Cristobal vs.

CA Doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction

G.R. No. 125339. June 22, 1998

FACTS:

In this case the petitioners were owners of a house and lot in an area which uses the property
bought by the private respondents as the nearest way out going to the public road. Before the private
respondent have bought the said land, it was converted from a Road lot into a residential lot by the
former owner of such land pursuant to decision of the RTC to which such petition for conversion were
applied. When the private respondent decided to construct a house in the said lot which might block
the said easement, the petitioner filed complaint before the trial court. The trial court decided in favor
of the private respondent. On appeal the CA affirmed the said decision. Hence this petition. One of
the issue raised in this case is that the conversion of the Road Lot into two (2) residential lots by Cesar
Ledesma, Inc., was violative of PD No. 957, hence illegal, and the titles issued as a consequence of the
conversion were null and void.

ISSUE:
WON the Court has jurisdiction over such issue raised by the petitioner.

RULING:

NO, The Court ruled that the questions relating to non-compliance with the
requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the National
Housing Authority (NHA), now the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957 and not by the
regular courts. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, where
jurisdiction is vested upon an administrative body, no resort to the courts may be
made before such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their
functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. (NOTE: This was not
mentioned in the case, but this in connection with doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction)
Corona vs. United Harbor Pilot Necessity for
notice and hearing
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

FACTS:

In issuing AO No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92) by the Philippine Ports Authority(PPA), limiting the
term of appointment of Harbor Pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, the
respondent questioned the constitutionality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 on the ground that it violated the
due process clause of the constitution because no hearing was conducted before the adoption of such
order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not notice and hearing is required before PPA-AO No. 04-92 shall be issued.

RULING:

NO. The Court ruled that Respondents argue that due process was not observed
in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92 allegedly because no hearing was conducted
whereby relevant government agencies and the pilots themselves could ventilate
their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural aspect of the
enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a
stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea, where it
declared that (a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in
due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this
opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four
times before the matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this
score, however, fail to persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine
Coast Guard, which issues the licenses of pilots after administering the pilots
examinations, was not consulted, the facts show that the MARINA, which took over
the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard, was duly represented in the
Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued that, there being no
matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the
Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.
 Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way
taint the validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing,
as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only
when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the
performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing.