be an erroneous,
irregular, or wrong judgment, cannot be said to be void, but remains valid and binding until reversed or set
aside on the ground of such error or irregularity."

In States vs. Second Judicial District (24 Mont., 238), the court said: "A judgment was rendered against
Baker, who appealed but could not furnish the necessary bonds or security on appeal. The purpose of this
application is to set aside the judgment, the relator asserting that the district court was without jurisdiction.
The right to hear and determine necessarily carries with it the power to decide wrong as well as right. It did
not exceed its jurisdiction although the court may have erred, yet it regularly pursued its
authority. Certiorari may not be used to correct errors committed within the jurisdiction of the court."

In Central Pac. vs. Board (43 Cal., 365) the court said: "Mere irregularly intervening in the exercise of an
admitted jurisdiction — mere mistakes of law committed in conducting the proceedings in an inquiry which
the Board had authority to entertain, . . . are not to be considered here upon certiorari, otherwise that writ
would be turned into a writ of error . . . Jurisdiction over a question presented being conceded, carries with
it necessarily the authority — the mere power — to decide the question either way."

In Lewis vs. Larson (45 Wis., 353), the court said: "The judgment of a justice of the peace will not be
reversed on a common-law certiorari, if the justice had jurisdiction to render it, no matter how irregular or
erroneous it may be."

In the case of Utah Association vs. Budge (16 Idaho, 751), the court said: "If the court had jurisdiction of
the person and the subject matter, then it is clear that whatever mistakes has been made has been only an
error committed on the part of the trial court in exercising his judgment and applying the law to the case,
rather than an excess of jurisdiction in acting in a matter wherein he had not acquired jurisdiction to act or
wherein his court has no jurisdiction of the subject in litigation. . . . The court had the jurisdiction, power,
and authority to hear and determine that question. It accordingly did so. If the court committed an error in
deciding the question thus presented, we answer that the court had jurisdiction to commit the error."

Although certiorari may be considered a direct attack upon a judgment as distinguished from a collateral
attack, nevertheless, under the laws of these Islands the only ground for the issuance of certiorari being
the failure of jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the basis of the direct attack upon the judgment becomes in
this jurisdiction the same as for collateral attack, inasmuch as, generally speaking, a collateral attack
against a judgment is sustainable only when the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction in the court to
pronounce it. Therefore the authorities relative to the ground necessary for a successful collateral attack
upon a judgment are authorities in a large sense, pertinent to a discussion as to when a court may be held
to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

In the case of Cooper vs. Reynolds (10 Wall., 308), the court said: "It is of no avail, therefore, to show that
there are errors in the record, unless they be such as prove that the court had no jurisdiction of the case,
or that the judgment rendered was beyond its power. This principle has been often held by this court and
by all courts, and it takes rank as an axiom of the law."

In the case of Cornett vs. Williams (30 Wall., 226), it was declared that "the settled rule of law is, that
jurisdiction having attached in the original case, everything done within the power of that jurisdiction, when
collaterally questioned, is to be held conclusive of the rights of the parties, unless impeached for fraud."

These two cases were cited and approved in the case of Manson vs. Duncanson (166 U. S., 533), wherein
the court said: "When a court has jurisdiction it has right to decide every question that may arise in the
cause; and whether its decisions be correct or not, its judgment, until reversed, is regarded as binding in
every other court. These principles apply in all respects and with special force in this case. It was for the
court whose decree is attempted to be impeached, not only to decide on the facts before it, but upon the
construction and legal effect of all deeds and muniments of title upon which the proceeding was based. The
court having general jurisdiction over the subject matter of decreeing the sale of real estate of a deceased
debtor and for the payment of debts, it had the right and was required to determine the question as to the
liability of the property for the debts, and whether the case was within its jurisdiction; and though its decision
may have been erroneous, it could only be reversed upon a direct appeal."

See Shepard vs. Adams, 168 U. S., 618; Gunn vs. Plant, 94 U. S., 664; Parker vs. Kane, 22 Howard, 1; Huff
vs. Hutchinson, 14 Howard, 586; Thompson vs. Tolmie, 2 Pet., 157; Hatcher vs. Hendrie, 68 C. C. A., 19.

See also, the long list of authorities cited as sustaining this doctrine in 23 Cyc., 1090, where the rule is
stated as follows: "Where a court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, its judgment,
although irregular in form, or erroneous or mistaken in law, is conclusive, as long as it remains unreversed
and in force, and cannot be impeached collaterally."

In the case of Miller vs. Rowan (251 Ill., 344), the court said: "A judgment or decree is not binding upon
anyone unless the court rendering the same had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the
cause. The court did have jurisdiction of the parties, and the appellant, who is disputing the binding effect
of the decree, was one of the complainants. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to adjudge
concerning the general question involved, and if a bill states a case belonging to a general class over which
the authority of the court extends, the jurisdiction attaches and no error committed by the court can render
the judgment void. It the court has jurisdiction, it is altogether immaterial, when the judgment is collaterally
called in question, how grossly irregular or manifestly erroneous its proceedings may have been. The
judgment cannot be regarded as a nullity, and cannot, therefore, be collaterally impeached. Such a
judgment is binding on the parties and on every other court unless reversed or annulled in a direct
proceeding and is not open to collateral attack. If there is a total want of jurisdiction in a court its proceedings
are an absolute nullity and confer no right and afford no protection but will be pronounced void when
collaterally drawn in question. (Buckmaster vs. Carling, 3 Scam., 104; Swiggart vs. Harber, 1 id., 364;
People vs.Seelye, 146 Ill., 189; Clark vs. People, 146 id., 348; O'Brien vs. People, 216 id., 354;
People vs. Talmadge, 194 id., 67.)"

Trombly vs. Klersy (146 Mich., 648); Chapman vs. Taliaferro (1 Ga. App., 235); Smith vs. Schlink (44 Colo.,
200), where the court said: "That the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter cannot be
questioned. This being true, and it not appearing that the judgment was not within the issues presented by
the pleadings, however, erroneous it may be, the judgment cannot be held to be void, so as to bring this
case within the rule that disobedience of a void decree does not constitute contempt of court."

Baldwin vs. Foster (157 Cal., 643), where the court said:

Throughout this consideration the fact is to be borne in mind that we are not reviewing this judgment
under attack made on direct appeal where errors prejudicial to those appealing would call for a
reversal, but we are considering it upon collateral attack, where every intendment is in favor of the
judgment and where mere errors and irregularities will not be considered. Upon collateral attack
the judgment will be set aside, generally speaking, for but one of three reasons: Lack of jurisdiction
of the person, lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, or an absolute lack of jurisdiction
to render such a judgment as the one given. (Moore vs.Martin, 38 Cal., 428; Mayo vs. Foley, 40
Cal., 281; In re James, 99 Cal., 374; 37 Am. St. Rep., 60; 33 Pac., 1122; Wood vs. Jordan, 125
Cal., 261; 57 Pac., 997.)

Goodman vs. City (164 Fed., 970); Sawyer vs. Kelly (148 Iowa., 644); Lucy vs. Deas (59 Fla., 552).

That certiorari will lie only in case of failure of jurisdiction has been consistently held by this court. The
following are substantially all of the cases decided by this court referring to certiorari or prohibition. We
include those referring to prohibition for the reason that the ground of its issuance is the same as that
in certiorari, viz, lack or excess of jurisdiction:
In the case of In re Prautch (1 Phil. Rep., 1 32), the court said: "Under the provisions of the code
in certiorari proceedings, it is necessary that it would appear both that the inferior court has exceeded its
jurisdiction and that there is no appeal from such court."

In his concurring opinion Judge Willard says: "Considering the existence of facts which may confer
jurisdiction, the question of whether those facts are presented in such a manner in the affidavit as to invoke
the exercise of this jurisdiction is one which the court has the same right to determine as it would have in
the decision of any other questions which might arise in a matter within its recognizance. In the exercise of
this power it may issue an erroneous order, but such an order is not absolutely void; unless it is remedied
during the same action by means of an appeal or otherwise, it will have the effect of a valid order. The Court
of First Instance should not give a judgment upon a complaint on a promissory note which does not state a
cause of action, but if it does so its judgment is valid unless it is reversed by means of appeal. We cannot
defer to any decision of the supreme court of California which sustains a contrary doctrine. Article 528,
already cited, establishes the law of these Islands, and we must submit to that. To accept the other rule
would be to convert the writ of habeas corpus into a writ of error, a thing which is in no wise permissible. It
would make it possible for any defendant by means of such writ to interpose an appeal to this court in all
those cases in which an order of arrest should be issued and would oblige us to review the errors of law
which are alleged to have been committed by the court in investigating the sufficiency of the affidavit, and
this is, in our opinion the very practice which article 528 seeks to avoid."

In the of Reyes vs. Roxas (1 Phil. Rep., 625), the court held that the refusal to hear witnesses offered by
the defense in a criminal action might constitute error, but was not an excess of jurisdiction to be remedied
by certiorari, the court saying: "The complaint in this case does not allege that the court which convicted
the petitioner had no jurisdiction to try the case. Neither does it allege that in the prosecution of the case
there has been any affirmative action by the judge outside of his jurisdiction. It simply alleges that he has
failed to take action; that he has refused to hear the witnesses for the defendant. This, if true, would
constitute error, but it would be error committed by the judge in the exercise of a jurisdiction which he
possessed. The remedy by certiorari does not apply to this case."

In the case of Dy Chuan Leng vs. Amber (1 Phil. Rep., 535), the court said: "We cannot grant an injunction
under this section unless there is a compliance with article 164 and 166. It must appear from the complaint
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action. If the complaint states no cause of action no preliminary
injunction can be issued. The complaint filed in this court is defective in this respect. It shows upon its face
that the petitioner are not entitled to an order of prohibition against the court below. That court had
jurisdiction of the action to dissolve the partnership. In that action it had the power to grant a preliminary
injunction (art. 164), and to appoint a receiver (art. 174). Having those powers, if in the exercise of them
any errors were committed, they could be corrected only on appeal from the final judgment. The facts as
alleged, that the complaint was ambiguous; that the judge believed that the plaintiff below was a partner
when the defendants denied it; that he fixed the bonds at $1,000 instead of $30,000, as requested by the
defendants; that no mention of the bond was made in the writ of injunction; that he refused to hear the
defendants' witnesses; that he refused to dissolve the injunction upon a bond which the defendants offered
to give, all of these do not show that the court was acting outside of its jurisdiction. They simply show, if
they are true, that the court has committed certain errors in exercising its jurisdiction, errors which must be
corrected by appeal."

In the case of Ivancich vs. Odlin (1 Phil. Rep., 284), the court said at page 287: "The ground upon which
the second prohibition is sought is that the attachment ordered by the court is not such an attachment as is
authorized by articles 424 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, but on the contrary
is an attachment under a procedure not in force here, although it is in force in the United States of America
in maritime cases, and that the attachment, moreover, was levied without affidavit, bond, or any of the
securities established by law whereby the owners of the steamer can obtain reparation for any damages
which may be occasioned them by the unlawful detention of the said steamer; and that the procedure of
the court below is devoid of all the formal requisites established by law for the levying of such attachments.

xxx xxx xxx

 The judge, did not, therefore, act without jurisdiction when directing the attachment of the vessel in
question, and has not exceeded his jurisdiction. If the excess of jurisdiction upon which the
argument was based consists in his having levied the attachment without the fulfillment of the
necessary conditions and without following the form prescribed by some law of procedure
applicable to the case, it is our opinion that this error is not such an excess of jurisdiction as can
be secured by prohibition, and the petitioner has other means whereby this error or procedure may
be corrected or remedied. Upon these grounds we decide that the petition for a writ of prohibition
must be denied, with the costs to petitioner, and it is so ordered.

In the case of Araneta vs. The Heirs of Tranquilino Gustilo (2 Phil. Rep., 60), this court said: "This is a
petition for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros in
requiring a supersedeas bond under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not appear from
the petition what the amount involved in the litigation is, nor on what sum that bond was fixed by the court,
but it is alleged that the bond is excessive. The court below had jurisdiction to require the bond as a
condition of a stay of execution, and to fix its amount. Assuming that the bond was excessive, yet nothing
is alleged in the petition which shows that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in the premises or committed
any irregularity in its proceedings in exercise thereof. The writ must therefore be denied."

In the case of Springer vs. Odlin (3 Phil. Rep., 344), the court said: "The court, on the 30th of May, after
hearing both parties, made an order by which it was adjudged that the claim of Co-Banco had a preference
over the claim of Springer and ordered the money in the custody of the clerk to be believed to Co-Blanco,
but requiring him to execute a bond for the sum of P400 with sureties for the protection of Springer in case
he appealed to the Supreme Court to annul the order.

The plaintiff, Springer, alleges in his application for certiorari that the Court of First Instance acted
without jurisdiction in making this order of the 30th day of May, 1903; that not being a party in the
cause of the United States vs. Catalino Mortes, he has no right to appeal nor has he any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy from the order; and further alleging that Co-Banco had no lien upon
the P259.50 in dispute, either by attachment or by execution; nor did the said Co-Blanco on the
date of the making of the order in his favor have any right of any other character upon said money.

If the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to render the judgment of the 13th day of May, 1903,
in favor of Co-Banco in the case of the United States vs. Catalino Mortes, and in the proceeding in
which Springer intervened resulting in the order of May 30, or if the plaintiff, Springer, had any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy by a bill of exceptions, appeal, or otherwise from the order of the
30th day of May, 1903, by which the money in question was directed to be paid to Co-Banco, then
the proceeding in certiorari will not lie.

In the case of Felizardo vs. Justice of the Peace of Imus (3 Phil. Rep., 635), the court said: "Attorneys
Pineda and Escueta, on behalf of Flaviano Felizardo and Francisca Felizardo, upon the facts stated by their
complaint, dated April 4, 1904, and upon the ground that there was no other speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, pray for an order dissolving the attachment levied upon the property of the
petitioners, and that a writ issue to the justice of the peace of Imus, requiring him to absolutely refrain from
all further proceedings until a final decision is rendered upon the complaint.

By intervening in the suit result in which the attachment was levied, the parties may avail
themselves of all the legal remedies provided for the defense of their lawful rights, but cannot avail
themselves of the writ of prohibition for the purpose of obtaining a discharge of attachment
complained of. The case is one which pertains exclusively to the jurisdiction of the judge who is
trying it, and there is no authority of law for interference with the proceedings.

In the case of Rubert & Guanis vs. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 473), the court said: "The court below had
jurisdiction of the subject matter of that suit and of the parties thereto. It had power by law to grant an
injunction in the case and power to dissolve it or modify it. There can be no doubt of the correctness of
these propositions, but it is claimed by the plaintiff in this suit that the stipulation made between the parties
to the suit below to the effect that the sheriff should hold the money until the final judgment in that case,
deprived the court of jurisdiction to make the order modifying the injunction and requiring to sheriff to pay
the money to the defendant Lo Shui upon his furnishing a proper bond.

When section 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure speaks of a tribunal exercising functions which
are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, it covers those cases only in which such tribunal acts
without or in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law. It has no reference to cases where
it is claimed that such tribunal acts in excess of jurisdiction which the parties may have attempted
by stipulation to confer upon it, or in excess of a jurisdiction to which the parties may by stipulation
have attempted to limit the court. The fact that the judge may have committed an error in
disregarding the stipulation of the parties has nothing to do with the question of the jurisdiction
which by law the judge was authorized to excess. If there was such error in the action of the court
below, it was an error that must be corrected by appeal. An action of prohibition cannot be
maintained in such cases. (Citing cases.) There is nothing in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil.
Rep., 404), relied upon by the plaintiff, in conflict with this rule. As was stated in the case of Dy
Chuan Leng vs. Amber above cited, the writ of prohibition was there granted upon the ground that
in no case where the fact of marriage was denied did the Court of First Instance have any
jurisdiction to grant temporary alimony.

In the case of Castaño vs. Lobinger (7 Phil. Rep., 91), the court said: "The concrete questions raised by
the parties to these proceedings are (1) whether or not the judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had
power to issue an injunction against the justice of the peace of Manila in an action pending in his court, and
(2) whether the judge of the said Court of First Instance of Leyte could entertain a petition for a writ
of certiorari against the said justice of the peace of the city of Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had no jurisdiction over the judge of the peace of
the city of Manila, and were a judge of the Court of First Instance permitted to grant such
extraordinary remedies against a justice of the peace in a district or province other than his own, it
would be a serious interference with the proper administration of justice, and a procedure relating
to appeals from and other remedies against the judgments of inferior courts would be subverted. It
should be borne in mind that the enforcement of the laws jurisdiction of the various courts, concerns
the interests of the community at large.

The judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte had no power to take cognizance, on appeal, of a
case originally tried in the justice court of the city of Manila, nor has he the power to take cognizance
of cases that should ordinarily be tried in the Court of First Instance of Manila, unless by virtue of a
special commission. Nor has he the power to issue writs of injunction in connection wit other special
and extraordinary remedies sought from the decisions of said justice of the peace.

In the case of Herman vs. Crossfield (7 Phil. Rep., 259), the court said: "After the term at which judgment
was rendered, a Court of First Instance made an order opening the case for the introduction of additional
evidence, the motion therefore having been made and argued during said term. Held, That such order was
not void because made after the close of said term and that it could not be reviewed on certiorari."

The court at page 261 said: "Whether the order made on the 14th of April was right or wrong is not before
us for decision. The court had jurisdiction to decide the motion, even if it were a motion for a new trial, a
point which we do not determine. If it decided it incorrectly, the plaintiff who was the defendant in that case,
had the right to except to the order and, although he could not bring the case here at once for decision
because that order was not a final judgment, yet he could do so after final judgment had been entered and
could then have the order in question reviewed."
In the case of Somes vs. Crossfield (8 Phil. Rep., 284), the action was one of certiorari. The court said:
"The plaintiff, in an action brought by himself in the Court of First Instance of Manila, made a motion for a
preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from selling certain property upon execution. After a
hearing upon the motion, the court after saying that the plaintiff was not entitled to the preliminary injunction,
made the following order:

"According, the petition for a preliminary writ of prohibition is denied, and it is hereby further
ordered that the proceeds of the sales under the executions already issued, and pending,
either in this court or in the hands of the sheriff of the Province of Albay, be deposited in
this court, subject to the further orders thereof, upon a bond of P10,000 being filed by the
plaintiff to answer for any loss resulting from the failure to apply said proceeds as ordered
in the execution issued."

The plaintiff thereupon commenced this original action of certiorari in this court, claiming that the
court below, in making the order in question, exceeded its jurisdiction. The defendants have
demurred to the complaint, and the case is now before us for decision upon such demurrer.

xxx xxx xxx

That the court below did not exceed its jurisdiction in making that order is free from doubt. (Rubert
& Guamis vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473.)

In the case of Artacho vs. Jenkins (11 Phil. Rep., 47), the court said at page 48: "It is alleged in the complaint
that, in ordering the issue of a second execution, the defendant judge exceeded his jurisdiction and that
such order was absolutely void. This contention cannot be sustained. The court of Pangasinan had
jurisdiction of the case of Tan Chu Chay against the plaintiff Artacho, jurisdiction both of the parties and of
the subject matter, and the mere fact that some creditor of Tan Chu Chay had attached the debt due from
Artacho to the former did not oust that court from its jurisdiction to proceed with the case. (See among other
cases decided by this court: Rubert & Guamis vs.Sweeney, 4 Phil. Rep., 473; Somes vs. Crossfield, 8 Phil.
Rep., 284; and Yambert vs. McMicking, 10 Phil. Rep., 95.)"

In the case of Lagahit vs. Nengasca and Wislizenus (12 Phil. Rep., 423), the action was one of certiorari.
The action in the court below was one over a contested election. The court, speaking through Mr. Chief
Justice Arellano, said: "Whether or not the below acted rightly in considering the other candidate as the
'adverse party' and the party defeated in the proceedings is not a matter on which action may be taken by
this court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. It is evident that it was a matter within the jurisdiction
of the court below to tax the 'adverse party' with the costs. The remedy of certiorari is, therefore, not
available, as the purpose thereof is to prevent and remedy extra limitations of jurisdiction and authority, not
to correct errors in decisions or mistakes of law, which are proper subjects for appeal and cassation.

The first finding is perfectly in accordance with the provision of the law. The court below in deciding upon
the protest against the contested election for president of Aloguisan said: 'The court believes that the
majority of the electors at the present election voted in favor of the petitioner, Simeon Nengasca.' Whether
or not this opinion of the court below is proper cannot be the subject or review by this court. It is a decision
which is within the jurisdiction of the lower court as conferred by law.

As a result of this opinion of the court below, and in compliance with the provision of the law, the
judgment should have been: "Let a writ of mandamus be issued against the board of canvassers
requiring the board to correct its canvass in accordance with the facts as found."

For the reason above set forth we decide that the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
recognizing Nengasca as president-elect at the elections in the municipality of Aloguisan, in said
province, should be, and is hereby annulled for the reason that it is not within the jurisdiction of the
said court to recognize or proclaim a president in a contested election.
The action of Ocampo vs. Jenkins (14 Phil. Rep., 681), was one of prohibition. It was held there: "The fact
that an appeal is pending in the Supreme Court in a criminal case for libel, under Act No. 277 of the
Philippine Commission, does not prevent the prosecution of a civil action for damages under the same Act,
which clearly recognizes two distinct actions upon the theory that there are two separate and distinct injuries
received from the crime, one by the State and the other by the individual damaged by the libel. In such a
case, therefore, a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoining the prosecution of the civil suit while the criminal
appeal is pending will be denied."

There are certain cases like Lagahit vs. Nengasca and Wislizenus above cited wherein the court has held
that certiorari would lie. In the case of Encarnacion vs. Ambler (3 Phil. Rep., 623), the court said at page
624: "In the case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs. Byron S. Ambler et al. (2 Phil. Rep., 392), which involved the
validity of the appointment of Antonio Torres as receiver of the estate of Tan-Tonco in the said cause
of Sergia Reyes vs. Fulgencio Tan-Tonco, it was held by this court that section 174 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, under which the appointment of the receiver was made, did not authorize the appointment; that
no property belonging to Fulgencio Tan-Tanco was the subject of litigation in the case of Sergia Reyes vs.
Tan-Tonco; nor did the case fall within either of the other subdivisions of section 174; that the placing of the
property of the defendant in said cause in the hands of the receiver for the purpose, after praying fees and
expense of distributing the property among the creditors, was practically a bankruptcy proceeding; that
there are no bankruptcy laws in force in these Islands; that bankruptcy proceedings have been expressly
forbidden by section 524 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions until a law shall be enacted; and that
consequently the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in appointing Antonio Torres
receiver in said action.

We adhere to the views expressed in the decision of this court in the said case of Eugenio Bonaplata vs.
Byron S. Amber et al."

In the case of United States vs. Siatong (5 Phil. Rep., 463), the court said: "Without its being our purpose
to decide if the remedy or certiorari invoked by the provincial fiscal is proper in this case or not, we cannot
admits his petition on account of its not being made in due form. The remedy of certiorari should be
petitioned for by formal complaint having all of the requirements prescribed by the Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions, and the petition formulated by the fiscal in the form of a brief in a criminal cause does not
come up to these requirements, for which reason it is set aside in accordance with law."

In the case of Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield (6 Phil. Rep., 355), the court, on page 358, after quoting the
section of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to cases in which a receiver may be appointed, said: "The
case at bar does not fall within any of the provisions of this section. There is no allegation in the complaint,
as has been before stated, that the plaintiff is the owner of any of the property of Rocha & Co., nor is there
any allegation that he has any lien thereon, nor are there any facts alleged in the complaint from which it
could be inferred that he was the owner of such property of had any lien thereon. On the contrary, from the
facts that are alleged in the complaint it would seem that his separation from the partnership of Carman &
Co. left that partnership as a going concern and did not dissolve it. The effect of the provisions of the articles
of partnership which are referred to in the complaint is that after the withdrawal of any partner the remaining
partners became the owner of all the assets of the partnership and he became a general creditor of the
partnership.

xxx xxx xxx

The case not being one in which a receiver could be appointed, the order making such appointment
was void and was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, although that court had jurisdiction of the
main action has been settled adversely to the defendants in this suit by the case of Bonaplata vs.
Amber (2 Phil. Rep., 392; see also Encarnacion vs. Amber, 3 Phil. Rep., 623; Findlay &
Co. vs. Amber, 3 Phil. Rep., 690).
 That certiorari is the proper remedy in such cases was decided in the case of Blanco vs. Amber (3
Phil. Rep., 358, 735).

In the argument in this court it was claimed that this extraordinary remedy would not, lie because
the plaintiff, Rocha & Co., had a right to appeal from the order appointment a receiver, although
that appeal could not be taken until a final judgment had been entered in the case. That argument
is answered by what is said in the case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404)."

In the case of Bañes vs. Cordero (13 Phil. Rep., 466), the court said: "And, if the jurisdiction has not been
exceeded, there is not nor could there be any legal ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari, because
these proceedings can only exclusively be granted to remedy abuses committed in the exercise of a power
or jurisdiction. Sections 217 and 514 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for such relief unequivocally
and specifically refer to the act of exceeding or going beyond the jurisdiction; and this court has repeatedly
held that, in order that certiorari may issue, it is absolutely necessary to show that the respondent has
exceeded his power or jurisdiction. (In re Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; De los Reyes vs. Roxas, 1 Phil. Rep.,
625; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil. Rep., 344.)"

In the case of Arzadon vs. Chanco (14 Phil. Rep., 710); the court decided as follows: "Certiorari is the
proper remedy whenever an inferior tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its
or his jurisdiction, and no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to correct such excess
or extra limitation. (Secs. 217 and 514, Code of Civil Procedure). The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance
to hear and decide election contests is exclusive and final (sec. 27 of the Election Law); consequently,
decisions rendered by them in the exercise of said jurisdiction cannot be reviewed by means of an appeal.
As they are not appealable and as against them no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, it is
evident that they constitute a proper subject for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Therefore, if the court
below has exceeded his jurisdiction in rendering the above-cited decision it is proper to annul and the same
by virtue of said proceedings."

In that case the Court of First Instance made the following order: "By the foregoing, Silvestre Arzadon
appears to have violated the provisions of the Election Law which prohibit every action, influence, and
promise of any kind, for the purpose of obtaining votes. These should indicate the free will of the voters,
and for such infractions his election for the office of municipal president of the town of Badoc must be
considered illegal.

Therefore, it is declared by the court that the election of Silvestre Arzadon for the office of president,
held on the 15th day of November last in the municipality of Badoc, Ilocos Norte, was not legal, and
another special election for the said office must be held at the expense of the said Arzadon who
shall not then be eligible, and any vote entered in his favor shall not count; the costs and expenses
of these proceedings shall also be charged to him.

In respect to that order the Supreme Court said: "It is our opinion that he has so exceeded his jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance hear election protests is conferred upon them by the aforesaid
section 27 of the Election Law, and neither the said section, nor any other legal provision, authorizes the
court, in deciding such protests, to declare ineligible in future elections the person against whom the
protests was presented, nor to sentence him to pay the expenses of the new election to be held. Hence,
the court below had no power to enter such rulings in the case as gave rise to these proceedings, and in
consequence there of said rulings must be entirely annulled."

See also Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. Rep., 238).

The case of Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404) was one relating to the allowance of alimony pending
the trial of an action for a divorce. The court below allowed alimony although the answer denied the
marriage. Prohibition was brought in this court, and after hearing, the lower court was enjoyed from levying
and collecting alimony. The court said at page 414: "The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit,
but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This code only grants the right to alimony to a wife. This
status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter."

See also U. S. vs. Crossfield (24 Phil. Rep., 321); Young Wampo vs. Collector of Customs (id., 431).

The reasons given in these cases last cited for the allowance of the writ of prohibition are applicable only
to the class of cases with which the decisions deal and do not in any way militate against the general
proposition herein asserted. Those which relate to election contests are based upon the principle that those
proceedings are special in their nature and must be strictly followed, a material departure from the statute
resulting in a loss, or in an excess, of jurisdiction. The cases relating to receivers are based, in a measure,
upon the same principle, the appointment of a receiver being governed by the statute; and in part upon the
theory that the appointment of a receiver in an improper case is in substance a bankruptcy proceeding, the
taking of which is expressly prohibited by law. The case relative to the allowance of alimony pendente
lite when the answer denies the marriage is more difficult to distinguish. The reasons in support of the
doctrine laid down in that case are given in the opinion in full and they seem to place the particular case to
which they refer in a class by itself.

It is not light thing that the lawmakers have abolished writs of error and with them certiorari and prohibition,
in so far as they were methods by which the mere errors of an inferior court could be corrected. As
instrument to that end they no longer exist. Their place is now taken by the appeal. So long as the inferior
court retains jurisdiction its errors can be corrected only by that method. The office of the writ
of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used
for any other purpose. It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly
extraordinary cases—cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps
in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where the
parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a
snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a
standing menace. It is only to avoid such results as these that a writ of certiorari is issuable; and even here
an appeal will lie if the aggrieved party prefers to prosecute it.

A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and
prohibition fully support the proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the person, its decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however
erroneous, cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal.

It must be remembered that the people of the Philippine Islands may go to the Court of First Instance to
require a public officer to perform his duties; and they have the right to have that court pass upon the whole
case and upon every phase thereof and upon every question arising therein. This right is conferred by
statute. It would be respected by the courts as well as by others. It would be manifestly illegal, as it would
be flagrantly unjust, so long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, to withdraw from the Court of First
Instance the consideration of that caseunder color of any proceeding whatever. As long as the court is
considering that case, its right and the rights of the litigants to continue to final determination are inviolate.

The fact that another action may have been pending involving the same subject matter and even between
the same parties, which was not the fact in this case, does not touch the jurisdiction of the court to act.

We cannot leave the case without suggesting that the applicant herein, before coming to this court, should,
as the better practice, have made the proper application to the Court of First Instance for a dissolution or
modification of the mandatory injunction, and thereby given that court an opportunity, after full argument of
counsel and citation of authorities, to pass upon the question of his power and jurisdiction and, even, the
correctness and propriety of his action, should power and jurisdiction be found by the court to exist.
Questions which Courts of First Instance are required by law to decide should not be summarily taken from
them and presented to this court without first giving them an opportunity of deliberately passing on such
questions themselves. The most natural and proper thing to do, when such court, in the judgment of one of
the parties, has issued an injunction erroneously, is immediately to call the attention of that court to its
supposed error and ask for its correction. The strongest reasons of policy and courtesy if not actual legal
rights itself, require such procedure; and we discourage all attempts to come to this court upon questions
which a court below is entitled to decide without first invoking its judgment thereon. There are special
reasons for following this course in cases where the court has acted ex parte.

The writ is denied and the proceeding is dismissed. So ordered.