DIGESTS

TOPIC: PERSONAL LAW, LEX PATRIAE and LEX DOMICILLI

IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS
and GLORIA C. ELLIS, Petitioners-Appellees, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Oppositor-
Appellant. [G.R. No. L-16922. April 30, 1963. ]

FACTS OF THE CASE: Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby
girl named Rose.
Petitioners, both are citizens of the United States, husband and wife, had been in the Philippines for three
(3) years at the time of the hearing of the petition for adoption, the husband being assigned as staff sergeant
in the U.S. Air Force Base in Angeles, Pampanga.

Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital and her mother left her
with the Heart of Mary Villa stating that she could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon
her family.

ISSUE: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt
Baby Rose.

HELD AND RATIO: NO. Not being permanent residents, petitioners cannot adopt in the Philippines,
pursuant to Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that non-residents cannot
adopt.

Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status not
only of the person to be adopted, but also of the adopting parents. The Civil Code of the Philippines (Art.
15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by his nationality.
Pursuant thereto, the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the status of an alien petitioner in adoption
proceedings. The political law of system, which adopts the view that personal status, in general is determine
by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of laws, p.
86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II pp. 713-714). Hence, under either the nationality
theory or the domiciliary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume an exercise jurisdiction over the status
of petitioners, who are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence, non-resident aliens.

Decision appealed is REVERSED, and another one shall be entered denying the petition in this case.
TECSON VS. COMELEC [424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3 Mar 2004]
Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation
of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to
a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage
had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been
a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him
from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that
San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence,
could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS

AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, petitioner, vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, respondent.
Quisumbing, J.:

NATURE: Action for prohibition under ROC 65 before the SC

FACTS
 Aug. 29, 2003 – PGMA signed RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003)
into law.
 SALIENT PROVISIONS:
o Declaration of Policy - all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the Act
o 2 Concepts – Reacquisition and Retention of citizenship upon the taking of the prescribed
oath
o Derivative Filipino citizenship for unmarried minor children of those who reacquire
citizenship under the Act
 o Retention of civil and political rights and liabilities subject to relevant provisions of the
Act and other laws (§5)
 Hector G. Calilung filed the present petition for prohibition to stop the DOJ Secretary
(Datumanong) from implementing RA 9225, arguing that the law violated Art. IV, §5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance.
ISSUES (HELD)
1) W/N RA 9225 is unconstitutional (NO)
2) W/N the SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance (NO)
RATIO
Note: No pronouncements were made on Calilung’s standing to sue.
1) RA 9225 SHIFTS THE ISSUE OF DUAL ALLEGIANCE OF DUAL CITIZENS AWAY FROM THE
PHILIPPINES
 CALILUNG’S ARGUMENTS
o RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. §§2 and 3 of the law, together, allow dual
allegiance and not dual citizenship. §2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or
naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without
losing their foreign citizenship.
o §3 permits dual allegiance because it allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to
regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting
their foreign allegiance, contrary to the Constitution’s characterization of dual allegiance.
 OSG ARGUMENTS
o §2 merely declares as a state policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."
o The oath in §3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino
citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship.
o The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of
the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to
the Republic.

 SC RULING
o Intent of the law must be sought in Congressional deliberations. SC looked into an
exchange between Maguindanao Rep. Dilangalen and Makati Rep. Locsin.
o RA 9225 aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means.
o By prescribing the taking of an oath, the law shifts the problem of dual citizenship to the
foreign country because the last oath that a naturalized Filipino will take is to the
Philippines. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines, the
person naturalized in another country implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
 o Locsin stressed that the dual allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill.
o He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act."
o Locsin then emphasized that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says
nothing about the other citizenship.
o Under RA 9225, a person is required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of
allegiance to the Philippines. After that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the
problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.
o It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting RA 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
o What RA 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.
o On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
o RA 9225§3 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of the law.
2) ART. IV, §5 NOT SELF-EXECUTING BUT A DECLARATION OF POLICY & A CONGRESSIONAL
MANDATE TO ENACT THE LAW ON DUAL ALLEGIANCE; MERCADO RULING DID NOT DEFINE
DUAL ALLEGIANCE
 Calilung: Absence of a law on dual allegiance does not justify the SC’s competence to rule on the
issue. While it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance, the SC, in Mercado v.
Manzano, had already drawn up the guidelines on how to distinguish dual allegiance from dual
citizenship.
 OSG: Art. IV, §5 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that dual allegiance shall be dealt with by law.
SC has therefore no jurisdiction over the matter until Congress enacts the law on dual allegiance.
 SC: The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance because RA 9225 did not deal with
the matter.
 In §§2 and 3, the framers of RA 9225 were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization.
 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
 Mercado v. Manzano did not define dual allegiance. It merely said that such dual allegiance and
dual citizenship are different.
 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan: “[C]ourts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the
borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for
the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority” [hihihihi].
 “Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,
we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.”
 “We cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when
the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual
allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.”

Nature:Two (2) separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction but are
decided jointly because the issues presented proceed from the same factual background.
Republic v. Maddela
Facts:
On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of Quezon (Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L.
Maddela presiding, rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding No. 4012.On the same day the
same court rendered another similarly worded, decision in its special Proceeding No. 4013, this
time in favor of Chan Po Lan.
The two cases involve the same petition to have petitioners declared Filipino citizens. Both
petitioners were legally married to Filipino citizens and during the trial it has been established to
the satisfaction of the Court that both petitioners have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen. The Fiscal representing the Solicitor General if he
has any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscal answered that he has no opposition, neither
has he any evidence to warrant opposition.
Both Po Lan and Tan Suat were declared Filipino citizens by marriage and the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel the necessary alien certificate
of registration and immigrant certificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue the
corresponding identification card.
The Solicitor General filed the instant petitions and on August 10, 1963 the SC issued in
each case a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution and enforcement of the judgment.
Issue: Whether petitioners should be declared Filipino citizens
Held: No.
Jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: no person claiming to be a citizen may get a
judicial declaration of citizenship.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply
a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of
the right of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to,
their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or
proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single,
or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as a necessary premise to justify a given
relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status,
such as naturalization by judicial decree. But there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of a
judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan v. Republic, L-14159, April
18, 1960).
BURCA V REPUBLIC – NONE
MO YA LIM YAO – NONE
OH HEK HOW – NONE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONER V DE LA ROSA & GATCHALIAN – NONE
NUVAL V. GURAY – NONE
FACTS:

On May 11, 1928, Nuval filed (in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified and registered in the
election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered candidate) a petition against
Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list, not being a qualified voter of
said municipality sine he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the
said Administrative Code.

CFI Decision: Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna from Janury
1, 1927. As that order was not appealable, Guray's name remained in the election list. In the
election on June 5, 1928, Guray was elected as municipal presidentby a plurality of votes, Nuval
obtaining second place.

On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto asking that Guray be
declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos to the election as required by the
Admin Code.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the judgment rendered in the CFI is res judicata, so as to prevent the
institution and prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.

HELD: 1. No. The petition for exclusion was presented by Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter
and as a duly registered candidate, against Guray as a registered voter. The present proceedings
of quo warranto was intreposed by Nuval as a registered candidate voted for the office of municipal
president of Luna, against Guray, as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is
no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons,
but there must be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil
Code; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation was the conclusion of
Guray as a voter from the election list, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of
the litigation is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he has been elected. Neither
does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the litigation, or the litigious matter.
In the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Guray had no six months' legal residence
in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in proceedings of quo warranto,
the cause is that Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the eligibility to the office
of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of causes of action.
For res judicata may exist the ff are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c)
identity of issues. There is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious matter, or of issues
or causes of action, there is no res judicata.
2. Whether or not Guray at the time of his election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in
said municipality. - He transferred his residence from the municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
Up to June 27, 1922, Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he had
married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. He was appointed municipal treasurer of
Balaoan, La Union. The rules of the provincial treasurer require that municipality treasurers live
continuously in the municipality where they perform they official duties. In order to qualify, he
asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, alleging as a ground therefore
the following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th day of
June, 1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union". In his cedula
certificates for1923 to 1928, he made it appear that his residence was Balaoan. In 1926, his wife
and children went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the
high cost of living in that municipality. Guray used to go home to Luna and his children studied in
the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the construction of a house of which
has not yet been completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,
Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the 16th of
the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also
by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided with a cedula by himself as municipal
treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him resident of said town, he obtained another
cedula from the municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928,
in which it is presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, Luna, La Union. On February 23,
1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the cancellation of his name in the election list of
the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna,
alleging that he had been residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made
of the cedula certificate antedated.
3. Whether or that to the date when he once more established his residence in the municipality of
Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and acquires one in
another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former residence until he has qualified by a
new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is
synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."
(People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in
order to vote and be a candidate in Luna, he needed to reacquire residence infor the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so, but his
personal presence in said municipality.
A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus
Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of Luna, transferring it to the
municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the requirements of the rules of the provincial
treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of
suffrage in the latter.
Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire
another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, when he filed his resignation from
the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, and which resignation
was accepted; and on being elected municipal president of Luna in the general elections of June 5,
1928, he had not reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
SC Decision: Election of Guray as municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and
quashed and he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio Nuval being the
one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession thereof, having secured second
place in the election.

RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

February 1, 1929

Sec 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in case a person not eligible should be elected
to a provincial or municipal office, does not authorize that it be declared who has been legally
elected, thus differing from section 479 of the law, which contains such an authorization, and for
the reason, furthermore, that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who have obtained
a plurality of votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may be certified as elected
to municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different from the appointive offices. The
occupation of the first depends on the will of the elector, while that of the second depends on the
will of the authority providing for it.
In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be determined is the
eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. In the first case when the person
elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place has
been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in
favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of
candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed and can and
ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.
Judgment is amended, eliminating from the dispositive part thereof, the holding that Gregorio
Nuval is the one who has been legally elected, so as to read as follows:
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of Municipal
president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed and, consequently, that he has no right
to take possession of said office, with costs against said respondent.

VELILLA V POSADAS
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila in an action to recover from the defendant-appellee
as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of P77,018,39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income
taxes assessed against the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
Arthur G. Moody, an American citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively
in business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931. He had no
business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate consisting principally of bonds and shares of
stock of corporations organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles
and personal property. All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located anywhere else.
He executed in the Philippine Islands a will where he bequeathed all his property to his only sister, Ida M.
Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the State of New York, USA.
On February 24, 1931, a petition for appointment of special administrator of the estate of the deceased
Arthur Graydon Moody was filed by W. Maxwell. Subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition was filed
by Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of said will of the deceased , and the same was, after hearing, duly
probated by the court and it was declared that Ida Palmer is the sole and only heiress of the deceased Moody.
However the will does not cover the respective values of said properties for the purpose of the inheritance
tax.the BIR prepared for the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return.
The estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and
the other sum of P40,019,75 on January 19, 1932, making a total of P90,019,75, of which P77,018.39 covers
the assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against
said estate. The protest was overruled by the BIR.
The petitioner contends that that there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, assessed or collected upon transfer,
by death and succession, of intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands

Issue: Whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of his death

Held: The Court ruled that Moody was domiciled in the Philippines.
According to the Court, the fact that Moody accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippines
and that he lived in the Elks’ Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date he left
Manila the latter part of February, 1928 proved that his domicile at the time of his death was in the
Philippines. And that the only reason why he left the country was that he was afflicted with leprosy in an
advanced stage and had been informed that he would be reported to the Philippine authorities for
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as required by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus
segregated and in violation of his promise to his doctor that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he
surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night, on a freighter, without
ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate.
He lived with a friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where he
was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. There is no statement of Moody, oral or written,
in the record that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was
physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not
claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled
that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there again. Much less
plausible is the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains
no writing whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed abode
that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he acquired any property in Paris or
engaged in any settled business on his own account there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors
that prove the establishment of a legal domicile there. His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely
consistent with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur
Institute.
The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody’s continued absence from his legal domicile in the
Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the same motive that caused his surreptitious
departure, namely, to evade confinement in the Culion Leper Colony.
Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their usual residence." The
record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual residence" of this unfortunate man, whom
appellant describes as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than
a quarter of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the date of
his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one’s domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable
intent that it should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, one’s home. There is a complete dearth
of evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
UJANO V. REPUBLIC
Nature: Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur.

Facts:
- Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur.
- He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal age.
- 1927- Went to the United States of America in where after a residence of more than 20 years he
acquired American citizenship by naturalization.
- November 10, 1960- Returned to the Philippines on to which he was admitted merely for a temporary
stay.
- He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less
than P5,000.00.
- He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States
of America.

- He has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

Court a quo: Denied the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the residence required by law
six months before he filed his petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Issue: Whether petitioner should be allowed to reacquire Philippine citizenship

Held: No.

The SC agreed with the lower court’s decision.

Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:

One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant shall have resided in
the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization.

The term "residence" has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent
home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (WilfredoUytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines,
95 Phil., 890; 50 Off. Gaz., 4781). A place in a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and
to which he intends to return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile.

In other words, domicile is characterized by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted
into this country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though
actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of
his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is accomplished.

In the present case, Petitioner, who is presently a citizen of the United States of America, was
admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the
present petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such
being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six months residence
before filing his present petition.

The word "residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen v. Republic, L-18885, January
31, 1964; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil., 645).
Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the
strength of a permit for temporary residence.

The only way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a
quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence requirement of
Commonwealth Act No. 63.

CAASI V. CA
Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during
the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner,
Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was
not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the
U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

Held: The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in
the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an
irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities
before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Court’s conclusion is
that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

MARCOS V. COMELEC
Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent
Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification,
alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her
COC, changing “seven” months to “since childhood.” The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the
amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's
head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, the Comelec Second Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended
as well as original COCs. The Comelec in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on
in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that
she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood
and school days, as her place of domicile. The Comelec en banc affirmed this ruling.
 During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But the Comelec suspended her
proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the
election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the
election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the Comelec which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of
Representatives.

Issues:

1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time
of the May 9, 1995 elections.
2. Does the Comelec lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?
3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary
residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following
reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin
by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption
of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment,
and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon
her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s
domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political
law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of
husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the
former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of
the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her
brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG
Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that
the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question.(Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)