This is again an Aristotelian term, explained in the Prior Analytics1.

It is well described by
Proclus in the following passage:
“Reduction (ἀπαγωγή) is a transition from one problem or theorem to another, the solution
or poof of which makes that which is propounded manifest also. For example, after the doubling of
the cube had been investigated, they transformed the investigation into another upon which it
follows, namely the finding of the two means; and from that time forward they inquired how
between two given straight lines two mean proportionals could be discovered. And they [ou t'ney]
say that the first to effect the reduction of difficult constructions was Hippocrates of Chios, who
also squared a kune and discovered many other things in geometry, being second to none in
ingenuity as regards construction2.”
7. Reductio ad absurdum.
This is variously called by Aristotle “reductio ad absurdum” (ἡ ειζ το ἀδύνατου ἀπαγωγή)3,
“proof per impossibile” (ἡ δια του ἀδυνάτου δειξις or ἀπόδειξις)4, “proof leading to the impossible”
(ἡ εις τὸ ἀδύνατον ἄγουσα ἀπόδειξις)5. It is part of “proof (starting) from a hypothesis 6” (ἐξ
ὑποθέσεως). “All (syllogisms) which reach the conclusion per impossibile reason out a conclusion
which is false, and they prove the original contention (by the method starting) from a hypothesis,
when something impossible results from assuming the contradictory of the original contention, as,
for example, when it is proved that the diagonal (of a square) is incommensurable because, if it be
assumed commensurable, it will follow that odd (numbers) are equal to even (numbers) 7.” Or again,
“proff (leading) to the impossible differs from the direct (δεικτικης) in that it assumes what it desires
to destroy [namely the hypothesis of the falsity of the conclusion] and then reduces it to something
admittedly false, whereas the direct proof starts from premisses admittedly true8.”
Proclus has the following description of the reductio ad absurdum. “Proofs by reductio ad
absurdum in every case reach a conclusion manifestly impossible, a conclusion the contradictory of
which is admitted. In some cases the conclusions are found to conflict with the common notions, or
the postulates, or the hypotheses (from which we started); in others they contradict propositions

1 ibid. II. 25, 69 a 20.

2 Proclus, pp. 212, 24 – 213, 11. This passage has frequently been taken as crediting Hippocrates, with the discovery
of the method of geometrical reduction: cf. Taylor (Translation of Proclus, II. p. 26). Allman (p. 41 n., 59), Gow (pp.
169, 170). As Tannery remarks (p. 110), if the particular reduction of the duplacation problem to that of the two
means is the first noted in history, it is difficult to suppose that it was really the first; for Hippocrates must have
found instances of it in the Pythagorean geometry. Bretschneider, I think, comes nearer the truth when he boldly (p.
99) translates: “This reduction of the aforesaid construction is said to have been first given by Hippocrates.” The
words are πρωτον δέ ϕασιτων ἀπορουμένων διαγραμμάτων τἠν ἀπαγωγἠν ποιήσασθαι, which must, literally, be
translated as in the text above; but, when Proclus speaks vaguely of “difficult constructions,” he probably means to
say simply that “this first recorded instance of a reduction of a difficult construction is attributed to Hippocrates.”
3 Aristotle, Anal. prior. I. 7, 29 b 5; I. 44, 50 a 30.
4 ibid. I. 21, 39 b 32; I. 29, 45 a 35.
5 Anal. post. I. 24, 85 a 16 etc.
6 Anal. prior. I. 23, 40 b 25.
7 ibid. I. 23, 41 a 24.
8 ibid. II. 14, 62 b 29.
previously established9” … “Every reductio ad absurdum assumes what conflicts with the desired
result, then, using that as a basis, proceeds until it arrives at an admitted absurdity, and, by thus
destroying the hypothesis, establishes the result originally desired. For it is necessary to understand
generally that all mathematical arguments either proceed from the first principles or lead back to
them, as Porphyry somewhere says. And those which proceed from the first principles are again of
two kinds, for they start either from common notions and the clearness of the self-evident alone, or
from results previously proved; while those which lead back to the principles are either by way of
assuming the principles or by way of destroying them. Those which assume the principles are called
analyses, and the opposite of these are syntheses – for it is possible to start from the said principles
and to proceed in the regular order to the desired conclusion, and this process is synthesis – while
the arguments which would destroy the principles are called reductiones ad absurdum. For it is the
function of this method to upset something admitted as clear10.”

9 Proclus, p. 254, 22 – 27.

10 ibid. p. 255, 8 – 26.