R 72: SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES
wrong"34 necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the
1) G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC vs. OLAYBAR
PERALTA, J.:
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves
of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing
may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere
application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary
proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates
the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the
civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any;
and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the
procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in
entries of the civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The
latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other
words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there
was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the
NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She
then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate.
2) G.R. No. 170498 January 9, 2013
METROPOLITAN BANK vs. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT
BRION, J.:
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is a special provision that should
prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court. The latter applies to money claims in ordinary actions while a
money claim against a person already deceased falls under the
settlement of his estate that is governed by the rules on special
proceedings. If at all, rules for ordinary actions only apply suppletorily to
special proceedings.
3) G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
MONTAÑER vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT
PUNO, C.J.:
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special
proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action
and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this
difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the
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enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
plaintiff or defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by
which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," 36 has
one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status,
right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar,
it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for
any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the
settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of
the estate, pay its liabilities,and to distribute the residual to those
entitled to the same.
4) G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001
NATCHER vs. COURT OFAPPEALS
BUENA, J.:
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government
by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules
prescribed for a special civil action.
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding"
may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides.
In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in
equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which
are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings
commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular relief, such as may be
instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion
upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
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Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir.
5) SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
PACIFIC BANKING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
MENDOZA, J.:
A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified
a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not
seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or
redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief
for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a
cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the
corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be able to file their
claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put
in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant
right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
6) G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
There is no doubt that the petition (annulment of a previous marriage
for the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage) of Apolinaria
Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the
Family Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court
appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a
summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the
trial court’s order sufficed.
7) G.R. No. 141396 April 9, 2002
MUSA vs. AMOR
KAPUNAN, J.:
With regard to the procedural error raised by petitioners, the Court of
Appeals held that the Rules of Court, particularly on modes of service
and filing of pleadings, does not apply to agrarian cases.
Service and filing of pleadings must be done personally whenever
practicable. The Court notes that in the present case, personal service
would not be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court
of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition was posted, clearly,
service by registered mail would have entailed considerable time, effort
and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with
the use of "may," signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the
court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While
it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice,14 rigid application of Section 11, Rule
13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
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8) G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988
VENTURA vs. VENTURA
PARAS, J.:
As authorized by section 2 of Rule 72 which direct that in the "absence
of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall
be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings."
9) G.R. No. 26751 January 31, 1969
MATUTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CASTRO, J.:
Rule 33 regarding judgment on demurrer to evidence is applicable to
special proceedings.
Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that in the absence of
special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary civil actions shall
be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The
application of the above cited Rule in special proceedings, like the case
at bar, is authorized by the rules. Instead of resolving the foregoing
motion, the probate judge issued the controverted order removing the
respondent as co-administrator without giving him the opportunity to
adduce his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be
afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in the event of
denial of his motion to dismiss and/or demurrer to evidence. The Court
views that the above actuation of the probate judge constituted grave
abuse of discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.
10) G.R. No. 172547 June 30, 2009
BUNYI vs. FACTOR
QUISUMBING, J.:
Respondent’s right to the property was vested in her along with her
siblings from the moment of their father’s death. 23 As heir, respondent
had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the
attributes of ownership. Such rights are enforced and protected from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration since
respondent acquired hereditary rights even before judicial declaration in
testate or intestate proceedings.24
11) G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000
LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
BUENA, J.:
The provisions of Republic Act 7691 17, which introduced amendments to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate,
where the gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro
Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
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 Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. —
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not
exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro
Manila where such personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which
must be specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall be
included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided further,
that where there are several claims or causes of actions between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint,
the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all
the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions;
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.
R73: SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
1) G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014
ARANAS vs. MERCADO
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of
properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination
shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and
whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
2) GR No. 198680 July 8, 2013
YPON vs. RICAFORTE
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs
of the deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in
court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only
be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party
sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It
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is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only
in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
3) G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014
REBUSQUILLO vs VELASCO
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or
letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
5) G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993
LEDESMA vs. PEDROSA
PADILLA, J.:
Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law
governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the
law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of
whatever remaining properties heave been allocated to petitioner.
This procedure involves details which properly pertain to the lower
court.
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner
by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be
distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession in
Special Proceedings No. 134.
The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with equal
reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage
annulment which is the situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge
is directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case (Civil Case No. 1446)
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of this decision to
determine which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be
adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a consequence or
incident of its decision rendered in the same case annulling the
marriage. Petitioner's letters to the Court indicate that she is seventy
(70) years of age and the prolonged action for partition (liquidation) has
taken a toll on her resources. Justice and equity demand the disposition
of her case with dispatch. Any properties that may be adjudicated to the
deceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with
his last will and testament in the special proceedings involving his
estate.
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6) G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
DE BORJA vs. DE BORJA
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
A counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator
against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made
in the course of a proceeding, is an extraneous matter in testate or
intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental
questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be
encouraged for to do otherwise would counter to the clear intention of
the law.
7) G.R. No. 188921 April 18, 2012
ROMERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
SERENO, J.:
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question
should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule has
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title
or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.
8) see #5
9) G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
LIMJOCO vs. FRAGRANTE
HILADO, J.:
in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant
doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets
left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested
and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the
decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have
been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal
exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the
rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system,
such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised
and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal
fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the
estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those
rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and
purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases.
This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs.
State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial
persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the
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law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance,
the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
10) G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
FULE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
MARTIN, J.:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should
allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence
of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy,
where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks
administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed.
The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the
country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an
inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the
state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration. 3
What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay
down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue
statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is
of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
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11) G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on
March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,
have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of
the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such
Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall
cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3)
weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition
for probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the
court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament,
even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to
relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament
of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
12) G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
EUSEBIO vs. EUSEBIO
CONCEPCION, J.:
It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in
a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with "knowledge
that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home."
At any rate, the presumption in favor of the retention of the old
domicile 1— which is particularly strong when the domicile is one of the
origin 2as San Fernando, Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said
decedent — has not been offset by the evidence of record.
13) G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses
the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning
as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
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understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
14) G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
GRIMM ROBERTS vs. LEONIDAS
AQUINO, J.:
The probate of the will is. It is anomalous that the estate of a person
who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore,
the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding
and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.
15) G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
URIARTE vs. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
DIZON, J.:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is
equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found
it hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of
the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage
an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required
to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be
without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of
a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
16) G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
TEEHANKEE, J.:
the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity
between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that
the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction
over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Page 5
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of
the decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the
decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his
surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold
the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court
which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.
17) G.R. No. 134100 September 29, 2000
ALIPIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
MENDOZA, J.:
Where a complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the
recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said conjugal
[partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action
should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse.
, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit
against petitioner.1âwphi1 Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against
the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a
petition either for the issuance of letters of administration 18 or for the
allowance of will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died
intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this
procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against
the Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to
represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal
property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid.
Needless to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having
jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any
other court.
18) G.R. No. L-39532 July 20, 1979
VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AQUINO, J.:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
19) G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983
PASTOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS
PLANA, J.:
Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or
heirs have been in possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or heirs
have entered into possession of portions of the estate before the
debts and expenses have been settled and paid and have become
liable to contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses,
the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that
purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities,
and order how much and in what manner each person shall
contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.
TrinaFaye SPECPRO – R72-80
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of
debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are
among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued.
... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate
court generally cannot issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed
to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the
adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or
administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a
writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any
judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the
probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out
of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession
of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the
expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a
person is cited for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule
142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius,
that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution.
20) GR L-81147 June 20, 1989
PEREIRA vs. CA
GANCAYCO, J.:
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving a property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator. An exception to this rule is Sec. 1 of
Rule 74 which provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age and
there are no debts due from the estate, the may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator. However, this does
not preclude them from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire FOR GOOD
REASONS to an ordinary action for partition.
[good reason – administration proceedings are long and costly]
In the case at bar, the reason why Nagas instituted the special
proceeding is because she and the widow are not in good terms and
she wants to obtain possession of the properties for her own purpose.
This is not a compelling reason which will necessitate the judicial
administration of the estate.
21) G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978
COCA vs. PANGILINAN
AQUINO, J.:
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the
inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action .
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title
or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the
general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate
action.
Page 6
Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership
of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its
exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the heirs
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
22) G.R. No. 118904 April 20, 1998
TRINIDAD vs. COURT OF APPEALS
PANGANIBAN, J.
Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already deceased and
there were proceedings in the probate court, it was incumbent upon the
court to first give authorization to administrator of the estate to deliver
titles which had been previously sold.
23) G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
SOLIVIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
MEDIALDEA, J.:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration
only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the
approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion
or parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine
the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the
inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent action is
necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of
the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical.
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the
decedent is exclusively within the range of the administratrix
proceedings and can not properly be made an independent action.
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
Partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed. The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through
an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge
which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.
TrinaFaye SPECPRO – R72-80
R74: SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
1) G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989
VDA. DE REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO, J.:
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors
or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may
be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The
correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no
amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment
once the latter had become final. 11 The court may make this
amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the
pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its
conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and
intended to settle the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and
elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or
leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided
because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of
interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without
designation or segregation of shares.
2) G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
AVELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
QUISUMBING, J.:
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in
his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or
fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
— If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are
all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means
of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the
gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died testate
or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made
to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by
the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be
held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from
the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested
persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without
delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to
determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the
estate and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of
such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such
persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or
by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the
possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting
the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
Page 7
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the
clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall
be recorded in the proper register's office.
3) G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
CUA vs. VARGAS
AZCUNA, J.:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex
parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do
not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby.18 It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed19 as what happened in the instant
case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case
confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without
their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
4) G.R. No. 45904 September 30, 1938
UTULO vs. PASION
IMPERIAL, J.:
According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are
no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the
property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply
to the competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with
the summary partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to
partition all the property constituting the inheritance among themselves
pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator.
5) G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958
SAMPILO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
LABRADOR, J.:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial
settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parteproceeding. It cannot by any
reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the
decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no
mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We
have examined the two cases cited by appellants and there is no
similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling therein
had been predicated and those of the case at bar.
TrinaFaye SPECPRO – R72-80
Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of
Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion and so hold that the
provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years
from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who
have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule
74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of
the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to
comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have
participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having
found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces
living at the time of his death.
6) see #3
7) G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008
BENATIRO vs. CUYOS
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive
notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and
was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the
decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case
confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the
filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without
their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned
8) G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001
PEDROSA vs.COURT OF APPEALS
QUISUMBING, J.:
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in
the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or
issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed
upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said
deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when
publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the
ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the
said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent
and vicious.
Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section
119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons
or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or
are represented by themselves or through guardians.20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial
partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
Page 8
9) G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
DE LA ROSA vs. DAMIAN
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling,
or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that the administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,
specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, 72a
situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the
persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the
nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the
deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.
10) G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
PORTUGAL vs. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and
does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse. The better
practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the
special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings
are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is,
under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been
instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a
putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
TrinaFaye SPECPRO – R72-80
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to
bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule
74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to
the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.
12) G.R. No. L-33261 September 30, 1987
AMEROL vs. BAGUMBARAN
SARMIENTO, J.:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribed in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of
decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this
rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 16 The only
discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, 17 which states that the
prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this
variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de
Guzman. 18 But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948,
hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not
coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be
stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new
provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old
Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis
of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of
title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
13) G.R. No. 76148 December 20, 1989
CARO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
MEDIALDEA, J.:
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribed in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of
decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this
rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from
the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 16 The only
discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, 17 which states that the
prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this
variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de
Guzman. 18 But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948,
hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not
coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be
stressed, at this juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new
provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old
Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis
of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance of
title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1948, Epifanio Caro was already
aware of the adverse claim of the private respondents. He should have
been vigilant of his right as the allegedly new owner of the questioned
land. What he did was the reverse, he slept on his rights for a number
of years. In the recent case of Bagtas vs. CA GR 50732, we held that a
Page 9
considerable delay in asserting one’s right before a court of justice is
strongly persuasive of the lack of merit of his claim, since it is human
nature for a person to enforce his right when same is threatened or
invaded. Thus, he is stopped by laches from questioning the ownership
of the questioned land. Not only that. There is also estoppels in pais
because Caro filed his answer only while Villanueva filed her answer.
14) G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998
MARQUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
ROMERO, J.:
It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens
title over the property. 13 For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive
period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on
June 16, 1982. Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was
filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident
that prescription had not yet barred the action.
To bolster the foregoing position, the Court of Appeal's reliance
on Gerona v. de Guzman, 14 is misplaced. In Amerol v.
Bagumbaran, 15 we ruled that the doctrine laid down in the earlier
Gerona case was based on the old Code of Civil Procedure 16 which
provided that an action based on fraud prescribes within four years
from the date of discovery. However, with the effectivity of the present
Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive periods
are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or
constructive trusts are obligations created by law then the prescriptive
period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years. 17
15) G.R. No. 128254 January 16, 2004
SALUDARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CORONA, J.:
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered
owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its
true owner. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set
aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands.
In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property
or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with
a better right.7
Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is
not absolute because it is subject to extinctive prescription.
There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an
action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the
land to be reconveyed
16) G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NERI vs.HEIRS of UY
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura,10 thus:
TrinaFaye SPECPRO – R72-80
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled
to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a
total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for
the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution…
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the
subsequent sale of the subject propertiesmade by Enrique and his
children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents
isvalid but only with respect to their proportionate shares therein.It
cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares
in the properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death11and
that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their undivided share in
the estate.12
R75: PRODUCTION OF WILL, ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY
1) G.R. No. 150739 August 18, 2005
QUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CARPIO, J.:
Under the Spanish Civil Code, the law governing Lorenzo’s alleged will,
all wills must be executed in writing27except when the testator takes part
in any military operation or when any warlike operation is imminent 28 or
when the testator29 is in danger of shipwreck.30 In such cases, the
testator can execute the will orally in the presence of at least two
witnesses.31 Failure to comply with these formalities renders the will
void.32 Furthermore, the Code of Civil Procedure requires that wills must
be submitted to the proper court for probate otherwise the same shall
not pass either real or personal property.33
2) G.R. No. L-27421 September 12, 1986
MANG-OY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CRUZ, J.:
After examining the musty records, we sustain the ruling-made both by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals-that the will, not having been
probated as required by law, was inoperative as such. The settled
principle, as announced in a long line of decisions in accordance with
the Rules of Court, is that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved or allowed in court.
We find, however, that the document may be sustained on the basis of
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time the
said document was executed by Old Man Tumpao in 1937. The said
article reads as follows:
Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act inter vivos, or by win, such partition shall stand in so far as
it does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.
Page 10
3) G.R. No. 78778 December 3, 1990
CORONADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
PARAS, J.:
While it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil Code),
the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of Article
1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said
document was executed by Melecio Artiaga in 1918. The said article
read as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of
Appeals, 144 SCRA 33 [1986])
Normally, the probate of a will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity
or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as
being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped
from questioning the ownership of the property in question,
notwithstanding her having objected to the probate of the will executed
by Monterola under which Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said
property.
4) G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007
NITTSCHER vs. NITTSCHER
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is
conclusive only as to its due execution. 11 The authority of the probate
court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties
forming part of her husband’s estate should be settled in an ordinary
action before the regular courts.
5) G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
MANINANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
... The authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with
those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the
validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may
be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The que0stions relating to these points remain
entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated .... 6
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of
the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its
only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law. 7
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6) G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008
ALUAD vs. ALUAD
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter
vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a
will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two
witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with
Article 805.
It is void and transmitted no right to petitioners’ mother. But even
assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not
probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to
Maria.42 Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by
her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her
(Matilde’s) will must be probated.
7) G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989
RALLA vs. UNTALAN
SARMIENTO, J.:
Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till
after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the
properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the
win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there
are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special
Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving
the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla,
respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
8) G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
FERNANDEZ vs. DIMAGIBA
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy,
being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes,
which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's
ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is
the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the
Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation
(Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be
evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling
the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is
patently unmeritorious.
9) see R75 #6
10) G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
AJERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO, J.:
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only
upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in
exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In
the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her
holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her
conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by
respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property,
which she shares with her father's other heirs.
Page 11
R76: ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL
1) G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992
FRAN vs. SALAS
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a
jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the
person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession
of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The section reads in full as
follows:
Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor,
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested
in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed,
whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.
In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation
were attached to the petition as Annex "A" and Annex "A-1",
respectively, and made integral parts of the same. It is to be presumed
that upon the filing of the petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly
authorized subordinate, examined the petition and found that the
annexes mentioned were in fact attached thereto.
2) G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966
RODRIGUEZ vs. BORJA
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on
March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio,
have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by
section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of
the old Rules):
SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such
Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall
cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for
probate has been filed by the testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the
court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament,
even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to
relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament
of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
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3) G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
VDA. DE PEREZ vs.TOLETE
QUIASON, J.:
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view
that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and
therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate
probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal
and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the
rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only
result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33
[1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for
the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan
spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially
the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are
conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate.
As this Court has held a number of times, it will always strive to settle
the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch
to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA
743 [1990]).
4) G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
DE ARANZ vs. GALING
PADILLA, J.:
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail
or personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of
the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and
deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at
least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be
mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service
of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of
the hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the
Philippines at their places of residence, if such places of residence be
known. There is no question that the residences of herein petitioners
legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The petition for
the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the
probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to
petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was
not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3)
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Page 12
5) G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
RODELAS vs. ARANZA
RELOVA, J.:
"Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even
a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be
exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the
photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may
be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased can be determined by the probate court.
6) G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966
NUGUID vs. NUGUID
SANCHEZ, J.:
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is
a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17
On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are
totally different from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article
854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This
annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.
7) G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975
BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ
AQUINO, J.:
vs. Nuguid case:
The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the
testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will
was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the
direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or
omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises
and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the
preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the
testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted
(.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His
preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .
-----
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a
purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed
testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner
therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally
tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the
parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-
27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).
To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-
24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to
intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition
operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a
provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose
of practically his whole estate. So compelling is the principle that
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intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should
prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect.
8) G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985
NEPOMUCENO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the
resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy
of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is
premature.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
Invoking "practical considerations", we stated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon
the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the
will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to
withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to
have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted
correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue.
9) G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978
GALLANOSA vs. ARCANGEL
AQUINO, J.:
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a
will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized
or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the
will is mandatory.
10) G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
LEVISTE vs. CA
CORONA, J.:
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court.
He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in
the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir.
We had occasion to rule that one who is only indirectly interested in a
will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:
the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is
not that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts which
would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the
courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in
the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would
entitle them to be heard with relation thereto.
Page 13
11) G.R. No. L-13938 July 31, 1968
BUTIONG vs. SURIGAO CONSOLIDATED MINING
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Indeed, it is well-settled that one who has or can have no interest in
succeeding a decedent cannot oppose the probate of his alleged
will.1 Appellant herein does not claim to have such interest in the
succession to Christian Harris.
12) G.R. No. L-23135 December 26, 1967
SUMILANG vs. RAMAGOSA
MAKALINTAL, J.:
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the
petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another.itc-alf The first decides the execution
of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the
second relates to descent and distribution.
13) G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
ACAIN vs. IAC
PARAS, J.:
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced
heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein,
or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are
expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966];
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she
does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the
inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code)
however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not
been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-
9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she
has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that
both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally
adopted child.
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open
to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre
(que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion"
Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of
Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should
stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway
for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor
devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the
deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be,
necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185
[1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated
above, be respected.
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14) G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973
CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
TEEHANKEE, J.:
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not
the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no
mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item
of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782,
Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an
heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person called to
the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law.
However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No.
591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
15) G.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938
MERCADO vs. SANTOS
LAUREL, J.:
Criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will
which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
[The Constitution of the Philippines provides that "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused . . . shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial]
16) G.R. No. L-26743 May 31, 1972
ABUT vs. ABUT
MAKALINTAL, J.:
*Death of executor does not result to dismissal of original action
We find the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal
of the probate court to admit the amended petition without a new
publication thereof to be untenable. The jurisdiction of the court
became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon
compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76. 2
A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction
extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named
additional heirs not included in the original petition 3 did not require
that notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that Section
4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the hearing for
the probate of the will, either by mail or personally.
Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination
of the case
17) G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988
DE GUZMAN vs. ANGELES
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition
for letters of administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and
shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and
creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons believed to
Page 14
 have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause
notice through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The
purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the
court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all
the world. Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules
of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the
estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be
deprived of his right to property without due process of law.
Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the absence of which
makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition
void and subject to annulment.
18) G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999
CODOY vs. CALUGAY
PARDO, J.:
that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way
as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will
is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will
was in the handwriting of the deceased.
19) EN BANC G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
GAGO vs. MAMUYAC
JOHNSON, J.:
The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation
of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove
the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or
revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be inferred
from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be
found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the
possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the
testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his
death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any
other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator,
while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that
the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
20) G.R. No. L-18799 March 31, 1964
MARAVILLA vs. MARAVILLA
BARRERA, J.:
The variation in the expressions used by the witness is the best evidence
that he was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of
truthfulness rather than the reverse.
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A will may be allowed even if some witnesses do not remember having
attested it, if other evidence satisfactorily show due execution and that
failure to identify his signature does not bar probate.
21) see #3
22) G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005
ALABAN, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Tinga, J.:
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. 48 A perusal of the
will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are
neither compulsory nor testate heirs49 who are entitled to be notified of
the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so
notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the
notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
23) G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST
WILL AND TESTAMENT OF LOPEZ vs. LOPEZ
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form
of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The
statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and
testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" 10 cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere
examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliund.11 On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding
the application of Article 809, to wit:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was
notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or
even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely
disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially
appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings.
Page 15
R77: ALLOWANCE OF WILL PROVED OUTSIDE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATE THEREUNDER
1) G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930
FLUEMER vs. HIX
MALCOLM, J.:
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts.
the courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson
[1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met.
There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State
of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate
of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State
of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.
2) G.R. No. L-21993 June 21, 1966G.R. No. 76714 June 2,
1994
VDA. DE PEREZ vs. TOLETE
QUIASON, J.:
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by
New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due
execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator
has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the
will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which
the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of.
3) G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN
BARREDO, J.:
It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not
have any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may
take it for granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that
the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need
of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the
competent evidence on the point.
[At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the
pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges
under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective
positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be
deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free
portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and
sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the
conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the
parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, PCIB being of the
view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth
of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that
there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately
appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas
on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB
would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs.
Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a
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party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in
our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel.]
4) G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
MICIANO vs. BRIMO
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not
in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any
evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines.
5) G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
SUNTAY vs. SUNTAY
PADILLA, J.:
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution
and validity of the same be established, and the will is proved to have
been in existence at the time of the death of the testator, or is shown
to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of
the testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are
clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. When
a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated
and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the
certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are filed and
recorded.
6) G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943
GUEVARA vs. GUEVARA
OZAETA, J.:
We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the
decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to
make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that
will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the
will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those
provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the
presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law
enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because
unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world,
the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of
the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some
of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other
than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that
they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will.
Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights
be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of
the will to present it to the court for probate.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobdy raises any question as to
the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue
for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first
securing its allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law
expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or personal estate
unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second,
because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be
dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or
Page 16
extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to
effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees
under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the
publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and
legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in
evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any
more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of
the land involved in an ordinary action for reinvindicacion or partition.
7) G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
GRIMM ROBERTS vs. LEONIDAS
AQUINO, J.:
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
8) G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006
ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance
of Will Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate
Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court
shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to
persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however,
petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound
to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.
9) see # 2
10) G.R. No. 156330 November 19, 2014
ROTTERDAM vs. GLOW LAKS
PEREZ, J.:
It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.13 To prove a
foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court14 which read: SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreigncountry, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
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R78: LETTER TESTAMENTARYAND OF ADMINISTRATION, WHEN AND
TO WHOM ISSUED
1) G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014
MARCELO vs. MARCELO
PEREZ, J.:
SECTION 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or
administrators.— No person is competent to serve as executor or
administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the
trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want of
understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude.
Section 6 of the same rule, on the other hand, lists an order of
preference in instances when there is a contest of who should be
appointed administrator:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.— If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving spouse, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving spouse, or next
of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving spouse, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or ifthe surviving spouse,
or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for the administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one ormore of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
2) G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992
GABRIEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO, J.:
It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given
to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court
where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for
thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered
opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the
administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very
strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the
administration.
Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of
co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have
the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different
interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause,
an intricate and perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested
persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the
best interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.
Page 17
3) G.R. No. 162934 November 11, 2005
HEIRS OF CASTILLO vs. LACUATA-GABRIEL
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion
of the court. The order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not
apply to the selection of a special administrator. In the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, the court determines who is entitled to the
administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, We hold that
the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient
reason.
4) G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000
AVELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
QUISUMBING, J.:
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in
his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or
fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent
court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in
Section 6 of Rule 78.5 The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age
or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. .
.
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever
the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he
died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos,
and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an interested person
and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1)
month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the last
publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons
as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and
without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any
there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to
participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among
them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court
shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if
they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or
trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall
thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of
the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The
court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs
of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or
rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of
the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real
estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death. 7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves
without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to
submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court.8
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5) G.R. No. 146737 December 10, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN
"JHONNY" LOCSIN” vs. LOCSIN, JR.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor.9 Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as
distributees.10 In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,11 this Court held that in the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of
the one to be appointed administrator.
6) G.R. No. L-42088 May 7, 1976
BALUYUT vs. PAÑO
AQUINO, J.:
Even the directive of the testator in his will designating that a certain
person should act as executor is not binding on the probate court and
does not automatically entitle him to the issuance of letters
testamentary. A hearing has to be held in order to ascertain his fitness
to act as executor. He might have been fit to act as executor when the
will was executed but supervening circumstances might have rendered
him unfit for that position.
Thus, it was held that a hearing is necessary in order to determine the
suitability of the person to be appointed administrator by giving him
the opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors a
chance to contest the petition.
7) see # 3
8) G.R. No. 167979 March 15, 2006
UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. 10 In Sioca v.
Garcia,11 this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without
sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving
spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But,
if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the
court may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s
suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the
sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and
such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears
affirmatively that the court below was in error.
x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises
all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration.15 The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate
proceedings is not prohibited. In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court
reaffirmed that jurisprudence allows the appointment of co-
administrators under certain circumstances.
Page 18
9) G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008
VILMA C. TAN vs. GEDORIO
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted
provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The
preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of
a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely
in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.
10) G.R. No. L-17633 October 19, 1966
LIM vs. DIAZ-MILLAREZ
REGALA, J.:
Shown to have some liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole,
Cirilo can not compatibly perform the duties of an administrator. In this
jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as
administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or hostility to
those immediately interested in the estate.
The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the
court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to
be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.
11) G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009
REPUBLIC vs. MARCOS
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a
necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the
manner he wishes. It is natural that the testator should desire to appoint
one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in
the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be
considered as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights
granted by will take effect from the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code
of the Philippines), the management of his estate by the administrator
of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no
reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed
any longer. It has been held that when a will has been admitted to
probate, it is the duty of the court to issue letters testamentary to
the person named as executor upon his application.
The "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral
turpitude as the mere omission is already a violation regardless of the
fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual.
Since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction
relating to four violations of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should
not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an executor of
the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his
conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify
him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving
moral turpitude.
12) G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005
ANGELES vs. MAGLAYA
GARCIA, J.:
It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator
of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the
next of kin of the decedent.38 When the law speaks of "next of kin", the
reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution,
to the decedent’s property;39 one whose relationship is such that he is
entitled to share in the estate as distributed, 40 or, in short, an heir. In
resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of
administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate
court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A
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separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into
and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late
Francisco Angeles.
13) see #9
14) G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990
GONZALES vs. AGUINALDO
PADILLA, J.:
In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased
person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said
estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 8 This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of
administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly
15) G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
SUNTAY vs. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
PEREZ, J.:
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator
over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest
in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78
takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the
rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the
highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference,
the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein
greater than any other candidate.
In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more
than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested
therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the
estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for
the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound
judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14
Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in
Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the
appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their
judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests
represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an
intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons
satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best
interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the
administration of an estate desires to have another competent person
associated with him in the office.18
Page 19
R79: OPPOSING ISSUANCE OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY, PETITION AND
CONTEST FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
1) G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992
PILIPINAS SHELL vs. DUMLAO
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having
left his estate in such province. 21 These facts are amply enumerated in
the petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate and
of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards,
no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration in any county. 23 Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner
seeking letters of administration is an interested person, does not fall
within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the
opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed
by an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to dismiss
may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court,
but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the
proceedings.
This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 24 where the
dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was affirmed because
the petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has
no material and direct interest in her estate." 25 In the said case, this
Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.
2) G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988
DE GUZMAN vs. ANGELES
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause
notice through publication of the petition after it receives the same. The
purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the
court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all
the world. Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules
of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the
estate of the deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be
deprived of his right to property without due process of law.
3) G.R. No. L-17759 December 17, 1962
SAGUINSIN vs. LINDAYAG
DIZON, J.:
Where it is undisputed that the decedent left a husband and three
legally adopted children, a petition for issuance of letters of
administration in favour of the sister of said decedent was properly
dismissed for lack of interest in the estate, she being neither an heir nor
a creditor thereof.
An interested party has defined in this connection as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa, 40
O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as
well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person
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may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely
indirect or contingent.
4) G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."
In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from
domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate.
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which
when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place
and domicile in another.
5) G.R. No. 129505 January 31, 2000
MALOLES vs. PHILLIPS
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may
have been preterited in the testator's will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed
executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may the
court appoint other persons to administer the estate. 20 None of these
circumstances is present in this case.
6) G.R. No. 167979 March 15, 2006
UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. 10 In Sioca v. Garcia,11
this Court set aside the order of preference, to wit:
It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without
sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving
spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But,
if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the
court may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s
suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the
sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and
such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears
affirmatively that the court below was in error.
x x x Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.
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A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises
all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the
administration.15 The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate
proceedings is not prohibited.

7) G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008

TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR
TINGA, J.:

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person. In
Saguinsin v. Lindayag,14 the Court defined an interested party as one
who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore,
must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent.

8) G.R. No. 178933 September 16, 2009

SILVERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject
property is part of an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before
the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules
of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to
the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the
Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be distributed after
the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against
the estate, except when authorized by the Court.

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