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Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Cavite, from the judgment of March 27, 1913, whereby the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge, dismissed the complaint with costs agai

of Cavite, representing the municipality of that name, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of said province alleging that the
9, had exclusive right, control and administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite; that th
the municipality of Cavite, the defendants having constructed thereon a house, through payment to the plaintiff for occupation thereo
en required by the municipality to vacate and deliver possession of the said land, but more than the sixty days within which they havin
cto null and void and of no force or effect, for the said land is an integral portion of a public plaza of public domain and use, and the m
occupy or to retain the said land under leasehold, or in any other way, their occupation of the parcel being furthermore illegal; and th
osts against the defendants.

fendants, in their answer of April 10, 1912, they admitted some of the allegations contained in the complaint but denied that the parce
g if they refused to vacate said land it was because they had acquired the right of possession thereof. As a special defense they alleg
nd in a cross-complaint they alleged that on the land which is the subject matter of the complaint the defendants have erected a hous
the extent of P3,000, wherefore they prayed that they be absolved from the complaint, or in the contrary case that the plaintiff be sen

dered the judgment that he been mentioned, whereto counsel for the municipality excepted and in writing asked for a reopening of th

ncil of Cavite by resolution No. 10, dated July 3, 107, Exhibit C, leased to the said Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of Plaza Sole
t 1) that she has paid the land tax on the house erected on the lot.
d in Act No. 1039 of the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan prepared by a naval engineer and submitted as evidence by the
e called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so proven by the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses.

he municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad. In the case of Nicolas vs. Jose (6 Phil. Rep., 589), wh
o is sought that inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this plaza occupied by them, this court decided that neith
t transferable property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name, because he intention of Act No. 1039 was that the said plaza a
it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which if for public use and is reserved for the common benefit.

he provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service

907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In lea
not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its
ds, rivers, fountains, etc."

Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing le
possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all
its origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim that the plaintiff municipality indemnity her f

e, that the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as the lease of said parcel of land is null
mages, but the municipality must in its turn to the defendant the rentals collected; without finding as to the costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines


Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for G.R. No. 170757
himself and in behalf of his co-heirs
LODOVICO, RICARDO, Present:
BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed
VALIAO and NEMESIO M.
GRANDEA, VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
Petitioners, PERALTA,
ABAD,
- versus- MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MACARIO Promulgated:
ZAFRA, and MANUEL YUSAY,
Respondents, November 28, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, granting petitioners' application for registration of title
over a parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On August 11, 1987, petitioners[4] Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo, Bienvenido, all


surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the RTC of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental an application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535
square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros
Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay filed their
Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds: (1) the land applied for
has not been declared alienable and disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the
application for registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payments/receipts of
applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/es not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for
or of their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in
the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel of land
applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the Republic, which is not
subject to private appropriation; and that the present action is barred by a previous
final judgment in a cadastral case prosecuted between the same parties and involving
the same parcel of land.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss. Trial
thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired
the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio),
who purchased the land from a certain Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of
Sale[5] dated May 19, 1916 entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio
possessed the land in question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's
possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in
the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the applicants as co-heirs possessed
the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed
them of their property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion
and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of possession over the
subject property, petitioners submitted in evidence Tax Declaration No.
9562[6] dated September 29, 1976 under the names of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application
for registration of the subject property, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and decrees
registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present proceedings and the registration
of title thereto, in favor of the applicants, who are declared the true and lawful
owners of said Lot No. 2372, except applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right
to Macario Zafra.

Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of registration and
Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the applicants, Heirs of Basilio
Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and
Nemesio Grandea, subject to the rights of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and
Manuel Yusay over said lot whose fishpond permits are declared VALID and will
expire on December 31, 2003.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic, through
Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the
trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. The CA ruled that the
classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and in the absence of such classification,
the lands remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the same parties
herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot No. 2372 belongs to the
Republic. The CA held that such judgment constitutes res judicata that bars a
subsequent action for land registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part
of the inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove that they
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED.


Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated December 15, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for registration of title filed by
petitioners-appellees, DECLARE as moot and academic any and all claims of
private oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and DECLARE the subject parcel
of land to be inalienable and indisposable land belonging to the public domain.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a


Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the present petition with the following
issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG CADASTRE IS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY THE APPLICANT
WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CAD.
CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO
ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R. NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS
FAR AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS CONCERNED.

IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF THE APPLICANTS
THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM FOR PRESCRIPTION.[9]
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain. The possession of applicants' predecessors-in interest since 1916
until 1966 had been open, continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said
land into a private land. The subject lot had already become private in character in
view of the length of time the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had
possessed the subject lot, which entitles them to the confirmation of their title.
Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in a cadastral proceeding does not
constitute res judicata in a subsequent application for registration of a parcel of land.

In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the present
petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain and whether petitioners have the right to have the said property registered in
their name through prescription of time are questions of fact, which were already
passed upon by the CA and no longer reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact
of the CA, when supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on the
parties. The OSG further claims that petitioners failed to prove that the subject lot is
part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain and that petitioners'
application for land registration is already barred by a prior decision in a cadastral
case. Lastly, the OSG asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to
prove that their possession over the subject lot applied for had been open, peaceful,
exclusive, continuous and adverse.

Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts and that
only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function
of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and
are, as a rule, binding on this Court. This rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to
those of the trial court.[10] Due to the divergence of the findings of the CA and the
RTC, the Court will now re-examine the facts and evidence adduced before the lower
courts.

Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as


the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly-authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-


interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms part of the
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fideclaim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.[11] These the petitioners must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.[12]

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any
ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have
been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private
person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. [13]Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person
by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public
domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter
how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. [14] The burden of
proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that
the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[15]

There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.[16]

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question
has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the
absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already
classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable
public domain.[17] Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.

With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that on July
11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the then CFI of Negros
Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings relative to three lots, one of which is
Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in its Order[18] dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot
No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. It found that after the subject lot was declared
public land, it was found to be inside the communal forest.On appeal, the CA, in its
Decision[19] dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error and affirmed the
decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition elevating the case to this Court
was dismissed for lack of merit.[20] In the present case, the CA, in its Decision dated
June 23, 2005, ruled that such judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a
subsequent action for land registration on the same land.

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court held that a judicial declaration
that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided
he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48[22] of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject
land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain, they failed
to demonstrate that they by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated
by the law.

It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of ownership
to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which
are mereconclusions of law than factual evidence of possession.[23] Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would actually exercise over his own property.[24]

The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their predecessors-in-
interest's possession and ownership over the subject lot fail to convince
Us.Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession of the land way back in 1916. Yet
no tax declaration covering the subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly
occupied the subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in evidence. Other
than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly introduced
improvements on the subject property, there is nothing in the records which would
substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was in possession of Lot No. 2372 since
June 12, 1945 or earlier, the period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners'
assertion that Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at
best, conjectural and self-serving.

As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to 1966,


petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration dated September 29,
1976. At best, petitioners can only prove possession since said date. What is required
is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12,
1945 or earlier.[25] Petitioners failed to explain why, despite their claim that their
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept of an
owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare the
same for purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are
not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not
supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may have been declared for
taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration, or of their
predecessors-in-interest, but it does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[26]

Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2)
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of
the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.


CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case No. 03,
is AFFIRMED. The application for registration of title filed by the petitioners
Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio
Grandea, over Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Sesinando E.
Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 27-38.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 39.
[3]
CA Records, pp. 82-104.
[4]
Represented in this case by Pacifico Valiao.
[5]
Exhibit F, records, p. 28.
[6]
Exhibit J, id. at 333.
[7]
CA records, pp. 103-104.
[8]
Rollo, p. 38.
[9]
Id. at 13.
[10]
Guillang v. Bedania, G.R. No. 162987, May 21, 2009, 588 SCRA 73, 84.
[11]
Republic v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 610, 619, citing Mistica v. Republic, G.R.
No. 165141, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 401, 408.
[12]
Mistica v. Republic, supra, at 401-411.
[13]
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91,101-102.
[14]
Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006 , 492 SCRA 272, 291.
[15]
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 and 173775,
October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 164, 192.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Arbias v. Republic, G.R. No. 173808, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 582, 596.
[18]
Records, pp. 102-107.
[19]
Id. at 108-113.
[20]
CA decision, rollo, pp. 34; OSG Comment, rollo, pp. 94.
[21]
G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing Director of Lands v Court of Appeals, No. L-47847,
July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433.
[22]
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under abona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).
[23]
Republic v. Carrasco, G.R. No. 143491, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 150, 160; Republic of the Phils. v.
Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607, 620 (2004).
[24]
Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., supra note 14, at 292-293.
[25]
Republic v. Bibonia, G.R. No. 157466, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 268, 276-277.
[26]
Arbias v. Republic, supra note 17, at 593-594.

Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

RNA, all surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners,

ODRIGUEZ, EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO,

XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Bar
ugust 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of t
een Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and Resolution No. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferr

29, 1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

dents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bid
r the land the body of water found within their titled properties, stating therein, among other things, that "to pursue the case, the same
ed in their favor as it is now clear that after the National Irrigation Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the land, no water get

ership in favor of herein petitioners of the fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was originall
m a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to priva
anaoag, 38 Phil. 4551; and considering further that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Administ
Compromise Agreement null and void and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.

ation binding upon this Court. The Municipality of Bugallon, acting thru its duly-constituted municipal council is clothed with authority t
ing suffices as a constructive notice to the whole world.

re the same null and void for being contrary to law and public policy. The Court further resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lac
Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

city as Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-app

ila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.

Raul I. Goco and Magno B. Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land Authority for petitioners-appellants.

68, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:

onstitutional and invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process and payment of just compensation. R
he City of Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he had issued in the name of the Land Tenure Adm
el of land in the name of the City of Manila.1

on court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parce
on August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the aforementioned parcel of
cancelled and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura Villanueva for the portions purchased by her. When the last sa
covering the residue thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the name of

adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City prope
Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof.2
of the Philippines by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the information that the same resolution was

se of Representatives by then Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the property in question as patrimonial prope

ot seem to have use thereof as a public communal property. As a matter of fact, a resolution was adopted by the Municipal Board of M
property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. Therefore, it will be to the best int
nts have expressed their willingness to buy the said property, it is but proper that the same be sold to them.4

men Manuel Cases, Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor Yñiguez as House Bill No. 1453, with the following explanatory note:

late, which is reserved as communal property into a disposable or alienable property of the State and to provide its subdivision and s

with an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. ... On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila in its regular session
operty of the State. There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and sold to bona fide occupants. This p

andless and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution, which states that the promotion of Social Justice to insure the well-
henever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.

nts thereof, approval of this Bill is strongly urged.5

te where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced by the Congressional Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion of which is as

yor Lacson was still alive, we approved a similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor Lacson came here and protested against the app

eliminated and that is why the City of Manila has no more objection to this bill.

ering that Mayor Villegas and Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not want to pretend t

approve this bill on second reading.

ral Senetors said aye and nobody said nay.

Act No. 4118. It reads as follows:

he District of Malate, City of Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is hereby converted into disposal or alienable land of th
ceed one hundred and twenty square meters in area and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants the
ovided, further, That no person can purchase more than one lot: Provided, furthermore, That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of an
lease the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per annum of the assessed value of the property leased: And

bona fide occupant of the above lots shall be instituted and any ejectment proceedings pending in court against any such tenant or b

in the payment of any rentals, the amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be payable in twenty-four equal monthly installmen
aged, or otherwise disposed of within a period of five years from the date full ownership thereof has been vested in the purchaser wi

of the price of the lot purchased by him, his widow and children shall succeed in all his rights and obligations with respect to his lot.

ue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

unds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act.

d accordingly.

he property involved, then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded the Land Tenure Administration) ad
division lots by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants.6

d receipt of the proposed subdivision plan of the property in question and informed the Land Authority that his office would interpose n

No. 4118, the Land Authority, thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor, f
h the knowledge and consent of the Office of the City Mayor.8

by the, City authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the Register of Deeds

r on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly organized pu
r of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as u

the trial court and approved by respondent Judge, the parties waived the presentation of further evidence and submitted the case fo
due process of law and payment of just compensation. The respondents were ordered to undo all that had been done to carry out the

o wit:

nal" which is a portion of the public domain owned by the State; that it came into existence as such when the City of Manila, or any pu
set aside portions of the public domain for a public plaza, a church site, a site for public buildings, lands to serve as common pasture
that in the case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such immediate acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the
land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the municipality's governmental functions.

purpose and had not been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some public buildings; that this circumstance confirms the
se of its inhabitants; that the present City of Manila as successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign
of its paramount title.
h authority to govern a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given political subdivision, and the extent o
e control over municipal corporations is not absolute and even if it is true that the City of Manila has a registered title over the propert

mmunal use, and this classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if the City of Manila feels that this is wrong and its interests hav
uestion as communal, the Courts certainly owe it to a coordinate branch of the Government to respect such determination and should

urt, which read thus:

that the property in question is communal property. This contention is, however, disproved by Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 iss
ner in 'fee simple' of the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of confirmation and registrati
of title indicating that the land was 'communal' land as contended by the respondents. The erroneous assumption by the Municipal Bo

o declare that the land in question was 'communal' land and the courts have no power or authority to make a contrary finding. This co
sable or not. Such power does not, however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and municipalities in their 'pat

palities are divided into properties for public use and patrimonial property. Art. 424 of the same code provides that properties for public
r municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial. Tested by this criterion the Court finds and holds that the

mmunal' and, therefore, such designation is conclusive upon the courts. The Courts holds otherwise. When a statute is assailed as un
States Supreme Court speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held:

does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give effect? It is emphatically the province and duty of the jud
ust either decide that case conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting r

judicial power is superior to the legislative power. It simply means that the power of the people is superior to both and that when the

ed, and it is that the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred of e
porate or private capacity, following the accepted doctrine on the dual character — public and private — of a municipal corporation. A
quisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes established by law for the acquisition of ownership and other real righ
the creation of the municipality (Unson vs. Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property ex
municipal corporation pertains.

country under the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios). The municipalities of the Philippine
ht be granted by the Government for communal purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the mun

ovince, in representation of the Governor General, designated the territory for their location and extension and the metes and bounds
n of the church, and as sites for the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa real, as well as of the lands wh
an vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220) (Emphasis supplied)

he possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held
or after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision
ions, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).

s property devoted to public use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their property or rights w
wn funds, the legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of ac
eated by the legislature, even without compensation to the city, was not violative of the due process clause of the American Federal C

ntrol of the local municipality, of its creation and of all its affairs, has the right to authorize or direct the expenditures of money in its tre
ties ... . The local municipality has no such vested right in or to its public funds, like that which the Constitution protects in the individu
ehner, 37 Md. 180: "It is of the essence of such a corporation, that the government has the sole right as trustee of the public interest,

n of the municipal airport to the commission without compensation to the city or to the park board, does not violate the Fourteenth Am

e act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered with by t

ht of Article III, Sections 1, subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which ordain that no person shall be deprived of his property with

of its property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation. It is now well established that the presumption is
law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringeme
. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in this case as the law assailed does not in any manner trenc
explanatory note of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118, reads in part as follows:

andless" and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution which states that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well
henever an opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.

e patrimonial property of the City of Manila into disposable alienable land of the State and placing it under the disposal of the Land Te
on shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law". In support thereof reliance is placed on the ruling in Provin
process of law and without payment of just compensation since it has no absolute control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule i
The property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary cap
d by the sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government, through the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor Gene
power to deal with it as such, the state not being bound by the mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.

of the State over said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio
cate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the p

y the City's own official act, which is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as bidden. If it were its patrimonial property why s
gnition of the fact that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes.
nt of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property
t court that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the State a
people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.

character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: And this was done at th
exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitut

Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The certificate of title over the property in the name of the City of Manila w
of the City Mayor. To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a lette
Authority to bona fide applicants." On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical Adviser, acknowledg
egoing sequence of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity and observance of due process in the reversion of the property to t
se or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought of having

d untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.

Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

O, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNAB
, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMA

t and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.

d Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacin
h labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob an
none.

Amt. due from


Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97

2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08


3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36

4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24

5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)

6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40

7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34


8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to
lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.
11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34

13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88

14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32


15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44

16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16


17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98

18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68

Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.

20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84

21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40


22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60

23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

P7,580.69

ed for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive
and on each defendant, made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to v

d opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they vacate the said premises, and the co

ound that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

e on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4
ing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. H

ower, to make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court it

ts. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordina
e 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional

nts have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permi
nimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right to possession is paramo
ng.

dge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.

despread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They
operty whenever and wherever convenient to their interests — without as much as leave, and even against the will, of the owner. The
re thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of
procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of so
d squatters have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them, violation of law means nothing. With the res
y of the permits granted defendants herein.

and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. T
ed to remain on city property.

mits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila.9

r considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giv

levate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper offic
it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an o

n or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.

They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that ho
e of constructing the school building annex is paramount.10

uisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the
a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction".12

d well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.13

that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that notice for them to vac
ble entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to rema

So ordered.

cur.
es of Court; Veluz vs. The Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 42 Phil. 557, 563.

uason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Joson vs. Nable, 87 Phil. 337, 340; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. de la R

nto vs. Lacson, 50 O.G. No. 29, pp. 5095-5096.

ments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 274.

Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
oreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary, respondents.

T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON T

g for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary r
of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.

3, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment

n extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by a second motion for an extension of another t
ing the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have been pending. After the comment was filed, the

ine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:

pproximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;

meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and

ential lot which is now vacant.

ational development projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and th

twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese govern
curements are divided into those for use by the government sector and those for private parties in projects as the then Nati
ational development projects.

edule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The R
ne Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs

apan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation —
ould be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) building
d by the Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Phil
between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the disposition/utilization o

ntities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Ja

, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been
st scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed such that t

92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principa
olved at the same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.

and

he Roppongi property?

nt to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296 in making the property availabl
ng discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the right to be informed about the bi

acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine govern

vice" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can atta
eparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are held by the S
nated nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of
measure constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.

erty is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex
ry 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a

le, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial property because
he Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Ph
(4) the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which
(6) the deferment by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment by the Senate
ee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.

xecutive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He no
iolates:

ipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution; Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141). i•t•c- aüsl

the national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);
on 7, Article III, Constitution);

o citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); a

interest (Section 28, Article III, Constitution).

ive order is a misapplication of public funds He states that since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi property were n
selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have th
se law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted.

the three related properties were through reparations agreements, that these were assigned to the government sector and

d by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of procurement which bind both the Philippin

rty has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.

ienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of
the object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the Philipp

orts and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;

tended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

d in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

s property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?

s not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from
til there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 1

change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public
ibutable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve

pongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonmen
in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties
n in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The execut
ther disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filip

er laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other

three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiate
or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by Executive Order No. 296.

s for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not w
ose reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department to sell the
roperty outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.

isting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.

sist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Jap
y without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.

A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that th
See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance i

perty belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belongi

itus rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor t
who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
when there is no showing that it can be sold?

investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in
dy convened for more than a year.

ominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.

rty. — In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conve
e the necessary papers which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philipp
ppines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer

cutive Order No. 292).

perty of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the gov

hilippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.
e name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or ins

ole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and

ppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it
ich raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind the decision t

onstitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the Presid
y nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the procee
view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the property became alienable nor di
monial and alienable by authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic development projects inc

0 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.

ublic domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling

perly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil
tatute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312

the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the Japanese military occ
Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the monu
ino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died
llo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)

ent in atonement for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for deaths, physical dislocation and ec

its significance today remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war ended, inspire of the passage of 32

-92047, p. 9)

s fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike.
mportance and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20
g observations only for emphasis.

pongi property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor General was at best ambiguous, althoug

hority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our properties abroad to be used for
ether; and ill any case it is not a law. The sale of the said property may be authorized only by Congress through a duly enact

ere every public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid authorization. I am happy to note tha

ns which could help in further clarifying the issues.

down or determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies determined by Congress are embodied in le
s that is the policy - determining branch of government.

by Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing such laws, are in accordance with the Con

greement between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such agreement, this property was acquired by the Ph
d for public service, squarely falling within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ntended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

rst transformed into private property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of the state. 1 The transformation
sification. Consequently, it is Congress which can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion p

property) must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48

perty of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the gov

public of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

but titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the

ikewise bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise.
ng or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a public dominion property to a sta

aining order earlier issued by this Court.

ature as property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the State. I understand that the partie
nd human commerce. The lone issue is, in the light of supervening developments, that is non-user thereof by the National G
6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the program's financing, State assets sold; the appro
or the deferment of its disposition it, "Roppongi", is still property of the public dominion, and if it is not, how it lost that cha

n our courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the public dominion, a public plaza in this i
has become of public dominion upon its donation to the town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that

gh the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the land . . . is no longer needed for [public] service- for public use or
e) alone may declare (under its charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6

blic domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fa
es brought about by earlier interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on the manner it is a
State patrimonial property.

roperty is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same c
long to the State. 10

e, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi property") may be characterized as property of public dominion, w

ded for some public service -.

e simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for public use property "intended for some public serv
n the territory of another sovereign State, is not self-evident. The first item of the classification property intended for public use — can
ealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a
rty that the Philippines happens to own outside its own boundaries must, however, be left to academicians.

before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concern

into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State; and (b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or no
nto property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the Civil Code does not address the question of who has a

has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the
and available for private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:

s no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special indu
ecutive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by
ts, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)

nte Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).

position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Consequen
uard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain not available for private appropriatio

y of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified e
property of the State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately imposable is that the intent to co

cipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial property of such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66
by another resolution, the City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through public bidding. Although the

ation of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the ob

when no longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

and unequivocal terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for whic

bsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registrable title over the lot in question. (66 SCRA at 484-; emphas

nicipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to some use other than "public use" or some "public se
amboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).

o in respect of property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carr

e los bienes de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la autoridad competente legislative realizan qun acto en virtud
relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y
e entedera que se ha verificado la conversion de los bienes patrimoniales?

tiva, y por nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una declaracion expresa
a se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via publica se abandona tambien por constituir otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....a

ssly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property — of the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is res
y susceptible of disposition to and appropration by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if not each individual act, ma
n/utilization of the Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed of officials of the Executive Department: the Execu
esident the sale of one of the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, the President approve

Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi. The Japanese Government through its Ministry of F
e of the Philippines of the proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.

ority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here sub
g sold or otherwise disposed of

ssuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically convert the property into patrimonial property. I respectfull
aw involving property of municipal corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to some
me conclusion in respect of conversion of property of the public domain of the State into property of the private domain of the State.

e non-use was attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and im
is the charge of the classification of the property from property of the public domain into property of the private domain of the State. M
oses, such circumstance may, with equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character of th

ot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly does not argue against an intent to convert the prope

st the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the Legislative Department) to convert the property involv

ssue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of the Roppongi property.

ollows:

n cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to re
ther with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, in
by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)

I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:

of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by th

nes, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Em

Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under th
yance. Section 48 does not purport to be itself a source of legal authority for conveyance of real property of the Government. For Sec

y of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by Congress both in the form of (a) a general, standing authorization fo

d by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Priva
egislature assembled and by the authority of the same:

of the Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the
onwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or agricultural public la

h land is agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Pu
xempt from the provisions of this Act.

t must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonw
ercial or industrial purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute covers the sale or lease or reside
i•t•c-aüsl

December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-
e of Lands of Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).

as not been repealed. 1

ed by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April 1904, which provided for the disposition of the
nds were held to be private and patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914, authorized the sale
including therein all lands and buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by private perso

horizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, whic

onal Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations of professionals with academic standing, for the nom
t in case the National Press Club stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905 authorized was really a donation, a

osition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted into patrimonial property of the Republic. 2

cated in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully s
rty found outside the boundaries of the Republic.

s of the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of the constitutional power of control exercised
Environment and Natural Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains the power t

tion of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative
ility of the political departments of government the Executive and the Legislative authorities.
ations only for emphasis.

operty. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor General was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fa

Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the sale of our properties abroad to be used for the comprehens
not a law. The sale of the said property may be authorized only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there is no such law

ry public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a valid authorization. I am happy to note that in the several ca

ch could help in further clarifying the issues.

determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies determined by Congress are embodied in legislative enactme
branch of government.

gress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing such laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.

nt between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such agreement, this property was acquired by the Philippine governm
within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which provides:

d for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

formed into private property of the state otherwise known as patrimonial property of the state. 1 The transformation of public dominion
which can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress

must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy (i.e. to keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Ad

of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by th

c of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

led in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or inst

bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise.

erwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial prope
g order earlier issued by this Court.

s property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property of the State. I understand that the parties are agreed that
s, in the light of supervening developments, that is non-user thereof by the National Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the last
ailable for the program's financing, State assets sold; the approval by the President of the recommendation of the investigating comm
n, and if it is not, how it lost that character.

ourts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of the public dominion, a public plaza in this instance, become
n upon its donation to the town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under these three cases, the characte

gh the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the land . . . is no longer needed for [public] service- for public use or
e) alone may declare (under its charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of it. 6

blic domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to allow the sale of the property" 7 the majority lays stress to the fa
es brought about by earlier interpretations that the nature of property-whether public or patrimonial is predicated on the manner it is a
State patrimonial property.

roperty is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing to the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same c
long to the State. 10

e, Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi property") may be characterized as property of public dominion, w

ded for some public service -.

e simple threefold classification found in Article 420 of the Civil Code ("property for public use property "intended for some public serv
n the territory of another sovereign State, is not self-evident. The first item of the classification property intended for public use — can
ealth is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a
rty that the Philippines happens to own outside its own boundaries must, however, be left to academicians.

before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell the Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concern

into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State; and (b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or no

nto property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that the Civil Code does not address the question of who has a
has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands (108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the
and available for private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:

s no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special indu
ecutive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by
ts, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad v. Director of Lands, supra.)

nte Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).

position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Consequen
uard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain not available for private appropriatio

y of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State. No particular formula or procedure of conversion is specified e
property of the State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only requirement which is legitimately imposable is that the intent to co

cipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial property of such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66
by another resolution, the City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the land through public bidding. Although the

xxx xxx xxx

ation of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the ob

when no longer intended for public use of for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

and unequivocal terms, states that "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for whic

bsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registrable title over the lot in question. (66 SCRA at 484-; emphas

nicipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to some use other than "public use" or some "public se
amboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 (1968).

o in respect of property of the State itself. Manresa in commenting on Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carr

e los bienes de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la autoridad competente legislative realizan qun acto en virtud
relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar Pero puede ocurrir que no haya taldeclaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y
e entedera que se ha verificado la conversion de los bienes patrimoniales?

tiva, y por nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la soluciion. El destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una declaracion expresa
a se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo de la via publica se abandona tambien por constituir otro nuevo an mejores condiciones....a

ssly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial property — of the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is res
y susceptible of disposition to and appropration by private persons. These executive acts, in their totality if not each individual act, ma

n/utilization of the Government's property in Japan, The Committee was composed of officials of the Executive Department: the Execu
esident the sale of one of the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October 1988, the President approve
Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of the property in Roppongi. The Japanese Government through its Ministry of F
e of the Philippines of the proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.

ority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order No. 296 is insufficient to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here sub
g sold or otherwise disposed of

ssuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not, by itself, automatically convert the property into patrimonial property. I respectfull
aw involving property of municipal corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual dedication of public property to some
me conclusion in respect of conversion of property of the public domain of the State into property of the private domain of the State.

e non-use was attributable not to the Government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and im
is the charge of the classification of the property from property of the public domain into property of the private domain of the State. M
oses, such circumstance may, with equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of the crystalizing intent to change the character of th

ot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding was not successful certainly does not argue against an intent to convert the prope

st the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the knowledge of the Legislative Department) to convert the property involv

II

ssue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or disposition of the Roppongi property.

ollows:

n cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to re
ther with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, in
by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)

I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which reads:

of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by th

nes, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Em

Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under th
yance. Section 48 does not purport to be itself a source of legal authority for conveyance of real property of the Government. For Sec

y of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by Congress both in the form of (a) a general, standing authorization fo

d by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Priva

egislature assembled and by the authority of the same:


of the Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the
onwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land Act, entitled to apply for the purchase or lease or agricultural public la

h land is agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Pu
xempt from the provisions of this Act.

t must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No. 2874) is now Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonw
ercial or industrial purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In other words, the statute covers the sale or lease or reside

December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-
e of Lands of Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29 [1955]).

as not been repealed. 1

ed by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted on 26 April 1904, which provided for the disposition of the
nds were held to be private and patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on -28 February 1914, authorized the sale
including therein all lands and buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased by private perso

horizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This statute is Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, whic

onal Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations of professionals with academic standing, for the nom
t in case the National Press Club stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No. 905 authorized was really a donation, a

osition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been converted into patrimonial property of the Republic. 2

cated in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully s
rty found outside the boundaries of the Republic.

s of the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451 [1939]), and in view of the constitutional power of control exercised
Environment and Natural Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan 101 Phil. 328 [1957]). At the very least, the President retains the power t

tion of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with much debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative
ility of the political departments of government the Executive and the Legislative authorities.
rvice, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)

erty involved here was a fortress.

ing 3 Manresa III. See also Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, No. L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334.

5, 66 SCRA 481.

egas, No.

152 SCRA 80.

s very much in effect and that the Bureau of Lands continues to date to act under it. See also, in this connection, Sections 2 and 4 of R
n of the State, including lands previously vested in the United States Alien Property Custodian and transferred to the Republic of the

e or lease of land of private domain of the government, it is relevant to note that Executive Order No. 296, promulgated at a time whe

, to the contrary notwithstanding, the above mentioned properties can be made available for sale, lease or any other manner of dispo

Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

munications

n Act to prohibit, remove and/or demolish the construction of dams, dikes or any works in public navigable waters or waterways and i
of in issue are Section 1 and the first part of Section 2, which read as follows:

due notice and hearing, that any dam, dike or any other works now existing or may hereinafter be constructed encroaches into any pu
thority to order the removal of any such works and give the party concerned a period not to exceed thirty days for the removal of the
ovisions of this Act, provided such constructions or works do not obstruct or impede the free passage of any navigable river, stream, o

la Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public Works and Communications against several fishpond owners in Macabebe, Pampan
s of the coastal areas into fishponds. Investigations were conducted under the authority of the Secretary, who thereafter rendered the

eprived them of the uses of the area as a fishing ground and for navigation. On the other hand, the respondents contend that this are

hether the fishpond constructions and/or works of the respondents are within the titled property. Said survey shows that a portion of M

ect to the provisions of Republic Act 2056, deserves consideration. The area being covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, the resp
of the enclosed portion, the area of 24,860 square meters has been conclusively shown by the relocation survey as not within the bo
ageway.

nd works and/or constructions insofar as it encroaches upon that portion of Manila Bay covering the area of approximately 24,860 sq
same at the expense of the respondents within ten (10) days following the expiration of the thirty-day period, without prejudice to inst

e Undersecretary in a resolution dated August 5, 1959. Thereupon, on August 20, 1959, petitioner herein filed the present suit in the C
hat Republic Act. No. 2056, under which the Secretary issued the order above-quoted, is null and void as to conferring upon the Secr
xcess of jurisdiction in delegating reception of evidence, in causing resurvey of the premises by a person who is not a duly licensed s
onstitutional as an encroachment upon the private rights of the petitioners, etc. Upon the presentation of the petition, the court below i
rties, after which the court, through Hon. Andres Reyes, rendered a decision declaring that the Secretary of Public Works and Comm
ned in Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 2056. We quote the order herein:.
Court is of the opinion that the case at bar hinges on only one vital issue-that is whether the petitioners properly fall within the benefit

d in good faith before the areas were proclaimed as fishing grounds shall be exempted from the provisions of this Act, provided such

shponds completed or about to be completed which do not encroach or obstruct any public navigable river or stream and/or which w

itled to the benefits of said exemptions provided the following requisites are present: first, that the constructions or works in question
river or stream; and lastly, that the same would not cause inundations of agricultural areas.

ions of agricultural areas. This was admitted in the answer of respondent Secretary and later included in the stipulation of facts. Ther
could have been declared communal." (pp. 2-3, of the decision).

AND PROHIBITION AND IN DECIDING THE SAME WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE ISSUES INVOLVED THEREIN.

II

WHICH, OTHERWISE, IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, AND IN CONSTRUING THE EXEMPTING CLAUSE PROVIDED IN SEC. 2

III

PROVISION OF SECTION 2 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2056.

IV

ND LATER MAKING IT PERMANENT..

HIBITION.

fishpond situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7087 dated January 28, 1952, containing an
rson of the Dredge Operation Supervisor of the Department of Public Works conducted an investigation and submitted a report (Ann
point A of Annex E-1 to point D, and it includes a portion of public land indicated in red (portion B-c in said Annex E-1, containing an

hed plan may be about one (1) foot M. L. L. W. 1äwphï1.ñët

that no part of dike B-C protruding towards the sea.

ne foot.

in the attached plan) with an indicated area of about 24,880 square meters.
Annex E - Stipulation) .

ecause it does not interfere with navigation and does not produce inundation and the dikes were constructed before the area was a fis

the authority granted the Secretary of Public Works and Communications is to declare that the construction or building of dams, dike
titioner, indicated in the red shaded portion in the Stipulation, Exh. E-1, was not a part of the land titled in the name of the petitioner, a
which contains an area of 24,860 square meters, is clearly, therefore, a portion of the Manila Bay area or coastal area, which the petiti
d at low tide navigable to those of 1 foot draft. It is, therefore, a part of the water ways, taking into account that the Manila Bay area, e
ded area, therefore, is a public property, not susceptible to appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to the S

xxx xxx xxx

zed by international law. ...." (Art. 1, paragraphs 1 and 2, Spanish Law of Waters; see also Insular Government v. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 5

of Section 2. But an examination of Section 2 shows that coastal waters or public waterways are not included in the exception. Only
of any navigable river can take place on the coastal waters or waterways, so coastal waters are not subject to the exception. The exc
Coastal waters are not within the contemplation of the exception because there is no navigable river or stream in coastal waters and

ct matter of the case at bar, fall within the exception mentioned in Sec. 2 of the Act and its order in issuing the prohibition is therefore

ealing from the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines. We find this assign
of Republic Act 2056.

etition against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, dismissed, with costs against the petitioner.

Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

SPELETA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal, Province of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and the Bureau of Land

ez and Trial Attorney David R. Hilario for respondents. .

application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu.

n September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal p
solution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded t
10,800.00.3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu

ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain a

pplication for registration of title.6 Hence, the instant petition for review.

paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and

erty of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract?

ontrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers:

Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to th

eet. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio,7 where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or wi
strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well with
blic use.

ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public tr

awn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contr

ed for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property b

itioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 100709. November 14, 1997]


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA L.
MORATO, SPOUSES NENITA CO and ANTONIO QUILATAN AND
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
PROVINCE, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Will the lease and/or mortgage of a portion of a realty acquired through free patent
constitute sufficient ground for the nullification of such land grant? Should such property
revert to the State once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore land?

The Case

These are the two questions raised in the petition before us assailing the Court of
Appeals[1] Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 02667 promulgated on June 13, 1991 which
answered the said questions in the negative.[2] Respondent Courts Decision
dismissed[3] petitioners appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court[4] of Calauag, Quezon, dated December 28, 1983 in Civil Case No. C-608. In turn,
the Regional Trial Courts decision dismissed petitioners complaint for cancellation of the
Torrens Certificate of Title of Respondent Morato and for reversion of the parcel of land
subject thereof to the public domain.

The Facts

The petition of the solicitor general, representing the Republic of the Philippines,
recites the following facts:[5]

Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application No.
III-3-8186-B on a parcel of land with an area of 1,265 square meters situated at
Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. On January 16, 1974, the patent was approved and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City issued on February 4, 1974 Original
Certificate of Title No. P-17789.Both the free patent and the title specifically mandate
that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five (5) years from the date
of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141, as amended).

Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that
respondent Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the
patent, conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject land
is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during high
tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, on
October 24, 1974, a portion of the land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to
respondents Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan for P10,000.00 (pp. 2, 25, Folder of
Exhibits). The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of
the land was leased to Perfecto Advincula on February 2, 1976 at P100.00 a month,
where a warehouse was constructed.

On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents


Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon for the cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the public
domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds that the
land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year
prohibitory period (p. 46, Records).

After trial, the lower court, on December 28, 1983, rendered a decision dismissing
petitioners complaint. In finding for private respondents, the lower court ruled that
there was no violation of the 5-year period ban against alienating or encumbering the
land, because the land was merely leased and not alienated. It also found that the
mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered only the improvement and not
the land itself.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter,
the Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition.[6]

The Issues

Petitioner alleges that the following errors were committed by Respondent Court: [7]
I

Respondent Court erred in holding that the patent granted and certificate of title issued
to Respondent Morato cannot be cancelled and annulled since the certificate of title
becomes indefeasible after one year from the issuance of the title.
II

Respondent Court erred in holding that the questioned land is part of a disposable
public land and not a foreshore land.

The Courts Ruling


The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Indefeasibility of a Free Patent Title

In resolving the first issue against petitioner, Respondent Court held: [8]

x x x. As ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco vs. Heirs of Jose Alivalas, 168 SCRA
198. x x. The rule is well-settled that an original certificate of title issued on the
strength of a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued in a
judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of the disposable land
of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the
expiration of one year from the date of promulgation of the order of the Director of
Lands for the issuance of the patent. (Republic v. Heirs of Carle, 105 Phil. 1227
(1959); Ingaran v. Ramelo, 107 Phil. 498 (1960); Lopez v. Padilla, (G.R. No. L-
27559, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44). A homestead patent, one registered under the
Land Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. (Pamintuan v. San
Agustin, 43 Phil. 558 (1982); El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17 (1934); Duran
v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144 (1961); Pajomayo v. Manipon, G.R. No. L-33676, June 30,
1971, 39 SCRA 676). (p. 203).

Again, in Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 271, citing Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon.
Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Branch I, (123 SCRA 516 (1983) and Pajomayo, et al. v.
Manipon, et al. (39 SCRA 676 (1971) held that once a homestead patent granted in
accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496,
the certificate of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a
Torrens Title issued under the Land Registration Act.

Indefeasibility of the title, however, may not bar the State, thru the Solicitor General,
from filing an action for reversion, as ruled in Heirs of Gregorio Tengo v. Heirs of
Jose Aliwalas, (supra), as follows:

But, as correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, Dr. Aliwalas title to
the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally
attacked. If indeed there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title,
an action for reversion instituted by the Solicitor General would be the proper remedy
(Sec. 101, C.A. No. 141; Director of Lands v. Jugado, G.R. No. L-14702, May 21,
1961, 2 SCRA 32; Lopez v. Padilla, supra). (p. 204).

Petitioner contends that the grant of Free Patent (IV-3) 275 and the subsequent
issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-17789 to Respondent Josefina L. Morato
were subject to the conditions provided for in Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. It alleges
that on October 24, 1974, or nine (9) months and eight (8) days after the grant of the
patent, Respondent Morato, in violation of the terms of the patent, mortgaged a portion
of the land to Respondent Nenita Co, who thereafter constructed a house
thereon. Likewise, on February 2, 1976 and within the five-year prohibitory period,
Respondent Morato leased a portion of the land to Perfecto Advincula at a monthly rent
of P100.00 who, shortly thereafter, constructed a house of concrete materials on the
subject land.[9] Further, petitioner argues that the defense of indefeasibility of title is
inaccurate. The original certificate of title issued to Respondent Morato contains the
seeds of its own cancellation: such certificate specifically states on its face that it is subject
to the provisions of Sections 118, 119, 121, 122, 124 of CA No. 141, as amended.[10]
Respondent Morato counters by stating that although a portion of the land was
previously leased, it resulted from the fact that Perfecto Advincula built a warehouse in
the subject land without [her] prior consent. The mortgage executed over the
improvement cannot be considered a violation of the said grant since it can never affect
the ownership.[11] She states further:

x x x. the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed not because of the principle of
indefeasibility of title but mainly due to failure of the latter to support and prove the
alleged violations of respondent Morato. The records of this case will readily show
that although petitioner was able to establish that Morato committed some acts during
the prohibitory period of 5 years, a perusal thereof will also show that what petitioner
was able to prove never constituted a violation of the grant. [12]

Respondent-Spouses Quilatan, on the other hand, state that the mortgage contract
they entered into with Respondent Morato can never be considered as [an] alienation
inasmuch as the ownership over the property remains with the owner.[13] Besides, it is the
director of lands and not the Republic of the Philippines who is the real party in interest in
this case, contrary to the provision of the Public Land Act which states that actions for
reversion should be instituted by the solicitor general in the name of Republic of the
Philippines.[14]
We find for petitioner.
Quoted below are relevant sections of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known
as the Public Land Act:

Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from
the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the
satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before
twenty-five years after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be denied
except on constitutional and legal grounds. (As amended by Com. Act No. 456,
approved June 8, 1939.)

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and solely for educational, religious, or charitable
purposes or for a right of way, no corporation, association, or partnership may acquire
or have any right, title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land granted
under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act or to any
permanent improvement on such land. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, approved
May 5, 1941)

Sec. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act,
nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, association, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the
Philippines authorized therefore by their charters.

Except in cases of hereditary successions, no land or any portion thereof originally


acquired under the free patent, homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred or assigned to any
individual, nor shall such land or any permanent improvement thereon be leased to
such individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his own, shall exceed one
hundred and forty-four hectares. Any transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation
hereto shall be null and void. (As amended by Com. Act No. 615, Id.)

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or
executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen,
one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two,
and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void
from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant,
title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or
presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the
State. (Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing legal provisions clearly proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land
acquired under a free patent or homestead within five years from the grant of such patent.
Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant and the reversion
of the land to the public domain. Encumbrance has been defined as [a]nything that
impairs the use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a
burden or charge upon property; a claim or lien upon property. It may be a legal claim on
an estate for the discharge of which the estate is liable; an embarrassment of the estate
or property so that it cannot be disposed of without being subject to it; an estate, interest,
or right in lands, diminishing their value to the general owner; a liability resting upon an
estate.[15] Do the contracts of lease and mortgage executed within five (5) years from the
issuance of the patent constitute an encumbrance and violate the terms and conditions
of such patent? Respondent Court answered in the negative:[16]

From the evidence adduced by both parties, it has been proved that the area of the
portion of the land, subject matter of the lease contract (Exh. B) executed by and
between Perfecto Advincula and Josefina L. Morato is only 10 x 12 square meters,
whereas the total area of the land granted to Morato is 1,265 square meters. It is clear
from this that the portion of the land leased by Advincula does not significantly affect
Moratos ownership and possession. Above all, the circumstances under which the
lease was executed do not reflect a voluntary and blatant intent to violate the
conditions provided for in the patent issued in her favor. On the contrary, Morato was
compelled to enter into that contract of lease out of sympathy and the goodness of her
heart to accommodate a fellow man. x x x

It is indisputable, however, that Respondent Morato cannot fully use or enjoy the land
during the duration of the lease contract. This restriction on the enjoyment of her property
sufficiently meets the definition of an encumbrance under Section 118 of the Public Land
Act, because such contract impairs the use of the property by the grantee. In a contract
of lease which is consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative, the owner temporarily
grants the use of his or her property to another who undertakes to pay rent
therefor.[17] During the term of the lease, the grantee of the patent cannot enjoy the
beneficial use of the land leased. As already observed, the Public Land Act does not
permit a grantee of a free patent from encumbering any portion of such land. Such
encumbrance is a ground for the nullification of the award.
Moratos resort to equity, i.e. that the lease was executed allegedly out of the
goodness of her heart without any intention of violating the law, cannot help her. Equity,
which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail
over all abstract arguments based on equity contra legem.[18]
Respondents failed to justify their position that the mortgage should not be considered
an encumbrance. Indeed, we do not find any support for such contention. The questioned
mortgage falls squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the
Public Land Act.[19] Verily, a mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and the
foreclosure of such mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the property.[20]
Even if only part of the property has been sold or alienated within the prohibited period
of five years from the issuance of the patent, such alienation is a sufficient cause for the
reversion of the whole estate to the State. As a condition for the grant of a free patent to
an applicant, the law requires that the land should not be encumbered, sold or alienated
within five years from the issuance of the patent. The sale or the alienation of part of the
homestead violates that condition.[21]
The prohibition against the encumbrance -- lease and mortgage included -- of a
homestead which, by analogy applies to a free patent, is mandated by the rationale for
the grant, viz.:[22]

It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable


agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and
cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the
patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the
homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his
family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be
subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within five
years. This section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of section 116. It aims to
preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land which
the State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this
fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when
the original homesteader makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his
widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of the statute.

By express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 and in conformity with
the policy of the law, any transfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five
years from the issuance of the patent is proscribed. Such transfer nullifies said alienation
and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the State.
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso
attached to the approval of every application.[23] Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements
of law, Respondent Morato had only an inchoate right to the property; such property
remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or
encumbrance. Conversely, when a homesteader has complied with all the terms and
conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a] particular tract of public land, he acquires
a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable owner thereof. [24] However,
for Respondent Moratos title of ownership over the patented land to be perfected, she
should have complied with the requirements of the law, one of which was to keep the
property for herself and her family within the prescribed period of five (5) years. Prior to
the fulfillment of all requirements of the law, Respondent Moratos title over the property
was incomplete. Accordingly, if the requirements are not complied with, the State as the
grantor could petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the title.
Respondent Morato cannot use the doctrine of the indefeasibility of her Torrens title
to bar the state from questioning its transfer or encumbrance. The certificate of title issued
to her clearly stipulated that its award was subject to the conditions provided for in
Sections 118, 119, 121, 122 and 124 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141.Because she
violated Section 118, the reversion of the property to the public domain necessarily
follows, pursuant to Section 124.

Second Issue: Foreshore Land Reverts to the Public Domain

There is yet another reason for granting this petition.


Although Respondent Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it
nevertheless sustained the award thereof to Respondent Morato: [25]

First of all, the issue here is whether the land in question, is really part of the
foreshore lands. The Supreme Court defines foreshore land in the case of Republic
vs. Alagad, 169 SCRA 455, 464, as follows:

Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to, the extraordinary action of nature,
rainful, for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed
or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore
land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as
private property.

A foreshore land, on the other hand has been defined as follows:

... that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux
and reflux of the tides x x x x (Republic vs. C.A., Nos. L-43105, L-43190, August 31,
1984, 131 SCRA 532; Government vs. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil 423)

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. (Rep. vs. CA, supra, 539).

The factual findings of the lower court regarding the nature of the parcel of land in
question reads:

Evidence disclose that the marginal area of the land radically changed sometime in
1937 up to 1955 due to a strong earthquake followed by frequent storms eventually
eroding the land.From 1955 to 1968, however, gradual reclamation was undertaken by
the lumber company owned by the Moratos. Having thus restored the land thru mostly
human hands employed by the lumber company, the area continued to be utilized by
the owner of the sawmill up to the time of his death in 1965. On or about March 17,
1973, there again was a strong earthquake unfortunately causing destruction to
hundreds of residential houses fronting the Calauag Bay including the Santiago
Building, a cinema house constructed of concrete materials. The catastrophe totally
caused the sinking of a concrete bridge at Sumulong river also in the municipality of
Calauag, Quezon.

On November 13, 1977 a typhoon code named Unding wrought havoc as it lashed the
main land of Calauag, Quezon causing again great erosion this time than that which
the area suffered in 1937. The Court noted with the significance of the newspaper
clipping entitled Baryo ng Mangingisda Kinain ng Dagat (Exh. 11).

xxxxxxxxx

Evidently this was the condition of the land when on or about December 5, 1972
defendant Josefina L. Morato filed with the Bureau of Lands her free patent
application. The defendant Josefina Morato having taken possession of the land after
the demise of Don Tomas Morato, she introduced improvement and continued
developing the area, planted it to coconut trees.Having applied for a free patent,
defendant had the land area surveyed and an approved plan (Exh. 9) based on the
cadastral survey as early as 1927 (Exh. 10) was secured. The area was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of defendant Josefina Morato denominated as Tax
Declaration No. 4115 (Exh. 8) and the corresponding realty taxes religiously paid as
shown by Exh. 8-A). (pp. 12-14, DECISION).

Being supported by substantial evidence and for failure of the appellant to show cause
which would warrant disturbance, the afore-cited findings of the lower court, must be
respected.

Petitioner correctly contends, however, that Private Respondent Morato cannot own
foreshore land:

Through the encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, a portion of the
subject land was invaded by the waves and sea advances. During high tide, at least
half of the land (632.5 square meters) is 6 feet deep under water and three (3) feet
deep during low tide. The Calauag Bay shore has extended up to a portion of the
questioned land.

While at the time of the grant of free patent to respondent Morato, the land was not
reached by the water, however, due to gradual sinking of the land caused by natural
calamities, the sea advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. As
disclosed at the trial, through the testimony of the court-appointed commissioner,
Engr. Abraham B. Pili, the land was under water during high tide in the month of
August 1978. The water margin covers half of the property, but during low tide, the
water is about a kilometer (TSN, July 19, 1979, p. 12). Also, in 1974, after the grant
of the patent, the land was covered with vegetation, but it disappeared in 1978 when
the land was reached by the tides (Exhs. E-1; E-14). In fact, in its decision dated
December 28, 1983, the lower court observed that the erosion of the land was caused
by natural calamities that struck the place in 1977 (Cf. Decision, pp. 17-18). [26]

Respondent-Spouses Quilatan argue, however, that it is unfair and unjust if Josefina


Morato will be deprived of the whole property just because a portion thereof was
immersed in water for reasons not her own doing.[27]
As a general rule, findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon this Court, unless such factual findings are palpably unsupported by the evidence
on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] The
application for a free patent was made in 1972. From the undisputed factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, however, the land has since become foreshore. Accordingly, it can
no longer be subject of a free patent under the Public Land Act.Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Cabagis[29] explained the rationale for this proscription:

Article 339, subsection 1, of the Civil Code, reads:

Art. 339. Property of public ownership is

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar
character.

********

Article 1, case 3, of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, provides as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The following are part of the national domain open to public use:

********

3. The Shores. By the shore is understood that space covered and uncovered by the
movement of the tide. Its interior or terrestrial limit is the line reached by the highest
equinoctal tides.Where the tides are not appreciable, the shore begins on the land side
at the line reached by the sea during ordinary storms or tempests.

In the case of Aragon vs. Insular Government (19 Phil. 223), with reference to article
339 of the Civil Code just quoted, this Court said:

We should not be understood, by this decision, to hold that in a case of gradual


encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may not
become property of public ownership. as defined in article 339 of the code, where it
appear that the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to
be totally destroyed, so as to become a part of the playa (shore of the sea), rada
(roadstead), or the like. * * *

In the Enciclopedia Jurdica Espaola, volume XII, page 558, we read the following:

With relative frequency the opposite phenomenon occurs; that is, the sea advances
and private properties are permanently invaded by the waves, and in this case they
become part of the shore or beach. They then pass to the public domain, but the owner
thus dispossessed does not retain any right to the natural products resulting from their
new nature; it is a de facto case of eminent domain, and not subject to indemnity.

In comparison, Article 420 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court
in Government vs. Cabangis[30] annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land.[31] In another case, the
Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity.[32] The subject land in
this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the assailed Decision of Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of
Free Patent No. (IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato and the subsequent Original
Certificate of Title No. P-17789. The subject land therefore REVERTS to the State. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

First Division composed of J. Asaali S. Isnani, ponente; and JJ. Rodolfo A. Nocon and Antonio M.
[1]

Martinez, concurring.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 25-32.
[3]
Ibid., p. 32.
[4]
Branch 63.
[5]
Petition, pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 9-11.
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by the Court of Private Respondent Quilatans
[6]

Memorandum, dated July 19, 1996, on February 16, 1996. (Rollo, p. 143.)
[7]
Ibid., p. 5; Rollo, p. 11.
[8]
Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 27.
[9]
Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[10]
Ibid., pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[11]
Respondent Moratos Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 44.
[12]
Ibid., pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 45-46.
[13]
Respondents Quilatans Comment, p. 1; Rollo, p. 64.
[14]
Ibid., p. 2; Rollo, p. 65.
[15]
Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, second edition, 1972, pp. 207-208.
[16]
CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 30.
[17]
Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil. 868, 870, April 25, 1956.
Causapin vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 615, 625, July 4, 1994, citing Zabat vs. Court of Appeals, No.
[18]

L-36958, July 10, 1986, 142 SCRA 587.


[19]
Siy vs. Tan Gun Ga, et al., 119 Phil. 676, February 29, 1964.
[20]
Prudential Bank vs. Panis, 153 SCRA 390, 397, August 31, 1987.
[21]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Garcia, et al., 105 Phil. 826, May 27, 1959.
[22]
Pascua vs. Talens, 80 Phil 792, 793-794, April 30, 1948, per Bengzon, J.
[23]
Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, 353-354, April 29, 1968.
Vda. de Delizo vs. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216, 229, January 30, 1976 citing Juanico vs. American Land
[24]

Commercial Company, Inc., 97 Phil. 221, Simmons vs. Wagner, 10 U.S. 260, 68 C.J.S. 875; Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498; Fiel, et al. vs. Wagas, 48 O.G., 195, January 9, 1950. SEE Uy Un vs. Perez and
Villaplana, 71 Phil. 508.
[25]
CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[26]
Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[27]
Respondents Quilatans Comment, p. 2; Rollo, p. 65.
[28]
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303, 313, February 7, 1996.
[29]
53 Phil. 112, 115-116, March 27, 1929, per Villa-Real, J.
[30]
Supra.
[31]
Ibid., p. 119.
[32]
Republic vs. Lozada, 90 SCRA 503, 510, May 31, 1979.
Today is Wednesday, January 10, 2018

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

itioner,

Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, METRO MANILA, PALANYAG KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE, responden

of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction applied for by respondents Municipa

ed the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro M
of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending area

l council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions:

ority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;
marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;

gnated;

the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.

Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and managemen

to an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obliga

c Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later

e latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.

on for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/op

ng his letter-order of October 16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.

0 of the Municipality' of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent P

e of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuing the assailed order.

icipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

nd are therefore public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation or private contract by any person, eve
ty of Parañaque has been granted by the legislature specific authority to convert a property already in public use to another public us
authorized to close streets, it failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of the
municipality violated its duty under the Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of the residents of the municipality.

of power given to local government units, the Municipality of Parañaque as such, is empowered under that law to close its roads, stre

xxx xxx xxx

thin its power is in fact an encroachment of power legally vested to the municipality, precisely because when the municipality enacted
public thoroughfare. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)

uthorizing the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the laws in force during the time the said ordinance
on the matter.

property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:

sts of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for

by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.


cal roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local go
1334). Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific auth
ment Code, which states:

ead acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any
A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the l

nd other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law. These b
public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be d
e sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no lon
, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the re
Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code. In one case, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, dec
orizing the sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. We held therein that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a ci
nc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No.
public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the lo
ttled by this Court en banc in "Francisco V. Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654, Ma

rket stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property
a, et al. v. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu v. Municipal Cou

ns of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses
he good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city off

s del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law tha
d to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.

ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority d

ority of the residents do(es) not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas thereon;

marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by pedestrians;

gnated;

the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. (p. 38, Rollo)

ns precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality that the closed streets were not used for ve
se, the designation by respondents of a time schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent.

traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea market alo
l when he said:

s and fire engines, instead of using the roads for a more direct access to the fire area, have to maneuver and look for other streets w

es and the people rushing their patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the vendors. One ca

ors, normal transportation flow is disrupted and school children have to get off at a distance still far from their schools and walk, rain o
at the end of the day. Needless to say, these cause further pollution, sickness and deterioration of health of the residents therein. (p

spondents want this Court to focus its attention solely on the argument that the use of public spaces for the establishment of a flea ma

y toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount c
maintain peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local g

on of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality have the corresponding dut

basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
vides that rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of

d December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic

o, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

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