FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000]

JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. ULANDU

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in LRC Case
No. M-77,[1] which was reversed by respondent Court of Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.[2] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on
September 30, 1992.[3]

The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land
located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to
James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las
Pias; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles. On January
16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale
which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations
were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to
Maria Cailles.

On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action
for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.[4] The case was
docketed as L.R.C. Case No.4328. On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the
Solicitor General, opposed petitioners application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-
in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the
application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.[5]

The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action filed by Crescencio
Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally
disposed of by this Court in G.R. No. 5263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over those of
the oppositor Leonardo.[6]

On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to the Makati Regional
Trial Court[7] where it was docketed as Land Registration Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General
resubmitted his opposition to the application on July 22, 1985,[8] this time alleging the following
additional grounds: (1) the failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time; and (2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the
lands applied for. Manikx

On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner.[9] The Solicitor
General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the
lower courts Order.[10] It also denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of
September 30, 1992.[11]

Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds -

"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement of thirty 30) year period
mandated under Sec. 48 (b ) shall commence only on March 27, 1972 in accordance with the
classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING conclusion and inference that
prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in Marc 27; 1972, the parcels of land sought to be
registered by Applicant was part of the forest land or forest reserves.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and failed to consider VESTED RIGHTS of the applicant-
appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land occupied from 1908."[12]

The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land under
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-
interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand it is
the respondents position that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972,[13] petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his
application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
We agree with respondents.

In Republic vs. Doldol,[14] the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid down, as follows --

"x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded b R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January
25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads: Maniks

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure.
Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (italicized in the
original)

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must be since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued."

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public
land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land
subject of his application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the
government that the same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even
granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still
cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not yet
alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain.[15]

A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[16] where a homestead patent issued
to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground t at at the time it was issued, the
subject land was still part of the public domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows --
"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219
SCRA 340). Manikan

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. This petitioners failed to do.

We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners predecessor-in-
interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus,
any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead
parent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director
of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as
disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bur au of Lands is void
ab initio."

Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as inalienable or indisposable,
therefore, the same could not be the subject of confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no
imperfect title to be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.[17] In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and
open to disposition.[18] Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[19]

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or
vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of
Forest Development[20] from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title,
we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/17/00 9:46 AM

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38314 June 25, 1974

BELEN S. RODRIGUEZ and JOSE S. SANTOS, JR., petitioners,

vs.

HON. FEDERICO ALIKPALA (Presiding Judge, Branch XXII, Court of First Instance of Manila), FEDERICO
TOLENTINO and FELISA TOLENTINO, respondents.

Santos, Santos & Cunanan Law Office for petitioners.

Prospero A. Crescini & Associates for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:p

Failing to levy on the properties of the respondents Federico and Felisa Tolentino because of a
prohibitory judgment rendered by the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila in civil case 85998,
the petitioners Belen S. Rodriguez and Jose S. Santos, Jr., have come to this Court on appeal by
certiorari.

On August 19, 1971 the petitioner Rodriguez, assisted by her counsel, the petitioner Santos, filed an
action, docketed as civil case 204601, with the city court of Manila against the spouses Manuel and Fe
Rebollado for recovery of the sum of P5,320 plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. A writ of
preliminary attachment was issued and served on the Rebollados at their store in Divisoria market. Fe
Rebollado immediately communicated with the petitioner Santos, and later with the latter's client, the
petitioner Rodriguez, to plead for time before the attachment was to be effectively enforced. Rodriguez
agreed to cause the suspension of the attachment writ on condition that Fe Rebollado's parents, the
now respondents Federico and Felisa Tolentino, would bind themselves, jointly and severally with the
Rebollado's, to pay the entire obligation subject of the suit. Felisa Tolentino who was then present
agreed to this proposal, and so the petitioner Santos, at the request of the petitioner Rodriguez, drew
up a motion for judgment on a compromise embodying the terms of the agreement of the parties. On
the basis of the said motion, the city court, on August 14, 1971, rendered judgment, as follows:

Parties herein submitted the following compromise agreement and prayed that judgment be rendered
in accordance there with:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

xxx xxx xxx

1. That the defendants admit all the material allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and acknowledged
their indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total amount of P5,980.00, which amount includes expenses of
litigation;

2. That in consideration of defendants acknowledging their said indebtedness and confessing judgment
therefor, plaintiff has allowed defendants some consideration by allowing them to pay their above-
stated account in the following manner, to wit:

a) the sum of P200.00 shall be paid upon the signing of this compromise agreement;

b) the remaining balance shall be paid in installment basis at the rate of P100.00 a week, payable every
Saturday beginning August 28, 1971 and every Saturday of the week thereafter until fully paid.
3. That in order to secure the prompt payment of the said obligations of the defendants, Federico
Tolentino and Felisa Tolentino hereby bind themselves to pay jointly and severally with the defendants
the said obligations, and in the event of default on the part of the defendants to pay any of the said
installments when the same is already due, the judgment which may be rendered by virtue hereof as to
full amount remaining unpaid, may likewise be executed as against the properties of Federico Tolentino
and Felisa Tolentino;

4. That failure on the part of the defendants to pay any one of the installments as above-scheduled shall
render the remaining balance unpaid immediately due and demandable and the plaintiff shall then be
entitled to the execution of the judgment which may be rendered by virtue hereof;

WHEREFORE, judgment by COMPROMISE is hereby rendered pursuant to the foregoing agreement,

enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties.

The Rebollado's subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the compromise, thus prompting the
petitioner Rodriguez to ask the city court for a writ of execution not only against the Rebollados but as
well against the Tolentino's. When this was granted; and later affirmed over the opposition of the
Tolentino's, the latter brought an action for certiorari in the respondent Court of First Instance of
Manila, docketed as civil case 85998, to enjoin the city court from enforcing any writ of execution
against them. On December 20, 1973, after hearing duly had, the respondent court rendered judgment
excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of the writ of execution granted by the city court in civil case
204601. It is this judgment that is the subject of the present appeal.

In excluding the Tolentino's from the effects of the judgment on a compromise rendered by the city
court, the respondent court invokes two reasons: first, the dispositive portion of the judgment quoted
above cannot be executed because it does not explicitly enjoin the Tolentino's to pay, jointly and
severally with the Rebollado's, the amount due to the plaintiff; and second, the city court never
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Tolentino's and, therefore, the latter cannot be bound by
the judgment rendered in civil cue 204601.

The respondent court is in error on both counts.

1. The dispositive portion of the judgment in civil case 204601 of the city court approving the
compromise and "enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties" is adequate for purposes of
execution. It is not unusual for the body of a judgment on a compromise to merely quote the words of
the agreement that spell out the respective rights and obligations of the parties, since it is both
unnecessary and improper for the court to still make preliminary adjudication of the facts and the law
involved in the case.1 These rights and obligations, although not reproduced in the dispositive portion of
the judgment in obvious avoidance of repetition, are understood to constitute the terms under which
execution may issue. Decisions of similar tenor, import and form have in the past been given effect by
this Court.2

2. There is no question in the mind of the respondent court that the Rebollado's and the Tolentinos
freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement which became the basis of the judgment
of the city court. Be it remembered that neither the Rebollado's nor the Tolentino's question the
existence of the indebtedness of the Rebollados or the amount thereof. The respondent court heard the
testimonies of the witnesses first hand and accorded no credence to the version of the Rebollado's and
the Tolentino's that Manuel and Fe Rebollado and Felisa Tolentino were made to sign the motion for a
judgment on a compromise without being permitted to read its contents and, further, that Felisa
Tolentino was induced to sign, too, the name of her husband without any authority from the latter. The
respondent court analyzed the evidence at length and found that the involvement of the Tolentino's in
the compromise agreement arose out of their natural filial concern for their daughter Fe whose
inventories at Divisoria market were under imminent threat of levy and seizure. The respondent court,
moreover, brooks no doubt, and we concur with it, that both the Rebollado's and the Tolentino's
understood the plain unequivocal terms of the compromise agreement. And by assuming the roles of
co-movants in the motion for a judgment on a compromise, the Tolentino's actively instigated the city
court into giving its judicial imprimatur to the said agreement as well as their participation therein.
Under the circumstances, the Tolentino's are estopped from denying the very authority they have
invoked.3

Moreover, because they signed and executed the compromise agreement willingly and voluntarily, and,
in a manner of speaking, with their eyes wide open, they should be bound by its terms. A person cannot,
to paraphrase Justice Alejo Labrador, repudiate the effects of his voluntary acts simply because they do
not suit him. In the very words of Justice Labrador, "in a regime of law and order, repudiation of an
agreement validly entered into can not be made without any ground or reason in law or in fact for such
repudiation."4

And even if we assume that estoppel does not apply in this case, we nonetheless cannot shunt aside the
principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not formally or originally a party to a litigation may
nevertheless be acquired, under proper conditions, thru the voluntary appearance of that person before
the court. Thus, judgment may be directed against one who, although not a formal party in the case, has
assumed or participated in the defense.5 By coming forward with the original litigants in moving for a
judgment on a compromise and, furthermore, by assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the
case as would place them in unequivocal liability, together with the Rebollado's, to the plaintiff therein,
the Tolentino's effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the city court. They were and are
thus subject to its judgment.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo of December 20, 1973 is reversed, and the order of the city court of
November 26, 1971 in civil case 264601, directing the release of the writ of execution against the
Rebollado spouses and the Tolentino spouses, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the respondents
Federico and Felisa Tolentino.

Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983

SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and
LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.

Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners.

Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents.

PLANA, J.:

I. FACTS:
This is a case of hereditary succession.

Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his
Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by
the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been
naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship.

On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged
holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT),
docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining
and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.

On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing,
appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered or
affected by the holographic will. He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P
5,000.00.

On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife
an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of
the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The action,
docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.

On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate
and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.

On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. Appealed to
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961- R, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977.
On petition for review, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute
resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying
reconsideration on January 11, 1978.

For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading
asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and
SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another
branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE
COURT.

On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25,
1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance
suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit
their respective position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive under
the wig. Pursuant thereto, PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated
April 10, which in effect showed that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was still
premature. QUEMADA submitted his Position paper dated April 20, 1980. ATLAS, upon order of the
Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group of tsn from June 1966 (when
Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980. The statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by
ATLAS, 60% pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:

1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%

2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%

3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%

On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment,
resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy
to QUEMADA was not inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972 had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights
of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.]

The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written acknowledgment of
PASTOR, JR. dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to the Pastor
Group, 42% belonged to PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25%
belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor Group. The PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit
directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which QUEMADA was authorized to
retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for payment of
the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees
was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR,
SR.'s death, which amounted to over two million pesos.
The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and
Garnishment on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of the
Order on September 6, 1980, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily
on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of
ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing
upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of
payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion
for reconsideration.

Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR., this time joined by his
wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP- 11373-R). They assailed the
Order dated August 20, 1980 and the writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The
petition was denied on November 18, 1980 on the grounds (1) that its filing was premature because the
Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was still pending determination by the PROBATE
COURT; and (2) that although "the rule that a motion for reconsideration is prerequisite for an action for
certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order assailed is "legally valid. "

On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's
decision of November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the appellate court to another order of the
Probate Court dated November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their petition for certiorari was pending decision in
the appellate court), by which the oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the Probate Court's Order
of August 20, 1980 was denied. [The November 11 Order declared that the questions of intrinsic validity
of the will and of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated
by the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the suit for reconveyance then pending in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It clarified that only the 33% share of PASTOR, JR. in the
royalties (less than 7.5% share which he had assigned to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died) was to be
garnished and that as regards PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was just the transfer of its
possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT through the special administrator. Further, the Order
granted QUEMADA 6% interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless, the
Court of Appeals denied reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre y injunction, assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 18, 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate Court
dated August 20, 1980, November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med by petitioners on March 26,
1981, followed by a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.
In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary injunction, the lifting of which was
denied in the Resolution of the same Division dated October 18, 1982, although the bond of petitioners
was increased from P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.

Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent filed seven successive motions
for early resolution. Five of these motions expressly prayed for the resolution of the question as to
whether or not the petition should be given due course.

On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution stating that "the petition in fact and
in effect was given due course when this case was heard on the merits on September 7, (should be
October 21, 1981) and concise memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments on the merits of the
case were filed by the parties pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . " and denied in a
resolution dated December 13, 1982, private respondent's "Omnibus motion to set aside resolution
dated October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter of due course to the present membership of the
Division; and to reassign the case to another ponente."

Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December 13, 1982 Resolutions, the
Court en banc resolved to CONFIRM the questioned resolutions insofar as hey resolved that the petition
in fact and in effect had been given due course.

II. ISSUES:

Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of execution and
garnishment dated August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to implement
the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, to wit: the Order of November 11, 1980 declaring that the
Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved the issues of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and
reiterating the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980; and the Order of December 17, 1980 reducing
to P2,251,516.74 the amount payable to QUEMADA representing the royalties he should have received
from the death of PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to February 1980.

The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in probate, is not questioned.
But petitioners denounce the Probate Court for having acted beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion when it issued the assailed Orders. Their argument runs this way: Before the provisions of
the holographic win can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the
intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality. Now, contrary to the position
taken by the Probate Court in 1980 — i.e., almost eight years after the probate of the will in 1972 — the
Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved
and actually did not decide QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the
payment of the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate Order of 1972 are unwarranted for lack
of basis.

Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The Probate Order of 1972 having
become final and executory, how can its implementation (payment of legacy) be restrained? Of course,
the question assumes that QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy was finally adjudged in the Probate
Order.

On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved
with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. A negative finding will necessarily render
moot and academic the other issues raised by the parties, such as the jurisdiction of the Probate Court
to conclusively resolve title to property, and the constitutionality and repercussions of a ruling that the
mining properties in dispute, although in the name of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, really belonged to the
decedent despite the latter's constitutional disqualification as an alien.

On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of
the order of execution and the implementing writ.

III. DISCUSSION:

1. Issue of Ownership —

(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section
9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
to resolve title. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 ed.), p. 458; Valero Vda. de Rodriguez
vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.]

(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of
the decision. (Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, in case of
ambiguity or uncertainty, the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in construing the
judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs. Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles
vs. Timario. 107 Phil. 809.)
The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order of December 5,
1972 which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. The said
Probate Order enumerated the issues before the Probate Court, thus:

Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these proceedings: (1) the probate of the holographic will (2)
the intestate estate aspect; and (3) the administration proceedings for the purported estate of the
decedent in the Philippines.

In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings are being impugned by the oppositors on
jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent's residence and existence of properties in the
Philippines have not been established.

Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate proceedings are: (a) whether or not the
holographic will (Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will and testament upon the death of Alvaro
Pastor, Sr. on June 5, 1966, in Cebu City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said will has been executed
with all the formalities required by law; and (c) Did the late presentation of the holographic will affect
the validity of the same?

Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was the ex- parte appointment of the
petitioner as special administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there any indispensable necessity for the
estate of the decedent to be placed under administration? (3) Whether or not petition is qualified to be
a special administrator of the estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed in the inventory
(submitted by the special administrator but not approved by the Probate Court) are to be excluded.

Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:

Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves some of the problems and issues
presented in these proceedings, as follows:

(a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as it hereby allows and
approves the so-called holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on July 31, 1961 with
respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. Let, therefore, a certificate of its allowance be prepared by the Branch
Clerk of this Court to be signed by this Presiding Judge, and attested by the seal of the Court, and
thereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and recorded by the clerk. Let attested
copies of the will and of the certificate of allowance thereof be sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining &
Development Corporation, Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and the Register of Deeds of Cebu or of Toledo
City, as the case may be, for recording.

(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of administration for as a matter
of fact, no regular executor and/or administrator has been appointed up to this time and - the
appointment of a special administrator was, and still is, justified under the circumstances to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased in the Philippines (particularly in Cebu) until the
problems causing the delay are decided and the regular executor and/or administrator appointed.

(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later on an executor and/or
administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court's declaration that the oppositors are the forced
heirs and the petitioner is merely vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the extent of the
bounty given to him (under) the will insofar as the same will not prejudice the legitimes of the oppositor
for the following reasons:

1. To submit a complete inventory of the estate of the decedent-testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr.

2. To administer and to continue to put to prolific utilization of the properties of the decedent;

3. To keep and maintain the houses and other structures and belonging to the estate, since the
forced heirs are residing in Spain, and prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good order after partition
and when directed by the Court, but only after the payment of estate and inheritance taxes;

(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and
personal properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the
intestate estate administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it is duly proven by the
oppositors that debts of the decedent have already been paid, that there had been an extrajudicial
partition or summary one between the forced heirs, that the legacy to be given and delivered to the
petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator, that the respective shares of
the forced heirs have been fairly apportioned, distributed and delivered to the two forced heirs of
Alvaro Pastor, Sr., after deducting the property willed to the petitioner, and the estate and inheritance
taxes have already been paid to the Government thru the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special administrator or administrator of
the other properties of the estate of the decedent, which properties are not directly or indirectly
affected by the provisions of the holographic will (such as bank deposits, land in Mactan etc.), will be
resolved in another order as separate incident, considering that this order should have been properly
issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the
contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of
extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it
allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been
duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the
intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before
Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate"
aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally
resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the
owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while
indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered
to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies
that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally,
the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special
administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate)
Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow
and approve the aforestated will. "

(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the
estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of
controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.

(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when
they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order.

(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated August 20, 1980, the
Probate Court in its Order of November 11, 1980 explained that the basis for its conclusion that the
question of ownership had been formally resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the findings in the
latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of the decedent, he was receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he
had resided in the Philippines since pre-war days and was engaged in the mine prospecting business
since 1937 particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR. was only acting as dummy for his father
because the latter was a Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched.

(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order
adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that,
premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special
administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -

(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two legitimate
children and one illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set
apart the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and
liquidation of the estate of PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the
extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her death. * When the disputed Probate order
was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no liquidation of the community properties of
PASTOR, SR. and his wife.

(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of
the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special
administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially
approved. The reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR,
SR. was still being litigated in another court.

(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and
his estate. Indeed, it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court
ordered that-

... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring
all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the Branch Clerk of
this Court."

(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of December 5,
1972.
(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in
concrete figures could not be ascertained.

(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of
QUEMADA - a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the
deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects.
It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years after the Probate Order
was issued the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.

3. Propriety of certiorari —

Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the disputed
Order of execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly
correctible only by appeal, not certiorari.

Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be
overlooked or condoned.

(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose the estate
of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE
PASTOR) involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the
intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its
Probate Order of 1972, which it did not, that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the
questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent
implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged implementation of the
dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.

(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the
estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and
expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees.
(Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7 SCRA 367.)
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment therefore of the
legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the provision of the National Internal Revenue Code requiring
payment of estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the estate (Section
107 [c])

(d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly under Rule
88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have been in possession. —
Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the estate before the
debts and expenses have been settled and paid and have become liable to contribute for the payment
of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose,
after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner
each person shall contribute, and may issue execution as circumstances require.

The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a
debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued.

... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a writ of
execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer to the
adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy without the
necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not render any judgment
enforceable by execution.

The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue execution
(a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in
possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of partition
(Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for examination in probate
proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that
those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA
96, 108.)

(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order the
execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not
there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a
prevailing party to the execution of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of
execution is issued with grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be
enforced (PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.

(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution which varies
the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in the dispositive part of the
latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify the remedy applied for.

Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her own right of three
mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of
PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the
Order of execution issued by the Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the execution
order, the urgency of the relief she and her co-petitioner husband seek in the petition for certiorari
states against requiring her to go through the cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to intervene in
the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the challenged order of
execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the royalties derived from
mineral properties of which she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with her husband.
She could not have intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid
ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties subject of the execution was then still
being litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special administrator of the estate of
PASTOR, SR.

Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
appeal was not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the execution order was still
pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of their major source of
income, petitioners could no longer wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They
needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of the execution order. Under the circumstances,
recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-11373-R is reversed. The Order of
execution issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the Orders issued
subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5, 1972,
particularly the Orders dated November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this
case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings, subject to the
judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Vasquez and Relova JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, J., took no part.