[G.R. NO.

146586 : January 26, 2005]

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS, Petitioner, v. JULIA DEL

ROSARIO, MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL ROSARIO, and HEIRS OF SANTOS
DEL ROSARIO, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review 1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 25 September 2000 and the Resolution
dated 29 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43929. The Court of Appeals
reversed the Decision3 dated 7 July 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 8, Malolos
("trial court") in Civil Case No. 70-M-92.

The Facts

On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and the
Heirs of Santos Del Rosario ("respondents") filed before the trial court a complaint for Recovery of
Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"). Respondents
alleged that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters ("Property") situated in
Kaypombo,4 Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in the name of respondents under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. Respondents alleged that the
Kaypombo Primary School Annex ("KPPS") under DECS was occupying a portion of the Property
through respondents' tolerance and that of their predecessors-in-interest. Respondents further alleged that
KPPS refused to vacate the premises despite their valid demands to do so.

In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPS's occupation of a portion of the Property was with the express
consent and approval of respondents' father, the late Isaias Del Rosario ("Isaias"). DECS claimed that
some time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion ("Donated Site") of the Property to the Municipality of Sta.
Maria ("Municipality") for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a regional trial court judge
("Judge Natividad"), prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance. KPPS started occupying the
Donated Site in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary educational needs of approximately 60
children between the ages of 6 and 8. Because of the donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650
square meter Donated Site. In fact, DECS renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.

During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted the existence and execution of
TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit "A"), Tax Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit "B"), and the tax receipts in
respondents' names for the years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"). On the other hand,
respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividad's affidavit that he prepared the deed of donation
(Exhibit "1") and the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipality's name (Exhibit "2"). Since there was no
dispute that the Property was registered in respondents' names, the parties agreed to a reverse trial with
DECS presenting its evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to the Municipality.

DECS presented three witnesses: Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal De Jesus and Judge Natividad, all residents of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The trial court summarized the witnesses' testimonies, thus:
Defendant, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, proceeded to present as its first witness,
Ricardo Nicolas, 78 years old, widower, housekeeper and residing at [K]aypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
since 1953 up to the present. He testified that during the duration of his residency in [K]aypombo, he
came across a public elementary school (KPPS); that as far as he knows, the land occupied by the primary
school was formerly owned by Isaias del Rosario who donated said land to the people of Sta. Maria,
Bulacan in 1959; that the act of donating said land was made during a political meeting in his residence
by Isaias del Rosario and in the presence of the then incumbent mayor; he actually saw Isaias del Rosario
and Mayor Ramos sign a document which is a deed of donation in favor of the Municipality of Sta.
Maria; that the signing was made in the presence of Judge Natividad who was then a municipal councilor;
that Isaias del Rosario is now dead but his death occurred long after the construction of the KPPS and that
Isaias del Rosario even witnessed the construction of the primary school.

Vidal de Jesus, the second witness for the defense, 65 years old, married, a barangay councilman of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and presently residing at No. 437 Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
testified that as barangay councilman, he was aware of the land problem of KPPS; that in 1991, the
barangay council and the children of Isaias del Rosario had a meeting in the presence of Judge Natividad,
during which, the latter told the children of Isaias del Rosario that the land had been donated by their
father. The children agreed but requested that the school be renamed after their father's name; that the
barangay council tried to secure a copy of the deed of donation from the Municipality of Sta. Maria, but
according to the people at the municipal hall, when they transferred to the new municipal building, the
deed got lost, only they were able to get a copy of the tax declaration in the name of the municipality of
Sta. Maria, Bulacan (Exh. "2"), a certification to that effect was issued by the municipal mayor (Exh. "3").
They went to the DECS office in Malolos, but could not likewise find a copy of the deed.

The last witness for the defense was Judge Eli Natividad, 63 years old, widower, resident of Kaypombo,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He testified that KPPS is very near his house; that the land occupied by said school
is formerly owned by Isaias del Rosario, a close relative; that as far as he knows, the municipality of Sta.
Maria is now the owner of the land; that when he was still one of the incumbent municipal councilors of
Sta. Maria in 1961, his relative Isaias del Rosario went to his house and told him that he wanted to have a
primary school in their place as he saw the plight of small pupils in their place; that the elementary school
then existing was very far from their place and Isaias del Rosario wanted to have a primary school to help
these pupils; that Isaias del Rosario was willing to donate a portion of the questioned lot for school site,
so that said matter was relayed to the municipal council; he also testified that he prepared the deed of
donation which was signed by Isaias del Rosario in his residence which was accepted by the municipality
of Sta. Maria, Bulacan through a resolution signed in the office of the secretary and the municipal mayor;
that a copy of said resolution could not be found due to the transfer of the municipal hall from the old to
the new building.5

Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R. Ignacio and Maria Del Rosario-Esteban, daughters of
the late Isaias. The trial court summarized their testimonies, as follows:

For the plaintiffs, Eugenia R. Ignacio, 59, residing at Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan testified that she
knows the plaintiffs as they are her brothers/sisters; that their father Isaias del Rosario died on April 18,
1966 long after the construction of the school and that she does not know everything about the donation
because her father never informed them of his dealings and she did not inquire from him about the
occupancy of the lot by the school.

Maria del Rosario-Esteban, 66, residing at Pulang-lupa, Pandi, one of the plaintiffs herein, testified that
she knows the property in question and that they own it by virtue of succession and that she cannot recall
how the school was constructed on the land; that her parents never donated any property because that is
their only property. Also, she stated that their father told them that he just lent the property temporarily to
the municipality and she never found any document conveying the lot in question to the municipality of
Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6

On 7 July 1993, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing respondents' complaint for recovery of
possession as follows:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, and for a much greater cause, the instituted complaint,
for recovery of possession of 1,181 square meters of land in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by
TCT No. T-222432 against the defendant is hereby DISMISSED without costs.7

The trial court explained its decision in this wise:

After a careful consideration of the facts at hand, taking into account the credibility and reasonableness of
the testimonies of the witnesses, the court is of the opinion that the defense was able to prove the due
execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of the same, in accordance with
Rule 130[,] Sec. 4. It is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria,
testified that he was the person who prepared the deed of donation and later notarized the same, and that
said deed was duly executed and signed before him and in his presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the
municipal board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, passed a resolution accepting the deed of donation in favor of the
said municipality. Noteworthy is the rule that a recantation/recollection of witness is a form of secondary
evidence to prove the existence/content of a document. Since the loss of the deed subject matter of this
case was likewise duly proved by the defense, exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy
of the same and without bad faith on its part, this Court is bent to give a greater weight to the secondary
evidence adduced by the defense vis - Ã -vis the title in the name of the plaintiff[s], most particularly in
this case, where the plaintiffs failed to make it appear that other and more secondary evidence is known to
the defendant and can be produced by them.

Further judging on the consistency, credibility and personality of the witnesses of the defense, notably
Judge Eli Natividad who was then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria at the time of the execution of the
deed of donation and who is thus in a best position to testify on the matter, not to mention the fact that
their testimonies were all under oath, the Court cannot avoid but give weight to their statements and
declarations. The defense witnesses were not induced by ill motive to testify in favor of the DECS,
considering that they will not derive any personal benefit, material or otherwise, from such an act. On the
contrary, such act may be considered heroic, as it is a manifestation of a moral compulsion to help shed
light to the truth.

On the part of the plaintiffs, it was testified to by Eugenia Ignacio that their father (donor) died on April
18, 1966, long after the school was constructed on the subject land with the occupation of the land by the
school which continued up to the present, and even after the land was allegedly transferred by succession
to the plaintiffs in 1976, it was only now that it comes to the mind of the plaintiffs to seek recovery of the
possession of the same. This, among other things, may be taken to favor the stand of the defense that the
land occupied by the school was in truth, donated to the municipality of Sta. Maria.8

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 25 September 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED and another one entered
ordering the defendant to vacate the subject premises.9
The appellate court denied DECS' motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated 29 December 2000.
Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that DECS failed to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of
donation as well as the Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The Court of Appeals
was not fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the alleged "lost"
deed of donation. Pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals' Decision read:

It is unfortunate that the Deed of Donation and the Resolution were not produced during the trial. The
defendant alleged that these were lost when the Municipality transferred to a new building. The defendant
resorted to proving the documents' existence through Sec. 5 of Rule 130 (B) of the Revised Rules on
Evidence by relying on the testimony of the witnesses who were present during the execution of the lost
documents. xxx.

xxx

The Court disagrees with the ruling of the lower court to the effect that the defendant was able to satisfy
the foregoing requisites. The defense was not able to prove the due execution or existence of the deed of
donation and the resolution, as well as the loss of these documents as the cause of their unavailability.

The Rule requires that the defendant must "prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of the witnesses in the order stated". However, the
defendant proceeded with the last resort-testimony of the witnesses, without even showing any diligent
effort to secure a copy of the deed of donation and the resolution. Note that Atty. Eli Natividad, then a
municipal councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the person who prepared the deed of donation and
later notarized the same. He also affirmed that the municipal board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan passed a
Resolution as he was a municipal councilor at that time such resolution was passed. He testified that he
furnished the municipal government, the Division Office of Education in Bulacan, the court of Sta. Maria
a copy of the deed. However, the defendant only submitted an affidavit showing that the deed can no
longer be located in the municipal government. There was no evidence to show that the defendant looked
for a copy from the Clerk of Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. If it is true that Atty. Natividad notarized the
deed, he should have a copy of it. In fact, such act of notarizing the deed should have been in his notarial
register. This notarial register was supposed to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First
Instance of the province and later, to the Chief of the National Library.

"Before secondary evidence of a writing may be introduced on the ground that the instrument has been
lost there must be proof that a diligent search has been made in the place where it is most likely to be
found and that the search has not been successful."

In the case at bar, this Court is not fully satisfied that a search was made or that there was diligence in the
search. The lower court erred in hastily concluding that the loss of the document was sufficiently
established when in fact, the defendant did not look for it in the office of the Clerk of Court and the
National Library. Since there was no diligent search, this Court finds it hard to believe the defendant's
theory that such documents existed because, for sure, if there really was a notarized deed or a resolution,
there must be a copy.

"Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted upon the theory that the original cannot be
produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered within a reasonable time by the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Until, however, the non-production of the primary evidence has been sufficiently
accounted for, secondary evidence is not ordinarily admissible."

For this Court to affirm the ruling of the lower court based on testimonies alone will work injustice to the
plaintiffs.10

The Issue

In its memorandum, DECS raises the sole issue of'

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER

FAILED TO PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE OF THE DEED OF DONATION
AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ACCEPTING THE DONATION, AS
WELL AS THE LOSS OF THE DOCUMENTS AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR UNAVAILABILITY.11

The Solicitor General contends that DECS had satisfactorily proven by secondary evidence the fact of
donation, the existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well as the municipal council
Resolution accepting the donation. DECS had also adequately proven the loss of these documents.
According to the Solicitor General, based on the evidence presented in the trial court, DECS established
that Isaias donated a parcel of land to the Municipality as the site of a school. Isaias executed a deed of
donation, which then Atty. Eli Natividad notarized. There was a municipal council Resolution accepting
the donation and expressing gratitude to Isaias. There was notice of this acceptance as DECS constructed
the school on the Donated Site during the lifetime of the donor, without objection on his part. Since all the
essential formalities had been followed, the donation made by Isaias long after the death of his wife
Nieves Gumatay is valid and proven by secondary evidence.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Formal Requisites of Donations of Real Property

The donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the formalities stated in Article
749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines ("Civil Code"). Article 749 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in a public
instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary public is a
public document.12 The notary public shall certify that he knows the person acknowledging the instrument
and that such person is the same person who executed the instrument, acknowledging that the instrument
is his free act and deed. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate
instrument. An acceptance made in a separate instrument must also be in a public document. If the
acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the donor shall be notified in writing of such fact. Both
instruments must state the fact of such notification.13

Best and Secondary Evidence

The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of donation
with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the original
document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be
no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when a party wants to
prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.

A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the exceptions in
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;

(b) xxx;

(c) xxx;

(d) xxx.

In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document
itself.14 A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when
the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad
faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or
primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof
of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order
of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion may change
this order if necessary.15

The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the deed of
donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation and
that he witnessed the signing of the document.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during cross-examination that he did not read and did not have
personal knowledge of the contents of the document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.16

In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus' testimony does not help to establish the deed of donation's existence,
execution and contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation. On cross-examination, Vidal
De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to the Municipality was only relayed to
him by Judge Natividad himself.17 If at all, DECS offered Vidal De Jesus' testimony to establish the loss
of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed
but the Municipality informed the barangay council that the deed was lost when the municipal office was
transferred to a new building. DECS also made a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved
futile too.

This leaves us with Judge Natividad's testimony. Judge Natividad testified that he prepared and notarized
the deed of donation. He further testified that there was a municipal council Resolution, signed in the
Office of the Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing gratitude to the donor.
He furnished the municipal government, the DECS Division Office of Bulacan and the clerk of court of
Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation.

DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation. There is
also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the
circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias' lifetime without objection on his part. There
is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both instruments.

Sufficiency of Proof of Loss

What mainly militates against DECS' claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate proof that
DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation may likely be
found and that the search was unsuccessful. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must
establish the existence and due execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the existence and
due execution of the document, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.18 The destruction
of the instrument'

may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact
of its loss, or by any one who had made, on the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the
place [or] places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.19

Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in
Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly "lost" when these
offices transferred to new locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Judge
Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other copies of the
deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated government offices.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The law requires him to keep
a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary public. The law specifies the
information that the notary public must enter in the notarial register. Failure to perform this duty results in
the revocation of his commission as notary public. We quote the provisions of the Notarial Law pertinent
to the case:
SECTION 245. Notarial register. - Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial
register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy
of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees
therefor.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Such register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) to any
notary public upon request and upon payment of the actual cost thereof, but officers exercising the
functions of notaries public ex officio shall be supplied with the register at government expense. The
register shall be duly paged, and on the first page, the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) shall certify
the number of pages of which the book consist[s].

SECTION 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the
person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature,
the date of the execution, oath, or acknowledgment or the instrument, the fees collected by him for his
services as notary in connection therewith, and; when the instrument is contract, he shall keep a
correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records a brief description of
the substance thereof, and shall give to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in
each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

xxx

At the end of each week the notary shall certify in his register the number of instruments executed, sworn
to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none, such certificate shall show this fact.

A certified copy of each month's entries as described in this section and a certified copy of any
instrument acknowledged before them shall within the first ten days of the month next following be
forwarded by the notaries public to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the province and shall
be filed under the responsibility of such officer; Provided, that if there is no entry to certify for the month,
the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of the certified copies herein required. (As
amended by C.A. 72, Sec. 1.)

SECTION 247. Disposition of notarial register. - Immediately upon his notarial register being filled,
and also within fifteen days after the expiration of his commission, unless reappointed, the notary
public shall forward his notarial register to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the province
or of the City of Manila, as the case may be, wherein he exercises his office, who shall examine the
same and report thereon to the judge of the Court of First Instance. If the judge finds that no irregularity
has been committed in the keeping of the register, he shall forward the same to the chief of the division
of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-marks. In case the judge finds that irregularities have been
committed in the keeping of the register, he shall refer the matter to the fiscal of the province - and in the
City of Manila, to the fiscal of the city - for action and the sending of the register to the chief of the
division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-marks shall be deferred until the termination of the
case against the notary public. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)ςrαlαωlιbrαrÿ

The Notarial Law mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary information
regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the notary public to
retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him when it is a contract.20 The notarial register is a
record of the notary public's official acts. Acknowledged instruments recorded in the notarial register are
public documents.21 If the instrument is not recorded in the notarial register and there is no copy in the
notarial records, the presumption arises that the document was not notarized and is not a public
document.22

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary public
should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the unavailability
of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also explained why he did not retain a copy of the
deed of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no evidence
showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or from the National Archives.
All told, these circumstances preclude a finding that DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to
obtain a copy of the deed of donation.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. In other words, preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of the
evidence - or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse party. This Court is not satisfied that
the evidence on the side of the party carrying the burden of proof is of preponderating weight.

Finally, DECS raises for the first time before this Court the issue on whether respondents' claim is barred
by the equitable defense of laches. DECS did not raise this matter in the complaint or during the trial in
the court below. DECS did not also raise this matter in its appeal to the Court of
Appeals.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

This Court cannot entertain this issue at this late stage, for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of
fair play, justice and due process.23

Much as we sympathize with the plight of the schoolchildren, we do not find reversible error in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot grant the relief DECS is seeking and disregard existing laws
and jurisprudence. DECS, however, is not without remedy. The government can expropriate at any time
the Donated Site, paying just compensation to respondents.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 25 September 2000 and the Resolution
dated 29 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43929 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. NO. 5510 : December 20, 2007]

SAJID D. AGAGON, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTEMIO F. BUSTAMANTE, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Sajid D. Agagon filed the instant administrative case against respondent Atty. Artemio
Bustamante charging the latter with malpractice and violation of the lawyer's oath. Complainant alleged
that respondent acted as Notary Public to the "Deed of Sale" allegedly executed by and between
Dominador Panglao and Alessandro Panglao. However, upon verification with the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, it was discovered that the alleged Deed of Sale was not
included in the notarial report. Instead, Doc. No. 375 appearing on Page 76 of Book XXXIII, Series of
2000 of respondent Atty. Bustamante referred to an Affidavit executed by a certain Teofilo M. Malapit.
Moreover, the Community Tax Certificates used by the parties in the Deed of Sale were fictitious, as
certified to by the City Treasurer's Office.

In his Comment, respondent admitted that he was the one who prepared the Deed of Sale. However, he
claimed that the parties merely dictated to him their Community Tax Certificate Numbers; that he
inadvertently failed to include the Deed of Sale in the report submitted to the Office of the Clerk of Court;
that it was pure inadvertence that the document that was reported and included in the report to the Office
of the Clerk of Court and which bore the document number assigned to the Deed of Sale was an Affidavit
executed by Teofilo Malapit.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa, the following
findings were made:

On May 11, 2001, Jofie S. Agagon, wife of herein Complainant, won in a labor case docketed as NLRC
Case No. RAB-CAR-12-0672 against Dominador Panglao. Dominador Panglao owned and operated a
meatshop. The decision in said case became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued on July
13, 2001. In the meantime, the meatshop business owned by Dominador Panglao was sold and transferred
to Alessandro Panglao. The meatshop was now called Sandro's Meatshop. Upon service of the writ,
Alessandro Panglao, owner of Sandro's Meatshop, verbally requested from the sheriff to temporarily
withhold the service of the writ with the promise that "they will satisfy the judgment in cash".
Subsequently, Alessandro Panglao offered P10,000 as "settlement" which was promptly rejected by Jofie
Agagon for being "way below the amount duly awarded by the NLRC". Hence, on August 20, 2001, a
levy was made on certain properties upon the issuance of an alias writ of execution.

Sometime in the last week of August, Alessandro Panglao, through his lawyer, herein Respondent, filed
before the NLRC in NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-12-0672 an "Affidavit of Title/Right of Possession of
Third Party Claimant" claiming that the levied properties were sold to him by Dominador Panglao and
that the same are exempt from levy. Alessandro Panglao desired to establish himself as a third party to the
case since the respondent in the labor case was Dominador Panglao, as owner of his own meatshop before
it was sold. Attached to this Affidavit is a supposed Deed of Sale dated October 6, 2000 executed by
Dominador Panglao and Alessandro Panglao and notarized by herein Respondent. The Deed of Sale
has the notarial series of: Doc. No. 375, Page No. 76, Book No. XXXIII, Series of 2000.
In a bid to verify the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, Complainant verified with the Office of the Clerk
of Court, RTC, Baguio City on September 4, 2001 that said Deed of Sale does not appear in Respondent's
Notarial Reports and, in fact, a different document corresponds with the aforesaid notarial entries.
Complainant submits a Certificate to this effect.

Moreover, on September 13, 2001, a check with the Baguio City Treasurer's Office showed that the
supposed Community Tax Certificate (CTC) numbers of the two affiants in the Deed of Sale were, in fact,
never issued to either of the two affiants. CTC No. 00856509 was not at all issued by Baguio City
although it is what is stated in the Deed of Sale; while CTC No. 01276192 was issued to a certain
Edilberto Bautista not to Alessandro Panglao.

x x x x1

Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

Respondent will have to be held accountable for GROSS NEGLIGENCE as a Notary Public. While there
is no basis to say that falsification was committed, Respondent's negligence constitutes in the a)
notarization of a document where the affiants have no valid and existing CTCs; and b) failure to include
the Deed of Sale in his Notarial Reports.

That such facts did occur are beyond dispute. The only question that remains is whether Respondent's
excuses can be accepted as satisfactory that would thus classify his acts as "excusable negligence." There
is nothing on record that can excuse Respondent or that can justify his lapses. That the Respondent did
not ask to see the CTC of the affiants and that the affiants simply dictated to him their CTC numbers out
of memory is an unacceptable excuse and explanation. This is gross negligence. In fact, it is funny. How
many people in this country can recite their CTC numbers from memory? Besides, how many people
would spend their time memorizing their CTC number? And yet, Respondent accepted this suspicious
behavior without question. This is not to say that no person in this world would want to memorize their
CTC number. Only that such an exceptional circumstance should have raised Respondent's suspicions. As
it turned out, the CTC numbers were merely plucked out of thin air by the affiants. In other words,
Respondent was fooled by his own clients.

Respondent's failure to include the Deed of Sale in his notarial report is another act of gross negligence.
This negligence is highlighted by the fact that said Deed of Sale was subsequently introduced into a
quasi-judicial proceeding when it was attached to Alessandro Panglao's "Affidavit of Title/Right of
Possession of Third Party Claimant". Its non-inclusion in the notarial report is inexcusable and for which
only the lawyer himself, and not his secretary, should be held to account.

The combination of these circumstances casts justified doubts upon the due execution and
notarization of the Deed of Sale.

Accordingly, Respondent should be held guilty of GROSS NEGLIGENCE as a Notary Public.

For the foregoing infractions, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
reprimanded for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and his notarial commission suspended
for one (1) year.

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified
the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and revocation and
suspension of respondent's notarial commission for two (2) years.
We adopt the findings of the IBP. However, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six (6) months and revocation and suspension of respondent's notarial commission for one (1) year
more appropriate under the circumstances.

There is no doubt that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law
when he failed to include a copy of the Deed of Sale in his Notarial Report and for failing to require the
parties to the deed to exhibit their respective community tax certificates. Doubts were cast as to the
existence and due execution of the subject deed, thus undermining the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process and diminishing public confidence in notarial documents2 since the subject deed was
introduced as an annex to the Affidavit of Title/Right of Possession of Third Party Claimant relative to
NLRC Case No. RAB-CAR-12-0672-00.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are the
acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts,
the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a document. The
notarial seal converts the document from private to public, after which it may be presented as evidence
without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as
an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. As early as Panganiban v. Borromeo, we held that notaries
public must inform themselves of the facts which they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal
transactions. They must guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.3

It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary

act.chanrobles virtual law library It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private
document is converted into a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary
proof of authenticity and due execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the
elementary formalities in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.4

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Moreover, the Notarial
Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice5 require a duly commissioned notary public to make the
proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act which
constitutes good cause for the revocation of commission or imposition of administrative sanction.
Unfortunately, respondent failed in both respects.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Artemio Bustamante is GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law, the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if
still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public
for a period of one (1) year. He is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this
Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as member of the Bar. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. NO. 6962 : June 25, 2008]

CHARLES B. BAYLON, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE A. ALMO, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This case stemmed from the administrative complaint filed by the complainant at the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) charging the respondent with fraud and deceit for notarizing a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) bearing the forged signature of the complainant as the supposed principal thereof.

Complainant averred that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his late wife, Rosemarie Baylon,
conspired in preparing an SPA1 authorizing his wife to mortgage his real property located in Signal
Village, Taguig. He said that he was out of the country when the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996,
and also when it was notarized by the respondent on June 26, 1996. To support his contention that he was
overseas on those dates, he presented (1) a certification2 from the Government of Singapore showing that
he was vaccinated in the said country on June 17, 1996; and (2) a certification3 from the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration showing that he was out of the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997.
To prove that his signature on the SPA was forged, the complainant presented a report4 from the National
Bureau of Investigation stating to the effect that the questioned signature on the SPA was not written by
him.

The complainant likewise alleged that because of the SPA, his real property was mortgaged to Lorna
Express Credit Corporation and that it was subsequently foreclosed due to the failure of his wife to settle
her mortgage obligations.

In his answer, the respondent admitted notarizing the SPA, but he argued that he initially refused to
notarize it when the complainant's wife first came to his office on June 17, 1996, due to the absence of the
supposed affiant thereof. He said that he only notarized the SPA when the complainant's wife came back
to his office on June 26, 1996, together with a person whom she introduced to him as Charles Baylon. He
further contended that he believed in good faith that the person introduced to him was the complainant
because said person presented to him a Community Tax Certificate bearing the name Charles Baylon. To
corroborate his claims, the respondent attached the affidavit of his secretary, Leonilita de Silva.

The respondent likewise denied having taken part in any scheme to commit fraud, deceit or falsehood.5

After due proceedings, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline recommended to the IBP-Board of
Governors that the respondent be strongly admonished for notarizing the SPA; that his notarial
commission be revoked; and that the respondent be barred from being granted a notarial commission for
one year.6

In justifying its recommended sanctions, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline stated that

In this instance, reasonable diligence should have compelled herein respondent to ascertain the true
identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the document, i.e., giving a third
party authority to mortgage a real property owned by another. The only saving grace on the part of
respondent is that he relied on the fact that the person being authorized under the SPA to act as agent and
who accompanied the impostor, is the wife of the principal mentioned therein.7
On October 22, 2005, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-109 which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's failure to
properly ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the nature of the
document, Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
Respondent's notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified (sic) from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years.8

In our Resolution9 dated February 1, 2006, we noted the said IBP Resolution.

We agree with the finding of the IBP that the respondent had indeed been negligent in the performance of
his duties as a notary public in this case.

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. In Santiago v. Rafanan,10
we explained,

. . . Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.
Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are
expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are dictated by public policy and
are impressed with public interest.11

Mindful of his duties as a notary public and taking into account the nature of the SPA which in this case
authorized the complainant's wife to mortgage the subject real property, the respondent should have
exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person who represented himself and was
represented to be the complainant.12 He should not have relied on the Community Tax Certificate
presented by the said impostor in view of the ease with which community tax certificates are obtained
these days.13 As a matter of fact, recognizing the established unreliability of a community tax certificate
in proving the identity of a person who wishes to have his document notarized, we did not include it in the
list of competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.14

Moreover, considering that respondent admitted15 in the IBP hearing on February 21, 2005 that he had
already previously notarized some documents16 for the complainant, he should have compared the
complainant's signatures in those documents with the impostor's signature before he notarized the
questioned SPA.

WHEREFORE, the notarial commission, if still extant, of respondent Atty. Jose A. Almo is hereby
REVOKED. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED to be reappointed as Notary Public for a period of two
years.
To enable us to determine the effectivity of the penalty imposed, the respondent is DIRECTED to report
the date of his receipt of this Decision to this Court.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the
personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. NO. 6882 : December 24, 2008]

MARISA BACATAN WILLIAMS and ORLANDO VERAR RIAN, JR., Petitioners, v. ATTY.
RODRIGO ICAO, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Maria Bacatan Williams and Orlando Verar Rian, Jr. (petitioners) administratively charge Atty. Rodrigo
Icao (respondent) for violation of the Notarial Law and for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful
conduct unbecoming of an attorney.1

In their Joint-Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment,2 petitioners allege that on May 23, 2002, respondent
notarized a Declaration of Heirship and Partition3 (the document) making it appear that three of its
signatories - Lucia Briones, Ramon Verar, and Martin Umbac - signed it in his presence when in truth
they did not. In support of their allegation, they gave the following details, quoted verbatim:

Proof that Attorney Icao was not present when the DECLARATION was actually signed came to light on
June 3, 2003 during the trial in Criminal Case No. 3051 held at MCTC Bacong, Negros Oriental when, in
his sworn testimony, Francisco B. Ventolero, one of the six signers, said that he was the one to carry the
document from one signer to the next to get their signatures. x x x

Additional support that the document was not signed in attendance with Attorney Icao is found where the
participants declared they signed the document on 14 January 2002 in Bacong as opposed to the
acknowledgment where Attorney Icao declares that they signed the document on 23 May 2002 in
Dumaguete City.

It is also apparent that Lucia Briones did not sign with Attorney Icao in attendance since her Community
Tax Certificate was not recorded, nor was any notation made as to how she was identified. In addition,
her printed signature (L. Briones) on page #2 is quite different from her written signature (Felicidad
Briones) on page #1 and #3 suggesting further that the signing was not attended by Attorney Icao. In
addition, it is commonly known amongst the participants that Lucia Briones lived in Cotabato for 20+
years before she died in 2004. It was equally known that she was deathly sick in 2002 which explains
why Francisco B. Ventolero had to take the document to Cotabato for her signature.

The style of the signatures of Francisco and Desiderio Ventolero also appear not to be under the guidance
of a legal expert since the family name of "Ventolero" is used on page #2 while the family name of
"Briones" is used on page #1 and #3. An attorney would never knowing[ly] allow such an inconsistency
in a legal document. Bouncing back and forth from one family name to another and from a written
signature on page #2 to thumbmarks on page #1 and #3 also seem to be highly irregular for a document
supposedly signed in front of a lawyer.4 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Petitioners additionally charge respondent to have conspired with Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez (Atty.
Enriquez), one of the signatories to, in the falsification, of the document.5

In his Comment,6 respondent, admitting that the document was not executed in his presence, claims that
before he notarized it, the parties thereto appeared before him and he ascertained their identities as well as
of those of their witnesses; that he explained to them the contents of the document which they
acknowledged to be true and correct; that all the parties acknowledged before him that the signatures
appearing thereon were theirs and that they executed the same freely and voluntarily; that he did not find
in the document anything contrary to law, morals and public policy since at the time of the notarization,
the signatories were accompanied by their counsel, Atty. Enriquez; that he did not require the presentation
of other documents to support the document as he was not privy to its preparation; and that petitioners'
complaint had already prescribed under Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP under which a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys prescribes in two years from the date of the professional misconduct.

Respondent attached to his Comment a Joint Affidavit7 of Ramon Ventolero Verar, Martin Umbac, and
Desiderio Briones Ventolero, who are among the signatories to the document, in which they attested to
having appeared before respondent to acknowledge as theirs the signatures they had previously affixed
thereon.

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8 While a mandatory conference/hearing was set on April 24, 2007,9 petitioners
requested that the case be resolved on the basis of the parties' position papers.10

In his Report and Recommendation,11 IBP Commissioner Edmund T. Espina (Espina), brushing aside
respondent's defense of prescription, citing Calo v. Degamo12 which held that disbarment proceedings do
not prescribe, found respondent guilty of violation of the Notarial Law.

Espina thereupon recommended that respondent be reprimanded, with warning that similar acts in the
future would merit severe penalty.

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of December 14, 2007, resolved to dismiss the case, viz:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.13 (Italics and
emphasis in the original)

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 averring that:

The Commission on Bar Discipline [sic] must have made an error by dismissing this case for "lack of
merit" considering that Commissioner Espina stated on page #7 of his report and recommendation that,
"The manner on which all the parties signed the document is highly irregular and questionable."
Furthermore, on page #8 the Commissioner added, "Sad to say, respondent miserably failed to refute the
allegations against him15 (Italics and underscoring in the original),

which motion the IBP forwarded to the Court.

The Court finds for petitioners.

On the technical issue of prescription, Frias v. Bautista-Lozada,16 holds that that prescription does not lie
in administrative proceedings against lawyers.

x x x As early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does not lie in administrative
proceedings against lawyers. And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,17 we declared that an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe.
 xxx

The CBD-IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative proceedings against lawyers from
this Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the
Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints against
lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by this Court.

Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the settled
ruling of this Corut. It should therefore be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra
vires.18

On the merits. The document does not bear the residence certificate number of Lucia Briones, one of the
signatories. In notarizing it without recording Lucia's residence certificate, respondent violated the
Notarial Law then effective19 which required the notary public to certify that a party to the instrument
which was acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from
the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place and date of issue as part of the certification.20 This
formality is mandatory and cannot be neglected, failure to comply with which results in the revocation of
a notary's commission.21

By respondent's admission, the signatories to the document did not personally sign it in his presence. He,
however, claims that they appeared before him and confirmed their identities and acknowledged that the
signatures appearing thereon were theirs. If indeed the heirs-signatories and their witnesses had personally
appeared before respondent, it is beyond comprehension why he did not ask them to affix their signatures
in his presence. By such omission, he failed to heed his duty as a notary public to demand that the
document for notarization be signed in his presence.22

More. The document contained false statements. Thus, it listed the signatories' counsel, Atty. Enriquez, as
one of the six heirs of Aurea Briones, albeit he is merely the legal counsel of the heirs.23 The Joint
Affidavit respondent attached to his Comment stating that there were five, not six, heirs should have
readily alerted him of such falsity.

Still more. The document states that Aurea Briones Ventolero died ab intestato during the Second World
War. The death certificate of the deceased on file at the Civil Registry states, however, that she died on
July 12, 1998.24 And the document states that the six signatories are heirs of Aurea Briones, whereas in
the Joint Affidavit attached to respondent's Comment, the three signatories-affiants claim that they are, as
well as of the deceased Aurea Briones' husband Ciriaco Ventolero, heirs of Aurea Briones.

Records show that Atty. Enriquez had in fact been previously suspended from the practice of law for two
years for his complicity in executing the same document.25

In notarizing a document containing false statements, respondent failed to discharge his duty to inform
himself of the facts to which he intended to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise.26

It bears recalling that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.27 It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notary
public.28 As a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, notaries public
must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties, lest the
confidence of the public in the integrity of the document will be undermined.29
No concrete evidence being appreciated from the records in support of the charge of complicity in the
falsification of the document, the same must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Rodrigo Icao is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law and from his commission as a notary public for a period of one year, effective immediately, with
warning that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
 [Adm. Case No. 5645. July 2, 2002.]

ROSALINDA BERNARDO VDA. DE ROSALES, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARIO G. RAMOS,

Respondent.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales by
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos for violation of Act
No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch. 11, otherwise known as the Notarial
Law, particularly Secs. 245 and 246 thereof.

In September 1990 Manuel A. Bernardo, brother of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de Rosales,
borrowed from Rosalinda the Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. 194464 covering Lot No. 1-B-4-H
in her name. The lot measures 112 square meters and is located at the back of Manuel’s house on Fabie
Street, Paco, Metro Manila. On 25 November 1990 Rosalinda sold this lot to one Alfredo P. Castro.
When she asked her brother Manuel to return her title he refused.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 22 October 1990 Rosalinda executed an Affidavit of Loss of her title and presented the affidavit to the
Register of Deeds of Manila.

On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to the property was already
transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in favor of Manuel
on 5 September 1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos on 1 October
1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No. 718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990.
Rosalinda however denied having signed any deed of sale over her property in favor of Manuel.

On 3 September 1991 Rosalinda filed with the NBI a complaint for falsification of public document
against her brother Manuel. The NBI invited respondent Atty. Ramos for questioning. The complaint
alleged among others that on 12 September 1991 Atty. Mario G. Ramos executed an affidavit before the
NBI admitting that when Manuel presented the purported Deed of Absolute Sale to him for notarization,
he (Atty. Ramos) found some defects in the document and that complainant Rosalinda was not around.
The NBI Questioned Documents Division also compared Rosalinda’s signature appearing in the Deed of
Absolute Sale with samples of her genuine signature, and found that the signature in the purported Deed
of Absolute Sale and her genuine signatures were not written by one and the same person.

On 5 October 1992 the NBI transmitted its findings to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with
the recommendation that Manuel and Atty. Ramos be prosecuted for Falsification of Public Document
under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and that Atty. Ramos be additionally
charged with violation of the Notarial Law.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The NBI also transmitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) photocopies of the NBI investigation report and its annexes, and a verified complaint 1 for
disbarment signed by Rosalinda. The CBD received the records on 5 October 1992. On the same date, the
CBD through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez directed respondent to submit an answer to the
complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice.
Respondent admitted in his Answer 2 that he had affixed his signature on the purported Deed of Absolute
Sale but failed to enter the document in his Notarial Registry Book. He also admitted executing before the
NBI on 12 September 1991 an affidavit regarding the matter. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint since according to him he only inadvertently signed the purported Deed of Absolute Sale
and/or that his signature was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence,
claiming that he simply relied on the assurances of Manuel that the document would not be used for
purposes other than a loan between brother and sister, and that he affixed his signature thereon with
utmost good faith and without intending to obtain personal gain or to cause damage or injury to another.

The CBD set the case for hearing on 3 March 2000, 28 April 2000, 16 June 2000 and 5 October 2000.
Complainant never appeared. The records show that the notices sent to her address at 1497 Fabie Street,
Paco, Manila were returned unclaimed. 3

On 26 January 2002 the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the CBD
through Commissioner Fernandez that the case against respondent be dismissed in view of complainant’s
failure to prosecute and for lack of evidence on record to substantiate the complaint. 4 The Investigating
Commissioner found that the notices sent to complainant were returned unclaimed with the annotation
"moved out," and that she did not leave any forwarding, address, and neither did she come to the CBD to
inquire about the status of her case. From these actuations, he concluded that complainant had lost interest
in the further prosecution of this case, 5 and so recommended its dismissal.

We cannot wholly agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It is
clear from the pleadings before us that respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing to register in his
notarial book the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent readily admitted.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It requires him to keep a
notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary 6 .and specifies what information with
regard to the notarized document should be entered therein. 7 Failure to perform this duty results in the
revocation of his commission as notary public. 8chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. 9 Notarization converts a private document into a
public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. 10. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by
a notary public and appended to a private instrument. 11

For this reason notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties. 12 Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance
would be undermined. 13 Hence a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein. 14 The purpose of this requirement is to enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that
the document is the party’s free act and deed. 15chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The notary public is further enjoined to record in his notarial registry the necessary information regarding
the document or instrument notarized and retain a copy of the document presented to him for
acknowledgment and certification especially when it is a contract. 16 The notarial registry is a record of
the notary public’s official acts. Acknowledged documents and instruments recorded in it are considered
public document. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records and there is no
copy of it therein, doubt is engendered that the document or instrument was not really notarized, so that it
is not a public document and cannot bolster any claim made based on this document. Considering the
evidentiary value given to notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the document in
his notarial registry is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was notarized when in
fact it was not.

We take note of respondent’s admission in his Answer that he had affixed his signature in the purported
Deed of Absolute Sale but he did not enter it in his notarial registry. This is clearly in violation of the
Notarial Law for which he must be disciplined.

Respondent alleges that he merely signed the Deed of Absolute Sale inadvertently and that his signature
was procured through mistake, fraud, undue influence or excusable negligence as he relied on the
assurances of Manuel A. Bernardo, a kababayan from Pampanga, that the document would not be used
for any illegal purpose.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

We cannot honor, much less give credit to this allegation. That respondent notarized the document out of
sympathy for his kababayan is not a legitimate excuse. It is appalling that respondent did away with the
basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a friend and client. In doing so,
he displayed a decided lack of respect for the solemnity of an oath in a notarial document. He also
exhibited his clear ignorance of the importance of the office of a notary public. Not only did he violate the
Notarial Law, he also did so without thinking of the possible damage that might result from its non-
observance.

The principal function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to
the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force
of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary
public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. 17 Where the
notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey
the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. 18 Failing in this, he must accept the
consequences of his unwarranted actions.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

From his admissions we find that Atty. Mario G. Ramos failed to exercise the due diligence required of
him in the performance of the duties of notary public. We do not agree however that his negligence
should merit disbarment, which is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. Disbarment should never
be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain
a member of the bar. Removal from the bar should not really be decreed when any punishment less severe
— reprimand, temporary suspension or fine-would accomplish the end desired. 19 Under the
circumstances, imposing sanctions decreed under the Notarial Law and suspension from the practice of
law would suffice.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, the commission of
respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos as Notary Public, if still existing, is REVOKED and thereafter Atty.
Ramos should be DISQUALIFIED from reappointment to the office of Notary Public.

Respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective immediately. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court his receipt of this Decision to
enable it to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.

The Clerk of Court of this Court is DIRECTED to immediately circularize this Decision for the proper
guidance of all concerned.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.chanro