Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197,
200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361,
368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551,
566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836,
923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242,
1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826,
1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213,
215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273,
275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343,
346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444-
445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609,
610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526,
1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723,
1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-
1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829,
1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858,
1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963,
1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-
2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-
507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560,
563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703,
705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76,
80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced
by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without
the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
1
a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and
the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen
and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election
for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this
Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon
by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen
that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by
said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall
determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually
been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts
of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
2
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee
said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all
form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of
Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this
holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal
laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication,
even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
binding force and effect.
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or SO ORDERED.
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past
this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
Relova, J., concurs.
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

Aquino, J., took no part.

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago,
1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such
a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and Separate Opinions
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified. There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared binding force and effect.
unconstitutional by this Court.
3
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made
to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to
the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a
legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily
by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level
of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication,
to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could
in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of
unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication
is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself
in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is
otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No.
386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice
that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to
obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from
the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
4
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the
Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has
to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the
date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity
will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice
is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative
acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A
law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However,
I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication
being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made
to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to
the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a
legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is
true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this
5
clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any
statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily
by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in
agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it
requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice.
This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by
publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level
of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication,
to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect
of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no
legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious
problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to
question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an
effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the
basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil
cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was
issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be
successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could
in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of
unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication
is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in
agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself
in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is
otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No.
386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or
executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be
devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier
noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set
procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice
that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to
obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process
enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from
the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the
Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has
to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
6
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication
date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity being in the Official Gazette.
will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due
process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice
Footnotes
is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for
their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date. 1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a 2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil.
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette. SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their 3 16 Phil. 366, 378.
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong,
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843;
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077;
Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.
of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative
acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." 5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A
law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot 6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.
how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, 8 308 U.S. 371, 374.
I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
9 93 Phil.. 68,.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo
S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-
request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring: the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the

7
Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential
issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills

connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel.
White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana,
U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24

SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice
Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall
provide publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force
until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR
1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

8
 et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October
1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required by
Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had
been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on
August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9,
1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
Republic of the Philippines petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
SUPREME COURT judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
Manila in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
THIRD DIVISION Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208),
this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that
no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a
vs. motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-
53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
RESOLUTION modes and periods of appeal.

CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the Special
First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed
the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule
barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
9
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the
grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987,
more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within
the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period
to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot
seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there
is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance,"
which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

10

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No.
34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he
purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he
alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De
Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of
the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija
town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her
in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before
a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which
is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application
of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At
the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet,
he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his
first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.
11
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior
as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private
life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,
must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday
life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing
v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.

Republic of the Philippines

SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and
TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of
money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

12
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the Court of Land
Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of Alabang,
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-subd. project),
being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by
Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road
widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa
Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to
6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing
an area of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la
parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por el NW, con
la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts.
Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS. 3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn
over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.
These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial
compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in
the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-
square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining
land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was later
divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17, 1994,
with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent
Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained
that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos
II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad
with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of title
issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
13
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo
II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their counterclaims for
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of irregularity
of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own motion for
summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit,
Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of respondent
Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v.
Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that
co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and
summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and
void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate, or legally
adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together
with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated
to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name
of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and
void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of
Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null
and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and defendant
minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and defendant
Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu
thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo contrary to law
and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first
sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee.
Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary
judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was
presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the
rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have traditionally been
applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact,
however, that appellee's own brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and
wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is
sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by
which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts
alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides:
14
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case
at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal
requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the
dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said
marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo
Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but
the number of said marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may
have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view that the
veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is not proof that
a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage
license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy of a particular
party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
statements. Although it had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's
brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate
filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare allegation that
appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the
rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is
more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo
Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the
trial court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to
thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. 8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof,
and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with
respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite
the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law,
or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has
decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now
Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35
governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof, entering another
remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made
findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications
of the laws and misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through
a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are
other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither judgment
on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment to the case at
bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not
be warranted. x x x11
15
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No delegation
of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property relations of
the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved. No
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed.
(Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case, We
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration of its
nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions.14 (Underscoring
supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to
intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the public
prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. 15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney
to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there
is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the public
prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not
fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene for the State
during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 16
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death
of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends
only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August
3, 1988.18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the
surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs
are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. 19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new
Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 20 is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court
held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)
16
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage
in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the
marriage took place.23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. 24 But the Civil Code is
silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can
bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by
the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity
of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00
to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court
must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.29(Underscoring supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-interest
to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law.30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. 31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.32 Conversely, if
there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased
brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother and
sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and without
ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner.
Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of
Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to
the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest
to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with respondent
Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage case
is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son
of Teofilo.
17
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner 2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted son of the late
has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, does lack of cause of action;
not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the
beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, 3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED AND SET
illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the ASIDE.
decedent.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or nullity case priority in its calendar.
of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of
marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, No costs.
illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper and
in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of action RUBEN T. REYES
before it. Associate Justice

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the case
concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the matter
WE CONCUR:
hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36 Associate Justice
Chairperson
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's
bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to
support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-
support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation Associate Justice NAZARIO
of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of Associate Justice
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided by
Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared Associate Justice
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that
is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion
by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or ATTESTATION
conceived within a valid marriage.37
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
initio. Associate Justice
Chairperson
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the status and
filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos; CERTIFICATION

18
 17
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418, 429,
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.
18
REYNATO S. PUNO Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA 766, 772.
Chief Justice (Note in the citation omitted.)
19
Id. at 429-430.
20
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
Footnotes of Voidable Marriages.
1
Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a
with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P. Abesamis, concurring. newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
2 21
Civil Case No. 95-135. Supra note 17.
3 22
Rollo, pp. 49-51. Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.
4 23
Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6. Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
5 24
Rollo, p. 55. See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No. 179474, March 28,
2008;Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446.
6
CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
25
Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735, 746.
7
Id. at 63.
26
Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
8
Id. at 60-63.
27
Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004,
9
Rollo, pp. 24-25. 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA
10
105, 117; andBank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1. (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466,
482 (1999); Ralla v. Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres, G.R. No. 151900,
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003,
direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in turn University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v.
11 Court of Appeals, supra; Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352
CA rollo, p. 61.
SCRA 334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
12
Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication in a Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003. 28
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 2, Rule 2,
13
G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts. 48 & 60, and Sec. 1; Niñal v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122.
Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954). 29
Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.
14
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143. 30
Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 522.
15
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177, citing Malcampo- 31
Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different classes of illegitimate
Sin v. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289, and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No.
children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them fall in the category of illegitimate
109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.
children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family Code:
16
Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 529,
andAncheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.

19
Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code.
32
See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA 322; see
also Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 520; Pedrosa v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620; Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 345.
33
Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.
34
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
35
Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
36
Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97, February 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 87,
citing Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991,
193 SCRA 105, 114, citing in turn Saura Import & Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co.,
Inc., 118 Phil. 150, 156 (1963); and Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).
37
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 438

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

20
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Order dated
January 2, 20062of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452
entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy.
The antecedents are as follows—
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent
spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case
No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check
Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored
upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2)
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952
contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same
is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."4
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its Order5 dated
February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open
court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused
respondents.1avvphi1
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint6 for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the
same loaned amount ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa
and BP Blg. 22 cases.
In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with
damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b)
of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration8 which the court denied in its Order9 dated June 5, 2006.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue –
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court
Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under
BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for
bouncing checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to identify both
the accused (respondents herein)?10
Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must
be given only prospective application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action is deemed instituted
with the latter—
(1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary for the resolution of the civil
aspect of the case;
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more expedient than a timely remand
to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the
case;
(3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused amounting
to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated in a separate action;
(4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist;
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex-delicto pursuant to Article
3111 of the Civil Code; and
(6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article 29 12 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22
proceedings.
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the
corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal
action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases. 13
This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus,
during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability
was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant
with our ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada14 that the possible single civil liability arising from the act
of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa
case and the prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining
party, without traversing the prohibition against forum shopping.15Prior to the judgment in either the
estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be deemed to have elected
either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of
the other.16
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt—where in Criminal Case No. 98-969952 there was no pronouncement as
regards the civil liability of the accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court
declared that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal effect of a
reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with
the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil Code.17
However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of
the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil
action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
21
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of the accused, the
question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the same legal effect as the dismissed estafa
cases. Put differently, may petitioner’s action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to
prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states –
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein.
If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is] subsequently awarded by the court, the
filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply
even to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this
is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. 18
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the
civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings
before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is
clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the
cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil
Code is not applicable.19
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not cast in stone, are for the
speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice and should therefore be adhered to in order to
attain this objective.20
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without
a remedy to recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice
even the petitioner’s Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-
88390 (Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie Sy), which
case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for an unreasonable length of
time.21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the same defense that petitioner had already elected to
litigate the civil action to recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor
during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public prosecutor
failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the
accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly instituted with
the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules
of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents
corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary
period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of respondents.
However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to
digress from this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.22 But this
rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s mistake is so great and serious that the client is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting
in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. 23 Tested against these
guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply
with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the Bar.24 Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be more
conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not
only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.25 Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the
proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed
to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only remaining remedy
available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal
of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute
the respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it dismissed the estafa charge
in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil
in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount
would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently evade
payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied against petitioner.
There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at
the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not be
allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this
principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on contract,
quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.26
Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal interpretation and
application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best
22
 3
way to ferret out the truth. The dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should Id. at 45-47.
not be barred by technicalities.27 For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the complement of
4
the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of Id. at 48-50.
their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are 5
incompetent to do so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner. Id. at 42-44.
6
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses Id. at 51-53.
William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. 7
Supra note 2.
SO ORDERED. 8
Rollo, pp. 28-38.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 9
Associate Justice Id. at 41.
10
WE CONCUR: Id. at 6.
11
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
Associate Justice complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
Chairperson and regardless of the result of the latter.
12
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
Associate Justice Associate Justice instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA found to be malicious.
Associate Justice
13
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
ATTESTATION action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was action prior to the criminal action.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
Associate Justice of the accused.
Chairperson, Third Division
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of
CERTIFICATION the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. opportunity to make such reservation.
REYNATO S. PUNO In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
Chief Justice
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
Footnotes In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information,
1 the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
Rollo, pp. 3-19.
trial. (Rule 111, 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure)
2
Id. at 22-27. 14
G.R. Nos. 155531-34, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 338.

23
15
Rodriguez v. Ponferrada, id. at 350.
16
Ibid.
17
Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 425, 433 (1989), citing Bernaldes, Jr. v. Bohol Land
Transportation, Inc., 117 Phil. 288, 291-292 (1963) and Bachrach Motors Co. v. Gamboa, 101 Phil.
1219 (1957).
18
Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 556, 559 (2002).
19
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., G.R. No. 163597, July 29,
2005, 465 SCRA 454, 461-462.
20
Id.
21
Rollo, p. 23.
22
Lynx Industries Contractor, Inc. v. Tala, G.R. No. 164333, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 169, 176.
23
Ceniza-Manantan v. People, G.R. No. 156248, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 364, 380.
24
Santiago v. Atty. Rafanan, 483 Phil. 94, 105 (2004).
25
Ramos v. Imbang, A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007, 530 SCRA 759, 768.
26
Chieng v. Santos, G.R. No. 169647, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 730, 747-748.
27
LCK Industries, Inc. v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007, 538
SCRA 634, 653.
28
Id. at 652.

24

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 189649 April 20, 2015
ADORACION CARO LINO (spouse and in substitution of the deceased JEREMIAS A.
CAROLINO),Petitioner,
vs.
GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP);
BRIG GEN. FERNANDO ZABAT, as Chief of the AFP Finance Center; COMMO.
REYNALDO BASILIO, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ Management and Fiscal Office; and
COMMO. EMILIO MARAYAG, Pension and Gratuity Officer, Pension and Gratuity
Management Center, AFP Finance Center, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated
May 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 103502 and the Resolution2 dated
September 10, 2009 denying reconsideration thereof.
The factual and legal antecedents are as follows:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioner's husband, Retired3 from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) with the rank of Colonel under General Order No. 1208 dated November 29,
1976, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340, 4 as amended.
He started receiving his monthly retirement pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in December 1976 until
the same was withheld by respondents in March 2005. On June 3, 2005, Jeremias wrote a
letter5 addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff asking for the reasons of the withholding of his retirement
pay. In a letter reply,6 Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA, Pension and Gratuity Officer of the AFP
Finance Center, informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name
in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners’ Payroll effective March 5, 2005; and that he could avail of re-
entitlement to his retirement benefits and the restoration of his name in the AFP Pensioners' Master
list Payroll by complying with the requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual
Citizenship Act.
7
It appeared that the termination of Jeremias' pension was done pursuant to Disposition Form dated
October 29, 2004,which was approved by the Chief of Staff and made effective in January 2005. In
the said Disposition Form, the AFP Judge Advocate General opined that under the provisions of
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA No. 340, retired military personnel are disqualified from receiving pension
benefits once incapable to render military service as a result of his having sworn allegiance to a foreign
country. It was also mentioned that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of the AFP could
be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638 8which provides that the name
of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance with the policy consideration that all
retirement laws inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are repealed and modified
accordingly.
On August 24, 2006, Jeremias filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a Petition
for Mandamus9against Gen. Generoso Senga, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, Brig. Gen. Fernando Zabat,
as Chief of the AFP Finance Center, Comm. Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP- GHQ
Management and Fiscal Office, and Comm. Emilio Marayag, Pension and Gratuity Management
Officer, Pension and Gratuity Management Center, AFP Finance Center, seeking reinstatement of his
name in the list of the AFP retired officers, resumption of payment of his retirement benefits under
RA No. 340, and the reimbursement of all his retirement pay and benefits which accrued from March
5, 2005 up to the time his name is reinstated and, thereafter, with claim for damages and attorney's
fees. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-06-58686, and raffled off to Branch 220.
On February 26, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision 10 granting the petition for mandamus, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering General Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., as Chief of
Staff of the AFP, Brigadier General Fernando Zabat, as the Commanding Officer of the AFP Finance
Center, Commodore Reynaldo Basilio, as Chief of the AFP-GHQ Management and Fiscal Office, and
Captain Theresa M. Nicdao, as Pension and Gratuity Officer of the Pension and Gratuity Management
Center, or any of their respective successors and those taking instructions from them as agents or
subordinates, to:
a. immediately reinstate the name of petitioner in the list of retired AFP Officers, and to resume
payment of his retirement benefits under RA 340; and
b. release to [petitioner] all retirement benefits due him under RA 340 which accrued to him from
March 2005 continuously up to the time his name is reinstated in the list of AFP retired officers. 11
The RTC found that the issue for resolution is the applicability of RA No. 340 and PD No. 1638 upon
Jeremias' retirement benefits. It found that he retired as a commissioned officer of the AFP in 1976;
thus, RA No. 340 is the law applicable in determining his entitlement to his retirement benefits and
not PD No. 1638 which was issued only in 1979. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." PD No. 1638 does not provide for such
retroactive application. Also, it could not have been the intendment of PD No. 1638 to deprive its loyal
soldiers of a monthly pension during their old age especially where, as here, the right had been vested
to them through time. RA No. 340 does not provide that the loss of Filipino citizenship would
terminate one's retirement benefits; and that PD No. 1638 does not reduce whatever benefits that any
person has already been receiving under existing law.
Respondents sought reconsideration,12 but the RTC denied the same in an Order13 dated May 25, 2007,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED,
considering that the questioned decision has not yet attained its finality. The Motion for Execution in
the meantime is hereby DENIED.14
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the CA. After the submission of the parties' respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for decision.
Jeremias died on September 30, 200715 and was substituted by his wife, herein petitioner. On May 25,
2009, the CA granted respondents' appeal. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The appealed decision is
REVOKED and SET ASIDE.16
25
In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jeremias retired in 1976 under the provisions of
RA No. 340, as amended, which does not contain any provision anent cessation or loss of retirement
benefits upon acquiring another citizenship, PD No. 1638, which was signed in 1979, effectively
repealed RA No. 340, as amended. Section 27 of PD No. 1638, which provides that the name of a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon such loss, was correctly made applicable to Jeremias' retirement benefits.
Logic dictates that since Jeremias had already renounced his allegiance to the Philippines, he cannot
now be compelled by the State to render active service and to render compulsory military service when
the need arises. The CA found that for the writ of mandamus to lie, it is essential that Jeremias should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondents to
perform the act required which petitioner failed to show; thus, mandamus will not lie.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated September 10, 2009.
Hence, this petition raising the following:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED THE 26 FEBRUARY 2007 DECISION OF THE QC RTC BECAUSE:
PD 1638 should not have been applied and cannot be used against petitioner as her husband's
retirement and pension were granted to him by the AFP under RA 340 which was not superseded by
PD 1638, a later statute.
Petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of mandamus to compel the reinstatement of his pension
and benefits from the AFP under RA 340 as PD 1638 was not applicable to him. Petitioner contends
that her husband's retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant to the provisions of RA No.
No. 340 as PD No. 1638 was not yet in existence then, and there was nothing in RA No. 340 that
disqualifies a retired military personnel from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring foreign
citizenship. The concept of retirement benefits is such that one is entitled to them for services already
rendered and not for those to be made at a future time. Retirement benefits due petitioner's husband
under RA No. 340, is an acquired right which cannot be taken away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638
does not expressly provide for its retroactive application. Respondents, being officers of the AFP
tasked to implement the provisions of RA No. 340 have neglected their function thereunder by
delisting petitioner's husband as a retiree, thus, mandamus is proper.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that PD No. 1638 applies to all military personnel in the
service of the AFP whether active or retired; hence, it applies retroactively to petitioner's husband.
Even when a retiree is no longer in the active service, his being a Filipino still makes him a part of the
Citizen Armed Forces; that whether a military personnel retires under the provisions of RA No. 340
or under PD No. 1638, he is still in the service of the military and/or the State only that he is retired,
thus, they should not be treated differently upon the loss of Filipino citizenship. He argues when there
is an irreconcilable conflict between the two laws of different vintages, i.e., RA No. 340 and PD No.
1638, the latter enactment prevails.
The Solicitor General argues that mandamus will not issue to enforce a right to compel compliance
with a duty which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. In this case, petitioner's
husband does not have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to continuously receive retirement
benefits after becoming an American citizen. Likewise, the AFP does not have a clear and imperative
duty to grant the said benefits considering that Section 27 of PD No. 1638 provides that the name of a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement
benefits terminated upon such loss.
Petitioner filed her reply thereto.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioner's husband retired in1976 under RA No. 340. He was already receiving his monthly
retirement benefit in the amount of P18,315.00 since December 1976 until it was terminated in March
2005. Section 5, RA No. 340 provides:
Sec. 5. Officers and enlisted men placed in the retired list shall be subject to the rules and articles of
war and to trial by court-martial for any breach thereof. At any time said officers and enlisted men
may be called to active service by the President. Refusal on the part of any officer or enlisted man to
perform such services shall terminate his right to further participation in the benefits of this Act
provided he resides in the Philippines and is physically fit for service. Such fitness for service shall be
determined by applicable regulations.
The afore-quoted provision clearly shows how a retiree's retirement benefits may be terminated, i.e.,
when the retiree refuses to perform active service when called to do so provided that (1) the retiree
resides in the Philippines and (2) is physically fit for service. There is no other requirement found in
the law which would be the reason for the termination of a retiree's retirement benefits. Petitioner's
husband was never called to perform active service and refused to do so, however, his retirement
benefit was terminated. The reason for such termination was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on
Section 27 of PD No. 1638, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired
list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss.
We find that the CA erred in applying PD No. 1638 to the retirement benefits of petitioner's husband.
Firstly, PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under
Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions; 17 that all statutes are to be
construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used;
and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect.18 These principles also apply
to amendments of statutes.
PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive application, nor the same may
be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the decree shall
take effect upon its approval. As held in Parreño v. COA, 19 there is no question that PD No. 1638, as
amended, applies prospectively. Since PD No. 1638, as amended, is about the new system of
retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the
service at the time of its approval.20 Conversely, PD No. 1638 is not applicable to those who retired
before its effectivity in 1979. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues
to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment. 21
Moreover, Section 27 of PD No. 1638 specifically provides for the retirees to whom the law shall be
applied, to wit:
Section 27. Military personnel retired under Sections 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 shall be carried in the retired
list of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The name of a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship
26
shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon such loss. (emphasis
supplied)
Notably, petitioner's husband did not retire under those above-enumerated Sections of PD No. 1638
as he retired under RA No. 340.
Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee,
he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age,
and length of service.22Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the conditions of eligibility
to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was
terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause.23 It is only upon retirement that military
personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits.24 Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.25
In Ayog v. Cusi,26 we expounded the nature of a vested right, thus:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173).1âwphi1 It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally
vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.S.
955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established
and is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or
by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power" (16
C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed
interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or
an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).27
Petitioner's husband acquired vested right to the payment of his retirement benefits which must be
respected and cannot be affected by the subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides that
loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations after the
right has vested.28
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No.1638 recognize such vested right, to wit:
Section 33. Nothing in this Decree shall be construed in any manner to reduce whatever retirement
and separation pay or gratuity or other monetary benefits which any person is heretofore receiving or
is entitled to receive under the provisions of existing law.
xxxx
Section. 35. Except those necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Decree and to preserve the
rights granted to retired or separated military personnel, all laws, rules and regulations inconsistent
with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear that the law has no intention to reduce or to revoke whatever
retirement benefits being enjoyed by a retiree at the time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides
for an exception to what the decree repealed or modified, i.e., except those necessary to preserve the
rights granted to retired or separated military personnel.
We also find that the CA erred in finding that mandamus will not lie.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petition for mandamus
may be filed, to wit:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s legal right to the performance of a particular
act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is
indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. 29 A doctrine well-embedded in our
jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the petitioner has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act sought to be compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform
the same.30 The remedy of mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty.31 A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.32 If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial.33
The petition for mandamus filed by petitioner's husband with the RTC was for the payment of his
terminated retirement benefits, which has become vested, and being a ministerial duty on the part of
the respondents to pay such claim, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel such payment.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. 34 However, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal. 35 This is because
issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. 36 Appeal to the
administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. 37 Here, the question raised is purely legal,
i.e., what law should be applied in the payment of retirement benefits of petitioner's husband. Thus,
there was no need to exhaust all administrative remedies before a judicial relief can be sought.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 25, 2009 and the Resolution
dated September 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated February 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
27
 6
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Id. at 67.
Associate Justice
7
Id. at 68-69; Termination of Pension Payments for Retirees of RA 340 with Foreign Citizenship.
WE CONCUR:
8
ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION FOR MILITARY
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Associate Justice
9
Chairperson Rollo, pp. 51- 58.
10
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ* BIENVENIDO L. REYES Per Judge Jose G. Paneda; id. at 132-138.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 11
Id. at 138.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA 12
Id. at 140-148.
Associate Justice
13
Id. at 150.
ATTESTATION
14
Id. (Emphasis in the original)
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 15
Id. at 47.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 16

Id. at 42. (Emphasis in the original)
Associate Justice
17
Chairperson, Third Division Buyco v. Philippine National Bank, 112 Phil. 588, 592 (1961), citing Lopez, et al. v. Crow,40 Phil.
997, 1007 (1919).
CERTIFICATION
18
Id., citing Montilla v. Agustinian Corp.,24 Phil. 220, 222 (1913).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
19
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case 551 Phil. 368 (2007)..
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
20
Parreño v. COA, supra, at 377.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
21
Chief Justice Buyco v. Philippine National Bank, supra, citing Fairchild v. U.S., 91 Fed. 297; Hathaway v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 99 F. 534.
22
Parreño v. Commission on Audit, supra note 19, at 377, citing Brion v. South Phil. Union Mission
of 7th Day Adventist Church, 366 Phil. 967, 975 (1999).
Footnotes
23
Id., citing Government Service Insurance System v. Montesclaros, 478 Phil. 573, 584 (2004).
*
Designated Acting Member, in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., per Raffle dated
24
April 20, 2015. Id.
25
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now Id.
a member of this Court) and Normandie B. Pizarro, concurring; rollo, pp. 34-42. 26
204 Phil. 126 (1982).
2
Id. at 44-45. 27
Ayog v. Cusi, supra, at 135.
3
Id. at 65. 28
Republic v. Miller,365 Phil. 634, 638 (1999), citing 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 651.
4
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH A UNIFORM RETIREMENT SYSTEM FOR THE ARMED FORCES 29
OF THE PHILIPPINES, TO PROVIDE FOR SEPARATION THEREFROM, AND FOR OTHER Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association
PURPOSES Incorporated ,508 Phil. 354, 371 (2005).
30
5
Rollo, p. 66. Id.

28
31
See Heirs of Spouses Venturillo v. Judge Quitain, 536 Phil. 839, 846 (2006).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Castro v. Gloria, 415 Phil. 645, 651 (2001).
35
Id. at 652.
36
Id.
37
Id.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006

ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP
29
MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS,
INC. Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50615 dated March 30, 2001 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 31, 1998 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for payment
of disability and other benefits for lack of merit and the Resolution 3 dated October 5, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services of petitioner Roberto
G. Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel registered and owned by its principal and co-
respondent, Barbership Management Limited.
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California, U.S.A. and while
petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner
experienced dizziness and he subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he
had a sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. 5 Petitioner
underwent a brain operation and he was confined at the Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon,
U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he underwent a second brain operation.
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines. On August
21, 1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining
physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed
for 120 days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled." 6
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably
by accepting the amount of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature
in the Receipt and Release dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard
Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the release.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC which was docketed as NLRC OCW
Case No. 6-838-97-L praying for an award of disability benefits, share in the insurance proceeds,
moral damages and attorney’s fees. On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Voltaire
A. Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioner appealed the decision
with the NLRC. On March 31, 1998, the NLRC promulgated its decision 10 finding the appeal to be
without merit and ordered its dismissal. When the motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the
NLRC in its resolution dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
On December 2, 1998, we resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling
in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission. 13
On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
petition for review raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT
AND RELEASE SINCE PETITIONER’S CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY
MAKING THE SAME VOID AND UNENFORCEABLE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD
APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED
FOR UNDER THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR PERIOD
PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or freely because he was
permanently disabled and in financial constraints. These factors allegedly vitiated his consent which
makes the Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
The petition lacks merit.
It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of fact. More so in labor cases
where the doctrine applies with greater force. 14 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already
determined the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they are
accorded not only great respect but also finality and are deemed binding upon this Court so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We reviewed the records of the case and we find no
reason to deviate from the findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated consent only gives rise
to a voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. 16 If consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent,
the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a proper action in court. 18
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent to the Receipt and
Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is not among the factors that
may vitiate consent. Besides, save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record
that his consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated
consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We agree with the findings of the
Court of Appeals that:
In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner’s consent was vitiated when
he signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner has not fully recovered his health at the time he
signed the subject document, the same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y
accept the agreement, for his wife and another relative witnessed his signing.
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by petitioner in his appeal
does not show on its face any violation of law or public policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any
proof to show that the consideration for the same is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any
evidence to support the same, the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide against the unreasonableness
of the consideration. 19
It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in
barring recovery for the full measure of the worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom
does not amount to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not stand
on the same footing. 21However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If
the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
30
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction
must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking, 22 as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt
as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that legally pertains to them. 23 We have
reviewed the terms and conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same to be
clear and unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by petitioner’s wife, Gloria T. Famanila and
one Richard T. Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in part:
That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS
(US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (365,904.00), the receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged to my full and complete satisfaction x x x I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, x x x hereby
remise, release and forever discharge said vessel "HANSA RIGA", her Owners, operators, managers,
charterers, agents, underwriters, P and I Club, master, officers, and crew and all parties at interest
therein or thereon, whether named or not named, including but not limited to BARBER SHIP
MANAGEMENT LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. and
ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all claims, demands, debts, dues, liens, actions or
causes of action, at law or in equity, in common law or in admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising
from and under the laws of the United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any other foreign country now held, owned or possessed by me or by any person
or persons, arising from or related to or concerning whether directly or indirectly, proximately or
remotely, without being limited to but including the said illness suffered by me on board the vessel
"HANSA RIGA" on or about 21st June 1990 at Portland, Oregon and disability compensation in
connection therewith.
This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all liabilities of any character and/or
claims or damages and/or losses and/or any other liabilities whatsoever, whether contractual or
statutory, at common law or in equity, tortious or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related
to or occurring as a consequence of the illness suffered by me as Messman of the vessel "HANSA
RIGA", including but not limited to all damages and/or losses consisting of loss of support, loss of
earning capacity, loss of all benefits of whatsoever nature and extent incurred, physical pain and
suffering and/or all damages and/or indemnities claimable in law, tort, contract, common law, equity
and/or admiralty by me or by any person or persons pursuant to the laws of the United States of
America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines and of all other countries whatsoever.
necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release since it has not been shown
that petitioner was forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money claims against the
respondents is the three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the Labor Code which provides that:
ART. 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing
during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxxx
Since petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim arising from his
employment, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies. From the time petitioner was declared
permanently and totally disabled on August 21, 1990 which gave rise to his entitlement to disability
benefits up to the time that he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three years have elapsed
thereby effectively barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001
in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
dismissing petitioner’s complaint for disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and
the Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand this instrument which was read to me MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
in the local dialect and I agree that this is a FULL AND FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all Associate Justice
parties and things referred to herein, and I further agree that this release may be pleaded as an absolute CERTIFICATION
and final bar to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be prosecuted by me or by any
one claiming by, through, or under me, against any of the persons or things Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
24 the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing referred to or related herein.
opinion of the Court’s Division.
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that moment the parties are
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences
Chief Justice
which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire

31
 23
Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Asset Builders Corporation, G.R. No. 147410, February
5, 2004, 422 SCRA 148, 166.
24
Footnotes CA rollo, pp. 55-56.
1 25
Rollo, pp. 35-41. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and concurred in by Associate CIVIL CODE, Art. 1315.
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Alicia L. Santos.
26
Veloso v. Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 87297, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 201,
2
CA rollo, pp. 32-36. 205.
3
Rollo, pp. 49-51.
4
CA rollo, p. 48.
5
Id. at 54.
6
Id.
7
Rollo, p. 11.
8
CA rollo, pp. 55-57.
9
Id. at 59-60.
10
Id. at 32-36.
11
Id. at 37-42.
12
Id. at 43-46.
13
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
14
Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag, G.R. No. 157010, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 514, 525.
15
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 148893, July 12,
2006.
16
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1330.
17
Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts, 1993 Ed., p. 571, citing 8
Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 2, p. 426.
18
CIVIL CODE, Art. 1390.
19
Rollo, p. 39.
20
Galicia v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 119649, July 28, 1997, 276 SCRA 381,
387.
21
Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers, G.R. Nos. 75700-01, August 30, 1990, 189
SCRA 179, 193.
22
Periquet v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 91298, June 22, 1990, 186 SCRA 724,
730-731.

32
 On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented
by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration 5 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and
entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim).

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei,
who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00
consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and
children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed
for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They
likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed
as Special Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification
Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.

In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He asserted that his
deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He further argued that private respondents should
have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article
175 of the Family Code.

The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against
forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. They contended
that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated
by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his co-heirs
alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished
Republic of the Philippines by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the
SUPREME COURT financial and educational assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
Manila discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
FIRST DIVISION The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006 established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation
of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner,
objections on the certification against forum shopping.
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI, of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents. 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
DECISION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
and July 17, 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 2000 2 and July 17, 20033 of the Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No. 4549 denying petitioner's Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED.10
The facts are as follows:
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.

33
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum
shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the
Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and that private respondents do
not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to
prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family
Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance
with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the petition raises no new issues to
warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure
to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the Release and Waiver
of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights; and 3) whether private
respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should
be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be
cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher
interest of justice would be served. InSy Chin v. Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may
have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by
the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the
present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules
with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not
explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in
full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents'
hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents,
such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code, provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an
inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by
judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator
to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned in
Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial
approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the
court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from
asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of
a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake
or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not
have such right. Hence, petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on
the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. Before
the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was
Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
(Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek
recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not
impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded Article 285 of
the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
34
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both
of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and
distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its
Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let
the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or Footnotes
a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be
1
brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and Rollo, pp. 19-26. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 2
Id. at 48-49. Penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to 3
be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to Id. at 53.
determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This Court is not a trier 4
of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial. Id. at 28.
5
While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the Id. at 29-31.
trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction 6
Id. at 31.
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. 20 That the two causes 7
Id. at 35-36.
of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint
is not new in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22 8
Id. at 37-41.
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a 9
Id. at 42-44.
complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief
in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, 10
Id. at 25.
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are
11
present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to 399 Phil. 442 (2000).
compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior
12
to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there Id. at 454.
is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here 13
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123552, February 27, 2003,
398 SCRA 203, 212.
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly 14
to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the Thomson v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 761, 778 (1998).
doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, 15
Rollo, p. 44.
but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); 16
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 554.
and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father, or mother (Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez 17
D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 266.
vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
35
18
424 Phil. 933 (2002).
19
Id. at 944.
20
Borromeo-Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. Nos. L-41171, L-55000, L-62895, L-63818 and L-65995,
July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 171, 182-183.
21
Tayag v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 665, 672.
22
43 Phil. 763, 768-769 (1922).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,
then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was
a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman
"Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes
made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person
successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The
petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines
Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in
a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,

36
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from
"male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the
petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American
fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any
[o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar
of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
7 8
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled
that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or
sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of
Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As
found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to
the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of
RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions
for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the
law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of
first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for
change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name
are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
37
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice
that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil
registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper
remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue
as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is
kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice
him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far
as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must
look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be
made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work
in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious
to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments
of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the
conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of
marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor
even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or
his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects,
such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.
38
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall
be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the
birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour
of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was
born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the
time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error,30is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces
ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at
the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the
early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something
alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground
of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This
is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social
institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the
laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various
laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of
women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case
of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be
granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative
guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what
proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on
a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform
with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized
as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that
matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the]
realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose
preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
39
1
Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in Statistics
and Master of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies Program,
Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in
Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2
This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or orchiectomy
which is the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the
vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the
size and shape of the breasts]." Id.
3
On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4
Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5
Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7
Special Sixth Division.
8 the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L.
Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9
Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical
or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register
Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
11
Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12
Id.
13
K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
14
Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a person which
may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the term
"first name" will be used here to refer both to first name and nickname.
15
The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. – xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner
may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the
proper court.
16
SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. – Any person having direct and personal
interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or
nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office
of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical
for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local
civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person,
with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled.
The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the
petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their
petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in
accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be
availed of only once.
17
SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. – The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit,
subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit
shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that
erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the
entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general
may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be
published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification from the appropriate law enforcement agencies
that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
19
Supra note 11.
20
Id.
21
In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22
Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23
Id.
24
Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25
Id.
40
26
Id. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
27
Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964). Manila
28
Salonga, Jovito, Private International Law, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238. THIRD DIVISION
29
This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code which G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of errors
including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
are not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in WILSEM,Petitioner,
the certificates of birth and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. vs.
(Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24) ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
30
The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the genitals of the DECISION
child are that of the opposite sex.
PERALTA, J.:
31
Moreover, petitioner’s female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male body
in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
32
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8 edition (2004), p.1406.
th
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of
the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503,
33
Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106. for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
34
and Their Children Act of 2004.
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not
Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing Webster’s The following facts are culled from the records:
II New College Dictionary (1999).
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
35
Id. marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
36
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619. (16) years of age.3
37
Article 1, Family Code. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by
38
the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
Article 2(1), Id. old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
39
These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition, facilities for According to petitioner, respondentmade a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others. amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
40 less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple seduction
support to the son, Roderigo.8
and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible
and consented abduction, among others. Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
41 since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known as
Section 3(jj)(4).
Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all
the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted
his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the

41
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial
support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner also
filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. 19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the
crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is analien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty
ishereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
22
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation
to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure todo so makes him liable
under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to
support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is
a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty
and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262
for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies
to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court
that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact
that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v.
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact
and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest
solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a
foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not
he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning
the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special
criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu
of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve
as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same
to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the
observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not
fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.
42
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support
his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation
to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to
support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added
that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of the New
Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject
to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child,
as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by
their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is
not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine
of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic
or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land
as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on
the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely
show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law,
said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v.
American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down
in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable
in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support
when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties
and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
43
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls
if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50 for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of
facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) jurisdiction over the case.
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits
of the case.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of Associate Justice
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the WE CONCUR:
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct: PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
xxxx Chairperson

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*
or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x Associate Justice Associate Justice
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
Associate Justice
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
ATTESTATION
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
anact of violence against women and children. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security Associate Justice
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the Chairperson, Third Division
principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here CERTIFICATION
in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our
courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest. certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which Chief Justice
provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
Footnotes
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the * Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No.
instant case has clearly not prescribed. 1896 dated November 28, 2014

44
1
Penned by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.; Annexes "A" and "B" to Petition, respectively, rollo, pp. (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.
22-26.
24
Annex "R" to Petition, rollo, p. 102.
2
Rollo, p. 6.
25
Annex "B" to Petition, id. at 25.
3
Id.
26
Id.
4
Id. at 7.
27
Rollo, p. 10.
5
Annex "F" to Petition, rollo, p. 31.
28
G.R. No. 194880, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 320.
6
Id. at 32.
29
Id.at 332-333.
7
Annex "A" to Petition, rollo, pp. 23-24.
30
Supra note 23.
8
Id. at 24.
31
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
9
Id.at 32. the country where they were solemnized, and valid there assuch, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
10
Id.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
11
Supra note 7, at 23-24. thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
12
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Supra note 5, at 32.
32
13
Comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari, rollo, p. 123.
Rollo, p. 7.
33
14
Id. at 122.
Id.
34
15
Supra note 23.
Id. at 22.
35
16
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
Id. persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
17
Id. at 24. 36
Supra note 7, at 24.
18
Id. at 8. 37
Id.
19
Id. 38
G.R. No. L-25441, October 26, 1968, 25 SCRA 616.
20
Id. 39
Id. at 625-626. (Emphasis supplied)
21
Supra note 7. 40
EDI-Staff builders International, Inc. v. NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).
22
Id.at 24. 41
Annex "N" to Petition, rollo, p. 84.
23
Art. 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support 42
399 Phil. 342 (2000).
each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
43
Id. at 354. (Emphasis supplied)
(1) The spouses;
44
Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 378 Phil. 1279, 1296 (1999).
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
45
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
46
Rollo, p. 18.
(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
45
47
Supra note 44. G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
48
Id.at 1296-1297. (Emphasis supplied) IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
49
543 Phil. 275 (2007). HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
50
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Id.at 290. Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
51
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. (Emphasis supplied)
52
Rollo, p. 15. REGALADO, J.:
53
In People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 722 (2009), it was held that: An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only
to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. Although there is a series of acts, there is only one
crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages
and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously
enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was
legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after
the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial
Republic of the Philippines Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
SUPREME COURT Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
Manila respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of
SECOND DIVISION the same court. 7
46
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition
was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice,
through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the respondent city
fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet
arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his
office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the
Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987.
The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William
Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal
of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were
fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction
"to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de
officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted
on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction
of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written
complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment
did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and
no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical
consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the
criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity
must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring
the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof,
where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did
not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of
a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to
when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary
in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant
and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right
to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall
have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have
been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution
of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
47
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his
status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense
is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and
by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil
law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case
in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be
ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.
Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer
be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons
for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void",
the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a married
woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her
marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can
still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab
initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in said case is
the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by
a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where
the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein
had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its
sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual
situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the
parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would
be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a
"socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
48
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the 1 Rollo, 5, 29.
correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one
of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when 2 Ibid., 6, 29.
the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently
since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or 3 Ibid., 7.
prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would
seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) 4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.
the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino
5 Ibid., 7, 178.
wife.
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce 7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.

9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.

Separate Opinions
10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.
PARAS, J., concurring:
11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his 12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already 13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege. 14 Ibid, 105.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute 15 Ibid., 11.
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American law. 16 Ibid., 311-313.
There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the
parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would 17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
be involved.
18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569 (1971); People
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the American
husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what he calls a 19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).
"socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no longer her
20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et al. vs.
husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the
Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984).
correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one
of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when 21 Rollo, 289.
the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum. Consequently
since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be injurious or 22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37 p. 1099;
prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law, it would State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.
seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988)
the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the Filipino 23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).
wife.
24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce 25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the Philippines
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue. (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, effective on August 3, 1988),
Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Footnotes
49
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or Republic of the Philippines
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to re under Philippine law. SUPREME COURT
Manila
26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).
THIRD DIVISION
27 Footnote 20, ante.
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry
under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree
of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City. 7 In
their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.

50
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage andits subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; 12 thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any
defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to
contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal
capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the
respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts." 19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether
respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these
two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson.
Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign
judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the
foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that
respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity
of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles
1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
with their respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with
the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as
follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a
sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the
following:
51
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxx xxx xxx
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be
required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article,
the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity
of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes
shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall
not affect their persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document – a
written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign
country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former
states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she
had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is
allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. 45 There
is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment
of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce
may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
52
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to
matter. the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's legal
capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court, for
the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained SO ORDERED.
under Australian laws.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Footnotes
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was 1
not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is Penned by Judge Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.
proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry. 2
Rollo, p. 10.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the 3
party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been Ibid, p. 9.
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly 4
Rollo, p. 37.
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of
the alien applicant for a marriage license.50 5
Ibid., p. 47.
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry 6
Id., p. 44.
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – 7
Id., p. 36.
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52(c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of 8
Annex "I"; temporary rollo, p. 9.
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987
in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City 9
The couple secured an Australian "Statutory Declaration" of their legal separation and division of
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was conjugal assets. See Annexes "3" and "4" of Respondent's Comment; rollo, p. 48.
in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2)
10
for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Id., pp. 33-35.
Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of 11
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Id., p. 39.
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory Declaration of the 12
Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995. 60 Amended Answer, p. 2; rollo, p. 39.
13
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Id., pp. 77-78.
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with 14
Id., p. 43.
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to 15
Rollo, pp. 48-51.
show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity
to contract the second marriage. 16
TSN, December 16, 1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the 17
RTC Order of December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to
18
marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Court's receipt of the
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal Memorandum for petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for
capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' respondent, signed by Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December
marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, 10, 1999.

53
19
Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243. 32
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private.
20
43 Phil. 43, 49, March 3, 1922.
Public documents are:
21
Ruben F. Balane, "Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law," Journal of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1st & 2nd Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25. "(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
22
"ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." xxx xxx x x x."
23
"ART. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be 33
"Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
xxx xxx xxx seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court."
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments 34
"Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country." Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
25
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
Tenchaves v. Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v. Gonzales, 58 accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933. custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by
"Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and 38. (71a).
See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia
"Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is Overseas Shipping Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6,
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino 1988.
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27,
1987). 35
The transcript of stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were
26
presented in court (TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only photocopies of the same
Cf. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, documents were attached to the records (Records, Index of Exhibit, p. 1.).
174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.1âwphi1.nêt
36
27
TSN, December 15, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., supra.
37
28
TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
Ibid., p. 143.
38
29
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3, November
For a detailed discussion of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp. 295- 10, 1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294
300.See also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16; SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998, Maunlad Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 114942, November 27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
30
"SEC. 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private. 39
Art. 15, Civil Code.
"Public documents are: 40
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed.,
p. 566.
"(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country. 41
Ricardo J. Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition, p. 382.
xxx xxx x x x." 42
Ibid., p. 384.
31
Burr W. Jones, Commentaries on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; 43
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 56, 2000, p. 7.
§3, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that "when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself."
54
44
Francisco, p. 29, citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 839, December 29, 1959. G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
45
274 CJS, 15-17, §1. FE D. QUITA, petitioner,
vs.
46
Ibid., p. 611-613, §161. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
47
27A CJS, 625, §162.
48
Rollo, p. 36. BELLOSILLO, J.:
49
"SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows: They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
xxx xxx xxx divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately
from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
"(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
"In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
50 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the
In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying
estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred
with the formal requirement for procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an
to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis,
irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued
Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo
without that certificate. (Vitug, Compendium, pp. 120-126); Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which
Code of the Philippines, 197 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, 1999 ed., p.
replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children)
146.).
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
51
Records, pp. 1-3. between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of
the deceased Arturo, intervened.
52
Ibid., p. 4.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
53
Id., p. 5. distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as
the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial
54 court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from
Id., p. 180.
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would
55
Id., pp. 170-171. be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents
being submitted.
26
Id., pp. 84-89.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
57
Id., pp. 181-182. citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
58
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and
Id., pp. 40-41. Arturo. Consecuently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
59 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of
Id., pp. 183. 60 Id., pp. 184-187. judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that marriage existed
Republic of the Philippines between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had
been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was
SUPREME COURT
Manila a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate
heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of
SECOND DIVISION the two intestate heirs. 5

55
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that
the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was
recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15
February 1988 6 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception
of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the
other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned
records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing,
in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares
to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order
of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18
April 1996 it denied reconsideration.9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there
is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the
Padlan children or as to the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private
respondent is the proper hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition
based on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversybefore the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to
inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective
hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The
trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued
an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs
would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue
as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured
a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural
rule. 11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to
her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner
was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the
trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the
arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court
perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo
Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to
resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their
citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis
to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she
was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit
from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought
anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic
notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer
certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial court.
When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since
1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the same year.
Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her
citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial
court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to
the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's claim to
heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while
the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage
considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not
a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be declared in contempt
of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For
forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and
circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial
courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging
to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision
holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of
the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary
estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise
AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should
he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
56
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present 17 Brief of Oppositors-Appellant, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 15.
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
18 Brief of Appellee: Id., p. 17.
SO ORDERED.
19 Rollo, pp. 225-226.
Puno, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
20 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1979
Footnotes Ed., Vol. III, p. 264.

* The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan appears as Blandina Padlan in the proceedings 21 Rollo, pp. 129-132.
before the lower courts.
22 Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.
1 No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.

2 Id., p. 367.

3 Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlement, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save
in virtue of a judicial order. Quite in relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the same Code provided
that the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval.

4 Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC- Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of
Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.

5 Art. 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

6 Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4.

7 Art. 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children,
such as widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children
or their descendent, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.

8 Decision penned by Justice Pacita Cañazares-Nye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J. Callejo
Jr. and Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39.

9 Id., p. 42.

10 Id., p. 180.

11 Rollo, p. 196. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
12 CA Rollo, p. 29. Manila
13 G.R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139. FIRST DIVISION
14 CA Rollo, p. 30. G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
15 Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
16 Rollo, p. 206.

57
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-
CATINDIG, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25,
2003 Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside and declared as null
and void the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84,
granting petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-
Intervention3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution4 denying the motion
for reconsideration.
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The
first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,
Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon City. The
marriage produced four children.
Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from each
other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge
of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws.6
Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican
Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently, on June 23, 1984,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete separation of properties
between Tristan and Lily.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States7 and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. 8
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in
the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When she
confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize their union after he obtains
an annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he would adopt
their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each of his children with
Lily.9
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-44847.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention10 claiming that she has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the trial
court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court granted on
September 30, 2002. Petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion for leave
to file intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely abused
its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and Lily.
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error subject of
the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a court with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper remedy is
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11 This is based on the premise that in issuing
the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower court. 12
It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the assailed
decision and resolution.
We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of law.13 The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary,"
conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative. 14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case can intervene, thus:
Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. 15
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not.16
Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and
effect of the judgment.17 Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent
and expectant.18
Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court.
58
Petitioner’s claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence her Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
claim of legal interest has no basis. the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, Chief Justice
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by
Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and
legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates
a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in Footnotes
getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. 20 1
Rollo, pp. 26-31. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate
When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.
the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we held: 2
Id. at 74. Penned by Judge Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo.
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the 3
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and Id. at 49-58.
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the 4
Id. at 33.
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
5
Referred as Lily Corazon Catindig in some parts of the records.
Thus, petitioner’s claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for 6
Rollo, p. 27.
intervention is based.
7
Id. at 34.
Since petitioner’s motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the indispensable requirement of
legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the complaint- 8
Id. at 35.
in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeals
correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said order. 9
Id. at 28.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution 10
Id. at 45-48.
dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.
11
Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137881, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 402, 411.
No pronouncement as to costs.
12
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152568, February 16, 2004,
SO ORDERED. 423 SCRA 122, 132.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO 13
Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, November 15, 2005.
Associate Justice
14
Olanolan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 165491, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 807, 814.
WE CONCUR:
15
RULES OF COURT, Rule 19, Sec. 1.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
16
Chief Justice Nordic Asia Limited v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111159, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 195, 198.
Chairperson
17
Id. at 199.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. 18
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252, 257.
19
CIVIL CODE, Art. 15.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice 20
Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations, Fourth Edition, p. 23.
CERTIFICATION
59
21
Republic Act No. 386 (1950). RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
22
122 Phil. 752, 765 (1965). FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and
January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was
residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s
Republic of the Philippines surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
SUPREME COURT second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
Manila at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed
that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
THIRD DIVISION
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
vs. Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007 dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two
motions to dismiss.

60
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case
was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also
ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not
bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court
in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping statement
— of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of
our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All
that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee, "shall x
x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition for
letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident
of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez
v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can only
have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph
2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
61
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the
time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule
for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing
the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms,
that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may
not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating that
his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo
was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In
resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the
Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court
of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction
are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from
the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without
a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely
freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis
added)
62
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper
party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence
of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo
M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,
is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article
26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly
be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the
same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
63
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved. 73
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
xxx

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through
their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion
to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, SO ORDERED.
or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent. 75 CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by WE CONCUR:
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the Associate Justice
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed ATTESTATION
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77 I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and Associate Justice
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the Chairperson, Third Division
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows: CERTIFICATION

64
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it 20
Id. at 270-272.
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
21
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. Id. at 288.
22
REYNATO S. PUNO Id. at 301.
Chief Justice 23
Id. at 302-303.
24
Id. at 306-311.
25
Footnotes Id. at 318-320.
26
1
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred Id. at 339-349.
in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios. 27
Id. at 350-354.
2
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel. 28
Id. at 391-393.
3
Id. at 391-393. 29
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
4
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by 30
Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios. Supra note 14.
31
5
Records, p. 125. G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
32
6
Id. at 137. Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact
because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December
7
Id. at 116. 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974.
These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
8
Id. at 1-5. 33
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
9
Id. at 10-24. 34
See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
10
Id. at 30-35. 35
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
11
Id. at 38. 36
Id. at 75.
12
Id. at 39-138. 37
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
13
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is 38
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. 39
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
14
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139. Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which
15
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192. he resides at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
40
16
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. 41
Id. at 199-200.
17
Records, p. 259. 42
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.
18
Id. at 260. 43
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v.
19
Id. at 262-267. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.

65
44 64
Records, pp. 76-78. Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
45 65
Id. at 60-75. ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
46
Id. at 79.
66
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
47
Id. at 80. their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
48
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Id. at 81-83.
67
49
Supra note 14 at 144.
Id. at 84.
68
50
G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because
the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded P200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 69
Id. at 264-265, 268.
19(4).
70
Supra note 60.
51
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:
71
Id. at 448-449.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive Order issued
72
by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, Records, pp. 118-124.
the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are
73
hereby defined as follows: Supra note 60 at 451.

xxxx
74
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati – over the municipalities of Las Pinas,
Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
52
Supra note 14. appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.
53 75
Id. at 139, 143-144. Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).
54 76
Id. at 144. Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
55
Supra note 31. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
56
Id. at 664. industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
57
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406. 77
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).
58
Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 78
Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005,
121. 451 SCRA 494, 506.
59
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 79
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
I, 1990 ed., p. 263.
80
Id. at 686.
60
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
81
Id. at 679, 686-687.
61
Id. at 447.
62
Supra note 58.
Republic of the Philippines
63
Id. at 119-121. SUPREME COURT
Manila

66
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval,
and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a
condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September
10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY.
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit)
at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for P1,449,056.00, to be paid on
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas
law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit
was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was
registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100);
and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100
share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit
was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992
in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to
Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x
x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that
the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion
of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN
on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato
G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during the
existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since
they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her
½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from
her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of
the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals
on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be
appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be
ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:
67
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the
entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect
to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are
ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor
transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS
ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS
ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT AND LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF
THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT
THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE
APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION
FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN
THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S
MONEY;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW
BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID
FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW
LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna while
marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and
valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage)
are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
68
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s approval
of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of
actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law
books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to the
25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should determine,
firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty.
Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines
on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code,
which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect
that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. 15 Pursuant to the
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both
of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time
of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage
as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-recognition of
absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital union
especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as
long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the
marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the
late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings
before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal
partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had
not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil
Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
69
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of
property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
(1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna
and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as an
incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications
for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for
divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally
valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty.
Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous, was void; properties acquired during their
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was
void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the
Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered
void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its
being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on
co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership,
without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership
ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential.
The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they
contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals,
we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution
in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled
to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must
still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact
has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence. 26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase of
the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions ofP159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions
of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The
70
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of
which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had the financial capacity to make
the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due
to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this case –
proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to
apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband
and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New
Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many
situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way
incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the
man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided
that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions.
Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was
to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article
147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the
exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355,
thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to
prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that
the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on
January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7"
was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
The third check which was for P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", forP4,072.00 was dated December
17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for
the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of P100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there
is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY.
LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee
or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The
loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty.
Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or
partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled
that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married
to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought
the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them.
Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof.
Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast,
given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty.
Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be
justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of
the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna
in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty.
Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
71
BIENVENIDO L. REYES The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void and voidable marriages. In
Associate Justice both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
CERTIFICATION lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion 17
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 446.
of the Court's Division.
18
Rollo,p. 37.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
19
Chief Justice Article XV, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.
20
Article 1, Family Code.
21
Id. at 74, 81-82.
Footnotes
22
Id. at 48.
1
Rollo, pp. 34-51; penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justice Conrado M.
23
Vasquez, Jr. (later Presiding Justice) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring. Article 83, Civil Code; Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA
155, 158.
2
Id. at 198-210.
24
The Civil Coderelevantly states:
3
Id. at 37-39.
Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
4
Id. at 198-210.
xxxx
5
Id. at 210.
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
6
Id. at 211-214.
xxxx
7
Id. at 217-219.
25
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
8
Id. at 283.
26
Id. at 686-687.
9
Supra note 1.
27
Rollo, pp. 23-24.
10
Rollo, p. 44.
28
Id. at 25.
11
Id. at 50-51.
29
Id. at 27.
12
Id. at 52-53.
30
Id. at 45-50.
13
Id. at 54-65.
31
Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 593, 602.
14
Id. at 17.
15
Article 15, Civil Code, which is a revision of Article 9.1, Spanish Civil Code, states:

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
16
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas(G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 277), the Court
declares:

72
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

PHILIPPINES

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE

House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located P1,693,125.00

at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila
(Sampaloc property)

Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. P400,000.00

located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora

73
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares P490,000.00 Philippines.5 David was able to collect P1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving
located at Maria Aurora, Aurora an unpaid balance of P410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located P175,000.00 Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on
at Sabang Baler, Aurora 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia
the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7

3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria P750,000.00 On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC
Aurora, Aurora of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply
with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties
in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal
USA properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David
to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5)
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE the payment ofP50,000.00 and P100,000.00 litigation expenses.8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City, $550,000.00 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
California (unpaid debt of $285,000.00) partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.9

Furniture and furnishings $3,000 The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

Jewelries (ring and watch)
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck
Bank of America Checking Account
Bank of America Cash Deposit
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity
$9,000 which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2)
children.
$13,770.00 2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can
be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
$8,000
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent
David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their
conjugal properties.

Life Insurance (Cash Value)
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the P2.2 [M]illion sales
$100,000.00 proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the
property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
4
$56,228.00 5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a 6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their
bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a conjugal properties.
total of P1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
property for P2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his legitimes.10
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall 1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;
be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to LeticiaP750,000.00, which is
equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David
shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
74
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are hereby
ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United States
of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, United
States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently
covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom
said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding paragraph are
hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia
Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles covering
the said properties.Their share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to them annually
by the respondent within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children
with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated
on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income from these properties,
if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A. Noveras shall
give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive
legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other
needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the respondent shall
be increased in the future as the needs of the children require and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of P410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the Paringit
Spouses are hereby ordered to pay P5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and P405,000.00 to the
two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children
shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names,
withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by their representative duly authorized with a
Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days
after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the
custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn
from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by them
individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue
of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of
San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus,
the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community
of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead
of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization
of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in
accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court
cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national
law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the
grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in
favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of
the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount
of P520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the
assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case
No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are hereby
divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David
A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain
to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall be
remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the
amount ofP520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the
sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a
local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be
made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding
passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable
only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount
ofP1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street
corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the
children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
75
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia
to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering
that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may
be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate
may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
16
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we relaxed the requirement on certification where
we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce
decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption 17 as the lower courts did with respect to the
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition
of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial
court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration
of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code. 18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4
and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that
power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against
the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly
[sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period
of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his hometown
in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the alleged
abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their children until
the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he
76
and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the
California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also
be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines. 19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in
the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the
absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for more
than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been
proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to
go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that
David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw
the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form. 20 Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis
supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and
the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each
of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share
provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance
with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance
with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling
and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen
the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall
decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we
will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court
of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in
the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from
the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption
money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount
of P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of P1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children
arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
77
 5
SO ORDERED. Id. at 16.
6
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Id. at 77.
Associate Justice
7
Id. at 79-81.
WE CONCUR:
8
Id. at 4-5.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
9
Chief Justice Id. at 23-26.
10
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Id. at 267.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.**
Associate Justice 11
Associate Justice Id. at 287-288.
Chairperson
12
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice 13
G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.

ATTESTATION 14
Id. at 281-282.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case 15
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, 26 June 2013.
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
16
591 Phil. 452, 470 (2008).
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
17
Associate Justice Processual presumption means that where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
Second Division Chairperson proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. See EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l. Inc. v.
NLRC, 563 Phil. 1, 22 (2007).
CERTIFICATION
18
Sta. Maria, Persons and Family Relations Law, Fourth Edition, 2004, p. 396.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
19
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case Records, p. 280.
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
20
TSN, 9 March 2006, p. 13.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
21
Chief Justice Rollo, pp. 34-35.

Footnotes

* Per Raffle dated 28 July 2014.

** Per Special Order No. 1757 dated 20 August 2014.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) with
Associate Justices Portia Aliflo-Hormachuelos and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring. Rollo, pp. 26-
37.
2
Presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren. Records, pp. 262-288.
3
Id. at 2.
4
Id. at 27-28.

78
 The Factual Antecedents

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met
with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland
Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and a
Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.

At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] 5 were for sale
for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were
clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to P2,800,000.00. On August 5,
2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 6 for One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another
check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the
purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26,
20039 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the condominium
unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which
were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping.
Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later on learned that
Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties with the
Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.

Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that
Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 536 10 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186
representing the title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for anannotation
under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No.
18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although CCT No.
Republic of the Philippines 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999 representing a mortgage in favor
SUPREME COURT of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by
Manila Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the
properties remained in possession of Perez.
SECOND DIVISION
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 dated September 8,
G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014 2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in
CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however,
ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.
vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent. On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating
that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he
DECISION executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion,
however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
BRION, J.:
On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) (covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking lot’s
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision 2 dated August 23, 2012 and the title.
resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.

79
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang
and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No.
42;
2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186
dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16,
2000;
3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged
Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and
6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
The RTC Ruling
14
In its decision dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City
ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties
prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of the
properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion claims to have
purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after
he bought the properties because Orion never bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin
CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion
timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186
pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV holder
about the implications of a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the RTC ruling,
however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses for
litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25,
2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any
conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good faith by
Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal.
Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation
of the presumption of conjugal ownership.17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a purchaser in
good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the law.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-
evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of the trial court and
the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the courts below both arrived at the same conclusion,
there appears tobe an incongruence in their factual findings and the legal principle they applied to the
attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual issues in the
exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may have been made. 19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold this
position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA. It is a
well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing court. 20 To
consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end
to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property —
its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights over
them have their natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is known
as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from one person
to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. 23 This general principle includes all
rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable property,
no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land if the
person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile
and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted. 25
80
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of
the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving
the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the
forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal
of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by South
Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof
of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated bythe
seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual presumption
comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. 31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that
Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is married to
Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the name
of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community property. 33 In
those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one
spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties. 34 Accordingly, we see no reason to
declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in
the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or more duly
executed contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 35 between
Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzuki’s witness Ms. Mary
Jane Samin (Samin).37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of
sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing sold, and to deliver
the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the seller.38 The execution of the
notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of possession amounted to delivery that produced the
legal effect of transferring ownership to Suzuki.39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius tempore, potior
jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and due execution of the Dacion
en Pagoin its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove
the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008. Orion
likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12"to
prove the existence of the additional P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the admission of
Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not
identified in court by any witness."40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a tender
ofexcluded evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this reason
alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12"
in the present petition.
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition,
the copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and documentary evidence of Orion,
militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First, there appears to be
no due and demandable obligation when the Dacion en Pago was executed, contrary to the allegations
of Orion. Orion’s witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was in default in
his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:
ATTY. CRUZAT:
Q: Okay, so this loan of P1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...
Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]
81
A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we have executed a
dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en pago
rather than going through the Foreclosure proceedings.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
41
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to speak of when
the supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.
Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither
can Orion claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments because the wordings of
the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and other charges shall be
paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS. 42 "There was thus no due and
demandable loan obligation when the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a vague
idea of the transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
xxxx
Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and surcharge due from
Mr. Yung Sam Kang?
A: It’s just the principal, sir.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?
A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat but....
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of February 10, 2003,
the outstanding obligation which is due and demandable principal and interest and other charges
included amounts to P1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
xxxx
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges, based on this
document?
43
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the P1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage. However, no document was ever presented to prove this real estate mortgage aside from it
being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line Agreement
referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that there was a subsequent
collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44
Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded
the delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the annotation of his
affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its
counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion en Pago.45 Not even Perez
mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003, when he personally received a letter demanding
the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and opted to first consult with his
lawyer.46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of facts
surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on [September 4,
2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility by
[Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,800,000.00)." Perez,
however, testified that there was "no cash movement" in the original P1,000,000.00 loan. In his
testimony, he said:
COURT:
xxxx
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for that
firstP1,000,000.00 loan?
A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the principal, by way
ofpayment of interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this loan?
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
82
Q: There was no actual cash?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an P800,000.00 additional
right?
A: Yes, sir.47
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on February
2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the records shows
that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six (6) months after the supposed
date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer possession of the
condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon. If Orion really
purchased the condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it not
assert its ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did it have to assert its
ownership only after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps have remained
unanswered and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete absence of
anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the property in question.
After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land and occupied the premises. The absence of any
attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is a
clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in
possession of the disputed condominium unit – from the time of the execution of the Dacion en
Pagountil the property’s subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably strengthens the fictitious nature
of the Dacion en Pago.
x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident Retiree’s
Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his property which serves as his investment in
order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the Implementing Investment Guidelines under Rule
VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the Philippine
Retirement Park System Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the
Philippine Retirement Authority) states:
Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or transfer the
same to another domestic enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his condominium unit or units to
another person, natural or juridical without the prior approval of the Authority, the Special Resident
Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or children[,] may be cancelled or revoked
by the Philippine Government, through the appropriate government department or agency, upon
recommendation of the Authority.54
Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis of
the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang. Incidentally,
Orion admitted accommodating Kang’s request to cancel the mortgage annotation despite the lack of
payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from impugning the validity of
the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and
"attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason
for the application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code. Suzuki,
moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to establish the validity of conveyance in his favor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
Orion Savings Bank.

These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of Orion’s SO ORDERED.
witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
ARTURO D. BRION
The fact that the Dacion en Pago is a notarized document does not support the conclusion that the Associate Justice
sale it embodies is a true conveyance
WE CONCUR:
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be considered
as containing all the terms of the agreement.49 While a notarized document enjoys this presumption, ANTONIO T. CARPIO
"the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents." 50 The presumption Associate Justice
of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing Chairperson
evidence to the contrary.51
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution of the Dacion Associate Justice Associate Justice
en Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their prima
facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their execution. 52 MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Effect of the PRA restriction on the validity of Suzuki’s title to the property
CERTIFICATION
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In
particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the express PRA Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
restriction contained in CCT No. 18186.53 Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.
We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect the
conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur withthe following findings of the ANTONIO T. CARPIO
CA: Acting Chief Justice
83
 manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion."
20
Footnotes Hubert Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 368 SCRA
134, 145.
1
Rollo, pp. 8-31.
21
Agpalo, Ruben E., Conflict of Laws, 2004 Ed., p. 182.
2
Id. at 35-51; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Rosalinda
22
Asuncion-Vicente and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurring. Salonga, Jovito R., Private International Law, 1995 Ed., p. 132, citing Wolff 515.
3 23
Id. at 53-55. Agpalo, Ruben E., Conflict of Laws, 2004 Ed., p. 183.
4 24
Records, Vol. I, pp. 257-258. Id.
5 25
Id. at 259-260. Id.
6 26
Id. at 250. Family Code of the Philippines, Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage
settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of
7
Id. at 251. the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
8
Id. at 252. This rule shall not apply:
9
Id. at 253-254. (1) Where both spouses are aliens;
10
Id. at 270 (2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines
11
and executed in the country where the property is located; and
Id. at 271.
12
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting
Id. at 262. property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
13
Id. at 263-264. 27
ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010, 632 SCRA 528, 534.
14
Id. at 92-135. 28
Id.
15
Id. at 8-31. 29
Rollo, pp. 57-58.
16
Id. at 65-89. 30
Id.
17
Id. 31
Supranote 26.
18
Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 157, 166. 32
Stuart v. Yatco, 114 Phil. 1083, 1084-1085 (1962); Magallon v. Montejo, 230 Phil. 366, 377 (1986).
19
Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942). See also New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212- 33
Bucoy v. Paulino, 131 Phil. 790 (1968).
213 (2005), citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004,
401 SCRA 79, the Supreme Court recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: "(1) when the 34
See Mendoza v. Reyes, 209 Phil. 120 (1983).
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
35
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the Records, Vol. I, pp. 213-214.
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)
36
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings Id. at 291.
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary 37
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which TSN, February 28, 2005, pp. 29-36.
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply 38
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed NEW CIVIL CODE, Article 1458.
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals

84
39
Id., Article 1496 in relation to Article 1498.
40
Records, Vol. II, p. 395.
41
TSN, June 1, 2007, pp. 32-33, emphasis supplied.
42
Records, Vol. II, p. 369. In fact, so important was the single payment arrangement that Orion only
allowed installment payments upon additional payment of Two Percent (2.00%) per annum service
fee and a written notice to Orion of not less than thirty(30) days prior to the proposed payment.
43
TSN, December 17, 2007, pp. 29-32, emphasis supplied.
44
Id. at. 22.
45
Records, Vol. II, pp. 371-372.
46
Records, Vol. I, pp. 263-267.
47
TSN, December 17, 2007, pp. 14-16, emphasis supplied.
48
321 Phil. 809, 831-832 (1995).
49
Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, 215 (1919).
50
Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 397 Phil. 707, 725 (2000);San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April
24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446.
51
Lazaro v. Agustin, G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 298, 309; Potenciano v. Reynoso,
449 Phil. 396, 406 (2003).
52
San Juan v. Offril, supra note 50.
53
Entry No. 73321/C-10186-RESTRICTIONS: IN an instrument duly subscribed and sworn to,
VERNETTE UMALI-PACO, CESO II, Phil. Retirement Authority, states that the property described
herein is subject to the following restriction: "The sale, transfer, or encumbrance of this property is
subject to the approval of the Philippine Retirement Authority, the owner-named herein being a holder
of Special Resident Retiree’s Visa (SRRV), and is therefore, subject to the provision of Executive
Order No. 1037 and it0`s implementing Rules and Regulations." (Doc. No. 68, p. 14, Bk.XIV, s. of
2000 of Not. Pub. For Mand. *City, Eddie Fernandez, dated June 23, 2000.) Date of Inscription-June
23, 2000-1:33 p.m.
54
Rollo, p. 47.

85
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Petitioners,
vs.
THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Far East Bank and Trust Company
(now Bank of the Philippines Islands) seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 dated August 30, 2002 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 which ordered it, together with its branch
accountant, Roger Villadelgado, to pay respondent Themistocles Pacilan, Jr. 2 the total sum
of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. The assailed decision affirmed with modification
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, in Civil Case
No. 4908. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of
the appellate court, denying petitioner bank’s motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following undisputed facts:
Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner bank’s Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980.
His account was denominated as Current Account No. 53208 (0052-00407-4). The respondent had
since then issued several postdated checks to different payees drawn against the said account.
Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and
the same was presented for payment to petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank. The
next day, or on April 5, 1988, the respondent deposited to his current account the amount of P800.00.
The said amount was accepted by petitioner bank; hence, increasing the balance of the respondent’s
deposit to P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check No.
2434866, he discovered that his current account was closed on the ground that it was "improperly
handled." The records of petitioner bank disclosed that between the period of March 30, 1988 and
April 5, 1988, the respondent issued four checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416 for P6,000.00; Check
No. 2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880 for P680.00 and; Check No. 2434886 for P680.00, or a
total amount ofP7,410.00. At the time, however, the respondent’s current account with petitioner bank
only had a deposit ofP6,981.43. Thus, the total amount of the checks presented for payment on April
4, 1988 exceeded the balance of the respondent’s deposit in his account. For this reason, petitioner
bank, through its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed the respondent’s current account effective
the evening of April 4, 1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the overdraft,
Check No. 2434886 was dishonored.
On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the closure of his account
was unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from petitioner bank, the respondent filed with the
RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a complaint for damages against petitioner bank
and Villadelgado. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4908. The respondent, as complainant
therein, alleged that the closure of his current account by petitioner bank was unjustified because on
the first banking hour of April 5, 1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to fund his checks.
The respondent pointed out that Check No. 2434886, in particular, was delivered to petitioner bank at
the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988 and, following normal banking procedure, it
(petitioner bank) had until the last clearing hour of the following day, or on April 5, 1988, to honor
the check or return it, if not funded. In disregard of this banking procedure and practice, however,
petitioner bank hastily closed the respondent’s current account and dishonored his Check No.
2434886.
The respondent further alleged that prior to the closure of his current account, he had issued several
other postdated checks. The petitioner bank’s act of closing his current account allegedly preempted
the deposits that he intended to make to fund those checks. Further, the petitioner bank’s act exposed
him to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
According to the respondent, the indecent haste that attended the closure of his account was patently
malicious and intended to embarrass him. He claimed that he is a Cashier of Prudential Bank and Trust
Company, whose branch office is located just across that of petitioner bank, and a prominent and
respected leader both in the civic and banking communities. The alleged malicious acts of petitioner
bank besmirched the respondent’s reputation and caused him "social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights" entitling him to an award of damages.
In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado maintained that the respondent’s current account
was subject to petitioner bank’s Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of
Regular Demand Deposits which provide that "the Bank reserves the right to close an account if the
depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits" and that "the
Bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn against
insufficient funds or for any reason."3
They showed that the respondent had improperly and irregularly handled his current account. For
example, in 1986, the respondent’s account was overdrawn 156 times, in 1987, 117 times and in 1988,
26 times. In all these instances, the account was overdrawn due to the issuance of checks against
insufficient funds. The respondent had also signed several checks with a different signature from the
specimen on file for dubious reasons.
When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, 1988, it was obviously to cover for issuances made
the previous day against an insufficiently funded account. When his Check No. 2434886 was presented
for payment on April 4, 1988, he had already incurred an overdraft; hence, petitioner bank rightfully
dishonored the same for insufficiency of funds.
After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the respondent as it ordered the
petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and severally, to pay the respondent the amounts
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs of suit. In so
ruling, the court a quo also cited petitioner bank’s rules and regulations which state that "a charge
of P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor for any check that is taken up as a returned item due to
‘insufficiency of funds’ on the date of receipt from the clearing office even if said check is honored
and/or covered by sufficient deposit the following banking day." The same rules and regulations also
provide that "a check returned for insufficiency of funds for any reason of similar import may be
subsequently recleared for one more time only, subject to the same charges."
According to the court a quo, following these rules and regulations, the respondent, as depositor, had
the right to put up sufficient funds for a check that was taken as a returned item for insufficient funds
86
the day following the receipt of said check from the clearing office. In fact, the said check could still
be recleared for one more time. In previous instances, petitioner bank notified the respondent when he
incurred an overdraft and he would then deposit sufficient funds the following day to cover the
overdraft. Petitioner bank thus acted unjustifiably when it immediately closed the respondent’s
account on April 4, 1988 and deprived him of the opportunity to reclear his check or deposit sufficient
funds therefor the following day.
As a result of the closure of his current account, several of the respondent’s checks were subsequently
dishonored and because of this, the respondent was humiliated, embarrassed and lost his credit
standing in the business community. The court a quo further ratiocinated that even
granting arguendo that petitioner bank had the right to close the respondent’s account, the manner
which attended the closure constituted an abuse of the
said right. Citing Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that "[e]very person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith" and Article 20 thereof which states that "[e]very person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same," the court a quo adjudged petitioner bank of acting in bad faith. It held that, under the foregoing
circumstances, the respondent is entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
The decretal portion of the court a quo’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants [petitioner bank and Villadelgado], jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
[the respondent] the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages plus costs and expenses of the suit; and
3. Dismissing [the] defendants’ counterclaim for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August 30, 2002, affirming with modification the
decision of the court a quo.
The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual findings of the court a quo as it held that
petitioner bank unjustifiably closed the respondent’s account notwithstanding that its own rules and
regulations
allow that a check returned for insufficiency of funds or any reason of similar import, may be
subsequently recleared for one more time, subject to standard charges. Like the court a quo, the
appellate court observed that in several instances in previous years, petitioner bank would inform the
respondent when he incurred an overdraft and allowed him to make a timely deposit to fund the checks
that were initially dishonored for insufficiency of funds. However, on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank
immediately closed the respondent’s account without even notifying him that he had incurred an
overdraft. Even when they had already closed his account on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank still
accepted the deposit that the respondent made on April 5, 1988, supposedly to cover his checks.
Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA declared that even as it may be conceded that
petitioner bank had reserved the right to close an account for repeated overdrafts by the respondent,
the exercise of that right must never be despotic or arbitrary. That petitioner bank chose to close the
account outright and return the check, even after accepting a deposit sufficient to cover the said check,
is contrary to its duty to handle the respondent’s account with utmost fidelity. The exercise of the right
is not absolute and good faith, at least, is required. The manner by which petitioner bank closed the
account of the respondent runs afoul of Article 19 of the Civil Code which enjoins every person, in
the exercise of his rights, "to give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
The CA concluded that petitioner bank’s precipitate and imprudent closure of the respondent’s account
had caused him, a respected officer of several civic and banking associations, serious anxiety and
humiliation. It had, likewise, tainted his credit standing. Consequently, the award of damages is
warranted. The CA, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded by the court a quo as it found
the same to be excessive:
We, however, find excessive the amount of damages awarded by the RTC. In our view the reduced
amount ofP75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages are in order. Awards
for damages are not meant to enrich the plaintiff-appellee [the respondent] at the expense of
defendants-appellants [the petitioners], but to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. The award
is aimed at the restoration, within limits possible, of the status quo ante, and should be proportionate
to the suffering inflicted.5
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION
that the award of moral damages is reduced to P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages
reduced to P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed Resolution dated
January 17, 2003, the appellate court denied its motion. Hence, the recourse to this Court.
Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing the account of the respondent in the evening of April 4, 1988,
it acted in good faith and in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the operation of a
regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank "the right to close an account if the depositor
frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits." The same rules and
regulations also provide that "the depositor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on this
deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn
against insufficient funds or for any reason."
It cites the numerous instances that the respondent had overdrawn his account and those instances
where he deliberately signed checks using a signature different from the specimen on file. Based on
these facts, petitioner bank was constrained to close the respondent’s account for improper and
irregular handling and returned his Check No. 2434886 which was presented to the bank for payment
on April 4, 1988.
Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law or rule which gives the respondent a legal right to
make good his check or to deposit the corresponding amount to cover said check within 24 hours after
the same is dishonored or returned by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds. It
vigorously denies having violated Article 19 of the Civil Code as it insists that it acted in good faith
and in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations.
The petition is impressed with merit.
87
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo and the appellate court show that the award of
damages in the respondent’s favor was anchored mainly on Article 19 of the Civil Code which, quoted
anew below, reads:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which
is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.7 Malice or bad
faith is at the core of the said provision.8 The law always presumes good faith and any person who
seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in
bad faith or with ill-motive.9 Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts
of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.10 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. 11Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.12
Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the account of the respondent based on the
following provisions of its Rules and Regulations Governing the Establishment and Operation of
Regular Demand Deposits:
10) The Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against
insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits.
… or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
12) …
However, it is clearly understood that the depositor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to overdraw on
this deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are
drawn against insufficient funds or for any other reason.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not establish that, in the exercise of
this right, petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the second and third elements for
abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case. The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates
the existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing the respondent’s account on April 4, 1988
because on the said date the same was already overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all due
on April 4, 1988, amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current account deposit was
only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the dishonor of his Check
No. 2434886. Further, petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current account of the respondent was
overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds.13 In 1987, the said
account was overdrawn 117 times for the same
reason.14 Again, in 1988, 26 times.15 There were also several instances when the respondent issued
checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen signature on file with petitioner
bank.16 All these circumstances taken together justified the petitioner bank’s closure of the
respondent’s account on April 4, 1988 for "improper handling."
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the
respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently drawing checks
against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be imputed on petitioner bank for so acting
since the records bear out that the respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly handling his
account not just a few times but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could
not be faulted for exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and regulations governing
the current accounts of its depositors. Upon the opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to
be bound by these terms and conditions.
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by the respondent the day following
the closure of his account constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same could
be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of bad
faith.
The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of proving bad faith on the part of petitioner
bank or that it was motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his account on April 4, 1988 and in
inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner bank with the sole intention of
prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It is conceded that the respondent may have suffered damages
as a result of the closure of his current account. However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. The Court had the occasion to explain the distinction between damages and injury
in this wise:
… Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains,
he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff – a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that the individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability
for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate
cause of the injury.17
Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of his other
insufficiently funded checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It was the respondent’s repeated
improper
and irregular handling of his account which constrained petitioner bank to close the same in
accordance with the rules and regulations governing its depositors’ current accounts. The respondent’s
case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2002 and Resolution
dated January 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627 are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
88
 6
WE CONCUR: Ibid.
7
REYNATO S. PUNO Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137916, 8 December 2004, 445
SCRA 500.
Associate Justice
8
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128690, 21 January 1999, 301
Chairman SCRA 572.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA 9
Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112660, 14 March 1995, 242 SCRA 341.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 10
Saber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 259.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO 11
Id. at 278-279.
Associate Justice 12
Id. at 279.

ATTESTATION 13
Exhibits "3" up to "3-X," Records, pp. 197-221. (Vol. I)
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was 14
Exhibits "4" up to "4-U," Id. at 222-243. (Vol. I)
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
15
Exhibits "5" up to "5-E," Id. at 244-249.
REYNATO S. PUNO
16
Exhibits "6" up to "6-C," Id. at 250-253.
Associate Justice
17
Chairman, Second Division BPI Express Card Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120639, 25 September 1998, 296
SCRA 260.
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, with Associate Justices Eliezer R. Delos Santos
and Danilo B. Pine, concurring.
2
In the Resolution dated July 1, 2004 of the Court of Appeals, the Court was furnished a copy of the
Notice of Death of respondent Pacilan, Jr. In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated September
27, 2004, his counsel averred that the respondent was survived by his children, namely, Jesus Rey,
Jesus Rhoel, Jesus Rene and Jesus Ryan, all surnamed Pacilan.
3
Exhibit "1," Records, p. 195. (Vol. I)
4
Records, p. 344. (Vol. II)
5
Rollo, p. 21.

89

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure
others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the underlying principles of
law and order in society. We reaffirm them in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the July
26, 2000 decision1 and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Juan Davalan, 2 Josefino Gabutero and
Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery3 filed by Quiamco
against them. They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its
certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but the three
accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
respondent’s business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible
to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner
corporation.4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued
the payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and
told petitioner corporation’s collector, Wilfredo Veraño, that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken
by respondent’s men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, 5 went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo
Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk
were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco
is a thief of a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, the policemen left to look for
respondent in his residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the establishment to take
photographs of the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitching’s instruction and over the clerk’s objection, took the
motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense
as he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitching’s subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros
Oriental, Branch 37.9 He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of
the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate
filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent
and injured his reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision10 finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated
with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner
and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners’
acts were found to be contrary to Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held
petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary damages
and P50,000 attorney’s fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification,
reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to P300,000 and P100,000,
respectively.13 Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here
is whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the
Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs in favor of respondent.
Petitioners’ suggestion is misleading. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a
groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the
motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only
the public imputation of a crime to respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were
90
deemed to have accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners
liable for damages to respondent.
Nevertheless, to address petitioners’ concern, we also find that the trial and appellate courts correctly
ruled that the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith. Petitioners themselves in
fact described their action as a "precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on portraying respondent as a
thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the RTC, as adopted by the
CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office] because
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is a lawyer, that there was no
probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity against
[respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in
question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons,
Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Veraño[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining installment(s) for the
motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must be noted that the
term used by Wilfredo Veraño in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of Juan
Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was [‘]taken[’], not [‘]unlawfully taken[’] or ‘stolen.’
Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the [complaint-
affidavit] wherein he named [respondent] as ‘the suspect’ of the stolen motorcycle but also charged
[respondent] of ‘qualified theft and fencing activity’ before the City [Prosecutor’s] Office of
Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of malice. What is
deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent]
or the latter’s men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft
before the authorities. That Atty. Uypitching’s act in charging [respondent] with qualified theft and
fencing activity is tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to the question of Cupid
Gonzaga16[during one of their conversations] - "why should you still file a complaint? You have
already recovered the motorcycle…"[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson
to the thief of motorcycle.")17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of
the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as
seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to
foreclose on the mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect
its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for the recovery of
possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such possession as a
preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.18
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of
the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his
policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse,
in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous
statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners’ acts
violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his
right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. 19 It seeks
to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise of
a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive
or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction
with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was
utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an
unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for
which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed
a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused
damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26, 2000 decision and October 18, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.
Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and
an officer of the court, for his improper behavior.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred in by Presiding Justice Salome
A. Montoya (retired) and Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. (now a member of the Supreme
Court) of the First Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 26-36.
2
"Juan Dabalan" in some parts of the records.
3
The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch
31 where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5630. On March 3, 1986, the trial court (through Judge
Rolando R. Villaraza) convicted Davalan and Generoso and acquitted Gabutero.
91
4
The certificate of registration issued to Gabutero bore the notation "Mortgaged."
5
These policemen were P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, Pfc. Damiola, Capt. Tayco, Pat. Romeo Tan and Pat.
Catigtig.
6
Presidential Decree No. 1612.
7
Docketed as I.S. No. 91-74.
8
Resolution dated June 14, 1991; rollo, pp. 147-151.
9
Presided by Judge Temistocles B. Diez. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10492.
10
Penned by Judge Temistocles B. Diez.
11
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
12
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
13
The modification was based on the principle that moral and exemplary damages are not imposed to
enrich a party. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
14
In fact, malice is presumed from a defamatory imputation. Manila
15
Petition, p. 5; rollo, p.17. FIRST DIVISION
16
One of respondent’s witnesses. G.R. No. 160273 January 18, 2008
17
CA Decision, supra note 1. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS Z.
NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T. LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE B.
18
Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115902, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA SALA, petitioners,
549. vs.
RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE, respondent.
19
Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation, Ltd. v. Catalan, G.R. Nos. 159590-91, 18 October 2004,
440 SCRA 498. DECISION
20
Id. SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
21
Id. For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision 1 dated January 31, 2003 and Resolution dated
22
Civil Code, Art. 20. October 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506.

The facts are:

Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and
non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.

Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary member of CCCI,
designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for
the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary member. The designation was thereafter
approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.

92
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The application was
indorsed by CCCI’s two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T. Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito Unchuan, then president
of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5 million. Respondent, however, purchased the
share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued
Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of Directors, action on
respondent’s application for proprietary membership was deferred. In another Board meeting held on
July 30, 1997, respondent’s application was voted upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997,
respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri, CCCI’s corporate secretary, informing him that the
Board disapproved his application for proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a letter of reconsideration.
As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote another letter of reconsideration. Still,
CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, respondent again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any
member of the Board objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. 67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P2,340,000.00 as actual
or compensatory damages.
2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral
damages.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by
way of attorney’s fees and P80,000.00 as litigation expenses.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003, affirmed the
trial court’s Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount
ofP2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount
ofP1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the mount
of P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of the suit.
The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set the motion
for oral arguments. In its Resolution4 dated October 2, 2003, the appellate court denied the motions
for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving respondent’s application for proprietary
membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if so, whether their
liability is joint and several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant damages to
respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in disapproving the latter’s
application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCI’s Articles of Incorporation provide in part:
SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership therein as well as the right of
participation in its assets shall be limited to qualified persons who are duly accredited owners of
Proprietary Ownership Certificates issued by the corporation in accordance with its By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws provides:
SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED – The procedure for the admission of new members
of the Club shall be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another voting proprietary member, shall submit to the
Secretary a written proposal for the admission of a candidate to the "Eligible-for-Membership List";
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period of thirty (30) days on the Club bulletin
board during which time any member may interpose objections to the admission of the applicant by
communicating the same to the Board of Directors;
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no objections have been filed or if there
are, the Board considers the objections unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in
the "Eligible-for-Membership List";
(d) Once included in the "Eligible-for-Membership List" and after the candidate shall have acquired
in his name a valid POC duly recorded in the books of the corporation as his own, he shall become a
Proprietary Member, upon a non-refundable admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that admission fees
will only be collected once from any person.
93
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board may, by unanimous vote of all
directors present at a regular or special meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate in the
"Eligible-for-Membership List".
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the "black ball system" of
voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents conformity to
the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as
amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the directors is required. When respondent’s application
for proprietary membership was voted upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve
or disapprove an application for proprietary membership. But such right should not be exercised
arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations provide
restrictions, thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,5 we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21, thus:
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. (Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondent’s application for proprietary membership, we find that petitioners violated the
rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of social order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
aptly held that petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith in disapproving respondent’s
applications. This is contrary to morals, good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for
damages pursuant to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCI’s Amended By-Laws requiring the
unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the original
provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the required number of votes needed for admission of
an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form due to economic
reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment, aside from being extremely
significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty (20) years before respondent filed his
application. We cannot fathom why such a prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI,
whose members are all affluent, did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated
application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his application was
disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board members was required.
When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an objection to his
application, petitioners apparently ignored him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of
treatment. Having been designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member
of CCCI, he should have been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they
should have informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance with the proper norm.
When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. 6 It bears reiterating that the
trial court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ disapproval of respondent’s application is
characterized by bad faith.
As to petitioners’ reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury,
suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v. Gutierrez,7 we held that this principle does
not apply when there is an abuse of a person’s right, as in this case.
As to the appellate court’s award to respondent of moral damages, we find the same in order. Under
Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered, among others, in acts and
actions referred to in Article 21. We believe respondent’s testimony that he suffered mental anguish,
social humiliation and wounded feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However,
the amount of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer, neither
to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. 8 Taking into consideration the attending
circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent of P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as
moral damages is reasonable.
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows it by way of example or correction for
the public good. Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions,9 we reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code provides,
among others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when
exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this case. In any event, however, such award must
be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus, we reduce the amount of attorney’s fees (P500,000.00) and
litigation expenses (P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 andP25,000.00, respectively.
Lastly, petitioners’ argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for damages
because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondent’s application lacks merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
94
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. — Directors or trustees who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
negligence or bad faithin directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for
all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons. (Emphasis ours)

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that (a) the award
of moral damages is reduced fromP2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the award of exemplary damages
is reduced from P1,000,000.00 toP25,000.00; and (c) the award of attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses is reduced from P500,000.00 andP50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*
Also referred to as "Ramonito" in the records of the case.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and concurred in by then Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam.
2
Annex "C" of the petition, rollo, pp. 65-91.
3
Annex "A" of the petition, id., pp. 40-62.
4
Annex "B" of the petition, id., pp. 63-64.
5
G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466.
6
Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, July 28, 2005, 464
SCRA 409, 428, citing Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Act Theater, Inc., 432
SCRA 418, 422 (2004).
7
G.R. No. 140420, February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 731.
8
Lamis v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 510, 519.
9
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc.,G.R. No. 136914, January 25, 2002, 374 SCRA 653.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
95
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated 1 June 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
62331 and the reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf Club, Inc. (Calatagan)
filed this Rule 45 petition against respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr. (Clemente).
The key facts are undisputed.
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his application for
membership his mailing address at "Phimco Industries, Inc. – P.O. Box 240, MCC," complete
residential address, office and residence telephone numbers, as well as the company (Phimco) with
which he was connected, Calatagan issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990
after paying P120,000.00 for the share.2
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet expenses for general operations, as well as
costs for upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly dues is
incorporated in Calatagan’s Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at the back
of each certificate of stock.3As reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock No. A-01295, the
provision reads:
5. The owners of shares of stock shall be subject to the payment of monthly dues in an amount as may
be prescribed in the by-laws or by the Board of Directors which shall in no case be less that [sic] P50.00
to meet the expenses for the general operations of the club, and the maintenance and improvement of
its premises and facilities, in addition to such fees as may be charged for the actual use of the facilities
xxx
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge stood at P400.00. He paid P3,000.00 for his
monthly dues on 21 March 1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991. Then he ceased paying
the dues. At that point, his balance amounted to P400.00.4
Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to collect Clemente’s back accounts by sending
a demand letter dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a second letter dated 22 October 1992.
Both letters were sent to Clemente’s mailing address as indicated in his membership application but
were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address had been closed. 5
Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for having failed to pay his monthly dues for more than sixty
(60) days, specifically P5,600.00 as of 31 October 1992. Calatagan also included Clemente’s name in
the list of delinquent members posted on the club’s bulletin board. On 1 December 1992, Calatagan’s
board of directors adopted a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquent members,
including Clemente’s; and the public auction of these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter to Clemente, this time signed by its
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning that unless Clemente
settles his outstanding dues, his share would be included among the delinquent shares to be sold at
public auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this letter was sent to Clemente’s mailing address that had
already been closed.6
On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted on the Club’s bulletin board, as well as on the
club’s premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993, and Clemente’s share
sold forP64,000.7 According to the Certificate of Sale issued by Calatagan after the sale, Clemente’s
share was purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.8 At the time of the sale, Clemente’s accrued monthly dues
amounted toP5,200.00.9 A notice of foreclosure of Clemente’s share was published in the 26 May
1993 issue of the Business World.10
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in November of 1997.11 He filed a claim with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his shareholding in Calatagan
with damages.
On 15 November 2000, the SEC rendered a decision dismissing Clemente’s complaint. Citing Section
69 of the Corporation Code which provides that the sale of shares at an auction sale can only be
questioned within six (6) months from the date of sale, the SEC concluded that Clemente’s claim, filed
four (4) years after the sale, had already prescribed. The SEC further held that Calatagan had complied
with all the requirements for a valid sale of the subject share, Clemente having failed to inform
Calatagan that the address he had earlier supplied was no longer his address. Clemente, the SEC ruled,
had acted in bad faith in assuming as he claimed that his non-payment of monthly dues would merely
render his share "inactive."
Clemente filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 1 June 2004, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. The appellate court restored Clemente’s one share with a
directive to Calatagan to issue in his a new share, and awarded to Clemente a total of P400,000.00 in
damages, less the unpaid monthly dues of P5,200.00.
In rejecting the SEC’s finding that the action had prescribed, the Court of Appeals cited the SEC’s
own ruling in SEC Case No. 4160, Caram v. Valley Golf Country Club, Inc., that Section 69 of the
Corporation Code specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, and not to any other debt
of stockholders. With the insinuation that Section 69 does not apply to unpaid membership dues in
non-stock corporations, the appellate court employed Article 1140 of the Civil Code as the proper rule
of prescription. The provision sets the prescription period of actions to recover movables at eight (8)
years.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that since that Calatagan’s first two demand letters had been
returned to it as sender with the notation about the closure of the mailing address, it very well knew
that its third and final demand letter also sent to the same mailing address would not be received by
Clemente. It noted the by-law requirement that within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the
sale at auction of a member’s share of stock for indebtedness, the Corporate Secretary shall notify the
owner thereof and advise the Membership Committee of such fact. Finally, the Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that "a person who is in danger of the imminent loss of his property has the right to be
notified and be given the chance to prevent the loss."12
Hence, the present appeal.
96
Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the
Corporation Code, and that the requisite notices under both the law and the by-laws had been rendered
to Clemente.
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover delinquent stock sold must be commenced
by the filing of a complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As correctly pointed out by
the Court of Appeals, Section 69 is part of Title VIII of the Code entitled "Stocks and Stockholders"
and refers specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which is governed by the
immediately preceding Section 68.
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagan’s and the SEC’s reliance on Section 69 by citing
another SEC ruling in the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with Section 69, Calatagan
raises a peripheral point made in the SEC’s Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as take-off Section
6 of the Corporation Code which refers to "such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in
the articles of incorporation," pointed out that the Articles of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not
"impose any lien, liability or restriction on the Golf Share [of Caram]," but only its (Valley Golf’s)
By-Laws does. Here, Calatagan stresses that its own Articles of Incorporation does provide that the
monthly dues assessed on owners of shares of the corporation, along with all other obligations of the
shareholders to the club, "shall constitute a first lien on the shares… and in the event of delinquency
such shares may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to
satisfy said dues or other obligations of the shareholders."13 With its illative but incomprehensible
logic, Calatagan concludes that the prescriptive period under Section 69 should also apply to the sale
of Clemente’s share as the lien that Calatagan perceives to be a restriction is stated in the articles of
incorporation and not only in the by-laws.
We remain unconvinced.
There are fundamental differences that defy equivalence or even analogy between the sale of
delinquent stock under Section 68 and the sale that occurred in this case. At the root of the sale of
delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for the share of stock itself. The
stockholder or subscriber has yet to fully pay for the value of the share or shares subscribed. In this
case, Clemente had already fully paid for the share in Calatagan and no longer had any outstanding
obligation to deprive him of full title to his share. Perhaps the analogy could have been made if
Clemente had not yet fully paid for his share and the non-stock corporation, pursuant to an article or
by-law provision designed to address that situation, decided to sell such share as a consequence. But
that is not the case here, and there is no purpose for us to apply Section 69 to the case at bar.
Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clemente’s suit is barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code
which establishes four (4) years as the prescriptive period for actions based upon injury to the rights
of the plaintiff on the hypothesis that the suit is purely for damages. As a second alternative still,
Calatagan posits that Clemente’s action is governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which sets five
(5) years as the period of prescription for all other actions whose prescriptive periods are not fixed in
the Civil Code or in any other law. Neither article is applicable but Article 1140 of the Civil Code
which provides that an action to recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years. Calatagan’s action
is for the recovery of a share of stock, plus damages.
Calatagan’s advertence to the fact that the constitution of a lien on the member’s share by virtue of the
explicit provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is relevant but ultimately of no help
to its cause. Calatagan’s Articles of Incorporation states that the "dues, together with all other
obligations of members to the club, shall constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to any lien
in favor of the national or local government, and in the event of delinquency such shares may be
ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or
other obligations of the stockholders."14 In turn, there are several provisions in the By-laws that govern
the payment of dues, the lapse into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and execution on
the lien. We quote these provisions:
ARTICLE XII – MEMBER’S ACCOUNT
SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent Members – The Treasurer shall bill al members
monthly. As soon as possible after the end of every month, a statement showing the account of bill of
a member for said month will be prepared and sent to him. If the bill of any member remains unpaid
by the 20th of the month following that in which the bill was incurred, the Treasurer shall notify him
that if his bill is not paid in full by the end of the succeeding month his name will be posted as
delinquent the following day at the Clubhouse bulletin board. While posted, a member, the immediate
members of his family, and his guests, may not avail of the facilities of the Club.
(b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60 days shall be reported to the Board and their
shares or the shares of the juridical entities they represent shall thereafter be ordered sold by the Board
at auction to satisfy the claims of the Club as provided for in Section 32 hereon. A member may pay
his overdue account at any time before the auction sale.
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The club shall have a first lien on every share of
stock to secure debts of the members to the Club. This lien shall be annotated on the certificates of
stock and may be enforced by the Club in the following manner:
(a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a member’s share of stock
for indebtedness under Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof, and shall
advise the Membership Committee of such fact.
(b) The Membership Committee shall then notify all applicants on the Waiting List and all registered
stockholders of the availability of a share of stock for sale at auction at a specified date, time and place,
and shall post a notice to that effect in the Club bulletin board for at least ten (10) days prior to the
auction sale.
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership Committee shall proceed with the auction by viva
voce bidding and award the sale of the share of stock to the highest bidder.
(d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning bidder to the Club within twenty-four (24) hours
after the bidding. The winning bidder or the representative in the case of a juridical entity shall become
a Regular Member upon payment of the purchase price and issuance of a new stock certificate in his
name or in the name of the juridical entity he represents. The proceeds of the sale shall be paid by the
Club to the selling stockholder after deducting his obligations to the Club.
(e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder fails to pay the amount of this bid within twenty-
four (24) hours after the bidding, the auction procedures may be repeated from time to time at the
discretion of the Membership Committee until the share of stock be sold.
(f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock are not sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness
of the member, the member shall continue to be obligated to the Club for the unpaid balance. If the
member whose share of stock is sold fails or refuse to surrender the stock certificate for cancellation,
cancellation shall be effected in the books of the Club based on a record of the proceedings. Such
cancellation shall render the unsurrendered stock certificate null and void and notice to this effect shall
be duly published.
97
It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a clear and comprehensive procedure to govern the
payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a member as delinquent, and the constitution of a lien on
the shares and its eventual public sale to answer for the member’s debts. Under Section 91 of the
Corporation Code, membership in a non-stock corporation "shall be terminated in the manner and for
the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws." The By-law provisions are
elaborate in explaining the manner and the causes for the termination of membership in Calatagan,
through the execution on the lien of the share. The Court is satisfied that the By-Laws, as written,
affords due protection to the member by assuring that the member should be notified by the Secretary
of the looming execution sale that would terminate membership in the club. In addition, the By-Laws
guarantees that after the execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be returned to the former
member after deducting the outstanding obligations. If followed to the letter, the termination of
membership under this procedure outlined in the By-Laws would accord with substantial justice.
Yet, did Calatagan actually comply with the by-law provisions when it sold Clemente’s share? The
appellate court’s finding on this point warrants our approving citation, thus:
In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third and final demand letter to Clemente on
December 7, 1992. The letter states that if the amount of delinquency is not paid, the share will be
included among the delinquent shares to be sold at public auction. This letter was signed by Atty.
Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan Golf’s Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to Clemente’s
mailing address – Phimco Industries Inc., P.O. Box 240, MCC Makati. As expected, it was
returned because the post office box had been closed.
Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to "give or cause to be given, all notices required
by law or by these By-Laws. .. and … keep a record of the addresses of all stockholders. As quoted
above, Sec. 32 (a) of the By-Laws further provides that "within ten (10) days after the Board has
ordered the sale at auction of a member’s share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 (b) hereof,
the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and shall advise the Membership Committee of such fact.,"
The records do not disclose what report the Corporate Secretary transmitted to the Membership
Committee to comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the reason for this mandatory requirement is to
give the Membership Committee the opportunity to find out, before the share is sold, if proper notice
has been made to the shareholder member.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is knowledgeable on the law and on the
standards of good faith and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of corporate records, he should
also have known that the first two letters sent to Clemente were returned because the P.O. Box had
been closed. Thus, we are surprised – given his knowledge of the law and of corporate records – that
he would send the third and final letter – Clemente’s last chance before his share is sold and his
membership lost – to the same P.O. Box that had been closed.
Calatagan argues that it "exercised due diligence before the foreclosure sale" and "sent several notices
to Clemente’s specified mailing address." We do not agree; we cannot label as due diligence
Calatagan’s act of sending the December 7, 1992 letter to Clemente’s mailing address knowing fully
well that the P.O. Box had been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes upon the Corporate
Secretary – the chief repository of all corporate records – the obligation to check Clemente’s other
address which, under the By-Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose
of giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the addresses of members on file is specifically for
matters of this kind, when the member cannot be reached through his or her mailing address.
Significantly, the Corporate Secretary does not have to do the actual verification of other addressees
on record; a mere clerk can do the very simple task of checking the files as in fact clerks actually
undertake these tasks. In fact, one telephone call to Clemente’s phone numbers on file would have
alerted him of his impending loss.
Ultimately, the petition must fail because Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the spirit and letter
of its own by-laws. The by-law provisions was clearly conceived to afford due notice to the delinquent
member of the impending sale, and not just to provide an intricate façade that would facilitate
Calatagan’s sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on Calatagan’s part is palpable. As found by the
Court of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that Clemente’s postal box to which it sent its previous
letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in sending that final letter to the same postal box. What
for? Just for the exercise, it appears, as it had known very well that the letter would never actually
reach Clemente.1avvphi1
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership application had provided his residential address
along with his residence and office telephone numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagan’s By-Laws
requires that the final notice prior to the sale be made solely through the member’s mailing address.
Clemente cites our aphorism-like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Court
of Appeals15 that "[a] simple telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x could have prevented this
present controversy." That memorable observation is quite apt in this case.
Calatagan’s bad faith and failure to observe its own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss of
Clemente’s privilege to play golf at its golf course and avail of its amenities, but also in significant
pecuniary damage to him. For that loss, the only blame that could be thrown Clemente’s way was his
failure to notify Calatagan of the closure of the P.O. Box. That lapse, if we uphold Calatagan would
cost Clemente a lot. But, in the first place, does he deserve answerability for failing to notify the club
of the closure of the postal box? Indeed, knowing as he did that Calatagan was in possession of his
home address as well as residence and office telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that
the club would not be at a loss should it need to contact him. In addition, according to Clemente, he
was not even aware of the closure of the postal box, the maintenance of which was not his
responsibility but his employer Phimco’s.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code,16 under the Chapter on Human Relations. These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did
apply, enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith towards
one another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its treatment
of its members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every person honestly and in good faith extends
even to its shareholders or members, even if the latter find themselves contractually bound to perform
certain obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
We turn to the matter of damages. The award of actual damages is of course warranted since Clemente
has sustained pecuniary injury by reason of Calatagan’s wrongful violation of its own By-Laws. It
would not be feasible to deliver Clemente’s original Certificate of Stock because it had already been
cancelled and a new one issued in its place in the name of the purchases at the auction who was not
impleaded in this case. However, the Court of Appeals instead directed that Calatagan to issue to
Clemente a new certificate of stock. That sufficiently redresses the actual damages sustained by
Clemente. After all, the certificate of stock is simply the evidence of the share.
The Court of Appeals also awarded Clemente P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. We agree that the award of such damages is
warranted.
The Court of Appeals cited Calatagan for violation of Article 32 of the Civil Code, which allows
recovery of damages from any private individual "who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs" the right "against deprivation of property without due process
of laws." The plain letter of the provision squarely entitles Clemente to damages from Calatagan. Even
without Article 32 itself, Calatagan will still be bound to pay moral and exemplary damages to
98
 1
Clemente. The latter was able to duly prove that he had sustained mental anguish, serious anxiety and Rollo, pp. 47-64; Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court, with
wounded feelings by reason of Calatagan’s acts, thereby entitling him to moral damages under Article Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes (later appointed to and retired from this Court) and Eliezer de los
2217 of the Civil Code. Moreover, it is evident that Calatagan’s bad faith as exhibited in the Santos, concurring.
2
course of its corporate actions warrants correction for the public good, thereby justifying exemplary Rollo, pp. 47-48, 145.
damages under Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
3
Id at 48, 145.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
4
against petitioner. Id. at 48, 145-146.
5
SO ORDERED. Id. at 48, 146.
6
DANTE O. TINGA Id. at 48-49, 146-147.
Associate Justice 7
Rollo, p. 49.
WE CONCUR: 8
Records, p. 250.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 9
Associate Justice Id.
Chairperson 10
Records, p. 250.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES 11
Rollo, pp. 49, 147.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
12
Id. at 13.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
13
Associate Justice Rollo, p. 20.
14
ATTESTATION See rollo, pp. 79-80.
15
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case G.R. No. 133107, 25 March 1999, 305 SCRA 449.
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
16
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
CERTIFICATION
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago as Raffle dated April 13, 2009 as additional member in lieu of
Justice Antonio D. Brion who inhibited himself in this case.

99

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER
DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 28,
2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision affirmed
with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing
unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fifty-three (153)
square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473,
Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The
Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second Party
(Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce
Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice,
the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water
District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she was delinquent for
three (3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998, January 1999, and February 1999.
Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31,
2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water
line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the
same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who authorized
the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente
that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for
damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when the
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p.
237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice, gave
plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water supply,
defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice to plaintiffs
as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant
COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual disconnection on March 12,
1999. The due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act with justice. Neither
did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente told
them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of
the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did not have the
patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the water four (4) years
ago and not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente,
COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed.
The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was because they were
influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be liable.
SO ORDERED.6
100
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, while
attorney's fees is lowered toP25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the possession and use of
water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and "that when
[petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and [injury to] Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent spouses
Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not commit
any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a Resolution 10 issued by this
Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY
INTO HALF) HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD
THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH
CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR
THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY
SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT
RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO
PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE TRANSFER OF
THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE.
RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A
GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO
OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR
RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN
AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST
PETITIONER ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants before
the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant petition. This
cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the instant
petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake
on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no basis to
do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim against
COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set
up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez before the
RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with
this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed CA
Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect their
lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same prayer in
their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues raised by
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts,
whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme
Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition. 13 This is
especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case. 14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses' water
supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she admitted in the
present petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water
supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner. While it
was COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that it
was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in
the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the
transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for
which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm
another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.16 In the present case,
intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner
claims that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her
intention was just to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's
account with COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
intention, then she should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her
101
request for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the
fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect
the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of
right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation 17 is
instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as
in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty
and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under
either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect
of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated
certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that]
should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal,
which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced
in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down
a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20
or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions
of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. x x
x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure
to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez,
it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both the
RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article 2219,19 in
connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the
award of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount granted, considering that respondent
spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9) months, and such deprivation
would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among others,
that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
July 24, 2013
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___July 17, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered by
the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on
July 19, 2013 at 2:25 p.m.
102
Very truly yours, (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28. 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

(SGD) xxxx
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
20
Division Clerk of Court Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
21
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Footnotes
22
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, supra note 17, at 405.
* Spelled as Gonzales in other parts of the rollo and records.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and
Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 60-67.
2
Id. at 68.
3
Penned by Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo, id. at 27-37.
4
Rollo, pp. 60-62.
5
Id. at 35-36.
6
Id. at 37.
7
Id. at 67. (Emphasis in the original)
8
Id. at 65.
9
Id. at 64.
10
Id. at 219.
11
Id. at 220.
12
Id. at 14.
13
Philippine National Bank v. DKS International, Inc., G.R. No. 179161, January 22, 2010, 610 SCRA
603, 621.
14
Id.
15
Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 172, 179.
16
Id.
17
G.R. No. 184315, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 392.
18
Id. at 402-404. (Emphasis supplied)
19
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxxx

103
 (b) the Certificate of securities Delivery Receipt No. 16587 indicating the sale of DMC PN No. 2731
to petitioner, with the notation that the said security was in custodianship of Pilipinas Bank, as per
Denominated Custodian Receipt ("DCR") No. 10805 dated 9 February 1981; and

(c) post-dated checks payable on 13 March 1981 (i.e., the maturity date of petitioner's investment),
with petitioner as payee, Philfinance as drawer, and Insular Bank of Asia and America as drawee, in
the total amount of P304,533.33.

On 13 March 1981, petitioner sought to encash the postdated checks issued by Philfinance. However,
the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

On 26 March 1981, Philfinance delivered to petitioner the DCR No. 10805 issued by private
respondent Pilipinas Bank ("Pilipinas"). It reads as follows:

PILIPINAS BANK
Makati Stock Exchange Bldg.,
Ayala Avenue, Makati,
Metro Manila

February 9, 1981
———————
VALUE DATE

Republic of the Philippines TO Raul Sesbreño

SUPREME COURT
Manila April 6, 1981
————————
THIRD DIVISION MATURITY DATE

NO. 10805

G.R. No. 89252 May 24, 1993 DENOMINATED CUSTODIAN RECEIPT

RAUL SESBREÑO, petitioner, This confirms that as a duly Custodian Bank, and upon instruction of PHILIPPINE
vs. UNDERWRITES FINANCE CORPORATION, we have in our custody the following securities to
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELTA MOTORS CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS you [sic] the extent herein indicated.
BANK, respondents.
SERIAL MAT. FACE ISSUED REGISTERED AMOUNT
Salva, Villanueva & Associates for Delta Motors Corporation. NUMBER DATE VALUE BY HOLDER PAYEE

Reyes, Salazar & Associates for Pilipinas Bank. 2731 4-6-81 2,300,833.34 DMC PHIL. 307,933.33
UNDERWRITERS
FINANCE CORP.

FELICIANO, J.:
On 9 February 1981, petitioner Raul Sesbreño made a money market placement in the amount of
P300,000.00 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation ("Philfinance"), Cebu Branch; the
placement, with a term of thirty-two (32) days, would mature on 13 March 1981, Philfinance, also on
9 February 1981, issued the following documents to petitioner:
We further certify that these securities may be inspected by you or your duly authorized
representative at any time during regular banking hours.
Upon your written instructions we shall undertake physical delivery of the above securities fully
assigned to you should this Denominated Custodianship Receipt remain outstanding in your favor
thirty (30) days after its maturity.

(a) the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale, "without recourse," No. 20496 of one (1) Delta Motors
Corporation Promissory Note ("DMC PN") No. 2731 for a term of 32 days at 17.0% per annum;

104
PILIPINAS BANK
(By Elizabeth De Villa
Illegible Signature) 1
On 2 April 1981, petitioner approached Ms. Elizabeth de Villa of private respondent Pilipinas, Makati
Branch, and handed her a demand letter informing the bank that his placement with Philfinance in the
amount reflected in the DCR No. 10805 had remained unpaid and outstanding, and that he in effect
was asking for the physical delivery of the underlying promissory note. Petitioner then examined the
original of the DMC PN No. 2731 and found: that the security had been issued on 10 April 1980; that
it would mature on 6 April 1981; that it had a face value of P2,300,833.33, with the Philfinance as
"payee" and private respondent Delta Motors Corporation ("Delta") as "maker;" and that on face of
the promissory note was stamped "NON NEGOTIABLE." Pilipinas did not deliver the Note, nor any
certificate of participation in respect thereof, to petitioner.
Petitioner later made similar demand letters, dated 3 July 1981 and 3 August 1981, 2 again asking
private respondent Pilipinas for physical delivery of the original of DMC PN No. 2731. Pilipinas
allegedly referred all of petitioner's demand letters to Philfinance for written instructions, as has been
supposedly agreed upon in "Securities Custodianship Agreement" between Pilipinas and Philfinance.
Philfinance did not provide the appropriate instructions; Pilipinas never released DMC PN No. 2731,
nor any other instrument in respect thereof, to petitioner.
Petitioner also made a written demand on 14 July 1981 3 upon private respondent Delta for the partial
satisfaction of DMC PN No. 2731, explaining that Philfinance, as payee thereof, had assigned to him
said Note to the extent of P307,933.33. Delta, however, denied any liability to petitioner on the
promissory note, and explained in turn that it had previously agreed with Philfinance to offset its DMC
PN No. 2731 (along with DMC PN No. 2730) against Philfinance PN No. 143-A issued in favor of
Delta.
In the meantime, Philfinance, on 18 June 1981, was placed under the joint management of the
Securities and exchange commission ("SEC") and the Central Bank. Pilipinas delivered to the SEC
DMC PN No. 2731, which to date apparently remains in the custody of the SEC. 4
As petitioner had failed to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed on 28 September 1982
an action for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Cebu City, Branch 21, against private
respondents Delta and Pilipinas. 5 The trial court, in a decision dated 5 August 1987, dismissed the
complaint and counterclaims for lack of merit and for lack of cause of action, with costs against
petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 15195. In a Decision dated
21 March 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and held: 6
Be that as it may, from the evidence on record, if there is anyone that appears liable for the travails of
plaintiff-appellant, it is Philfinance. As correctly observed by the trial court:
This act of Philfinance in accepting the investment of plaintiff and charging it against DMC PN No.
2731 when its entire face value was already obligated or earmarked for set-off or compensation is
difficult to comprehend and may have been motivated with bad faith. Philfinance, therefore, is solely
and legally obligated to return the investment of plaintiff, together with its earnings, and to answer all
the damages plaintiff has suffered incident thereto. Unfortunately for plaintiff, Philfinance was not
impleaded as one of the defendants in this case at bar; hence, this Court is without jurisdiction to
pronounce judgement against it. (p. 11, Decision)
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed in toto. Cost against plaintiff-appellant.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the above Decision, without success.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
After consideration of the allegations contained and issues raised in the pleadings, the Court resolved
to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. 7
Petitioner reiterates the assignment of errors he directed at the trial court decision, and contends that
respondent court of Appeals gravely erred: (i) in concluding that he cannot recover from private
respondent Delta his assigned portion of DMC PN No. 2731; (ii) in failing to hold private respondent
Pilipinas solidarily liable on the DMC PN No. 2731 in view of the provisions stipulated in DCR No.
10805 issued in favor r of petitioner, and (iii) in refusing to pierce the veil of corporate entity between
Philfinance, and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas, considering that the three (3) entities belong
to the "Silverio Group of Companies" under the leadership of Mr. Ricardo Silverio, Sr. 8
There are at least two (2) sets of relationships which we need to address: firstly, the relationship of
petitioner vis-a-visDelta; secondly, the relationship of petitioner in respect of Pilipinas. Actually, of
course, there is a third relationship that is of critical importance: the relationship of petitioner and
Philfinance. However, since Philfinance has not been impleaded in this case, neither the trial court nor
the Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the person of Philfinance. It is, consequently, not
necessary for present purposes to deal with this third relationship, except to the extent it necessarily
impinges upon or intersects the first and second relationships.
I.
We consider first the relationship between petitioner and Delta.
The Court of appeals in effect held that petitioner acquired no rights vis-a-vis Delta in respect of the
Delta promissory note (DMC PN No. 2731) which Philfinance sold "without recourse" to petitioner,
to the extent of P304,533.33. The Court of Appeals said on this point:
Nor could plaintiff-appellant have acquired any right over DMC PN No. 2731 as the same is "non-
negotiable" as stamped on its face (Exhibit "6"), negotiation being defined as the transfer of an
instrument from one person to another so as to constitute the transferee the holder of the instrument
(Sec. 30, Negotiable Instruments Law). A person not a holder cannot sue on the instrument in his own
name and cannot demand or receive payment (Section 51, id.) 9
Petitioner admits that DMC PN No. 2731 was non-negotiable but contends that the Note had been
validly transferred, in part to him by assignment and that as a result of such transfer, Delta as debtor-
maker of the Note, was obligated to pay petitioner the portion of that Note assigned to him by the
payee Philfinance.
Delta, however, disputes petitioner's contention and argues:
(1) that DMC PN No. 2731 was not intended to be negotiated or otherwise transferred by Philfinance
as manifested by the word "non-negotiable" stamp across the face of the Note 10 and because maker
Delta and payee Philfinance intended that this Note would be offset against the outstanding obligation
of Philfinance represented by Philfinance PN No. 143-A issued to Delta as payee;
105
(2) that the assignment of DMC PN No. 2731 by Philfinance was without Delta's consent, if not against
its instructions; and
(3) assuming (arguendo only) that the partial assignment in favor of petitioner was valid, petitioner
took the Note subject to the defenses available to Delta, in particular, the offsetting of DMC PN No.
2731 against Philfinance PN No. 143-A. 11
We consider Delta's arguments seriatim.
Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the negotiation of a negotiable instrument must be
distinguished from theassignment or transfer of an instrument whether that be negotiable or non-
negotiable. Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may
be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone where the
negotiable instrument is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument may, however, instead of being
negotiated, also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation as distinguished
from assignment of a negotiable instrument are, of course, different. A non-negotiable instrument may,
obviously, not be negotiated; but it may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition
against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument:
The words "not negotiable," stamped on the face of the bill of lading, did not destroy its assignability,
but the sole effect was to exempt the bill from the statutory provisions relative thereto, and a bill,
though not negotiable, may be transferred by assignment; the assignee taking subject to the equities
between the original parties. 12 (Emphasis added)
DMC PN No. 2731, while marked "non-negotiable," was not at the same time stamped "non-
transferable" or "non-assignable." It contained no stipulation which prohibited Philfinance from
assigning or transferring, in whole or in part, that Note.
Delta adduced the "Letter of Agreement" which it had entered into with Philfinance and which should
be quoted in full:
April 10, 1980
Philippine Underwriters Finance Corp.
Benavidez St., Makati,
Metro Manila.
Attention: Mr. Alfredo O. Banaria
SVP-Treasurer
GENTLEMEN:
This refers to our outstanding placement of P4,601,666.67 as evidenced by your Promissory Note No.
143-A, dated April 10, 1980, to mature on April 6, 1981.
As agreed upon, we enclose our non-negotiable Promissory Note No. 2730 and 2731 for
P2,000,000.00 each, dated April 10, 1980, to be offsetted [sic] against your PN No. 143-A upon co-
terminal maturity.
Please deliver the proceeds of our PNs to our representative, Mr. Eric Castillo.
Very Truly Yours,
(Sgd.)
Florencio B. Biagan
Senior Vice President 13
We find nothing in his "Letter of Agreement" which can be reasonably construed as a prohibition upon
Philfinance assigning or transferring all or part of DMC PN No. 2731, before the maturity thereof. It
is scarcely necessary to add that, even had this "Letter of Agreement" set forth an explicit prohibition
of transfer upon Philfinance, such a prohibition cannot be invoked against an assignee or transferee of
the Note who parted with valuable consideration in good faith and without notice of such prohibition.
It is not disputed that petitioner was such an assignee or transferee. Our conclusion on this point is
reinforced by the fact that what Philfinance and Delta were doing by their exchange of their promissory
notes was this: Delta invested, by making a money market placement with Philfinance, approximately
P4,600,000.00 on 10 April 1980; but promptly, on the same day, borrowed back the bulk of that
placement, i.e., P4,000,000.00, by issuing its two (2) promissory notes: DMC PN No. 2730 and DMC
PN No. 2731, both also dated 10 April 1980. Thus, Philfinance was left with not P4,600,000.00 but
only P600,000.00 in cash and the two (2) Delta promissory notes.
Apropos Delta's complaint that the partial assignment by Philfinance of DMC PN No. 2731 had been
effected without the consent of Delta, we note that such consent was not necessary for the validity and
enforceability of the assignment in favor of petitioner. 14 Delta's argument that Philfinance's sale or
assignment of part of its rights to DMC PN No. 2731 constituted conventional subrogation, which
required its (Delta's) consent, is quite mistaken. Conventional subrogation, which in the first place is
never lightly inferred, 15 must be clearly established by the unequivocal terms of the substituting
obligation or by the evident incompatibility of the new and old obligations on every point. 16 Nothing
of the sort is present in the instant case.
It is in fact difficult to be impressed with Delta's complaint, since it released its DMC PN No. 2731 to
Philfinance, an entity engaged in the business of buying and selling debt instruments and other
securities, and more generally, in money market transactions. In Perez v. Court of Appeals, 17 the
Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Herrera, made the following important statement:
There is another aspect to this case. What is involved here is a money market transaction. As defined
by Lawrence Smith "the money market is a market dealing in standardized short-term credit
instruments (involving large amounts) where lenders and borrowers do not deal directly with each
other but through a middle manor a dealer in the open market." It involves "commercial papers" which
are instruments "evidencing indebtness of any person or entity. . ., which are issued, endorsed, sold or
transferred or in any manner conveyed to another person or entity, with or without recourse". The
fundamental function of the money market device in its operation is to match and bring together in a
most impersonal manner both the "fund users" and the "fund suppliers." The money market is an
"impersonal market", free from personal considerations. "The market mechanism is intended to
provide quick mobility of money and securities."
The impersonal character of the money market device overlooks the individuals or entities
concerned.The issuer of a commercial paper in the money market necessarily knows in advance that
it would be expenditiously transacted and transferred to any investor/lender without need of notice to
said issuer. In practice, no notification is given to the borrower or issuer of commercial paper of the
sale or transfer to the investor.
106
xxx xxx xxx
There is need to individuate a money market transaction, a relatively novel institution in the Philippine
commercial scene. It has been intended to facilitate the flow and acquisition of capital on an
impersonal basis. And as specifically required by Presidential Decree No. 678, the investing public
must be given adequate and effective protection in availing of the credit of a borrower in the
commercial paper market.18 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
We turn to Delta's arguments concerning alleged compensation or offsetting between DMC PN No.
2731 and Philfinance PN No. 143-A. It is important to note that at the time Philfinance sold part of its
rights under DMC PN No. 2731 to petitioner on 9 February 1981, no compensation had as yet taken
place and indeed none could have taken place. The essential requirements of compensation are listed
in the Civil Code as follows:
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary:
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal
creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consists in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the
same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
(3) That the two debts are due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and
communicated in due time to the debtor. (Emphasis supplied)
On 9 February 1981, neither DMC PN No. 2731 nor Philfinance PN No. 143-A was due. This was
explicitly recognized by Delta in its 10 April 1980 "Letter of Agreement" with Philfinance, where
Delta acknowledged that the relevant promissory notes were "to be offsetted (sic) against [Philfinance]
PN No. 143-A upon co-terminal maturity."
As noted, the assignment to petitioner was made on 9 February 1981 or from forty-nine (49) days
before the "co-terminal maturity" date, that is to say, before any compensation had taken place.
Further, the assignment to petitioner would have prevented compensation had taken place between
Philfinance and Delta, to the extent of P304,533.33, because upon execution of the assignment in favor
of petitioner, Philfinance and Delta would have ceased to be creditors and debtors of each other in
their own right to the extent of the amount assigned by Philfinance to petitioner. Thus, we conclude
that the assignment effected by Philfinance in favor of petitioner was a valid one and that petitioner
accordingly became owner of DMC PN No. 2731 to the extent of the portion thereof assigned to him.
The record shows, however, that petitioner notified Delta of the fact of the assignment to him only on
14 July 1981, 19that is, after the maturity not only of the money market placement made by petitioner
but also of both DMC PN No. 2731 and Philfinance PN No. 143-A. In other words, petitioner notified
Delta of his rights as assignee after compensation had taken place by operation of law because the
offsetting instruments had both reached maturity. It is a firmly settled doctrine that the rights of an
assignee are not any greater that the rights of the assignor, since the assignee is merely substituted in
the place of the assignor 20 and that the assignee acquires his rights subject to the equities — i.e., the
defenses — which the debtor could have set up against the original assignor before notice of the
assignment was given to the debtor. Article 1285 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 1285. The debtor who has consented to the assignment of rights made by a creditor in favor of a
third person, cannot set up against the assignee the compensation which would pertain to him against
the assignor, unless the assignor was notified by the debtor at the time he gave his consent, that he
reserved his right to the compensation.
If the creditor communicated the cession to him but the debtor did not consent thereto, the latter may
set up the compensation of debts previous to the cession, but not of subsequent ones.
If the assignment is made without the knowledge of the debtor, he may set up the compensation of all
credits prior to the same and also later ones until he had knowledge of the assignment. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 1626 of the same code states that: "the debtor who, before having knowledge of the assignment,
pays his creditor shall be released from the obligation." In Sison v. Yap-Tico, 21 the Court explained
that:
[n]o man is bound to remain a debtor; he may pay to him with whom he contacted to pay; and if he
pay before notice that his debt has been assigned, the law holds him exonerated, for the reason that it
is the duty of the person who has acquired a title by transfer to demand payment of the debt, to give
his debt or notice. 22
At the time that Delta was first put to notice of the assignment in petitioner's favor on 14 July 1981,
DMC PN No. 2731 had already been discharged by compensation. Since the assignor Philfinance
could not have then compelled payment anew by Delta of DMC PN No. 2731, petitioner, as assignee
of Philfinance, is similarly disabled from collecting from Delta the portion of the Note assigned to
him.
It bears some emphasis that petitioner could have notified Delta of the assignment or sale was effected
on 9 February 1981. He could have notified Delta as soon as his money market placement matured on
13 March 1981 without payment thereof being made by Philfinance; at that time, compensation had
yet to set in and discharge DMC PN No. 2731. Again petitioner could have notified Delta on 26 March
1981 when petitioner received from Philfinance the Denominated Custodianship Receipt ("DCR") No.
10805 issued by private respondent Pilipinas in favor of petitioner. Petitioner could, in fine, have
notified Delta at any time before the maturity date of DMC PN No. 2731. Because petitioner failed to
do so, and because the record is bare of any indication that Philfinance had itself notified Delta of the
assignment to petitioner, the Court is compelled to uphold the defense of compensation raised by
private respondent Delta. Of course, Philfinance remains liable to petitioner under the terms of the
assignment made by Philfinance to petitioner.
II.
We turn now to the relationship between petitioner and private respondent Pilipinas. Petitioner
contends that Pilipinas became solidarily liable with Philfinance and Delta when Pilipinas issued DCR
No. 10805 with the following words:
Upon your written instruction, we [Pilipinas] shall undertake physical delivery of the above
securities fully assigned to you —. 23
The Court is not persuaded. We find nothing in the DCR that establishes an obligation on the part of
Pilipinas to pay petitioner the amount of P307,933.33 nor any assumption of liability in solidum with
Philfinance and Delta under DMC PN No. 2731. We read the DCR as a confirmation on the part of
Pilipinas that:
107
(1) it has in its custody, as duly constituted custodian bank, DMC PN No. 2731 of a certain face value,
to mature on 6 April 1981 and payable to the order of Philfinance;
(2) Pilipinas was, from and after said date of the assignment by Philfinance to petitioner (9 February
1981), holding that Note on behalf and for the benefit of petitioner, at least to the extent it had been
assigned to petitioner by payee Philfinance; 24
(3) petitioner may inspect the Note either "personally or by authorized representative", at any time
during regular bank hours; and
(4) upon written instructions of petitioner, Pilipinas would physically deliver the DMC PN No. 2731
(or a participation therein to the extent of P307,933.33) "should this Denominated Custodianship
receipt remain outstanding in [petitioner's] favor thirty (30) days after its maturity."
Thus, we find nothing written in printers ink on the DCR which could reasonably be read as converting
Pilipinas into an obligor under the terms of DMC PN No. 2731 assigned to petitioner, either upon
maturity thereof or any other time. We note that both in his complaint and in his testimony before the
trial court, petitioner referred merely to the obligation of private respondent Pilipinas to effect the
physical delivery to him of DMC PN No. 2731. 25 Accordingly, petitioner's theory that Pilipinas had
assumed a solidary obligation to pay the amount represented by a portion of the Note assigned to him
by Philfinance, appears to be a new theory constructed only after the trial court had ruled against him.
The solidary liability that petitioner seeks to impute Pilipinas cannot, however, be lightly inferred.
Under article 1207 of the Civil Code, "there is a solidary liability only when the law or the nature of
the obligation requires solidarity," The record here exhibits no express assumption of solidary
liability vis-a-vis petitioner, on the part of Pilipinas. Petitioner has not pointed to us to any law which
imposed such liability upon Pilipinas nor has petitioner argued that the very nature of the custodianship
assumed by private respondent Pilipinas necessarily implies solidary liability under the securities,
custody of which was taken by Pilipinas. Accordingly, we are unable to hold Pilipinas solidarily liable
with Philfinance and private respondent Delta under DMC PN No. 2731.
We do not, however, mean to suggest that Pilipinas has no responsibility and liability in respect of
petitioner under the terms of the DCR. To the contrary, we find, after prolonged analysis and
deliberation, that private respondent Pilipinas had breached its undertaking under the DCR to
petitioner Sesbreño.
We believe and so hold that a contract of deposit was constituted by the act of Philfinance in
designating Pilipinas as custodian or depositary bank. The depositor was initially Philfinance; the
obligation of the depository was owed, however, to petitioner Sesbreño as beneficiary of the
custodianship or depository agreement. We do not consider that this is a simple case of a
stipulation pour autri. The custodianship or depositary agreement was established as an integral part
of the money market transaction entered into by petitioner with Philfinance. Petitioner bought a portion
of DMC PN No. 2731; Philfinance as assignor-vendor deposited that Note with Pilipinas in order that
the thing sold would be placed outside the control of the vendor. Indeed, the constituting of the
depositary or custodianship agreement was equivalent to constructive delivery of the Note (to the
extent it had been sold or assigned to petitioner) to petitioner. It will be seen that custodianship
agreements are designed to facilitate transactions in the money market by providing a basis for
confidence on the part of the investors or placers that the instruments bought by them are effectively
taken out of the pocket, as it were, of the vendors and placed safely beyond their reach, that those
instruments will be there available to the placers of funds should they have need of them. The
depositary in a contract of deposit is obliged to return the security or the thing deposited upon demand
of the depositor (or, in the presented case, of the beneficiary) of the contract, even though a term for
such return may have been established in the said contract. 26 Accordingly, any stipulation in the
contract of deposit or custodianship that runs counter to the fundamental purpose of that agreement or
which was not brought to the notice of and accepted by the placer-beneficiary, cannot be enforced as
against such beneficiary-placer.
We believe that the position taken above is supported by considerations of public policy. If there is
any party that needs the equalizing protection of the law in money market transactions, it is the
members of the general public whom place their savings in such market for the purpose of generating
interest revenues. 27 The custodian bank, if it is not related either in terms of equity ownership or
management control to the borrower of the funds, or the commercial paper dealer, is normally a
preferred or traditional banker of such borrower or dealer (here, Philfinance). The custodian bank
would have every incentive to protect the interest of its client the borrower or dealer as against the
placer of funds. The providers of such funds must be safeguarded from the impact of stipulations
privately made between the borrowers or dealers and the custodian banks, and disclosed to fund-
providers only after trouble has erupted.
In the case at bar, the custodian-depositary bank Pilipinas refused to deliver the security deposited
with it when petitioner first demanded physical delivery thereof on 2 April 1981. We must again note,
in this connection, that on 2 April 1981, DMC PN No. 2731 had not yet matured and therefore,
compensation or offsetting against Philfinance PN No. 143-A had not yet taken place. Instead of
complying with the demand of the petitioner, Pilipinas purported to require and await the instructions
of Philfinance, in obvious contravention of its undertaking under the DCR to effect physical delivery
of the Note upon receipt of "written instructions" from petitioner Sesbreño. The ostensible term
written into the DCR (i.e., "should this [DCR] remain outstanding in your favor thirty [30] days after
its maturity") was not a defense against petitioner's demand for physical surrender of the Note on at
least three grounds: firstly, such term was never brought to the attention of petitioner Sesbreño at the
time the money market placement with Philfinance was made; secondly, such term runs counter to the
very purpose of the custodianship or depositary agreement as an integral part of a money market
transaction; and thirdly, it is inconsistent with the provisions of Article 1988 of the Civil Code noted
above. Indeed, in principle, petitioner became entitled to demand physical delivery of the Note held
by Pilipinas as soon as petitioner's money market placement matured on 13 March 1981 without
payment from Philfinance.
We conclude, therefore, that private respondent Pilipinas must respond to petitioner for damages
sustained by arising out of its breach of duty. By failing to deliver the Note to the petitioner as
depositor-beneficiary of the thing deposited, Pilipinas effectively and unlawfully deprived petitioner
of the Note deposited with it. Whether or not Pilipinas itself benefitted from such conversion or
unlawful deprivation inflicted upon petitioner, is of no moment for present purposes.Prima facie, the
damages suffered by petitioner consisted of P304,533.33, the portion of the DMC PN No. 2731
assigned to petitioner but lost by him by reason of discharge of the Note by compensation, plus legal
interest of six percent (6%) per annum containing from 14 March 1981.
The conclusion we have reached is, of course, without prejudice to such right of reimbursement as
Pilipinas may havevis-a-vis Philfinance.
III.
The third principal contention of petitioner — that Philfinance and private respondents Delta and
Pilipinas should be treated as one corporate entity — need not detain us for long.
In the first place, as already noted, jurisdiction over the person of Philfinance was never acquired either
by the trial court nor by the respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioner similarly did not seek to implead
Philfinance in the Petition before us.
108
Secondly, it is not disputed that Philfinance and private respondents Delta and Pilipinas have been
organized as separate corporate entities. Petitioner asks us to pierce their separate corporate entities,
but has been able only to cite the presence of a common Director — Mr. Ricardo Silverio, Sr., sitting
on the Board of Directors of all three (3) companies. Petitioner has neither alleged nor proved that one
or another of the three (3) concededly related companies used the other two (2) as mere alter egos or
that the corporate affairs of the other two (2) were administered and managed for the benefit of one.
There is simply not enough evidence of record to justify disregarding the separate corporate
personalities of delta and Pilipinas and to hold them liable for any assumed or undetermined liability
of Philfinance to petitioner. 28
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 15195 dated 21 march 1989 and 17 July 1989, respectively, are hereby MODIFIED and
SET ASIDE, to the extent that such Decision and Resolution had dismissed petitioner's complaint
against Pilipinas Bank. Private respondent Pilipinas bank is hereby ORDERED to indemnify petitioner
for damages in the amount of P304,533.33, plus legal interest thereon at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum counted from 2 April 1981. As so modified, the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Exhibit "C", Folder of Exhibits, p. 3; TSN, 14 June 1983, p. 41.
2 Records, p. 441; Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 3.
3 Id., p. 451; Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 13.
4 TSN, 14 June 1983, p. 35.
5 Petitioner explained that he did not implead Philfinance as party defendant because the latter was
under rehabilitation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (TSN of the Pre-trial Conference,
pp. 6 and 30; dated 04 March 1983).
6 Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 90.
7 Private respondent Delta adopted as its own the Memorandum filed by private respondent Pilipinas
(Rollo, pp. 269-73).
8 Rollo, p. 6; Petition, p. 5.
9 Id., p. 88.
10 TSN, 17 August 1983, p. 36.
11 Records, pp. 36-37.
12 National Bank of Bristol v. Bartolome & O.R. Co., 59 A. 134, 138. See also, in this connection,
Consolidated Plywood v. IFC Leasing, 149 SCRA 449 (1987).
13 Exhibit "3," Records, p. 240.
14 National Investment and Development Corporation v. De Los Angeles, 40 SCRA 487 (1971);
Bastida v. Dy Buncio & Co., 93 Phil. 195 (1953). See also Articles 1285 and 1625, Civil Code.
15 Article 1300, Civil Code.
16 Article 1292, id.
17 127 SCRA 636 (1984).
18 127 SCRA at 645-646.
19 Records, p, 451; Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 13.
20 Gonzales v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 183 SCRA 520 (1990); Philippine National bank v.
General Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449 (1988); National Investment and Development
Corporation v. De los Angeles, 40 SCRA 489 (1971); Montinola v. Philippine National Bank, 88 Phil.
178 (1951); National Exchange Company, Ltd. v. Ramos, 51 Phil. 310 (1927); Sison v. Yap-Tico, 37
Phil. 584 (1918).
21 37 Phil. 584 (1918).
22 37 Phil. at 589. See also Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 553, 559 (1992). See, generally,
Philippine National Bank v. General Acceptance and Finance Corp., 161 SCRA 449, 457 (1988).
23 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 12; Rollo, p. 221.
24 The DCR specified the amount of P307,933.33 as the extent to which DMC PN No. 2731 pertained
to petitioner Raul Sesbreño. This amount probably refers to the placement of P300,000.00 by petitioner
plus interest from 9 February 1981 until the maturity date of DMC PN No. 2731, i.e., 6 April 1981.
25 Complaint, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 23-24; TSN of 11 April 1983, p. 51; TSN, 9 October 1986, pp. 15-
16. See also Minutes of the Pre-trial Conference, dated 04 March 1983, p. 9.
26 Article 1988, Civil Code.
27 See, in this connection, the second and third "whereas" clauses of P.D. No. 678, dated 2 April 1975.
28 Pabalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 184 SCRA 495 (1990); Del Rosario v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 187 SCRA 777 (1990); Remo, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 172
SCRA 405 (1989).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
109
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4697 November 25, 2014
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 4728
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with conditions, 1 including
continuing fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of the
law, play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a consequent obligation of lawyers is to
maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.2 Failure to live by the standards of the legal
profession and to discharge the burden of the privilege conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant
the suspension or revocation of that privilege.
The Factual Antecedents
Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a "Deed of
Sale with Right to Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with rightof repurchase)
to complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for P15,000.00. Under the said deed, respondent
represented that he has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the subject property and
that the said property is "free from all liens and encumbrances."3The deed also provided that
respondent, as vendor a retro, had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not
repurchased within the said period, "the parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement." 4
Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and no
renewal of the contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated May
10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the
property until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc.
(RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI, that the bank had
subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should therefore vacate the property.5
Complainant was alarmed and made aninvestigation. He learned the following:
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;
(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his wife on
January 4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on the
property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991.6 Complainant was
subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.7
Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
approved the Resolution8 dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144 finding that "[t]he facts of [the] case
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been committed and that
respondent herein is probably guilty thereof."9Accordingly, an Information10 dated January 8,1996
was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent
with the crime of estafa under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code,11 committed
as follows:
On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at
that time was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused
executed in favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first
redeeming/repurchasing the same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[’s] unlawful act only on
or about the last week of February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the property, the
mortgage having been foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced
by accused[’s] unlawful transaction and misrepresentation.
The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.
Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing before
this Court an Affidavit-Complaint12 dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaint13 dated
February 27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both
complaints, complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.
The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.14
In his Consolidated Answer15 dated August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied that his
agreement with complainant was a pacto de retrosale. He claimed that it was an equitable mortgage
and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the
total amount would have exceeded P15,000.00.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors
In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with complainant
and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was
one of equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he represented in the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the property was covered by
TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said certificate of title, when the
said TCT had already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of
Philippine National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even worse, when he had TCT No. T-
3211 cancelled with the issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his wife’s name on January 4,1982
without informing complainant. This was compounded by respondent’s subsequent mortgage of the
property to RBAI, which led to the acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof
110
of complainant. Thus, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1) suspended
from the practice of law for one year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt
with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00, the amount he received as
consideration for the pacto de retrosale, with interest at the legal rate.
Considering respondent’s "commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral turpitude,
actsof dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification as
follows: respondent is(1) suspended from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar
misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of P15,000.00
received in consideration of the pacto de retrosale, with legal interest. 17
The Court’s Ruling
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the P15,000.00
consideration, plus interest.
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2,
1981 in favor of complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of sale with pacto
de retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent argues that he still had the legal right to
mortgage the subject property to other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that complainant
should render an accounting of the produce the latter had collected from the said property, which
would already exceed the P15,000.00 consideration stated in the deed.
There is no merit in respondent’s defense.
Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale
with pacto de retroor of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held administratively liable.
When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to "obey
the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion."18He gravely violated his oath.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that
respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as he
was the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent could have simply denominated
the instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as "mortgagor" and
"mortgagee," respectively, rather than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If only respondent had
been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy
between him and complainant could havebeen avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His
imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack oflegal competence on
his part. He thereby fell short of his oath to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of
[his] knowledge and discretion."
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations
asembodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he
should have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly
expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the
agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the
respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to
legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor
formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal
controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.
Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,19 the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired the
subject property and obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a
purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such purchaser
becomes entitled to the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a memorandum thereof
shall be "indorsed upon the mortgagor’s original certificate."20 TCT No. T-662, which respondent gave
complainant when they entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2,
1981, does not bearsuch memorandum but only a memorandum on the mortgage of the property to
PNB in 1963 and the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.
Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear
that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owner’s
copy of the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some
nine years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not evencare to correct the wrong
statement in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4,
1982,21 or barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed
an act of gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under
Canon 1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is
moreover expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the
norm of conduct that is expected of all lawyers.22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to,
or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. 23
To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy;
lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the
other hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:
[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.
In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and
conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the
intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement
or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.24The actions of respondent in connection with the
111
execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a disregard for
Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit on
respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.
Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Court’s referral
of these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused delay in the
resolution of these administrative cases.
In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint in A.C.
No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997,
respectively.25 While he requested for several extensions of time within which to submit his comment,
no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution dated February
4,1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment.26Respondent neither showed cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, nor submitted the consolidated
comment.
When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBP’s Investigating
Commissioner, respondent was again required several times to submit his consolidated answer. He
only complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this Court originally required him to
do so. The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers. Despite having been given several opportunities to submit the same, respondent did not file
any position paper.27
Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner, which
caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx
CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
xxxx
Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
court processes.
Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before.1âwphi1 In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,28 respondent was held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney for which he was fined P2,000.00.
Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.
The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return the
sum ofP15,000.00 he received from complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase."
This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the present
administrative cases.
In Roa v. Moreno,29 the Court pronounced that "[i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.
Our only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no
material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other."While
the respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and
administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case must be
resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in
each. Section 5,30 in relation to Sections 131 and 2,32 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, such as the ones atbar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence asin civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.33
The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative cases,
complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.34 Unless the complainant waived the civil action, reserved the
right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then his civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa committed by respondent is deemed
instituted with Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that complainant may recover in Criminal
Case No. 3112-A includes restitution; reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification
for consequential damages,35 which may already cover the P15,000.00 consideration complainant had
paid for the subject property.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyer’s Oath;
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue delay of
these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years,
reckoned from receipt of this Decision, with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
Decision to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
112
 7
Id., Vol. II, p. 67.
On leave
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 8
Id. at 21-25.
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
9
Id. at 24.
10
Id. at 26.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
11
Associate Justice Associate Justice ART. 316. Other forms of swindling.– The penalty of arresto mayorin its minimum and medium
periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value, shall be imposed upon:

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. 1. Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or
Associate Justice Associate Justice mortgage the same;

2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although
such encumbrance be not recorded[.]
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice 2
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 2-5.
13
Id., Vol. II, pp. 1-7.
On official leave 14
Id., Vol. I, p. 51; Resolution dated February 14, 2000.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE**
Associate Justice 15
Associate Justice Id., Vol. III, pp. 146-154.
16
Id., Vol. II, pp. 52-69.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. 17

Id. at 50-51, Notice of Resolution.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 18
The Lawyer’s Oath states in full:

I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution and obey the lawsas well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
Footnotes same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best ofmy knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
* On leave. impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
So help me God. (Emphases supplied.)
** On official leave.
19
1 Act No. 496 enacted on November 6, 1902.
Manzano v. Atty. Soriano, 602 Phil. 419, 421 (2009).
20
2 Section 63 of the Land Registration Act provides: Sec. 63. Mortgages of registered land may be
Preamble, 2nd paragraph, American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility foreclosed in the manner provided in the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings.
(1983), cited in Code of Professional Responsibility (Annotated), p. 1. A certified copy of the final decree of the court affirming the sale under foreclosure proceedings may
3 be filed with the register of deeds after the time for appealing therefrom has expired, and the purchaser
Joint Memorandum for complainant, rollo, Vol. III, pp. 173-205, 173-174, 192-193.
shall thereupon be entitled to the entry of a new certificate and to the issuance of a new owner’s
4
Id. at 192-193. duplicate certificate, a memorandum thereof being at the same time likewise indorsed upon the
mortgagor’s original certificate and the mortgagee’s duplicate, if any, being first delivered up and
5
Id. at 174-175, 195-197. canceled: Provided, however, That nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to prevent the
mortgagor or other person interested fromdirectly impeaching by any proper legal proceedings any
6
Id. at 175, 198-203.

113
foreclosure proceedings affecting registered land, prior to the entry of a new certificate of title.
(Emphasis supplied.)
21
It appears from the annotations/memoranda at the back of TCT No. T-3211 that said certificate of
title was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 when the deed of sale dated March 27, 1979 between PNB
and respondent was registered with the Register of Deeds. Respondent, however, lost his owner’s
duplicate and was issued a new copy of such owner’s duplicate on January 4, 1982. (Rollo, Vol. III,
p. 200.)
22
Code of Professional Responsibility (Annotated), pp. 1, 16.
23
Id., citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1536.
24
Id. at 6-7.
25
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 25, and Vol. II, p. 37, respectively.
26
Id., Vol. I, p. 40.
27
Id., Vol. III, pp. 222-224, Order dated January 24, 2005.
28
492 Phil. 450, 460 (2005).
29
A.C. No. 8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 700.
30
SECTION 5. Substantial evidence. – In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a
fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
31
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all
the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
32
SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. – In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
33
Peña v. Paterno, A.C. No. 4191, June 10, 2013, 698 SCRA 1, 12-13.
Republic of the Philippines
34
Rule 111, Section 1(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. SUPREME COURT
Manila
35
Articles 104 to 107 of the Revised Penal Code.
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

114
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner,
with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an
amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura and
defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s
fees ofP100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiff’s separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by
ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79
or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-half
(1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount
ofP15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the herein
defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of properties.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of
their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or
that such incident be set for oral argument.3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite toP20,000.4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution. 5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner’s appeal for lack
of merit and affirming in toto the trial court’s decision. 6 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for the
son.7Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari8 and the Petition for Certiorari9 were ordered
consolidated by this Court.10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case
not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF
P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM
THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF ORP1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF
ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE
GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES’ MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY
13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO
PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON. 11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
115
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO
SET RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES’ SON FOR
HEARING.12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY’S MONTHLY
SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT PRESENT PRICES. 13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY’S SUPPORT, THE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES SUBMITTED
BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF
MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS
SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT AFFORD
TO INCREASE JAVY’S SUPPORT.15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the testimonies not
only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of the two psychologists,
awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying him
by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy parental pressure to marry
and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to enter into marriage
as in fact his career was and always would be his first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to
defendant-appellee as a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to
make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendant–appellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights
not only in those years the parties were together but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court’s decision on the ground that unlike those arising from a
breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not be awarded.
While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court where damages by reason
of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations were awarded, it does not follow that
no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in
the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its discretion, found full
justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for. We find no reason to disturb
the ruling of the trial court.16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 221917 of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must be
noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is
a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which
the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages
would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article
36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article
36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . . 18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful
and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product
of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability,
while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the
marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had
knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to
have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the
basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private
respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the
award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.19
With respect to the grant of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
116
Regarding Attorney’s fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiff’s act or omission has
compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect her interest (par. 2),
and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should
be recovered. (par. 11)20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified, the award
of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified. 21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity,
and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with
the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock
in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the conjugal
partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable Supreme Court
has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a judgment for the liquidation of
property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572
– 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide
for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support
of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of
one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family
Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership
properties. Among others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether
the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common
property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of what are
the parties’ conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each spouse, it was disclosed
during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first as Branch Manager and later as
Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received separation/retirement package from the said
bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave
him a net amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal
partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and
wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless
there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this particular
case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any
voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wife’s share in the conjugal partnership
properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their
residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, Metro
Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993,
and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in
full settlement of any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed
some concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the
process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only
child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2) portion of the
house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past unpaid support, while the
other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the conjugal
properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of the
separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their conjugal
partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry, work or profession of
said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the Family Code. For the same reason,
she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the
Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies.22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give one-
half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half of his
outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the defendant-
appellee as the latter’s share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise Agreement
entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had agreed that henceforth,
their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were taken for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement benefits which
plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his retirement as Vice-
President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from plaintiff–appellant’s service
for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was married to defendant-appellee, the
trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in
Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-
appellant at the time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as
her share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. 23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
117
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,24 this Court expounded on the
consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the applicable
provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of
Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed
to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination
of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment
to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without
the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law)
refers to thelegal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the
Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall
be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the
Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-ownership
property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-
ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common
children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default
thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation
or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
…
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property,
the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had jurisdiction to declare the
marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and
consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of
either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of
Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by
its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the
Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void
marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very
beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes
of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage,
the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage.
It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in
valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or
spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership
subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the
"family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force
and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been
included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained,
but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now
moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 200526 and has, therefore, attained
the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be
moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained the
age of majority.
118
 16
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 81-82.
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
17
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses of litigation ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner
from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioner’s shares of stock in Manila Memorial (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals’
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente
lite in favor of the parties’ son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
accordingly, DISMISSED.
(6) Illegal search;
No costs.
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
SO ORDERED.
(8) Malicious prosecution;
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Footnotes ...
1
Rollo (G.R. No.127449), p. 54. 18
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34. Emphasis
2
supplied.
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 76.
19
3
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for
Rollo (G.R. No. 127358), pp. 7-8. the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
4
Id. at 136. 20
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 67.
5
Id. at 138. 21
Id. at 82.
6
Id. at 144. 22
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 69 -71.
7
Id. at 153. 23
Id. at 82-83.
8
G.R. No. 127449. 24
G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996, 260 SCRA 221.
9
G.R. No. 127358. 25
Id. at 226-234. (Emphasis in the original.)
10
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 100. 26
Javy Singh Buenaventura was born on May 27, 1980; Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 56.
11
Id. at 32.
12
Rollo (G. R. No.127358) p. 11.
13
Id. at 15.
14
Id. at 17.
15
Id. at 20.

119
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174715 October 11, 2012

FILINVEST LAND, INC., EFREN C. GUTIERRE and LINA DE GUZMAN-

FERRER, Petitioners,
vs.
ABDUL BACKY, ABEHERA, BAIYA, EDRIS, HADJI GULAM, JAMELLA, KIRAM,
LUCAYA, MONER, OMAR, RAMIR, ROBAYCA, SATAR, TAYBA ALL SURNAMED
NGILAY, EDMER ANDONG, UNOS BANTANGAN and NADJER ESQUIVEL, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated November
9, 2006, of petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc., which seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated March 30, 2006
and Resolution2dated September 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) partially reversing the
Decision3 dated October 1, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas, Branch 253 (RTC).

The factual antecedents, as found in the records follow.

Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands located in Tambler, General Santos City
through Homestead and Fee patents sometime in 1986 and 1991 which are covered by and specifically
described in the following Original Certificates of Title issued by the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City:

OCT No. Area (sq. m.) Grantee Date Granted

P-5204 38,328 Abdul Backy Ngilay November 11, 1986

120
 A few days after the execution of the aforestated deeds and the delivery of the corresponding
P-5205 49,996 Hadji Gulam Ngilay November 11, 1986
documents to petitioner, respondents came to know that the sale of their properties was null and void,
because it was done within the period that they were not allowed to do so and that the sale did not
P-5206 49,875 Edris A. Ngilay November 11, 1986 have the approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
prompting them to file a case for the declaration of nullity of the deeds of conditional and absolute
sale of the questioned properties and the grant of right of way with the RTC, Las Piñas, Branch 253.
P-5207 44,797 Robayca A. Ngilay November 11, 1986
On the other hand, petitioner claims that sometime in 1995, the representative of Hadji Ngilay
approached petitioner to propose the sale of a portion of his properties. Thereafter, representatives of
P-5209 20,000 Omar Ngilay November 11, 1986 petitioner flew to General Santos City from Manila to conduct an ocular inspection of the subject
properties. Petitioner was willing to purchase the properties but seeing that some of the properties
were registered as land grants through homestead patents, representatives of petitioner informed
P-5211 29,990 Tayba Ngilay November 11, 1986 Ngilay that they would return to General Santos City in a few months to finalize the sale as ten (10)
certificates of title were issued on November 24, 1991.

P-5212 48,055 Kiram Ngilay November 11, 1986 According to petitioner, Ngilay and his children prevailed upon the representatives of petitioner to
make an advance payment. To accommodate the Ngilays, petitioner acceded to making an advance
with the understanding that petitioner could demand anytime the return of the advance payment should
P-5578 20,408 Nadjer Esquevel November 24, 1991 Ngilay not be able to comply with the conditions of the sale. The Ngilays likewise undertook to secure
the necessary approvals of the DENR before the consummation of the sale.
P-5579 35,093 Unos Bantangan November 24, 1991 The RTC ruled in favor of Filinvest Land, Inc. and upheld the sale of all the properties in litigation. It
found that the sale of those properties whose original certificates of title were issued by virtue of the
1986 Patents was valid, considering that the prohibitory period ended in 1991, or way before the
P-5580 39,507 Moner Ngilay November 24, 1991 transaction took place. As to those patents awarded in 1991, the same court opined that since those
properties were the subject of a deed of conditional sale, compliance with those conditions is necessary
for there to be a perfected contract between the parties. The RTC also upheld the grant of right of way
P-5582 44,809 Baiya Ngilay November 24, 1991
as it adjudged that the right of way agreement showed that the right of way was granted to provide
access from the highway to the properties to be purchased. The dispositive portion of the Decision
P-5583 10,050 Jamela Ngilay November 24, 1991 dated October 1, 2003 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court upholds the sale of all the properties in litigation. It
P-5584 49,993 Ramir Ngilay November 24, 1991 likewise upholds the grant of right of way in favor of the respondent. Consequently, the petition is
DISMISSED.

P-5586 40,703 Satar Ngilay November 24, 1991 No pronouncement as to damages for failure to prove the same.

Costs against the petitioners.

P-5590 20,000 Abehara Ngilay November 24, 1991
SO ORDERED.4

P-5592 41,645 Lucaya Ngilay November 24, 1991 Respondents elevated the case to the CA in which the latter modified the judgment of the
RTC.1âwphi1 While the CA upheld the validity of the sale of the properties the patents of which were
awarded in 1986, including the corresponding grant of right of way for the same lots, it nullified the
P-5595 13,168 Edmer Andong November 24, 1991 disposition of those properties granted through patents in 1991 and the right of way on the same
properties. As to the "1991 Patents," the CA ruled that the contract of sale between the parties was a
perfected contract, hence, the parties entered into a prohibited conveyance of a homestead within the
Negotiations were made by petitioner, represented by Lina de Guzman-Ferrer with the patriarch of the prohibitive period of five years from the issuance of the patent. The CA Decision dated March 30,
Ngilays, Hadji Gulam Ngilay sometime in 1995. Eventually, a Deed of Conditional Sale of the above- 2006 disposed the case as follows:
enumerated properties in favor of petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc. was executed. Upon its execution,
respondents were asked to deliver to petitioner the original owner's duplicate copy of the certificates WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated October 1, 2003 is MODIFIED:
of title of their respective properties. Respondents received the downpayment for the properties on
October 28, 1995.
121
a) The Deed of Conditional Sale and Deed of Absolute Sale for the properties covered by the "1991
Patents", as well as the Right of Way Agreement thereto, are declared null and void. The Register of
Deeds of General Santos City is consequently directed to cancel the certificates of title covered by the
"1991 Patents" issued in favor of appellee Filinvest and to issue new titles in favor of herein appellants.
b) The sale of the properties covered by the "1986 Patents", including the corresponding grant of way
for said lots, are declared valid.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, the present petition.
The grounds relied upon are:
1.
A CONDITIONAL SALE INVOLVING THE 1991 PATENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE
PROHIBITION AGAINST ALIENATION OF HOMESTEADS UNDER THE PUBLIC LAND ACT
SINCE NO ACTUAL TRANSFER OR DISPOSITION WAS PERFECTED UNTIL ALL THE
CONDITIONS OF THE DEED ARE FULFILLED.
2.
REGISTRATION IS THE OPERATIVE ACT THAT CONVEYS OR DISPOSES RIGHTS IN REAL
PROPERTY. BEING UNREGISTERED, THE DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE DID NOT
CONVEY OR DISPOSE OF THE 1991 HOMESTEADS OR ANY RIGHTS THEREIN IN
VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
3.
ASSUMING THE NULLITY OF THE SALE OF THE 1991 PATENTS, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE ORDERED RESPONDENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW
TO RETURN TO PETITIONERS WHAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED.6
In their Comment7 dated March 5, 2007, respondents stated the following counter-arguments:
(1) The Honorable Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Deed of Conditional Sale and Deed
of Absolute Sale for the properties covered by the 1991 Patents, as well as the Right of Way Agreement
thereto is null and void for the simplest reason that the said transactions were volatile of the Public
Land Act.
(2) The questions raised by the Petitioner, Filinvest Land Inc. (FLI) are unsubstantial to require
consideration.8
In its Reply9 dated July 30, 2007, petitioner insists that the prohibition against alienation and
disposition of land covered by Homestead Patents is a prohibition against the actual loss of the
homestead within the five-year prohibitory period, not against all contracts including those that do not
result in such an actual loss of ownership or possession. It also points out that respondents themselves
admit that the transfer certificates of title covering the ten parcels of land are all dated 1998, which
confirms its declaration that the lands covered by 1991 Homestead Patents were not conveyed to
Filinvest until after the five-year prohibitory period.
The petition is unmeritorious.
The five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is provided under
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 456, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act.10 It bears stressing that the law was enacted to give the homesteader or
patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously
given to him as a reward for his labour in cleaning and cultivating it.11 Its basic objective, as the Court
had occasion to stress, is to promote public policy that is to provide home and decent living for
destitute, aimed at providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace
and order.12 Hence, any act which would have the effect of removing the property subject of the patent
from the hands of a grantee will be struck down for being violative of the law. 13
In the present case, the negotiations for the purchase of the properties covered by the patents issued in
1991 were made in 1995 and, eventually, an undated Deed of Conditional Sale was executed. On
October 28, 1995, respondents received the downpayment of P14,000.000.00 for the properties
covered by the patents issued in 1991. Applying the five-year prohibition, the properties covered by
the patent issued on November 24, 1991 could only be alienated after November 24, 1996. Therefore,
the sale, having been consummated on October 28, 1995, or within the five-year prohibition, is as
ruled by the CA, void.
Petitioner argues that the correct formulation of the issue is not whether there was a perfected contract
between the parties during the period of prohibition, but whether by such deed of conditional sale there
was "alienation or encumbrance" within the contemplation of the law. This is wrong. The prohibition
does not distinguish between consummated and executory sale. The conditional sale entered into by
the parties is still a conveyance of the homestead patent. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Ortega
v. Tan:14
And, even assuming that the disputed sale was not yet perfected or consummated, still, the transaction
cannot be validated. The prohibition of the law on the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within
five years after the grant is MANDATORY. The purpose of the law is to promote a definite policy,
i.e., "to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which the
State has gratuitously given to him." Thus, the law does not distinguish between executory and
consummated sales. Where the sale of a homestead was perfected within the prohibitory period of five
years, the fact that the formal deed of sale was executed after the expiration of the staid period DID
NOT and COULD NOT legalize a contract that was void from its inception. To hold valid such
arrangement would be to throw the door open to all possible fraudulent subterfuges and schemes which
persons interested in the land given to a homesteader may devise in circumventing and defeating the
legal provisions prohibiting their alienation within five years from the issuance of the patent.15
To repeat, the conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the five-year prohibitory period
following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for it is not
within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve. 16
Nevertheless, petitioner does not err in seeking the return of the down payment as a consequence of
the sale having been declared void. The rule is settled that the declaration of nullity of a contract which
is void ab initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before
the execution thereof.17Petitioner is correct in its argument that allowing respondents to keep the
amount received from petitioner is tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment. Unjust
enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."18 There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is
unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.19 Thus,
122
 *
the sale which created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed amount having been declared void, Designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1299 dated August 28, 2012.
respondents have the duty to return the down payment as they no longer have the right to keep it. The
1
principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-
person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.20 As found by the CA and undisputed by Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo. pp. 40-57.
the parties, the amount or the down payment made is P14,000,000.00 which shall also be the amount 2
to be returned by respondents. Id. at 60-62.
3
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 9, 2006 or petitioner Filinvest Penned by Presiding Judge Jose F. Caoibe, Jr., id. at 335-343.
Land, Inc. is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 30, 2006 and Resolution dated 4
September 18, 2006 or the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Rollo, pp. 342-343.
respondents return the amount of P14,000,000.00 given by petitioner as down payment for the sale 5
Id. at 56-57. (Emphasis supplied)
which is ruled to be void ab initio.
6
Id. at 21-22.
SO ORDERED.
7
Id. at 428-437.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice 8
Id. at 428.
WE CONCUR: 9
Id. at 445-455.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 10
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands
Associate Justice acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation
Chairperson from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ* prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
Associate Justice Associate Justice pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years
Associate Justice after issuance of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds. (Emphasis
ATTESTATION supplied)
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case 11
Flore v. Marciano Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 173365, April 15, 2010, 618 SCRA 323, 330, citing Heirs
was assigned to the writer of the opinion or the Court's Division. of Venancio Bajenting v. Bañez, G.R. No. 166190, September 20, 2006, 502 SCRA 531, 553.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 12

Id.
Associate Justice
13
Chairperson, Third Division Id.
14
CERTIFICATION G.R. No. 44617, January 23, 1990, 181 SCRA 350; 260 Phil. 371 (1990).
15
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I Rollo, pp. 53-54. (Emphasis supplied)
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
16
was assigned to the writer or the opinion of the Court's Division. Saltiga de Romero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109307, November 25, 1999, 319 SCRA 180, 192;
377 Phil. 189, 201.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
17
Chief Justice Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 110053, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA
331, 337; 319 Phil. 447, 454-455 (1995).
18
Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 138088, January
23, 2006, 479 SCRA 404, 412; 515 Phil. 376, 384 (2006).
Footnotes

123
19
H.L. Carlos Corporation, Inc. v. Marina Properties Corporation, G.R. No. 147614, January 29, 2004,
421 SCRA 428, 437, citing MC Engineering, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104047, April 3,
2002, 380 SCRA 116, 138; 466 Phil. 182, 197 (2004).
20
Gil Miguel T. Puyat v. Ron Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536. February 26, 2001, 352 SCRA 738, 750: 405
Phil. 413, 431 (2001).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160600 January 15, 2014

DOMINGO GONZALO, Petitioner,

vs.
JOHN TARNATE, JR., Respondent.
124
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The doctrine of in pari delicto which stipulates that the guilty parties to an illegal contract are not
entitled to any relief, cannot prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public policy against unjust
enrichment.
Antecedents
After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on July 22, 1997 the
contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-Benguet
Road in the total amount of 7 014 963 33 to his company, Gonzalo Construction,1 petitioner Domingo
Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate) on October 15, 1997, the
supply of materials and labor for the project under the latter s business known as JNT Aggregates.
Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four
percent of the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate s first and second billing in the project.2
In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment whereby
he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total collection
from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee (equivalent to P233,526.13) was the rent for
Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project. In the deed of assignment, Gonzalo further
authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the
documents relative to the collection of the 10% retention fee and in encashing the check to be issued
by the DPWH for that purpose.3 The deed of assignment was submitted to the DPWH on April 15,
1999. During the processing of the documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that
Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of
deed of assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999; 4 and that the
disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the
retention fee released to him.5
Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he brought
this suit against Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mountain
Province to recover the retention fee of P233,526.13, moral and exemplary damages for breach of
contract, and attorney’s fees.6
In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of assignment and the authority given therein to Tarnate,
but averred that the project had not been fully implemented because of its cancellation by the DPWH,
and that he had then revoked the deed of assignment. He insisted that the assignment could not stand
independently due to its being a mere product of the subcontract that had been based on his contract
with the DPWH; and that Tarnate, having been fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the
deed of assignment from the time of its execution, could not go to court with unclean hands to invoke
any right based on the invalid deed of assignment or on the product of such deed of assignment.7
Ruling of the RTC
On January 26, 2001, the RTC, opining that the deed of assignment was a valid and binding contract,
and that Gonzalo must comply with his obligations under the deed of assignment, rendered judgment
in favor of Tarnate as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and as prayed for by the plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr. in his
Complaint for Sum of Money, Breach of Contract With Damages is hereby RENDERED in his favor
and against the above-named defendant Domingo Gonzalo, the Court now hereby orders as follows:
1. Defendant Domingo Gonzalo to pay the Plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr., the amount of TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX and 13/100 PESOS (P233,526.13)
representing the rental of equipment;
2. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS by way of
reasonable Attorney’s Fees for having forced/compelled the plaintiff to litigate and engage the services
of a lawyer in order to protect his interest and to enforce his right. The claim of the plaintiff for
attorney’s fees in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) plus THREE
THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) clearly appears to be unconscionable and therefore reduced to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as aforestated making the same to be reasonable;
3. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) by way of
litigation expenses;
4. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for moral
damages and for the breach of contract; and
5. To pay the cost of this suit.
Award of exemplary damages in the instant case is not warranted for there is no showing that the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner analogous to the
case of Xentrex Automotive, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 66. 8
Gonzalo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Decision of the CA
On February 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.9
Although holding that the subcontract was an illegal agreement due to its object being specifically
prohibited by Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594; that Gonzalo and Tarnate were guilty of
entering into the illegal contract in violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594; and that the
deed of assignment, being a product of and dependent on the subcontract, was also illegal and
unenforceable, the CA did not apply the doctrine of in pari delicto, explaining that the doctrine applied
only if the fault of one party was more or less equivalent to the fault of the other party. It found Gonzalo
to be more guilty than Tarnate, whose guilt had been limited to the execution of the two illegal
contracts while Gonzalo had gone to the extent of violating the deed of assignment. It declared that
the crediting of the 10% retention fee equivalent to P233,256.13 to his account had unjustly enriched
Gonzalo; and ruled, accordingly, that Gonzalo should reimburse Tarnate in that amount because the
latter’s equipment had been utilized in the project.
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Gonzalo has now come to the Court to seek the review
and reversal of the decision of the CA.
Issues
Gonzalo contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC because: (1) both parties were in pari delicto;
(2) the deed of assignment was void; and (3) there was no compliance with the arbitration clause in
the subcontract.
Gonzalo submits in support of his contentions that the subcontract and the deed of assignment, being
specifically prohibited by law, had no force and effect; that upon finding both him and Tarnate guilty
of violating the law for executing the subcontract, the RTC and the CA should have applied the rule
125
of in pari delicto, to the effect that the law should not aid either party to enforce the illegal contract
but should leave them where it found them; and that it was erroneous to accord to the parties relief
from their predicament.11
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, but we delete the grant of moral damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
There is no question that every contractor is prohibited from subcontracting with or assigning to
another person any contract or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary has
approved the subcontracting or assignment. This is pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1594, which provides:
Section 6. Assignment and Subcontract. – The contractor shall not assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract
or make any other disposition of the contract or any part or interest therein except with the approval
of the Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public
Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be. Approval of the subcontract shall not relieve
the main contractor from any liability or obligation under his contract with the Government nor shall
it create any contractual relation between the subcontractor and the Government.
Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in question, subcontracted the implementation of
the project to Tarnate in violation of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal, therefore,
because it did not bear the approval of the DPWH Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of assignment was
also illegal, because it sprung from the subcontract. As aptly observed by the CA:
x x x. The intention of the parties in executing the Deed of Assignment was merely to cover up the
illegality of the sub-contract agreement. They knew for a fact that the DPWH will not allow plaintiff-
appellee to claim in his own name under the Sub-Contract Agreement.
Obviously, without the Sub-Contract Agreement there will be no Deed of Assignment to speak of.
The illegality of the Sub-Contract Agreement necessarily affects the Deed of Assignment because the
rule is that an illegal agreement cannot give birth to a valid contract. To rule otherwise is to sanction
the act of entering into transaction the object of which is expressly prohibited by law and thereafter
execute an apparently valid contract to subterfuge the illegality. The legal proscription in such an
instance will be easily rendered nugatory and meaningless to the prejudice of the general public. 12
Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law
is a void or inexistent contract. As such, a void contract cannot produce a valid one. 13 To the same
effect is Article 1422 of the Civil Code, which declares that "a contract, which is the direct result of a
previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent."
We do not concur with the CA’s finding that the guilt of Tarnate for violation of Section 6 of
Presidential Decree No. 1594 was lesser than that of Gonzalo, for, as the CA itself observed, Tarnate
had voluntarily entered into the agreements with Gonzalo. 14 Tarnate also admitted that he did not
participate in the bidding for the project because he knew that he was not authorized to contract with
the DPWH.15 Given that Tarnate was a businessman who had represented himself in the subcontract
as "being financially and organizationally sound and established, with the necessary personnel and
equipment for the performance of the project,"16 he justifiably presumed to be aware of the illegality
of his agreements with Gonzalo. For these reasons, Tarnate was not less guilty than Gonzalo.
According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover
from one another and are not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal
fault. The doctrine of in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or
at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover
the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation;
and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against
the other.17
Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid.1âwphi1 An accepted
exception arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy.18 In this jurisdiction,
public policy has been defined as "that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can
lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good." 19
Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,20 "when a person unjustly retains a
benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment
is a recognized public policy of the State, for Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes
into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him." It is well to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human
Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as
golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway
and dominance of justice."21
There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and materials for the project in
compliance with his obligations under the subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was
Gonzalo as the contractor who received the payment for his contract with the DPWH as well as the
10% retention fee that should have been paid to Tarnate pursuant to the deed of
assignment.22 Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to Tarnate the stipulated
10% retention fee that would have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the project,
Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from
recovering because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The prevention of unjust
enrichment called for the exception to apply in Tarnate’s favor. Consequently, the RTC and the CA
properly adjudged Gonzalo liable to pay Tarnate the equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee
(i.e., P233,526.13).
Gonzalo sought to justify his refusal to turn over the P233,526.13 to Tarnate by insisting that he
(Gonzalo) had a debt of P200,000.00 to Congressman Victor Dominguez; that his payment of the 10%
retention fee to Tarnate was conditioned on Tarnate paying that debt to Congressman Dominguez; and
that he refused to give the 10% retention fee to Tarnate because Tarnate did not pay to Congressman
Dominguez.23 His justification was unpersuasive, however, because, firstly, Gonzalo presented no
proof of the debt to Congressman Dominguez; secondly, he did not competently establish the
agreement on the condition that supposedly bound Tarnate to pay to Congressman Dominguez; 24 and,
thirdly, burdening Tarnate with Gonzalo’s personal debt to Congressman Dominguez to be paid first
by Tarnate would constitute another case of unjust enrichment.
The Court regards the grant of moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to Tarnate to be
inappropriate. We have ruled that no damages may be recovered under a void contract, which, being
nonexistent, produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. 25 It is notable, too, that the RTC
and the CA did not spell out the sufficient factual and legal justifications for such damages to be
granted.
126
 6
Lastly, the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil Code command Gonzalo to make a full reparation Id. at 1-4.
or compensation to Tarnate. The illegality of their contract should not be allowed to deprive Tarnate
7
from being fully compensated through the imposition of legal interest. Towards that end, interest of Id. at 50-52.
6% per annum reckoned from September 13, 1999, the time of the judicial demand by Tarnate, is 8
imposed on the amount of P233,526.13. Not to afford this relief will make a travesty of the justice to Id. at 110-120.
which Tarnate was entitled for having suffered too long from Gonzalo’s unjust enrichment. 9
Rollo, pp. 16-34; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in by
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on February 18, 2003, but DELETE the Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes (later Presiding Justice and a Member of the Court, but already
awards of moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; IMPOSE legal interest of 6% per retired) and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam (retired/deceased).
annum on the principal oLP233,526.13 reckoned from September 13, 1999; and DIRECT the 10
petitioner to pay the costs of suit. Id. at 36.
11
SO ORDERED. Id. at 8-12.
12
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Rollo, p. 30.
Associate Justice 13
Nool v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116635, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 149, 157.
WE CONCUR: 14
Rollo, p. 31-32.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 15
TSN, July 24, 2000, pp. 23-24.
Chief Justice
16
Records, p. 26.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. 17
CASTRO Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827, 831 (1953).
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
18
Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 515.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES 19
Associate Justice Avon Cosmetics, Incorporated v. Luna, G.R. No. 153674, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 376, 393-
394.
CERTIFICATION 20
G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above 21
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion Id. at 96.
of the Court's Division. 22
TSN, August 28, 2000, pp. 44, 64, 70, and 71.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO 23
Chief Justice Id. at 46-50.
24
Id. at 51-54.
25
Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., supra note 20, at 94-95; Menchavez v. Teves, Jr., G.R. No. 153201,
Footnotes January 26, 2005, 449 SCRA 380, 398-399.

1
Records, pp. 88-90.
2
Id. at 26-28.
3
Id. at 5-6.
4
Id. at 8.
5
Id. at 9-10.

127
 Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any
condition.6Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in the commencement ceremonies
held on March 30, 2003.

After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS. In the course of
their conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of RIS in their
personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant headmaster.

Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him that Tan was planning to
sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching:

Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], that’s dangerous.

Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said "talking to him was dangerous."

Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against petitioner on August 21, 2003.

On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 607 under the following Information:

That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within
Republic of the Philippines
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate intent of
SUPREME COURT
bringing ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit, dishonor, disrepute and contempt, did then and
Manila
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter the following words to Ms. Bernice C.
FIRST DIVISION Ching:

G.R. No. 180832 July 23, 2008 "OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL TALKING TO [TAN], THAT’S
DANGEROUS."
JEROME CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs. and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
RESOLUTION
Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
CORONA, J.:
The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan as a "dangerous person."
This petition for review on certiorari1 emanated from the complaint for grave oral defamation2 filed Ching testified that petitioner warned her that talking to Tan was dangerous. Tan, on the other hand,
by Albert P. Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro. testified that petitioner’s statement shocked him as it portrayed him as "someone capable of
committing undesirable acts." He added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint
The facts follow. he filed against RIS in the Dep-Ed.

On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan’s son, Justin Albert (then
a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary probation. 3 Upon Tan’s request, RIS
reconsidered its decision but imposed "non-appealable" conditions such as excluding Justin Albert
from participating in the graduation ceremonies.
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for violation of the Manual
of Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article 19 of the Civil Code4 against
RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad faith and evident
premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that RIS’ code violation point system allowed
the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law). The system
therefore violated due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it.5
For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latter’s complaint
against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing with Ching (whom he considered as a
close acquaintance) on the telephone a few days after RIS’ 2003 commencement exercises, petitioner
asserted that he never said or insinuated that Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous. On cross-
examination, however, he did not categorically deny the veracity of Ching’s statement.
The MeTC found that Ching’s statements in her affidavit and in open court were consistent and that
she did not have any motive to fabricate a false statement. Petitioner, on the other hand, harbored
personal resentment, aversion and ill-will against Tan since the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his
son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that

128
he uttered the statement with the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and professional
reputation.
In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
grave oral defamation:8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused, Jerome Castro GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation, sentencing him therefore, in accordance to
Article 358(1) of the Revised Penal Code and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor as minimum to 4 months and 1 day
of arresto mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC. However, in
view of the animosity between the parties, it found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. But
because Tan filed his complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on
August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the RTC ruled that prescription had already
set in; it therefore acquitted petitioner on that ground. 9
On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the RTC.10 It contended that the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it downgraded petitioner’s offense to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly
misappreciated the antecedents which provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory statement
against Tan.
The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it misapprehended the totality
of the circumstances and found petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated
the MeTC decision.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.12 Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari
inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC misappreciated the evidence
presented by the parties) but failed to prove that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
double jeopardy attached when the RTC acquitted him.
We grant the petition.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.13 This constitutional
mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or in information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
xxx xxx xxx
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court
(3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted
or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.14 Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable
on the ground of double jeopardy.15
The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held
in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,16 when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said
judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and prove its case.17
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double
jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC’s finding on the nature of petitioner’s statement, that
is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG premised its allegation of grave
abuse of discretion on the RTC’s "erroneous" evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by
the parties.1awph!1
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving misappreciation of
evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a petition for certiorari, cannot review the public
respondent’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings.18 Errors of judgment cannot be raised in
a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion).19
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition
and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC.20 We therefore reinstate the RTC decision
so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code21 :
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal
offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such,
he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. 22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007 decision and December 5,
2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The November 20, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212
is REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome Castro is ACQUITTED of slight oral defamation as defined
and penalized in Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
No pronouncement as to costs.
129
 8
SO ORDERED. Decision penned by Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres. Rollo, pp. 214-221.
9
RENATO C. CORONA Decision penned by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali of the RTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212.
Associate Justice Dated November 20, 2006. Id., pp. 438-448.
10
WE CONCUR: Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98649.
11
REYNATO S. PUNO Decision penned by Associate Justice Remedio A. Salazar-Fernandez and concurred by Associate
Chief Justice Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired) of the Seventh Division of the
Chairperson Court of Appeals. Dated August 29, 2007. Rollo, pp. 56-63.
12
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Resolution dated December 5, 2007. Id., p. 65.
Associate Justice Associate Justice 13
Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 21.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO 14
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Veridiano, 427 Phil. 795, 803 (2001).
Associate Justice
15
People v. Velasco, 394 Phil. 517, 554-556 (2000).
CERTIFICATION
16
228 Phil. 42 (1986).
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion 17
Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 11, 24 (2002).
of the Court’s Division.
18
Id.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice 19
Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17 at 23.
20
See People v. Velasco, supra note 15 at 560-561.
21
This action would have been a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict, subject to Article
1146 of the Civil Code.
Footnotes
22
1
Civil Code, Art. 19, supra note 4.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Revised Penal Code, Art. 358 provides:

Article 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period
toprision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the
penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
3
Letter of RIS directress Nellie Aquino-Ong to Mr. and Mrs. Albert Tan. Rollo, p. 301. According to
RIS, Justin Albert accumulated 34 code violations including public display of affection and conduct
unbecoming of a gentleman. The maximum number of code violation was 25.
4
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
5
Dep-Ed decision penned by Corazon D. Santiago, Director IV. Dated July 28, 2003. Rollo, pp. 321-
331.
6
Letter of Dep-Ed Director IV Corazon D. Santiago. Id., p. 141.
7
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 93541.

130
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD dIVISION

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as
private respondents),respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then the President
of the West Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
for failure to graduate a student with honors.

The facts are not disputed.

An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the West Visayas
College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans
from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act
of extending loans was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the
School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the
club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus, appealed
to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.

The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:

Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of this Office disclosed
the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive
student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it
passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for financial
131
aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said resolution and as treasurer of the
Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and members of the Club upon proper application
duly approved by the majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the
report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office conducted an investigation
on the matter and having been convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and
members of the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's
order or decision, it is contended that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the
Club is necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the
Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was
passed based on the Constitution and By-Laws- is without any force and effect and the treasurer,
Violeta Delmo, who extended loans to some officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are
illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed guilty of misappropriating the
funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President,
Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution
and By-Laws in a meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution
and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No. 2, which
resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some officers and members of the Club,
that the Club honestly believed that its Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the
superintendent because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the Club
that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the Superintendent; the officers of
the Club have been inducted to office on October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had
been likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the Superintendent in
penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and members thereof by dropping them from
membership therein. However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith,
in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of the Student
partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in
need of financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved by the Club adviser,
Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and
extension of the Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and members of the
Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws
of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club president that he would
do so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the
performance of his duties as such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of
the questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for any award or citation
from this school or any organization in this school." Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent
full scholar of the school and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question
would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in
this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs that appellant Violeta.
M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived
of any award, citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-
30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the records of
the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the telegram
as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records
plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to furnish Delmo
with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the
latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director
ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible by this time to include
Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain
student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a reconsideration of
the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors.
The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic
records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for damages against
the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended
and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the spouses
Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per investigation of Violeta
Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the
defendant who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the
Club was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not
approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and
allow the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his own act that the
students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was
the assurance of Mr. Jemm Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting
as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he kaew as early as April
27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he
kept Id information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of Director Bernardino directed
him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished reading
the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn,
Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he has not finished
reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion
which directed that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if
otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he know the last
paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and prejudice. When his
action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss
Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by
Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by
Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo
132
copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision, since he said
he mailed back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director
Bernardino, informing the latter that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record.
Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case, because graduation
day was only four days ahead? An examination of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he
had been sending ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the
defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told
her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the commencement be announced or indicated.
But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own
testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was
overturned by Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that she
did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied). Despite the telegram of
Director Bernardino which the defendant received hours before the commencement executory on May
3-4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he would be
embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r
Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim And certainly, not the
least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of
mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous arrogance,
oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and
instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her parents for
moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00
and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under
Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be
disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case
of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss Delmo by
stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting
this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have
done so considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back
with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages.
Moreover, the petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and
inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not
without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the decision, he could have
used his discretion and plain common sense by informing her about it or he could have directed the
inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or announced it during the
commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours before the
commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by refusing to give the honors due
Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in
complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo, father of Miss
Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme
disappointment and humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due regard to the rights
of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful
directive of his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity.
. . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case of Prudenciado
v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example
or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in addition to what they are already
entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral
damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
133
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8261 March 11, 2015
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FEDERICO S. TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL
F. VICTORIO, JR., and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 8725
JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN and ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CONSTANTE P. CALUYA, JR. and ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and Robert C. Torres seek
the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty.
Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying
a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice ofadverse claim
and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Antecedents
Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a civil action
they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-290546 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598). They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on
TCT No. N-290546 their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens. 1 Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C. No. 8261), 2 the
complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres,
they inherited upon the deaths of their parents a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that
TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-290546 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and Josefina Ricafort;4 and that,
accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No.
N-290546.
It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and
the proceeds thereof would be equally divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim
would be withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant
to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated
February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the
defendants’ lack of objection thereto and the defendants’ willingness to similarly withdraw their
counterclaim.7
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order dated May 16,
2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office; that they found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that
new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-
request appearing to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse
claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the annotation of the
decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in
Quezon City, granting the complainants’ Motion to Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter
request dated June 30, 2008 addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed
that it was defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter.
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta with the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing the unlawful cancellation of
their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-
3828-9, respectively. The LRA set Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed
the parties to submit their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or beforesuch
scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. 4707 was already
resolved, or remained pending at the LRA.
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for
his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case. They
submitted that the cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without
a court order specifically allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy
between Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their positions
as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Registrar, and Atty.
Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby
prejudiced.
On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified complaint. 11 Atty.
Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 2009 12 that complainant Robert Torres had
been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598, which included the mediation
process; that the complainants, after having aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable
settlement, could not now claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same
way that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did not commit
any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties as the counsel for the
complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not be held responsible for their
representation in other proceedings, such as that before the LRA, which required a separate
engagement; and that the only payment he had received from the complainants were those for his
appearance fees of P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he
had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that although he had notarized the letter
request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about
how said letter-request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present complaint
134
was the second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him with no other motive except to
harass and intimidate him.
Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty. Caluya, Jr., another
Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority of the annotations that resulted in the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that
the cancellation of the annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the
exercise of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was performed
in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was impleaded in Civil Case No.
Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting any involvement in the proceedings in the
case.
Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
As the result of Atty. Quilala’s allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had been Atty.
Caluya, Jr.’s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the complainants filed another sworn
disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010 alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature
of Atty. Cunanan.16 This disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on
consolidated with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and rested on
similar allegations against the respondents.
Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and to reiterate the
arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty. Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted
Atty. Quilala’s Comment.19
Ruling
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct
committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same Code not to engage
in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Failure to observe these tenets of the
Code of Professional Responsibility exposes the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, viz.:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants’ allegations of the respondents’ acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any
censurable conduct against them.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) enumerates the general
duties of the Register of Deeds, as follows:
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. – x x x
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the requisites for
registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the proper documentary science stamps and
that the same are properly canceled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the present or of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason
therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this
Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely ministerial act
or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a merely
ministerial act of the Register of Deeds, explaining:
x x x [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the duty of a Register
of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his concern to see whether the
documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal requirements for such
documents.
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by Atty. Quilala,
Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim
and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated
May 16, 2008 or the letter-request dated June 30,2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was
not for them to determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration was
limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request
and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient in law and to be in conformity with existing
requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary
delay.24
Should they be aggrieved by said respondents’ performance of duty, the complainants were not bereft
of any remedy because they could challenge the performance of duty by bringing the matter by way
of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section 117 25 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as
enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a court
of competent jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document
registered by the Register of Deeds.
The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having conspired with each
other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598 would enter into the amicable settlement,
and then to cause the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated
on TCT No. N-290546. The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their
cause since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008. The complainants’ charges are
devoid of substance.
Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish conspiracy because
conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending the commission of an act, it is
135
nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established by clear and convincing evidence. 27 The SO ORDERED.
complainants failed in this regard. Outside of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
discharge of the annotations, they presented no evidence to support their allegation of conspiracy. On Associate Justice
the contrary, the records indicated their own active participation in arriving at the amicable settlement
with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the WE CONCUR:
amicable settlement that they had themselves entered into.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated and participated in the Chief Justice
settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was actually their obligation as
lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.: TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
CASTRO
Associate Justice
RULE 1.04 – A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit Associate Justice
of a fair settlement.1âwphi1
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the complainants and the Associate Justice
defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
Footnotes
Anent the complainants’ charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are applicable, to wit: 1
Rollo, A.C. No. 8261, p. 7.

CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. 2
Id. at 1-4.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in 3
Id. at 5. 4
Id. at 6.
connection therewith shall render him liable.
5
Id. at 24-25.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. 6
Id. at 8-9.
7
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as their counsel in Id. at 10.
Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel. With Atty. Victorio, Jr.
8
assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of Id. at 7.
the sale of the property in litis, without any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal 9
fees. The complainants did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Id.
Atty. Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty. Victorio, Jr. was 10
not liable for abandonment. Id. at 12.
11
Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other matters subsequent to Id. at 13.
the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless otherwise expressly stipulated between them at 12
Id. at 17-18.
any time during the engagement, the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s
legal representation was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law 13
Id. at 14-15.
Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to the clients; hence,
the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement between the attorney and the client. 14
Id. at 28-30.
Atty. Victorio, Jr.’s alleged failure to respond to the complainants’ calls or visits, or to provide them
with his whereabouts to enable them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement 15
Id. at 52.
in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that he
16
continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after the termination of Civil Case Rollo, A.C. No. 8725, pp. 1-3.
No. Q-07-59598.
17
Rollo, A.C. No. 8261, p. 53.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. Federico S.
18
Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victoria, Jr., Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Rollo, A.C. No. 8725, pp. 14-18.
Constante P. Caluya, Jr. 19
Id. at 49-50.

136
20
Tan, Jr. v. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 527, 532; Roa v. Moreno, A.C. No.
8382, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 693, 699.
ROMERO, J.:
21
See Register of Deeds, Pasig, Rizal v. Heirs of Hi Caiji,99 Phil 25, 30 (1956); Ledesma v. Villaseñor,
G.R. No. L-18725, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 494, 496. In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
22
Mallari v. Government Service Insurance System, et al., G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010, 611 Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
SCRA 32, 49-50; Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273, the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
277. secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution
of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General
23
G.R. No. L-17956, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 136, 141. to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense
24
charged.
Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1992 Revised Edition, p.387.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
25
Section 117. Procedure. – When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General,
be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the
to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
Register of Deeds. arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
xxxx Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
The Commissioner of Land Registration, considering the consulta and the records certified to him die before final judgment is rendered.
after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made. His resolution or ruling in consultas shall be conclusive and binding upon We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
all Registers of Deeds, provided, that the party in interest who disagrees with the final resolution, extinguish his civil liability?
ruling or order of the Commissioner relative to consultas may appeal to the Court of Appeals within
the period and in manner provided in Republic Act No. 5434. (Bold emphasis supplied) In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
26
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
Supra note 23. responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
27
People v. Dagani, G.R. No. 153875, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 64, 79. It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
28
Bautista v. Seraph Management Group, Inc., G.R. No. 174039, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 141, 145. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Republic of the Philippines Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
SUPREME COURT
Manila 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
EN BANC
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994 The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or,
vs. is it a judgment which is final and executory?
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
part, recites:
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

137
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo
cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme"
under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado
por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when
judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal."
Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple
reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles
72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive
conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the
right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity,
cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2
O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure,
1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based
solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability
is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the
criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability
— does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-
R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose,
et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v.Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the
accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there
is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes'
Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years
after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability
under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with
estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused
138
had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It
therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal
liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case
as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that
the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court
of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the
pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent
of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim
thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of
such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal,
passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for
the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8,
1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because
his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him
to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the
absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People
and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court
of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87
of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him
by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.
Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although
he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego
insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising
from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses
of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the
civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that
a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal
of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and
no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal
act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence
and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of
the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
139
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims
for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with
the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely
a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on
the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does
not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to pinpoint the
statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the
court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the
intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death
of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil
liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and
pronounced the same as thesource of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not
applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal
action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the
recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by
holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him
by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which,
relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication
therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already
passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the
Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment
of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in
the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority
nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and
as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the
latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule
3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for
the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear
that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there
could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction
of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall
be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against
140
the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
Court: apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against
the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein,
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished
his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for SO ORDERED.
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must
be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract,
express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal Cruz, J., is on leave.
obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil #Footnotes
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the 3 supra.
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex 4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.
delicto in senso strictiore."
5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code 6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission: 7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.

a) Law 20 8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.

b) Contracts 9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
c) Quasi-contracts dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.

d) . . . 10 Supra.

e) Quasi-delicts 11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357,
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of November 27, 1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220;
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either People v. Pancho, No. L-32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-67966,
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v. Asibar,
upon which the same is based as explained above. No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102
SCRA 558; and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its 12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal

141
. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without
the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is without
having to prove the criminal liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice
to the offended party is proven by preponderance of evidence.
13 Supra, p. 134.
18 Ibid.
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability may still be pursued in a separate
civil action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, except when by
statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance
enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code." Justice Regalado stressed that:

14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had
been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.
16 Sec. 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender where it also
arises simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of a contract, as in Torrijos; or
from law, as stated in Torrijos and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to
the Civil Code; or from a quasi-contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil
action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it would be unfair and inequitable to deprive
the victim of his property or recovery of damages therefor, as would have been the fate of the second
vendee in Torrijos or the provincial government in Sendaydiego."
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related provisions of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.
21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when
there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment
of the debt by the debtor.
22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of
the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution
starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information,
the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for
trial. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since the damages sought, as a result of Manila
the felony committed amounts to injury to person or property, real or personal, the civil liability to be
recovered must be claimed against the executor/administrator and not against the estate. THIRD DIVISION

142
G.R. No. 155223 April 4, 2007
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, MARIE F. FUJITA, Petitioner,
vs.
FLORA SAN DIEGO-SISON, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Bobie Rose V. Frias represented by her
Attorney-in-fact, Marie Regine F. Fujita (petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated June 18,
2002 and the Resolution2 dated September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
52839.
Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired from Island Masters Realty and Development
Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated Nov. 16, 1990. 3 The property is covered by
TCT No. 168173 of the Register of Deeds of Makati in the name of IMRDC.4
On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST PARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison (respondent),
as the SECOND PARTY, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement5 over the property with the
following terms:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION PESOS
(P3,000,000.00) receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the FIRST PARTY from the SECOND
PARTY, the parties have agreed as follows:
1. That the SECOND PARTY has a period of Six (6) months from the date of the execution of this
contract within which to notify the FIRST PARTY of her intention to purchase the aforementioned
parcel of land together within (sic) the improvements thereon at the price of SIX MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P6,400,000.00). Upon notice to the FIRST PARTY of the
SECOND PARTY’s intention to purchase the same, the latter has a period of another six months
within which to pay the remaining balance of P3.4 million.
2. That prior to the six months period given to the SECOND PARTY within which to decide whether
or not to purchase the above-mentioned property, the FIRST PARTY may still offer the said property
to other persons who may be interested to buy the same provided that the amount of P3,000,000.00
given to the FIRST PARTY BY THE SECOND PARTY shall be paid to the latter including interest
based on prevailing compounded bank interest plus the amount of the sale in excess of P7,000,000.00
should the property be sold at a price more than P7 million.
3. That in case the FIRST PARTY has no other buyer within the first six months from the execution
of this contract, no interest shall be charged by the SECOND PARTY on the P3 million however, in
the event that on the sixth month the SECOND PARTY would decide not to purchase the
aforementioned property, the FIRST PARTY has a period of another six months within which to pay
the sum of P3 million pesos provided that the said amount shall earn compounded bank interest for
the last six months only. Under this circumstance, the amount of P3 million given by the SECOND
PARTY shall be treated as [a] loan and the property shall be considered as the security for the mortgage
which can be enforced in accordance with law.
x x x x.6
Petitioner received from respondent two million pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated
check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered said check stale. 7 Petitioner then gave
respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property and notified petitioner through a letter 8 dated March
20, 1991, which petitioner received only on June 11, 1991, 9 reminding petitioner of their agreement
that the amount of two million pesos which petitioner received from respondent should be considered
as a loan payable within six months. Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent the amount of
two million pesos.
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint 10 for
sum of money with preliminary attachment against petitioner. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-65367 and raffled to Branch 30. Respondent alleged the foregoing facts and in addition thereto
averred that petitioner tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report 11 of the
loss of her owner’s copy of TCT No. 168173 to the Tagig Police Station on June 3, 1991, executing
an affidavit of loss and by filing a petition12 for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of said
title with the RTC of Makati, Branch 142; that the petition was granted in an Order13 dated August 31,
1991; that said Order was subsequently set aside in an Order dated April 10, 1992 14where the RTC
Makati granted respondent’s petition for relief from judgment due to the fact that respondent is in
possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173, and ordered the provincial public
prosecutor to conduct an investigation of petitioner for perjury and false testimony. Respondent prayed
for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and payment of two million pesos with
interest at 36% per annum from December 7, 1991, P100,000.00 moral, corrective and exemplary
damages and P200,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
In an Order dated April 6, 1993, the Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a writ of preliminary
attachment upon the filing of a bond in the amount of two million pesos. 15
Petitioner filed an Amended Answer16 alleging that the Memorandum of Agreement was conceived
and arranged by her lawyer, Atty. Carmelita Lozada, who is also respondent’s lawyer; that she was
asked to sign the agreement without being given the chance to read the same; that the title to the
property and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC were entrusted to Atty. Lozada for
safekeeping and were never turned over to respondent as there was no consummated sale yet; that out
of the two million pesos cash paid, Atty. Lozada took the one million pesos which has not been
returned, thus petitioner had filed a civil case against her; that she was never informed of respondent’s
decision not to purchase the property within the six month period fixed in the agreement; that when
she demanded the return of TCT No. 168173 and the Deed of Sale between her and the IMRDC from
Atty. Lozada, the latter gave her these documents in a brown envelope on May 5, 1991 which her
secretary placed in her attache case; that the envelope together with her other personal things were lost
when her car was forcibly opened the following day; that she sought the help of Atty. Lozada who
advised her to secure a police report, to execute an affidavit of loss and to get the services of another
lawyer to file a petition for the issuance of an owner’s duplicate copy; that the petition for the issuance
of a new owner’s duplicate copy was filed on her behalf without her knowledge and neither did she
sign the petition nor testify in court as falsely claimed for she was abroad; that she was a victim of the
manipulations of Atty. Lozada and respondent as shown by the filing of criminal charges for perjury
and false testimony against her; that no interest could be due as there was no valid mortgage over the
property as the principal obligation is vitiated with fraud and deception. She prayed for the dismissal
of the complaint, counter-claim for damages and attorney’s fees.
Trial on the merits ensued. On January 31, 1996, the RTC issued a decision, 17 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
143
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby RENDERED:
1) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P2 Million plus interest thereon at the rate of thirty
two (32%) per cent per annum beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid.
2) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P70,000.00 representing premiums paid by plaintiff
on the attachment bond with legal interest thereon counted from the date of this decision until fully
paid.
3) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral, corrective and
exemplary damages.
4) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 plus cost of litigation.18
The RTC found that petitioner was under obligation to pay respondent the amount of two million pesos
with compounded interest pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement; that the fraudulent scheme
employed by petitioner to deprive respondent of her only security to her loaned money when petitioner
executed an affidavit of loss and instituted a petition for the issuance of an owner’s duplicate title
knowing the same was in respondent’s possession, entitled respondent to moral damages; and that
petitioner’s bare denial cannot be accorded credence because her testimony and that of her witness did
not appear to be credible.
The RTC further found that petitioner admitted that she received from respondent the two million
pesos in cash but the fact that petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada was without
respondent’s knowledge thus it is not binding on respondent; that respondent had also proven that in
1993, she initially paid the sum ofP30,000.00 as premium for the issuance of the attachment
bond, P20,000.00 for its renewal in 1994, andP20,000.00 for the renewal in 1995, thus plaintiff should
be reimbursed considering that she was compelled to go to court and ask for a writ of preliminary
attachment to protect her rights under the agreement.
Petitioner filed her appeal with the CA. In a Decision dated June 18, 2002, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision with modification, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in the sense that the
rate of interest is reduced from 32% to 25% per annum, effective June 7, 1991 until fully paid.19
The CA found that: petitioner gave the one million pesos to Atty. Lozada partly as her commission
and partly as a loan; respondent did not replace the mistakenly dated check of one million pesos
because she had decided not to buy the property and petitioner knew of her decision as early as April
1991; the award of moral damages was warranted since even granting petitioner had no hand in the
filing of the petition for the issuance of an owner’s copy, she executed an affidavit of loss of TCT No.
168173 when she knew all along that said title was in respondent’s possession; petitioner’s claim that
she thought the title was lost when the brown envelope given to her by Atty. Lozada was stolen from
her car was hollow; that such deceitful conduct caused respondent serious anxiety and emotional
distress.
The CA concluded that there was no basis for petitioner to say that the interest should be charged for
six months only and no more; that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan; that interest
should commence on June 7, 199120 with compounded bank interest prevailing at the time the two
million was considered as a loan which was in June 1991; that the bank interest rate for loans secured
by a real estate mortgage in 1991 ranged from 25% to 32% per annum as certified to by Prudential
Bank,21 that in fairness to petitioner, the rate to be charged should be 25% only.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 11,
2002.
Hence the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner raising the following issues:
(A) WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPOUNDED BANK INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO
SIX (6) MONTHS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.
(B) WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES.
(C) WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF CORRECTIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES IS PROPER EVEN IF NOT MENTIONED IN THE TEXT OF THE
DECISION.22
Petitioner contends that the interest, whether at 32% per annum awarded by the trial court or at 25%
per annum as modified by the CA which should run from June 7, 1991 until fully paid, is contrary to
the parties’ Memorandum of Agreement; that the agreement provides that if respondent would decide
not to purchase the property, petitioner has the period of another six months to pay the loan with
compounded bank interest for the last six months only; that the CA’s ruling that a loan always bears
interest otherwise it is not a loan is contrary to Art. 1956 of the New Civil Code which provides that
no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
We are not persuaded.
While the CA’s conclusion, that a loan always bears interest otherwise it is not a loan, is flawed since
a simple loan may be gratuitous or with a stipulation to pay interest,23 we find no error committed by
the CA in awarding a 25% interest per annum on the two-million peso loan even beyond the second
six months stipulated period.
The Memorandum of Agreement executed between the petitioner and respondent on December 7,
1990 is the law between the parties. In resolving an issue based upon a contract, we must first examine
the contract itself, especially the provisions thereof which are relevant to the controversy. 24 The
general rule is that if the terms of an agreement are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.25 It is further required that the
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.26
In this case, the phrase "for the last six months only" should be taken in the context of the entire
agreement. We agree with and adopt the CA’s interpretation of the phrase in this wise:
Their agreement speaks of two (2) periods of six months each. The first six-month period was given
to plaintiff-appellee (respondent) to make up her mind whether or not to purchase defendant-
appellant’s (petitioner's) property. The second six-month period was given to defendant-appellant to
pay the P2 million loan in the event that plaintiff-appellee decided not to buy the subject property in
which case interest will be charged "for the last six months only", referring to the second six-month
period. This means that no interest will be charged for the first six-month period while appellee was
making up her mind whether to buy the property, but only for the second period of six months after
appellee had decided not to buy the property. This is the meaning of the phrase "for the last six months
only". Certainly, there is nothing in their agreement that suggests that interest will be charged for six
months only even if it takes defendant-appellant an eternity to pay the loan.27
The agreement that the amount given shall bear compounded bank interest for the last six months
only, i.e., referring to the second six-month period, does not mean that interest will no longer be
144
charged after the second six-month period since such stipulation was made on the logical and
reasonable expectation that such amount would be paid within the date stipulated. Considering that
petitioner failed to pay the amount given which under the Memorandum of Agreement shall be
considered as a loan, the monetary interest for the last six months continued to accrue until actual
payment of the loaned amount.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and thus, until the
principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor
continues to use such principal amount.28 It has been held that for a debtor to continue in possession
of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after maturity of the loan without payment
of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense
of the creditor.29
Petitioner and respondent stipulated that the loaned amount shall earn compounded bank interests, and
per the certification issued by Prudential Bank, the interest rate for loans in 1991 ranged from 25% to
32% per annum. The CA reduced the interest rate to 25% instead of the 32% awarded by the trial court
which petitioner no longer assailed.1awphi1.nét
In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp.,30 we upheld the validity of a 21% per annum interest on
a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,31 we sustained the agreement of the parties to a
24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the interest rate of 25% per annum awarded
by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and reasonable.
Petitioner next claims that moral damages were awarded on the erroneous finding that she used a
fraudulent scheme to deprive respondent of her security for the loan; that such finding is baseless since
petitioner was acquitted in the case for perjury and false testimony filed by respondent against her.
We are not persuaded.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. 32
While petitioner was acquitted in the false testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent against her,
those actions are entirely distinct from the collection of sum of money with damages filed by
respondent against petitioner.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the CA that petitioner’s act of trying to deprive
respondent of the security of her loan by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a
petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to
moral damages.1a\^/phi1.net Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of
contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.33
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in the event that respondent opts not to buy the
property, the money given by respondent to petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the property shall
be considered as the security for the mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that after they executed
the agreement on December 7, 1990, petitioner gave her the owner’s copy of the title to the property,
the Deed of Sale between petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of occupancy, and the certificate of
the Secretary of the IMRDC who signed the Deed of Sale.34 However, notwithstanding that all those
documents were in respondent’s possession, petitioner executed an affidavit of loss that the owner’s
copy of the title and the Deed of Sale were lost.
Although petitioner testified that her execution of the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she was
of the belief that since she had demanded from Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she thought that
the brown envelope with markings which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991 already contained
the title and the Deed of Sale as those documents were in the same brown envelope which she gave to
Atty. Lozada prior to the transaction with respondent. 35 Such statement remained a bare statement. It
was not proven at all since Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to corroborate her claim. In fact, even
petitioner’s own witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not able to establish petitioner's claim that
the title was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's testimony that after the brown envelope
was given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her and she placed it in petitioner’s attaché case36 and
did not bother to look at the envelope. 37
It is clear therefrom that petitioner’s execution of the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing of
the petition with the RTC for the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
Petitioner’s actuation would have deprived respondent of the security for her loan were it not for
respondent’s timely filing of a petition for relief whereby the RTC set aside its previous order granting
the issuance of new title. Thus, the award of moral damages is in order.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages is
proper.38Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of example or correction for the
public good.39 The RTC awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. While
the award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of
awarding said damages,40 no error has been committed by CA. There is no question that respondent is
entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in awarding attorney’s fees because the trial court’s decision did
not explain the findings of facts and law to justify the award of attorney’s fees as the same was
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the RTC decision.
We agree.
Article 220841 of the New Civil Code enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and, in
all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be granted.42 Attorney's fees as
part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They
are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be
placed on the right to litigate.43 The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general
rule. As such, it is necessary for the trial court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees cannot be
mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision. 44 They must be clearly explained and
justified by the trial court in the body of its decision. On appeal, the CA is precluded from
supplementing the bases for awarding attorney’s fees when the trial court failed to discuss in its
Decision the reasons for awarding the same. Consequently, the award of attorney's fees should be
deleted.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision dated June 18, 2002 and the Resolution
dated September 11, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52839 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
145
 9
WE CONCUR: Exhibit "D-1", folder of exhibits.
10
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Records, pp. 3-8.
Associate Justice
11
Chairperson Id. at 18, Annex "E".
12
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Id. at 20-22; Docketed as LRC Case No. M-2282; Annex "G".
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice 13
Id. at 23-24; Penned by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.; Annex "H".
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 14
Id. at 25-27; Annex "I".
Associate Justice
15
Id. at 28. Per Judge Rosalio G. dela Rosa.
ATTESTATION
16
Id. at 130-141.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. 17
Id. at 286-292; Branch 30, Penned by Judge Senecio O. Ortile.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO 18
Id. at 292.
Associate Justice
19
Chairperson, Third Division CA rollo, p. 165.
20
CERTIFICATION The date when the second six-month period commences under the Memorandum of Agreement
dated December 7, 1990.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
21
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation Exhibit "L", folder of exhibits.
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
22
Rollo, p. 14.
REYNATO S. PUNO
23
Chief Justice Civil Code, Article 1933.
24
Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. Pampanga III Electric Cooperative, Inc., G.R. No. 152569,
May 31, 2004, 430 SCRA 389, 396.
25
Footnotes Civil Code, Article 1370.
26
1
CA rollo, pp. 134-144; Penned by Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (retired), concurred in by Justices Civil Code, Article 1374.
B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz (retired) and Regalado E. Maambong. 27
CA rollo, p. 164-165.
2
Id. at 164-165. 28
State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90676, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 390,
3
Records, pp. 15-16. Exhibit "C". 398.
29
4
Id. at 13-14; Exhibit "B". State Investment House, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28, at 399.
30
5
Id. at 9-11; Exhibit "A". 371 Phil. 533, 544 (1999).
31
6
Id. at 9-10. G.R. Nos. L-82282-83, November 24, 1988, 167 SCRA 815, 830.
32
7
Respondent did not correct or replace the post-dated check. Records also do not show that petitioner Gorospe v. Nolasco, 114 Phil. 614, 618 (1962).
demanded its correction or replacement. 33
Abando v. Lozada, G.R. No. 82564, October 13, 1989, 178 SCRA 509, 516, citing Board
8
Id. at 17, Annex "D". of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987, 1007.
34
TSN, July 17, 1995, p. 5.
146
35
TSN, August 21, 1995, pp. 7-10.
36
TSN, October 2, 1995, p. 10.
37
Id. at 16.
38
Bert Osmeña & Associates, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 205 Phil. 328, 334 (1983); Kapoe v. Masa, 219
Phil. 204, 208 (1985).
39
Civil Code, Article 2229.
40
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 50504-05, August 13, 1990, 188 SCRA 461,
474.
41
ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than
judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or
to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. Manila

42
Citibank, N.A. v. Cabamongan, G.R. No. 146918, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 517, 535-536. FIRST DIVISION

43
Id. citing Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose
Cooperative, Inc. 425 Phil. 511, 525 (2002); Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil.
707, 714 (1999). G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

44
Samatra v. Vda. de Pariñas, 431 Phil. 255, 267 (2002); Development Bank of the Philippines v. REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental,
Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 801, 810 (1996). HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA,
Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO,
ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,

147
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN
and DELIA ESTRELLANES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17 February 1992 and its orders
dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines
versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
The present controversy arose from the following antecedents:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated
as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively,
for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos
of the Department of Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath
of office on 16 February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for review and
recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied the petition
and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives.
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as members
of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives,
docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department
of Local Government, et al."
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No.
16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners thus:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses REYNALDO
V. TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G. FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO,
ERENIETA K. MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS A.
VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, committed as follows:
That during the period from February 1989 to February 1991 and subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused, all public officers, Mayor REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO G.
FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
MENDOZA, MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, ILUMINADO D.
ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA while in the performance of their official functions
and taking advantage of their public positions, with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and
conspiring and confederating with each other did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully cause undue
injury to Sectoral Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes by refusing to pay despite
demand the amount of NINETY FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00)
representing respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits, and such undue
injury continuing to the present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome Binaohan and Delia
Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil Case
No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 2
On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the
designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral
representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code. 3
The trial court expounded thus:
The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663,
along with 7 companion cases of similar import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792, 87935,
88072, and 90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990, ruled that:
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President (or the Secretary of the Department of Local
Government) may appoint members of the local legislative bodies to represent the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors, there must be a determination to be made by the Sanggunian itself that the
said sectors are of sufficient number in the city or municipality to warrant representation after
consultation with associations and persons belonging to the sector concerned.
The Supreme Court further ruled —
For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code even
prescribe the time and manner by which such determination is to be conducted by the Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned has not yet determined that the Industrial and
Agricultural Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of sufficient number to warrant
representation, there will absolutely be no basis for the designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector concerned to warrant
representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law (B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and
persons belonging to the sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a pre-
requisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector are the ones primarily
interested in being represented in the Sanggunian. In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court
considers such prior determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body) as a
condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior determination by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot help but declare the designations of private
defendants as sectoral representatives null and void.
148
This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases, the Supreme Court invariably nullified
the designations where the requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not complied with. Just
to cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of Valenzuela that the sectors concerned are of
sufficient number to warrant representation and there was no consultation whatsoever with the
associations and persons belonging to the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors. Therefore, the
appointment of private respondents Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez are null and void (Romeo
Llanado, et al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et al., G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 36769, where the same is currently pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion
for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Said respondent Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, it
appears, nevertheless, that the private complainants have been rendering services on the basis of their
respective appointments as sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity.
Having rendered such services, the private complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to their
office. Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court shall later decide that the said
appointments of the private complainants are null and void, still the private complainants are entitled
to their salaries and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for the reason that before
such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are considered at least de facto public
officers acting as such on the basis of apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities.
In other words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered in Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld salaries for the services they have
actually rendered as sectoral representatives of the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that
may be rendered by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be determinative of
the innocence or guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of Proceedings in Virtue of Prejudicial
Question filed by the accused through counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution in view of the decision
promulgated by the trial court nullifying the appointments of private respondents but it was, likewise,
denied in an order issued by respondent Sandiganbayan on 19 August 1992 on the justification that
the grounds stated in the said motion were a mere rehash of petitioners' original motion to hold the
case in abeyance. 6 The dispositive portion of its order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the accused which was scheduled today
is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda, Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K.
Mendoza, Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado Estrellanes are, however, hereby ordered to show cause
in writing within ten (10) days from service hereof why they should not be cited for contempt of court
for their failure to appear in court today for arraignment.
In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is to be filed by the counsel for the
defense, set this case for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all dates the trial
to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an order holding consideration of all incidents
pending the issuance of an extended resolution. 8
No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed order dated 13 May 1992, respondent
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The dispositive portion of the order
reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the scheduled hearing today which We
deem to be excusable, reset this case for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the merits on
June 30 and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso Briones. Considering that the
accused come all the way from Himalalud, Negros Oriental, no postponement will be allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent
Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 in spite of the pendency of a prejudicial
issue before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the
proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e., the validity
of the appointments of private respondents and their entitlement to compensation which is already
pending resolution by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that
private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due
process. 10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the legality or validity of private
respondents' designation as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution in CA-G.R. No. 36769
is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted
or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that point is vital to the
eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the prejudicial question is a logical
antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. 12 It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from "the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
149
the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case." 13
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has
two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. 18
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de
factoofficer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de
jure office. 19

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15 WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May
1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA- Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of petitioners in Criminal
G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment Case No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 36769.
and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is
no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged
partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral Hermosisima, Jr., J., took no part.
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the
Footnotes
designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law.
1 Rollo, pp. 36-37.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be any
reason to proceed with the criminal action. 2 Id., at 38-50.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, 3[e]) 3 Id., at 51-60.
due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents'
salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that 4 Id., at 59-61.
said designations were made in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus,
were null and void. Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring 5 Id., at 34-35.
null and void private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with
the provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against 6 Id., at 30.
petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad
faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents' 7 Id., at 31.
claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other
benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will 8 Id., at 82.
ultimately determine whether or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.
9 Id., at 29. 10 Id., at 13-14.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation
for actual services rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, 11 Edgardo C. Paras, Rules of Court Annotated Vol. Three, 1990, citing People v. Aragon, L-5930,
from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by 17 Feb. 1954.
petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were 12 Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1994); Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA 674 (1988); Donato v. Luna,
received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath 160 SCRA 441 (1988); Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980).
of office. 17 Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral
representatives has not been established. 13 Librodo v. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303 (1982): see also Apa, et al. v. Fernandez, et al., G.R.
No. 112381, March 20, 1995.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private
respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public 14 Developments In The Law On Prejudicial Questions, 44 SCRA 208 (1972).
officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.

150
15 Sec. 5, Rule III of Revised Rules of Court; Yap v. Paras, supra, Umali v. IAC, 186 SCRA 680
(1990).
16 Rollo, p. 92.
17 Id., at 52-53.
18 Hector S. De Leon and Hector M. De Leon, Jr., Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 1990
ed., pp. 87-88.
19 Government of the Philippine Islands v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being
the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and
set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran
vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the
Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. 1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2 petitioner filed a petition
for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.4 Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code
against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution
dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information 6 against
them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a
Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied
the foregoing motion in the Order7dated August 31, 1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of
the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went
to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated
August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated
February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based
on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the
civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial
court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case,
the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding
petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on
the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological
incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never
existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was
never before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question
to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause
the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based,
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
151
 2
nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than Annex "E," Rollo, p. 61.
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:
3
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.
. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
4
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as 5
an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' Petition, Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 69-70.
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, 6
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs Petition, Annex "H," Rollo, pp. 80-81.
not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 7
Petition, Annex "I," Rollo, pp. 82-83.
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final 8
Petition, Annex "J," Rollo, pp. 84-100.
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. 9
Petition, Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 33-39.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should 10
Petition, Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 52-54.
his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that
his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. 11
Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25 [1997].
1 14
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova cited in Donato vs. Luna where this Court 12
226 SCRA 572 [1993].
held that:
13
22 SCRA 731 [1968].
. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact
would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be 14
160 SCRA 441 [1988].
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Republic of the Philippines
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to SUPREME COURT
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent Manila
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. THIRD DIVISION
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and MICHAELC. U. DE GUZMAN, Complainants,
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for
vs.
concubinage.
JOSEFINA TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO Undersecretary for Communications, Department of
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Transportation and Communication (DOTC), Respondents.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, JJ., concur. TINGA, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated 21 February 2000 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. SP 49422. The assailed Decision authorized the dismissal of a
civil complaint against respondent Josefina Trinidad-Lichauco (Lichauco), former Undersecretary for
Footnotes Communications of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), on the premise
that the complaint constituted a suit against the State.
1
Amended Complaint, Annex "E," Petition, Rollo, p. 61.
A brief rundown of the relevant facts is in order.

152
Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized corporation, whose President and
Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a
consortium of private telecommunications carriers2 which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the
planned launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch of the
satellite was to be an endeavor of the private sector, and the satellite itself to be owned by the Filipino-
owned consortium (subsequently organized as PASI).3 The consortium was to grant the Philippine
government one (1) transponder free of charge for the government's exclusive use for non-commercial
purpose, as well as the right of first refusal to another one (1) transponder in the Philippine satellite, if
available.4 The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the MOU to secure from
the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slot(s) and frequency assignment(s)
for the Philippine satellite.
PASI itself was organized by the consortium in 1996. The government, together with PASI,
coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union two (2) orbital slots, designated as
161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. On 28 June 1996, PASI wrote
then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government
confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its
satellites, which PASI had designated as the Agila satellites. 5 Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a
letter dated 3 July 1996, confirming "the Philippine Government's assignment of Philippine orbital
slots 161E and 153E to [PASI] for its [Agila] satellites."6
PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded
with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the
availment of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with business partners, and an initial payment
of US$3.5 Million to the French satellite manufacturer. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC
Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the name of
[Michael de Guzman] and sabotage the business of PASI." Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI
culminated allegedly in her offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude
for bidding to other parties sometime in December 1997, despite the prior assignment to PASI of the
said slot.7 It was later claimed by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity
whose indentity was unknown to PASI.8
Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted on 23 January 1998 a civil
complaint against Lichauco, by then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC, and the "Unknown Awardee"
who was to be the recipient of orbital slot 153º East Longitude. The complaint, alleging three (3)
causes of action, was for injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages. The first cause of
action, for injunction, sought to establish that the award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude should be
enjoined since the DOTC had previously assigned the same orbital slot to PASI. The second cause of
action, for declaration of nullity of award, averred that the award to the unknown bidder is null and
void, as it was rendered by Lichauco beyond her authority.9
The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged
"crusade" to malign the name of plaintiff [D]e Guzman and sabotage the business of [PASI]:
12. xxx
(a) On 4 December 1996, in a meeting with the members of the Board of Directors of plaintiff
corporation, defendant Lichauco then uttered disparaging and defamatory comments against plaintiff
de Guzman. These defamatory remarks triggered efforts from within the plaintiff corporation aimed
at ousting plaintiff de Guzman from his position.
(b) Defendant Lichauco, then an undersecretary of DOTC, wrote Mr. Jesli Lapuz on 5 December 1996
(barely two days after plaintiff de Guzman wrote him) to deny that the DOTC has assigned the two
(2) Philippine orbital slots to plaintiff corporation. Defendant Lichauco falsely asserted that only
orbital slot 161 E was assigned to plaintiff, orbital slot 153 E was not.
In the same letter, defendant Lichauco branded as FALSE plaintiff de Guzman's claim that "Agila" is
a registered corporate name of plaintiff corporation.
A copy of the letter is attached as Annex E.
(c) Not contented, defendant Lichauco, again for reasons known only to her, and with malice
aforethought, made defamatory remarks against plaintiffs during a telecommunications forum held in
Makati City sometime in October 1997 in the presence of public officials and business executives.
(d) Defendant Lichauco did not spare plaintiff corporation from her unprovoked defamation.
Defendant Lichauco arrogantly said that she had asked President Fidel V. Ramos to sue plaintiff
Michael de Guzman. With the same degree of arrogance she threatened plaintiff corporation not to use
the name "Agila", otherwise she would fight plaintiff corporation and would make sure that the name
of Agila would never be given back to plaintiff corporation.
(e) To top it all, defendant Lichauco without basis and with evident bad faith, said that plaintiff
corporation will never pay its contractors.
(f) In December 1997, defendant Lichauco delivered the coup de' grace. Again, acting unilaterally,
without prior notice to plaintiff corporation and in gross violation of DOTC's earlier assignment to
plaintiff corporation of orbital slot 153 E, defendant Lichauco offered said slot to interested applicants.
A copy of the notice of offer is attached as Annex F.
13. Plaintiffs learned of defendant Lichauco's acts after orbital slot 153 E was offered for bidding. To
plaintiff coproration's knowledge, the orbital slot was eventually awarded to defendant Unknown
Awardee.
x x x x10
The complaint alleged that since Lichauco's act of offering and awarding orbital slot 153º East
Longitude was patently illegal and violative of DOTC's prior commitment to PASI, Lichauco should
be enjoined from performing any acts and entering into or executing any agreement or arrangement of
whatever nature in connection with the said orbital slot. The complaint also averred that the purported
award of the orbital slot to the "Unknown Awardee was illegal, and thus should be declared null and
void. Finally, the complaint alleged a cause of action for damages against Lichauco, cast in the
following manner:
xxxx
21. Defendant Lichauco attacked the good name and reputation of plaintiffs.
22. She willfully caused damage to plaintiffs by orchestrating the above-described acts which are
contrary to law; morals and basic norms of good faith.
23. She interefered with and violated plaintiff corporation's contract with DOTC by offering and
awarding orbital slot 153 E to defendant Unknown Awardee.
153
24. Because of defendant Lichauco's reprehensible acts, plaintiffs suffered actual damages of at least
P10 million each, for all of which defendant Lichauco should be held liable to pay.
25. By reason of defendant Lichauco's illegal and malicious acts, plaintiff corporation's business name
and goodwill was tarnished, for which plaintiff corporation should be indemnified by way of moral
damages in the amount of at least P10 million.
26. For the same reasons, plaintiff de Guzman suffered and continue to suffer extreme mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and besmirched reputation, for all of which plaintiff
de Guzman should be indemnified in the amount of at least P10 million.
27. Defendant Lichauco should also be sanctioned, as a deterrent for public good, to pay each plaintiff
exemplary damages in the amount of at least P5 million.
28. In order to protect and enforce their rights, plaintiffs were compelled to institute this suit, engage
the services of counsel and incur litigation expenses, for all of which plaintiffs should be indemnified
in the amount of at least P500 Thousand each.11
xxxx
In sum, petitioners sought the following reliefs for the three (3) causes of action:
xxxx
3. After trial of the issues, render judgment as follows:
[a] On the first cause of action, making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction;
[b] On the second cause of action, declaring the offer and award of orbital slot 153 E to defendant
Unknown Awardee null and void.
[c] On the third cause of action, directing defendant Lichauco to pay the following sums:
i. P10 million each to plaintiffs as actual damages;
ii. P10 million to plaintiff corporation as moral damages;
iii. P10 million to plaintiff de Guzman as moral damages;
iv. P5 million each to plaintiffs as exemplary damages;
v. P500 Thousand each to plaintiffs as attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
x x x x12
The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, and
subsequently raffled to Branch 214. On 2 February 1998, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order
against Lichauco, who received the summons together with the complaint on 28 January 1998.
Lichauco failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, but eight (8) days after the lapse
thereof, she filed a Manifestation and Motion asking for a new five (5)-day period, or until 25 February
1998, to file a responsive pleading to the complaint. However, she filed instead a Motion to Admit
with attached Motion to Dismiss on 27 February 1998. She rooted her prayer for the dismissal of the
complaint primarily on the grounds that the suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued
without its consent; that the complaint stated no cause of action; and that the petitioners had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek recourse with the Office of the President.
In an order13 dated 14 August 1998, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It characterized the defense
of state immunity as "at very least a contentious issue which can not be resolved by mere allegations
in the pleadings but which can be best threshed out in a litig[i]ous forum where parties are accorded
enormous (sic) opportunity to argue for the ascertainment of whether the act complained of are indeed
within the parameters and prerogatives of the authority exercising the same."14 The RTC also noted
that the allegations in the complaint regarding the ultimate facts sufficiently presented an ultra
vires act of Lichauco, and that she was being sued in her personal capacity. As to the argument
pertaining to the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that the principle is not
an inflexible rule, and may be dispensed with when its application would cause great and irreparable
damage or when it would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 15
Lichauco assailed the RTC order through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of
Appeals, which subsequently nullified the RTC order in the Decision now assailed before us. The
Court of Appeals sustained the contention that the complaint is a suit against the State with the
following ratiocination:
The suit is to the mind of this court a suit against the state.1avvphil.net
The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad faith was done in the exercise
of and in pursuance of an official duty. Her duties are as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. The Undersecretary shall:
(1) Advise and assist the Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department objectives
and policies;
(2) Oversee all the operational activities of the department for which he shall be responsible to the
Secretary;
(3) Coordinate the programs and projects of the department and be responsible for its economical,
efficient and effective administration:
xxxxxxxxx
It is apparent from the above enumeration that the petitioner is directly under and answerable to the
DOTC Secretary. We can therefore conclude that her official acts such as the said "notice of offer"
was with the blessing and prior approval of the DOTC Secretary himself.
Being an official act, it is also protected by the presumption that the same was performed in good faith
and in the regular performance of official duty.
"Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. - As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial,
quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed
within the scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official duty. In order that acts may be
done within the scope of official authority, it is not necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or
even that they be specifically directed or requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are
done by an officer in relation to matters committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they
have more or less connection with such matters, or that they are governed by a lawful requirement of
the department under whose authority the officer is acting. Under this principle, state building
commissioners who, in obedience to a stature, discharge one who has been employed to construct a
154
state building, take possession of the work, and place it in the hands of another contractor, are not
liable to the former contractor in damages, since in so doing they are merely acting in the line of their
duty. An officer is not personally responsible for the necessary and unavoidable destruction of goods
stored in buildings, when such buildings were destroyed by him in the lawful performance of a public
duty imposed on him by a valid and constitutional statute."
xxxxxxxxx
Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. - Where an officer is invested with discretion and is
empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him he is sometimes called a quasi-
judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may
be injured as the result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however, erroneous judgment may be,
provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer's authority, and without
willfulness, malice, or corruption." (43 Am. Jur., pp. 85-86).
In Sanders vs. Veridiano[16], the Supreme Court held:
"Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have to conclude that the petitioners
were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government and not the
petitioners personally, that is responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is
proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages, such award will have to be satisfied
not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the United States government as their
principal. This will require that government, viz.: the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover
the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought
to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in
many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our
own government but also to foreign States sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by
the presumption of good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even
mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown
that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. This too is well-
settled."17
Preliminarily, we discuss the procedural grounds cited by petitioners which they assert are sufficient
to have caused the dismissal of Lichauco's petition before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners claim that
contrary to Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Lichauco failed to attach all
pleadings and documents relevant to her petition, and that those that were attached were merely
"duplicate original copies." Lichauco counters that for the viability of her petition for certiorari, all
that she needed to attach were her motion to dismiss, the RTC orders acting on such motion, her motion
for reconsideration of the denial of her motion to dismiss, and petitioners' opposition to said motion
for reconsideration. She claims that only these motions and submission were relevant to the resolution
of her petition.18
In her comment, Lichaucho claims that she did not have to attach the complaint to the copy of the
petition she sent to the petitioners herein, since the latter obviously retained the original copy of the
complaint they filed.19However, her petition before the appellate court does not indicate that the same
complaint was included as an attachment, and indeed, there is a curious absence of any averment on
Lichuaco's part that she indeed attached the said complaint to her petition.20 Certainly, in a petition for
certiorari assailing the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint, the very complaint itself is a
document relevant and pertinent to the special civil action. It should be remembered that unlike in an
ordinary appeal that is given due course,21 the case record is not automatically elevated to the court
exercising jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari; hence there is an even more impelling
need to attach all pleadings and documents to the special civil action, as mandated under Section 1,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. After all, how could the court a quo properly ascertain
whether or not the motion to dismiss itself should have been granted if it did not have a copy of the
complaint sought to be dismissed itself.
Nonetheless, the requirement to attach such relevant pleadings under Section 1, Rule 65 is read in
relation to Section 3, Rule 46, which states that the failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
documentary requirements, such as the attachment of such relevant pleadings, "shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition." The procedural rule accords sufficient discretion to the court
hearing the special civil action whether or not to dismiss the petition outright for failure to comply
with said requirement. If the court does dismiss the petition on that ground, the dismissal would be
justifiable under Section 3, Rule 46, and generally such action of the court cannot be assailed as
constituting either grave abuse of discretion or reversible error of law. If the court, on the other hand,
takes cognizance of the petition despite such lapses, the phrasing of Section 3, Rule 46 sufficiently
justifies such adjudicative recourse. Indeed, the ultimate logic behind rules of procedure being the
promotion of the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding,22 the higher interests of justice may at times sufficiently warrant the allowance of the
petition for certiorari despite such lapses, especially if they are nonetheless correctible through
subsequent submissions.
In any event, the Court is willing to overlook Lichauco's failure to attach the complaint in her petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, an oversight sadly ignored by the appellate court. There are
weighty issues at hand relating to the doctrine of state immunity from suit and the requisites of a
motion to dismiss.
There is a connective issue between these two aspects in that if the State is sued without its consent,
the corresponding suit must be dismissed. At times, it would be teasingly obvious, even from the
moment of the filing of the complaint, that the suit is one against the State. A cursory examination of
the caption of the complaint can sometimes betray such proscribed intent, as when the suit is directly
initiated against the Republic of the Philippines, any foreign government, or an unincorporated
government agency as the named respondents. In such cases, obviously there is need for immediate
caution, although if it is somehow established that those respondents had given their consent to be
sued, the suit may nonetheless prosper.
The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the unknown awardee, Lichauco was
identified in the complaint as "acting Secretary of the [DOTC]."23 The hornbook rule is that a suit for
acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a private
citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded
as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 24 However, government
immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the government no longer has an
interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises
from a tortious act in the performance of his/her duties.
Petitioner insists that Lichauco is being sued for her acts committed in excess of her authority, ultra
vires innature, and tortious in character. The Court of Appeals responded that such acts fell within
Lichauco's official duties as DOTC Undersecretary, thus enjoying the presumption that they were
155
performed in good faith and in the regular performance of official duty. This rationale is pure sophistry
and must be rejected outright.
We do not doubt the existence of the presumptions of "good faith" or "regular performance of official
duty", yet these presumptions are disputable25 and may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence.26 Many civil actions are oriented towards overcoming any number of these presumptions,
and a cause of action can certainly be geared towards such effect. The very purpose of trial is to allow
a party to present evidence overcome the disputable presumptions involved. Otherwise, if trial is
deemed irrelevant or unnecessary, owing to the perceived indisputability of the presumptions, the
judicial exercise would be relegated to a mere ascertainment of what presumptions apply in a given
case, nothing more. Consequently, the entire Rules of Court is rendered as excess verbiage, save
perhaps for the provisions laying down the legal presumptions.
If this reasoning of the Court of Appeals were ever adopted as a jurisprudential rule, no public officer
could ever be sued for acts executed beyond their official functions or authority, or for tortious conduct
or behavior, since such acts would "enjoy the presumption of good faith and in the regular performance
of official duty". Indeed, few civil actions of any nature would ever reach the trial stage, if a case can
be adjudicated by a mere determination from the complaint or answer as to which legal presumptions
are applicable. For example, the presumption that a person is innocent of a wrong is a disputable
presumption on the same level as that of the regular performance of official duty. 27 A civil complaint
for damages necessarily alleges that the defendant committed a wrongful act or omission that would
serve as basis for the award of damages. With the rationale of the Court of Appeals, such complaint
can be dismissed upon a motion to dismiss solely on the ground that the presumption is that a person
is innocent of a wrong.
So obviously, the Decision of the Court of Appeals cannot receive the imprimatur of this Court. Still,
the question of whether Lichauco may validly invoke state immunity from suit to secure the outright
dismissal of petitioners' complaint warrants closer examination.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three (3) causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction
against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of
nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for
damages against Lichauco herself. Evidently, the first two causes of action stem from Lichauco's act
of offering orbital slot 153º East Longitude for bidding, through the Notice of Offer which was
attached to the complaint.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Lichauco asserts that she is being sued for issuing the aforementioned Notice
of Offer, which fell within her official functions as DOTC Undersecretary for Communications. She
claims that it was Secretary Lagdameo who authorized her to offer orbital slot 153º East Longitude
for bidding, and she thus acted well within the scope of her authority to advise and assist the DOTC
Secretary in the formulation and implementation of department objectives and policies.
The Notice of Offer cites Department Circular 97-01, signed by then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile,
as authority for it. The Court has examined the aforementioned Department Circular, issued on 17
October 1997, which establishes the "Guidelines on the Procurement of Orbital Slots and Frequency
Registration of Philippine Satellites". Therein, the DOTC is mandated "to conduct a bidding process
in case there are competing applications for any one of the assigned or applied-for-orbital slots"28.
Further, the Department Circular states that "the DOTC shall publish in three newspapers of general
circulation a notice of offer for the government assigned, initiated and applied for orbital slots." 29
Thus, insofar as the first two causes of action are concerned, Lichauco may have a point when she
asserts that they were based on acts which she performed in her capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
But does this necessarily mean that these two causes of action may thus be dismissed on the basis of
state immunity of suit?
As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the
government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint
must be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between
where the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity
and where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction. In the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it
is the official concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.
On this point, our ruling in J.M. Tuazon & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration30 is material. Petitioners
therein had filed a special civil action for prohibition to nullify Republic Act No. 2616, or law that
directed the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. Impleaded as respondents were the
officials and government agency tasked to undertake such expropriation. The respondents alleged that
the petition for prohibition was actually a suit against the State without its consent. The Court, through
then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, debunked the argument, ruling instead
that the petition was within the ambit of judicial review:
[T]he power of judicial review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from the
relevant provisions of the Constitution. This power may be exercised when the party adversely affected
by either a legislative or executive act, or a municipal ordinance for that matter, files the appropriate
suit to test its validity. The special civil action of prohibition has been relied upon precisely to restrain
the enforcement of what is alleged to be an unconstitutional statute. As it is a fundamental postulate
that the Constitution as the supreme law is binding on all governmental agencies, failure to observe
the limitations found therein furnishes a sufficient ground for a declaration of nullity of the government
measure challenged. The argument then that the government is the adverse party and that, therefore,
must consent to its being sued certainly is far from persuasive. x x x x31
The Court further noted that it was well-settled for the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of
nullity, "it is enough if the respondents or defendants named be the government officials who would
give operation and effect to official action allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality."32
Unlike in J.M. Tuason, the case at bar does not seek to nullify an unconstitutional law or measure.
However, the first two causes of action do sufficiently impute grave abuse of discretion against
Lichauco in her official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave
abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows in such instances that it is
the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in the appropriate suit.
Moreover, if the suit had been directed against Lichauco alone, and in her personal capacity, yet it
sought, as it now does, the nullification of the Notice of Offer or the awards thereon, such remedy
could not avail even if granted. Lichauco, in her personal capacity, cannot be directed to set aside the
Notice of Offer, the award of the bid, or to issue a new award herself. It is only because Lichauco was
sued in her official capacity as the DOTC Undersecretary that she, or her successors in office, could
be judicially compelled to act in such fashion.
As to the first two (2) causes of action, the Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit do
not apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in
constitutional contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial
liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two
causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award,
nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of
156
action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the
DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have
been considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that at the time of the filing of the complaint, Lichauco herself was
already the acting head of the DOTC, owing to the sudden death of then Secretary Enrile a few days
before. At that stage, any suit seeking to nullify the Notice of Bid and the alleged award to the
"Unknown Bidder" should have properly denominated Lichauco as the respondent, and not the DOTC.
Nonetheless, as to the first two causes of action, there was a viable ground to dismiss the complaint:
the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Indeed, such ground was alleged by Lichauco in her
Motion to Dismiss. Yet the principle of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies admits to several
exceptions. In its Order denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, the RTC adequately dispensed
with the objection, applying the established exceptions to the rule of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies. To wit:
Turning to the matter pertaining to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is fundamental that
this principle is not an inflexible rule. It yields to many accepted exceptions. (Rocamora vs. RTC -
Cebu, G.R. No. 65307). As in this case, this principle can be dispensed with when its application
would cause great and irreparable damage and when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.
When the subject orbital slot 153 E was bidded out to other applicants, the damage and injury plaintiffs
stand to suffer was clear, present, and substantiated that this Court was impelled to provide urgent
needed measure such as the issuance of writ of injunction against the public defendant. Indeed, under
the circumstances then obtaining it was impractical for the plaintiffs to first proceed to the
administrative official concerned before taking court action.33
A different set of principles applies to the third cause of action, anchored as it is on alleged acts that
are tortious in character or otherwise beyond the scope of Lichauco's official duties. The complaint
alleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and defamatory remarks against petitioners and made
false assertions against them in her letter to the Land Bank President.
The veracity of those allegations is of course presented at the trial to be determined on the basis of the
evidence. However, if proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded
by the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals
:34
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed
to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although
it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing
as to be applicable under all circumstances.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice
Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.
'Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government
officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal
and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.35
The doctrine poses no controversy if after trial on the merits, it is established that the public official
concerned had committed illegal or tortious acts against the plaintiff. How does it apply in relation to
a motion to dismiss on the ground of state immunity from suit, necessarily lodged before trial on the
merits?
Our ruling in United States of America v. Reyes36 warrants due consideration. The Court therein,
through then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., ruled that a motion to
dismiss averring immunity from suit of a State and its functionaries was actually grounded on the
specific ground for dismissal of the lack of cause of action, for even assuming that the defendants had
committed the injurious acts complained of, "no action may be maintained thereon, because of the
principle of state immunity."37 Pertinently, the Court noted that "a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint."
Thus, Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by the State's immunity from
suit, to hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint. Such hypothetical
admission has to be deemed a concession on her part that she had performed the tortious or damaging
acts against the petitioners, which if true, would hold her liable for damages.
Of course, Lichauco could very well raise the defense of state immunity from suit in regard to the third
cause of action with the assertion that the acts complained of constituting said cause of action fell
within her official functions and were not tortuous in character. Still, to establish such assertions of
fact, a full-blown trial on the merits would be necessary, as would the case be if Lichauco raised the
defense that she did not commit these acts complained of. Certainly, these defenses cannot be accorded
merit before trial, factual as they are in character.
All told, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in denying Lichauco's Motion to Dismiss.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21
February 2000 is SET ASIDE and the Order dated 14 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to try and decide the case
on the merits with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
157
 9
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Id. at 50-51.
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice 10
Rollo, pp. 49-50.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. 11
Id. at 51-52.
Associate Justice
12
Id. at 53.
ATTESTATION
13
Penned by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. 14
Rollo, p. 112.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING 15
Id. at 113.
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division 16
Cited as 162 SCRA 88.
CERTIFICATION 17
Rollo, pp. 39-42.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is 18
Id. at 214.
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
19
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division, See id. at 215.
20
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN In her Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of Lichauco, states: "Respondent
Chief Justice [Lichauco] attached the following to her petition filed before the Court of Appeals, to wit: (a) Original
copies of the assailed orders as Annexes "A" and "B"; (b) [respondent]'s motion to dismiss as Annex
"C"; (c) Copy of [respondent]'s motion for reconsideration as Annex "D"; and (d) [petitioner]'s
opposition to the motion for reconsideration as Annex "E." See id. at 214.

Footnotes 21
See Section 8, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio Labotoria, concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus Elbinias 22
See Section 6, Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
and Marina Buzon.
23
Rollo, p. 46.
2
Particularly consisting of Capitol Wireless, Inc.; Clavecilla Electronics and Telecom Corporation;
24
Digital Telecommunications Philippines; Domestic Satellite Phils.; Eastern Telecommunications See e.g., Isberto v. Raquiza, G.R. No. L-35001, 25 September 1975, 67 SCRA 116, 119 (1975).
Philippines, Inc.; Express Telecommunications Company; GMCR, Inc; International Communications
25
Corporation; Isla Communications Company, Inc.; Liberty Broadcasting Network, Inc; Philippine See e.g., Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
Communications Satellite Corporation; Philippine Global Communications, Inc.; Philippine Long 26
Distance Telephone Company; Pilipino Telephone Corporation; Radio Communications of the See Section 3, Rule 131, Rules of Court.
Philippines, Inc.; and Smart Communications, Inc. See rollo, pp. 57-59. 27
See Section 3(a), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
3
Id. at 60. 28
Article III, sec. 6, DOTC Department Circular No. 97-01 (17 October 1997).
4
Id. at 61. 29
Article III, sec. 7, id.
5
Id. at 64. 30
G.R. No. L-21064, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
6
Id. at 65. 31
Id. at 421-422.
7
The assignment of the other orbital slot, 161º East Longitude, was previously affirmed by the DOTC 32
to PASI and formally effected through an Agreement on Transponder Agreement dated 16 June 1997. Id. at 422.
See rollo, p. 89. 33
Rollo, p. 113.
8
See id. at 50. 34
G.R. No. 90314, 27 November 1990, 191 SCRA 713.
158
35
Id. at 726-727. Citations omitted. Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In
consideration of said purchases, petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
36
Id. at 206. postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie
37
and Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
G.R. No. 79253, 1 March 1993, 219 SCRA 192.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when
the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored for the reason that
the "Account is Closed."Demands were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the
petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.

On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages
and attorney's fee with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6231. 3 On
December 15, 1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 6238.4

Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), General Santos City. The criminal complaints were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874, 34862 to 34869, and Criminal Case No. 35522-I.5

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings on account of the
existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in
the proceedings.6 Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the
Republic of the Philippines civil cases pending before the RTC were finally resolved.
SUPREME COURT
Manila The MTCC, in its Orders7 dated June 21, 2000 and July 4, 2000, denied the motions for lack of merit.
Petitioner filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration 8 relative to Criminal Case Nos. 34873, 34874,
THIRD DIVISION 34862 to 34869 and a Motion for Reconsideration of the Part of the Order Denying the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings on Account of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question relative to Criminal Case
G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009 No. 35522-I.9 The subsequent motions were denied in the Order10 dated October 18, 2000.
JESSE Y. YAP, Petitioner, Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
vs. Preliminary Injunction11 before the RTC, docketed as SPL. Civil Case No. 539, imputing grave abuse
HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General of discretion on the part of the MTCC Judge. On July 2, 2001, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the
Santos City; MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT OF petition.
APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA DIMALANTA and MERGYL
MIRABUENO, Respondents. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was denied in an Order dated October 18,
2001.14
DECISION
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus with
PERALTA, J.: Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,15 docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 68250.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or issuance of status quo order seeking to annul and On April 30, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision 16 dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The CA
set aside the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 17, 2003 denying petitioner's motion opined that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 did not pose a prejudicial question to the prosecution of
for reconsideration of the Decision2 dated April 30, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250. the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
The facts of the case are as follows: The CA ruled:
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their In the instant case, a careful perusal of Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 reveals that the issue involved
company Primetown Property Group. therein is not the validity of the sale as incorrectly pointed out by the petitioner, but it is, whether or
159
not the complainants therein are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the
checks which they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. It behooves this Court to state that the sale and
the rediscounting of the checks are two transactions, separate and distinct from each other. It so
happened that in the subject civil cases it is not the sale that is in question, but rather the rediscounting
of the checks. Therefore, petitioner's contention that the main issue involved in said civil cases is the
validity of the sale stands on hollow ground. Furthermore, if it is indeed the validity of the sale that is
contested in the subject civil cases, then, We cannot fathom why the petitioner never contested such
sale by filing an action for the annulment thereof or at least invoked or prayed in his answer that the
sale be declared null and void. Accordingly, even if Civil Cases Nos. 6231 and 6238 are tried and the
resolution of the issues therein is had, it cannot be deduced therefrom that the petitioner cannot be held
liable anymore for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.17
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,18 which was denied in the Order19 dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN THE CIVIL CASES (FOR COLLECTION OF SUMS OF MONEY
INSTITUTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER CHECKS ISSUED BY THE PETITIONER,
CIVIL CASE NOS. 6238 AND 6231) THAT WOULD WARRANT SUSPENSION OF THE
CRIMINAL CASES (CASE NO. 35522-1, FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22, SUBJECT OF WHICH
ARE THE VERY SAME CHECKS).
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR STATUS QUO
ORDER.20
The main contention of the petitioner is that a prejudicial question, as defined by law and
jurisprudence, exists in the present case. It is the petitioner's assertion that Civil Case Nos. 6231 and
6238 for collection of sum of money and damages were filed ahead of the criminal cases for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. He further alleged that, in the pending civil cases, the issue as to whether private
respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner despite the lack of consideration, is an issue that
is a logical antecedent to the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. For if the court rules that
there is no valid consideration for the check's issuance, as petitioner contends, then it necessarily
follows that he could not also be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Petitioner further avers that B.P. Blg. 22 specifically requires, among other elements, that the check
should have been issued for account or for value. There must be a valid consideration; otherwise, no
violation of the said law could be rightfully pursued. Petitioner said that the reason for the dishonor of
the checks was his order to the drawee bank to stop payment and to close his account in order to avoid
necessary penalty from the bank. He made this order due to the failure of Evelyn to deliver to him the
titles to the purchased properties to him.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that there is no prejudicial
question in Civil Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 which would warrant the suspension of the proceedings in
the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner. The issue in the civil cases is not
the validity of the sale between the petitioner and Evelyn, but whether the complainants therein are
entitled to damages arising from the checks. These checks were issued by the petitioner in favor of
Evelyn, who, thereafter, negotiated the same checks to private complainants. The checks were
subsequently dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. The OSG maintains that the resolution of such
issue has absolutely no bearing on the issue of whether petitioner may be held liable for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22.21
The present case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question that
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCC.
We find that there is none and, thus, we resolve to deny the petition.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both
pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
(i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.22
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues
raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or
characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which
the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil
action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the resolution of
the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal
action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before
taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.23 Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently
of each other.24
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while in the
civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or
the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.lavvphil
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined
first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of the
value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to
support the checks is in itself an offense.25
In Jose v. Suarez,26 the prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of
5% was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void for
being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In resolving the
issue, We ruled that "whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void
for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg. 22 cases because what will
ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question posed
before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached; that is, if a
bouncing check has been issued."
Further, We held in Ricaforte v. Jurado,27 that:
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. In Lozano v. Martinez, we
have declared that it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not
intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain
160
of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense Associate Justice
against property, but an offense against public order. In People v. Nitafan, we said that a check issued
as an evidence of debt - though not intended to be presented for payment - has the same effect as an WE CONCUR:
ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
xxxx Associate Justice
Chairperson
x x x The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as
evidence of pre-existing debt - is malum prohibitum. ANTONIO T. CARPIO* RENATO C. CORONA**
Associate Justice Associate Justice
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance,
will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. So what the law Associate Justice
punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum ATTESTATION
prohibitum.28
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
Moreover, petitioner's reliance on Ras v. Rasul29 is misplaced. The case of Ras involves a complaint was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
for nullification of a deed of sale on the ground of an alleged double sale. While the civil case was
pending, an information for estafa was filed against Ras (the defendant in the civil case) arising from CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
the same alleged double sale, subject matter of the civil complaint. The Court ruled that there was a Associate Justice
prejudicial question considering that the defense in the civil case was based on the very same facts Third Division, Chairperson
that would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the estafa case.
CERTIFICATION
The instant case is different from Ras, inasmuch as the determination of whether the petitioner is liable
to pay the private respondents the value of the checks and damages, will not affect the guilt or Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
innocence of the petitioner because the material question in the criminal cases is whether petitioner certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
had issued bad checks, regardless of the purpose or condition of its issuance. assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Guided by the following legal precepts, it is clear that the determination of the issues involved in Civil REYNATO S. PUNO
Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or Chief Justice
innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

In addition, petitioner's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of
the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a party’s defense and accusation, as well as
the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court, are better ventilated Footnotes
during trial proper. *
Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 646 dated May158, 2009.
Precisely, the reason why a state has courts of law is to ascertain the respective rights of the parties, to **
examine and to put to test all their respective allegations and evidence through a well designed Designated to sit as an additional member, per Special Order No. 631 dated April 29, 2009.
machinery termed "trial."Thus, all the defenses available to the accused should be invoked in the trial 1
of the criminal cases. This court is not the proper forum that should ascertain the facts and decide the Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 filed against the petitioner. and Danilo B. Pine, concurring, rollo, pp. 30-32.
2
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in affirming the decision of the RTC. Id. at 33-41.
3
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 2003 and the Resolution Id. at 97-103.
dated July 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68250 are AFFIRMED. 4
Id. at 90-96.
SO ORDERED. 5
Id. at 68-89.

161
6
Id. at 219-223; 224-228.
7
Id. at 165; 166.
8
Id. at 229-235.
9
Id. at 236-238. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
10
Id. at 167-168. Manila
11
Id. at 152-164. THIRD DIVISION
12
Id. at 66-67. G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
13
Id. at 45. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
14
vs.
Id. CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
15
Id. at 44-65. DECISION
16
Id. at 33-41. VELASCO, JR., J.:
17
Id. at 37-38. The Case
18
Id. at 105-107. Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision 1 in SCA
19 No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Piñas City. The Decision affirmed
Id. at 30-32. the Orders dated October 16, 20072 and March 12, 20083 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by
20 the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Piñas City.
Id. at 22.
21 The Facts
Id. at 298-311.
22 On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for
Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 773, 781-782, citing Carlos v. Court of
Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 4 for
Appeals, 335 Phil. 490, 499 (1997) and Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 (1995).
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the
23
People v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 366, 370, citing Sabandal Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33.
v. Tongco, 366 SCRA 567 (2001), Alano v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 549 (1997), Benitez v. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private
Concepcion, Jr., 112 Phil. 105 (1961), Te v. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327 (2000), Beltran v. respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, entitled
People, 334 SCRA 106 (2000), and Isip v. Gonzales, 148-A Phil. 212 (1971). People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.

24
Sabandal v. Tongco, supra note 23, citing Rojas v. People, 156 Phil. 224, 229 (1974). On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against
petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 5 for the rescission of an alleged construction
25
Lozano v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323. agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197
in Las Piñas City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the checks, subject of the
26 criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Supra note 22.
27 Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24,
G.R. No. 154438, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 317, 330. (Emphasis supplied).
20076 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and
28
Wong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117857, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 100, citing Llamado v. issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt
Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 423, 431 (1997). or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private respondent
claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
29
G.R. Nos. L-50441-42, September 18, 1980, 100 SCRA 125.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Question 7 on

162
the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon
which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether
private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of
the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element
is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend Proceedings,
and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as the
same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22 must be
dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the correctness
of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time before the
prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).8
In an Order dated March 12, 2008,9 the MTC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the existence
of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended
merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence of
any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their initial
stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal
action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character. 10
Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.11
The Court’s Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated June
17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111, Sec. 5,
which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases12 that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated in
the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,13 are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the
above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question and,
thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous to the
filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation wherein
a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay
the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed
either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action. Private
respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the
Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the
criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of
a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."14 In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena15 that:
Even if we ignored petitioners’ procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold that
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying their
omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil Case No. 7160.
Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
163
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the
prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time
before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus,
no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to
be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form
a complete, coherent and intelligible system."16 This principle is consistent with the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 171 a vv p
hil
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously
instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in Art.
36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court conducting
the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.—A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code
that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the
civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence
of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of the
civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In resolving
the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case was
a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years after the
institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as an
afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases. 19
Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the
time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting
that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ½) years from the time that private
respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show
that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and
interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no
prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are:
(1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties is
declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such contract
would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.20
164
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in Las
check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of Piñas City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 with
the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases 21 that the agreement surrounding the dispatch.
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v.
People,22 we ruled: No costs.

It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The SO ORDERED.
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner. To PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, will Associate Justice
greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency
substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the framers WE CONCUR:
of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Lee v. Court of Appeals23 is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of valuable Associate Justice
consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is Chairperson
immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value. Associate Justice Associate Justice

Petitioner’s claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration. Valuable Associate Justice
consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, ATTESTATION
or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or not to do in favor
of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser. I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said account. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a pre-existing Associate Justice
obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check was given by Chairperson
Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer connected with
Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier discussed, petitioner failed CERTIFICATION
to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or Unlad.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is because was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.24 (Emphasis supplied.) REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the
parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in
the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
Footnotes
22.lawphil.net
1
Rollo, pp. 88-90. Penned by Judge Salvador V. Timbang.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that
the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may proceed, 2
Id. at 65-67.
is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to
the case before us. 3
Id. at 75-76.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26, 4
Id. at 23-27.
2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Piñas City and the Orders dated
165
5
Id. at 28-41.
6
Id. at 42-45.
7
Id. at 46-48.
8
Id. at 67.
9
Id. at 75-76.
10
Id. at 90.
11
Id. at 11.
12
Carlos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109887, February 10, 1997, 268 SCRA 25, 33; Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110544, October 17, 1995, 249 SCRA 342, 351; Apa v. Fernandez, G.R.
No. 112381, March 30, 1995, 242 SCRA 509, 512; Yap v. Paras, G.R. No.101236, January 30, 1994, Republic of the Philippines
205 SCRA 625, 629; Umali v. IAC, G.R. No. 63198, June 21, 1990, 186 SCRA 680, 685. SUPREME COURT
Manila
13
G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 106, 110.
SECOND DIVISION
14
R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction 97 (4th ed., 1998).
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
15
G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509.
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
16
R.E. Agpalo, supra note 14, at 269-270. vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
17
Algura v. The Local Government Unit of the City of Naga, G.R. No. 150135, October 30, 2006, 506 PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SCRA 81, 98; Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 680-
81; Bañares v. Balising, G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000, 328 SCRA 36, 49; Cabada v. Alunan III, DECISION
G.R. No. 119645, August 22, 1996, 260 SCRA 838, 848; Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208,
March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 211; Corona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97356, September 30, 1992, CARPIO, J.:
214 SCRA 378, 392.
The Case
18
G.R. No. 124498, October 5, 2001, 366 SCRA 567.
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated
19
Id. at 572. on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
20
Mejia v. People, G.R. No. 149937, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 209, 213-214. The Antecedent Facts
21
Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 451, 461; Narte v. Court of The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
Appeals, G.R. No. 132552, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 336, 341; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
105461, November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 723, 726-727, citing People v. Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for
October 22, 1992, 215 SCRA 79, 84-85 and Que v. People, Nos. L-75217-18, September 21, 1987, frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-
154 SCRA 161, 165. 130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC
Quezon City).
22
Supra note 20, at 214-215.
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
23
G.R. No. 145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455. Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
24
Id. at 474-475. Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the

166
relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the case
before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries
sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage
with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of
the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
5
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, the RTC Quezon City
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August
2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals
ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced
the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other
hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if
the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required
for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage
is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against
petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC
Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC
Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner
was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil
case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the
civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension
of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12 which
punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the offender and the
victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide.
Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with
frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
167
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First, the
issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage Footnotes
on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of *
prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled inTenebro that "[t]here is x x x a Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886 dated 1 September 2010.
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce **
legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 September 2010.
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the 1
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
State’s penal laws are concerned."19
2
Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong with Associate Justices
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case. 3
Id. at 50-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon A. Cruz.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of 4
Id. at 51.
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
5
Id. at 53.
SO ORDERED.
6
Dated 1 December 2000.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice 7
Rollo, p. 54.
WE CONCUR: 8
Id. at 56.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA 9
Id. at 61-65.
Associate Justice
10
Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 773.
*
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD 11
Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 150329-30, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 574, 577-578.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
12
People v. Dalag, 450 Phil. 304 (2003).

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.** 13

Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
Associate Justice
14
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
ATTESTATION
15
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
16
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. See Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
17
ANTONIO T. CARPIO 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
Associate Justice 18
Chairperson Id. at 744. Italicization in the original.
19
CERTIFICATION Id. at 742.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

168

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial
question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through
falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt
or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252 entitled People
v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati City and
Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case
No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question in the civil cases pending between him and the complainant in the trial courts in
Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz)
various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were secured by a
real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite registered under the name of
de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected
by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and
paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. 3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the
property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties
from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De la
Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999
that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the demands. 5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
(Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against
him for the collection of theP41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere agent of his
mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public
document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. 6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for
the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment
(Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing and De
la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati City
(Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal case). 8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the
ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil cases.
On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his arraignment, citing the
additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the
Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati criminal
case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18, 2001, the RTC denied
the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition
for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private respondent
may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or innocence of private
respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
169
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite
criminal case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in controversy are identical;
(3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of
Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are identical; and (6) the issue of private
respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or intimately
related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to the parties in the
cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent in the
Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party thereto, did so
pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice of an official act of another judicial authority.
It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked to
suspend private respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding the fact
that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages against
Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was filed
against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7668-00
and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the arraignment on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil
cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s
motion. Later on, it also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in the
CA a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and
later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting
aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding
with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for
the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court granted the
petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the
CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings
in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil
case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages
and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for
estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question
will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is
held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that
respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently,
a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will
not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be
established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article 319 of
the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in favor of another
party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party filed a civil case for
termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner
having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground
that the civil case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal
proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground
that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of action based
on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant executed in favor of the
said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-
6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not determine the criminal liability of the
accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in
this case, the fact remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the
eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases
could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides:
"In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing
the orders referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the adverse
decision of the CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the Pasig and Manila
civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in the
Cavite criminal case, and claiming that under the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati
civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal
case.
170
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling in G.R.
No. 148193 was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which was different
from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No.
148193 did not yet become final and executory, and could still be reversed at any time, and thus should
not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for
his mother, and should not be held personally liable under a contract that had involved property
belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R.
No. 148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the
documents involved; the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions are all
identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same parties with the exception of private
complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the Philippines vs.
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
Damages and attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in
selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the
criminal case at bar." In view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus
amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated
November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No.
00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the second assailed
resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in relation
to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant in Criminal
Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not consider the
pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a prejudicial question,
considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the issue of whether he had falsified
a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which would
determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought the
Makati civil case as an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately from
Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193,
holding in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case,
was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the Makati
civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-
120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial
question, because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had
any obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case
were not intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-empt such
resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered determinative of whether a prejudicial
question existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that warranted
the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to
the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be suspended because the Makati
civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no prejudicial question.
That was wrong for him to do considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity
between his case with Plus Builders and his case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was predicated on
fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the effect that Consing
and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in offering as
security and later object of sale, a property which they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious
title."22 As such, the action was one that could proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. 23 This was precisely the Court’s thrust in
G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the alleged
fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that
will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
171
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193
to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved different
complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had
separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, Footnotes
and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be 1
suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed. Rollo, pp. 34-35; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos retired/deceased), with the
concurrence of Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (later Presiding Justice, but already. retired and
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother now deceased) and Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong (retired/deceased).
who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved having belonged 2
to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit: Id. at 57-58.
3
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings Id. at 58.
in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil 4
case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an agent of his Id.
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages 5
Id.
and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to
return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared 6
Id.
merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to 7
Id. at 77-88.
falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759
for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for 8
Id. at 58-59.
estafa through falsification of public document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring
9
supplied for emphasis) Id. at 59.
10
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003; and Id.
ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
11
Id. at 57-63.
SO ORDERED.
12
Id. at 61-62.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
13
Associate Justice Raffled to Branch 12.
14
WE CONCUR: People v. Consing, Jr., G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 366, 370-372.
15
The ruling in G.R. No. 148193 became final and executory.
Chief Justice 16
Rollo, pp. 34-35.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE 17
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Id. at 39-55.
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice 18
Id. at 37-38.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES 19
Id. at 104-117.
Associate Justice
20
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
CERTIFICATION civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division. The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO opportunity to make such reservation.
Chief Justice

172
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees therefore shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action.

xxxx

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the criminal action has been commenced, the
separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever state it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with
the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already
adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witness presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and
civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running period of prescription of the civil action which
cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
21
Rollo, pp. 120-126.
22
Rollo, p. 83.
23
Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612, 620-621; Rojas v. People,
No. L-22237, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 243, 246.
24
Supra note 14, at 371-372.
25
Id. at 370-371.

173
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and
JACOBA CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge
Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential
relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant,
despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did
not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff
had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no
amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the
plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet
unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;"
just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of
the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a forced
heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is
an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet
unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text
of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born
for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the
conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish
Civil Code, clearly points this out:
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la
moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30,
no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de
un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause
of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state
a cause of action was doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao.
So ordered.
174
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and
other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental

Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-
Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9

175
January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for
dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental
and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxxx
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay
to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children,
brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
xxxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
xxxx
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental
insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
xxxx
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of
the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single,
this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be
presented (e.g. death certificate).4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano,
had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.5 According
to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. 7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the
series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the Union to file a
Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement
dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole
issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
Article X, Section 2
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.10 The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.11
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties
proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant
to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the
CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and
Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel,
whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan
was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA
between his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before
labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during
labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same
compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed
the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental
Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor
legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the
laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate
the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements
for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of
which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 16 of the Civil
Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died
because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental
Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence,
the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor
did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither
of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed
automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-
employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Union to the legally accepted
definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies,
MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its
claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss
of an unborn child constituted "company practice."
176
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a
Resolution17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the
covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable
elements must be present: (1) there is "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and
(3) such dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under
Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must
be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such dependent
must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.18
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent
occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was
conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained
himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the
fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child,
legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner
Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-
Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims for bereavement
leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred.
The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA
since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus,
which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was
bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted
that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement
leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution
dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term "death" is used
in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which
the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery
of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be covered by the CBA provision,
undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands
in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the
term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits
under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak
of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything
less than "loss of human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave
and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to
them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child.
[Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly
misses this crucial point.20
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration 23 of
Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical
personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the
CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister,
of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death
and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must
be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother,
or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death,
e.g., death certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for
bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms
"death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and
unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same.
Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define
the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition
of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is
177
born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil
personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and
capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child
acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed
by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case
pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside
the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception,25 that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself
defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself
without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn child is a
dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life
without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the
CBA provisions in question that the dependentmay be the parent, spouse, or child of a married
employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood
in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents.
In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article
164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally
adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis
ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that
Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him
to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn
child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA,
Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid
to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is
specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.29 In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions
should be interpreted in favor of labor. InMarcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations
Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when
the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be
stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the
Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended
CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to
labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically
stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the
heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must
accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we
declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice
policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution
dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated
20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to
Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four
Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.
178
 7
SO ORDERED. Id. at 86.
8
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Id. at 33.
Associate Justice
9
CA rollo, p. 60.
WE CONCUR:
10
Id. at 67.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
11
Associate Justice Id. at 46.
Chairperson 12
Id. at 25.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 13
Id. at 62-65.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
14
Id at 66-72.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice 15
Records, pp. 46-53.

ATTESTATION 16
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was article.
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely
ANTONIO T. CARPIO delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven
Associate Justice months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
Chairperson, Third Division maternal womb.
CERTIFICATION Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before 17
CA rollo, pp. 24-34.
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
18
Id. at 32.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice 19
Id. at 2-18.

Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule XIX of Department Order No.
40-03 series of 2003 provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator
shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or
Footnotes decision by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and 20
Rollo, pp. 38-39.
Sesinando E. Villon concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.
21
2
Id. at 39.
Id. at 42.
22
3
Id. at 153.
Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montaño, Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392.
23
4
Id. at 136-143.
CA rollo, p. 26.
5
24
Black’s Law Dictionary
Rollo, pp. 84-92.
25
6
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:
Id. at 93.

179
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
26
As opposed to the more limited or precise definition of a dependent child for income tax purposes,
which means "a legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living
with the taxpayer if such dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not
gainfully employed or if such dependent, regardless of age, is incapable of self-support because of
mental or physical defect."
27
G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 369.
28
483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004).
29
Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164060, 15 June 2007, 524 SCRA 709, 716.
30
325 Phil. 618, 634-635 (1996).

180