[G.R. No. 129242. January 16, 2001.

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA

MANALO, Petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
(BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M.
ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO,
Respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, et. al., seeking to annul the
Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4
which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 law library

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He
was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo,
Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo,
Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in
the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop with offices at No. 19
Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at No. 45 Gen. Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo,
namely: Purita, Milagros, Belen, Rosalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993 and
directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their
respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order "declaring the whole
world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16,
1993. However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted ten (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filing of an
Omnibus Motion 8 on July 23, 1993 seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9,
1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order 9 which resolved, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of
considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground for the
dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue of
the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate estate of the
deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after their motion for reconsideration of the Order dated July 30, 1993 was
denied by the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition for certiorari with the appellate
court, they contend that: (1) the venue was improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and
(5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its Resolution 11
promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was
likewise dismissed. 12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion for the
outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver
that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filing
of the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments which, according to them, are
indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO, had
not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father, TROADIO MANALO.

Par. 8. . . . the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned, without proper
accounting, to his own benefit and advantage. . . .

x x x

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-heirs . . . .

x x x

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and were forced
to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than, P250,000.00 and engaged the
services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00
per appearance in court . . . . 13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to aver
in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments 15 and the
character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners’ claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The
said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17 The petition
in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of
the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to
wit:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(a) That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the administration
of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such reasonable sum that this
Honorable Court may fix.

(b) That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses and just
debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said estate of TROADIO
MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c) That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount
of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial of this case and costs
of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO. 18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an
ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and
filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing
admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil
action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis, Article 222 of the
Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial to the said
petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, sitting as a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction 20
and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary
civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the defenses contained
in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1 (j) of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the same
by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding." Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily
include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2,
of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of
the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035 (Emphasis supplied). 22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term "suit"
that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or others in a court of justice in which the plaintiff
pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at
law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. 24 Besides, an excerpt from the Report of the Code
Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal provision applicable
only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family, thus:cralaw : red

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family. It
is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
strangers.25cralaw:red

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for any
cause of action as in fact no defendant was impleaded therein. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as
such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 The
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father and
subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 133000. October 2, 2001.]

PATRICIA NATCHER, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO
DEL ROSARIO — LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL ROSARIO-MANANGAN, ROSALINDA
FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and
EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision 1 of public respondent
Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and another
one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia
Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without
prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper
court. No costs.

So ordered."cralaw virtua1aw library

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled,
and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the
land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano’s name, as
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107442 and
the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano
sold the first lot 2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot. 3chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 4 was issued in the
latter’s name. On 07 October 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first
marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint 5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Graciano’s death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of
Sale dated 25 June 1987 6 in favor of herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT No. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer 7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on
20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano’s lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano’s estate or against herein petitioner’s
property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding: 8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and
thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited
from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law under
Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw
library

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court’s decision ratiocinating, inter alia:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a
quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed
the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. . . .

". . . Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance. What the court should
have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a
separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and assails the appellate court’s decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."cralaw
virtua1aw library

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

x x x

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding.
An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law.
It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding"
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually,
in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." 9chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special
proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. . . . A special proceeding must therefore be in the
nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a
pending action, by petition or motion upon notice." 10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision 11
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings" .

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our
mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement
made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

At this point, the appellate court’s disquisition is elucidating:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the estate in a
special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective legitimes
of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-
appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special
proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance." 12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca v. Borromeo 13 and
Mendoza v. Teh 14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of
First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue
but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice which may be
waived." 15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of
the decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific
issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership. 16chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Similarly in Mendoza v. Teh, we had occasion to hold:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the exercise of the
limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 17 (Emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it
is necessary that certain steps be taken first. 18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then,
all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes. 19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court
failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This
Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that
under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best
forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of
Graciano Del Rosario’s estate.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 168799 : June 27, 2008]

EUHILDA C. TABUADA, Petitioner, v. HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, ERLINDA CALALIMAN-LEDESMA and YOLANDA CALALIMAN-
TAGRIZA, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the March 2, 2005
Order1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and
the May 20, 2005 Resolution2 of the trial court denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged order.

The very simple issue raised for our resolution in this case surfaced when the parties in Sp. Proc. No. 5198 (the
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Jose and Paciencia Calaliman) manifested to the RTC
their desire to amicably settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court issued the following Order 3
on December 6, 2004:

In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective counsel that they will be able to raise
(sic) an amicable settlement, finally, on or before 25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending
incidents for hearing as the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit a "Motion
for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement" on or before 25 December 2004.

Atty. Honorato Sayno Jr., Atty. Gregorio Rubias and Atty. Raul Retiro are notified in open court.

Serve a copy of this Order to Atty. Rean Sy.

SO ORDERED.4

The RTC, however, on March 2, 2005, invoking Section 3, 5 Rule 17, of the Rules of Court, terminated the
proceedings on account of the parties' failure to submit the amicable settlement and to comply with the afore-quoted
December 6, 2004 Order. The trial court, in the challenged order of even date, likewise denied all the motions filed
by the parties.6

Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately moved for the reconsideration of the
March 2, 2005 Order arguing, among others, that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no
payment of the debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the necessary papers for
the amicable settlement.7 Despite the said pleas for reconsideration, the trial court remained firm in its position to
terminate the proceedings; hence, in the assailed May 20, 2005 Resolution, 8 it affirmed its earlier order. Dissatisfied,
petitioner scuttles to this Court via Rule 45.9

The petition is granted.

While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly encouraged, the failure to consummate
one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. 10 Sp.
Proc. No. 5198 should not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere failure of the
parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable
Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special proceedings11 (which do not depend on the will of an actor,
but on a state or condition of things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal
should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is the sole remedy consistent
with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the parties therein. 12
The third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu propio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to
comply with the rules or any order of the court,13 cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous,
termination of the proceedings herein. An examination of the December 6, 2004 Order 14 readily reveals that the trial
court neither required the submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor warned
the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given period, their case would be dismissed. 15
Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to
the court and the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced to comply, for,
as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to consummate a compromise. An order
requiring submission of an amicable settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.

Lastly, the Court notes that inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of
court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone
the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better
served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court. 16

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The March 2, 2005
Order and the May 20, 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39 in Sp. Proc. No. 5198
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 164108 : May 8, 2009]

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION,

Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife,
private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners.
The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch
44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then
pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the
value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued
an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. 5 In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending
claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. 6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case
No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory
and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, 9
praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an
omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required
inventory of the decedent's estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was
filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the
Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in
fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they
cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on
Special Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that
they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the
pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court. 14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for
the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We
can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners
from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant." 17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes
into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that
"[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under
Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their
recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on
Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in
the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions
before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the
issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the
giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any
other persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the
estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of
the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent's title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires
notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator's account "to persons interested;"
(6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and
grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90,
which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should
have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the
issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose
from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-
delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These
actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by
its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case 21 was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto's death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners' claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were
raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they
would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be
allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?cralawred

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia, 22 and it does provide us with guidance on
how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the
intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended
his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified
claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the
bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the
administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination
of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to
protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of
said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect
and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of
civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its
existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would
this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the
heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule
is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of
the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x 23 (Emphasis supplied)
[Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the
Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect
their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action." 24

Petitioners' interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless.
We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or
"persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate.
Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably
concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the
estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right
to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate
court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the
intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to
the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate
proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain
to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners' interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to
participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent's submission that if the Court were to entitle
petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor,
whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of
merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and
pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and
burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly
disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the
petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate
proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners
herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which
the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the
records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested
person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the
intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing
the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory
and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting ' appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the
settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x 26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules
will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of
every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the
intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests
of the creditors in the estate are preserved.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested
parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and
allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize
the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3)
Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the
petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market
value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified
annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with
due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot
grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary
or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either
duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there
are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against
the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the
removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek
with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have
the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained,
petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this
decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the
intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons
in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No
pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Rule 73
[G.R. No. L-8409. December 28, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, Petitioner-Appellee, vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, VIRGINIA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO,
and CARLOS EUSEBIO, Oppositor-Appellant.

DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case was instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on
November 28, 1952, residing, according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda,
Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are
illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying,
therefore, that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal
taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of
the Rules of Court, provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad
condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extension, in said City (Exhibits 2).
While transferring his belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a stroke (probably heart
failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him to his (Dr. Eusebio’s) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of Manila, sometime before November 26, 1952. On
this date, he contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife, Concepcion Villanueva, in said
hospital. Two (2) days later, he died therein of “acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive heart
disease”, at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A). Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house
at España Extension.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he resided for over seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence,
residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that “a domicile once acquired is
retained until a new domicile is gained” (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 70; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryRestatement of
the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryIn re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the
circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of
choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) capacity to choose
and freedom of choice; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) physical presence at the place chosen; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) intention to stay therein permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryGoodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryVelilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil.,
624; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryZuellig vs. Republic of the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220).
Admittedly, the decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been in Quezon City several days
prior to his demise. Thus, the issue narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent appear to have manifested his wish to live
indefinitely in said city. His son, Petitioner-Appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify thereon, despite the
allegation, in his answer to the aforemention, opposition of Appellants herein, that “the deceased (had) decided to
reside cralaw for the rest of his life, in Quezon City”. Moreover, said Appellee did not introduce the testimony of
his legitimate full brother and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice, presumably, the house
and lot at No. 889-A España Extension was purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent’s) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding, the lower court held that the decedent’s intent to
stay permanently in Quezon City is “manifest” from the acquisition of said property and the transfer of his
belongings thereto. This conclusion is untenable.
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent because he had been adviced to do so “due to his
illness”, in the very words of herein Appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very likely — that said advice
was given and followed in order that the patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment. It is
well settled that “domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one’s own health”, even if
coupled with “knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home.” (The Conflict of
Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysee, also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Knight, D.C. Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his
children, who used to live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that municipality. Then, again, in the
deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which said property at No. 889-A España Extension, Quezon City, was conveyed to
him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his
residence. Similarly, the “A” and “B” residence certificates used by the decedent in acknowledging said Exhibit 2,
before a notary public, was issued in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1, signed by
the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November
26, 1952, or two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of
notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of the legitimate full brothers of the herein Appellee, was a witness to said
wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his first marriage, including said Appellee, were
represented on that occasion and would have objected to said statement about his residence, if it were false.
Consequently, apart from Appellee’s failure to prove satisfactorily that the decedent had decided to establish his
home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately before his death, prove the contrary. At any
rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old domicile 1 — which is particularly strong when the
domicile is one of the origin 2 as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been
offset by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, and refused to entertain
the same in the order appealed from. The reasons therefor are deducible from its resolution in rejecting said
documents during the hearing of the incident at bar. The court then held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Exhibits ‘1’ and ‘2’ are rejected but the same may be attached to the records for whatever action Oppositors may
want to take later on because until now the personality of the Oppositors has not been established whether or not
they have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot pass upon this question as the Oppositors refuse to
submit to the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before Appellants had
established their “personality” to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their filiation. When Appellants,
however, sought, during said hearing, to establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate
children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained Appellee’s objection thereto stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the
status of your client; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryyou are leading to that. The main point here is your contention that
the deceased was never a resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to cross-examine. If yon are trying
to establish the status of the Oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Court. This is not yet the time to declare who are the persons who should inherit.” p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider Appellant’s evidence on the domicile of the decedent, because of their
alleged lack of “personality”, but, when they tried to establish such “personality”, they were barred from doing so on
account of the question of venue raised by them. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing
procedure adopted by the lower court or the inferences it drew from the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that
Appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the
jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the Appellee,
said Appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the beginning of the hearing, in the lower court,
Appellants’ counsel announced that he would take part therein “only to question the jurisdiction, for the purpose of
dismissing this proceeding,” (p. 2, t. s. n.). During the cross-examination of Petitioner herein, said counsel tried to
elicit the relation between the decedent and the Appellants. As, the Appellee objected thereto, the court said,
addressing Appellants’ counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of
the court cralaw. If you are trying to establish the status of the Oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you
want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court” (p. 7, t. s. n.). Thereupon, Appellants’ counsel refused to do so,
stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “I will insist on my stand.” Then, too, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court
rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the reason that Appellants “refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this court and they
maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed.” Thus, Appellants specifically made of record that they were
not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the
court felt that Appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, Appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to prove, not only their right to object to Appellee’s
petition, but, also, that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed him under the Civil Code of the Philippines;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (b) his alleged residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have
admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper effect, in connection with the issue under
consideration.
Appellee, however, asks:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “What will happen if this case be dismissed in the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue?” In this connection, it
appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga received a petition of
Appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the “Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres
Eusebio”. Attached to said petition was another petition for the docketing thereof free of charge, pursuant to Rule 3,
section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was
received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the
children of the decedent by first marriage, including Petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings,
owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953.
This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the
Rules of Court, pursuant to which “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.”
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the
question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case
exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two
or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the
authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which
jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More
specifically, said provision refers mainly to non- resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the
Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may be undertaken before the court of first instance of
either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one
first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to, this effect in
said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence,
which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may be settled before the court of first instance of any
province in which they have properties.
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.”
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the
question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case of Taciana Vda. de Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27,
1955). Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case
pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper
court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that it should,
accordingly, have sustained Appellants’ opposition and dismissed Appellee’s petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and Appellee’s petition is dismissed, with costs against the
Appellee. It is SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-40502. November 29, 1976.]

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS * , PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-42670.]

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, Respondents.

Francisco Carreon, for Petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for Private Respondents.

DECISION

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the
rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by
Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia,
"that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over
the estate. On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she
should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of
Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in
lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29,
1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised
in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading
and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has
shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly
publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
Administrator" filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects:
(1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of
the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that
Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia
and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G.
Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental
petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original
petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental petitions for letters of
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G.
Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of
properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the estate of the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July
31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18, 1973.chanrobles law library

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or
over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G.
Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.

On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of
Pablo G. Alcaide, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcaide, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix
from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to
Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to
dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the
special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the
previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement
with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without
any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa
B. Garcia’s motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the
failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of
the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing
order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the
making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for
lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute
and remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motions to
substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed the special
administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973
and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing
(cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of
special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of
the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motion for
reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish
Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as
well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to
Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to
deliver to the court all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with
the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule
presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon
City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily
to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in
the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their
motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on
the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A.
Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us
on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate.
Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond
of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No.
27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by
the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738
should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna
in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia
inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."cralaw
virtua1aw library

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction"
reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this
Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B.
Garcia’s "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the
estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12, 1976.

On February 4, 1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary
restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from
further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.chanrobles law library : red

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and
considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary
facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets,
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation
facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not
an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of
the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." 4 It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is
another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power
is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be
rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural
law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First
Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall
be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of
letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely
constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or
domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex
vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue,
the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated" (t)hat on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties
in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed
the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted
statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of
Calamba, Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa
B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba
court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G.
Garcia’s "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased’s residence
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated
November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his
interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia’s last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled
rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the
Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa
B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia’s challenge to Virginia G. Fule’s appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that" (w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession
and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment
and such appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any
cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator
or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be
based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not y be taken into account in the appointment of a
special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in
this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the
conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate
correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than
the naked ownership of a property. 18

Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With
equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or
that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in
the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is
appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who
is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The
preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his
spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to
be the surviving spouse of the late. Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly
assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay
that the Quezon City court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter’s estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer
all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the
proceedings.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Paño of December 17, 1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R.
No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of
P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R.
No. L-42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-24742. October 26, 1973.]

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD

DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO LOURDES CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA,
CARMEN-CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ,
Respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for Petitioner.

Jalandoni & Jamir for Respondents.

DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated
21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital, Manila. He was survived
by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both
surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first
marriage, respondents herein, namely Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other
things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time
of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs
and interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general
circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13 March
1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On
the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco’s petition for the appointment
of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as
reasons the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this
proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies
of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration." 2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate for the
deceased’s last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow
and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-
7898.

Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu
court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order
holding in abeyance its resolution or petitioner’s motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City shall have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the
deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probate proceedings in the
Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu
court nor did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964,
opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner’s
petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No, 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
The pertinent portion of said order follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows
‘that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death. the
aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong
venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court . . .’. From the aforequoted
allegation, the Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident
of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings in
Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that the probate
proceedings should he filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the
oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the
petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of
Quezon City at 69 Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for
probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a
resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his
first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence.’ If a party has two residences, the one will be deemed or
presumed to be his domicile which he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be the center
of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence
of the decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all
others." 5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco’s motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court’s said order of 11 April 1964
asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27
April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the
decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors
had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) That She will was not executed and attested as required by law;

"(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or some
other persons for his benefit;

"(c) That the testator’s signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake and did not intend
that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto." 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly
complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent’s last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache
and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the
documentary evidence (such as the decedent’s residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of
donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him
in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator’s last will
and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law"
and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his
will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court’s said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from
proceeding with case No. Q-7808.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeal’s rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and
against the herein petitioner, holding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that
court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can properly and
exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether
or not the decedent was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.

"Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it
follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for
probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent
should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction
of another court.

"The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI,
acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was ‘not yet ready for
the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding . . .’ It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was
certainly not referring to the court’s jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the
moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise for jurisdiction in relation to the state of the proceedings. At all
events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a trial
judge."cralaw virtua1aw library

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court’s judgment provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from
proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All orders
heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected
therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in n resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July
1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.

The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the testate
proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
decedent’s last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance
with the testator’s express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court,
to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu
court’s order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to
be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" — which order of the Cebu court
respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon
City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco’s motion to
dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the
petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.

The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased’s last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator’s express wish, for the
following considerations: —

1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matters of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down
the rule of venue as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts
which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts." The cited Rule provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance for the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from the court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." (Rule 73) 8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa v. Co
Ho 9 as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence of the deceased is
regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its
mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of
a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the first time
in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the
effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in
court will have to be annulled and the same case will to be commenced anew before another and the same rank in
another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require
comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan v. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of
Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last
resided, could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we
have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-
General v. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 —
confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of
the deceased. Since however, there are many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act
No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon t his
ground that in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly
called ‘venue’."cralaw virtua1aw library

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is
first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."cralaw virtua1aw library

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction — indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent’s last will has been presented
in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent’s alleged last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow’s filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes’
intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the
Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court’s order
was that if the will was duly admitted to probate by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take
cognizance of Lourdes’ intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the
exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of
deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent’s residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in
Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the
intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative
finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over
the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to
do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably
had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule
of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of
the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared,
as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent’s will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator’s testamentary disposition.

4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the
present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court’s questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a ‘probate matter’ or a
proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence
in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for
the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a
clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings." 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although
opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344,"
15 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner’s contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper venue
therefor.

"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to
raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio
Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for
the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed
with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only
to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the
probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would
be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the
present where the objection against said proceedings is raised too late." 16

5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate on
the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first
choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in
comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case.
The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly
invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had
the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while
recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja v. Tan 17 that.

" ." . . The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail in the
exercise of jurisdiction — in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we
note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution on
the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in
view of the fact that the deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also
gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper court, as
so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja v. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, Et Al., G.R. L-7792, July 27,
1955."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and
deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would
depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court — that
Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja
ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu
court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for itself
the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as the
actual residence at the Cebu court’s behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding based
on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or
its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to
institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76,
section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show:" (a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando v. Crisostomo 18 "are the death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."cralaw virtua1aw library

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that" (T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in
rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.
The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The
Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not
the proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court’s giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent’s last
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court’s action should not
be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court’s appealed decision,
and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition
challenging the Manila court’s action admitting the decedent’s will to probate and distributing the estate in
accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to
annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in Sy, Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question
of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over
again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
comment."cralaw virtua1aw library

8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent’s relatives gets first to file a
petition for settlement of the decedent’s estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section
1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from
doing so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is
waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be
converted into a race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice, regardless of whether the
decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent’s actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last
will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were
certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly
administration of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and
despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu
court earlier by a week’s time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within
fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent’s death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent’s last
will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her
husband’s estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit
anew the decedent’s will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be
converted into a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the
facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-
widow had their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent’s last
will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law
on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the
Cebu court everytime-she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner’s
marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to be
administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision,
notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the
deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even
her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to the testate
proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent’s last
will, since the record before it (the petitioner’s opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation
in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged
by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court’s order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate
proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court’s order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent’s will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent’s will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance
with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay
down only a rule of venue not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court’s order of May 15, 1964 admitting the
will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civil action of
prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court’s exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by and
transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the
Quezon City court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and
consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent’s express will and all its orders and actions taken
in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly
had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon
City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the
decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents
with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., did not take part.

Castro, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the laying of the
venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of
First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and
their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches, for which
reason they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the present petition.

Endnotes:
 [G.R. NO. 133743 : February 6, 2007]

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

[G.R. NO. 134029 : February 6, 2007]

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage
was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.7 He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at
100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are
respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not
have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's
place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of
the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna,
he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from
the Order denying their motions to dismiss.15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be given retroactive effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair
vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state
the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the twin issues
of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's
legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied.28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.31 It found
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26,
Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus'

With the well-known rule - express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, - there is no
justiciable reason to sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari .35 Rodolfo later filed
a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38
"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence - as
contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the
object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant
case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of
election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has
the intention of returning.42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible
that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased's children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards 49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must
first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under
the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was
not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien
spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton v. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to
change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married
to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis
added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized
foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the
foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59
In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers
codified the law already established through judicial precedent.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a
mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino
spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the
good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."

xxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present
petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law
and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.71

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of California which
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-
owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the
validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil
Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly
regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In
Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the
Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

xxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. x x x 81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the
February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and its October 24,
1994 Order which dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 144915. February 23, 2004]

CAROLINA CAMAYA, FERDINAND CAMAYA, EDGARDO CAMAYA and ANSELMO

MANGULABNAN, Petitioners, v. BERNARDO PATULANDONG, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757, In re: Petition for the
Probate of the Codicil (Will) of Rufina Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G.
Camaya, Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya.

On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised, among others, Lot
No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). The pertinent portion of her will
reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

IKALIMA. - Aking inihahayag at ginagawa na tagapagmana, sa aking kusang loob, ang pinalaki kong APO
na si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN,may sapat na gulang, kasal kay Flora Umagap, at naninirahan sa San
Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, at anak ng aking anak na si SIMPLICIA, at sa aking APO na si ANSELMO ay
aking ipinagkakaloob at ipinamamana, sa aking pagkamatay, ang mga sumusunod kong pagaari:

LOT NO. TITLE NO. KINALALAGYAN NABANGGIT SA

288-ANT-47089Sta. Cruz (1) p. 2

3348-A100629Poblacion (2) p. 2

3349-B100630Poblacion (3) p. 2

xxx1 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

The testatrixs son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), respondent herein, was in the will appointed as the
executor.

During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija where it was docketed as Sp. Pro. No. 128.

By Order2 of January 11, 1973, the CFI admitted the will to probate.

On June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying above-quoted paragraph five of her will in this
wise:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

UNA. - Ang Lote No. 288-A na nakalagay sa barrio ng Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, magsukat 36,384 metro
cuadrados, at nagtataglay ng TCT No. NT-47089, na aking ipinamana sa aking apong si ANSELMO P.
MANGULABNAN, sangayon sa Pangkat IKA-LIMA, pp. 5-6, ng aking HULING HABILIN (Testamento), ay
ipinasiya kong ipagkaloob at ipamana sa aking mga anak na sina BERNARDO, SIMPLICIA, GUILLERMA
at JUAN nagaapellidong PATULANDONG, at sa aking apong si ANSELMO P. MANGULABNAN, sa
magkakaparehong bahagi na tig-ikalimang bahagi bawat isa sa kanila.
IKALAWA. - Na maliban sa pagbabagong ito, ang lahat ng mga tadhana ng aking HULING HABILIN ay aking
pinagtitibay na muli.

x x x 3 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied) On May 14, 1988, the testatrix died.

Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong
refused to heed the request, however, in view of the codicil which modified the testators will.

Mangulabnan thus filed an action for partition against Patulandong with the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, docketed as Civil Case No. 552 (the partition case).

On June 8, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision in the partition case, 4 the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

WHEREFORE, the court orders the partitioning of the properties and the defendant to deliver the copy of the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-47089.

However, in view of the case cited by the plaintiff himself, the court holds that the partition is without
prejudice [to]... the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court, [P]alacios v. Catimbang
Palacios cited by the plaintiff:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable of his petition and if he
should die before he had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the testators death
would be in order.

The Court also orders that the right of the tenants of the agricultural land in question should be protected meaning to
say that the tenants should not be ejected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

On July 17, 1989 Patulandong filed before the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija a petition5 for probate of the
codicil of the testatrix, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 218.

On December 28, 1989, the probate court issued an Order6 setting the petition for hearing and ordering the
publication of said order.

On February 7, 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title
of the testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and TCT No. NT-2157507 was issued in his name.

Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot No. 288-A by a Deed of Sale dated February 19, 1991. 8
TCT No. NT-215750 was thus cancelled and TCT No. NT-2164469 was issued in the name of the Camayas.

On January 16, 1996, the trial rendered a decision10 in Sp. Proc. No. 218 admitting the codicil to probate and
disposing as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:

1.Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-215750 issued by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name
of Anselmo Mangulabnan dated February 7, 1991 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the
intervenors Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo, all surnamed Camaya on February 19, 1991 and Transfer Certificate
of Title No. NT-216446 under date March 18, 1991 issued in the names of the above-named intervenors as NULL
and VOID and of no force and effect; and,
2.Ordering the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-
216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Filipino, married to
Gorgonia Mariano residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Juan R. Patulandong, Filipino, widower and
residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija; Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan of legal age, Filipino, widow
and residing at San Vicente, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Simplicia R. Patulandong Mangulabnan, of legal age, widow, and
residing at San Lorenzo, Gapan, Nueva Ecija and her grandson, Anselmo Mangulabnan with full personal
circumstances stated herein to the extent of one fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved codicil (will) of Rufina
Reyes dated June 27, 1973.11 cralawred

The Camayas who had been allowed to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. 218, and Mangulabnan, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above-said decision but it was denied by Order12 of February 28,1996.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Camayas and Mangulabnan (hereinafter referred to as petitioners) raised the
following errors:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.THERE WERE SERIOUS SUBSTANTIAL DEPARTURES FROM THE FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY THE
RULES, THE LAW, AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SETTING AS A PROBATE
COURT.

2.THE OPPOSITOR DID NOT ONLY ACQUIRE LOT NO. 288-A BY WILL BUT HE ALSO ACQUIRED THE
SAME BY PARTITION IN A CIVIL CASE WHERE THE DECISION HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS
FINALITY AND THEREFORE CAN NO LONGER BE NEGATED BY A QUESTIONABLE CODICIL.

3.THAT THE SUBJECT LOT 288-A IS NO LONGER WITHIN THE REACHED (sic) OF THE PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THAT THE OPPOSITOR VENDOR HAD A CLEAN TITLE AND THAT THE
INTERVENORS-VENDEED HAD ACQUIRED THE SAME BY WAY OF SALE AS INNOCENT PURCHASER
IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.13 cralawred

By Decision14 of June 19, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court.

Hence, the present petition for Review on Certiorari proffering the following issues:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of
the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale; andcralawlibrary

2.Whether the final judgment in Civil Case No. 552 bars the allowance of the codicil.

As to the first issue, petitioners contend that the under the law, the probate court has no power, authority, and
jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and titles of petitioners;15 and that the probate court can only resolve the
following issues:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

1.Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will and testament of the decedent; in other
words, the question is one of identity[;]

2.Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; in other words,
the question is one of due execution[; and]

3.Whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will; in other words, the question
is one of capacity.16 cralawred

In Cuizon v. Ramolete, 17 this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a probate court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to
belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so.

xxx

Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court
should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and
ownership of the property.x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Following Cuizon, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further declared the deed of sale and the titles
of petitioners null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property.

Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,

petitioners titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null and void.

As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final
judgment in the partition case which is not allowed by law; 18 and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers
for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful. 19 cralawred

Petitioners first argument does not persuade.

Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically
provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was without prejudice [to]. .. the probate of the codicil. The
rights of the prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.

The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners titles, there is no longer any
necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas claim that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy
the legal presumption that the transfer was lawful.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 19, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 53757 affirming the January 16,
1996 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, is hereby AFFIRMEDwith
MODIFICATION.

The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED,but the 1) declaration as null and void of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. NT-215750 issued on February 7, 1991 by the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija in the name of Anselmo
Mangulabnan, the February 19, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale executed by him in favor of the intervenors - herein
petitioners Carolina, Ferdinand and Edgardo Camaya, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-216446 issued on
March 18, 1991 in favor of the petitioners Camayas, and 2) the order for the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to
cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title Nos. NT-215750 and NT-216446 and reissue the corresponding Certificate of
Titles to Bernardo R. Patulandong, Juan R. Patulandong, Guillerma R. Patulandong Linsangan, Simplicia R.
Patulandong Mangulabnan, and Anselmo Mangulabnan to the extent of one-fifth (1/5) each pursuant to the approved
codicil are SET ASIDE,without prejudice to respondent and his co-heirs ventilation of their right in an appropriate
action.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 127920 : August 9, 2005]

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners, v. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-
CHING, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a
person's estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another
case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute
over the estate of their loved one.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorarifiled by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela
Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and
Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated
January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner's motion for
partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock
investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita's
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelita's mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner's
prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita's estate is composed of "paraphernal
properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead. 5 Afterwards, she also filed
a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent's opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in
the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26,
1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita's estate. 11 Emmanuel did not
submit an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.12

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion 13 praying, among others, that an Order
be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared
heirs; and 3) payment of attorney's fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner's motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature
and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory
are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture." 14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of
Miguelita's estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney's fees but denied
petitioner's prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate
court ratiocinated as follows:

"On the partition and distribution of the deceased's properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer
of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor's claim as indicated in her opposition to the
instant petition is necessary to determine 'whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by
petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the
oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture. '"

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
intestate court's Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner's prayer
for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondent's claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and
Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
private respondent's unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate
court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of
private respondent's claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorarianchored on the following assignments of error:

"I
RESPONDENT COURT'S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT'S ORDER IS A GRAVE
ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT
ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT'S

ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS
SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT'S ORDER AND
RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING'S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE
CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent's estate?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to
the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. 16

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:

"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
conduct a hearing on respondent's claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership
is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of this case
show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition 18 dated September 18, 1995,
respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994,
and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion.
Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right
to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."

Respondent could have opposed petitioner's inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which
she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking
exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent's son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita's estate, did not submit
his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a
true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession
or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which
respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced
with petitioner's inventory.

Obviously, respondent's purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or
should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita's estate. The
intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution 20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:

"On petitioner's motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed
that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of
oppositor's claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she
allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and
direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to
"determine the propriety of oppositor's (respondent's) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that
the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita's) properties," then it means that she has a "material
and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in
court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent's contention that she is the true owner of
the bulk of Miguelita's estate.

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent's ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving
her blanket claim against Miguelita's estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner's inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to
maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long
line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the
course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional
trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so."22

Hence, respondent's recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not
the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to
Miguelita's estate.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of
the issue of ownership, still respondent's claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita's estate,
as stated in petitioner's inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either
in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until
their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court's pronouncement in
Bolisay v. Alcid23 relevant, thus:

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on
the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability
until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include,
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in
the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against
Torrens Title, hence:

"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her
bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:

"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I
quote:" In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the
undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame
witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to
Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ', is that right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.

xxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is
that right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect
to the estate of your late husband?

A: If I only knew that this will happen'

Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Wala po."24

She further testified as follows:

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and
deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc.
and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned
or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of
the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.

Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San
Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat
na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Kung ano ang sa akin'

xxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong
paghahatian or hindi?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir." 25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner's inventory belong to
her. Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her
claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita's estate is composed of
paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to
change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter
most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner's inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over
them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two
minor children.28

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever
rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 167405 : February 16, 2006]

ANA JOYCE S. REYES, Petitioner, v. HON. CESAR M. SOTERO, Presiding Judge, RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac,
Branch 67, ATTY. PAULINO SAGUYOD, the Clerk of Court of Branch 67 of the RTC at Paniqui, Tarlac in
his capacity as Special Administrator, CORAZON CHICHIOCO, ANGELITO LISING, ERLINDA
ESPACIO, GONZALO ZALZOS and ERNESTO LISING, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review seeks to modify the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74047 as well as the Resolution dated May 14, 2005 denying the motion for reconsideration. In the assailed
judgment, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 Resolutions
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paniqui, Tarlac, Branch 67 in Spec. Proc. No. 204 but refrained from
dismissing the petition for letters of administration and settlement of estate on the ground that petitioner must first
prove that she was legally adopted by the decedent, Elena Lising.

On September 15, 1998, respondent Corazon L. Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, where it was
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204 and raffled to Branch 67. Chichioco claimed that she was the niece and heir of
Lising who died intestate on July 31, 1998. Named as co-heirs of Chichioco were Rosario L. Zalzos, Florante
Zalzos, Erlinda Lising, Manuel Lising, Evelyn Lising, Josephine Lising, Alfredo Lising and respondents Ernesto
Lising and Erlinda Espacio.

According to Chichioco, the deceased left real properties located in the municipalities of Ramos and Paniqui, Tarlac,
as well as assorted pieces of jewelry and money which were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S.
Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased. Chichioco prayed that she be appointed administrator of the estate, upon
payment of a bond, pending settlement and distribution of Lising's properties to the legal heirs. 1

On November 6, 1998, petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition2 to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child
of Lising and the latter's husband, Serafin Delos Santos, who died on November 30, 1970. She asserted that the
petition should be dismissed and that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary, since she was the only
heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts. She further asserted that Chichioco is unfit to serve as
administrator of Lising's estate because of her "antagonistic interests" against the decedent. Chichioco and her
alleged co-heirs have questioned the decedent's title to a piece of real property which forms a large part of the estate.

On November 11, 1998, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition 3 attaching thereto the Certification4 issued
by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac stating that on page 76, Book No. 01 of the Register of Court
Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and Serafin Delos Santos pursuant to a decision rendered in Spec.
Proc. No. 1410 by Judge Julian Lustre of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, Branch 3, promulgated on
December 21, 1968 and duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar on January 29, 1969.

Petitioner also submitted a Certification5 issued by the Clerk of Court of the RTC-Tarlac City, stating that a
judgment was rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410 on December 21, 1968 decreeing petitioner's adoption by Elena
Lising and Serafin Delos Santos. She also presented a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 6 indicating that the adoption
decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City, wherein the dispositive portion of the adoption
decree was recorded as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the court finds this petition a proper case for adoption and therefore grants the same.
Consequently, the Court declares that henceforth, the child Ana Joyce C. Zalzos is freed from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural parents Orlando Zalzos and May C. Castro, and is to all legal
intents and purposes the child of the petitioners Serafin delos Santos and Elena Lising. 7
Petitioner likewise submitted a Decree of Final Distribution8 issued by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(PVAO) showing that, upon the death of Serafin Delos Santos, death benefits were paid to his widow, Elena Lising,
and his "daughter", Ana Joyce Delos Santos, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

On April 5, 1999, the RTC ordered respondents to submit documentary evidence to prove the jurisdictional facts of
the case and to comment on petitioner's opposition.9 Only Rosario L. Zalsos appears to have filed a Comment/Reply
to Oppositor's Opposition,10 after which the RTC ordered the parties to submit memoranda thereon. 11 On July 22,
1999, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.12

Meanwhile, on June 30, 1999, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
annulment of the adoption decree docketed as SP No. 53457.13 They claimed that no proceedings for the adoption of
petitioner took place in 1968 since the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
had no records of the adoption case. Petitioner's natural mother supposedly connived with the court personnel to
make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFI's order for initial hearing
was published in a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders in special proceedings.

Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered on October 4, 1999, the suspension of hearings in Spec. Proc. No. 204
pending the outcome of SP No. 53457.14 Subsequently, however, the Court of Appeals dismissed 15 SP No. 53457 for
failure to comply with the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 16 The said dismissal became
final and executory on March 8, 2000.17

Thereafter, on August 22, 2000, petitioner filed a motion before the RTC praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc.
No. 204 be finally resolved and that the petition be dismissed. 18 This was followed by an Urgent Ex Parte Motion19
filed by petitioner on October 17, 2000 praying for the immediate resolution of her opposition.

On November 16, 2000, respondents filed a Comment20 to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been
cast on petitioner's claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud." Respondents also
informed the RTC that they have filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, Tarlac City, for alleged falsification of the adoption decree and Judicial Form No. 43, docketed as I.S.
No. 00-1016.

Subsequently, the RTC issued a Resolution21 dated December 12, 2000 deferring resolution of petitioner's
opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against the latter. In the meantime,
the parties were enjoined from dissipating or disposing any or all of the properties included in the estate of Elena
Lising without order from this Court.

On December 13, 2000, Chichioco filed an Urgent Motion to Appoint Special Administrator22 before the RTC on
the ground that there was yet no true determination and appraisal of the decedent's universal estate. It was prayed
therein that the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed special administrator as he was "an
experienced and able person in the management of properties" and is "honest, impartial, competent and acceptable to
the majority of the interested parties."

In the meantime, the Provincial Prosecutor found probable cause to charge petitioner with falsification of public
documents per resolution dated January 5, 2001. 23 Petitioner thus appealed the said finding to the Office of the
Regional State Prosecutor.

On August 8, 2001, the RTC granted respondents' motion for the appointment of a special administrator and
appointed its branch clerk of court, Atty. Saguyod. 24 Petitioner moved for reconsideration on the grounds that the
branch clerk of court was disqualified from taking on the task of special administrator, and that Atty. Saguyod was
appointed without being required to file a bond. Petitioner also reiterated that the petition should be dismissed
because she is the sole heir of the decedent.25 However, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on
November 5, 2001.26
On January 14, 2002, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor reversed the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor
and dismissed the criminal complaint against petitioner.27 Undaunted, Chichioco filed a Petition for Review before
the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Simultaneously, Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin petitioner from
conducting business in a property belonging to the estate. Respondent Chichioco alleged that petitioner converted
the basement of Lising's residence into a billiard hall without authority of the special administrator. 28

Acting on said motion, the RTC issued a resolution on September 18, 2002, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Oppositor Ana Joyce Reyes is hereby enjoined from conducting business activity in any of the
properties left by the decedent. The Special Administrator is also empowered to take control and possession of the
listed personal and real properties of the decedent and those that may be found to be owned or registered in the name
of the same.

SO ORDERED.29

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution which was denied by the RTC on November 12,
2002. On even date, the DOJ also issued a resolution dismissing respondent Chichioco's Petition for Review in the
criminal case.30

Subsequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 74047,31 assailing the September 18, 2002 and November 12, 2002 resolutions of the RTC. Petitioner
alleged that said resolutions were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
since as sole heir, she had the right to possess and use the decedent's property, title over which automatically passed
on to her upon the latter's death. Moreover, the special administrator, Atty. Saguyod, had yet to file a bond and
submit an inventory of the decedent's estate.

Additionally, petitioner insisted that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed since the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of SP No. 53457 constituted res judicata as to the former. There was likewise no valid challenge to her
adoption and she consequently remains to be the sole heir of the decedent. Thus, she stressed that there was no need
for the appointment of an administrator or for the settlement proceedings.

In due course, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment32 nullifying the resolutions of the trial court. It held that the
presiding judge, Judge Cesar M. Sotero, gravely abused his discretion in appointing his branch clerk of court as
special administrator. Citing Balanay, Jr. v. Martinez, 33 the appellate court reasoned that such act could engender a
suspicion that Judge Sotero and his clerk are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Moreover, Atty. Saguyod
failed to comply with the requirements of a bond and inventory and could not therefore take control and possession
of any of the decedent's properties.

However, the appellate court refused to dismiss Spec. Proc. No. 204 since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a
judgment on the merits and did not operate as res judicata to the former. It was also incumbent upon petitioner to
prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouses since, according to the
appellate court, "imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of
doubt."

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied on March 15, 2005,34 hence this petition on the following
assigned errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE VALIDITY
OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF SECTION 47 OF RULE
39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457 WAS NOT A
DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.36

The petition is meritorious.

On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other
than those which she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner submitted a certification from
the local civil registrar's office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No.
43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-
Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper
officers. These are thus presumed to have been regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers
perform.37

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document38 required by law to be entered into the
public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of
individuals, is the local civil registrar's office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk
of court regarding details of petitioner's adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody,
are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner's
adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of
irregularities" will not cast a "cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are
presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action brought
principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed collaterally in a
proceeding for the settlement of a decedent's estate, as categorically held in Santos v. Aranzanso.40 Accordingly,
respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption decree in order to defeat petitioner's claim
that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the
decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be
deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Petitioner's status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and
no serious challenge has been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioner's adoption is
considered valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedent's estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.

As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41

From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an interest in the
estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of the fact that
in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New Civil Code).
The same holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case - considered valid. (Emphasis added)

Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting from the
decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to continue would
serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No.
204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative to the presumed validity of petitioner's adoption.

Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioner's opposition, which is
actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of administration and settlement of the estate, is a matter of
record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution before the RTC more than six years
ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The parties have likewise amply ventilated their
positions on the matter through their respective pleadings filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus
be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter, only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and
subsequently to this Court. The remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.42 This is in keeping
with the avowed purpose of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 are
extant in the records and there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be
dismissed.

Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioner's second assigned error.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-27082. January 31, 1978.]

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator,
PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P.
YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, Petitioners-Appellants, v.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely,
FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and
CRISPIN BORROMEO, Oppositors-Appellees.

[G.R. No. L-29545. January 31, 1978.]

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant, v. CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS

VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, Claimants-Appellees.

Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for Appellants.

Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for Appellees.

SYNOPSIS

In the special proceedings for the settlement of estate, the probate court deferred action on the project of partition
submitted by the administrator until the ownership of the twelve-hectare of land, claimed by the oppositors and
previously excluded from the inventory, has been determined in an ordinary action. Later, after noting that no
separate action was filed, the probate court approved the project of partition but excluded the twelve-hectare portion
claimed by oppositors. The probate court issued two other orders — one directing oppositors’ claim for
reimbursement of litigation expenses regarding the disputed land to be referred to the clerk of court reception of
evidence, and another, directing the administrator to account for the income of the estate and to pay the claim of
certain heirs.

These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the
deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the interstate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in
issue is the liability of the decedents’ estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding the
same land.

The Supreme Court held that the case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title in a
probate proceeding should be ventilated in a separate action since the probate court had already received evidence
on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from the inventory
and the only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

Assailed orders reversed and set aside, and case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

SYLLABUS

1. JURISDICTION; PROBATE COURTS; ISSUE OF WHETHER PARTICULAR MATTER SHOULD BE

RESOLVED BY THE PROBATE COURT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS GENERAL JURISDICTION OR IN ITS
LIMITED PROBATE JURISDICTION NOT JURISDICTIONAL. — Whether a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction
is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived."

2. ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURTS NOT TO PASS FROM QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP; EXCEPTIONS. — As a
general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceedings but
should be ventilated in a separate action except when justified by expediency and convenience, as when the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
 assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.

3. PROBATE; PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED WHEN PROBATE COURT JUSTIFIED IN RAISING UPON

QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP. — When the probate court had already received evidence on ownership of land and
the only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding, the just expeditious and
inexpensive solution is to require the parties claiming ownership to file in the intestate proceeding a motion in the
form of a complaint, setting forth their claim and stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, copies of which
should be served to the opposing parties who should answer the same within 15 days from receipt. After the issues
had been joined and no amicable settlement had been reached, a full-dress hearing should be held. The decision of
the issue as to what constitutes the estate of the deceased should include the partition thereof.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to the
deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action. Also in issue
in these two cases is the liability of the decedents’ estate for the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case
regarding that same land.

Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court’s resolution of August 18,
1969.

The spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possessed a
homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located in Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis
Occidental.

One parcel is identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is
now covered by transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7,
Appellees’ brief in L-27082).

The other parcel is identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No. P-8419
issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pangilinan, represented by Concepcion Pangilinan de
Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in L-27082).

According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares which
was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pangilinan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112, also forms part of
the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and
Apolinar, all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3) Francis,
Algerian, Benjamin, Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pangilinan, the children of Francisco Pangilinan who
died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller,
Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a
daughter of Francisco Pangilinan. See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).

Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on September 5,
1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos.
1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney’s fees in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February
27, 1952, Crispin Labaria v. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the lower court’s decision dated July 19, 1965 in
Civil Case No. 2440, Borromeo v. Coca (p. 11, Appellees’ brief in L-27082), three hectares which should be taken
from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;

(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and
designated as Lot No. 1112-B;

(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-C, and

(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the remainder of Lot No.
1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum: of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to
Concepcion Pangilinan, should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of heirs,
and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, Et. Al.) opposed that project of partition. They contended
that the proposed partition contravened the lower court’s order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of
the heir Francisco Pangilinan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share
to Francisco Pangilinan, should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares,
and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for P5,088.50 had not been properly allowed.

The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares,
which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispin
Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory court’s order of December 6, 1963) is
determined in an ordinary action.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On May 14, 1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan supplemental opposition wherein they asked that Lot No. 1920,
with an area of eight hectares, which lot was the instance of Concepcion Pangilinan, should be included in the
project of partition.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its volition, tackled once more the project of partition.
After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, it issued an
order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan.

That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower court did not
bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that
remainder.

That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower court’s order of December 6,
1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained by the Court of Appeals in its
decision in Atay v. Catolico. CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14, 1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused
to review that decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in L-23088-89, Atay v. Court of Appeals.

The other incident involves the lower court’s order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of the heirs of
Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of P1,459.49, as the value of the
produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was appropriated by the special administrator), be referred
to the clerk of court for reception of the evidence.

In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the
administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan the amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The court
further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount due from the special
administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan
as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.

The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan also appealed from
those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).

The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the
twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan
counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from
the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a
separate action or in the intestate proceeding.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In
essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding.
That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in,
or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action (Lachenal v. Salas, supra).

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are
all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez v. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA
892; Cunanan v. Amparo, supra, 3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 473).

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be
ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the
hearing of the motion for its exclusion from the inventory, The only interested parties are the heirs who have all
appeared in the intestate proceeding.

As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to incur
additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve
hectare portion.

The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to file in the intestate
proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 508, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their
claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the partition
made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their
parents, their long possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by
them in Civil Case No. 560, Labaria v. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of
the Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of that motion should be served upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer the motion within fifteen
days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the
violation section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate
of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one
third of the expenses incurred by Concepcion Pangilinan in Civil Case No. 560.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court should
receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay v. Catolico, supra, a full-dress hearing should be
held.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what
portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for the sum of P416 had already
been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26-27 Record on Appeal in L-29545). No
appeal was interposed from that adjudication.

After trial, the lower court’s decision on the issues as what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should
include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be allocated to Crispin Borromeo.
If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his
lifetime, should be passed upon.

Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan
for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be included in the trial,
the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They
should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court’s amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the
partition of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (L-270827) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968,
regarding the claim Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-
29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no amicable
settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from notice of the
entry of judgment this case.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set forth.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. NO. 155555 : August 16, 2005]

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners, v. LEONILA PORTUGAL-
BELTRAN, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002 1 Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 2 which dismissed,
after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.

From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations î º claims of the parties which they
sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3

On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4

On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein
co-petitioner.5

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein
respondent.7

On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. 9 In the deed,
Portugal's siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in
Caloocan in his favor.10

On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292
covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11

On February 18, 1984, Paz died.

On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased
Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal's name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on
March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."

Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the
Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint 15
against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title
issued in her name.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not
entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in
her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void
and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent's name and to issue in its
stead a new one in their (petitioners') name, and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees and
litigation expenses be awarded to them.

Following respondent's filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
the issues as follows:

A. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal Sr.?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.

d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. 16 (Underscoring
supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies of the parties
and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners' status and right as putative heirs had
not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18

In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:

The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.

xxx

In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial
evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a status and right to the
estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a
particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary
civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of
a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right.
Their status and right as putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to
state a cause of action.

The court, not being a probate(sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs' cause to establish their status
and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule
2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court's ratio decedendi in dismissing
the case as diametrically opposed to this Court's following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In
such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).

Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this wise:

To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of contention between the
two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is
not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime,
and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death benefits of
the deceased Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon
the other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property.
The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, - herein
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, - both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and
naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding,
not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly.
To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be
determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to
impinge upon this axiom. x x x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, 22 thus affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case.

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred when

I.

. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.

II.

. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary
ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment based on the
evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be
reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based on the above
disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cariño apply, a
decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the two marriages is
valid, and the determination of "heirship" and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of
the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.

Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.25 (Underscoring supplied).

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño
allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is
necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate court's ruling, they had established their
status as compulsory heirs.

In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and of
the TCT issued in her name.

In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on March 17,
1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots
had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in
turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint
for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to,
inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this
wise:

But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any
proof or even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays'that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are
the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .27 (Italics
in the original; underscoring supplied).

On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper recourse, found
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28
and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."

In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of letters of
administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of
Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7)
siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will
nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse
of the decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosa's request, her
nephew Arminio Rivera.

While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same
court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed
guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations
made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the
marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.

Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both
were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring,
inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they are the
legitimate children of Rafael Litam.

This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether
Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court's findings of fact
and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the
deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of
birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other
documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged
marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said
decedent."

This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have declared, in the decision
appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."

In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of
said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent's maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent's paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court's order
declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the
motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against
Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was
raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.

On Petition for Review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of
the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's
share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the
same court," this Court held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal
court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32

This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless
[therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir
of the decedent.

In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez
Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of
the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.

Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the ground of
lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to
her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive
father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.

After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties' agreement to suspend action or
resolution on Juanita's motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her
until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.

Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set
aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question to her
motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial
court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.

Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.

The probate court's approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to the
archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanita's share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:

As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong v. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive
and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor
has not elapse (Mari v. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his
share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or
for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra,; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April
24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but
allowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has
lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-
opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of
the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed
on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property,
it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein.37

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that
the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the
trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in the civil
case filed by petitioners,39 the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the
trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;

2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated issues
defined during the pre-trial.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v. LEONILA

PORTUGAL-BELTRAN DIGEST

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR. v.

LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
467 SCRA 184 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of a deceased.

FACTS: Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo. Subsequently Portugal married petitioner
Isabel de la Puerta and she gave birth to Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her co-petitioner.
Meanwhile, Lazo gave birth to respondent Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal.

Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver of
Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed,
Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land
in his favor.

Lazo died. Portugal also died intestate. Having such situation, Portugal-Beltran
executed an ―Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person‖
adjudicating to herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in
her name.
Puerta and Portugal Jr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City a
complaint against Portugal-Beltran for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication alleging
that she is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to
inherit the parcel of land. But such was dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action
on the ground that Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status amd right as putative heirs had not
been established before a probate court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Puerta and Portugal Jr. thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
RTC‘s dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Puerta and Portugal Jr. have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
Portugal-Beltran‘s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the title issued in her name

HELD: The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties
are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its
settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate
of Portugal is the parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of Puerta and Portugal Jr. as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to
the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil casesubject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason
to still subject Portugal‘s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of
Puerta and Portugal Jr.‘s status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
Puerta and Portugal Jr., the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
 [G.R. No. L-18148. February 28, 1963.]

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the
instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO
REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., Respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Romerico F. Flores for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; TESTATE PROCEEDINGS; DETERMINATION BY PROBATE COURT

OF QUESTION AS TO TITLE TO PROPERTY; GENERAL RULE AND EXCEPTIONS. — While as a general
questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, except where one of the
parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate
court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action
(Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Guinguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144), however, when the parties are all heirs of the
deceased, it is optional on them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so
submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 Mañalac v.
Ocampo, Et Al., 73 Phil. 661.)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURTS VESTED WITH JURISDICTION TO TRY CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN;
HEIRS REGARDING OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO DECEASED. — The
jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of the deceased regarding the ownership of properties alleged to
belong to his estate is vested in probate courts. This is so, because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees, and by liquidation is meant the
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses (Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil.
982).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBATE COURT VESTED WITH JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE IF PROPERTIES
BELONG TO CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. — The question of whether certain properties involved in a testate
proceeding belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively, is a matter within the jurisdiction of the
probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs.

4. OWNERSHIP; WAIVER BY PARTY WHO RAISES AN OBJECTION. — Where a party, by presenting a

project of partition including therein disputed lands. puts in issue the question of ownership of the lands, they can
not thereafter, just because of an opposition thereto, withdraw the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. There is a
waiver where the parties who raise the objection, are the ones who set the court in motion (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil., 229, 232), and they can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges the question
against them (Mañalac v. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661).

5. ESTOPPEL; SILENCE WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS REQUIRED. — To constitute estoppel, the
actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting
estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel (21 C.J. 1152-1153).

DECISION

BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties
mentioned therein.

The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. His will was
admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando,
Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of
the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos,
Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed
Isidoro.

"On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the
will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena
Reyes, whose share was allotted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an
opposition to the executor’s project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming
1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the
latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

"The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of
partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda
discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1)
that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the
conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the
collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no ‘lawful standing or grounds’ to question the validity of the donation;
and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.

"The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was
determinative of the original conjugal character of the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in
Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not
become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.

"On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the
donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or
mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code,
which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does
not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there
being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the
executor to file another, dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio
Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation Exhibit B between the instituted heirs of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were
conjugal properties of the deceased spouses.’ On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial,
reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties
mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the Court’s declaration of the nullity of the donation
‘without stating facts or provisions of law on which it was based.’ The motion for new trial was denied in an order
dated October 3, 1960."cralaw virtua1aw library

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for
review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having
limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the
rule.

In a line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be
passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, 1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the
question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. 2 However, we have also held that when
the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as
to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Mañalac v. Ocampo, Et Al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters
affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate
proceeding provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).

In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to
whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes,
or to the deceased husband exclusively?

At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by
appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its
decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to
its decision, because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or
broaden it. If appellants’ contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as
has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro
Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The respondent
Soriano’s objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the
estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a
mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived." Strictly speaking, it is more a
question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between
heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate has been recognized
to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of
the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the
assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. 3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent’s
liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition
in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this
end and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the
properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent’s estate are before the court, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so
long as no interests of third parties are affected. 4

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties
involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly
within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to
determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings,
including, of course, the widow, now represented, because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon
petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be
affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in
addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her
substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it
complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented
by respondents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court,
for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the
admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition
claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator’s asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of
the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing
so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the
petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court
take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the
opposition of the respondents." In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed
lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the
question of ownership of the properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court — and just
because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the
jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who
set the court in motion. 5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges the
question against them. 6

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties
involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties
in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have
knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because
silence without knowledge works no estoppel. 7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of
the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and
ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ.,
concur.

Makalintal, J., did not take part.

Endnotes:
G.R. No. L-44602 November 28, 1938

MARIA CALMA, as administratrix of the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ESPERANZA TAÑEDO, assisted by her husband Felipe Mamaual, and BARTOLOME QUIZON, Deputy
Sheriff of Tarlac, defendants-appellees.

AVANCENA, C.J.:

The spouses Eulalio Calma and Fausta Macasaquit were the owners of the property described in the complaint,
being their conjugal property. They were also indebted to Esperanza Tañedo, chargeable against the conjugal
property, in the sums of P948.34 and P247, with interest thereon at 10 per cent per annum. On October 10, 1933,
Fausta Macasaquit died leaving a will wherein she appointed her daughter, Maria Calma, as administratrix of her
properties. Upon the commencement of the corresponding probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, the said daughter, Maria Calma, was appointed judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased.

While these probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were pending, Esperanza Tanedo, on January
27, 1934, filed a complaint against Eulalio Calma for the recovery of the sums of P948.34 and P247. The Court of
First Instance of Tarlac rendered judgment for the payment of this sum. In the execution of this judgment, despite
the third party claim filed by Fausta Macasaquit, the property described in the complaint was sold by the sheriff.

Maria Calma, as administratrix of the estate of Fausta Macasaquit, now brings this action and asks that the sale made
by the sheriff of the property described in the complaint be annulled and that the estate of Fausta Macasaquit be
declared the sole and absolute owner thereof. lawphi1.net

The court absolved the defendants from this complaint.

The probate proceedings of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176
reading:

SEC. 685. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property
shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the
administration and liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties, being all of age and legally
capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to an extrajudicial
partition and liquidation of said property.

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay the outstanding debts
and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the manner and with the formalities established by
this Code for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of
said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that
belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made.

Prior to this Act, the liquidation of conjugal property was made under section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Interpreting the scope of Act No. 3176, this court, in the case of Caragay vs. Urquiza (53 Phil., 72), said that the
amendment introduced by this Act consists in authorizing the institution of testate or intestate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased spouse or of an ordinary action for the liquidation and partition of the property
of a conjugal partnership. It should be understood that these remedies are alternative, and not cumulative, in he sense
that they cannot be availed of at he same time, inasmuch as an anomalous and chaotic situation would result if
conjugal property were administered, liquidated and distributed at the same time in a testamentary proceeding and in
an ordinary action for liquidation and partition of property. Consequently, the testamentary proceedings of Fausta
Macasaquit having been instituted, the liquidation and partition of the conjugal property by reason of her marriage to
Eulalio Calma should be made in these proceedings, to the exclusion of any other proceeding for the same purpose.

Interpreting this same Act No. 3176 in another decision, this court, in the case of Cruz vs. De Jesus (52 Phil., 870)
said that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the wife, the legal power of management of the husband
ceases, passing to the administrator appointed by the court in the testate or intestate proceedings instituted to that
end if there be any debts to be paid. This doctrine has been confirmed in the other case of Ona vs. De Gala (58 Phil.,
881).

From the foregoing it follows that when Esperanza Tanedo brought suit against Eulalio Calma for the payment of
the sums of P948.34 and P247, which wee debts chargeable against the conjugal property, the power of Eulalio
Calma. legal administrator of the conjugal property while Fausta Macasaquit was living, had ceased and passed to
the administratrix Maria Calma appointed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. Hence, this being
an indebtedness chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio
Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this amount had to be filed in
the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit.

Having to be filed according to Act No. 3176 under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the
administration and liquidation of properties of deceased persons, it should be filed before the committee on claims in
said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the corresponding Court of First Instance, in
an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix.

On the other hand, he property described in the complaint is included among the inventoried properties subject to the
testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit because, belonging as it does to the conjugal property, it should,
under Act No. 3176, be included among the properties of the testamentary proceedings.

We conclude that, Eulalio Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife
Fausta Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against
said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings of the deceased
Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law, by filing it first with the committee on claims.

Wherefore, we hold that the sale of the property described in the complaint, made by the sheriff in execution of the
judgment rendered against Eulalio Calma for the collection of the indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
property, is void and said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the deceased Fausta
Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case.

The appealed judgment is reversed, without special pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 [G.R. No. L-2263. May 30, 1951.]

PAZ Y. OCAMPO, JOSEFA Y. OCAMPO, ISIDRO Y. OCAMPO, GIL Y. OCAMPO, MAURO Y.

OCAMPO, and VICENTE Y. OCAMPO, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CONRADO POTENCIANO, VICTOR
POTENCIANO and LOURDES POTENCIANO, Defendants. VICTOR POTENCIANO and LOURDES
POTENCIANO, Defendants-Appellants.

Salvador P. de Tagle for Appellants.

Amado A. Yatco and Rosendo J. Tansinsin for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; DISSOLUTION; HUSBAND CAN NO LONGER

LIQUIDATE, UNDER PRESENT RULE. — The decisions laying down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the
marriage by the death of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs are now obsolete. The present
rule is that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Rule 75, sec. 2; 2 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 3rd ed., p. 324).

2. TENDER OF PAYMENT AND CONSIGNATION; JAPANESE MILITARY NOTES CONSTITUTED LEGAL

CURRENCY. — Tender of payment and consignation of Japanese military notes, made in court during the Japanese
occupation, when the contract to be discharged which was that of loan with security, was still in force, must be held
to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from liability.

3. PACTO DE RETRO SALE, DECLARED AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. — Where it is not disputed that the
pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a loan with security, or an equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for
interest, the lenders had no right, through the unilateral declaration of one or both of them, to consolidate title in
themselves over the property given as security.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

From the findings of fact of said court, which are conclusive for the purposes of this appeal, it appears that on
February 3, 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed purporting to convey to his relative,
Conrado Potenciano, and the latter’s wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,500, a
town lot with a house of strong materials standing thereon. On that same day, Ocampo signed another document,
making it appear that, for an annual rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the
purchase price, the vendees were leasing to him the house and lot for the duration of the redemption period.

The property involved in the above transaction is located at the center of the poblacion of Biñan, Laguna, and, in the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, worth between 20 and 26 thousand pesos. Though registered in the name of
Ocampo alone, it in reality belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property.

The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, "extendible to another year," but several extensions
were granted, with the vendor paying part of the principal in addition to interests. The last extension granted was for
one year from February 3, 1937, and the period having elapsed without the repurchase having been made,
Potenciano, on January 24, 1939, filed with the register of deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of title,
on the strength of which the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title No. 18056 in the name of Potenciano
and his wife. This, however, did not close the avenue for settlement, for on February 28, 1939, with Edilberto
Ocampo and Rufina Reyes already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property for P2,500
within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period of time at an annual rental of P300 which, as may again be
noted, is equivalent to 12 per cent of the purchase price. On or about February 7, 1944, Paz Yatco sought to exercise
the option by tendering to Potenciano at his clinic in Manila the sum of P4,000, an amount sufficient to cover both
principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the money in court and brought an action in her
own name and as judicial administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and
to have the title to the property reinstated in her name and that of her husband.

Intervening in the case, Potenciano’s children, Victor and Lourdes, filed a cross-complaint, alleging that the option
to purchase granted by their father to plaintiff on February 28, 1939, was null and void as to the share of their
deceased mother Rufina Reyes in the property in litigation, which share passed to them by right of inheritance, and
that as to their father’s share in the same property they, the intervenors, were exercising the right of redemption
accorded by law to co-owners of property held in common, for which purpose they had already tendered him the
sum of P1,250 on the fifth day after they learned of said option through plaintiff’s complaint. To meet these
allegations, plaintiff amended her complaint by including the intervenors as defendants and alleging, in effect, that
the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, with the rental contract
thrown in to cover the stipulated interest of 12 per cent; that the option agreement for the repurchase of the property
within five years from February 28, 1939, and for the payment of rental for that period in an amount equal to an
annual interest of 12 per cent on the loan, was also meant to be in reality an extension of the life of the mortgage;
and that the tender of payment was valid, the same having been made within the extended period. The Court of First
Instance, after trial, upheld these allegations and gave judgment in favor of the children of Edilberto Ocampo and
Paz Yatco, who had substituted the latter after her death.

When the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, that court took a somewhat different view and rendered
judgment declaring:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) That contract Exhibit A entered into between Edilberto Ocampo and Conrado Potenciano was one of mortgage,
with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum;

"(b) That the ’option to purchase’ and the ’contract of lease’ (Exhibits E and E-1) were validly executed by
defendant Conrado Potenciano and binding upon the property in litigation;.

"(c) That appellants were not co-owners of said property, by inheritance of one-half of the same from their deceased
mother Rufina Reyes;.

"(d) That appellants were not entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto legal) of the other half of the
property belonging to their father Conrado Potenciano;.

"(e) That the late Paz Yatco exercised her option to purchase the property in litigation within the time she had to do
so;

"(f) That the consignation of the P4,000 in Japanese military notes, made with the Clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna in payment of the property in question, was in accordance with law and relieved the heirs of the
spouses Ocampo-Yatco from paying anew said purchase price;

"(g) Ordering defendant Conrado Potenciano to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance, sufficient in law to
transfer the title of the property in litigation to the heirs of the deceased spouses Edilberto Ocampo and Paz Yatco;
and

"(h) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 (Exhibit 1) and issue
in lieu thereof a new transfer certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto
Ocampo and Paz Yatco, upon payment by appellees of the corresponding fees and the registration in his office of the
deed of conveyance mentioned in the next preceding paragraph."cralaw virtua1aw library

This is the judgment that is now before us for review.

First thing to be noted is that the Court of Appeals found and it is not disputed that the pacto de retro sale made by
Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an equitable
mortgage, with simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, the lenders had no right, through the unilateral
declaration of one or both of them, to consolidate title in themselves over the property given as security. The
consolidation of title effected by Potenciano in this case was, therefore, null and void.

The Court of Appeals, however, held that the mortgage contract was superseded, through novation, by the option
agreement for the repurchase of the property mortgaged, and the appellants now contend that this was error because
Potenciano had no authority to enter into that agreement after the death of his wife. To this contention we have to
agree. The Court of Appeals erred in supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto
administrator of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that court in support of
its view are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death
of the wife, the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act No. 3176
(approved on November 24, 1924), now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3d ed., Vol. II, p. 324).

Furthermore, there is ground to believe that, as alleged by the appellees, the option agreement in question was
nothing more than a mere extension of time for the payment of the mortgage debt, since in the mind of the parties
the real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or equitable mortgage, though, as is usual in
these cases, it was given the form of a sale with right to repurchase.

It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned the necessary
amount in court, the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made in legal
currency (Haw Pia v. China Banking Corporation, * 45 O. G. [Supp. 9] 229), the tender and consignation must be
held to produce their legal effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from liability. (Art. 1176, Civil Code;
Limkako v. Teodoro, 74 Phil., 313.)

Under this view of the case, it is not necessary to consider the claim of the appellants Victor Potenciano and Lourdes
Potenciano that the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring them owners of the property in question, they having
inherited one-half of it from their mother and acquired the other half from their father in the exercise of their right of
legal redemption as co-owners. As ownership in the property never passed to their parents, these appellants acquired
nothing.

Wherefore, with the modification of the judgment below, let judgment be entered, declaring the obligation
evidenced by Exhibit "A", which is hereby held to be a mere contract of loan with security or equitable mortgage,
already discharged, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Laguna to cancel transfer certificate of title No. 18056 and
to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title for said property in favor of the heirs of the spouses Edilberto
Ocampo and Paz Yatco upon payment of the corresponding fees. With costs against the appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

Tuason, J., concurs in the result.